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**FORMATION AND CHANGE OF THE IMAGE OF THE ENEMY IN THE
PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE USSR DURING THE GREAT
PATRIOTIC WAR. 1941—1945**

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INTRODUCTION

Purposeful formation of public opinion is extremely important for the existence of any state. In 1941—1945, millions of Soviet citizens sacrificed themselves at the front and performed labor feats in the rear for the sake of preserving the country, the lives of current and future generations. It was only thanks to the awareness of the Soviet society of the universal duty to the fatherland that our country managed to survive and win one of the most difficult wars in the history of mankind.

The relevance of the research lies in the need for a modern understanding of the causes and conditions for achieving the victory of the USSR not only over Germany, but also over fascist ideology during the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet Union suffered enormous losses in this military conflict, paying an exorbitantly high price for victory. The feat of the peoples of the USSR has recently been often questioned even in countries that were liberated by our soldiers. Attempts to put patriotic propaganda in the Soviet Union and Nazi ideology on the same level are unacceptable, which, in fact, is a justification for fascism.

Currently, the Russian Federation has to overcome the peculiar historical amnesia of Western and Eastern European countries, as attempts are regularly made to rewrite history. In this regard, it is of interest to study the similarities and differences of political priorities and forms of propaganda struggle used by the warring parties. This is necessary to counteract the incitement of future conflicts not only between Russia and Germany, but also between other countries of the modern world.

The bloodiest war of the twentieth century proved that victory can be won by a united multinational people who trusted the leadership of their country and supported its actions in difficult times. The stability of the ruling party's power, based on its legitimacy in the eyes of the Soviet people, was ensured during various periods of the war by propaganda activities, many of which were undeservedly forgotten and became known again only in the XXI century. Political propaganda is the foundation of every State, on which the recognition of State

power by the people is based. For the political elite, the primary and most difficult task is to achieve legitimacy on the part of the people and, accordingly, the right to govern the country.

During the war years, many outstanding works of literature, music, painting and cinematography were created, which significantly influenced the public consciousness. Studying them, we carry out a historical and cultural analysis of images that had an ideological impact on the population of the warring parties. Thus, we immerse ourselves in the realities of 1941—1945 and expand our knowledge about the joint work of public authorities with cultural and artistic figures. A similar problem of interaction between the state and society exists at the present time. It requires more careful study, because now we have the opportunity to obtain information without taking into account the previously existing censorship prohibitions.

During the Great Patriotic War, there was a struggle between two military Stakes. Over time, the effectiveness of the Nazi propaganda machine's influence on Soviet citizens decreased. At the same time, in accordance with the course of development of military operations, it has undergone significant changes. The Nazis failed to achieve a comprehensive impact on various social categories of the USSR population. Is the unsuccessful formation of the enemy's image the most important miscalculation of the Goebbels propaganda machine? The answer to this question has yet to be found.

Ideological wars have been and are to this day, therefore, the study of the problems of carrying out propaganda work in crisis situations is especially important. To do this, it is necessary to consider the complex interweaving of external historical and political events, the understanding of which for the modern world reveals the importance of political propaganda through its most important component — the image of the enemy. The study of the designated topic was carried out on the basis of the application of the method of historical and comparative analysis of archival materials, as well as other published and unpublished sources.

Significant is the problem of the multilevel nature of communist propaganda, which covered both rational consciousness and logic, as well as emotions, feelings and experiences of the population of the USSR. It was competently addressed to both the individual and public legal awareness of Soviet citizens. It is the complex nature of the study of communist propaganda, in particular the transformation of the image of the enemy as its main element in 1941—1945, that is of exceptional importance, since such issues have not been adequately covered in Russian science.

The degree of knowledge of the problem. The research is based on scientific works devoted to the history of the Great Patriotic War, the role of officials of the state and party apparatus in ensuring victory, the study of methods of propaganda, as well as the stages of the development of the image of the enemy in 1941—1945.

For a theoretical understanding of the processes of functioning of patriotic propaganda, scientific works are important, which reveal the structure and activities of the Soviet state administration. It is necessary to note the scientists who analyzed various aspects of the mechanism of political propaganda, through which the regulation of social processes took place: A. Y. Bezugolny, N. M. Galimullina, A. S. Gorlov, M. V. Zelenov, G. M. Ippolitov, S. N. Poltorak, Kovalev, N. D. Kozlov, E. E. Krasnozhenova, E. F. Krinko, A. V. Kutuzov, B. N. V. I. Morozov, V. A. Nevezhin, S. I. Repko and others. When analyzing the works of the listed authors, the main directions of propaganda activities in 1941—1945 were identified.

A. Y. Bezugolny analyzes the forms and methods of agitation and propaganda work with the conscription contingent, conscripts and military personnel from among the mountain peoples of the North Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War. In particular, he considers a specific episode: the gatherings of front-line and district agitators who worked with such fighters, organized by the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. The dissertation work of the Doctor of Sciences summarized the historical experience of the activities of state and military

authorities in the field of building national formations of the Red Army. Special attention was drawn to information about the organization of educational work with representatives of the autochthonous peoples of the Soviet Union¹.

N. M. Galimullina studies the experience of spreading and the content of propaganda of communist ideology during the Great Patriotic War. In his work, the author adheres to the statement that propaganda consists in the systematic use of any means of communication. This determines the purpose, nature and communicative activity of all propaganda work. The essence of propaganda in practical implementation is revealed, as well as in particular the methods of its dissemination used. The scientist pays great attention to feedback issues when evaluating the results of incoming information².

A. S. Gorlov gives a detailed description of the material and personnel base of the Soviet propaganda system. The researcher reveals the mechanisms, forms and methods of propaganda activities. In addition, he deduces the statement that patriotic propaganda is the central direction of ideological work. At the same time, A. S. Gorlov considers such activities in dynamics, noting the successes and failures of military propaganda. The author draws conclusions about the reasons for the effectiveness of propaganda work, as well as the failures that took place³.

M. V. Zelenov describes the formation, functions and structure of the top management bodies of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) in 1939—1945. He reveals the dynamics of the transformation of the system of higher party bodies, as well as changes in their personnel composition. The Organizational Bureau was created to solve personnel and organizational issues, but with the advent of the Central Committee Secretariat, it lost its purpose. This issue is being studied

¹ Bezugolny A. Y. "A German will not find shelter anywhere. Having escaped from the revenge of the Circassian, he will stumble upon the dagger of a Chechen, he will be struck down by an Ingush bullet...". The Highlanders of the North Caucasus as an object of Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War // *Military Historical Journal*. 2012. No. 7. pp. 25—30; Bezugolny A. Y. Fruits of "Great work": All—Army meeting of agitators working with fighters of non—Russian nationalities (July — August 1943) // *The Great Patriotic War in the history and memory of the peoples of Southern Russia: events, participants, symbols. Materials of the III All-Russian Scientific Conference*. Rostov—on—Don, 2022. pp. 58—63; Bezugolny A. Y. The experience of building the Armed Forces of the USSR: the national aspect (1922—1945): diss. D. ist. nauk. M., 2019. 597 p.

² Galimullina N. M. Soviet—party propaganda of the Great Patriotic War period as a problem of historical and political analysis: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. Kazan, 2005. 167 p.

³ Gorlov A. S. Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War: institutional and organizational aspects: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences, Moscow, 2009. 270 p.

inextricably with the peculiarities of the tasks of public administration and improving the effectiveness of such work⁴. In particular, M. V. Zelenov has developed three main approaches to understanding the institution of censorship. He believes that it plays a positive role, protecting society from malicious information on the basis of compliance with moral and ethical standards⁵.

G. M. Ippolitov, S. N. Poltorak pay attention to the study of issues related to the initial, defensive, period of the war, starting from June 22, 1941 and ending in November 1942. The authors conclude that it was during this difficult time that the fundamental principles of propaganda adopted before the war were rethought⁶.

B. N. Kovalev describes the problems of collaboration during the Second World War. The researcher analyzes the activities of the Soviet military command, which widely attracted the local population not only to combat, but also to propaganda work. The fascists distributed various propaganda materials, newspapers, leaflets, etc. among the population of the occupied territories. As a result, it was extremely important to provide these Soviet citizens with information about the current situation on the fronts. We are talking about using methods of both propaganda and counter-propaganda⁷

N. D. Kozlov examines in detail the features of the moral potential and social consciousness of the Soviet people on the eve and during the war. The analysis of propaganda problems in the context of patriotic education deserves special attention. The professor examines the specifics of the policy aimed at strengthening the importance and importance of love for the motherland in the public consciousness. The author's conclusions regarding the moral rejection by the citizens of the USSR of the policy of the German occupation authorities

⁴ Zelenov M. V. The apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) in 1939—1945: functions, structure, leaders // XIV Tsarskoye Selo Readings. Vocational education: Socio—cultural aspects, April 20—21, 2010: Vocational education: socio—cultural aspects: materials of the international scientific conference / Leningrad State University. A. S. Pushkin University; under the general editorship of V. N. Skvortsov. — St. Petersburg, 2010 pp. 222—228.

⁵ Zelenov M. V. Censorship: approaches to the definition of the concept // Leningrad Law Journal. 2013. pp. 94-103.

⁶ Ippolitov G. M., Poltorak S. N. Features of Soviet propaganda and agitation in the first (defensive) period of the Great Patriotic War (June 22, 1941 — November 1942) // KLIO. 2013. No. 4. pp. 67—79.

⁷ Kovalev B. N. Novgorod under enemy occupation 1941-1944. // St. Petersburg Historical Journal. 2020. No. 3 (27). pp. 122-131; Kovalev B. N. The daily life of the Russian population during the Nazi occupation. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2011. 656 p.

towards the civilian population of the occupied territories are also of interest. The researcher pays considerable attention to the activities of party and state bodies within the framework of organizing propaganda work⁸.

E. E. Krasnozhenova studies the history of children's daily life during the Great Patriotic War, including the occupation policy of the period of the Nazi occupation in the Leningrad region. The scientist explores the German policy of reducing the population in the territories of the USSR occupied by them⁹ and the creation of labor exchanges, which determined the professional qualifications and willingness of workers to cooperate with the Nazis¹⁰.

E. F. Krinko pays attention to the problems of the Great Patriotic War and their reflection in the historical memory of the southern regions of Russia.¹¹ The author is the head of numerous research projects in the field of social history. In his scientific works, the researcher studies issues related to religious organizations, the purpose of which was to support the occupation authorities¹²

A. V. Kutuzov describes the formation of the perception of the defense of Leningrad as a feat under the influence of political and ideological processes. The scientist examines the peculiarities of the work of the press in wartime, including revealing its role in mobilizing the population. An important issue is raised — creating an image of the enemy¹³.

V. I. Morozov draws conclusions about the immense concentration of power in the center, which turned out to be represented by a rather narrow circle of people. These were the heads of the main authorities: I. V. Stalin himself and his immediate political entourage. The role of executive authorities has significantly increased, whose decisions have become perceived as dogma. At the same time,

⁸ Kozlov N. D. The moral potential of the people and mass public consciousness during the Great Patriotic War: dissertation of the Doctor of Historical Sciences. St. Petersburg, 1996. 455 p.

⁹ Krasnozhenova E. E. "There was no more childhood": Children's daily life during the occupation of the North-West of Russia (1941-1944) // The Caspian region: politics, economics, culture. 2021. pp. 51-57.

¹⁰ Krasnozhenova E. E. North-West of the RSFSR during the Nazi occupation (1941-1944) // Historical Courier. 2020. No. 3 (11). pp. 6-11.

¹¹ Bezugolny A. Yu., Bugai N. F., Krinko E. F. The Highlanders of the North Caucasus in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: problems of history, historiography and source studies. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2012. 479 p.

¹² Krinko E.F. Religious life in the rear and at the front during the Great Patriotic War // Bulletin of the Orenburg State Pedagogical University. 2015. No. 1 (13). pp. 98-112.

¹³ Kutuzov A. V. The Siege of Leningrad in the information war. M.; St. Petersburg: State Educational Institution of the Ministry of Justice of Russia, 2008. 214 p.

this state of affairs turned out to be inextricably linked both with the strengthening of the principles of unity of command characteristic of wartime, and in general with the peculiarities of the organization of the governing work of the ruling Communist Party¹⁴.

V. A. Nevezhin raises important issues of Soviet ideological propaganda during the Great Patriotic War. The monograph is based on a large number of previously unknown archival documents¹⁵.

S. I. Repko describes the general effect of Soviet propaganda on the troops of the Hitlerite coalition countries at the beginning of the war as insufficiently effective. Explains this by many factors, including:

- the wrong choice of the object of propaganda influence;
- the isolation of propaganda materials from the information needs of Wehrmacht soldiers;
- the ineffectiveness of Soviet propaganda due to its increased control by the party leadership;
- suppression of local initiatives;
- the predominance of class propaganda, etc.

The definition of class characteristics as dominant in propaganda images was clearly erroneous. German workers and peasants were ready to fight for the interests of Germany against the class—related majority of the population of the USSR. The attitude towards proletarian internationalism was clearly inadequate to the realities of wartime¹⁶.

The general characteristics of the activities of Soviet propagandists were supplemented by the scientific works of A. A. Kohan, N. A. Lomagina, O. V. Romanko, E. S. Senyavskaya, M. I. Skulenko, F. I. Chestnov and others. In their works, the technologies of information manipulation of mass and individual consciousness are considered. For the study, it was important to trace the

¹⁴ Morozov V. I. Features of state administration of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War (1941—1945) // Administrative Consulting. 2005. No. 1. pp. 32—46.

¹⁵ Nevezhin V. A. If we go camping tomorrow. Moscow: EKSMO, 2007. 320 p.

¹⁶ Repko S. I. The price of illusions. Propaganda against the enemy's troops and population in the first months of the war // Military History magazine. 1992. No. 11. pp. 8—15.

development of the mass communication system as the most important tool for propaganda.

A. A. Kohan covers the subject of German propaganda quite widely. The author believes that the Germans attached great importance to radio broadcasting, traveling exhibitions and other forms of visual propaganda. Such materials were aimed at the broad masses of the population, whose representatives were not always literate. Of particular interest is the description of special propaganda companies, which were staffed by people recruited from among journalists, artists, and film reporters. The scientist also notes the role of representatives of emigration in the propaganda units of Germany¹⁷.

N. A. Lomagin is one of the leading researchers of the history of the siege of Leningrad. In his works, he notes that the true scale of hunger and suffering of the civilian population in the besieged city was hidden from the Soviet and foreign public.¹⁸ Moreover, he emphasizes that it was hunger, cold and the constant threat of death from bombs and shells that created a strong negative impact on the population of the besieged city¹⁹.

O. V. Romanko specializes in studying the problems of collaboration during the Second World War. Scientific works are of interest, where he describes the importance of special moral and psychological treatment of employees opposed to the Soviet government. Using the example of the formation and functioning of the units of the Russian Liberation Army, the scientist analyzes the new national policy of Nazi Germany in the occupied territory of Crimea²⁰.

¹⁷ Kohan A. A. "My ideology was alien to the ideology of the Soviet man": on the question of the composition and activities of the editorial boards of the newspaper *Golos Krym* in 1941-1944. // *Bulletin of the Russian State University*. 2016. No. 10. pp. 154-164.; Kohan A. A. German propaganda events in Crimea in November 1941 — September 1942. // *The electronic scientific publication Almanac Space and Time*. 2016. Vol. 12. Issue 1, pp. 1-10.

¹⁸ Lomagin N. A. *In the grip of hunger. The siege of Leningrad in the documents of the German special services and the NKVD*. St. Petersburg: European House, 2000. 290 p.

¹⁹ Lomagin N. A. *Famine as a weapon: short-term and long-term effects (on the example of the siege of Leningrad)* // *Paths to peace and security*. 2022. No. 2 (63). pp. 125-149.

²⁰ Romanko O. V. *Combat and religious-ideological training of personnel of the Crimean Tatar collaborationist formations in the power structures of Nazi Germany (1941-1944)* // *Muslim World*. 2016. No. 1. pp. 42-51; Romanko O. V. *German occupation policy on the territory of Crimea and the national question (1941-1944)*. Simferopol: Antiqua, 2009. 272 p.

E. S. Senyavskaya reveals the role of social institutions in shaping attitudes towards the invader. The author uses archival documents, letters, diaries, memoirs of war participants, which complement the information about the evolution of the image of the enemy²¹.

M. I. Skulenko explores the main characteristics of the journalistic propaganda system, the features of its functioning, methods and techniques of propaganda as an ideological influence. He has developed important recommendations that can still significantly improve the effectiveness of propaganda activities, including in international conflict situations.²²

F. I. Chestnov, in addition to the technical characteristics of radio communications as an instrument of propaganda, gives a description of the combat use of radio. His scientific works have significantly expanded the understanding of the role and importance of radio broadcasting in military conflict²³.

Due to the hardships of the Great Patriotic War, the situation of the Soviet population was changing, which was reflected in the transformation of the image of the enemy. The works of I. B. Hasanov, L. D. Gudkov, D. A. Denisov, E. V. Dry, N. A. Demina, G. I. Kozyrev, O. M. Kordas, S. I. Kuzminskaya, A. Ya. Livshina, S. I. Maslakov, A. K. Osepyan and others are devoted to this problem. In the process of researching the works of these authors, it was revealed that the image of the enemy has become the main element of propaganda. It had its own dynamics of development, which was reflected in the mass consciousness.

I. B. Hasanov notes that the propaganda institute in question, responsible for shaping the image of the enemy, is complex. The issues of its study relate to the subjects of different sciences. From the researcher's point of view, the image of the enemy primarily implies the absolute dehumanization of the enemy and the

²¹ Senyavskaya E. S. *Opponents of Russia in the wars of the twentieth century*. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2006. 288 p.

²² Skulenko M. *And. Journalism and propaganda*. Kiev: Vishta school, 1987. 159 PP.

²³ Chestnov F. I. *In the world of radio*. M.: Voenizdat, 1954. 336 p.

absence of human traits in him, therefore the enemy is practically impersonal at all stages of the development of his image²⁴.

D. A. Denisov in his article proposes a new identification system, which consists of 12 universal signs of the image of the enemy²⁵.

E. V. Dry and N. A. Demina pay attention to the disclosure of the term "enemy image". They highlight the mechanism of formation of the concept of "friend — foe", and also emphasize the importance of such a foreign object as the "other"²⁶.

Special attention was drawn to the scientific work of G. I. Kozyrev, it separates such concepts as "enemy", "hostility" and "image of the enemy". The author analyzes the mechanisms and methods of formation of the latter. The scientist believes that when a certain people face one or another threat to survival, the stereotype of the "image of the enemy" is immediately revived in their memory in appropriate circumstances. Then the mass consciousness creates an updated version of it²⁷.

O. M. Kordas also develops the problem of hostility, but at the same time argues that the image of the enemy is the main tool for rallying and consolidating large communities. At the same time, it does not matter at all that it is negative²⁸.

S. I. Kuzminskaya considers the image of the enemy as an effective means of manipulating mass consciousness, and also analyzes various linguistic mechanisms necessary for this. As the main propaganda task, she highlights the transfer of a hostile opponent from the category of "friends" to the status of

²⁴ Hasanov I. B. National stereotypes and the "image of the enemy". Moscow: Russian Academy of Management, 1994. 40 p.

²⁵ Denisov D. A. Identification of the enemy image in political communication // Vestnik of the Russian State University for the Humanities. Series: Political Science. History. International relations. 2009. No. 1. pp. 113—126.

²⁶ Dry E. V., Demina N. A. Analysis of the "image of the enemy" in military history // Innovative trends in the development of Russian science. Materials of the XII International Scientific and Practical Conference of Young Scientists. Volume Part II. Krasnoyarsk: Krasnoyarsk State Agrarian University 2019, 2019. pp. 208—210

²⁷ Kozyrev G. I. "The enemy" and "The image of the enemy" in public and political relations // Sociological research. 2008. No. 1. pp. 31—39.

²⁸ Kordas O. M. "The image of the enemy" as a mechanism of negative consolidation of society // Man and society in an unstable world. 2019. pp. 82—86.

"strangers". In the course of this process, according to the author, it is important to arouse negative emotions in the masses towards the enemy²⁹.

A. Y. Livshin describes the specifics of forming the image of the enemy, which directly depended on the work of oral propagandists both in the rear and at the front. The scientist reveals the dominant feature of mass consciousness. According to his theory, it was based on the rejection of the political regime and the morality of the invaders³⁰.

S. I. Maslakov raises the question of the need for a more detailed consideration of such an important concept as manipulation, because it is aimed at creating an image of the enemy. The author draws attention to the fact that it is necessary to carefully study the ways of its implementation. This makes it possible to identify manipulations in a timely manner and resist them, especially in conditions of exposure to the broad masses of people³¹.

A. K. Osepyan puts the solution of the issue of creating and developing the image of the enemy in conflict situations as the central problem of the study. In his opinion, the image of the enemy depends both on the peculiarities of perception of the conflict of social groups as a whole, and on the psychological qualities of an individual in this conflict³².

The number of publications on the history of the Great Patriotic War is growing every year. Nevertheless, special studies devoted to the chosen topic related to the study of propaganda in artistic images of literature and various types of art are clearly insufficient. In this regard, historiography is represented by scientific works from different fields of art: L. I. Batyuk, N. P. Gerasimova, Y. Ya. Gerchuk, V. Y. Krupyanskaya, S. I. Mints, A. V. Kulish, S. V. Ruzaeva, G. L. Soboleva, V. I. Fomin, etc. The works of these authors contain information that

²⁹ Kuzminskaya S. I. "The image of the enemy" in modern political mythology // Bulletin of the VSU. Series: Linguistics and Intercultural Communication. 2016. No. 3. pp. 49—52.

³⁰ Livshin A. Ya. Soviet propaganda of the Great Patriotic War period: the image of the enemy and the image of an ally // Human capital. 2019. No. 12(132). pp. 22—29.

³¹ Maslakov S. I. Formation of the "image of the enemy" as a means of manipulative influence on social groups // Risks in a changing social reality: the problem of forecasting and management: materials of the international scientific and practical conference. Voronezh: Prosto tipografiya, 2015. pp. 507—512.

³² Osepyan A. K. The image of the enemy in the theory of conflict // Political parties and elections: problems of modernity. 2016. pp. 284—290.

allows us to determine who and by what artistic means helped to create the image of the enemy. It is also important to study the problems of strengthening the legitimacy of the power of the Communist Party and its leaders during the war years. The formation of the image of the enemy is inextricably linked with the need to ensure the unity of Soviet society on the basis of creating positive types of Soviet soldiers, home front workers, outstanding statesmen and commanders of the country in artistic images, both modern and past. This circumstance was caused by the need to rely in propaganda work on the images of outstanding people who defended the freedom and independence of the country for many generations of our compatriots.

L. I. Batyuk examines the cultural system of Soviet society during the Great Patriotic War and shows its ability to transform. In addition, the author explores the role and significance of music, visual arts, radio, cinema, songwriting at the front and in the rear. L. I. Batyuk successfully systematizes creative work within the framework of each type of culture under consideration by periods³³.

N. P. Gerasimova explores the patriotic activity of theaters in wartime. She summarizes and publishes many situations in which the courage and heroism of Soviet citizens who worked in theater groups were manifested³⁴.

Yu. Ya. Gerchuk analyzes two important topics: the development of graphic and book art. Of particular interest was the easel graphics of the XX century. The work is illustrated with graphic works, including those devoted to the historical period, which is discussed in this dissertation³⁵.

V. Y. Krupyanskaya, S. I. Mints study the phenomenon of popularity of front-line songs and poetic repertoire among partisans and soldiers of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War³⁶.

³³ Batyuk L. I. Culture of Russia during the Great Patriotic War: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences, Moscow, 2005. 182 p.

³⁴ Gerasimova N. P. Patriotic activity of Moscow theaters during the Great Patriotic War: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. M., 1988. 218 p.

³⁵ Gerchuk Yu. Ya. The history of graphics and art books: A textbook for university students. M.: Aspect Press, 2000. 320 p.

³⁶ Materials on the history of the song of the Great Patriotic War / Comp. Krupyanskaya V. Yu., Mints S. I. M.: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1953. 211 p.

S. V. Ruzaev examines the process of organizing the authorities of the city of Sevastopol, and the main forms of leisure activities of the local population in 1941-1942. Cultural programs satisfied their physical and spiritual needs. In particular, we are talking about the work of theaters, cinemas and libraries. It is also concluded that the city authorities paid great attention to propaganda work and tried to maintain high morale of military personnel and civilians³⁷

G. L. Sobolev is a specialist in the history of Russia of the XX century. In his research, he notes that already in the difficult February 1942, the revival of the cultural life of Leningrad began. Radio broadcasting in the besieged city was of exceptional importance, the voice from the loudspeaker gave the illusion of the presence of another living soul in an empty cold room³⁸.

A. V. Kulish examines the essence, features, organizational foundations and functioning of army musical culture. An important part of the study contains a description of the activities of military orchestras, song and dance ensembles, including concert propaganda teams in parts of the Red Army³⁹.

V. I. Fomin studies the history of military cinematography in various fields, ranging from management and repertoire to film production, film technology and the film industry. There is a valuable collection of archival materials on this subject in his works⁴⁰.

Foreign authors also made a significant contribution to the development of the theme of Soviet patriotic propaganda during the war years. Among them, the following should be noted: R. R. Bootzin⁴¹, S. Keen⁴², H. T. Conserva⁴³, G. Simmel⁴⁴, M. G. Steinert⁴⁵, Karl—Heinz Frieser⁴⁶, N. Haslam⁴⁷ and others.

³⁷ Ruzaev S. V. Activity of the authorities of the city of Sevastopol in 1941-1942: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. St. Petersburg, 2021. 248 p.

³⁸ Sobolev G. L. Leningrad in the struggle for survival in the blockade. The first book: June 1941 — May 1942. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University, 2013. 500 p.; Sobolev G. L. Leningrad in the struggle for survival in the blockade. Book two: June 1942 — January 1943. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University, 2015. 396 p.

³⁹ Kulish A. V. The musical culture of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War: a historical study: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. M., 2004. 210 p.

⁴⁰ Fomin V. I. The history of Russian cinematography (1941—1968). Moscow: Rehabilitation, 2019. 736 p.

⁴¹ Bootzin R. R. Psychology Today: An Introduction. New York: Random House, 1991. 723 p.

⁴² Keen S. Bilder des Bösen. Wie man sich Feinde macht. Weinheim: Beltz, 1987. S. 159.

⁴³ Conserva H. T. Propaganda Techniques. San Francisco: 1st Books Library, 2003. 120 p.

⁴⁴ Simmel G. Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliation. Glencoe: Free Press, 1964, 196 p.

Such scientific works are interdisciplinary studies in the field of psychology, political science and history. They reveal the patterns of political behavior and consciousness of people who were participants in military events, as well as their ways and techniques of fighting the occupiers. The scientific works of these authors explore the psychological components of the behavior of an individual and society as a whole, concerning the problems of ethnic conflicts and military policy. The acquired knowledge makes it possible to explain the positive and negative results of the propaganda policy of the warring parties.

Thus, an understanding of the works of the above-mentioned scientists makes it possible to note that many issues related to the history of Soviet military propaganda of the 1940s were covered in the works of domestic and foreign researchers. At the same time, some of them need to be studied in more detail in order to fill in a number of gaps existing in modern scientific historical knowledge. In particular, the concept and stages of forming the image of the enemy as a basic element of propaganda activity require in-depth analysis. This is also due to the fact that modern researchers often do not have enough digitized and publicly available documents containing information about propaganda work during the Great Patriotic War to study the identified issues. Many materials are still classified, or access to them is very slow. A number of open archival documents have not yet been introduced into scientific circulation. Soviet propaganda in the presented scientific study "The formation and change of the image of the enemy in the public consciousness in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. 1941—1945" is considered as a technology of information control of the masses and information weapons against an external enemy in the specified historical period.

Let us highlight the scientific works of the Serbian historian A. Y. Timofeev, who believes that the term Great Patriotic War is rightly applied to the struggle of the Soviet people against Nazism. The struggle was waged for the confrontation

⁴⁵ Steinert M. G. *Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen*. Düsseldorf: Econ, 1970. 646 s.

⁴⁶ Frieser Karl—Heinz. *Germany and the Second World War. The Eastern Front 1943—1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2017. Vol. VIII. 1307 p.

⁴⁷ Haslam N. Dehumanization: An Integrative Review // *Personality and Social Psychology Review*. 2006. Vol. 10. №. 3. P. 252—264.

between the implementation of the Nazi plan "Ost" and national survival, and it was won. By 1945, the country was able to preserve its territories and even acquire new ones. The historian raises questions about the activities of Russian emigration abroad. The author points out that its representatives, who were opposed to the Nazis, became part of the People's Liberation Movement, whose work began in the autumn of 1941 - winter of 1942⁴⁸.

The chronological framework of the study covers June 1941 — May 1945, i. e. the entire period of the Great Patriotic War.

The geographical scope of the study includes the territory of the USSR, as well as Germany, where Soviet propaganda work was carried out.

The object of the study is the image of the enemy, considered as the main element of the institute of Soviet propaganda in 1941—1945, in its various manifestations reflected in normative legal acts, works of culture and art, periodicals and other sources.

The subject of the study is the process of evolution of the enemy's image, its constant transformation in the main forms and methods of patriotic propaganda during the Great Patriotic War (1941—1945).

The purpose of the study is to study the general characteristics of the organization of Soviet propaganda, as well as to determine the periodization and dynamics of the development of the image of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War.

Achieving this goal involves solving the following tasks:

1. To formulate the concept and organizational and legal basis for the implementation of Soviet propaganda.
2. Consider the use of the mechanism of patriotic propaganda as a tool to strengthen the power of the Communist Party.
3. To note the essence and significance of the image of the enemy as the main element of patriotic propaganda.

⁴⁸ Timofeev A. Yu. Activity of the "Union of Soviet Patriots" in Serbia during the Second World War // Slavic Almanac: collection of scientific papers. 2013. pp. 241-257.; Timofeev A. Yu. The Russian factor. The Second World War in Yugoslavia. Moscow: Veche, 2010. 526 p.

4. To investigate the formation of the image of the enemy in the initial period of the war in June 1941 — May 1942 and to identify a rethinking of the stereotypes of Soviet propaganda of the pre-war period.

5. To highlight the dynamics of the development of the image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the turning point of the struggle against fascism in June 1942 — August 1943.

6. To trace the transformation of the enemy's image at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War in September 1943 — May 1945.

Scientific novelty of the research:

- It is revealed that the Soviet patriotic propaganda of 1941—1945 appears as a complex, structured mechanism aimed at organizing and forming public consciousness and including an impact on all spheres of public life: both individually and collectively;

- An analysis was carried out on the implementation of communication between the country's leadership and the population during the war period. It is proved that the interaction was two—way and connected the entire Soviet society;

- The problem of the legitimacy of power in different periods of the war is considered through the images of the enemy created by the creative intelligentsia in their works. The necessity and limits of direct state information control and regulation of the activities of cultural and art workers are shown;

- For the first time in historiography, the origin, dynamics and transformation of the enemy image as the main element of Soviet patriotic propaganda in 1941—1945 are revealed in a comprehensive form.;

- A new periodization of the formation of the enemy's image in Soviet propaganda is proposed and analyzed;

- Some of the sources extracted by the author from the funds of state archives covering the history of the development of the image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War are being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time;

- The research materials, provisions, conclusions and recommendations specify and complement the relevant sections of the modern history of Russia.

Research methodology. The author used general scientific historical research methods: the method of critical analysis and synthesis (when studying documents), the method of reconstruction (when drawing up a research plan), the method of modeling (when studying the structure of military propaganda bodies), the comparative historical method (when writing conclusions), the systematic method (when considering the evolution of the image of the enemy), etc.

The research is based on an analysis of the past from the perspective of modern historical knowledge and capabilities. To identify the causal relationship between the development of the enemy image as the main element of patriotic propaganda in 1941—1945 and to clarify its effectiveness in military conditions, the principles of scientific, complexity, comprehensiveness, historicism and objectivity were used.

The source database. Official materials are widely used in the study, which can be divided into two main groups: normative legal acts and communications from the state and party leadership in official periodicals.

The first group is represented by legislative acts: The Constitution of the USSR (1936), the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (as amended on August 1, 1941), decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 640 (1942), Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 (1942), etc. The listed normative legal documents allow us to consider the impact of state policy on public behavior in the USSR. The collections, which contain documents and supporting local materials, also reveal the specifics of propaganda activities in 1941—1945.

The second group includes the main political newspapers — Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda. They trace in more detail the periodization of the transformation of the enemy's image. Additional publications such as "Combat Alert", "Bolshevik Pravda", "Izvestia of the USSR", "Soviet Warrior" and the German newspaper

Völkischer Beobachter allowed to determine the attitude of Soviet society to propaganda policy in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Separately, we will highlight the Vedomosti of the USSR Armed Forces, which in 1941—1945 were published in the form of a newspaper, where information materials on the work of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were published, and the Propagandist magazine, containing the experience of party education and mass propaganda. These materials were useful for analyzing the most important issues of the party's policy.

Much attention is paid to the study of the works of political and statesmen who had a direct impact on the achievement of victory by our people. Among them we can mention I. V. Stalin ⁴⁹ and P. N. Kubatkin ⁵⁰.

I. V. Stalin is one of the most outstanding leaders of our country. During the war, he held numerous senior positions (Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), People's Commissar of Defense, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Chairman of the GKO of the USSR, etc.), which allowed him to exercise supreme command of the army and government in general. His activities in the field of patriotic propaganda during the war are extremely multifaceted. While holding public office, he issued numerous regulations on the issues of propaganda and organization of patriotic work. A number of documents had crucial significance in terms of ideological impact on society, for example, Order No. 227 of July 28, 1942. In addition, I. V. Stalin was the initiator and one of the developers of many laws and decrees adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. During the war, he made numerous appeals and reports to Soviet citizens, encouraging them to fight against Nazi Germany. Among his numerous works, it is necessary to mention the work "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union"⁵¹ 1942, subsequently supplemented and published in five separate editions. It includes appeals, orders, reports, speeches, answers and individual statements by I. V. Stalin during the war years.

⁴⁹ Stalin I. V. Works. Vol. 14. M.: Pisatel, 1997. 295 p.

⁵⁰ Kubatkin P. N. Let's destroy spies and saboteurs. M.: OGIZ. State Publishing House, 1941. 20 p.

⁵¹ Stalin I. V. On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. Moscow: OGIZ State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. 207 p.

P. N. Kubatkin was a prominent party figure during the Great Patriotic War, headed the state security and counterintelligence agencies. The Department of the NKVD and State Security of Leningrad and the Leningrad Region worked under his leadership. In addition, he was a member of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front, as well as the Leningrad City Committee and the Regional Committee of the CPSU (b). According to his positions, P. N. Kubatkin was a member of the Headquarters of the partisan movement and was considered an experienced specialist in the field of counterintelligence. He made a significant contribution to maintaining order in besieged Leningrad, was a practical worker, personally led the fight against espionage and looting, and also led intelligence operations behind the front line. In his work, he gave practical recommendations on conducting propaganda, counter-propaganda, special propaganda, etc. Based on the collected material on the facts of violations of the rule of law and the actions of the enemy on the territory of the USSR, P. N. Kubatkin prepared methodological recommendations for strengthening discipline and improving the morale of Soviet soldiers and officers.

Thanks to the study of sources of personal origin, where the authors themselves were participants in military operations, it was possible to obtain first-hand information about the historical events of 1941—1945. For this study, the memoirs of M. I. Burtsev, G. K. Zhukov, D. I. Ortenberg played an important role. The description of the facts is valuable for studying the problem posed. They not only characterize the personal attitude of the memoirists to what is happening, but also reflect the public thought of the wartime.

M. I. Burtsev is a Soviet and Russian military figure who stood at the origins of the creation of a special propaganda in the USSR. He began his organizational work in the field of special propaganda back in 1939—1940. In 1941—1945, he headed the department (since August 1944, transformed into the department) of special propaganda of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, engaged in information and propaganda work among the German troops and their allies on the eastern front. In the post-war years, M. I. Burtsev published the monograph

"Epiphany"⁵², which was dedicated to the employees who conducted special propaganda during the period of hostilities, as well as the methods of its implementation.

G. K. Zhukov⁵³, During the war, he held the posts of Chief of the General Staff, commander of a number of fronts, member of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the USSR, made a number of important conclusions regarding propaganda and the formation of the image of the enemy. In particular, he paid considerable attention to the issues of the need to counter Nazi propaganda and the use of the partisan movement for this. Countering the destructive propaganda of the enemy was necessary, because after the defeats of 1942—1943, the Nazis tried to mobilize the social resources of the occupied territories not only by terror, but also by direct deception.

D. I. Ortenberg⁵⁴ From July 1941 to September 1943, he held the position of editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda*. With his direct participation, a number of materials were published regarding the formation of the image of the enemy, the theme of betrayal and his redemption. Many terms, such as penal battalion, collaboration, etc., were excluded from the publications of the Red Star.

A significant part of the work is the study of materials from the state archives. The dissertation used documents from the State Archive of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Central Archive of Social Movements in Moscow.

The State Archive of the Russian Federation (hereinafter — GARF) has documents of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, which functioned under the Council of People's Commissars (since 1946 under the Council of Ministers) of the USSR in 1925—1992. TASS in wartime represented the unified state information system of the USSR. Important materials are stored in the fund

⁵² Burtsev M. I. Epiphany. Military memoirs. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981. 320 p.

⁵³ Zhukov G. K. Memories and reflections. 5th Ed. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1983. Vol. 2. 327 p.; Zhukov G. K. Memories and reflections. 5th Ed. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1983. Vol. 3. 351 p.

⁵⁴ Ortenberg D. I. The year 1942. The story—chronicle. M.: Politizdat, 1988. 462 p.

No. 4459. According to eyewitnesses, they record crimes committed by fascists and their accomplices during the Great Patriotic War.

Specific information on the reduction and unification of individual theater troupes and concert brigades that gave combined performances at the front and in the rear is concentrated in the directive letters of the Foundation No. 5508 of the Central Committee of the Professional Union of Art Workers of 1919—1953. The repertoire policy makes it possible to understand the ideological and artistic position of the Communist Party and the moral ideals of the Soviet people. The main task for the propagandists was the correct formation of social norms of behavior in the fierce war against the Nazis.

In the materials of the fund No. P7523 of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 1937—1989, there were warnings about propaganda that was addressed to traitors. The facts that testify to the participation of Soviet citizens in the fight against the occupiers are also valuable.

Significant information is contained in the documents of the foundation No. 8265, which are united by the name "Central Committee of the International Organization for Assistance to Fighters of the Revolution (CC MOPR). 1922—1948." They provide data on Soviet propagandists. In their patriotic reports and lectures, these specialists emphasized the liberation mission of the Red Army and the unity of the front and rear.

In addition, several funds of the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (hereinafter — RGALI) should be allocated. They contain extensive information about the propaganda work of Soviet cultural and artistic figures during the period under study.

The Fund No. 962 contains documents of the Committee for Arts Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Of particular value are a fragment from a memo by the director of photography L. M. Egorychev to the deputy chairman of the All-Union Committee for the Arts under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the variety puppet brigade No. 5 and the plan of the Committee for the Arts under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on

calculating the number of brigades and drawing up routes. The repertoire of the pop—puppet brigade and the distribution of responsibilities of various units responsible for propaganda work at the front and in the rear are very interesting to study. These materials reflect the propaganda methods, military everyday life and the mood of the Soviet people.

Fund No. 2455 contains documents of the Main Directorate for the Production of Popular Science and Educational Films of the USSR Ministry of Cinematography. Here are the minutes of meetings of both the board itself and its presidium — the Ministry of Cinematography of the USSR — for 1943—1945, which have exceptional scientific significance.

The Fund No. 2456 contains documents of the former Committee for Cinematography Affairs under the USSR Council of People's Commissars (hereinafter referred to as the USSR Ministry of Cinematography):

1. A memorandum by the Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Cinematography, M. I. Khripunov, V. M. Molotov, on the search for film equipment exported by the Germans.

2. Minutes of the meetings of the 1941—1945 Committee. They were classified until recently.

The materials contain an indicator for calculating the damage caused by the invaders. This parameter was also used to ideologically justify the fairness of waging war against the robbers of the Third Reich.

It is necessary to note the importance of the following materials:

1. Resolution No. 278 of March 13, 1944 "On commemoration of the centenary of the birth of N. A. Rimsky-Korsakov".

2. Resolution No. 490 of April 29, 1944 "On the fortieth anniversary of the death of A. P. Chekhov."

These normative legal acts are evidence of the continuation of cultural life even during the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War. The government took care of maintaining the morale of the population of the USSR.

For dissertation research, it is relevant to study the documents contained in the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (hereinafter referred to as the RGASPI). This archive contains a large number of materials reflecting the activities of the main structures of the Central Committee of the party: the general department, the department of agitation and propaganda, etc.

Special attention should be paid to the fund No. 17 "Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 1938—1948", which contains directives from party leaders, memos from cinematographers, letters from clergymen, visual materials, as well as recommendations for organizing the activities of propaganda points in the USSR and beyond. In addition, these documents contain data on the return of Soviet citizens from the territory of Nazi Germany and the occupied states, reports on the mood among the population of the liberated areas, etc.

Special attention should be paid to the fund No. 17 "Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 1938—1948", which contains directives from party leaders, memos from cinematographers, letters from clergymen, leaflets, lists of activities for the creation and operation of propaganda points abroad and on the territory of the USSR. In addition, the listed materials contain information on the repatriation of Soviet citizens from the territory of Germany and adjacent countries, reports on the mood among the population of liberated and occupied areas, etc.

Answers to many questions related to work among prisoners of war are obtained from the materials of the foundation No. 495. This fund is dedicated to the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ICCI), G. M. Dimitrov, and it contains:

1. Review of the head of the propaganda department of regimental Commissar N. Brychev dated April 25, 1942 "On fascist printed propaganda among the troops of the Red Army and the Soviet population of the temporarily occupied regions".

2. Theses of the report on printed propaganda among enemy troops for 10 months of the Great Patriotic War.

3. Reviews of front-line leaflets for October-November 1943.

The fund No. 644 of the USSR State Defense Committee (GKO) contains various resolutions of the USSR leadership, including those devoted to mobilization. They reflect the peculiarities of involving citizens in the performance of work in order to ensure the defense and security of the state during the war period. Currently, these materials have been digitized and are available to researchers.

The presented archival group of documents in the RGASPI expands the range of studying the image of the enemy in 1941—1945, and also gives a concrete idea of the activities of propagandists of the USSR and the Third Reich.

Materials from the fund No. 32 of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army reveal the essence and focus of the propaganda activities of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and the Main Personnel Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense. The dissertation work includes leaflets from the series "International Information".

The auxiliary sources were the directives of the VGK Rate, located in the fund No. 148a "8 Management". These normative documents reflect the position of the Soviet command, which makes it possible to clarify who exactly was considered an enemy during the third period of Soviet propaganda indicated in the study.

The fund No. 235 of the 1st Baltic Front contains evidence of crimes committed by Germany and its allies during the war against the peoples of the USSR.

The fund No. 236 of the 1st Ukrainian Front is of the greatest interest. An analysis of his materials (directives of the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army, L. Z. Mehlis, decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, etc.) made it possible to trace the work with the heads of the propaganda departments of the fronts.

The fund No. 372 of the Political Department of the 19th Army of the Karelian and 2nd Belorussian Fronts (1942—1945) contains documents confirming the facts of the brutal massacres of Germans against prisoners of war from the USSR, as well as evidence describing the behavior of Soviet workers at rallies. The two-fold attitude of the masses towards the incoming political information is evident from the sources presented. The most informative materials of the conversations on the topic "Let's take revenge on the Nazi invaders for all their atrocities".

The documents of the "Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army" are in the fund No. 500: forms with intelligence information of the 295th Infantry Division, background information, translated captured documents (including the diary of a German radio operator in 1941), interrogations of prisoners of war, defectors, etc. The main source for the dissertation research was a selection of surveys that highlight the sentiments of soldiers in the enemy army.

The Central Archive of Public Movements in Moscow (hereinafter — CAODM) currently contains the largest collection of documents, which includes charters and programs of organizations, declarations, protocols, transcripts of conferences, correspondence of government officials with private individuals, periodicals, systematized lists containing personal data about members of governing bodies, etc.

The dissertation work included materials from the foundation No. 4 "Moscow City Committee (MGK) of the CPSU". These are the reports of the instructor of the Sverdlovsk district party committee Ozolina in the MGK of the CPSU (b), as well as the instructor of the Leninsky district of the party S. Vagina. There is information that reveals the sentiments of the workers who spoke at patriotic rallies in support of state power.

The collections of normative documents contain laws and by-laws, including laws adopted by the Armed Forces of the USSR, decrees of the Presidium of the Armed Forces of the USSR, resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, directives of military

authorities, orders of front commanders, etc. During the war, the regulatory system underwent significant changes. New authorities were formed: GKO, SVGK, etc. A distinctive feature of the regulation of relations related to the implementation of propaganda was the use of numerous subordinate normative legal acts of military authorities. As a rule, it was about numerous directives of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, as well as orders from commanders of fronts, armies, etc.

The study of the listed sources makes it possible to solve the tasks set in the study.

The theoretical and practical significance of the study lies in the fact that the author's conclusions are necessary to determine the general vector of development of Russian-German relations. In addition, the materials can be used in the preparation of lecture courses in the following disciplines: the modern history of Russia, the history of the Second World War, the history of state and law of Russia, as well as in further scientific work in the designated area.

Approbation of the results. The manuscript was prepared and reviewed at a meeting of the Department of Modern History of Russia at St. Petersburg State University. The author has participated in international and national scientific conferences:

1. XXIII Tsarskoye Selo Readings international scientific conference. Materials April 23—24, 2019 Leningrad State University named after A. S. Pushkin, St. Petersburg;

2. The role of intellectual capital in the economic, social and legal culture of the 21st century society. Materials November 7—8, 2019, St. Petersburg University of Management Technologies and Economics, St. Petersburg;

3. Military history: people, destinies, conflicts. Materials 2020 St. Petersburg State Budgetary institution Youth House "OUTPOST" Vyborgsky district, St. Petersburg;

4. Interuniversity student scientific conference dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War and the 90th anniversary of Dagestan State University. Materials June 10, 2021 Dagestan State University, Makhachkala.

5. Public authorities in the system of human rights activities at the present stage. Materials December 20, 2021 St. Petersburg University of Management Technologies and Economics, St. Petersburg;

6. Human rights activities in modern Russia: problems and their solutions. Materials March 31, 2022 St. Petersburg University of Management Technologies and Economics, St. Petersburg;

7. XXVI Tsarskoye Selo Readings international scientific conference. Materials April 19—20, 2022 Leningrad State University named after A. S. Pushkin, St. Petersburg;

8. XXVII Tsarskoye Selo Readings international scientific conference. Materials April 18—19, 2023 Leningrad State University named after A. S. Pushkin, St. Petersburg.

The main approbation of the dissertation work is published in three scientific articles published in peer-reviewed scientific journals and publications designed to publish the main scientific results of dissertations recommended by the Higher Attestation Commission under the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation:

Makarova O. S. 'The Image of the Enemy During the Initial period of the Great Patriotic War and the Rethinking of the Stereotypes of Soviet Propaganda of the Pre-war Period' // *Modern History of Russia*, vol. 13, no. 3, 2023, pp. 584—591.

Makarova O. S. The image of the enemy in soviet propaganda during the turning point of the struggle against fascism (June 1942 — August 1943) // *Historical Search* 2024. Vol. 5. No. 1. pp. 51—60.

Makarova O. S. Transformation of the enemy image in Soviet propaganda at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, September 1943 — May 1945 // *The*

Bulletin of Ryazan State University named for S. A. Yesenin. 2024. No. 1 (82). pp. 36—42.

Among the author's scientific works on the problems of dissertation research, 1 monograph stands out:

Makarova O. S. Soviet artistic weapons 1941—1945. St. Petersburg: LEMA, 2021. 158 p.

An additional list of scientific materials related to the approbation of the dissertation work:

Makarova O. S. The contribution of theatrical artists to patriotic agitation and propaganda in 1941—1945. // XXIII Tsarskoye Selo Readings 2019. Vol. 1. pp. 226—229.

Makarova O. S. Patriotic propaganda in periodicals during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // XXIII Tsarskoye Selo Readings 2019. Vol. 1. pp. 222—226.

Makarova O. S. Literary political works of Soviet propaganda (1941—1945) // Step into historical science: materials of the XIX All-Russian scientific and practical conference of young scientists / Uralsky. State Pedagogical University pp. 363—366.

Makarova O. S. The significance of the value of medal art during the Great Patriotic War as one of the aspects of the development of legal culture // The role of intellectual capital in the economic, social and legal culture of society of the XXI century. 2019. pp. 193—201.

Makarova O. S. The role and importance of propaganda activities of theatrical art workers on the formation of public legal awareness during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // Sociology and law. 2019. No. 4. pp. 34—39.

Makarova O. S. Soviet propaganda in musical form in 1941—1945. // Military History: people, destinies, conflicts. 2020 pp. 184—187.

Makarova O. S. Radio propaganda of the USSR and the Third Reich in 1941—1945 // Psychology of human and society. No. 2. pp. 47—51.

Makarova O. S. Multiplikation als Form der Verkörperung der Bilder der Propaganda der UdSSR und Deutschlands 1941—1945 // Knowledge sharing in the educational process: collection of scientific papers. 2021. pp. 124—129.

Makarova O. S. Soviet censorship during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // XXVI Tsarskoye Selo Readings 2022. Vol. 1. pp. 372—376.

Makarova O. S. The propaganda significance of the Order of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942 in raising the morale of Soviet soldiers and officers // XXVII Tsarskoye Selo Readings. 2023. Vol. 2 pp. 309—313.

Makarova O. S. Features of the development of Soviet sculpture during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // Prospects for using the digital space of knowledge in science and education: a collection of scientific papers. 2023. pp. 391—395.

The implementation of the results of the dissertation research was carried out in the process of conducting classes for students of LSU named after A. S. Pushkin.

A total of 15 scientific papers have been published on the research topic.

The structure of the study includes an introduction, two chapters, six paragraphs, a conclusion, a list of used sources and literature.

THE MAIN CONTENT OF THE WORK

In the introduction, the relevance of the topic is substantiated, the degree of study of the problem is revealed, the purpose and objectives of scientific research are formulated, the object and subject of research are defined, chronological and territorial frameworks are indicated, methodology, historiography and source base are presented, scientific novelty, theoretical and practical significance of the work, as well as its approbation are indicated.

The first chapter of the study "General characteristics and organization of Soviet propaganda in 1941—1945".

In paragraph 1.1. — "The concept and organizational and legal basis for the implementation of Soviet propaganda" — patriotic propaganda is presented as one

of the most important activities of the Soviet leadership. It aimed to influence public consciousness in order to ensure the cohesion of Soviet society, as well as to maintain the legitimacy of the Communist Party's power. At the same time, the paper analyzes the peculiarities of the impact of patriotic propaganda on various social groups. The main technologies used in the military propaganda of the USSR and Germany are considered. The existence of propaganda is inextricably linked to the work of specialized public authorities. The features of the techniques and methods of work of both propaganda bodies themselves and institutions with powers of control, supervision, regulatory and methodological support in this area are studied. The normative basis of the propaganda work was mainly made up of by-laws in the form of orders.

Paragraph 1.2. — "The use of the mechanism of patriotic propaganda as a tool to strengthen the power of the Communist Party" — indicates that the traditional type of legitimacy of power was decisive during the war years. The leadership of the Soviet Union had to rely on the centuries-old experience of the country's history to gain public support. The Communist Party turned to the people's memory and began to revive many traditional institutions. The Soviet leaders, in fact, were removed from the pedestal, taking a place in propaganda images next to the great rulers and generals of the past. Allusions are made to the events of wars of past eras. Religious motives are also beginning to be used in propaganda images. At the same time, it should be noted that for the first time the central figure in propaganda works was a man as a self-sufficient person, as well as the entire Soviet society as a whole. The creative intelligentsia made an invaluable contribution to the fight against the common enemy, demonstrating the image of the enemy to the Soviet people.

In paragraph 1.3. — "The essence and meaning of the image of the enemy as an element of patriotic propaganda" — the template structure of the image of the essence of the enemy is investigated. At the same time, during the Great Patriotic War, the image of the enemy underwent a rather complex transformation and acquired new colors and shapes. The complete dehumanization of the opponent

turned out to be the key to the success of the armed conflict. Qualitative characterization of the enemy's appearance performed a mobilization function and was necessary as a tool for influencing mass consciousness.

Propaganda tools were used to explain ideology and politics, both foreign and domestic. Soviet propaganda is exclusively the official point of view of the ruling party on emerging problems and events. All information material had to be carefully edited by the party leadership.

The second chapter of the study "Periodization and dynamics of the development of the image of the enemy in 1941—1945".

In paragraph 2.1. — "Formation of the image of the enemy in the initial period of the war in June 1941 — May 1942 and rethinking the stereotypes of Soviet propaganda of the pre-war period" — it is noted that at the beginning of the war in the mass consciousness of Soviet society and patriotic propaganda, the image of the enemy was not clearly defined. This state of affairs was unacceptable and dangerous. In the public consciousness, the understanding of an external threat was not adequate to the actual situation. The country's leadership understood that it was necessary to convey information about the war and the real enemy to Soviet citizens. The pre-war postulates of class struggle and class solidarity have not stood the test of time. In other words, there was a need to form a new image of the enemy, which should have been different from the one created in previous wars. Before the end of the counteroffensive near Moscow on December 5, 1941 — January 7, 1942, panic moods were often noted among Soviet soldiers. The mobilized citizens, many of whom had never carried weapons before and had no serious military training, let alone combat experience, had no idea of the enemy our homeland faced. It is important to note that after the severe defeats of 1942, which replaced the victorious mood of the winter of 1941, serious changes took place in the public consciousness. Both the country's leadership and ordinary citizens have fully realized the catastrophic situation on the fronts. In May 1942, the real threat of defeat loomed over the country. At the same time, in Nazi Germany, it began to be seen as inevitable. In 1942, Soviet political workers and

agitators relied on already documented evidence of crimes committed by the enemy. Photographs and newsreel footage captured numerous brutal murders of children, women, the elderly, prisoners of war, etc. Soldiers and home front workers saw burned villages and destroyed cities. The epithet "beasts" has become the main characteristic

Paragraph 2.2. — "The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the turning point of the struggle against fascism in June 1942 — August 1943" — describes the ideological struggle between Germany and the Soviet Union during the turning point of the Great Patriotic War. The metaphorical image of the enemy reflected in communist propaganda is revealed based on the study of archival materials and periodicals. At the same time, the importance of a naturalistic description of the crimes committed by the fascists against the civilian population of the occupied territories is assessed in order to present the true face of the invaders and mobilize society to fight the enemy.

Paragraph 2.3. — "The transformation of the image of the enemy at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War in September 1943 — May 1945" — describes the propaganda work carried out among the population of the territories liberated by the Red Army, propaganda actions carried out for the inhabitants of the country, including Operation Big Waltz, are considered directives containing norms for the treatment of the population other states. The study draws conclusions about the ambiguity of assessments regarding the formation of the image of the enemy at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War. In order to avoid the bitterness of the enemy, who found himself in a desperate situation, the idea was introduced into the consciousness of Soviet soldiers that revenge and promiscuity in fighting methods would only delay victory and multiply victims. The image of the enemy does not soften, but the idea of humane treatment of those who are ready to lay down their arms becomes obvious.

Thus, three periods of the formation of the image of the enemy in wartime have been identified. The latter two were based on ethnic and political rather than class solidarity, unlike the first.

In conclusion, the results of the study are summarized and generalizing conclusions are formulated.

Main scientific results

1. The author draws conclusions about the decisive importance of theatrical art in propaganda work. Theatrical performances were the most effective sphere of influence on the consciousness of the Soviet people. The task of political education of the new Soviet man and the expression of the authority of the USSR government was being solved. The performances evoked a sensual and emotional beginning, there was a fusion of power and society in a single stage action. On the one hand, the Soviet leadership actively promoted theatrical creativity, on the other hand, it sought to manage all the processes of theatrical art⁵⁵.

2. The role and importance that medal art had in raising the patriotic spirit of Soviet citizens were revealed. Firstly, there is a desire of the Soviet government to develop an effective system of rewards for those who have made achievements in the field of fighting the enemy. Every soldier had to feel the personal attention from the command, the party and the government. Secondly, it should be noted that a significant number of awards of the highest rank were issued, which were received not by representatives of the command, but by ordinary soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers. This practice was in many ways unique in world history and undoubtedly contributed to strengthening the power of the Communist Party in the eyes of the people. Thirdly, the desire to revive the military traditions of pre-revolutionary Russia is undeniable. In particular, the establishment of the orders of "Suvorov", "Nakhimov", etc. it showed the continuity of the combat traditions of the Russian army and the Red Army. The Soviet government was to become a new and the greatest stage in the history of the development of Russian statehood in terms of its world-historical significance. Fourthly, the elaboration of the statuses of the orders, as well as special attention to their modeling and embodiment in metal. The orders and

⁵⁵ Makarova O. S. The contribution of theatrical artists to patriotic agitation and propaganda in 1941—1945. // XXIII Tsarskoye Selo Readings 2019. Vol. 1. pp. 226—229.

medals were distinguished by a high artistic level. As a result, the recipient was aware not only of the fact that his merits were recognized by the Soviet government, but also had to feel his involvement, both in the entire Soviet society and in a special group of people who showed valor on the battlefields. Such attention to military personnel and the awards they received undoubtedly strengthened the legitimacy of the ruling party⁵⁶.

3. The author concludes that the level of legitimacy of the Soviet government increased significantly in 1941—1945. Political propaganda provided great help to the Soviet government, consolidating the new political regime in Russia. The Soviet leadership, with the help of literary works in 1941—1945, solved the most difficult problems of the psychological mood of Soviet society. A special type of personality and a new social community were being formed. The works of literature brought up a person in the spirit of respect for state power, self-sacrifice for the sake of their country and society, mutual assistance, faith in their own strength and readiness to perform a feat for the sake of future generations. This policy of the state played one of the key roles in the victory in the Great Patriotic War, as well as the further reconstruction of the country⁵⁷.

4. During the crucial period of the Great Patriotic War, the image of the enemy is being transformed. The original image of an inhuman, bestial enemy who enslaved more and more new peoples, after the defeats suffered by the German army, is transformed into a caricature of a defeated cowardly enemy. The enemy is still strong, cruel and insidious, but the image of the defeated enemy is becoming dominant in the works of Soviet propaganda and public consciousness. Naturalization of the submission of information about crimes committed by fascists and their accomplices becomes an important factor. We are talking about the development of a counter-propaganda system that convinces people that an

⁵⁶ Makarova O. S. The significance of the value of medal art during the Great Patriotic War as one of the aspects of the development of legal culture // The role of intellectual capital in the economic, social and legal culture of society of the XXI century 2019. pp. 193—201.

⁵⁷ Makarova O. S. Literary political works of Soviet propaganda (1941—1945) // Step into historical science. 2019. pp. 363—366.

inhuman enemy cannot be trusted. The images created in Soviet propaganda works have achieved their goal and are firmly rooted in the public consciousness⁵⁸.

5. The role and importance of sculptural projects in patriotic propaganda, as well as their influence on the formation of public consciousness, were revealed. Soviet art glorified the heroism of our people, revealed the meaning of a fierce struggle against the enemy⁵⁹.

6. Soviet propaganda in the press in 1941—1945 underwent a number of changes: a reduction in the number and volume of trade publications and magazines, an expanded network of military and front-line newspapers, etc. Recommendations for regional and local newspapers were developed for this period. In July 1941, 18 newspapers were published in foreign languages. There was a concept of how a work written "in hot pursuit", literally last night a poem, essay or story written, could appear in print today. Literary political propaganda among the population of the USSR created the illusion of the involvement of each individual citizen in great and grandiose achievements⁶⁰.

7. The author noted that the Order of the NGO of the USSR No. 227 corresponded not only to the sentiments of the party leadership, but also to the army. There were frequent situations when the achievements gained as a result of the heroism of some servicemen lost their meaning due to the cowardice of others, which caused righteous anger in the army. Many fighters got rid of psychological insecurity, their morale rose. Propaganda has changed its perspective, it has stopped hiding the true state of affairs and new facts⁶¹.

8. The author has studied the problems of not only improving the morale of Soviet society through propaganda activities, but also ensuring the legitimacy and recognition of state power in the USSR in 1941—1945. Such a formulation of

⁵⁸ Makarova O. S. The image of the enemy in soviet propaganda during the turning point of the struggle against fascism (June 1942 — August 1943) // Historical Search 2024. Vol. 5. No. 1. pp. 51—60.

⁵⁹ Makarova O. S. Features of the development of Soviet sculpture during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // Prospects for using the digital space of knowledge in science and education: a collection of scientific papers. 2023. pp. 391—395.

⁶⁰ Makarova O. S. Patriotic propaganda in periodicals during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // XXIII Tsarskoye Selo Readings 2019. Vol. 1. pp. 222—226.

⁶¹ Makarova O. S. The propaganda significance of the Order of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942 in raising the morale of Soviet soldiers and officers // XXVII Tsarskoye Selo readings. 2023 Vol. 2 pp. 309—313.

the problems of the study of propaganda is in many ways new for the national historical and legal science. Materials from several collections of the Russian State Archive of Literature and Art (RGALI) were studied: F. 962, Op. 3, D. 1104 (1), L. 38; F. 2928. Op. 1. Storage unit 484. L. 1; F. 962. Op. 3. Storage unit 951. L. 31; F. 2932. Op. 3. Storage unit 398. L. 1 and others . The legitimacy of State power is one of its fundamental principles. The organization of professional concert and theatrical performances at the front played an important role in maintaining the morale of the fighting troops. Every Soviet citizen should have seen firsthand that he was the most important link in ensuring victory and that it was the Soviet government that mobilized the people for military and labor exploits. Propaganda was addressed both to the emotions, feelings, and experiences of a person, as well as to his mind, logical thinking. The legitimacy and support of the ruling Communist Party was strengthened not only by mobilizing material resources and uniting all citizens in the desire to sacrifice their lives for the sake of a common victory. The organization of professional performances by prominent cultural figures in the frontline showed firsthand the respect of the ruling party for the citizens of the country. Such a policy allowed every citizen to feel not like an instrument fulfilling someone else's will, but a citizen fighting for his country and freedom⁶².

9. It is concluded that musical creativity during the war years became an important factor of moral and psychological impact and had an effective informational and propaganda value. The development of musical culture during the war years not only did not stop, but on the contrary received a powerful incentive to its development. The ideological postulates of the past years cease to be relevant, since the new war was not a class war, but a nationwide one. The new attitude towards citizens precisely as people with their thoughts, hopes, feelings,

⁶² Makarova O. S. The role and importance of propaganda activities of theatrical art workers on the formation of public legal awareness during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // *Sociology and law*. 2019. No. 4. pp. 34—39.

etc., and not only as objects of propaganda and executors of the will of party leaders was the defining line of propaganda in the field of musical creativity⁶³.

10. It is concluded that during the war period, the formation of a new cultural policy took place, artists found non-standard forms to express their experiences. The works of the painters were focused on raising patriotic sentiments, love for their fatherland, and inciting feelings of hatred towards the enemy. The theme of the selfless struggle for the preservation of power of the Bolshevik Party has receded into the background. The artists focused on the feat of warriors, partisans and civilians in the fight against the merciless enemy. The works of Soviet artists depicted Christian motives of the struggle against evil. Allusions to ancient motifs were used, in particular, the expulsion of unholy enemies from their land. Attention was focused on a person's conscious acceptance of martyrdom for the sake of saving other people. Dedication and self-denial could be traced in the exploits of the warriors. Soviet propaganda in graphics and posters was deservedly recognized as an effective tool for influencing public consciousness. The government of the USSR sought to fully satisfy the needs of the population in spectacular forms of art. Films were shot that were not only dedicated to the fight against a common enemy, but also allowed Soviet citizens to forget about the tragic everyday life of the war for a while. Moreover, it was such films that generated confidence in the inevitability of the coming victory, allowed people to think about the future and not lose their human appearance in this terrible time. The Soviet government showed that it addresses the population precisely as citizens, as people with their thoughts and feelings, and not as soulless executors of its will⁶⁴.

11. It is concluded that one of the propaganda mechanisms of any state is a system of prohibitions and restrictions, which is an important and necessary element of public administration. Censorship has a significant impact on the state of public communication, especially during the war period. Numerous methods

⁶³ Makarova O. S. Soviet propaganda in musical form in 1941—1945. // *Military History: people, destinies, conflicts*, 2020 pp. 184—187.

⁶⁴ Makarova O. S. *Soviet artistic weapons 1941—1945*. St. Petersburg: LEMA, 2021. 158 p.

and forms of ideological and political influence were used in this system: prohibition of publication, censorship interference, rejection of manuscripts, jamming of foreign radio stations, control of printed materials, etc. But military censorship did not limit the display of violent scenes, denouncing the brutality of the invaders⁶⁵.

12. On the basis of archival materials, the features of the formation of the image of the enemy at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War from September 1943 to May 1945 are considered. Conclusions are drawn about the ambiguity of assessments regarding the representation of the image of the enemy. The realization of the inevitability of an early victory led to the need to transform the image of the enemy, and in orientation not only towards the Soviet army and society, but also towards the aggressor. In order to avoid the bitterness of the enemy, who found himself in a critical situation, the idea was introduced into the consciousness of Soviet soldiers that revenge only delays victory and multiplies victims. The image of the enemy did not soften, but the idea of a humane attitude towards those who are ready to lay down their arms became obvious⁶⁶.

13. It was concluded that the dual ideas of class struggle and class solidarity of workers as the basis of propaganda work turned out to be inadequate to the threat hanging over the country. The image of the enemy was not clearly defined, and it should differ from what was formed at the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War⁶⁷.

14. The paper analyzes the artistic images of Soviet and Nazi animated paintings. Propaganda techniques and ways of influencing citizens through

⁶⁵ Makarova O. S. Soviet censorship during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // XXVI Tsarskoye Selo readings. 2022. Vol. 1. pp. 372—376.

⁶⁶ Makarova O. S. Transformation of the enemy image in Soviet propaganda at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, September 1943 — May 1945 // The Bulletin of Ryazan State University named for S. A. Yesenin. 2024. No. 1 (82). pp. 36—42.

⁶⁷ Makarova O.S. 'The Image of the Enemy During the Initial period of the Great Patriotic War and the Rethinking of the Stereotypes of Soviet Propaganda of the Pre-war Period'// Modern History of Russia, vol. 13, no.3, 2023, pp. 584—591.

animation are described. The main general patterns of propaganda and its ideological content in the field of animation art are compared⁶⁸.

15. The radio propaganda conducted by the Soviet leadership during the Great Patriotic War in 1941—1945 is being studied. The author analyzes the work of not only party leaders, but also the activities of people whose profession "announcer" has become a weapon in the fight against invaders. The structure and effectiveness of the military radio propaganda of the USSR as a whole are weighed. The radio propaganda of nazi Germany, its methods and techniques of influencing the Red Army and citizens of the Soviet rear are evaluated⁶⁹.

Provisions to be defended:

1. One of the most important tasks of propaganda during the Great Patriotic War (1941—1945) was to substantiate the legitimacy of the ruling party and its leaders. The propaganda was aimed at mobilizing all social resources to fight the enemy. The key to the success of such activities was the formation of firm confidence of Soviet soldiers and civilians in the common tasks of representatives of the ruling elite and the general public. For this, the traditional type of legitimacy was chosen. Without denying the goals of building communism, a classless society, internationalism of workers, etc., the leadership of the Communist Party focused its propaganda on the idea of continuity of Soviet power with the rulers and political forces that led the country for a millennium of its history. We are talking about a fundamental idea, and not about a fundamentally new socialist character of the state of workers and peasants. The emphasis was placed on the formation of just one of the stages in the history of the development of a multinational country with a centuries-old history. Soviet leaders and military leaders were put on a par with the generals of the past. There was a deliberate and widely recited revival of many traditions of pre-revolutionary statehood, including

⁶⁸ Makarova O.S. Multiplikation als Form der Verkörperung der Bilder der Propaganda der UdSSR und Deutschlands 1941—1945 // Knowledge sharing in the educational process: collection of scientific papers. 2021. pp. 124—129.

⁶⁹ Makarova O.S. Radio propaganda of the USSR and the Third Reich in 1941—1945 // Psychology of human and society. No. 2. pp. 47—51.

an appeal to traditional religious values. One of the main features of propaganda has become an allusion linking wartime events with similar episodes in the past.

2. A characteristic feature of Soviet propaganda was that its addressee was an ordinary citizen with his human needs, the desire to protect his family and home. It was the Soviet citizen and the Soviet people as a whole, and not the Communist Party and its leadership, that were the main purpose of propaganda work. The common man was the goal, not the means to achieve a certain ideological result. The images of propaganda embodied in various works created by the creative work of cultural and artistic figures reflected peaceful work, family, love and the exploits of an ordinary Soviet man leading a selfless struggle against the invader. The idea was being introduced that the survival of society depends on the personal feat of everyone. Each person had to feel the support of the people both in relation to himself and in relation to his loved ones. The most striking embodiment of the image of a society like a single living organism was the beats of the metronome transmitted in Leningrad on the radio. The image of the Soviet leaders and, in general, the state and party leadership faded into the background before the need to express the selfless struggle of an individual citizen and the people of the USSR.

3. The positive humanistic attitude of propaganda materials reflecting the usual peaceful life complemented by contrast the image of an inhuman enemy being formed. Broadcasting positive emotions in propaganda images was necessary for the moral support of society no less than calls for the destruction of a treacherous enemy. This duality of Soviet propaganda work is its characteristic feature. The creative embodiment of the image of the ruthless invader and his crimes, calling for his murder, was combined with paintings of pre-war peaceful life as a natural result of victory in the war.

4. The history of the formation of Soviet propaganda in the aspect of forming the image of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War (1941—1945) went through three main stages of development. Each of them is differentiated by the nature of the situation on the fronts and the degree of threat to the survival of the

Soviet Country. This predetermined the specifics of the goals and objectives of the ongoing propaganda in terms of forming the image of the enemy, as well as the methods and methods used to implement it. As a result, the following stages are highlighted: 1) June 1941 — May 1942; 2) June 1942 — August 1943; 3) September 1943 — May 1945.

5. The initial stage of the development of Soviet propaganda occurred in June 1941 — May 1942. At that time, there was a deep crisis in the fundamental tenets of Soviet political propaganda. The image of the enemy as a capitalist or a representative of the exploiting class, opposing the proletarians of all countries, turned out to be inadequate to the actual situation. The internationality of the interests of the workers, which are based on their class rather than national ideas, was erroneous. The image of the enemy as a man of labor, forcibly conscripted into the army and ready, obeying class interests, to turn weapons against exploiters together with Soviet workers and peasants, turned out not only to be wrong, but also to pose a danger to the survival of the Soviet society. Excessive humanization of the enemy was premature. The crimes against humanity committed by the occupiers ran counter to pre-war propaganda. As a result, the formation of a different image of the enemy began — an inhuman beast that has no right to compassion. Soviet citizens and home front workers drafted into the army had to be ready for self-sacrifice to save the country. Killing an enemy on the battlefield by a previously peaceful person means overcoming a moral barrier. The most important way to achieve this goal is dehumanization, dehumanization of the enemy. It was the formation of such an image of the enemy and its strong rooting in the public consciousness that became decisive for victory in the war.

6. The second stage of the development of Soviet propaganda during the war years covers June 1942 — August 1943. This period is characterized by a turning point in the formation of the image of the enemy. The war became total, and the country was on the brink of destruction. The most important task of propaganda was to convey this information to the public consciousness. It was during this period that propaganda materials most accurately reflected the current state of

affairs. A similar situation has developed due to the accumulation of factual data on the crimes of the fascists and the definition of the goals of their invasion related to the destruction and enslavement of the peoples of the USSR. In normative acts, official addresses of the Soviet leader and party figures, as well as works of propaganda, the ideas of the senselessness of retreat and compromise with the enemy are traced. The image of the enemy acquires the features of a soulless machine or embodied universal evil with allusions to religious motives. Since February 1943, the situation has changed. The defeats of the German troops led to a strengthening of confidence in victory in Soviet society. A caricature image of an insidious, cruel, but precisely beaten and cowardly opponent is being formed. Hypertrophied features of ugliness and degeneracy have become characteristic of the literary and graphic description of the invaders. The enemy is still being dehumanized, but now he is associated not with strength and power, but with ugliness and a sense of disgust.

7. The final stage of the development of military propaganda occurred in September 1943 — May 1945. This period is characterized by fundamental changes in the goals and objectives of propaganda work. The image of the defeated enemy became dominant. Victory had not yet been achieved, but in the propaganda information and public consciousness it was perceived as inevitable. Hundreds of thousands of enemy soldiers, who had lost their fighting spirit and the will to resist, appeared before the Soviet soldiers and the civilian population. As a result, the promotion of the ideas of total and uncompromising struggle has created two main problems. The introduction of the idea of the inevitability of revenge against the occupiers led to a hardening of their resistance. In addition, the personification of the enemy in the image of a certain nation was dangerous in itself. Soviet soldiers were presented as noble liberators, not brutal murderers. Thanks to these processes, the image of the enemy was differentiated. The enemy was only a person who continued to resist or did not recognize the Soviet government. Increasing importance was attached to counter-propaganda and propaganda addressed to the population of the occupied territories. Anyone who cooperated with the Nazis

could admit his guilt and atone for it. The main task of propaganda during this period was to minimize the losses and casualties of the war through the moral decomposition of enemy troops. The introduction of the image of the enemy as a broken man choosing a life of senseless resistance has become dominant. Nevertheless, this state of affairs should not be considered as a manifestation of pity for the enemy. Such an approach in Soviet propaganda was purely pragmatic. Even the Nazi who surrendered in propaganda images remained an enemy, and fraternization with him was expressly prohibited by directives.

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ORGANIZATION OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA IN 1941—1945

1.1. The concept and organizational and legal basis for the implementation of Soviet propaganda

Patriotic propaganda and ideological education are considered to be one of the most important areas of state policy. They acquired special importance during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. Ensuring the unity of Soviet society turned out to be the key to preserving the USSR. In the pre-war years and subsequently during the war, a system of authorities was formed to fully conduct propaganda work among soldiers and civilians. To carry out this activity, a system of legislative regulation of patriotic propaganda was also created, the central link in which was taken by by-laws — numerous directives of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army.

To date, there are many different definitions of the concept of "propaganda". This is due to the fact that it is an integral part of the economy and culture of any society. The value system of society is revealed by ideology, which closely interacts with propaganda and always lies in the logical and psychological basis of the system of political government of the state.

Since its inception, the term "propaganda" has been used to name the institution of missionaries and their proselytizing work (Congregatio de Propaganda Fide). The congregation was founded in the 17th century in Rome primarily for the purpose of spreading Catholicism, as well as to combat harmful heresies. In the future, the meaning of the term "propaganda" changed. During the Great French Revolution, this word acquired a purely political meaning. Various secret societies were formed, which aimed to seize and retain power, as well as change government policy. They were called "propaganda". Secret and subsequently openly operating societies spread their political ideas and values. Initially, this term was associated with any organization that was engaged in the

implementation of a certain worldview. Then it began to be used in relation to the mechanism, a special technique for spreading ideology. In the works of the Social Democrats at the beginning of the 20th century, it had a neutral meaning: the transmission of a complex of ideas, both political and other.

Thus, the word propaganda is translated from Latin as 'faith to be spread'. Propaganda should be understood as pre—planned control over people's way of thinking and behavior. Propaganda is the spiritual purposeful promotion of certain ideas, values, views, arguments, and facts. It works primarily with abstract symbols.

The concepts of "propaganda" and "agitation" should be separated. The most popular statement is that propaganda affects the mind, agitation affects a person's feelings. This judgment is controversial, because campaigning is also filled with content, as well as propaganda materials, and propaganda speeches are often characterized by rich emotions.

Agitation is aimed at social psychology, the main object of its influence is public opinion. Propaganda nevertheless correlates with another sphere of social consciousness — with social ideology (systematized knowledge) as a system of views⁷⁰. Propaganda requires an idea to be disseminated, a target audience, and means of dissemination.

Propagandists always strive to form public opinion and provoke the necessary emotional states among the masses of people. This circumstance led to the division of propaganda into two components: constructive (positive) and destructive (negative). The first performs educational and informational functions in society and is carried out in the interests of those to whom it is addressed. The second one imposes certain beliefs on people to incite social or national hostility⁷¹.

The main forms of psychological influence:

1. The propaganda of creation encourages the mass consciousness to build a new type of society.

⁷⁰ Skulenko M. I. Journalism and propaganda. Kiev, 1987. p. 4.

⁷¹ Ivanov A. A. The communicative space of war: propaganda and public sentiment: An educational and methodological guide. St. Petersburg, 2017. p. 6.

2. The propaganda of perseverance and heroism calls for heroically enduring military difficulties through self-sacrifice.

3. The propaganda of education informs about the actions of the political party, the economy of the country and the plans of the leader of the state.

4. Propaganda of destruction works against the ideology of a hostile state.

5. Propaganda of division incites national, religious and social conflicts in the army.

6. Propaganda of intimidation intimidates the enemy in various psychological and physical ways.

7. Propaganda of despair highlights the difficult economic and social situation in a hostile country⁷².

Military propaganda implies the following options of influence: encouraging the enemy to surrender, praising the military successes of his country, instilling fear of defeat, forming the image of the enemy, etc. Any event is inflated to universal proportions, and weaknesses are significantly amplified. Totalitarian propaganda determines the status of the enemy, he is aggressive and changes reality. The enemy is often endowed with exceptionally inhuman features. The idea is brought to the population that the invader destroys all living things in his path. Such work helps the country's leadership to rally citizens in the face of common danger, as well as inspire them to military and labor exploits.

Propaganda is able to promote any point of view, but at the same time it is subject to censorship.⁷³ Censorship is a system of supervision that prohibits or permits the publication of certain information. It is an essential element of propaganda, a system of control over information that is widely disseminated by various means. Data that may have a harmful effect on the population is prohibited from distribution, as it may benefit the enemy.

In addition, by fulfilling censorship requirements, a single line of propaganda is achieved, as well as a certain dosage of information provision. Some

⁷² Kiselev M. V. Psychological aspects of propaganda [Electronic resource] // Library of the Psi Factor. URL: <https://psyfactor.org/propaganda5.htm> (date of application: 12.10.2023).

⁷³ Makarova O. S. Soviet censorship during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // XXVI Tsarskoye Selo Readings. 2022. Vol. 1. pp. 372—376.

facts need to be brought to the attention of the population, otherwise they will find out about them from various sources anyway. Censorship tools allow you to postpone the publication of certain information for a while, which may have a malicious meaning at the moment or in a certain presentation. In the future, reports from official sources will make it possible to highlight certain facts in the right way, without causing panic or negative sentiments in society.

Currently, there are three main approaches to understanding the institution of censorship. In accordance with the first, the so-called "state approach", it represents an objective result of the development of state control bodies. Political or ideological censorship is carried out by previewing materials by an editor or a special official acting as a censor. Then decisions are made to release materials to print or not, to make banknotes of the text, to withdraw this or that literature from circulation, etc. At the same time, censorship is opposed to "self-censorship". According to the second approach, censorship is understood more broadly. It refers to the activities of a significant range of both state and public structures and cannot be considered in isolation from the existing political regime in society. It is often considered a manifestation of the restriction of the rights and freedoms of citizens, as it is a deliberate interference in creative activity. It is important to note the third direction, which is essentially psychological. We are talking about the inner properties of the personality itself. Censorship is the processes related to the categories of morality and ethics that every person has. It should be noted that censorship is a broad concept that cannot be limited only to the work of the relevant government official performing the functions of a censor. Censorship is mainly one of the important parts of the emerging diverse social relations. It is necessary and exists objectively. It also has a positive role, protecting society from malicious information on the basis of compliance with moral and ethical standards⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Zelenov M. V. Censorship: approaches to the definition of the concept // Leningrad Law Journal. 2013. pp. 96-97.

As a result, the importance of censorship in wartime should not be underestimated. The fight against alarmism, false rumors, as well as information intentionally disseminated by the enemy with malicious meaning are all important components of victory. The perusal of letters sent with soldiers and officers from the front was also necessary, since even unintentional disclosure of certain information could lead to serious consequences if they got to the enemy.

During the war period, special censorship bodies monitored ideological purity. N. G. Sadchikov, the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the Protection of military Secrets in the press, insisted on the introduction of perustration of letters and telegrams, as well as mandatory preliminary censorship of all handwritten and printed works.

In a letter from N. G. Sadchikov to the head of the Press Department of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) A. A. Puzin dated August 13, 1942, it was stated that "August 3, 1942 brochure by L. Dubrovitsky "Under the yoke of the German oppressors, "it was forbidden to distribute ⁷⁵. <...> Permission for the release was given on June 30, 1942 by censor Lyzlov." The reasons were as follows: the work contained information that was not completely politically sound about facts that could not cause hatred of the enemy. At the same time, a number of them can become the basis for a wrong attitude towards the enemy and reduce the morale of Soviet soldiers. In particular, on page 24 it was said that the German command was trying to prevent looting of civilians, although it had previously encouraged them. It was recommended that such an author's statement be perceived as false. No measures were taken against looting and looting, and no intentions to stop them were noticed. Violence against the local population is part of the policy of the Nazis. The author's reference to the alleged impotence of the German leadership and the inability to influence this situation in any way is also false. The author's incorrect statement is also contained on page 50. For example, he points out that in official documents the Nazis are fighting against the Jewish—communist government, but do not oppose the Soviet one. They

⁷⁵ Dubrovitsky L. Under the yoke of the German oppressors. M., 1942. 76 p.

supposedly respect the choice of the population in favor of Soviets reflecting the will of the workers and peasants. Such information is not only false, but also harmful in its content. It is directly linked to Goebbels' propaganda. Only the enemy can say that the fascists want to preserve Soviet power. Further, on pages 57—58, there is a literal statement by a German soldier who was a looter in Fedorova's house: "Your Stalin is kaput!". The replication of such information should be considered criminal. As a result, the brochure's circulation was destroyed, its editors and censor were removed from their posts⁷⁶. It should be noted that subsequently L. A. Dubrovitsky resumed his propaganda work. In the spring of 1945, he served as head of the 7th department of the political Administration of the 1st Ukrainian Front, and after the war became head of the propaganda department in the Allied Commission for Austria.

In the period from the summer of 1941 to April 1943, censorship activities were under the control of the General Commissioner of State Security L. P. Beria. Then, by a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, she was redirected to the People's Commissariat of State Security, separated from the NKVD⁷⁷.

Propaganda began to be used as a weapon in conflicts after its significant successes in the First World War. At the same time, the propaganda of the Second World War was significantly different from the propaganda of 1914—1918. Firstly, it used fewer words with high evaluative potential. Secondly, the emphasis was on factual data to the detriment of expressing any preferences. Thirdly, it contained more meaningful information⁷⁸.

It is necessary to note the following basic techniques and methods of propaganda influence, which became the most common during the Great Patriotic War:

Technologies of Soviet propaganda:

⁷⁶ RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 117. L. 149.

⁷⁷ Gorlov A. S. Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War: institutional and organizational aspects. M., 2009. p. 65.

⁷⁸ Fallows Erwin. Propaganda: the History of the word (translated from English. Zyryanova I. P.)// Politicheskaya lingvistika. 2009. No. 1(27). p. 157.

1. Resolutions of the leadership prohibiting any actions or, conversely, encouraging certain activities when using a symbolic system (GKO Resolution No. GKO—452ss dated August 10, 1941 "On the mobilization of conscripts born in 1904—1890 and conscripts born in 1922—1923"⁷⁹ and others).

2. The creation of an image of the enemy and the formation of a sense of real danger were inextricably linked with the tightening of criminal liability measures for the spread of panic rumors, treason, espionage, etc. (Articles 58.1—58.14 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1926, as amended on August 1, 1941⁸⁰, Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR No. 39 of April 19, 1943 "On punishments for Nazi villains guilty of murder and torture of Soviet civilians and captured Red Army soldiers, for spies, traitors to the Motherland"⁸¹, Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 06, 1941 "On responsibility for spreading false rumors in wartime that arouse alarm among the population"⁸² and others).

3. The formation of the image of a wise ruling elite or leader and the suggestion of the need for subordination, which is the only guarantee of the survival of society (as an example, numerous artistic embodiments of the images of I. V. Stalin and other Soviet party and state figures on posters and leaflets, as well as in films and musical works, including the national anthem of the USSR 1944, etc.).

4. Simplification of the picture of the surrounding reality in order to influence the deep instincts and subconscious of people, as a result of which there is often an appeal to prejudice (this was most clearly manifested in the caricature of the image of the enemy in the works of Kukryniks⁸³ and other graphic artists).

⁷⁹ RGASPI F. 644. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 140—141.

⁸⁰ The Criminal Code of the RSFSR. As amended on August 1, 1941: The official text with the appendix of article—by—article systematized materials. Moscow: Legal Publishing House of the NKYSU USSR, 1941. pp. 27—33.

⁸¹ GARF. F. P7523. Op. 4. D 164. L. 118—120.

⁸² Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 07/06/1941 "On responsibility for spreading false rumors in wartime that arouse alarm among the population" // Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 1941. No. 32. pp. 187—191.

⁸³ Demosthenova G. L. Kukryniksy — illustrators: Album. M.: Iskusstvo, 1956. 220 p.

5. Appeal to the traditional positive symbols characteristic of this particular culture and public consciousness of justice (an illustrative example was the revival of a number of elements of the pre-revolutionary military uniform ⁸⁴, The Order of Glory was established⁸⁵ by analogy with the royal George Cross, the Order of Alexander Nevsky, Suvorov, Kutuzov⁸⁶, Bogdan Khmel'nitsky ⁸⁷ and others).

6. The formation of a paternalistic type of relationship between society and the state, the use of patriarchal stereotypes and symbols (for example, the exploitation of images such as the Motherland, the "father of nations", etc.)⁸⁸.

The interests of the addressee and the propagandist may not coincide, but it must be understood that the latter does not consider the well-being of the audience to be its main goal. Propaganda uses information communication, the addressee often has difficulty recognizing propaganda and distinguishing it from manipulation. And yet the difference between these two concepts is enormous. Manipulation is a kind of deception, a form of abuse of social power. It can be carried out both through control and through events (provocation). Manipulation works at the expense of human consciousness and controls the mind. Propaganda is information, the dissemination of which is beneficial to someone, or the art of remote control of the masses. Its task is to introduce any political, philosophical, scientific, artistic and other ideas, where manipulative methods can also be applied.

The most effective means of promoting ideas are:

- verbal propaganda (lectures, performances by artists, etc.);
- visual propaganda (posters, honor boards, etc.);

⁸⁴ Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 06.01.1943 "On the introduction of shoulder straps for the personnel of the Red Army" // *Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*. 1943. No. 2. pp. 23—31; Order of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR dated 15.01.1943 No. 25 "On the introduction of new insignia and changes in the uniform of the Red Army" // *Izvestiya (Moscow)* 1943. January 17.

⁸⁵ Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 08.11.1943 "On the establishment of the Orders of Glory of the I, II and III degrees" // *Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*. 1943. No. 8. pp. 278—281.

⁸⁶ Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 07/29/1942 "On the establishment of military orders: the Order of Suvorov of the first, second and third degrees, the Order of Kutuzov of the first and second degrees and the Order of Alexander Nevsky" // *Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*. 1942. No. 30. pp. 55—59.

⁸⁷ Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 10.10.1943 "On the establishment of the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitsky I, II and III degrees" // *Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*. 1943. No. 1. pp. 273—277.

⁸⁸ Gorlov A. S. Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War: institutional and organizational aspects. pp. 127—128.

- propaganda actions (exhibitions, competitions, etc.).

Many events of the Soviet government were of a propaganda nature. In particular, the military march on Red Square on November 7, 1941, dedicated to the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution, was of great patriotic importance. Soldiers left the parade straight to the front to defend the capital of their homeland. It was a unique event during the war years. Citizens and foreign observers saw the determination of the Soviet people to defend the freedom of their country⁸⁹.

The propaganda campaigns paid considerable attention to the national issue. Important events were held among representatives of national minorities. For example, in July-August 1943, the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army under the leadership of A. S. Shcherbakov held a long twenty-day meeting, to which 192 agitators representing 24 nationalities were recalled from the fronts. They gave lectures on the following topics: Russian People's Role as an Elder Brother in the Family of the Peoples of the USSR, The Heroic Past of the Russian People and the Fraternal Peoples of the USSR, National Republics in the Great Patriotic War, and others⁹⁰. Such work on the exchange of experience in conducting propaganda activities, as well as achieving its uniformity, played a positive role in organizing the fight against fascism. The creation of national military formations, in which nationally oriented propaganda events were held, was also a positive factor. For them, the task was often set to liberate the areas native to these peoples from invaders⁹¹.

During the Great Patriotic War, the leadership of the USSR used propaganda to achieve two main goals: to raise the morale of the population and weaken the will of the enemy to resist. The latter gave rise to a new term — "special propaganda" — a purposeful informational impact on enemy troops and civilians

⁸⁹ Galimullina N. M. Soviet—party propaganda of the Great Patriotic War period as a problem of historical and political analysis: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. Kazan, 2005. pp. 43—44.

⁹⁰ Bezugolny A. Y. Fruits of "Great work": All—Army meeting of agitators working with fighters of non—Russian nationalities (July — August 1943) // The Great Patriotic War in the history and memory of the peoples of Southern Russia: events, participants, symbols. Materials of the III All-Russian Scientific Conference. Rostov—on—Don, 2022. p. 59.

⁹¹ Bezugolny A. Y. The experience of building the Armed Forces of the USSR: the national aspect (1922—1945): dissertation of the Doctor of Historical Sciences, M., 2019. p. 232.

in order to reduce the morale of the former, incline public opinion of the latter to their side and ultimately reduce combat losses among their troops⁹².

As you know, on June 22, 1941, J. Goebbels sent a secret message number 13 "Germany's response to the betrayal of the Jewish-Bolshevik Kremlin" for use in propaganda work. The most important message of this false information was that this war was preventive and defensive for the Third Reich. The predatory aims of the war pursued by Germany were forbidden to be discussed. The fact that the USSR was considered mainly as a source of raw materials and other materials was categorically not allowed to be mentioned. German propagandists were supposed to report that the "Jewish-Bolshevik leaders" had violated the treaty with their country, despite the Fuhrer's efforts to preserve peace. Vilification of the victim is one of the main techniques used in fascist propaganda. The predatory goals of the war in the eyes of their own people and the world community should be veiled by the false accusation of the USSR in bad faith⁹³.

The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On martial Law" was published in the Soviet newspaper Pravda on June 23, 1941. It was necessary to ensure public order and state security in certain areas and throughout the USSR. Where martial law was declared, the local leadership was granted permission:

- to involve able-bodied citizens in the work necessary to ensure defense, in fact, it was about the introduction of compulsory labor;
- to carry out rationing of food and industrial goods for different categories of citizens;
- instruct organizations to provide necessary assistance to the military;
- prohibit citizens from entering and staying in areas under martial law;
- to issue normative documents that are mandatory for the entire civilian population;

⁹² Surzhik D. V. Special propaganda during the Great Patriotic War [Electronic resource] // The Great Patriotic War. URL: https://w.histrf.ru/articles/article/show/spietsialnaia_propaganda (date of application: 12.10.2021).

⁹³ Cit. by: Kutuzov A.V. The siege of Leningrad in the information war. M., 2008.. pp. 170—171.

- to make decisions on the imposition of harsh administrative penalties, etc.⁹⁴

With this decree, the content of Stalin's speeches and propaganda in general changed, which now proceeded from the liberating, just nature of the war against Nazi Germany. With the beginning of the military conflict, the might, strength, superiority and unstoppable of the Red Army offensive, as well as the impotence of the Wehrmacht and the senselessness of its resistance were promoted⁹⁵. The enemy was carefully studied and analyzed. The progressive impotence and inevitability of the defeat of the Nazi army were vividly demonstrated⁹⁶. Now the propagandist had to know the way of thinking of his people and adequately process information about the opposing side.

According to the report "On printed propaganda among enemy troops during the 10 months of the Patriotic War", the following main theses of Soviet military and political propaganda stood out:

1. "Fascist Germany is waging an aggressive, unjust war. The USSR is waging a patriotic, just war.
2. The perpetrators of the war are Hitler and his clique. The destruction of Hitler's rule is the only way to peace.
3. The Soviet people are not the enemy of the German people.
4. Hitler and his clique are leading Germany to disaster.
5. The Hitlerite clique is bringing death to the German people. The German people do not want war. The German rear is fragile.
6. The strength and power of the Red Army is increasing, the strength of the Nazi army is drying up. Hitler's defeat is inevitable.
7. Hitler is not Germany or the German state. The Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain. For a free and independent Germany!
8. Exposure of fascist leaders, fascist ideology and fascist military propaganda.

⁹⁴ Pravda (Moscow). 1941. June 23 .

⁹⁵ RGASPI. F. 495. Op. 77. D. 23. L. 2.

⁹⁶ Ibid.. L. 11.

9. Appeal to the historical traditions of the German people.
10. The truth about the USSR and the Red Army.
11. The creation of an anti-Hitler coalition of the three great powers of the world. All freedom-loving nations are fighting against Hitler. Hitler's European rear is fragile.
12. The plan of the "lightning war" has been defeated, the myth of the invincibility of the German army has been exposed.
13. Hitler's plan to encircle and capture Moscow failed. The German army is retreating to the west. The German Fascist army was facing a catastrophe.
14. The German army is drained of blood. Reserves are running out. A new offensive means new lives for soldiers and officers and a guarantee of return to their homeland after the war.
15. The creation of Soviet committees for the struggle for peace, for saving the lives of soldiers from inevitable death"⁹⁷.

The leadership of the Soviet country set a number of tasks for propaganda and agitation bodies: to expose Hitler as an enemy of the German people, to prove the inevitability of Germany's military defeat, to encourage enemy soldiers to surrender, to explain the peace-loving plans of the USSR, etc.

One of the striking examples of the propaganda work of the Soviet propaganda organs is the following leaflet: "German soldier! <...> Who knows better what the soldiers of the German army should do now to get away from senseless death? GERMAN GENERALS! Some continue to deceive their soldiers and condemn them to death, while others BREAK WITH HITLER, LEAVE THE DOOMED HITLER ARMY AND SURRENDER. During the first two weeks of the Russian offensive in Belarus, 14 German generals were captured. <...> Some of them not only surrendered themselves, but also led the transfer of tens of thousands of their soldiers and officers into captivity. If the generals themselves surrender, then you, soldier, do not have to think: do not hesitate, take an example from your

⁹⁷ Ibid. D. 14. L. 6—7.

generals." A "prisoner pass" was printed below, and on the back of the leaflet was a picture of the generals who surrendered⁹⁸.

At the beginning of the war, a number of events followed: the creation of circles of prisoners of war in order to conduct pacifist propaganda, the dissemination among enemy troops of appeals from German soldiers and generals who voluntarily sided with the Red Army, etc. A typical example is the following proclamation: "Soldiers of the 4th army, located east of the Ptich River! <...> There is no hope of getting out of here with our strength and means. Our connections are randomly scattered. A colossal number of the wounded have been abandoned without any help. The Russian command promised: medical care for the wounded and preservation of cold steel for officers, and orders for soldiers. We are asked to collect and hand over all weapons and equipment intact and put an end to senseless resistance. I order you to stop fighting immediately. Local groups of 100 to 500 people gather under the leadership of officers or senior non-commissioned officers. Collect the wounded and take them with you. We must show discipline and restraint and start holding these events as soon as possible. This order should be passed on in writing, orally and by all means. Muller, Lieutenant General, Commander of the 18th Army Corps"⁹⁹.

In 1941—1945, people sincerely believed in the values they promoted. They gave their lives for a bright future, their children fought and died following this ideology, like, for example, Ya. I. Dzhugashvili.

The main sources of information about the decline in morale and morale of the enemy troops were interrogations of prisoners of war, analysis of captured documents, reports on the sentiments of the hostile side, etc.

Here are some examples from the interrogations of prisoners of war in November-December 1941. From the protocol of the interrogation of the prisoner of war soldier Paul Rusik, captured on November 21, 1941, it follows that "the morale of soldiers has fallen noticeably lately, this is due to the fact that most

⁹⁸ Ibid. D. 48. L. 5—6.

⁹⁹ Ibid.. L. 22—23.

soldiers have not been to their homeland for a whole year or more. In addition, the difficult conditions in which soldiers have to fight in Russia also affect the mood of soldiers"¹⁰⁰. It is necessary to note the emerging national contradictions in the German army. In the following interrogation of the Austrian prisoner, soldier Mikhail Binder, captured on December 6, 1941, the political and moral state is described as follows: "The soldiers became indifferent whether Germany would win or be defeated, they became "impatient" and wish to return home as soon as possible. <...> The relationship between Germans and Austrians — Austrians are forced to stand at posts the most, work the most (chop wood, carry water); there is constant hostility between Austrians and Germans, Austrians do not want to fight for their enemy — Germany"¹⁰¹. The overstrain from months of being in a combat situation and the massively emerging reluctance to fight are becoming the determining factors corroding the Wehrmacht. For the Soviet people, the war with Nazi Germany began on June 22, 1941, but many German soldiers were continuously in service since September 1, 1939, having passed Poland, France, Yugoslavia and other countries. From the interrogation of the captured German Corporal Ernst Knoche, captured on November 22, 1941: "The mood of the soldiers: one feels war fatigue and homesickness. Soldiers don't talk about anything else but vacation. There have been cases of desertion recently"¹⁰². The exhausting Soviet campaign dragged on, the enemy was unable to win a quick victory. From the interrogation of a German prisoner, an orderly of the II platoon of the 10th company, Corporal Herman Kellner, captured on December 23, 1941, it follows: "Due to the prolonged war, the mood of the soldiers has greatly decreased. They became indifferent to the course of the war. Even some officers have lost their military fervor. Hitler is beginning to gradually lose his authority in the eyes of many soldiers"¹⁰³. The weather factor also played an important role. The German army was not quite ready to wage war in winter conditions on the territory of the European part of the USSR. From the interrogation of a German prisoner,

¹⁰⁰ CAMO RF. F. 500. Op. 12486. D. 284. L. 47.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. L. 50—51.

¹⁰² Ibid. L. 52.

¹⁰³ Ibid. L. 66—67.

Senior Corporal Ville Rade, captured on December 8, 1941, it is noticeable that "the coming winter affected the mood of the soldiers. Discipline is falling — the sentries cannot stand the cold, leave their posts and run away to their huts. Soldiers are reluctant to attack, many hide in houses and thus evade the battle"¹⁰⁴.

As a result, it should be noted that the severity of military trials already in the first half of the war turned out to be significant even for the German army, which conquered a number of European states. Prolonged stay at the front had a negative impact on the military spirit of the soldiers, which was reported by many of those captured.

In wartime, public administration was based on the Constitution of the USSR, which was adopted in 1936. According to Article 126 of the basic law, the governing core of all public and state organizations belonged to the Central Committee of the CPSU(b)¹⁰⁵.

Such an administrative body was quite large. It had more than fifty departments and other divisions. It included the Department of Propaganda and agitation management. These units were under the jurisdiction of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b). The position of the leadership of this body of party power was directly related to the consideration and decision-making, in fact, in any area of public administration of the country. It consisted of I. V. Stalin, A. A. Andreev, A. A. Zhdanov and G. M. Malenkov¹⁰⁶.

The monopoly position of the ruling Communist Party was legislated. The Soviet government under the leadership of I. V. Stalin during the war was often forced to resort to harsh methods. The state administration of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War was characterized by extremity and extreme. The principle was

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. L. 70—71.

¹⁰⁵ The Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (approved by the resolution of the Extraordinary VIII Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of December 5, 1936) // *Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Central Executive Committee*. 1936. No. 283.

¹⁰⁶ Zelenov M. V. The apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) in 1939—1945: functions, structure, leaders // XIV Tsarskoye Selo Readings. Vocational education: Socio—cultural aspects, April 20—21, 2010: Vocational education: socio—cultural aspects: materials of the international scientific conference / Leningrad State University. A. S. Pushkin University; under the general editorship of V. N. Skvortsov. — St. Petersburg, 2010 p. 223.

the same: "Victory at any cost!". There was a conscious militarization of the foundations of public administration¹⁰⁷.

Propaganda materials began to be transmitted through many channels. Firstly, through various oral presentations and lectures, i.e. through interpersonal communication with the people. Secondly, thanks to new technical tools such as broadcasting and cinematography. Thirdly, the Soviet government was supported by cultural and artistic figures who created unique creative works in the field of literature, music, theatrical productions, etc.

In accordance with the decisions of the Communist Party, explanatory work was carried out among the population. Special celebrations were held in connection with the anniversaries of prominent public, party and government figures. Special attention was paid to the promotion of the life and work of V. I. Lenin. Scientists E. V. Tarle, B. D. Grekov, V. I. Picheta, S. A. Bakhrushin, M. N. Tikhomirov and others shared their historical knowledge¹⁰⁸.

Since the beginning of the war, propaganda and agitation were conducted both in the army and among the population in the rear. They pursued specific military and economic tasks. The Soviet leadership informed the people about the difficult situation on the fronts and gave their assessment of what was happening on the battlefields. Propaganda and agitation have occupied one of the central places in the ideological struggle against the aggressor. It was thanks to the ideological function of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that bodies were created to control the sphere of culture.

Patriotic education was an important part of the work for the authorities of the Soviet Country. By decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated January 6, 1943, shoulder straps and officer insignia, traditional for the Russian army, were returned. The continuity of the centuries-old combat traditions of the country's armed forces was proclaimed. In addition, the prestige of officer ranks also increased. The officers had to preserve and increase the glory of the country's

¹⁰⁷ Morozov V. I. Features of state administration of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War (1941—1945) // Administrative Consulting. 2005. No. 1. p. 40..

¹⁰⁸ Kozlov N. D. The moral potential of the people and mass public consciousness during the Great Patriotic War: dissertation of the Doctor of Historical Sciences. St. Petersburg, 1996. pp. 242—243.

armed forces, relying not only on the experience of the revolution and the first decades of Soviet power, but also on the exploits of many generations of professional military men, defenders of the motherland¹⁰⁹.

The Central Committee of the CPSU(b) drew attention to the need to extol the heroic history of the peoples of the USSR. Propaganda and agitation demonstrated a sacred hatred of the fascist regime, which actively pursued a policy of intervention. The agitation work of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) can be analyzed thanks to a number of preserved resolutions, which clearly spelled out the state of all current affairs on this issue. The Central Committee of the CPSU(b) and local party bodies organized the training of ideological cadres in the rear. Freelance groups of lecturers and speakers were created and worked under the Central Committee of the CPSU(b). Women and young people were involved in propaganda work. In areas liberated from Nazi occupation, army political bodies organized ideological activities, for example, launched artillery fireworks, held exhibitions of enemy equipment, etc.

These events, as well as the march of prisoners of war on July 17, 1944 in Moscow, marked the triumph of the Soviet people over an inhuman enemy. Fireworks marked the liberation of cities and victories in battles. Exhibitions of captured weapons were also perceived by the population as a victory over the enemy. The broken and captured equipment, originally intended for the murder of Soviet citizens, became a common exhibit at exhibitions in parks, squares and streets of cities of the USSR. People were convinced of the inevitability of victory and that no enemy weapon could break the spirit of the Soviet people¹¹⁰.

Among the normative legal acts that had great legal force after the Constitution of the USSR, it is necessary to note the Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR devoted to regulating relations related to influencing public opinion and patriotic education. Among them was the Decree of

¹⁰⁹ On the introduction of new insignia for the personnel of the Red Army (Decree of January 6, 1943) // *Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*. 1943. No. 2.

¹¹⁰ Galimullina N. M. Soviet—party propaganda of the Great Patriotic War period as a problem of historical and political analysis. p. 69.

the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated July 6, 1941 "On responsibility for spreading false rumors in wartime that arouse alarm among the population."¹¹¹ This document established liability in the form of imprisonment for a period of 2 to 5 years for the very fact of introducing information that could only cause panic among civilians, even if these severe consequences had not occurred. In the event of severe consequences, the act was punishable as aiding the enemy, which could result in a verdict on the highest measure of social protection. The directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of political departments (political departments) of fronts, districts and armies "On the inadmissibility of disclosing military secrets in the press" dated December 17, 1942 is also devoted to this issue¹¹².

By approving new awards in honor of the names of famous generals, many of whom were invincible on the battlefield, the Soviet government sought to rely on the memory of the former greatness of the country, to instill in people faith in the inevitability of victory. A number of decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces established orders and medals, which were awarded to particularly distinguished officers and ordinary soldiers of the Red Army. In some cases, civilians who proved themselves in the armed struggle against the enemy were also presented with awards¹¹³.

¹¹¹ Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 07/06/1941 "On responsibility for spreading false rumors in wartime that arouse alarm among the population" // *Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*. 1941. No. 32. pp. 187—191.

¹¹² CAMO RF. F. 32. Op. 920265. D. 5. L. 808—809.

¹¹³ Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated May 20, 1942 "On the establishment of the Order of the Patriotic War of the first and second degree"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 29, 1942 "On the establishment of military orders: the Order of Suvorov of the first, second and third degrees, the Order of Kutuzov of the first and second degrees and the Order of Alexander Nevsky"; Decree of the Presidium The Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated December 22, 1942 "On the establishment of medals "For the Defense of Leningrad", "For the Defense of Odessa", "For the Defense of Sevastopol", "For the Defense of Stalingrad" and on awarding these medals to participants in the defense of Leningrad, Odessa, Sevastopol and Stalingrad"; Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated February 2, 1943 "On the establishment of the medal "Partisan of the Patriotic War" of the first and second degree"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated February 8, 1943 "On the establishment of the Military Order of Kutuzov of the III degree and on supplementing the statute of the Order of Suvorov"; Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated July 16, 1943 "On the establishment of the honorary title "People's Artist of the USSR"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated October 10, 1943 "On the establishment of the Order of Bogdan Khmel'nitsky I, II and III degrees"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated November 8, 1943 "On the establishment of the Order of Glory I, II and III degrees"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated November 8, 1943 "On the establishment orders "Victory"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated May 1, 1944 "On the establishment of the medal "For the Defense of Moscow"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated May 1, 1944 "On the

Before the German attack on the USSR, a number of awards for military merit had already been awarded, for example, the Order of the Red Star and the Red Banner, medals for Bravery. These insignia retained their highest value, and they continued to be encouraged during the Great Patriotic War. In the spring of 1942, by order of I. V. Stalin, medals were awarded for specific achievements¹¹⁴.

The rules for wearing orders and medals were adjusted in the summer of 1943. Thus, award badges that were distinguished by a round shape, for example, the Gold Star medal, were worn on the left side of the chest from that time on. A person was rewarded for certain feats and services to the state, and the status of the award depended on them.

During this bloody period, they were awarded as many medals and orders as they had never been awarded in any war. The Soviet government understood that such a form of praise would keep the USSR army in good shape. For propagandists, the award attributes were symbolic in nature, since they highlighted the personal successes of an individual.

The Communist Party maintained the continuity of the glorious military traditions of the Russian armed forces. This is evidenced by the establishment of the Orders of Suvorov, Nakhimov, Alexander Nevsky, etc. The Order of Glory of all degrees, in fact, became an analogue of the Order of St. George — one of the most revered military awards of pre-revolutionary Russia.

All orders and medals during the Great Patriotic War were created at a high artistic level. They were made of precious and semi—precious metals and stones.

establishment of the medal "For the Defense of the Caucasus"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated March 3, 1944 "On the establishment of the military orders: the Order of Ushakov I and II degrees and the Order of Nakhimov I and II degrees"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated March 3, 1944 "On the establishment of military medals: Ushakov Medals and Nakhimov Medals"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated December 5, 1944 "On the establishment of the medal "For the Defense of the Soviet Arctic" and about awarding this medal to the participants of the defense of the Soviet Arctic and others .

¹¹⁴ Smirnov M. I. According to the laws of wartime [Electronic resource] // Vodyanoy znak. 2005. № 4. URL: <http://www.vodyanoyznak.ru/magazine/24/476.htm> (date of application: 07/13/2021).

Unlike medals, all orders had numbers that were linked to the identity of their owner¹¹⁵.

The Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated May 21, 1942 "On the introduction of Guards military ranks for military personnel of Guard units and formations of the Soviet Army and Navy" had an important propaganda value¹¹⁶. Subsequently, the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of January 06, 1943 "On the introduction of shoulder straps for Red Army personnel" was issued¹¹⁷. These decrees, together with the establishment of the Orders of Kutuzov, Suvorov, Nakhimov and Alexander Nevsky, are aimed at reviving the historical memory of the military traditions of the peoples of our country in the fight against the enemy and raising the prestige of military service. The first step in this direction was made by introducing personal military ranks, partly reviving pre-revolutionary traditions.

At the final stage of the war and after the surrender of Germany before the victory over the Japanese militarists, regulations on the establishment of state awards and titles were adopted. They were published in addition to the existing ones and reflected the participation of soldiers in the battles of the Red Army during this difficult period. As a rule, participation in the capture or liberation of certain cities of European states was noted, as well as the general contribution of military personnel and home front workers to the victory over Nazi Germany¹¹⁸.

¹¹⁵ Makarova O. S. The significance of the value of medal art during the Great Patriotic War as one of the aspects of the development of legal culture // The role of intellectual capital in the economic, social and legal culture of society of the XXI century 2019. pp. 199—200.

¹¹⁶ Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 05/21/1942 "On the introduction of Guards military ranks for military personnel of Guard units and formations of the Soviet Army and Navy" // Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 1942. No. 20. pp. 111—112.

¹¹⁷ Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated 06.01.1943 " On the introduction of shoulder straps for Red Army personnel " // Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 1943. No. 2. pp. 23—31.

¹¹⁸ Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated May 09, 1945 "On the establishment of the medal "For the Victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945""; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated June 06, 1945 "On the establishment of the medal "For Valiant Labor in the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945""; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on June 09, 1945 "On the establishment of medals "For the Capture of Budapest", "For the capture of Konigsberg", "For the capture of Vienna" and "For the capture of Berlin"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated June 09, 1945 "On the establishment of medals "For the Liberation of Belgrade", "For the Liberation of Warsaw" and "For the Liberation of Prague", etc.

After the end of the war, the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces of September 30, 1945 "On the establishment of the medal "For Victory over Japan" was published"¹¹⁹.

The great human losses during the war years caused the need to increase the prestige of motherhood. In the future, regulations are adopted that establish titles and insignia in this area. At the same time, financial assistance to women with children was increased¹²⁰:

A number of other regulations were adopted that encouraged citizens to provide assistance to their country in various forms. For example, the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated June 24, 1944, which approved the badge "Honorary Donor of the USSR"¹²¹.

Normative acts on the provision of social assistance had not only propaganda, but also real material content for citizens of the USSR, in particular, the Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated May 06, 1942 No. 640 "On the employment of disabled people of the Patriotic War"¹²².

The Department of Propaganda and Agitation of 84 people, established in 1939, united several structural divisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b):

- party propaganda;
- Marxist-Leninist training and retraining of party personnel (including newspaper workers);
- printing (with sectors of TASS, newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, printing and fiction);
- agitation (with the magazine "Agitator's Companion");

¹¹⁹ The Code of laws of the USSR. M., 1990. Vol. 1. p. 525.

¹²⁰ Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 08, 1944 "On increasing state assistance to pregnant women, large and single mothers, strengthening the protection of motherhood and childhood, establishing the highest degree of distinction of the title "Mother Heroine" and the establishment of the Order of Maternal Glory and the Medal of Motherhood"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated August 18, 1944 "On approval of the statute of the Order of Maternal Glory"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated August 18, 1944, approving the "Regulations on the title "Mother Heroine"; Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated August 18, 1944, approving the "Regulations on the medal "Medal of Motherhood" and others .

¹²¹ By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated 06/24/1944 "On approval of the badge "Honorary Donor of the USSR" // Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. 1944. No. 35. p. 418.

¹²² Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 640 of 05/06/1942 "On the employment of disabled people of the Patriotic War" // SP USSR. 1942. No. 5. p. 76.

- cultural and educational institutions (cinema, radio broadcasting, radio broadcasting, theater);
- Marx—Engels—Lenin Institute (IMEL);
- The secretariat¹²³.

It was the Department of Propaganda and Agitation during the Great Patriotic War that became responsible for party ideology and carried out theoretical training of civil servants¹²⁴. G. F. Alexandrov was appointed chief. Surveillance and censorship extended to the Windows of TASS (the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union), radio and cinema.

During the war period, the structure of the Propaganda and Agitation Department was supplemented:

- in February 1942, three propaganda groups were established;
- in May 1942 — Department of Science;
- in September 1942 — printing and paper departments;
- in January 1943 — Department of Fiction;
- in February 1943 — Department of Cinematography;
- in October 1944 — Department of Radio Broadcasting and Radioification;
- in February 1945 — Department of Arts;
- in April 1945, the publishing house of literature in foreign languages was taken over by the UPA¹²⁵.

Party influence on the foreign policy of the USSR was carried out under the control of G. M. Dimitrov, who headed the Comintern until 1943, and after its dissolution — the Department of International Policy of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). His duties included: maintaining communication links with communist and workers' parties of other states, obtaining and analyzing data on the situation in the foreign labor movement, spreading propaganda in other countries,

¹²³ Zelenov M. V. The apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) in 1939—1945: functions, structure, leaders. p. 226.

¹²⁴ Nevezhin V. A. If we go camping tomorrow. M., 2007. p. 55.

¹²⁵ Zelenov M. V. Apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) in 1939—1945: functions, structure, leaders. p. 227.

overseeing party relations abroad and carrying out contacts of various Soviet public organizations with foreign bodies. In addition, he selected and controlled the personnel of foreign policy bodies¹²⁶.

The following units were responsible for cultural and ideological work in the army and navy as departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b): the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army (headed by L. Z. Mehlis, then, from 1942, A. S. Shcherbakov) and the Main Political Directorate of the Navy (headed by I. V. Rogov in 1941—1946).

The directives of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda created a mechanism for carrying out ideological work during the war years. They had methodological and organizational significance. These regulations regulated a wide range of issues, ranging from the organization of propaganda bodies to methodological recommendations on the specifics of the implementation of ideas of patriotic education in various forms of culture and art. The detail of the regulation was such that the directives approved the main content of the campaign materials. Such attention to detail, on the one hand, somewhat hampered the freedom of creativity, but, on the other hand, the General Directorate of Political Propaganda and other bodies created to direct such work continuously analyzed and summarized the experience of using various propaganda sources. The study of anti—Soviet propaganda also played an important role. As a result, the images of propaganda and patriotic education found their embodiment in the images of culture and art, preserved in the modern public consciousness due to their effectiveness and high artistic embodiment.

The directive of the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army dated June 23, 1941, L. Z. Mehlis, to the members of the military councils reads as follows: "Immediately begin the systematic publication of newspapers in foreign languages: German, Polish, Finnish, Romanian by the forces of your editorial offices for transfer to the enemy's rear. Take into account the peculiarities of each hostile country and army, and do not allow simplistic

¹²⁶ Ibid. P. 228.

behavior. To distribute newspapers according to the situation in the most important areas and directions for us"¹²⁷.

Among the directives of the heads of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, L. 3. Mehlis and A. S. Shcherbakov, devoted to the recommendations of conducting propaganda in various forms of its embodiment by available technical means in culture and art, the following should be noted:

- "On chronicle filming on the fronts of the Patriotic War" dated December 30, 1941 to the heads of the political departments of the fronts¹²⁸;
- "On the use of broadcasting stations and trench installations" dated December 15, 1941 to the chiefs of the army political departments¹²⁹;
- "On the content of propaganda work on the subject of lectures, reports, conversations" dated November 14, 1941 to the heads of political departments of districts, fronts and individual armies¹³⁰;
- "On the schedule of radio broadcasts for the Red Army" dated March 10, 1945 to the heads of the political departments of the fronts and districts¹³¹;
- "On the use of fiction and political literature published by the GlavPU of the Red Army" dated December 31, 1942 to the heads of political departments of fronts and districts¹³²;
- "On the organization of film services for ordinary and officer personnel of the active army" dated August 18, 1943 to the heads of political departments of fronts and districts¹³³;
- "On improving the ideological and political content of newspapers published in the languages of the peoples of the USSR" dated April 4, 1944 to the heads of political departments of fronts and districts¹³⁴ and others .

The following directives were devoted to slogans and agitation:

¹²⁷ CAMO RF. F. 32 Op. 795436c. D. 3. L. 191.

¹²⁸ RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 71. L. 229—231.

¹²⁹ CAMO RF. F. 32. Op. 920265. D. 4. L. 136—137.

¹³⁰ Ibid. Op. 795436. D. 4. L. 191—193.

¹³¹ Ibid. Op. 11302. D. 288. L. 33.

¹³² Ibid. Op. 920265. D. 5. L. 833—835.

¹³³ Ibid. D. 6. L. 162—164.

¹³⁴ Ibid. D. 8. L. 42—43.

- Directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to Military Councils, heads of political departments of fronts, armies "On the publication of an editorial in the press of the Red Star "Executions of captured Red Army soldiers by the Germans"" dated December 10, 1941.¹³⁵;

- The directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the Military Councils, the front lines, the front armies, the front circles "On changing slogans on military newspapers" dated December 10, 1941.¹³⁶ and others.

The directives took into account the specifics of conducting propaganda among certain categories of the population and military personnel:

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of political departments of military districts "On the organization of educational work among soldiers drafted from the western regions of Ukraine" dated March 22, 1944.¹³⁷;

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of the political departments of the Moscow Military District, the Volga Military District, the Yuno—Ural Military District, the Central Asian Military District "On work among soldiers of non—Russian nationality in reserve brigades of districts" dated May 22, 1942.¹³⁸;

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of political departments of the districts, the Far Eastern, Trans-Baikal and Transcaucasian fronts, heads of political departments of republican, regional and regional military enlistment offices "On working with families of front-line soldiers" dated April 4, 1944.¹³⁹;

- Directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of political departments of military districts "On improving political work among the wounded" dated August 23, 1943.¹⁴⁰;

¹³⁵ Ibid. D. 4. L. 98.

¹³⁶ Ibid. L. 110.

¹³⁷ Ibid. Op. 795436. D. 12. L. 8—10.

¹³⁸ Ibid. Op. 920265. D. 5. L. 458—460.

¹³⁹ Ibid. D. 8. L. 34—37.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. D. 6. L. 169—170.

- The directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the Military Councils and the heads of the political departments of the fronts "On work among the population of the occupied regions and the party—political leadership of the partisan movement" dated August 19, 1941.¹⁴¹;

- Directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to Military councils and heads of political departments of the fronts "On the supply of literature to units and reconnaissance groups sent to occupied areas" dated July 23, 1941.¹⁴²;

- The directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of the political departments of the districts "On the organization of material and cultural services for the personnel of the replenishment" dated March 22, 1945.¹⁴³ and others.

Separate directives contained recommendations on holding holidays dedicated to important dates in the life of the country, in particular:

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of the political departments of the active fronts and armies "On the preparation and holding of the celebration of the XXIV anniversary of the Red Army" dated February 8, 1942.¹⁴⁴;

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of the political departments of the fronts and districts "On the organization of events in honor of the 25th anniversary of the proclamation of the Ukrainian SSR" dated December 13, 1942.¹⁴⁵ and others.

The directives also informed about the conduct of propaganda work among enemy soldiers, for example:

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of the political departments of the fronts (except the Far Eastern, Trans—Baikal, Transcaucasian), the head of the political department of the separate Primorsky Army "On

¹⁴¹ Ibid. D. 3. L. 245.

¹⁴² Ibid. Op. 795436. D. 3. L. 331.

¹⁴³ Ibid. Op. 920265. D. 8. L. 12—13.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. D. 5. L. 71—76.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. L. 798.

strengthening oral political propaganda and agitation among enemy troops" dated April 8, 1944.¹⁴⁶;

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of the political departments of the fronts (except the Far Eastern, Trans—Baikal, Transcaucasian), the head of the political department of the separate Primorsky Army "On ensuring timely operational information about the enemy" dated April 7, 1944.¹⁴⁷;

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of the political departments of the fronts (except the Far Eastern, Trans-Baikal and Transcaucasian), the head of the political department of the 7th separate Army "On strengthening political propaganda among soldiers of the German army" dated August 24, 1943.¹⁴⁸ and others.

Directives were adopted on organizational and staff measures to guide political work. In particular, we can note the directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army addressed to the military councils of fronts, armies, districts, commanders and commissars of divisions "On the introduction of military commissar positions in battalions of rifle divisions" dated December 28, 1941.¹⁴⁹.

Numerous directives have been issued on personnel policy in propaganda agencies:

- Directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to Military councils and heads of political departments of districts "On sending political workers after treatment in hospitals" dated August 22, 1941.¹⁵⁰;

- Directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to Military councils and heads of political departments of fronts, districts "On the release of commanders and military specialists from the posts of secretaries of party organizations" dated August 2, 1941.¹⁵¹;

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. Op. 11302. D. 202. L. 79—80.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. JI. 77—78.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. Op. 920265. D. 6. L. 171—172.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. D. 4. L. 305.

¹⁵⁰ CAMO RF. F. 32. Op. 795436. D. 4. L. 51—52.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. Op. 920265. D. 3. L. 141.

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to Military councils and heads of political departments of fronts and districts "On the creation of a reserve of political personnel in the troops" dated August 9, 1941.¹⁵²;

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to Military councils and heads of political departments of fronts, districts "On the selection of the best political workers for the posts of commissars of regiments and divisions" dated July 21, 1941.¹⁵³ and others.

Directives were regularly formed to improve the effectiveness of propaganda work:

- directive of the Chief of the Red Army to the military Commissar of the Engel Military School of Pilots to the regimental commissar Comrade. To Dergunov, head of the political department of the school, regimental Commissar Comrade. To Chernov "On the state of party and political work in the aviation regiments" dated March 1, 1942.¹⁵⁴;

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of political departments of military districts, heads of political departments of formations, military educational institutions "On improving party and political information in political departments of districts" dated June 22, 1944.¹⁵⁵ and others.

Directives as by-laws were also aimed at creating a mechanism for the execution of Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, among them the following can be noted:

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the Military Councils of the fronts on the implementation of the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces "On the procedure for awarding orders and medals of the USSR" dated August 18, 1941.¹⁵⁶;

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the Military Councils of the fronts on the implementation of the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR

¹⁵² Ibid. Op. 795436. D. 2. L. 31.

¹⁵³ Ibid. D. 3. L. 318—319.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. Op. 795436. D. 6. L. 16—19.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. Op. 11302. D. 227. L. 7—8.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid. Op. 920265. D. 3. L. 238.

Armed Forces "On awarding military ranks to the commanding staff and Red Army soldiers who distinguished themselves in the battles for the Motherland" dated August 18, 1941.¹⁵⁷;

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to all heads of political departments of fronts and districts, heads of political departments of individual armies "On studying the Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of May 1, 1945" dated May 4, 1945.¹⁵⁸ and others.

Directives were also created on the assignment of distinctive signs, in particular, the directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of political departments of fronts and districts "On awarding distinctive signs to wounded servicemen" dated September 9, 1942.¹⁵⁹

Directives explaining the policy of the USSR, expressed in official communications of the Soviet Information Bureau, diplomatic notes, etc., were important.:

- the directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to the heads of the political departments of the fronts (except for the Far Eastern Front and the Trans-Baikal Front) and individual armies on explaining the note of the Soviet government "On widespread looting, devastation of the population and monstrous atrocities of the German authorities in the Soviet territories they captured" dated January 8, 1942.¹⁶⁰;

- directive of the GlavPU of the Red Army to Military councils and heads of political departments of fronts and districts on explaining to the troops the message of the Sovinformburo "Political and military results of the year of the Patriotic War" dated June 23, 1942.¹⁶¹ and others.

An important event aimed at strengthening discipline and improving the organization of propaganda work was the revival of the institution of commissioners. Commissars and political workers relied on ideological supporters

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. L. 233.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. D. 8. L. 23.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. D. 5. L. 685.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid. L. 14.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. L. 528.

of the Communist Party. As A. Y. Bezugolny rightly notes, the Communists and Komsomol members became the "backbone of the military collective." The coordination of the work of political bodies in military units was carried out by the propaganda instructors of the political departments of the fronts and armies.¹⁶² Public organizations (Anti-Fascist committees) were created all over the country. They included scientists, women, youth, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, etc. All their activities were organized and distributed thanks to the Sovinformburo, which was subordinate to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b).

The Sovinformburo, formed on June 24, 1941, existed until 1961, and A. S. Shcherbakov was appointed its head. The activity of this organization consisted in compiling reports for radio, newspapers and magazines, working with war correspondents, informing embassies and consulates of the USSR abroad. I. V. Stalin personally supervised and supervised the reports.

By its Resolution in June 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) organized the Soviet Bureau of Military and Political Propaganda. Then, almost immediately, an order was issued by the head of this body, L. Z. Mehlis. According to this document, the bureau determined the direction and slogans of political ideology among the enemy troops, developed and approved particularly important general political leaflets addressed to the enemy troops, and monitored printed and oral propaganda on the fronts and in the army¹⁶³.

It is possible to note some additional instructions from L. Z. Mehlis, for example, the directive of June 26, 1941 to the heads of the Propaganda Departments of the fronts: "The following slogans are immediately translated into German, print one million copies of each slogan and scatter from airplanes among the German troops. About the execution and in which areas the slogans are scattered on a daily basis.

¹⁶² Bezugolny A. Y. "A German will not find shelter anywhere. Having escaped from the revenge of the Circassian, he will stumble upon the dagger of a Chechen, he will be struck down by an Ingush bullet...". *The Highlanders of the North Caucasus as an object of Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War // Voenno—istoricheskiy zhurnal* 2012. No. 7. p. 29.

¹⁶³ RGASPI. F. 495. Op. 77. D. 14. L. 2.

1. German soldiers! The German and Russian peoples want to live in peace with each other. Hitler tore up the non-aggression pact between Germany and Soviet Russia and involved you in an aimless and bloody war.

2. German soldiers! The Soviet Union faithfully fulfilled its obligations under the non-aggression treaty. Hitler attacked the Soviet Union without making any claims and without declaring war. Overthrow Hitler, let's end the war.

3. German soldiers! Down with Hitler's predatory war! Long live the friendship of the German and Russian peoples!

4. German soldiers! Hitler promised the German people peace, but gave them endless war. The whole of Europe is littered with your corpses. Down with Hitler, end the aimless war!

5. German soldiers! Soviet Russia did not and does not encroach on the independence and integrity of Germany. Think about what you're shedding your blood for!

6. German soldiers! Your comrades are fleeing from Hitler and joining us. The Red Army welcomes them as its brothers. Come over to our side. You are provided with safety and a good life"¹⁶⁴ and others.

Since February 23, 1942, the basis of propaganda among the enemy troops was laid by I. V. Stalin's order No. 55. Intensive propaganda work begins, which contained the following main ideas of the order:

1. The just nature of the Patriotic War of the Soviet people and the unfair nature of Hitler's predatory war.

2. The Red Army has the right and is obliged to destroy the oppressors of its homeland, the fascist occupiers. The expulsion of the occupiers, the liberation of the areas temporarily occupied by them is our goal of the war.

3. Hitler and his clique brought the German army to the brink of disaster.

4. Hitler's defeat is inevitable. But Hitler is not Germany. The Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain.

¹⁶⁴ CAMO RF. F. 32. Op. 920265. D. 2. L. 330—331.

5. Exposing the fascist theory of racial hatred. The theory and practice of racial hatred are leading Germany to disaster. The theory and practice of friendship of the peoples of Soviet Russia lead to victory and prosperity.

6. The Soviet people do not hate the people of Germany and do not encroach on its independence.

7. The way out for the German soldier and officer is surrender. If the enemy does not surrender, they are destroyed. If the enemy lays down his weapons, he is captured and his life is spared.

Most of the leaflets and brochures for German soldiers were devoted to explaining Stalin's order No. 55¹⁶⁵.

A year later, on June 16, 1942, the first meeting of the Council of Military and Political Propaganda was held. This body had advisory functions. It was established by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) in June 1942 under the GlavPU of the Red Army. His functions included analyzing the generalized experience of propaganda activities in the army, creating methodological recommendations in the field of political activity, and assisting the bodies that carried out propaganda work. At the meeting, it was decided to pay attention not only to the preparation and distribution of campaign materials, but also to direct communication with people: building personal contacts with soldiers and the population, organizing lecture events, etc. The questions about encouraging the initiative of the officers of the special propaganda were also approved. Further, the situation on the fronts was scrupulously analyzed, the strongest and weakest sides of the enemy were identified, coordination of political agitation among soldiers and civilians was determined, the most important directions of propaganda work were formulated, theses and slogans were put forward, arguments were given, etc.

Thus, propaganda in itself is not a purely positive or negative phenomenon. As such, it is necessary to strengthen State power and maintain stability in society. At the same time, the content of the information in it can be both negative and positive. Propaganda can pursue the following goals: fostering love for the

¹⁶⁵ RGASPI. F. 495. Op. 77. D. 14. L. 9.

motherland and interest in the history of one's country, respect for human and civil rights and freedoms, raising the level of culture and education, developing qualities such as internationalism, mutual assistance, etc. At the same time, it can also be used for negative purposes. A striking example is the propaganda of Nazi Germany. Its main message was the affirmation of ideas of racial superiority, the cult of violence, impunity towards the vanquished, enslavement or extermination of entire peoples, etc. Propaganda is a tool in the hands of the ruling elite, which is used to achieve certain goals.

Political agitation is used to influence the consciousness of citizens of their country and residents of foreign countries. In this regard, the goals of internal propaganda and propaganda aimed at transforming the public consciousness of the population of both real and potential enemy countries may be diametrically opposed. In the first case, it is necessary to strengthen the existing state and, if possible, eliminate existing social contradictions. In the second case, propaganda activities aimed at residents of other States can have a corrupting effect. For example, the slogans of the Soviet Country contained information about the inevitability of victory, the justice of the war against fascism, the social unity of Soviet society, and the inhumanity of the enemy. At the same time, propaganda aimed at soldiers and residents of Nazi Germany and its allies contained information that their society was fragmented, that workers should not die for the interests of capitalists, that the ruling political elite was criminal, therefore military personnel should surrender to save their lives.

Propaganda includes two structural components that affect different levels of public consciousness: legal psychology and legal ideology. The first reflects a person's feelings about the existing institutions of the state and law. The second is related to the formation of an integrated system of knowledge about the state and law. In this regard, Soviet propaganda profoundly influenced both the emotions and the logic of the citizens of the USSR. Emotional calls for revenge on enemies who kill women, children and the elderly were juxtaposed with visual agitation showing the real successes of the Red Army on the fronts, the power of the defense

industry, the senselessness of ending the struggle, because in this case the people are waiting for physical destruction, and the survivors will become slaves. Such methods were extremely effective.

The normative basis for the implementation of propaganda was made up of numerous Soviet laws and by-laws. Regulations governing propaganda activities were usually subordinate and issued in the form of orders for the army and special directives to units responsible for propaganda management.

The existence of an ideological institution was inextricably linked with the work of specialized state authorities. In the pre-war years, the Department of Propaganda and Agitation was created, which united several structural divisions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b): party propaganda, Marxist-Leninist training and retraining of party personnel (including newspaper workers), the press (with sectors of TASS, newspapers, magazines, publishing houses, printing and fiction), agitation (with the magazine "Agitator's Companion"), cultural and educational institutions, etc. In the army and Navy, there was the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army and the Main Political Directorate of the Navy as departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b). The Soviet Bureau of Military and Political Propaganda was created.

1.2. Using the mechanism of patriotic propaganda as a tool to strengthen the power of the Communist Party

The legitimacy of State power is one of the fundamental categories of statehood and law. The recognition by the people of the right of a certain circle of the elite to lead the state is fundamentally different from legality, i.e. the legality of performing such functions. The power of rulers can be completely legitimate both from the point of view of observing the proper legal procedure for its formation, and from the point of view of the legality of its implementation. Nevertheless, society has the right not to recognize the primacy of one or another political elite. The issued regulations and acts of application of the law may be ignored by the general public, the bureaucratic apparatus, law enforcement agencies and other structures.

In the USSR, there was an intertwining of state and party authorities. All key positions in the Soviet Country were held by members of the Communist Party. The vast majority of deputies of representative authorities at all levels were Communists. In each relatively large institution, organization, and enterprise, in addition to their leaders, there were party committees headed by their chairmen, who oversaw the implementation of the decisions of the ruling political party. The first secretaries of party organizations of regions and republics became their de facto heads, having greater powers than the chairmen of representative authorities and heads of executive committees and governments. Political departments headed by commissars, political officers and other similar positions existed in the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, branch management departments and other similar organizations. The most important tasks of the listed structures and their officials were:

- monitoring the observance of socialist legality and the implementation of decisions taken by the party congresses, the Politburo and the First secretary;
- conducting propaganda and educational work;
- solving personnel issues;

- taking into account the opinion of the population regarding the current leadership of organizations, institutions, executive committees, etc.;
- coordination of the work of various executive authorities, etc.

The actual power in the country was held by the CPSU(b), as well as its bodies and officials. A cult of personality was instilled against the leader of the ruling party and his associates, who held senior positions in the party and state apparatus. These political bodies were intertwined with each other. Every communist had to carry out the decisions of the party leadership. All key positions in the country were held by members of the CPSU(b), as a result, the supremacy of the ruling party in the executive, legislative and judicial authorities was ensured.

There was a certain limitation in this system. Legally, there was the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Supreme Court of the USSR and the subordinate authorities of both the Soviet Union and its constituent republics. They were not party in themselves, but key positions in them were held by party members. The source of their power was the people. Meanwhile, the election of the party leader by the people was not carried out, only members of the CPSU (b) took part in the congresses. As a result, the foundation for the preservation of such a system of power was the recognition of its guiding and guiding role by the broad masses of the population. The strengthening of legitimacy, propaganda and patriotic education became the basis for the existence of Soviet statehood. This model of the state was based on the power of an uncontested single ruling party with its overwhelming approval by the people. The Soviet state was ideocratic in its essence.

The USSR was one of the countries with a goal-oriented constitutional legislation. The fundamental principles of communist ideology were the basis of the entire system of Soviet law. This implies not just the propaganda of certain political ideas, but the fact that they already form the skeleton of the legal system of the state. As a result, their undermining and denial mean the death of the country. One of the fundamental postulates of Marxism stated that law is the will of the economically dominant class, which has been elevated to law. The Soviet

state was proclaimed a country of workers and peasants, and it was socialist as a transitional model on the way to building communism. The ruling party played the role of a wise leader who will bring the people to a strictly defined future of a classless society of universal justice. Any denial of ideological postulates was clearly perceived as a grave state crime, undermining the existing constitutional order and, in a broader social sense, as some unscientific heresy that had no right to exist. In this regard, the propaganda system was the foundation for the formation of the Soviet state, law and society. The main ideas of the communist ideology found support among the broad masses of the population. People have seen real economic growth in industry and agriculture, as well as an increase in the level of education. Achievements in the field of medicine have become significant. The material well-being of the citizens increased slowly but steadily. The country's military power grew rapidly. The CPSU(b), headed by I. V. Stalin, and in general the entire system of state party power enjoyed public support. On the eve of the war, the Soviet government already possessed all the necessary signs of legality and legitimacy. Legitimacy was based on the principles of charismatic leadership, in addition, the government relied on a legal constitutional framework based on elections. According to the 1936 Constitution, only persons serving sentences for serious criminal offenses did not have the right to vote in the country¹⁶⁶.

During the war years, the USSR experienced severe hardships. The enemy captured the areas where almost half of the country's population lived. The struggle was for the very possibility of the survival of our society and the state. Many propaganda ideas were reinterpreted as having proved their inadequacy in solving the issues of mobilizing the country to fight against a treacherous enemy. The postulates of brotherhood and proletarian solidarity of workers and peasants, of the inevitability of a world revolution and the priority of the class principle over the national, actually broke down against the harsh reality of the struggle against German national Socialism. Hitler's army, consisting overwhelmingly of

¹⁶⁶ The Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (approved by the resolution of the Extraordinary VIII Congress of Soviets of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of December 5, 1936) // *Izvestia of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the Central Executive Committee*. 1936. No. 283.

conscripted workers and peasants, committed monstrous crimes in our country, relying on the merciless ideas of National Socialism.

The Soviet government, despite serious defeats in the initial period of the war, retained support in society. At the same time, a number of ideological attitudes of the pre-war period were revised. An important motive for propaganda and patriotic education during the war years was the reliance on the traditions of the multinational population of our country. The traditional type of legitimization of power as a central link in the fight against the enemy turned out to be decisive during the war years. The appeals were addressed to the people's memory. The Communist Party showed reasonable flexibility and began to revive many traditional institutions of society, culture, law and statehood. For the first time, the central image of propaganda was the man himself and the entire Soviet society as a whole. The humanistic ideals of protecting the country, children, and home prevailed over the ideals of proletarian solidarity or world revolution. Propaganda images were embodied in various forms of culture and art, often of high artistic significance. Many of them are the cultural heritage of our people at the present time.

During the war years, we can talk about the transition of the ruling party to an indirect model of legitimization of power based on an appeal to the traditional type of legitimacy. The task of preserving the country with its multinational people and centuries-old history comes to the fore. The power of the Communist Party, the Soviet state and Soviet society is no longer considered in isolation from the eras of the Russian Empire, the Moscow Kingdom, Kievan Rus, as well as the statehood of other peoples of the USSR. Dmitry Donskoy, Ivan the Terrible, and Peter the Great were proclaimed progressive rulers whose historical experience must be adopted and used. A similar turn to the study of the history of pre-revolutionary Russia began already in the 1930s, but during the war it became decisive. Soviet leaders and military leaders were seen as continuers of the glorious traditions of our multinational people, including those related to the defense of the

country. The continuity of state power, law and culture with the pre-revolutionary period was emphasized.

A person with his natural desires to save his life, his native hearth and loved ones becomes the most important concern of the party and the government. Society is not a tool for achieving the goals of building communism. On the contrary, the State power and the ruling party serve the interests of protecting both the individual and the multinational people. Propaganda combines images designed to inculcate hatred of the enemy with appeals to the common man as a son, father or mother, as well as a warrior who gives his life for people close to him. "Brothers and sisters!"¹⁶⁷ — these words began the address of I. V. Stalin to the Soviet people. The government of the USSR, like previous generations of the country's leaders, regardless of their class origin, belonging to an economic class or religion, performed the general social function of protecting the state. It is no coincidence that it was during the war that the revival of The Patriarchate took place and the pre-revolutionary shoulder straps, previously firmly associated with the white army, were returned. The newly established orders were named after princes, generals and admirals of pre-revolutionary Russia, for example, the Order of Glory became an allusion to the St. George's Cross. In the first post-war years, the ministries traditional for the Russian Empire returned to replace the People's commissariats.

At the same time, it should be noted that the ruling party has not changed the course of development of the country. This is not about any kind of revisionism. The Soviet state was perceived as a more progressive model compared to previous eras. The significant achievements of the previous periods of statehood formation should have been preserved in the further development of the country. The ruling party showed that it sees in the Soviet man not the builder of communism, although this was also not forgotten, but a person with natural needs to have a family, children, a home, be safe, etc.

¹⁶⁷ Stalin I. V. On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. M., 1948. p. 9.

It is no coincidence that the children of a number of party leaders, such as I. V. Stalin, N. S. Khrushchev, and others, were participants in hostilities, and many of them died during the war. Deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR fought in the trenches along with ordinary citizens of the country. A high state or party position was not an exemption from participation in the struggle for the freedom of one's country. It was the Communists who aspired to primacy, demonstrating an example of heroism on the battlefield or selfless work in the rear. Such a policy has become the basis for ensuring the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party.

Political propaganda had many forms of embodiment in various works of culture and art, including painting, graphics, literature, and music. The created works had to comply with the methodological recommendations contained in numerous directives and other normative acts issued by the Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation, the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, the Main Political Directorate of the Navy.

During the war period, the formation of a new cultural policy took place, artists found non-standard forms to express their experiences. The works of the painters were focused on raising patriotic sentiments, love for their fatherland, and inciting feelings of hatred towards the enemy. The theme of the selfless struggle for the preservation of power of the Bolshevik Party has receded into the background. The artists focused on the feat of warriors, partisans and civilians in the fight against the merciless enemy. The idea was being introduced that the fascist invaders were waging a war to destroy the entire Soviet people and were opposing humanity itself by committing unthinkable crimes. They presented themselves as the enemies of every person, regardless of nationality, age, gender, religious or political affiliation. In this regard, it was indicative of the fact that there was a development of the genre of battle painting, which originated in pre-revolutionary art. The works of Soviet artists depicted Christian motives of the struggle against evil. Allusions to ancient motifs were used, in particular, the expulsion of unholy enemies from their land. Attention was focused on the

conscious acceptance of martyrdom by a person for the sake of saving other people. Dedication and self-denial could be traced in the exploits of the soldiers who defended Sevastopol, Leningrad, Stalingrad and other cities¹⁶⁸.

In the period from 1941 to 1945, Soviet painters continued to create, revealing in their paintings the various experiences of their fellow citizens. There was no shortage of vivid impressions. In their works, the creators admired people who steadfastly withstood inhuman trials. These works of art painstakingly depicted hatred of the enemy and the deepest sorrow for the dead.

The Soviet government provided painters with the opportunity to demonstrate their work to the whole country. Artists in the rear staged two All-Union exhibitions: The Great Patriotic War and The Heroic Front and Rear. In addition, their works were exhibited at national exhibitions. All artists strictly followed Soviet ideology and propaganda. The harsh everyday life of the Great Patriotic War is reflected in the canvases of the painters A. A. Deineki, A. A. Plastov, K. F. Yuon, S. A. Gerasimov and others. The courage of the Soviet troops can be seen on canvases:

- V. N. Yakovleva "The Battle of Streletskaya Sloboda" (1942);
- D. K. Mochalsky "The feat of 28 Panfilov Guards" (1942);
- A. Serebryany "Lesgaftovtsy. The Partisan detachment" (1942);
- J. D. Romas's "Winter Volleys of the Baltic" (1942) and others.

During the Great Patriotic War, a patriotic poster flourished in the graphics, which answered the propaganda tasks. He was distinguished by his didacticism and normativity, taught to take an example from his characters and act like them. The most striking examples:

- I. M. Toidze "The Motherland is calling!" (1941);
- Kukryniksy "Mercilessly defeat and destroy the enemy" (1941);
- V. B. Koretsky "Soldier of the Red Army, save!" (1942);
- T. A. Eremina "Partisans, take revenge without mercy!" (1942), etc.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Makarova O. S. Soviet art weapons 1941—1945, pp. 90—91.

Soviet propaganda in graphics and posters was deservedly recognized as an effective tool for influencing public consciousness. The graphic form reflected the struggle of light with darkness, good with evil. Red banners, stars and other symbols of the USSR opposed the black swastika and the German eagle. The power of the Communist Party was the personification of goodness and peace. The activities of the leadership of the Third Reich seemed to be evil and chaos. The graphics included genres such as political poster, newspaper and magazine drawing, book illustration and caricature, industrial applied graphics, film advertising and engraving¹⁷⁰.

It should be noted that the sculptural works erected during the war years were distinguished by significant originality. Due to the hardships of wartime, large sculptural forms were created in limited quantities. Such works of art were aimed at mobilizing people to fight a common enemy. They celebrated the exploits of soldiers and ordinary citizens who gave their lives on the battlefield. Most of the sculptures that appeared at this time glorified the outstanding deeds of specific individuals. Among them were both generals and marshals, as well as ordinary soldiers. Many monuments glorify both a specific person and the collective image of millions of ordinary people who, in difficult military conditions, did the impossible and sacrificed themselves for the sake of a common victory. Remembering and perpetuating the exploits of M. I. Kutuzov, A. S. Suvorov and other generals, the sculptors emphasized the continuity of military glory of pre-revolutionary and Red Army generals and marshals. At the same time, the traditions of Russian imperial and ancient battle sculpture are being revived. Allegorical images of defeated enemy banners, bas-relief battle scenes placed on the pedestals of monuments were an allusion to the Roman traditions of battle sculpture on triumphal arches and columns. The revival of the old school had a beneficial effect on the development of monumental art already in the post-war

¹⁶⁹ Gerchuk Yu. Ya. The history of graphics and art books: A textbook for university students. M., 2000. p. 309.

¹⁷⁰ Makarova O. S. Soviet art weapons 1941—1945, p. 91.

years. Thanks to the efforts of Soviet propaganda in this area, works were created that became the property of world culture¹⁷¹.

The government of the USSR sought to fully satisfy the needs of the population in spectacular forms of art. Films were shot that were not only dedicated to the fight against a common enemy, but also allowed Soviet citizens to forget about the tragic everyday life of the war for a while. Moreover, it was such films that generated confidence in the inevitability of the coming victory, allowed people to think about the future and not lose their human appearance in this terrible time. The Soviet government cared not only about the physical survival of people, conducting evacuations, establishing a card system, and fighting crime. The ruling Communist Party singled out the spiritual education of a person and the maintenance of his high morale as the most important tasks. Setting difficult guidelines for citizens, it at the same time provided an opportunity for recreation, providing light comedy films, fairy tales, historical and educational tapes, as well as films produced in other countries. The Soviet government showed that it addresses the population precisely as citizens, as people with their thoughts and feelings, and not as soulless executors of its will. Such a policy undoubtedly strengthened the legitimacy of the ruling party and united the country¹⁷².

The leader of the Soviet people could get real ideas about military events only from the footage of front-line newsreels, he watched it carefully and a lot. There is evidence that some documentary filming was carried out personally for I. V. Stalin. From the very beginning of the war and up to May 1944, no repressive measures were taken against the leadership of the Cinematography Committee, and the best film works were awarded¹⁷³.

During the Great Patriotic War, newsreels became the most operational type of cinema. This is confirmed by the impressive volume of releases of "Combat Film Collections", as well as newsreels, documentaries and films. The directive of

¹⁷¹ Makarova O. S. Features of the development of Soviet sculpture during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // Prospects for using the digital space of knowledge in science and education: a collection of scientific papers. 2023. pp. 391—395.

¹⁷² Makarova O. S. Soviet artistic weapons 1941—1945, pp. 117—118.

¹⁷³ Fomin V. I. The History of Russian cinematography (1941—1968). M., 2019. pp. 26—32.

the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, L. Z. Mehlis, to the heads of the political departments of the fronts "On chronicle filming on the fronts of the Patriotic War" dated December 31, 1941 states the following: "Films created on the basis of documentary films are a powerful political tool for the political education of Red Army soldiers and many generations of Soviet people. A good front-line film report shown on foreign screens is a convincing means of propaganda and popularization of the forces and power of the Red Army. I order you: pay attention to the filming of direct battles of offensive operations of all branches of the armed forces, the exploits of the most distinguished units of the Red Army, its fighters, commanders, and political workers. To provide more expressive filming of the actions of infantry, machine gunners, mortars, tankers, signallers, scouts, to shoot captured trophies more widely and pay special attention to film documents of the atrocities of the Nazi occupiers. In the process of preparing cameramen for filming, of course, to ensure the preservation of military secrets, not to devote film groups to operations taking place at the front. At least once every 10 days, send all the filmed material to the Main Directorate of the Red Army"¹⁷⁴.

Special films were also created for propaganda purposes, these were pictures that instructed the population. From the note to the explanatory note on the annual report of the Main Directorate for the Production of Scientific and Educational-technical films for 1942, it follows: "... in his May Day order, the People's Commissar of Defense T. Stalin wrote: "The task of the Red Army, its fighters, its machine gunners, its artillerymen, its mortar men, its tankmen, its pilots and cavalrymen is to learn military science, to study persistently, to study their weapons perfectly, to become masters of their craft and thus learn how to beat the enemy for sure.". To accomplish this task, military educational paintings play an important role. This type of film is currently gaining special importance and plays an essential role in the training of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army..."¹⁷⁵.

¹⁷⁴ RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 71. L. 229—231.

¹⁷⁵ RGALI. F. 2455. Op. 1. D. 44. L. 22—26.

The central themes of the documentary of the Great Patriotic War were the nodal events of military operations, generalized pictures of the struggle of the Soviet people, the confrontation of the people with the invaders in the rear, the resistance of the occupied countries. Famous directors participated in the creation of documentaries: S. A. Gerasimov, S. I. Yutkevich, Yu. Ya. Raisman, A. G. Zarkhi, I. E. Heifits.

Separately, we note that the party leadership of Leningrad, headed by A. A. Zhdanov, pursued a policy aimed at improving the morale of the population, including by suppressing many facts from the life of the city. It was necessary to "not exaggerate." In particular, when discussing the documentary film "The Defense of Leningrad" and Zinaida Shishova's poem "The Road of Life", it was said that it was impossible to show the suffering of the city so vividly. The position was expressed that this could lower morale, and detract from the feat of the defenders of the city. It was recommended to pay more attention to the heroism of home front workers and soldiers. It was not necessary to inflate the difficulties existing in Leningrad once again¹⁷⁶.

Artistic cinematography turned to a short propaganda novel to reflect the realities of military events. The heroic novel was a front-line essay about the heroes and their exploits.

It is important to emphasize that during the war years, cinematographers made attempts to raise acute social issues and spoke directly or hinted at the fallacy of the path the Communist Party was leading the country along. In this regard, the criticism of the painting "Ukraine on Fire" by A. P. Dovzhenko by I. V. Stalin is indicative. The analysis of this film was used as an excuse to build the right propaganda line in Soviet films.

In particular, the following was noted:

- 1) the inadmissibility of nationalist propaganda in the inherently international Soviet state;

¹⁷⁶ Sobolev G. L. Leningrad in the struggle for survival in the blockade. Book two: June 1942 — January 1943. St. Petersburg, 2015. p. 75.

2) the inadmissibility of justifying betrayal towards one's country and people in order to save one's own life;

3) the harmfulness of criticism of the communist system, whatever it may be expressed in, and the irreversibility of the social transformations of the Soviet government;

4) the blasphemy of portraying in a negative light the citizens of the USSR who fought fascism;

5) the prohibition of revising the history of the peoples of the Soviet Country as an action that undermines the unity of the state and the dissemination of false discrediting information about prominent figures of the past;

6) prohibition of the dissemination of defamatory information about the policies of the Communist Party and revisionism in relation to the ideas of Leninism;

7) the inadmissibility of comparing the USSR with bourgeois states and Fascist Germany, indicating their superiority as the reason for the defeats of the first years of the war;

8) the need to highlight the peaceful nature of the USSR's foreign policy and the extraordinary circumstances caused by the treacherous invasion.

During the war, a variety of animated paintings were created. Some of them were, in fact, propaganda posters, which presented a bestial image of the enemy. Fascist leaders were shown in comic situations, which made it possible to fight the fear of invaders. At the same time, game tapes based on folk tales and literary works by both domestic and foreign authors were created. Let's identify the most famous cartoons of the Great Patriotic War:

- "New Year's Tree" (1942) by P. N. Nosov and M. M. Tsekhanovsky;
- "The Fox, the Hare and the Rooster" (1942) by O. P. Khodataeva;
- "The Stolen Sun" (1944) by I. P. Ivanov—Vano;
- "The Tale of Tsar Saltan" (1943) and "Sinbad the Sailor" (1944) by sisters V. S. Brumberg and Z. S. Brumberg;
- "The Eagle and the Mole" (1944) by P. P. Sazonov and L. Bredis;

- "Telephone" (1944) by M. M. Tsekhanovsky and others¹⁷⁷.

The creation of a communication line of epochs is a characteristic feature of musical works during the war years. At all times, it was music that was the most important tool for raising the spirits of soldiers on the battlefield. In their musical works, the composers sought to show the centuries-old history of the peoples of the USSR in their struggle against conquerors, in the conquest of nature, in an effort to create a better future. The Great Patriotic War should not have been perceived as an unprecedented disaster, the outcome of which is difficult to predict. On the contrary, it was emphasized that in the history of the country such invasions were repeated and always ended with the defeat of the enemy¹⁷⁸.

In 1941—1945, army music became widespread, which played an important role in the military education of the Red Army personnel. It was filled with patriotic content and had a socially mobilizing character. Musical compositions were performed by military bands, which were kept at the headquarters of divisions, reserve army and front-line regiments¹⁷⁹.

Army music had a number of functions:прикладная (сопровождение воинских ритуалов);

- 1) providing control (signaling);
- 2) ideological (propaganda of communist ideology);
- 3) cognitive (transfer of specific combat experience);
- 4) the function of historical continuity (the revival of army combat traditions);
- 5) socializing (turning people into a single fighting family);
- 6) educational (formation of the spiritual world of fighters and commanders);
- 7) communicative (organization of interpersonal contacts);

¹⁷⁷ Makarova O. S. Multiplikation als Form der Verkörperung der Bilder der Propaganda der UdSSR und Deutschlands 1941—1945 // Knowledge sharing in the educational process: collection of scientific papers. 2021. p. 126.

¹⁷⁸ Makarova O. S. Soviet propaganda in musical form in 1941—1945. // Military History: people, destinies, conflicts. 2020p. 184.

¹⁷⁹ Batyuk L. I. Culture of Russia during the Great Patriotic War: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. M., 2005. pp. 101—102.

- 8) suggestive (creation of works of symbols, works of spells);
- 9) anticipations (generalization of repetitive facts);
- 10) compensatory (preservation and restoration of mental balance);
- 11) aesthetic (formation of aesthetic tastes)¹⁸⁰.

The song genre has become one of the most popular. The Soviet people claimed that the frontline song was a real rifle. The song was played everywhere: before execution, in captivity, on vacation, etc. Let's list some of the most popular songs of that time:

- V. P. Solovyov—Sedogo and A. D. Churkin "Evening on the Raid" (1941);
- K. Ya. Listov and A. A. Surkov "In the Dugout" (1942);
- N. V. Bogoslovsky and V. I. Agatov "Dark Night" (1943);
- M. I. Blanter and M. V. Isakovsky "In the Frontline Forest" (1942—1943);
- S. A. Katz and A.V. Sofronov "The Bryansk forest was noisy severely" (1942), etc.¹⁸¹

In September 1941, D. D. Shostakovich performed on the radio with his famous Leningrad, or Seventh, Symphony. In 1943, the composer wrote the Eighth Symphony about the unquenchable faith in the victory of the Soviet people. S. S. Prokofiev dedicated the Fifth and Sixth Symphonies to the greatness of the human spirit and his native land.

Composers, like other cultural and artistic figures, turn to the heroic past. During the war years, such characteristic works appeared as the oratorio "The Legend of the Battle for the Russian Land" by Yu. A. Shaporin, the cantata "Kirov with Us" by N. Ya. Myaskovsky, the epic opera "War and Peace" by S. S. Prokofiev, the opera "Yemelyan Pugachev" by M. V. Koval, etc.

¹⁸⁰ Kulish A.V. The musical culture of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War: a historical study: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. M., 2004. pp. 30—31.

¹⁸¹ Materials on the history of the song of the Great Patriotic War / Comp. Krupyanskaya V. Yu., Mints S. I. M., 1953. p. 187.

During the war, numerous documents were published related to the perpetuation of the memory of one or another creative figure of the past. An example is Resolution No. 278 of March 13, 1944 "On commemoration of the centenary of the birth of N. A. Rimsky-Korsakov"¹⁸².

Wartime stamps were used as a propaganda tool. We are talking about one of the forms of artistic embodiment of images that become part of the public consciousness. Postage stamps and postcards are small in size, but are often found in everyday use. They were part of the daily life of a Soviet person and were purchased at the price that was indicated on them. As a rule, the nominal value was small and amounted to pennies. Postage stamps were available to the general public when using postal services.

The task was to convey important information to a person in a short, concise form. Slogans with unambiguous information that did not require any additional interpretation were introduced into the public consciousness. As an example, the brand "Be a hero!"¹⁸³ 1941 . It depicts a young soldier in a greatcoat and with a weapon, who is hugged by an elderly woman. Her left hand is pressed against the soldier's heart. The image of the son and mother in this image is obvious. The message to the soldier is also obvious, what his mother expects from him, which can also be considered as an image of the motherland. Heroism is what his mother and the motherland as a whole demand from a soldier. In order to make this conclusion, a fleeting glance at the image is enough. The circulation of the brand "Be a hero!" amounted to 3 million copies, but almost all of it was destroyed in the bombing. The name of I. V. Stalin is mentioned on the stamp "People's Militia" in 1941.¹⁸⁴ It contains a motto that tells that at the call of the great leader, the sons of the Soviet people join the militia.

The stamps were printed with images of A.V. Suvorov, M. I. Kutuzov, D. M. Pozharsky and others. The appeal to the images of the heroes of the past was a characteristic feature of the Soviet propaganda of the war period. The stamps

¹⁸² RGALI. F. 2456. Op. 1. D. 915. L. 17—18.

¹⁸³ Postage stamps of the Russian Empire. The RSFSR. USSR. 1857—1965. Ed. Zagorsky V. B., St. Petersburg: Standard Collection, 2018. 357. P. 137.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. P. 137.

depicted battle scenes associated with these heroes. The society was reminded that this was not the first war and the motherland was in danger many times, but won victories on land and at sea.

Numerous stamps contained sketches from front-line life. They depicted scouts, snipers, tankers, etc. in a combat situation. On such widely distributed stamps, the slogans "Death to the fascist occupiers!", "Let's cleanse the homeland from the fascist beasts!", "Death to the German invaders!", "For the Motherland, for Stalin!" and others were repeatedly replicated. A series of stamps depicting scenes of labor had the slogan "Rear to the front." Stamps dedicated to the victories of the Soviet troops were issued, for example, the "Stalingrad — hero City" stamp of 1945.¹⁸⁵ A significant number of stamps were dedicated to specific people who performed feats during the war, for example Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya (1942), machine gunner X. Nuradilov (1944) and others. The country should have known and remembered its heroes, many of whom had already given their lives for their homeland. As a result, postage stamps, which were originally a utilitarian item, have become an important means of propaganda and preserving the memory of war heroes.

It is worth noting certain changes in the propaganda line regarding the creation of musical works. At the beginning of the war, writing and performing lyrical compositions was discouraged and often explicitly prohibited as allegedly negatively affecting soldiers and home front workers. Subsequently, this practice was discontinued. The attitude towards citizens precisely as people with their own thoughts, hopes and feelings, and not only as objects of propaganda and executors of the will of party leaders, has become the defining line of propaganda in the field of musical creativity¹⁸⁶.

During the war, the Soviet government paid great attention to propaganda through radio broadcasting. This method was the most convenient, since it allowed for the dissemination of information among citizens in the shortest possible time

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. P. 147.

¹⁸⁶ Makarova O. S. Soviet propaganda in musical form in 1941—1945, p. 186.

when equipping the area and premises with radio points. No other way of transmitting information at that time was distinguished by such efficiency. Shortwave radio broadcasting made it possible to spread messages to vast territories, including those occupied by the enemy. At the same time, citizens were obliged to hand over radios and be content with wired broadcasting through radio points in the premises, as well as loudspeakers installed on the streets of Soviet cities and villages. The information had to be lightning fast, reliable and at the same time limited. Receiving information only through radio streams did not provide the possibility of using radio broadcasting for Nazi propaganda¹⁸⁷.

Soviet enterprises were constantly developing new models of radio equipment, which were then supplied to military units. For example, partisans operating behind enemy lines had the opportunity to keep in touch with the "Mainland". The All-Union Radio Committee constantly received letters for the front from the Soviet people and from soldiers from the front. These letters were read out by announcers, so radio listeners could keep in constant contact with each other. It is known that during the war period, the radio committee received 2 million such messages. I. V. Stalin more than once gave orders through radio broadcasting, numerous groups of Soviet citizens gathered near street loudspeakers and listened attentively to them. In addition to the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, messages about the victories of the Red Army were broadcast on the radio, and party leaders of the Soviet state often spoke. For example, in 1942, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M. I. Kalinin addressed the people¹⁸⁸.

Radio broadcasts on a variety of Socio-Political and patriotic topics showed high efficiency (for example, calls to collect warm clothes for defenders of the motherland on one or another front). Another important function of Soviet radio is the fight against counter-propaganda. By the end of 1941, Soviet radio

¹⁸⁷ Makarova O. S Radio propaganda of the USSR and the Third Reich in 1941—1945 // Psychology of human and society. No. 2. pp. 47—51.

¹⁸⁸ Chestnov F. I. In the world of radio. M., 1954. p. 64.

broadcasting to foreign countries was conducted in 23 foreign languages, an example is the weekly broadcast of "Fighting France"¹⁸⁹.

The truthfulness of the information provided to citizens made it possible to avoid panic in their ranks. The radio points were originally intended for the implementation of civil defense tasks and coped with their task during the war years. Through radio messages, citizens received information about air raids, artillery shelling, the location of bomb shelters, evacuation, etc. Radio broadcasting in besieged Leningrad was of exceptional importance for maintaining the moral and psychological spirit of the population. The messages on the radio gave hope of victory in the war. They were often the only source of information for powerless citizens. It would not be an exaggeration to say that radio broadcasting in the besieged city saved many human lives, giving rise to hope in people, strengthening their morale. The survivors warmly recalled the radio messages with which the man did not feel his loneliness¹⁹⁰.

Thus, initially the tasks of broadcasting during the war were purely utilitarian. In practice, since the first days of the war, radio broadcasts have become the voice of the government and the population. Soviet citizens received daily the most truthful information about the situation on the fronts, as far as possible in wartime conditions. The leaders of the ruling party, representatives of local authorities and the military command directly addressed the people during these difficult years. People literally heard the voice of the Soviet government. The speakers of the Soviet Information Bureau also read out letters from soldiers and home front workers. The government and the people had to feel their unity in achieving a common goal — victory over the enemy¹⁹¹.

Soviet political propaganda in literary works created the illusion that every citizen was involved in the great achievements of the USSR in science, economics, culture and other areas of public life. The government dictated tasks that were understandable and close to each person, thereby gaining solidarity with the whole

¹⁸⁹ Makarova O. S. Radio propaganda of the USSR and the Third Reich in 1941—1945. p. 49.

¹⁹⁰ Sobolev G. L. Leningrad in the struggle for survival in the blockade. Book one: June 1941 — May 1942. St. Petersburg, 2013. p. 320.

¹⁹¹ Ibid. P. 50.

people. The literary works created in 1941—1945 were formed mainly with the aim of demonstrating the aggressive, aggressive nature of this war on the part of Germany and, accordingly, the liberation mission of the Soviet government. Despite the extreme conditions, the spiritual life of society in the USSR continued to develop. Many writers were published in printing houses marked "lightning". Literary works created during the war years became an effective weapon in the fight against fascism¹⁹².

The literature of the Great Patriotic War was characterized by emotionality, drama, intensity of style and other similar features. The most popular forms of artistic works were the short story and the novella, they spelled out vivid folk characters that extinguished the fear of mortal combat.

I. V. Stalin singled out outstanding literary figures not only in his speeches. For example, he signed Resolution No. 490 of April 29, 1944. "On the fortieth anniversary of the death of A. P. Chekhov." An All-Union Committee was established to conduct this event. In addition, the authorities organized the release of the complete works of the writer, as well as the installation of a monument to Chekhov in Moscow.¹⁹³ People had to remember what the war was about. The Government set itself the goal of preserving not only people's lives, but also the culture of a multinational people. The memory of outstanding cultural figures was honored even in the most difficult years of the war.

Such historical works as "Nakhimov" and "Napoleon" by E. V. Tarle, "Genghis Khan" and "Batu" by V. Yana, "Dmitry Donskoy" by S. P. Borodin were in high demand among readers. The works of A. A. Akhmatova, A. P. Platonov and other authors began to be published.

In 1941—1945, new ideologists needed familiar and understandable heroes to maintain the political climate in the country. The updated literary repertoire includes slogans of such characters who controlled human feelings and destinies. Many quotes from recognizable literary characters were shown on various posters.

¹⁹² Makarova O. S. Literary political works of Soviet propaganda (1941—1945) // Step into historical science 2019. pp. 363—366.

¹⁹³ RGALI. F. 2456. Op. 1. D. 915. L. 23—24.

By 1942, there were many articles in the press about the deeds of the country's iconic personalities. They were read by soldiers before battles and in the trenches¹⁹⁴.

The most important themes in the literature of the war period are patriotism and national identity. For example, in 1942, as part of a state order, I. L. Selvinsky wrote the drama "General Brusilov". It was a brave act, as it was forbidden to write positively about Nicholas II and former tsarist generals. The author thoroughly thinks over the plot of the play and the image of the main character, the Bolshevik sergeant Kovalev. It is he who convinces Brusilov to launch a general offensive, and the tsarist generals are trying in various ways to interfere with the right cause.¹⁹⁵

During the war, literature followed a free course focused on the fight against the invaders. The works of art dedicated to the hardy workers of the rear, the amazing feats of the partisans and the heroism of soldiers at the front, glorified the outstanding qualities of the Russian people during the years of military trials¹⁹⁶.

Soviet writers K. M. Simonov, N. A. Tikhonov, A. N. Tolstoy, A. A. Fadeev, K. A. Fedin, M. A. Sholokhov, I. G. Ehrenburg and many others were engaged in covering military life.

During the war years, books about the heroes who fought for their homeland with numerous invaders, as well as about the great generals and soldiers of the current war, were very popular in the country. It should be noted that such works were small in volume. As a rule, they were issued on one or two sheets. These pamphlets, due to their popularity, were printed in mass editions. In 1941—1945, more than 33.6 million copies of propaganda works were published in various printing houses in the country¹⁹⁷.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Starodubova O. Y. Fiction as a means of propaganda: the formation of the image of the Brusilov breakthrough in Soviet fiction of the 1940s // *History. Historical sciences*. 2010. p. 180.

¹⁹⁶ Simmons E. J. Political Control and Soviet Literature (translated from English. Koltysheva S. Ya.) // *Politicheskaya lingvistika* 2008. No. 1(24). p. 162.

¹⁹⁷ Okorokov A. Z. In the world of the Soviet political book. Book. Research and materials. 1964. Issue 9. pp. 56—68.

Soviet propaganda in the press in 1941—1945 underwent a number of changes: the issues and volume of trade publications and magazines decreased, the network of military and front-line newspapers expanded. During this period, recommendations were developed for regional and local newspapers.

The poetry of 1941—1945 is the voice of the Soviet people, which sounded from everywhere and told about the bloody events of the war. Many poets proudly called themselves privates of the newspaper regiment. Their poems were born in the most difficult conditions of the war and became a kind of chronicle of this era. There was an exhausting propaganda struggle, the party word everywhere escalated the wartime situation¹⁹⁸.

Popular lyrics by famous poets could be found in newspapers and magazines. One of the most beloved works of the people was the song of M. V. Isakovskiy "Ogonyok". Many themes, plots, and images of 1941—1945 were subordinated to the main task: to show contempt for the enemy and hit him with "cannon laughter"¹⁹⁹.

The most important military newspaper of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War was *Krasnaya Zvezda*, edited by D. I. Ortenberg. The publication published information about the situation on the fronts. Each issue was proofread by the General Staff. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command sent its recommendations and comments to the publisher. At the same time, *Krasnaya Zvezda* was the most popular literary newspaper²⁰⁰.

There was a publishing center in Moscow, where, for example, 1,300 issues of the *Pravda* newspaper were published between 1941 and 1945. In addition to *Pravda*, more than 100 other multi—editions have been published. Newspapers were a platform for political propaganda and agitation²⁰¹.

¹⁹⁸ Makarova O. S. Patriotic propaganda in periodicals during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // XXIII Tsarskoye Selo Readings 2019. Vol. 1. pp. 222—226.

¹⁹⁹ Vakurova O. A. Source studies of literary activity of writers during the Great Patriotic War. // Pushkin Leningrad State University Journal. 2009. No. 1. p. 12.

²⁰⁰ Ortenberg D. I. Year 1942. The story—chronicle. M., 1988. p. 5.

²⁰¹ Andreev P. P., Bukov K. I., Vasiliev A.V., etc. The history of Moscow during the Great Patriotic War and in the post-war period 1941—1965. M., 1967. p. 188.

The love of the motherland and the desire to help the country's leadership in this difficult time led the writers to the active army of the USSR. Literary disputes have stopped, as can be seen from the transcript of the writers' meeting in the early days of the war: "Every Soviet writer is ready to devote all his strength, all his experience and talent, all his blood, if necessary, to the cause of the holy people's war against the enemies of our Motherland"²⁰². So, in 1942, A. A. Beck arrived as a war correspondent in the 8th Guards Rifle Division named after I. V. Panfilov. Subsequently, he wrote the heroic story "Panfilovites at the first turn"²⁰³. By the end of the war, there was also an increase in the number of publications of foreign literature²⁰⁴.

Numerous means of agitation and propaganda were used in theatrical productions, expressed in the form of propaganda posters, cartoon dolls, etc. The Soviet government actively promoted the development of theatrical creativity, while it sought to manage all processes in this art form²⁰⁵.

For example, during the war years before the German occupation, the cultural institutions of Sevastopol continued their work. Two theaters were still functioning — the Russian Drama Theater named after A. V. Lunacharsky and the Krasnoflotsky Theater named after B. A. Lavrenev. There were several cultural centers, as well as the Pioneer Palace, three cinemas and thirteen libraries²⁰⁶. Even under these conditions, not only a commandant was assigned to each shelter, but also a political worker and propagandists. Regular work was carried out to educate citizens: informing them of the situation on the fronts, reading newspapers, holding lectures, a number of very limited concert events, etc. New Year celebrations and other memorable dates were carried out. The city city Committee received regular information about the morale of the population and, if possible, provided

²⁰² Pravda. (Moscow) 1941. June 24.

²⁰³ Nikiforov Yu. A. Rzheshesky O. A., Glukharev N. N. The Great Patriotic War. 1941—1945: encyclopedia. M., 2015. p. 51.

²⁰⁴ Vasiliev V. I. Book publishing during the Great Patriotic War // New and modern history. 2004. No. 5. pp. 45—52.

²⁰⁵ Makarova O. S. The contribution of theatrical artists to patriotic agitation and propaganda in 1941—1945. // XXIII Tsarskoye Selo Readings 2019. Vol. 1. pp. 226—229.

²⁰⁶ Ruzaev S. V. Activity of the authorities of the city of Sevastopol in 1941-1942: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. St. Petersburg, 2021. p. 203.

household services, including organizing access to cultural and promotional events²⁰⁷ Thus, under extraordinary circumstances, the city authorities created conditions to meet not only the physical but also the spiritual needs of the population²⁰⁸.

In early July 1941 The Presidium of the All-Russian Theater Society (WTO) organized work in all theaters of the country to create a defense and Anti-Fascist repertoire. The patriotic movement of the theatrical intelligentsia, together with the Committee for the Arts, began to restructure the work of creative institutions in a military manner. Concert services were organized in mobile conditions, propaganda work with the audience was launched, and a massive merger of various creative teams took place²⁰⁹.

Russian Russian People" by K. M. Simonov, "Russian Character" by A. N. Tolstoy, "General Brusilov" by I. A. Solovyov, "The Governor" by A. N. Ostrovsky, "The Inspector" by N. V. Gogol, "1812", "Field Marshal Kutuzov" and "The Great Sovereign" by V. A. Solovyov, "Russian People" by K. M. Simonov, "Russian Character" by A. N. Tolstoy, "General Brusilov" by I. L. Selvinsky and the staging of L. N. Tolstoy's novel "Anna Karenina".

The WTO, headed by the chairman, People's Artist of the USSR A. A. Yablochkina, created five front-line theaters:

1. Theater of the Northern and Black Sea Fleet (N. I. Rybnikov).
2. The Theater of the Central, Ukrainian and Belarusian fronts (directed by I. K. Lipsky).
3. Komsomol Youth Theater (directed by I. M. Rayevsky).
4. Opera House (A. V. Bogdanovich).
5. Miniature Theater "Merry Landing" (V. S. Polyakov).

The above-mentioned creative groups collectively gave 2,233 concerts on all fronts of the Great Patriotic War ²¹⁰.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 207.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 215.

²⁰⁹ Gerasimova N. P. Patriotic activity of Moscow theaters during the Great Patriotic War: dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. M., 1988. pp. 37—40.

²¹⁰ Batyuk L. I. Culture of Russia during the Great Patriotic War. pp. 82—83.

It took the Soviet leadership less than a day to organize the first concert brigades as part of political propaganda. In Moscow, the composition of such groups numbered about 700 people, they held more than 450 concerts. 3,685 art brigades visited the front. Over 42,000 creative workers participated in the organization of these events.²¹¹ Concert crews gave combined performances, which could consist of various circus acts, excerpts from opera or drama performances, songs, and satirical stories. In a directive letter dated July 6, 1941, an instruction was prescribed for the reduction and unification of individual theater troupes²¹². Quickly formed creative teams, consisting of artists of different genres, went to mobilization points.

The departments responsible for issues of patriotic propaganda of frontline and army subordination sent applications to the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. The required number of brigades was determined there, as well as their further routes were planned. In conclusion, a general consolidated application was formed in the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. In the future, it was transferred for study to the Task Force of the Committee for the Arts under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. In this state institution, a departure plan was drawn up for performances by creative workers in a given month. Similar plans were presented to theater groups. Those, in turn, based on them compiled lists of artists who were planned to be invited to perform. These lists were preliminary. They were approved by this committee under the SNK. It is important to note that all creative teams necessarily passed the inspection commission. Its main task was to determine the relevance for propaganda work and to assess the overall artistic level of the programs. As a result, it should be noted²¹³.

Theatrical and concert creativity at the front performed a number of functions that were so necessary for the Soviet elite to increase their legitimacy, as well as to rally society to defeat the enemy. There were many of them, it is necessary to highlight the following as the main ones:

²¹¹ Pravda (Moscow). 1941. July 2

²¹² GARF. F. 5508. Op. 3. D. 103. L. 1.

²¹³ RGALI. Ф. 962. Op. 3. D. 1104 (1). L. 38.

1. The cognitive function reflected the knowledge of the world in images. They were positive and negative, but recreated the reality of time.

2. The educational function gave an assessment of what the creative team depicted, what they wanted to express by their action, and they expressed, as a rule, what the leadership of the USSR dictated. A specific image of the proper behavior of a Soviet person in war conditions was being formed. The highest virtue was a feat when a soldier gave his life defending the country, compatriots and the world as a whole in the face of the threat of destruction. Self-denial for the common good and the salvation of the motherland was the most important guarantee of victory and the life of future generations.

3. The communicative function was also important, which is closely related to the human need for ordinary communication. She filled in the missing emotional impressions and experiences of each person. Thanks to this function, a dialogue took place with the characters of literature, performance, and dance that struck the imagination. Each person had to perceive himself, first of all, as part of one large collective, the entire Soviet society. Everyone was obliged to sacrifice their interests for the sake of other people's lives. Even when they found themselves in a seemingly hopeless situation, everyone could feel the struggle of the entire Soviet society, the army and the government for their lives. It was not the doom of the situation, but the belief in the inevitability of victory that should have been formed among the fighters of the partisan movements and residents of besieged Leningrad, who held the bridgeheads from which the inevitable offensive was supposed to be launched to liberate the Soviet homeland. In this regard, no one should have to experience loneliness. In that difficult time²¹⁴.

These functions are in the sphere of social and historical-cultural phenomena. They had a decisive influence on the formation of the mass consciousness of Soviet society. Love for the motherland and self-sacrifice become the most important leitmotif. At the same time, we must not forget about the

²¹⁴ Makarova O. S. The role and importance of propaganda activities of theatrical art workers on the formation of public legal awareness during the Great Patriotic War of 1941—1945. // *Sociology and law*. 2019. No. 4. pp. 34—39.

political aspect of this issue. The authority of the leaders of the ruling party was based on the universal conviction that victory in the war was possible only under their leadership.

The role of artistic creativity, embodied in theatrical performances in 1941—1945, and its influence on the formation of public consciousness is difficult to overestimate. The audience formed the highest feelings that a person should have. It is about love for the motherland, morality, self-sacrifice for the sake of saving the fatherland, etc. We must not forget that theatrical, concert, audiovisual and other works themselves often became masterpieces that enriched world art. The audience developed a high artistic taste. Political propaganda, whose basic tenets were introduced into the public consciousness through artistic techniques, focused on the images of a warrior and a home front worker selflessly fulfilling their duty. At the same time, works about peaceful life, family, motherhood, childhood, love, as well as simple human joys were not excluded. The viewer was immersed in the artistic world of a theatrical work or concert of a patriotic orientation. The images of the characters created by the creative work of the actors had the necessary impact on the audience.

Ensuring the legitimacy of the power of the CPSU(b) and its leaders during the war years was sometimes a difficult task. The years of severe defeats and difficulties that befell the Soviet people could undermine their trust, which was a difficult task to earn. The party was able to maintain this support. It should be noted that the propaganda work carried out took into account all the features of individual legal awareness and affected all its levels.

The Great Patriotic War united the entire Soviet society. Our people emerged victorious in this confrontation. Cultural and art workers have made an invaluable contribution to the fight against the common enemy. They created the strongest artistic weapon against the fascist invaders. Thanks to their work, we preserve and honor the feat of Soviet soldiers and home front workers at the present time. Their works reflected the centuries-old experience of the struggle of the multinational people against the invaders who sought to enslave our country.

Cultural and artistic figures were forced to restructure their work taking into account the martial law. All their works, created at the cost of great exertion and the greatest sacrifices, were imbued with patriotism. They performed a unique job, maintaining the high morale of Soviet soldiers and home front workers. At the same time, these works created an atmosphere of confidence that each person is not alone, he is part of one great whole. A citizen of the Soviet Union is not at all a cog in the mechanism of state power. He is, first of all, a person who is taken care of by the whole society and the state.

During the war, the most important task of mobilizing society to fight Nazi Germany was achieved. It was the Communist Party, as a leading and guiding force, that was able to ensure such unity. The mechanism for ensuring the legitimacy of the ruling party's power in the eyes of Soviet society was complex and included many structural elements, and patriotic propaganda became the most important of them.

Failures at the front and colossal human sacrifices could have shaken faith in the effectiveness of the management carried out by the Communist Party, but this did not happen. An important circumstance was the active participation, as well as the mass heroism of party members in the fight against the enemy. Many family members of the country's top leadership died on the battlefields. The personal example was indicative in the eyes of society. Systematic and purposeful propaganda and educational work was required for mass consciousness. This work is focused on promoting the basic political postulates that were necessary to ensure the legitimacy of the Soviet government:

- a possible defeat in the war is an irreparable catastrophe, entailing the enslavement and death of a multinational people, the destruction of its diverse culture and the very possibility of existence;
- the Soviet government will never come to an agreement with the enemy, while it is the members of the Communist Party who are at the forefront of the fight against Nazism and do not spare their lives to defeat the enemy;

- disobedience to the Soviet government in war conditions is tantamount to treason to one's fatherland and entails the death of the people;
- Only the Communist Party, thanks to its centralizing role, can ensure victory over the enemy.

In the early years of the war, during a period of severe defeats, only the conviction of the inevitability of victory could save the country and society. This could only be achieved by means of propaganda.

Reliance on the traditional type of legitimacy was a distinctive feature of propaganda work during the war years. The Soviet Government showed considerable flexibility in conducting propaganda activities. Prominent figures of culture and art joined it. Paradoxically, it was man and the Soviet people, and not the Communist Party, who became the central goal of such work. The propaganda images embodied in various works of culture and art reflected peaceful work, family, love and the exploits of an ordinary Soviet citizen leading a selfless struggle against the invaders. It was the person who became the goal, not the means to achieve a certain ideological result. The Communist Party relied on the mind and emotions of the population of the USSR. She pointed out the continuity of her power with the previous rulers of our country, which has more than a thousand years of history. The belief in the inevitability of victory was based on centuries of experience in fighting a common enemy, and now it was the Communist Party, like its heroic ancestors, that led this confrontation. The goal of the confrontation is humanistic — to protect our people, family, childhood, and homeland. The preservation of human dignity for the entire population of our multinational country was the most important task of the Soviet Government. This main idea was reflected in the specifics of the propaganda works created during the war years, many of which are still outstanding works of culture and art.

1.3. The essence and significance of the image of the enemy as the main element of patriotic propaganda

To achieve managerial goals, the country's leadership turns to the institute of propaganda. This was necessary for the transmission of ideas and values that were fundamental to the Soviet government. The Communist Party exerted a strong influence on public consciousness through a variety of means. The ruling party established control over society, which was necessary to achieve its stated social and political goals. Scientist A. Y. Livshin writes: "In order to mobilize the forces of society to fight the enemy, it becomes a vital necessity to influence the mass consciousness in order to instill in society confidence in victory, perseverance and a desire to fight, giving all their strength and, if necessary, life for the sake of victory"²¹⁵.

One of the most important elements of propaganda is the image of the enemy, which is a complex category. It includes the ideas that arise in a person, a group of people and society as a whole about another individual or collective subject. This subject is considered as something that poses a danger to every person, the entire society and the state. This may be a real or only possible harm to interests and values, or even a threat to the very physical survival of society. This image is formed as a result of individual or collective experience. Stereotypes imposed by the State also have an important impact as a result of the use of various measures of information and propaganda influence²¹⁶.

In the process of dialogue between States and, accordingly, their peoples, an image arises, i.e. a more or less accurate representation of each other. Military opponents were portrayed differently in propaganda at different times: powerful, strong, minor, weak, etc. An armed invader is perceived differently than a partner from other fields, be it culture or economics. The image of the enemy is in constant dynamics. Its formation is influenced by various perception factors, for example:

²¹⁵ Livshin A. Ya. Soviet propaganda of the Great Patriotic War period: the image of the enemy and the image of an ally // *Chelovecheskiy kapital* 2019. No. 12(132). p. 22.

²¹⁶ Senyavskaya E. S. Opponents of Russia in the wars of the twentieth century. M., 2006. p. 20.

the place of a military clash, the time of hostilities, the experience of command, etc. In order to maintain the unity of a certain society, the state is obliged to form an image of the enemy. Such an interesting idea is put forward by researcher G. Simmel. He believes that the absence of this element in the political propaganda of a particular state means the destruction of one's own ethnic group²¹⁷.

Let's consider such a concept as the "image of the enemy". Historians rarely pay attention to him. As an exception, it is necessary to highlight the definition that researcher A.V. Fateev derived: "The image of the enemy is an ideological expression of social antagonism, a dynamic symbol of forces hostile to the state and the citizen, an instrument of the policy of the ruling group of society"²¹⁸.

The image of the enemy in historical science is considered as a kind of symbol filled with political content, from which a psychological stereotype is deliberately created to control the masses. It should be noted that when carrying out a critical analysis of the enemy, not only negative, but also positive features can be revealed. At the same time, it is important to know complete, comprehensive information about the invader²¹⁹.

The concept of "enemy image" in propaganda was formed together with the meaning of the term "prisoner" — this is a person who was represented as a traitor and a nonentity to Soviet society. Surrender was considered a crime and a stigma. Only a pathetic coward who clings to his life without thinking about the collective right thing can surrender to the enemy. It was believed that if a person did not prefer death to captivity, it means that he accepted the values of the enemy, showed cowardice.

The concept of "enemy" can be correlated with the term "hostility", i.e. dislike or hatred. Let's highlight several reasons for hostility:

- 1) aggressiveness emanating from primitive times, as a result of which man inherited the character of a wild beast;
- 2) the desire to solve their internal problems at the expense of others;

²¹⁷ Simmel G. Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliation. Glencoe, 1956. P. 98.

²¹⁸ Fateev A.V. The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda. 1945—1954 M., 1999. p. 2.

²¹⁹ Gorlov A. S. Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War: institutional and organizational aspects. Moscow, 2009. p. 137.

- 3) finding society in an unsatisfactory state caused by infringement of its needs, interests and values;
- 4) people's struggle for existence, for resources, for power, etc.²²⁰

G. I. Kozyrev argues: "... the "enemy" and his "image" can differ significantly from each other, since perception reflects not only objective reality, but also evaluative interpretations and emotional components of perception"²²¹.

In the scientific community, there are adherents of the opinion that the image of the enemy is an artificial propaganda mechanism that is formed by the political elite. For example, the candidate of historical sciences V. Yu. Dukelsky believes this: "The persistently formed "image of the enemy" is in fact a propaganda myth, a "dummy", a political device designed to distract people from real problems, to present them with fictional perpetrators of their plight"²²². According to the author, each ethnic group is a complex of images created by the leaders of these peoples. Consequently, the Soviet image of the enemy is a product of information for the mass consciousness, formed by the communist government. There is an opposite point of view, for example, psychologist K. Balding believes that "the image of a nation is a mass image shared by both leaders and subordinates"²²³.

Based on the above, we can say that in political propaganda, the image of the enemy is used to unite significant social groups. Let's explain their two categories:

- 1) the ruling circles (political elite and state public institutions);
- 2) the broad masses (reproducers and perceivers).

Jurist and academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. S. Nersesyants wrote: "The image of the enemy is only an external symptom of the real struggle of opposing groups, forces and interests, a struggle overt or hidden, hot or cold. It is not the "image of the enemy" that generates the enemy, but the reality of resistance in a violent struggle for and against something. The enemies

²²⁰ Kozyrev G. I. "The enemy" and "the image of the enemy" in public and political relations // Sociological research. 2008. No. 1. p. 33.

²²¹ Ibid. C. 32.

²²² Kordas O. M. "The image of the enemy" as a mechanism of negative consolidation of society // Man and society in an unstable world: materials of the international scientific and practical conference. 2019. p. 84.

²²³ Osepyan A. K. Conflict as a subject of sociological analysis: structure and essence // Vestnik of the Orenburg State University. 2011. No. 16 (135). p. 542.

are the parties in a non—legal (violent) dispute. An orderly, nonviolent dispute between formally equal, independent and free subjects is possible only on the basis of law (with appropriate sanction against violators of law and order)"²²⁴.

Thanks to the works of researchers of the anthropology of wars that exist in our time, a number of signs have been identified that characterize the image of the enemy. In particular, it has destructive motives and is the source of all the troubles that have befallen a particular society. In addition, it destroys the value system, because it is evil by nature. Any person who accepts and defends the values of the enemy begins to be perceived as hostile. The enemy can be associated with a specific person, a state (the "evil empire"), an ideology. The aggressor is defined by the authorities and promoted in society as a destroyer of the state and the nation. In politics, the image of the enemy is usually not specified, but used as a metaphor. In the hands of the Soviet government, this tool was used to achieve patriotic and other goals.

The content of the concept of "enemy image" depends on specific cultural and social circumstances. It has similar and different features depending on historical realities. Any tense situation in the country can lead to military clashes. Armed conflicts are always reinforced by the image of the enemy. I. B. Hasanov argues: "It is not the "images of the enemy" or "negative national stereotypes" that give rise to conflicts, but the situation of conflict tension, tension is the ground for the emergence, formation and development of the "image of the enemy""²²⁵.

The image of the enemy has its own template structure. It is based on the "friend—foe" opposition and the situation, which is defined as "danger". The hero confronts the antihero, and the situation of "danger" depends on racial and religious differences. "Someone else's" is perceived in different ways, usually the attitude towards it is wary. If "someone else's" threatens "one's own", then a negative attitude is manifested towards it from the side that feels danger. The situation of "danger" that comes from the "stranger" partially affects the formation

²²⁴ Nersesyants V. S. "The image of the enemy" — a self—portrait of society // Platon. 2014. No. 4. p. 51.

²²⁵ Hasanov I. B. National stereotypes and the "image of the enemy" // Psychology of national intolerance. 1994. p. 207.

of the image of the enemy. "Friends" usually evoke positive emotions, their behavior is expected, predictable and understandable, they are preferable to "strangers". R. R. Butzin, an American professor of psychology and psychiatry, analyzes this issue in this way: "... all "strangers" are similar to each other and different from "their own"; assessments of "strangers" tend to extremes: they tend to be either very positive or very negative"²²⁶.

The Russian sociologist A. K. Osepyan in the article "The image of the enemy in the theory of conflict"²²⁷ indicates that when creating an image of one's own group and other, alien, groups, some processes take place that are focused on maintaining a positive image of one's own social group. At the same time, negative characteristics are often attributed to social groups that are perceived as strangers, and negative labels are attached to them.

Identification is necessary to define an individual as part of a certain social community according to certain criteria. At the same time, the criteria for classifying an individual to different social groups are not identical. In addition, an individual can be part of different social groups according to different criteria. We are talking about ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic, class, class and other identification. Various social groups have their own rules of initiation, self—identification, intra—group behavior, and interaction with representatives of other groups. Rationalization is the process of finding explanations for behavior that is unacceptable for one reason or another by appealing to logic, finding purely logical reasons that explain it. Projection is used to transfer negative characteristics to one or another alien social group. As a result, there is an opposition of one's own and another's. At the same time, one's own social group becomes a carrier of positive properties and qualities, while another's becomes a carrier of negative ones. As a result, the individual receives a certain psychological comfort from the realization of his or her being chosen to a greater or lesser extent. At the same time, this is

²²⁶ Butzin R. R. *Psychology Today: An Introduction*. New York, 1991. P. 645.

²²⁷ Osepyan A. K. *The image of the enemy in the theory of conflict // Political parties and elections: problems of modernity: a collection of scientific articles based on the materials of the All-Russian Scientific and practical conference*. 2016. p. 289.

how the image of the enemy is formed as a representative of an alien social group, which is a carrier of negative qualities. As the fighting develops and harms the individual's own social group, this image is further strengthened. During the transfer, the social group or individual loses the original source of frustration. When replacing, it is already being transferred to a third party. During polarization, specific features are created and contrasted along the line of us and them, while the meaning of "we" means the individual himself, and "they" are friends and enemies. Dehumanization is carried out by waging a fierce struggle. The enemy is intentionally attributed characteristics that do not relate to human qualities at all. As a result, in the fight against such an enemy, generally recognized norms and principles of morality related to relationships with representatives of the human race may not be applicable.

The success of creating an image of the enemy largely depends on the complete dehumanization of the opponent, that is, his identification with some universal biblical evil and the erasure of all his human features. At the same time, all the actions of the enemy must be taken beyond the legal field and introduced into the mass consciousness²²⁸. The basis of the public consciousness of a particular nation is a complex of phenomena. At the same time, most of them originated in the deep past. The history and traditions of the people are implied. In turn, the ruling elite, through state power, preserves old or forms new ideological structures. Ideas about good and evil, a just social structure, family, duty to the fatherland, mutual responsibility of the state and the individual, etc. are necessary both for the preservation and development of society itself, and for strengthening a certain political system. For this reason, the image of the enemy belongs to the sphere of mass consciousness. It can also be said that this concept reflects the mentality of society²²⁹.

In armed conflicts, the image of a "stranger" is transformed into the image of an "enemy." S. Keen summarizes in his work "Images of evil. How to make

²²⁸ Kuzminskaya S. I. "The image of the enemy" in modern political mythology // Vestnik of the VSU. Series: Linguistics and Intercultural Communication. 2016. No. 3. p. 50.

²²⁹ Senyavskaya E. S. Russia's opponents in the wars of the twentieth century. p. 25.

enemies": "... to carry out a war, the readiness for war of many segments of the population is necessary, who will suffer need, kill the enemy on the battlefield or sacrifice their lives. To do this, the political leadership is interested in convincing the population of the need for war. The creation of an enemy image is used as a reliable means"²³⁰. With. Keen is known in scientific circles as the founder of constructing the image of the enemy. He considered this psychological process with the help of "animal metaphors" (the absence of human qualities in the "other", the depiction of opponents in the form of various animals) and the dehumanization of the "other" (mechanization that undermines the individuality of the individual). In modern methodology, these two forms have already successfully taken root.

N. Haslam, a psychologist at the University of Melbourne, also addresses the dehumanization of the image of the enemy and considers it as an everyday social phenomenon, deducing his terminology: "There are two forms of dehumanization based on the denial of two "feelings of humanity": human species uniqueness and human nature"²³¹. We are talking about such forms as "animalistic dehumanization" (human-animal) and "mechanical dehumanization" (automaton object). S. Keen and N. Haslam complement each other by analyzing the image of the enemy.

The mechanism of dehumanization is demonization, which is often interpreted in scientific circles as the inhumanity of the enemy in the image of the enemy being formed. Because of this, the listed terms lose their identity and become similar. Demonization should be considered as a certain propaganda practice that only blurs the image of the enemy by one association or another and is used to justify murders. For example, D. Rowell argues that "demonization is a propaganda technique that promotes the idea that the enemy is an evil aggressor"²³². The scientist G. T. Conserva writes as follows: "The oldest trick of a

²³⁰ Keen S. Bilder des Bösen. Wie man sich Feinde macht. Weinheim, 1987. S. 67.

²³¹ Haslam N. Dehumanization: An Integrative Review // Personality and Social Psychology Review. 2006. Vol. 10. № 3. P. 252—264.

²³² Rowell D. The Power of Ideas: A Political Social—Psychological Theory of Democracy, Political Development and Political Communication. Universal—Publishers. 2011. p. 163.

propagandist is to demonize and dehumanize hated others and form an image of the enemy"²³³.

It should be noted that the image of the enemy tends to form quickly and can retain its characteristic for quite a long time. Attempts to destroy it may not always be successful, as it is able to be passed down from generation to generation. There is a possibility that the image of the enemy contributes to the emergence of xenophobia. This happens because a person's scientific ideas about the world are fixed through his specific life experience.

Illustrative examples of the development of the enemy's image can be observed during periods of military operations. It is the war that creates a favorable ground for the formation of citizens' perception of "others". The role of "others" is played not only by people, but also by social groups, as well as by states. As an ideological construct, the image of the enemy begins to change, construct and develop in these conditions. In this regard, at the beginning of the XX century, a new scientific field was born, which later received the name "imagology". Currently, imagology (from Latin. Imago is an independent direction, a discipline that studies the perception of the masses through historical sources of various cultures, ethnic languages and art. There is a proprietary toolkit that helps scientists analyze images of "their own" and "others". The main purpose of this field is to study the "images" of another world, to identify its stereotypes.

Researchers of this field E. V. Dry and N. A. Demina fix: "The main concept in imagology is "own and others", where "own" acts as a starting point in the perception of "other", "alien". The "alien" is presented as an archetype characterizing something general, fundamental, some kind of scheme of ideas about the "other". All these components of the perception of a social community can be constant, which for a long time remain unchanged in the perception of a particular image, and historically unstable, which is expressed in constant imbalance, changes, etc. In all these processes, the basis or basis for the formation of images is the historical experience of the people, which is in constant

²³³ Conserva H. T. Propaganda Techniques. San Francisco, 2003. p. 74.

dynamics"²³⁴. Another important component is the need to take decisive action. To do this, propaganda develops various manipulative technologies. As an example, let's look at ways to create an image of an enemy:

1. Substitution of concepts (instead of the real culprits of the events that happened, another society is presented to the mass in the image of the enemy).
2. Ridiculing or destroying a symbol (dismantling monuments of a bygone era).
3. Negativization (attributing negative qualities to the subject of manipulation).
4. Associative chain (transfer of meaning).
5. The use of assumptions as an argument ("perhaps", "probably", etc.).
6. The spread of myths (simplification of the image in order to influence emotions).
7. The use of specific disorienting terms (reducing or enhancing the degree of significance of information).
8. Anticipating (spreading information about possible provocations).
9. Using lies (information does not correspond to reality).
10. Disabling critical perception (introducing negative attitudes).
11. Unity with the audience (using the opinion of some outside group of people).
12. Mixing of information and opinion (providing facts in combination with their assessment).
13. The cover of authority (an argument in support of some purely ideological or political statement)²³⁵.

An additional factor that forms the image of the enemy is the propaganda work of the state authorities. Propaganda management bodies should make decisions and strive for knowledge about the enemy. These actions will eliminate myths and help lead the people to the most favorable outcome of the war. There

²³⁴ Draï E. V., Demina N. A. Analysis of the "image of the enemy" in military history p. 209.

²³⁵ Maslakov S. I. Formation of the "image of the enemy" as a means of manipulative influence on social groups // Risks in a changing social reality: the problem of forecasting and management: materials of the international scientific and practical conference. Voronezh, 2015. pp. 507—512.

are two levels of interaction with the enemy. The first is the passive level, that is, the selection of information about the presence of an enemy, the assessment of danger, forecasting and accounting for its negative impact on one's own group. The second is the active level, or actions aimed at deterring, damaging the enemy, eliminating it, eliminating it²³⁶.

The image of the enemy during the Great Patriotic War was in constant transformation. It has changed repeatedly under the influence of many factors related to: 1) to the subject of perception (the experience of each person and his social position); 2) to the object of perception (different assessment of the enemy in combat); 3) to the conditions (general and individual, the clash of different types of states) and the circumstances of perception (moments from a personal biography)²³⁷.

An important factor that has preserved all the events of the past passed down from generation to generation is historical memory. Thanks to her, today we have an idea of the war and the image of the enemy. Historical memory belongs to the field of mass social psychology and the ideological sphere. It is designed to take care of the state and society. Historical memory is the basis of national identity, which contains its own assessments and views of other societies²³⁸.

Historical memory has preserved for our generation a certain technique of depicting the enemy during the Great Patriotic War in culture and art. This is, for example, the escalation of a common threat to the state and society, the demonstration of the enemy in comic detail, the victory over the fascists, which was presented during the war period as a feat of an individual and an entire nation, censorship, which allowed only information beneficial to the Soviet leadership, etc.

In the typology of the image of the enemy, preserved in the public consciousness, it is necessary to note two main components.

²³⁶ The large psychological dictionary. Ed. Meshcheryakova B. G., Zinchenko V. P. M.; St. Petersburg, 2009. p. 305..

²³⁷ Senyavskaya E. S. Psychology of war in the twentieth century. The historical experience of Russia [Electronic resource] // Online Library xliby.ru URL: http://www.xliby.ru/voennaja_istorija/psihologija_voiny_v_hh_veke_istoricheskii_opyt_rossii/p5.php (date of application: 11.11.2022).

²³⁸ Senyavskaya E. S. Opponents of Russia in the wars of the twentieth century. p. 251.

First, it is important to mention the symbolism of its display. The enemy is depicted as a certain non—anthropomorphic creature: an animal, a bird, etc. At the same time, wordplay also has a certain meaning. For example, the image of an enemy in the form of a snake, i.e. a reptile, is in itself a curse word. A snake is an insidious, venomous, reptilian and ruthless creature. A similar image has biblical motives as a symbol of evil and lies. The image of a vulture is associated with eating dead flesh, which is an allusion to the coat of arms of the German state with the image of an eagle. The image of the wolf was often used in fascist propaganda, in particular, in the names of military formations, military facilities, etc. As a result, it gradually acquired a negative meaning in the eyes of Soviet citizens. In Soviet propaganda as a whole, the term "fascist beast" became widespread. The use of the words "atrocities", "fascists", "occupiers", "enemies", etc. has become commonplace both in propaganda works and in official speeches.

Secondly, it is necessary to note the caricature of the enemy's image. It was necessary to introduce into the minds of Soviet citizens thoughts not only about the danger of a ruthless invader, but also that he, too, might show weakness. Fear of the enemy could constrain the will of both soldiers and home front workers. He was unacceptable. As a result, images of a pathetic, cowardly enemy were created. In fine art and graphics, ugly figures of the leaders of nazi Germany were replicated with hypertrophied features indicating their vices and shortcomings: stupidity, gluttony, greed, etc. After the defeat of Germany in the Battle of Stalingrad, images of a beaten, dying of wounds, freezing, running enemy were often found in the images. Despite this, the invaders were supposed to arouse not so much pity as disgust. Leniency towards an inhuman enemy is unacceptable. It is impossible to forget about the spilled blood and the fact that he can still resist. As a result of creating caricature images of the enemy, the feeling of fear of him should have disappeared and given way to the conviction of imminent victory.

- Consequently, the image of the enemy has undergone a rather complex evolution. Now it is a qualitative characteristic of the enemy's appearance. The main list of signs of the enemy's image looks like this:

- we-they juxtaposition;
- dehumanization of the enemy;
- the threat of negative consequences of enemy aggression;
- symbolic belonging to evil;
- putting the blame for everything that happens on the enemy;
- deception or conspiracy of the enemy;
- the presence of a victim;
- the plot of betrayal;
- negative emotions²³⁹.

It is the image of the enemy that helps to rally the crowd against certain countries. Invaders are outsiders who intentionally harm their native state. The negative image of an external enemy was used to foment hostility between nations and served to suppress internal opposition. The term "enemy image" implies the purposeful formation of a certain image of the enemy through the use of metaphors, narratives, myths, and ideas. Harold Lasswell believes that: "To mobilize national hatred, the enemy must be presented as a formidable, bloodthirsty aggressor, a satanic violator of morality and generally accepted standards, an obstacle to the cherished goals and ideals of the nation as a whole and each of its constituent parts"²⁴⁰.

During the war period, the image of the enemy performed a mobilization function and controlled the mass consciousness. Propaganda introduced it to the masses through religion, the media, education, literature, cinema and other forms of art. The image of the enemy was aimed at a political struggle against the invader.

²³⁹ Denisov D. A. Identification of the enemy image in political communication // Vestnik of the Russian State University. Series: Political Science. History. International relations. 2009. No. 1. p. 121.

²⁴⁰ Merskin D. The Construction of Arabs as enemies: Post — Sept 11 Discourse of George W. Bush // Mass Communication and Society. 2004. № 7. P. 167.

CHAPTER 2. PERIODIZATION AND DYNAMICS OF THE ENEMY IMAGE DEVELOPMENT IN 1941—1945

2.1. Forming the image of the enemy in the initial period of the war in June 1941 — May 1942 and rethinking the stereotypes of Soviet propaganda of the pre-war period

The experience gained during the Great Patriotic War shows that the image of the enemy was formed gradually, it was designed taking into account the changing conditions at the front and the mood in society. Nevertheless, this process is universal, it is achieved by justifying the actions of one or another party in a military confrontation. Emphasizing the superiority of the Soviet people over the enemy helped to unite diverse social groups in this difficult time.

The invaders planned to carry out: "1. The division of the territory inhabited by Russians into different political districts with their own governing bodies in order to ensure separate national development in each of them. 2 The weakening of the Russian people racially. <...> It is important that the majority of the Russian population consists of people of a primitive semi—European type. 3. Bringing the birth rate of Russians to a lower level than that of the Germans"²⁴¹. Let's highlight the third point separately. The fascists pursued a fanatical policy of reducing the population in the territories of the USSR occupied by them.²⁴² In particular, in the "Comments and proposals of the Eastern Ministry" on the Ost Master Plan, it was explicitly stated that the measures taken in Germany to strengthen the institution of motherhood and childhood were inapplicable to the Slavs, who were considered inferior peoples by the Nazis. The birth rate should be reduced by preventing the prevention of childhood diseases, the lack of support for kindergartens, the prohibition of teaching mothers to care for children, etc.²⁴³ For example, the

²⁴¹ Top secret! Only for the command! The strategy of Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR: Documents and materials / Comp. regiment. V. I. Dashichev. Moscow: Nauka, 1967. pp. 117—120.

²⁴² Publication of documents. The general plan "Ost" // Military Historical Journal. 1960. No. 1. p. 83.

²⁴³ Krasnozhenova E. E. "There was no more childhood": Children's daily life during the occupation of the North-West of Russia (1941-1944) // The Caspian region: politics, economics, culture. 2021. p. 53.

suffering of the population of besieged Leningrad: hunger, cold and the constant threat of death from bombs and shells created a strong negative impact on the local population. Psychoemotional overstrain caused the death of many people, including pregnant women²⁴⁴.

In the summer of 1941, Soviet society convinced itself and others that the war would end very soon. The active creation of the image of the invincible Red Army began, and confidence was instilled that it would defeat the invader. This confidence was reinforced by the fact that the USSR border was shifted far to the west thanks to the joining Baltic republics and other territories. The main fighting should have stopped there. Many argued that the population of the Third Reich had a high level of culture, so there was no need to feel fear or excitement. Society in the USSR did not believe in the cruelty of the German people, there was talk that the Germans would bring order, discipline, etc.²⁴⁵

The Soviet people hoped to see among the German soldiers fellow class members, i.e. deceived workers and peasants who would turn their aggression against the Fuhrer. In an "Open letter to German workers on behalf of the workers of the Stalin Automobile Plant and the workers of the Dynamo Kirov Plant," these lines were preserved: "Germans! Who drove you to a crazy war with Russia? The bloody maniac Hitler, the gorged rich Goering, the shrill empty—mouthed Goebbels, the ferocious executioner Himmler. Overthrow this gang — the only way you will achieve peace! The German people! German soldiers! You are told that you are not fighting against the Russian people, not against the peoples of the USSR, but against Bolshevism. Don't believe it! The whole world knows that the war that Hitler drove you to is a predatory war against the Russian people. It was they, the German plutocrats, shouting about "German socialism," who threw you into the war against the only country of socialism in the world. We don't have slaves and masters, we don't have plutocrats. Against your plutocrats, against the

²⁴⁴ Lomagin N. A. Famine as a weapon: short-term and long-term effects (on the example of the siege of Leningrad) // Paths to peace and security. 2022. No. 2 (63). p. 126.

²⁴⁵ Popova V. V. Changing the image of the enemy in the minds of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union in the first months of the Great Patriotic War [Electronic resource] // Universum: Social Sciences: electronic scientific journal. 2016. No. 11(29). URL: <http://7universum.com/ru/social/archive/item/3922> (date of application: 11.12.2023).

enemies of the German people, we defend our homeland. German workers and peasants! German soldiers! Refuse to fight for interests that are alien to you! Overthrow the yoke of the rich who profit from your blood!"²⁴⁶.

In the January issue of the newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda*, one can also see a reflection of this position: "The cigarettes with which our Red Army soldiers treated them; lard and bread, which they were willingly given. For our fighters, the enemy, who did not have a weapon in his hands, ceased to be an enemy."²⁴⁷. The first slogans sounded in the newspaper *Pravda*: "Greetings to the German people, groaning under the yoke of Hitler's Black Hundred gangs, — we wish them victory over bloody Hitler!"²⁴⁸. Film and photographic documents from this period most often showed captured German soldiers and broken equipment, such as airplanes. These visual images were often complemented by posing cheerful Red Army soldiers²⁴⁹.

When forming the image of the enemy, I. V. Stalin, in his speeches at the beginning of the war, separated the concepts of "fascist" and "German":

- June-October 1941 — "Nazi Hitler's army", "fascist tyrants", "fascist Germany", etc.²⁵⁰ Since July, the Red Star has been calling for the destruction of the fascist invaders: "Drive them out and destroy them, fellow countrymen! Expel them to put an end to the fascist enemy once and for all!"²⁵¹;

- November 1941 — "German occupiers", "German invaders", etc.²⁵²

Then the national aspect became predominant.

The leader spoke positively about the USSR: "our peace-loving state," "the Soviet system is the most stable," "the morale of the Red Army is higher than that of German soldiers," etc.²⁵³

The moral and psychological situation at the front and the first documents of the communist propaganda machine at the beginning of the war contradicted each

²⁴⁶ RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 35. L. 5—11.

²⁴⁷ *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow). 1942. January 1.

²⁴⁸ *Pravda* (Moscow).. 1941. October 31

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 1941. 12 июля.

²⁵⁰ Stalin I. V. *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*. M., 1947. pp. 4—8.

²⁵¹ *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow). 1941. July 1.

²⁵² Stalin I. V. *Works*. Vol. 14. M., 1997. p. 37.

²⁵³ Stalin I. V. *On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*. pp. 7, 22.

other. The directives issued in 1941 were stamps of the pre-war system of ideological activity in the Red Army. In case of retreating actions, for example, there was an instruction from L. Z. Mehlis: to highlight the mood of the soldiers of the Third Reich and the enemy population, "widely use the stories of prisoners, diaries, letters and other documents"²⁵⁴. Changes in propaganda rhetoric can be seen only a month after the attack of Nazi Germany on the USSR. During this period, many propaganda materials were used in broadcast programs. The main changes became noticeable by the end of 1941, in particular, in December, a directive was issued to remove the slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" from all military newspapers without exception. A new call came to the fore in military publications: "Death to the German occupiers!"²⁵⁵. At the same time, the same slogan remained in Pravda and other party newspapers.

At the very beginning of the war, the leadership of the USSR faced the problem of mobilizing the population to fight against a treacherous enemy. At the same time, it should be noted that at the beginning of the war, information about the victims among the inhabitants of the besieged city of Leningrad was not used enough to mobilize public opinion in the countries of the world to fight against Germany²⁵⁶. More attention was paid to this issue at the final stage of the war. The Soviet government turned to improving the legislation of the state. One of the most effective ways to solve the problem was the organization of propaganda activities and the formation of the image of the enemy in the official ideology.

On June 23, 1941, the Pravda newspaper published a Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the mobilization of military service in the Leningrad, Baltic Special, Western Special, Kiev Special, Odessa, Kharkov, Oryol, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Ural, Siberian, Volga, North Caucasian and Transcaucasian districts."²⁵⁷ According to this document, the draft affected

²⁵⁴ CAMO RF. Ф. 32. Оп. 795436с. Д. 3. Л. 189.

²⁵⁵ Ibid. Оп. 920265. Д. 4. Л. 103.

²⁵⁶ Lomagin N. A. In the grip of hunger. The siege of Leningrad in the documents of the German special services and the NKVD. St. Petersburg, 2000. p. 273.

²⁵⁷ Pravda (Moscow). 1941. June 23.

conscripts born in 1905—1918²⁵⁸. Subsequently, the mobilization expanded, it affected citizens of other ages.

At this time, an acute question arose about the moral and psychological state of the population of the Soviet Country. For propaganda purposes, mass rallies were held at factories and enterprises with the slogans "Our answer: death to the enemies! Our slogan is victory!", "The enemy who sowed the wind will reap the storm", "Sacred hatred of the enemy", "Calmness, endurance, confidence in victory", "The instigators of the war will not escape the reckoning", "We will give everything that the motherland demands", "The spirit of unity and cohesion"²⁵⁹ and others. In addition, after V. M. Molotov's speech on the radio, many heads of production organizations and departments stated that labor productivity had sharply increased.

People went to the front of their own accord in whole families and brigades. During the war period, the policy of the USSR to mobilize the population to the Red Army directly depended on the state ideology and aimed to increase patriotic sentiments among local residents. From the information of the instructor of the Sverdlovsk district committee of the Ozolina party in the MGK of the CPSU (b) on the sentiments of the population of the district, it follows: "I, I. I. Egorov, reserve commander, pilot since 1917, being currently in reserve, I ask you to call me into the Red Army as a volunteer. I have a huge flight experience. I am ready to give all my strength to defend my homeland and, if necessary, my life. Please do not refuse the request. I am 48 years old, but I am full of health. I am currently receiving a superannuation pension"²⁶⁰. The non—partisan Kumin stated that he had two sons, one in the Red Army, the other volunteered: "If necessary, I will stand next to my sons, I will beat the brutal fascists"²⁶¹. A German emigrant made a statement at a meeting of the glass engraving factory staff. He said: "It was not the German people who declared war on the Soviet Union, but Hitler and his fascist pack.

²⁵⁸ Pravda (Moscow). 1941. June 23/

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ CAODM. F. 4. Op. 34. D. 10. L. 147—148.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

Hitler will be kaput from the Red Army"²⁶². Workers and employees reacted to the outbreak of hostilities in this way: "If necessary, we will work for a day or two, and if necessary, even more, so that our country wins"²⁶³. There were also the following statements: "Oh, that bastard Hitler! What is he counting on? After all, if we beat them with our bare hands, with only a pitchfork, now that we have enough cars, he will be screwed. When I finish my shift, I'll come home, and there's a summons to the army. And I'm going to beat Hitler. I won't come back without the order"²⁶⁴. Such statements prove that the mechanism of forming the image of the enemy was successfully launched and began to gain momentum.

Judging by the information provided by the head of the NKVD in the Moscow region, Commissioner of State Security of the 3rd rank P. N. Kubatkin on June 24, 1941, to the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs V. A. Abakumov, there were not only patriotic, but also defeatist sentiments in society. They were suppressed by arrests and other measures of procedural coercion in wartime. In particular, the military doctor of Noginsk Tobias assured that "we will lose the war with Germany — that's clear. But before that, you will have to go through a lot of tests. We have some equipment, but it's not working well in our rear, and Hitler is counting on it"²⁶⁵. Danilov, an employee of the district department of the Stalinsky district, said: "At last we will breathe easy. In three days Hitler will be in Moscow, and the intelligentsia will live in a good way"²⁶⁶. The German Kuhn, a former factory owner, expressed the idea that "the Soviet government was not elected by the will of the people, and he will say his word now"²⁶⁷.

P. N. Kubatkin summed up that by 21:00 on June 23, 79 people had been arrested by the criminal gang and counterrevolutionary element ²⁶⁸. At the same time, he noted the negative behavior of some recruits. So, at a recruiting station in

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ CAODM. F. 4. Op. 34. D. 8. L. 33—35.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Moscow is military. 1941—1945. Memoirs and archival documents / comp. K. Bukovsky. I., Gorinov M. M., Ponomarev A. N. M., 1995. p. 52.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

²⁶⁷ Ibid.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

the Tagansky district of Moscow, a certain Ivanov, who was previously an engineer at the Sickle and Hammer plant, was detained. He campaigned for the refusal to serve in the Red Army. In the Kuibyshev district, conscript Nikolaev, not wanting to serve in the Red Army, committed suicide²⁶⁹.

Such inconsistency in the behavior of the population is not accidental, since exaggerating enemy losses and downplaying one's own is part of the propaganda of all warring armies. Soviet propaganda fabrications at the beginning of the war came from various sources. In a summary from the newspaper Pravda dated June 23, 1941, you can find out the following: "The enemy was repulsed with heavy losses"²⁷⁰. As we know, on July 3, 1941, I. V. Stalin declared on the radio that "the best divisions of the enemy and the best units have already been defeated"²⁷¹. In November 1941, in a report on the anniversary of the October Revolution, he cited a fantastic figure of enemy losses: more than 4.5 million people²⁷². Part of the population was already aware of the reality of these alerts in the summer, in particular, the commander of the sanitary company, the military doctor of the 3rd rank Feklin stated: "If we count according to the information bureau how many German planes were shot down, tanks and soldiers were destroyed, then the German army should have been defeated, but in fact it is advancing. The High Command does not know the true state of affairs on the fronts"²⁷³. German propaganda also reported that the Soviet army was defeated and the war would end before winter.

The propaganda policy was wishful thinking. For example, in the leaflets of the International Information series dated August 3, 1941, it was said: "At the sight of a Soviet fighter, German pilots fly away in panic fear." A leaflet dated August 6, 1941 stated: "The German army has no reserves, no provisions"²⁷⁴.

²⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 53.

²⁷⁰ Pravda (Moscow). 1941. June 23/

²⁷¹ Ippolitov G. M., Poltorak S. N. Features of Soviet propaganda and agitation in the first (defensive) period of the Great Patriotic War (June 22, 1941 — November 1942) // KLIO. 2013. No. 4. p. 72.

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Livshin A. Ya., Orlov I. B. Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War. "persuasion communication" and mobilization mechanisms. Documents of Soviet history. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2007. p. 22.

²⁷⁴ CAMO RF. Ф. 32. Оп. 11306. Д. 31. л. 404.

It is also necessary to emphasize the fact that in the early days of the war, the top Soviet party and state leadership was at a loss as to the choice of a strategy for describing the events taking place. The Molotov — Ribbentrop Pact of August 23, 1939 obliged the parties not to attack each other. Moreover, on September 28, 1939, an agreement "On Friendship and Border" was signed between the USSR and Germany. There was a reassessment of their forces and an underestimation of the capabilities and intentions of the enemy. In the field of ideology, the situation was in crisis. The friendly German people, as well as the army, consisting largely of workers and peasants, turned out to be deadly enemies for the Soviet Country in practice. The solidarity of the proletariat and internationalism were not demonstrated. The basic ideological attitudes turned out to be false.

A large-scale spread of repressive measures followed in order to strengthen discipline and raise the morale of the Red Army. At the same time, the primary task was not to solve ideological problems, but to strengthen order and subordination to counter looting, desertion, and the commission of ordinary crimes by both Red Army soldiers and civilians in wartime conditions. The scout, the future professor of LSU M. O. Malyshev, wrote in his diary on December 5, 1941: "It's creepy and scary. It was the first time I attended a court martial. Fighters from our unit were tried for stealing porridge. The verdict was short and clear — to shoot"²⁷⁵. These propaganda actions aroused alarm and, in many cases, panic among Soviet citizens. According to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 6, 1941 "On responsibility for spreading false rumors in wartime that arouse alarm among the population"²⁷⁶. A real prison term of 2 to 5 years was imposed for spreading rumors. Rumors were equated to "moral sabotage"²⁷⁷.

In order to strengthen military discipline, propaganda and explanatory events were organized. On the pages of the newspaper "Combat Alert" dated July 10, 1941, it was reported about the execution of criminal liability measures applied by

²⁷⁵ Ippolitov G. M., Poltorak S. N. Features of Soviet propaganda and agitation. p. 71.

²⁷⁶ Vedomosti of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.. 1941. No. 32.

²⁷⁷ Kubatkin P. N. Let's destroy spies and saboteurs. M.: OGIZ. Gospolitizdat, 1941. pp. 1—20.

military courts for spreading malicious rumors and inciting panic. In particular, the trial period was reduced to 24 hours from the date of receipt of the indictment. The sentences were carried out immediately, and the death penalty was applied within 72 hours. The tribunal was compared to a sword that inevitably punishes the enemies of the motherland²⁷⁸.

The Soviet government used two main methods of mobilizing the population for military service: conscription and voluntary. There were a number of shortcomings in this area. In particular, 1,800 people were due to appear at the Oktyabrsky district military Commissariat of Moscow on June 24, but only 814 showed up. Many conscripts in the Klinsky district came to the recruiting stations drunk. The conscripted Gusev, a peat worker, wounded himself with a cold weapon in order to evade conscription into the Red Army²⁷⁹.

From the summer of 1941 to the spring of 1942, desertion and evasion of conscription in a number of regions were widespread. The main reason can be considered critical material and human losses. The confusion of the broad masses of the population was explained by the significant military failures of the first months of the war, as well as the panic in which thousands of Soviet citizens were involved, who evacuated to the interior of the country and told about the horrors of the German occupation. Despite the massive heroism of the Soviet soldiers, significant mistakes were made in the fight against the German army, which was also formed on the basis of general mobilization, but already had almost two years of experience in waging war by June 1941. These factors led to the tightening of a number of legislative acts, especially the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, etc. Not only deserters and evaders were involved, but also scammers who launched document forgery activities.

For successful mobilization, a nonviolent mechanism of influence on the consciousness of the Soviet man was required. It was propaganda that helped to solve this difficult task. In this case, both individual social groups and individual

²⁷⁸ Boyevaya trevoga (Moscow). 1941. July 10.

²⁷⁹ Moscow is military. 1941—1945. p. 55.

Soviet citizens became the object of mobilization. It was necessary to create an image of the enemy in order to explain to people why they were going to die, moreover, why they should take up arms and kill. It could not be otherwise, since killing people is not a moral norm of society, rather, it is a deviation from a healthy psyche and a religious worldview. Despite this, war brings death, the enemy must be destroyed, under such circumstances it is legitimate to kill "fascist rabid dogs". The subjects of mobilization were the state, the Communist Party and the leader of the country himself²⁸⁰. I. V. Stalin's radio speech of July 3, 1941 indicates that the government realized the need for a direct and truthful appeal to the Soviet people. The extremely difficult situation in which the country found itself is emphasized by the following words of the leader: "... it must be said about the current German fascist army of Hitler. This army has not yet encountered serious resistance on the continent of Europe. It met with serious resistance only on our territory. <...> The war of Fascist Germany against the USSR began under favorable conditions for the German troops and unfavorable for the Soviet troops. The fact is that the troops of Germany, as a country waging war, were already fully mobilized, and 170 divisions thrown by Germany against the USSR and moved to the borders of the USSR were in a state of full readiness, waiting only for the signal to speak, while the Soviet troops still needed to mobilize and move closer to the borders. <...> How could it happen that the Soviet government agreed to conclude a non-aggression pact with such treacherous people and fiends as Hitler and Ribbentrop? Was there a mistake on the part of the Soviet government here? Of course not! <...> I think that no peace-loving State can refuse a peace agreement with a neighboring Power. <...> The enemy is cruel and relentless. He aims at seizing our lands, watered with our sweat, seizing our bread and our oil, extracted by our labor. He aims to restore the power of the landlords, restore tsarism, destroy the national culture and national statehood of Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Uzbeks, Tatars, Moldovans, Georgians,

²⁸⁰ Makarova O.S. 'The Image of the Enemy During the Initial period of the Great Patriotic War and the Rethinking of the Stereotypes of Soviet Propaganda of the Pre-war Period'// *Modern History of Russia*, vol. 13, no.3, 2023, pp. 584—591.

Armenians, Azerbaijanis and other free peoples of the Soviet Union, numb them, turn them into slaves of German princes and barons. Thus, the matter is about the life and death of the Soviet state, about the life and death of the peoples of the USSR. <...> We must organize a merciless struggle against all kinds of disorganizers of the rear, deserters, alarmists, rumor—mongers, destroy spies, saboteurs, enemy parachutists..."²⁸¹.

After this explanation by the leader, in fact, crowded patriotic rallies followed in all factories, factories and other institutions on the same day. S. Vagina, an instructor of the Leninsky district of Moscow, who spoke at one of them, said: "... it is difficult to put into words the greatest patriotic upsurge that all those present at the rallies were covered by. All those present expressed their love and devotion to our great, beloved socialist homeland, our best friend, father and teacher — T. To Stalin. All the speakers as one declared their readiness to immediately stand up and defend our country with their breasts from the most vile enemy, monster and cannibal — German fascism."²⁸².

He immediately drew up a report to the first secretary of the MGK of the CPSU (b) A. S. Shcherbakov on the reaction of the population to the speech of I. V. Stalin and P. N. Kubatkin, he wrote: "The speech on the radio by the Chairman of the State Defense Committee, T. I. V. Stalin, caused a new surge of patriotism, energy and will to fight for victory over fascism among the workers of Moscow and the Moscow region. At their rallies, workers express their readiness to defend the motherland and organize themselves into rear militia units..."²⁸³.

At the Sergo Ordzhonikidze Moscow Machine Tool Factory, T. Smolnikov, a member of the party, a former locksmith, head of a distribution workshop, who was removed from the register of military service due to illness, said in his speech: "My country is in danger. Now I don't recognize any diseases. I am a machine gunner by military profession, I cannot stay outside the front. I ask you to enroll

²⁸¹ Pravda (Moscow). 1941. July 3.

²⁸² CAODM. F. 4. Op. 34. D. 8. L. 69—70.

²⁸³ Moscow is military. 1941—1945. p. 67.

me in the workers' militia."²⁸⁴. T. Kuzina, a worker at the Udarnitsa factory, immediately submitted a statement to the party bureau: "I will express the opinion of all the women of our factory if I say that we, the workers, are ready at any moment to give all our strength to protect our homeland."²⁸⁵. A worker at the plastics factories expressed his opinion about the speech of I. V. Stalin as follows: "The hammered, warm speech of the leader. His words — brothers and sisters— reach everyone's heart. In response to it, I want to work even better, giving all my strength and energy to my beloved Homeland"²⁸⁶. The head of the shop of the Bolshevikka factory Efimov gathered his subordinates and addressed them with the words: "The leader rallied the whole people with his speech and mobilized them to defeat the enemy. Now everyone, young and old, will join the people's militia and stand up for the Motherland."²⁸⁷.

However, P. N. Kubatkin in his report also recorded statements that questioned the truth of the words contained in the speech of I. V. Stalin. For example, engineer Perelman said that "all these speeches, the mobilization of the people, the organization of the rear militia indicate the exceptional unreliability of the front and will not save the situation. Apparently, the German will occupy Moscow soon, and the Soviet government will not be able to resist."²⁸⁸. Maisel, editor of the publishing house "Physical Culture and Tourism", added: "The situation at the front is more serious than Stalin said. Hitler's victories are very significant. The Germans are coming very close to Moscow. All this talk about the people's militia is childish and naive fun. They are not of serious importance. Here, as always, we are chasing the ostentatious side with our usual efficiency. The USSR on the eve of decisive events"²⁸⁹. Kozlov's employee also reacted sharply: "It's too late to talk about volunteers, it's too late to address the people when the Germans are already approaching Moscow"²⁹⁰. Panic moods did not play a

²⁸⁴ CAODM. F. 4. Op. 34. D. 8. L. 69—70.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Moscow is military. 1941—1945. p. 68.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 69.

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

significant role. In general, it should be noted that the vast majority of citizens of the USSR selflessly rose up to fight fascism. Criticism of the leadership's decisions was possible in peacetime, but in wartime it meant the spread of panic, i.e. crime²⁹¹.

The creative intelligentsia also joined the mobilization. The writer A. N. Tolstoy, speaking on August 10, 1941 at the First All-Slavic Rally in Moscow, made a speech: "The whole Slavic world must unite to defeat fascism." It follows from his speech: "Slavs! The hour has struck when the entire Slavic world must unite for a speedy and final liberation from Hitler's oppression. <...> Slavs! You can't expect mercy from the fascists. There is no mercy... And those who think of getting through this time quietly, becoming humble and inconspicuous, are sorely mistaken. The humble ones, like bugs with their paws tucked in, will be crushed by a fascist boot. Away with humility and peace!²⁹² <...> Freedom or death! We want peaceful prosperity for ourselves and our neighbors. We want the highest gifts of human freedom: the development of culture, arts and sciences, prosperity, happiness. Culture, not war. In the name of these lofty universal goals, let's fight, Slavs! Into a victorious battle with fascist barbarians drunk on blood and robbery! Death to fascism!"²⁹³. Thus, the humanistic goals of the struggle waged by the Soviet people were clearly outlined.

At the first stage of military operations, the party ideology was built in two directions. It was necessary to convince the Soviet people that victory would certainly and indisputably be for the USSR, but at the same time it would require enormous sacrifices. The war will be long and difficult, so significant human resources are needed at the front and in the rear. The headings "Revenge and death to the German fascist dogs" are often found in newspapers, for example, in the September issue of Pravda it is written: "... fascists exterminate the sons and daughters of all peoples inhabiting our great homeland with unprecedented ferocity. They rob, torture, and kill. <...> The great Russian people and all other

²⁹¹ Makarova O. S. The formation of the image of the enemy in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. p. 588.

²⁹² Pravda (Moscow). 1941. August 11.

²⁹³ Ibid.

peoples of the Soviet Union will never be slaves. <...> We swear: day by day to strengthen the blows against the vile rapists, the murderers of our fathers and mothers, our wives and children. We swear: to mercilessly destroy Hitler's scoundrels like rabid dogs, sparing no lives, to wage a sacred struggle for the motherland, honor and freedom until not a single Fascist scoundrel remains on our native land."²⁹⁴.

Fascist Germany declared a total war to destroy not only the Soviet state, but also the society of our country. The peoples of the USSR fought for freedom from enslavement, as well as for the very right to live on their land, so such sacrifices were justified. Defeat and surrender became equivalent to slavery and death, and, on the contrary, struggle meant the preservation of life and freedom²⁹⁵. The nurse E. P. Ershova described the situation, which she witnessed: "... fascist-German scoundrels broke into the village. <...> These criminals gathered the old people in one pile, tied them up and crushed them with tank tracks. Hitler's bandits seized a fifteen—year—old girl and brutally raped her. Sixteen animals tormented her. They gouged out her eyes and left her, torn, spat on, on the street... drove all the girls to the square, ordered them to strip naked and dance their native dance "Lyavonikha". The proud Soviet girls, of course, refused to follow the order of the scoundrels. They were shot. Children were walking along one highway. The fascist beasts took away their parents, took away their shelter and bread. The children were exhausted, they were staggering from fatigue and hunger. But this was not enough for the fascist fiends. The German vulture descended and began to pour machine-gun fire on the small defenseless orphans. He returned a second time to finish them off. From the very first second when I witnessed the nightmarish fascist violence, I swore to take revenge, to take revenge on the two-legged beasts..."²⁹⁶. Explaining such information to the general public is not an ideological stamp of Soviet propaganda, but, on the contrary, is regarded as a description of

²⁹⁴ Pravda (Moscow). 1941. September 13.

²⁹⁵ Makarova O. S. The formation of the image of the enemy in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. p. 588.

²⁹⁶ Pravda (Moscow). 1941. September 9

the true state of affairs, which was the most important task of ideological work during the war in the USSR²⁹⁷.

In 1941 and in the following years of the war, significant areas of the USSR were occupied by the enemy. The Nazis made attempts to establish industrial production in them. The local population was used as a labor force. Labor exchanges were established, which determined the professional qualifications of employees, as well as the degree of their willingness to cooperate with the occupation authorities. Those who wanted to get a job received a special registration card. The availability of this document was as important as the passport. People were hijacked to Germany or forced to work in local production for 10-14 hours a day. The work was usually hard, and wages and food rations were minimal and did not cover human needs for food. Residents tried to find food by any means, ate various roots, grass, glue, tree bark, etc. The occupiers cared little about the preservation of the civilian population, even as a labor force. It should be noted that in addition to labor exchanges, forced mobilization of both men and women, including representatives of the elderly and minors, was also practiced²⁹⁸.

It is necessary to note three main achievements of the Germans at the beginning of the war in conducting propaganda activities. First, with their lies and tyranny, they convinced many people in the world to make a choice in favor of the fascist dictatorship. Allegedly, their future depended on this decision. Secondly, the Germans skillfully demonstrated each military campaign as the last. The Soviet leadership hoped to stay out of the war even when Britain and France were already at war. Thirdly, the Germans used blatant intimidation of people by showing them films about the Blitzkrieg. All these measures suppressed the moral foundations of a part of the population of the USSR.

From the day of the attack of nazi Germany on the Soviet Union, an information confrontation began, which raised issues of the causes, goals, nature

²⁹⁷ Makarova O. S. The formation of the image of the enemy in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. p. 588.

²⁹⁸ Krasnozhenova E. E. North-West of the RSFSR during the Nazi occupation (1941-1944) // Historical Courier. 2020. No. 3 (11). pp. 7-8.

and prospects of the military conflict. A. Hitler, preparing for the invasion, explained to the Germans that this war was "national" and "people's", and the USSR was a threat to Germany. On July 3, 1941, Supreme Commander-in-Chief I. V. Stalin exposed this version with his statement. The content of this appeal was brought to the enemy's troops and population through leaflets, radio stations, and loudspeakers.

Even before the start of the war, special units were created in the USSR, which aimed to influence the personnel of enemy troops. They had extensive reference materials on various States, such as Iran and Afghanistan. Information on Germany had previously been mistakenly not interested in the center, therefore, a permanent subscription to German periodicals was not issued, in which information about the Socio-Political situation in the country could be gleaned²⁹⁹.

The Soviet and Russian military figure, the creator of the special propaganda service in the Red Army M. I. Burtsev wrote: "Who is he, our enemy? Yes, the knowledge of the enemy, his moral and political potential — that's what we really lacked then. We began to understand more acutely how important it is to know literally everything: the history of Germany, its economy, culture, the ideology of the ruling class, the customs, customs and traditions of the people, their mental makeup, and the peculiarities of the development of the army. It was important to know not only the army in general, but also those of its troops that operate in one direction or another, that is, specific opposing units, to know thoroughly what these units breathe. To do this, it was necessary to study the captured documents more fully — orders, orders, letters, enemy surveillance data during battles, intelligence information, materials of interrogations of prisoners of war (using questionnaires) and much, much more. In studying the enemy army, the commanders and political workers were well helped by the "Instructions for interviewing prisoners" developed by the staff of our department. This instruction, approved in October

²⁹⁹ Repko S. I. The price of illusions. Propaganda against the enemy's troops and population in the first months of the war // Military History magazine. 1992. No. 11. p. 8.

1941 by the head of the Main Political Directorate, was reproduced in a typographic way and sent to all political organizations of the army and Navy"³⁰⁰.

The first review of the political and moral state of the German army was compiled by N. N. Bernikov, a graduate of the Philological Faculty of Leningrad State University, who was called up for military service on May 3, 1941 in the 7th Department of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda of the Red Army. It was based on a text about the "fall of discipline, anti-war statements and immoral acts of soldiers and officers" of the Wehrmacht. One of the sections of the review was entirely devoted to anti-war sentiments, at the end it was concluded that "the processes of decomposition and decline of spirit began in the German army," but this did not correspond to the real state of affairs. In the early summer, this material was received by the leadership of the Red Army. A small print run was distributed among the top commanders of the Red Army for familiarization. At the beginning of the war, the staff of the apparatus for work among the enemy's armed forces had no idea about the Wehrmacht and the Third Reich in general, the quality of propaganda aimed at enemy troops was greatly reduced³⁰¹.

At the initial stage of the war, Soviet agitation made a serious mistake: the enemy was presented in a ridiculous or helpless way. In June 1941 — May 1942, personal attacks on the current top leaders of Germany in order to discredit them turned out to be premature, they caused only negative reviews from the soldiers of the Wehrmacht³⁰². The Soviet propagandists involved in the information confrontation with the German ideology understood that it would be difficult to succeed. In order to increase the effectiveness of propaganda influence, it was necessary to find vulnerabilities.

Let's note another important fact that Major General M. I. Burtsev cited in his military memoirs: "We also addressed the German authorities — some of their statements were quite strong arguments. For example, Frederick the Great was quoted as saying: "Any enemy army that dared to penetrate into Russia and go

³⁰⁰ Burtsev M. I. Epiphany. M., 1981. p. 120.

³⁰¹ Repko S. I. The price of illusions. p. 9.

³⁰² Ibid. p. 13.

beyond Smolensk would certainly find its grave there, in the steppes.” In the leaflet “Russia cannot be defeated” We have already referred to the sayings of six statesmen and military figures of Germany's past. As the prisoners testified, leaflets with historical arguments "introduced a certain warning" into their minds even at this, the first stage of the war"³⁰³.

In the autumn of 1941, leaflets on the personnel of the German army were printed in the printing houses of Kuibyshev and Engels. The remoteness of these cities made it difficult to deliver propaganda material to the fronts. The leaflets either did not arrive at all as intended, or were already outdated. The small editorial staff, the lack of qualified personnel, the conditions of the constant offensive of the Wehrmacht, the decisive influence on the content of the materials of the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, L. Z. Mehlis, who imposed his views on the staff of this department — all this led to typos and grammatical errors in the texts³⁰⁴.

In the winter of 1941—1942, leaflets appeared that contained official appeals from the command to the district German troops, for example, with demands to stop resistance. There was always a signature at the end of such a leaflet: "The Soviet command".

Due to the saturation of the Red Army with the latest military equipment and weapons, from the end of 1941 there was a need for military-technical knowledge and practical skills of the Red Army personnel. One of the main activities of the agitation was military-technical propaganda, which was responsible for the training of each crew member or crew in order to increase the effectiveness of the use of equipment and weapons in combat. The special department of technology propaganda of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army was engaged in the management of military-technical propaganda activities. The specified unit monitored the transfer of the experience of the participants of the battles to the young replenishment. Mechanics-drivers, radio operators, tower commanders, etc.

³⁰³ Burtsev M. I. Epiphany. p. 121.

³⁰⁴ Repko S. I. The price of illusions. p. 11.

shared their knowledge and skills. It was important to explain how to master, save and competently use military equipment and weapons. To do this, the personnel of the Red Army were supplied with posters and diagrams, as well as educational films such as "Hand-to-hand combat", "Machine gun", "Guards mortars", "Fire training of tankers", "Infantry in battle", "Chemical protection", etc. The film materials were accompanied by speeches by specialists and had an effective effect on soldiers, improving their professionalism and skills.

Let us highlight the following important circumstance — the change in the assessment of the Soviet political leadership and military command of the situation on the fronts in June 1941 — May 1942. Our country repeatedly defeated the invaders who invaded its borders. At the same time, victories were won over both commensurate in military power and stronger opponents. The planning of military operations has always been based on the study of the past experience of the military command, taking into account the changed situation associated with the emergence of new types of weapons, tactics, mobilization capabilities, etc. During the First World War, the irretrievable losses of the army of the Russian Empire amounted to about 2 million people in opposition to two thirds of the total power of the army of the central powers. At the same time, the defeat was due not to the catastrophic state of affairs at the fronts, but to a complex of internal reasons related to the revolutionary events of 1917 and the moral decay of the army. The Soviet leadership duly appreciated the importance of ensuring social unity, as well as the importance of the work of the law enforcement system in the fight against alarmism, enemy propaganda, etc. Much attention was paid to propaganda activities.

On the eve of the war, the government initiated the creation of a powerful military-industrial complex and carried out the rearmament of the army. Most of the mistakes made by the tsarist government during the First World War were studied, which allowed us to draw a number of conclusions. Nevertheless, during its course, German and Austro-Hungarian troops managed to occupy only relatively small areas of the Russian Empire, which included the Polish and Baltic

provinces. Initially, the war with Germany and its allies was not perceived as doomed to defeat. The enemy was adequately assessed as the strongest military force in Europe, not inferior, but often superior to the Soviet army in many respects. For this reason, the possibility of severe defeats and breakthroughs of the fronts were perceived as probable, but not critical due to the remoteness of industrial centers from the borders and the gradual deployment of the army. In this case, the enemy, as they move deeper into the country, increases the supply shoulder, suffers significant losses and meets with more fierce resistance from fresh divisions being put into battle. It took the USSR several months to mobilize and deploy military operations in 1941. In general, the Soviet leadership turned out to be ready for the temporary loss of a number of regions in the fight against such a strong enemy as Nazi Germany, which had already won victories over France, Poland, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Denmark, Greece and other countries³⁰⁵.

Both in the USSR and in Germany, it was considered important to take into account the experience of not only the First World War, but also the war of 1812: "Thieves, without declaring war, Napoleon's troops marched on June 24, 1812. Almost the same date and the same method was chosen for the invasion of the USSR by the arrogant Hitler"³⁰⁶. Napoleon's "Great Army" won a number of major victories over the troops of the Russian Empire, advanced more than a thousand kilometers into the interior of the country and eventually occupied the ancient capital, Moscow. The dishonorable victory became Pyrrhic: "... partisan detachments of peasants exterminated Napoleon's army in parts, depriving it of food, fire, shelter, destroyed its wagons, seized its weapons and ammunition and brought this "invincible" army to complete exhaustion and impoverishment"³⁰⁷. Heavy losses, fatigue and demoralization of the army, as well as fierce resistance of Russian troops under the able command of Kutuzov caused the inevitable defeat of France. After the defeat at the Berezina river, the French army ceased to exist as an organized force, not reaching the border river Neman a third of the way. As

³⁰⁵ Makarova O. S. The formation of the image of the enemy in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. p. 589.

³⁰⁶ Pravda (Moscow). 1941. July 6.

³⁰⁷ Ibid. 1941. July 11.

practice has shown, both the Soviet and German command objectively assessed all the positive and negative aspects of conducting military operations in this geographical region. As in 1812, the invading army approached Moscow. But the losses were significant, the motor resource of military equipment was almost exhausted, an increase in the supply arm led to interruptions in the supply of fuel, shells, reinforcements, etc. As in 1812, the invaders did not properly take into account the climatic features of our country. As a result, the "ghost of Berezina" inspired fears to the command and ordinary soldiers of the Wehrmacht and gave hope to the defenders of the Soviet Union. The counteroffensive near Moscow, which failed to be taken this time, pushed the German troops back 100—250 km. The enemy suffered heavy losses. As a result, A. Hitler issued an order forbidding retreat, and ignored the opinion of a number of members of the German command, who proposed to end the campaign. Further retreat would have led to the defeat of the Wehrmacht, the leadership of the Third Reich recognized this. It should be noted that after the defeat of the German army near Moscow, illustrations began to appear in the Soviet press as an addition to the text. In them, A. Hitler was depicted running away in a Napoleon headdress.

One of the main directions of Soviet propaganda was to discredit the successes of the enemy. To do this, the goal was to demonstrate that the invaders are not omnipotent and will soon face defeats. After the Soviet counteroffensive in the winter of 1941 and early 1942, the population and military forces of the enemy were widely informed about the first major defeat of A. Hitler through leaflets and radio broadcasts. The plan for a "lightning" war was thwarted by the forces of the Red Army. The myth of the invincibility of the Nazi German army has been debunked. Soviet agitators and propagandists had ample opportunities for creative activity.

At the same time, the Red Army command, based on the experience of the First World War and the War of 1812, overestimated its strength. The General Staff concluded that Germany had exhausted the possibilities for continuing active offensive operations and was unable to provide the necessary supplies to the active

army. The blitzkrieg was thwarted, and a transition to a strategic offensive against a weakened enemy was required. The strike was planned in the Kharkov direction, but the forces of the Red Army turned out to be overestimated. The German army launched a series of counterattacks. As a result, by May 25, over 500 thousand people had been lost among the Soviet troops. The Germans broke through the front for more than 200 km and began the decisive stage of the Blau plan. This operation ended with the exit to Stalingrad with the closure of navigation along the Volga River, the occupation of the territory to the south of the bend of the Volga and Don rivers and the threat of a breakthrough in Transcaucasia. The USSR faced a real threat of cutting off oil supplies and complete military defeat. The victorious mood of the winter of 1941 was replaced by an awareness of the catastrophic situation.

It was in May 1942 that the Soviet Union faced a real threat of military defeat, which in Germany began to be seen as inevitable. The assessment of the situation, based on the analysis of the experience of the First World War and the War of 1812, turned out to be erroneous.

Summing up, we note that the psychological state of Soviet citizens was negatively affected by the delay or lack of information about real events. Many questions arose, for example: "What made Hitler violate the non-aggression pact? Why are the Germans strengthening the areas they occupy so quickly and strongly? Why can't the Red Army push back the enemy and transfer military operations to the enemy's territory?" etc.³⁰⁸. The war forced the agitation to change the content, forms and methods of ideological work.

Now propaganda still needed, however, to publish pictures of victims of the Nazi invasion on the pages of newspapers, in order for the population to begin a rapid rethinking of the real state of affairs. To solve this problem, the newspaper Pravda published a regular column "In the footsteps of fascist cannibals", in which it was possible to see collective farmers stealing cattle from areas occupied by the

³⁰⁸ Popova V. V. Changing the image of the enemy in the minds of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union in the first months of the Great Patriotic War [Electronic resource] // Universum: Social Sciences: electronic scientific journal. 2016. No. 11(29). URL: <http://7universum.com/ru/social/archive/item/3922> (date of application: 11.12.2023).

Nazis³⁰⁹, children who died from a German air raid ³¹⁰ and others. Other slogans followed, a change in the priorities of the USSR's information and propaganda activities and a transformation of the enemy's image. Now the main thing has become a call for revenge not only on the "German plutocrats", but also on all Germans: "The brutal enemy is robbing and ravaging our towns and villages, killing our mothers, wives, children. Let's take revenge on the German fascist scoundrels for the blood and tears of the Soviet people"³¹¹. The image of the enemy took on a national coloring, the words "Hitlerites" and "German" were most often used. The names Fritz and Hans became equivalent to the words "murderer" and "rapist".

The image of the enemy at the initial stage of the war was not clearly defined, which led to a blurred perception of external danger in the mass consciousness. The leadership of the Communist Party understood that it was necessary to turn the thinking of the Soviet people around. In other words, there is a need to create a new image of the enemy, which will differ from the one formed in previous wars. Soviet propagandists at the beginning of the war felt the need for documentary evidence of the atrocities committed by the invaders. Before the victory near Moscow, there were often moods of bewilderment and fear among the soldiers, they completely lacked an idea of the enemy, the enemy was perceived as a machine that could not be stopped. In 1942, the agitators relied on photographic materials and newsreel footage, through which the crimes of the Nazis were recorded. The mass murders of women, children, and the elderly could not be called anything other than atrocities.

Already after 6 months of the war, there was a psychological breakdown among the Nazis. The anger of the Soviet people towards the aggressor became palpable. Here is an excerpt from a captured letter from a German soldier (late 1941): "Everything around us is destroyed and destroyed. The hurricane artillery fire has been going on for three hours now. I have to sit in a corner and wait for

³⁰⁹ Pravda. (Moscow). 1941. July 11 .

³¹⁰ Pravda. (Moscow). 1941. July 27.

³¹¹ Livshin A. Ya., Orlov I. B. Soviet propaganda during the Great Patriotic War: "communication of persuasion" and mobilization mechanisms. p. 381—382.

death. That alone can drive you crazy. Nerves are strained to the last degree. I can't take it anymore. I've aged at least twenty years."³¹². From June 1941 to May 1942, the image of the enemy was formed dynamically.

³¹² Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow). 1941. December 26.

2.2. The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the radical turning point of the struggle against fascism in June 1942 — August 1943

Studying the problems of forming the image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda, we must not forget that the processes associated with its development and creative embodiment were a complex and complex work. Many artistic and propaganda works were created as a reaction to the atrocities that the Nazis staged on our land. It is also important to take into account the response of Soviet propagandists to the propaganda work carried out by the enemy. Both sides took into account the advantages and disadvantages of the events.

A year after the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, it became clear to Soviet propagandists that the discrediting of the leaders of Nazi Germany did not make the desired impression on the enemy soldiers and, accordingly, did not bring the expected results. In turn, the enemy wasted no time and carefully analyzed the difficult situation that had developed for him in the territories of the theater of military operations. The blitzkrieg failed, instead a war of attrition between the opposing sides unfolded. By August 1942, during Operation Blau, which involves access to the Caucasus and the Volga River, the Third Reich and its allies managed to achieve significant success. Nevertheless, this achievement did not lead to a decisive German victory and the defeat of the Soviet Union, despite the destruction of large Red Army forces near Kharkov and in the bend of the Don River. At the same time, supplies of military equipment and strategic resources from the allies of the USSR were carried out with increasing volumes.

In 1943, a set of measures was carried out in the North Caucasus region for a voluntary, rather than forced, mobilization method of recruiting soldiers into the army. The region has a complex interethnic situation. Mobilization based on volunteerism was carried out with the active participation of Soviet, party and Komsomol organizations of the republics of the North Caucasus. It was a strong propaganda campaign that was carried out, in which all the available forces of the

party ideologists of the republics and employees of military enlistment offices participated³¹³.

As a result, the German leadership began to pursue a more thoughtful policy aimed at using the opportunities of the occupied territories for their needs. The terror, the mass extermination of the local population, and the hijacking for forced labor in Germany continued. At the same time, attempts were made to act with the help of a carrot and stick policy. With the help of propaganda work, the illusion of a peaceful and safe life under the rule of the occupiers was created for the local population³¹⁴. If only terror methods were used, this led to a situation of desperation, increased partisan movement, uprisings, etc. In these circumstances, significant forces had to be in the occupied territories, and not on the front line. Resistance among the captured population grew from the hopelessness of the situation. At the same time, creating the illusion of acceptability of the proposed living conditions under the occupiers reduced tensions.

The Nazis decided to divide the occupied territories into three main categories. Each of them had its own regime. In the frontline zone, the depth, which, as a rule, was determined at fifty kilometers. The situation of the population there was the most difficult. They were subject to forced deportation to the rear or placement in camps, which, in fact, became death camps. The displaced persons could be forcibly kept in non-residential premises, pigsties, sheds, etc. Food was not provided, or it was extremely scarce, which led to mass deaths from hunger and disease. In particular, in the districts of the Leningrad region, in 1942 it consisted of one bowl of balanda per day. At a greater distance from the front line, as well as in areas where active partisan actions were conducted, civilians were allowed to stay outside their homes only during daylight hours and when doing household chores, they were escorted by German soldiers. In other areas, the general regime of the occupied territories was established³¹⁵.

³¹³ Bezugolny A. Yu., Bugai N. F., Krinko E. F. *The Highlanders of the North Caucasus in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945: problems of history, historiography and source studies*. M., 2012. p. 196.

³¹⁴ Makarova O. S. *The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the turning point of the struggle against fascism (June 1942 — August 1943)* // *Historical Search*. 2024. Vol. 5. No. 1. p. 53

³¹⁵ Kovalev B. N. *The daily life of the Russian population during the Nazi occupation*. Moscow, 2011. p. 4.

In addition, it was necessary to establish agricultural and industrial production in the interests of Germany, recruit collaborators to military units, promote the development of an agent network, etc. Anti-Soviet agitation and the inculcation of ethnic hatred were important tasks. The purpose of such a policy was to reduce the burden on combat-ready units, which should not have been distracted from the front³¹⁶

Special propaganda companies were created in Germany. They were under the jurisdiction of the Propaganda Department in the Army of the Ministry of Education and Propaganda. They were staffed by people recruited from among journalists, artists, film reporters, etc. All of them had to receive additional military training. These companies carried out daily propaganda work, promoting the ideas of national Socialism among the soldiers by reading reports and lectures, as well as creating film materials, front-line printing, etc. At the same time, they themselves collected the necessary work on the life of soldiers at the front and the ongoing struggle, performed the functions of Gestapo agents, conducting intelligence and counterintelligence work, processed data on the morale of soldiers, identifying unreliable ones. J. Goebbels directly pointed out that they are not front-line correspondents in the usual sense, they are rather soldiers, those who do exactly the propaganda work³¹⁷.

In addition, it was necessary to establish agricultural and industrial production in the interests of Germany, recruit collaborators to military units, promote the development of an agent network, etc. Anti—Soviet propaganda and the inculcation of ethnic hatred were important tasks. The purpose of such a policy was to reduce the burden on combat—ready units, which should not have been distracted from the front. The German leadership was also interested in developing the occupied territories with the involvement of the local population in the first place. The reason for this political line was the depletion of the material and human resources of Germany and its allies. Thus, it is only on the basis of purely

³¹⁶ Makarova O. S. The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda. p. 53.

³¹⁷ Kohan A. A. German propaganda events in the Crimea in November 1941 — September 1942. // Electronic scientific publication Almanac Space and Time. 2016. Vol. 12. Issue 1. p. 10.

propaganda measures that it is impossible to draw conclusions that the Nazis refused to implement the plan "Ost" (Generalplan Ost), which implied mass deportation and extermination of the local population.³¹⁸

This state of affairs was obvious to the Soviet command. Marshal G. K. Zhukov wrote in his memoirs "Memories and Reflections": "Fascist propaganda launched a campaign for "more thorough and timely preparation for the second Russian winter"³¹⁹. The Nazi order was established in the occupied territories, which aimed to ensure control over oil sources, food bases, industrial enterprises, mines and other resources in the interests of Nazi Germany. In order to turn the local population away from the Soviet government and the ideals of the Communist Party, the occupation authorities opened reading rooms, schools, gymnasiums and even universities, for example in the Baltic States.

The occupation regime had its own distinctive features, depending on which territory and with which population the invaders interacted. Ethnic, religious and other peculiarities were taken into account without fail. In a number of localities, in particular in those created in 1940. In the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian SSR, as well as in the western regions of Ukraine, the invaders did not meet strong national resistance. At the same time, it would be wrong to talk about the massive support of the Nazis by the local population. The German leadership created a false idea of the possibility of broad autonomy or the status of satellites for the peoples living there. Attempts were also made to create incentives for cooperation with the occupiers in relation to territories with a predominantly Russian population. We must not forget about myth-making, for example, the invaders sought to highlight the special ethnic position of the Cossacks as descendants of the Germanic tribes of the Goths.

Fascist propagandists organized exhibitions and trips to Germany. Among them, the newspapers "Speech", "North Caucasus", "Pyatigorsk Echo" and others were published. The Nazis also spread rumors and used visual propaganda —

³¹⁸ Makarova O. S. The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda. p. 53.

³¹⁹ Zhukov G. K. Memories and reflections. 5th Ed. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1983. Vol. 2. P. 290.

posters. The higher leadership obliged the German soldiers to treat the population of the occupied territories correctly, not as enemies. Powerful Nazi propaganda was carried out in churches, at village meetings, on the radio, where it was reported about the successes of the Germans in the battles against the Bolshevik USSR. The ministries of Goebbels and Rosenberg published calendars, for example, in 1943 the Orthodox calendar was published. The birthdays of Hitler, Goering and other ideologues of fascism were included in it. The main informational and psychological form of influence on the Red Army propagandists of Nazi Germany had leaflets.

In this regard, the Nazi leadership developed a document called "Proposals for the preparation of leaflets for enemy troops." If necessary, it was even allowed to pour mud on the Fuhrer ³²⁰.

The Soviet leadership drew attention to the effect that the content of enemy leaflets began to have on soldiers. Nazi printed materials began to be carefully analyzed and retaliatory materials were created, such as the column "Retribution to fascist executioners!" in the newspaper Pravda: "... the Nazis proclaimed lawlessness as their legal norm. They elevated the despicable function of the executioner to a high profession. They called the bloody war the normal state of human nature. They openly renounced such feelings as shame, pity, mercy, compassion... fascist bandits destroy everything in their path with bestial malice. <...> We will not forgive anything to the hated enemy. <...> Their black blood will be the price for the atrocities committed by them, for the mockery of our people. To retaliation, Soviet soldiers! To retaliation, Soviet people! Death to the German occupiers!"³²¹. The essence of the answer was simple. You cannot believe the occupiers who committed atrocities against Soviet citizens. Everyone who cooperates with them loses their human appearance. It is important to remember the crimes they committed and are committing now. The occupiers deserve only death for their lawless actions.

³²⁰ Drobyazko S. I. Under the banners of the enemy. Anti—Soviet formations in the German armed forces 1941—1945. Moscow: Eksmo, 2004. p. 355—359.

³²¹ Pravda (Moscow). 1943. April 7

It is necessary to note the isolated episodes of sending captured Nazis to the rear on behalf of the Soviet command. During the battles at Velikiye Luki from November 25, 1942 to January 20, 1943, there were cases of previously captured German soldiers returning to their previous positions. As a result of the propaganda influence exerted by Soviet specialists, they agitated their colleagues to surrender. The decisive role was played by the so-called fatigue from the war — the general demoralization of enemy units that were surrounded. There were similar cases in other sectors of the front, for example, during the offensive operation near Königsberg in 1945.³²² Despite this, the enemy soldiers maintained their fighting spirit. Consequently, it can be argued that such propaganda influence did not bring the results that the Soviet command hoped for.

In Soviet party documents, the press was required to publish as much as possible materials about violent acts against women, children and the elderly, about bullying of prisoners, etc. The leadership of the USSR began to rapidly record the terrible episodes of this bloody war and transform the image of the enemy by various means. Russian Russian Artists' Exhibition in June 1943 featured a painting by the artist I. E. Grabar: "... three drunken SS men with skull emblems on their sleeves, with vile stupid faces, are sitting in a Russian hut at a table filled with empty bottles and snacks, and a girl who was raped and killed by them is lying on the floor"³²³. Here is an example from G. Grigoriev's article "On the role of the moral factor in the struggle to defeat the enemy" in the Propagandist magazine, which appeared during the culmination of the Battle of Stalingrad: "A hut is on fire, set on fire by the Germans. There was a one-year-old girl left in it. Her twelve-year-old brother rushes into a burning hut and takes out the surviving child. Then the German officer turns to the boy and tells him: "You are doing well... Show me!" And when the boy trustfully handed him a package, the officer lifted the girl high, stepped forward to the hut and threw her directly into the fire. <...> He could have committed this terrible act of cruelty only because he is

³²² CAMO RF. F. 235. Op. 2086. D. 412. L. 1.

³²³ Pravda (Moscow). 1943. June 28.

German. Boundless cruelty is not a personal trait of an officer who threw a child into a fire. She's his family. And not only the family one. None of the German soldiers present at this scene even turned away, as they all look no different from the damned child killer..."³²⁴. Another article in the newspaper Pravda under the heading "Murders and tortures of Soviet citizens": "... V. I. Murashevsky, aged 74, was subjected to senseless mockery and atrocities. He was carrying a bucket of water from a street well to his house. A German soldier who lived next door to him called him to his house and brutally killed him there. Upon examination of Murashevsky's corpse, it was found that his right cheek was cut and turned to his right ear, the right ear was torn off, the left eye was gouged out, the eyelid was cut out with a triangle, the upper lip was cut off, a triangle was cut on the temple, the skin on the back of the head was cut off with a razor..."³²⁵.

Thus, the population of the USSR became aware of the crimes and atrocities of the fascists. The stories of eyewitnesses who visited the sites of mass shootings, destroyed and burned villages and towns, etc., had a tremendous impact on the Soviet people. From what they saw or heard, the citizens of the USSR immediately had a moral rejection of the Germans. The initial illusions of the Soviet population in the occupied territories about the highly cultured German people came into conflict with the atrocities of Hitler's soldiers. The Nazis considered the Slavic peoples to be second—class people: illiterate, godless and uncivilized. In this regard, the treatment of the invaders was appropriate, since they were guided by the belief in the superiority of the German race.

With the help of such a psychological stereotype as the image of the enemy, the leadership of the ruling party could construct the necessary behavior of people. The concept of creative depiction of the enemy needed a well-chosen arsenal of constructing verbal and visual means. The image of the enemy absorbed all these moods and began to represent the invader as a cruel beast and a fascist who knows no mercy. Let's give as an example several headlines from newspapers:

³²⁴ Propagandist. 1942. № 13/14. p. 35.

³²⁵ Pravda (Moscow).. 1943. April 7.

"Documents on the atrocities of the Germans", "Fascist barbarians", "Bandits and rapists", etc. 1942 was the turning year in the formation of hatred against the Germans, the following appeals sounded on posters: "Soldier of the Red Army, save!", "Take revenge!", "Protect!", etc. The writers reflected this hatred in an accessible form. For example, on the eve of the Battle of Stalingrad, a poem appears—the slogan of K. M. Simonov "Kill him!". The work, published in the Red Star in July 1942, ends with the lines:

So kill at least one!
 So kill him quickly!
 How many times will you see him,
 Kill him so many times!³²⁶

This escalating appeal demonstrates the power of aggression of the citizens of the USSR against the enemy. In Soviet propaganda, the line between the concepts of "Germans" and "fascists" was finally erased.

The image of the enemy is most vividly presented in the early articles of I. Ehrenburg "Hitler's Horde"³²⁷, "Rabid Wolves"³²⁸ and others. His works were heard on the radio and are now a kind of chronicle of the Great Patriotic War. The author pursued propaganda goals to overthrow those who encroached on the lives of the Soviet people. In the text "Hitler's Horde", the nomadic people, called the horde, are compared to a fascist gang under the control of Khan Hitler. The image of the horde is immediately associated with brutal raids and the desire to rule the occupied land. The struggle against the Mongol invasion became a projection of Germany's attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. The image of the enemy was revealed in such definitions as "beasts", "pedigreed degenerates", "robbers", etc. In "Rabid Wolves", German political and military figures are endowed with animal essence. For example, I. G. Ehrenburg gives A. Hitler the image of a rabid dog, Marshal G. Goering is called an arrogant turkey and an executioner who loves

³²⁶ Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow). 1942. July 18.

³²⁷ Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow).. 1941. June 26 .

³²⁸ Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow). 1941. July 6.

ritual executions, Goebbels is a disgusting monkey and the court jester of A. Hitler, etc.³²⁹

Thus, a metaphorical image of the enemy is formed—a beast that does not want to obey humane norms of behavior. Here is another prosaic example from the newspaper *Bolshevik Pravda*: "... if the Nazis continue to be on our land, they will take away your entire crop and take it to Germany. Fascist bandits are wolves in sheep's clothing"³³⁰.

In September 1942, Yaroslavsky published his article with the title "Horde" in the newspaper *Pravda*. In it, he quoted a captured letter from the German pilot X. Kremer from the Soviet-German front, addressed to his Frau Fani Heidenheim in Württemberg. The author of the article calls the German a "fascist chicken-eater", "locust", "robber", "executioner's horde". We present a part of this letter: "... eggs, milk and sour cream can always be found. One day I found 21 eggs, ½ liter of good thick sour cream and ¾ pound of homemade butter. Then the chickens are caught, their heads are torn off. Cows and calves are tied up, after that the village is set on fire, and we go home with the loot. When everything is "threshed" in the area, we move a few kilometers further." Yaroslavsky then sets out what needs to be done with such subhumans: "It is difficult to add anything to this disgusting self—portrait of a representative of the "higher Aryan race". This is a completely finished portrait of a robber, one of the representatives of the fascist locust, which devastates, burns, "threshes" everything around it that can be devoured. If this locust, that hungry, butchering horde is not exterminated, it will leave bare earth everywhere, saturated with tears and blood. This dishonest executioner's horde must be exterminated so that humanity can live."³³¹.

During the Great Patriotic War, the rhetoric of state ideology was formed by propaganda tools. The image of the enemy acquired lexical specificity in the words "fascist", "Fritz", "beast", "bastard", "fiend", "monster", etc. The verbal image of the enemy was clarified by appropriate definitions: "insidious", "treacherous",

³²⁹ Makarova O. S. The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the turning point of the struggle against fascism (June 1942 — August 1943) p. 55.

³³⁰ *Bol'shevistskaya pravda* (Moscow). 1942. November 4.

³³¹ *Pravda* (Moscow). 1942. September 6

"brutal", etc. Models of behavior of the Soviet people expressed the verbs "smash", "smash", "destroy", "kill", etc.

In all forms of art, to strengthen faith in the victory of the Red Army, the enemy began to be depicted either as an inhuman fiend or a pathetic grotesque character. The Soviet government pointed out that extremes should be avoided in propaganda materials: the invader should not be too strong or too weak. It was also not necessary to mention any successes of the enemy.

By the beginning of the summer of 1942, the word "German" had become identical to the definition of "enemy". The final fusion of these two concepts is reproduced by I. G. Ehrenburg in the article "Kill!" published in the Red Star on July 24, 1942: "... we know everything. We remember everything. We realized that the Germans are not human. From now on, the word "German" is the most terrible curse for us. From now on, the word "German" discharges the gun. Let's not talk. Let's not be indignant. We will kill. If you haven't killed at least one German in a day, your day is gone. If you think that your neighbor will kill a German for you, you did not understand the threat. If you don't kill the German, the German will kill you. He'll take yours and torture them in his damned Germany. If you can't kill a German with a bullet, kill a German with a bayonet. If there is a lull in your area, if you are waiting for a fight, kill the German before the fight. Russian russians, if you let a German live, a German will hang a Russian man and disgrace a Russian woman. If you killed one German, kill another — there is nothing more fun for us than German corpses. Don't count the days. Don't count the miles. Count one thing: the Germans you killed. Kill the German! — the old mother asks for it. Kill the German! — this is the child begging you. Kill the German! — this is the native land screaming. Don't miss. Don't miss it. Kill him!"³³².

Since August 1942, appeals have been increasingly printed on the front pages of newspapers: "A fighter of the Red Army! The German brings you, your family, and friends shameful and terrible bondage, torment, and death. Do not

³³² Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow). 1942. July 24.

offend your family, your homeland. Beat the German bastard to death!"³³³. Such appeals in Soviet propaganda and agitation deprived the malicious aggressor, from general to soldier, of the right to leniency, but excluded genocide against the German people. In addition, Marshal G. K. Zhukov notes: "The Communist partisans not only fought with weapons in their hands, but also conducted great political and explanatory work among the population, distributed leaflets, proclamations, messages of the Soviet Information Bureau, exposed the false propaganda of the enemy. The impact of the partisans on the morale of the enemy troops was of great importance"³³⁴.

The aggravation of the situation at the front by the summer of 1942 gave rise to Order No. 227 "On measures to strengthen discipline and order in the Red Army and the prohibition of unauthorized withdrawal from combat positions." From the text of the document it followed: "After the loss of Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, Donbass and other regions, we have less territory, which means there are much fewer people, bread, metal, factories, factories. <...> Retreating further means ruining ourselves and at the same time ruining our Homeland. <...> It follows from this that it is time to end the retreat. Not a step back! That should be our main call now."³³⁵. With the help of this order, it was planned to stop the mass desertion and voluntary surrender of Soviet soldiers. By this time, the Red Army soldiers had lost their fighting spirit and faith in victory, which they had originated after the success of the counteroffensive near Moscow. The leadership of the USSR had to find a radical solution regarding the reversal of the military situation in its favor. It took not only time and additional forces, but also a strong propaganda influence to organize a powerful strike against the invaders. The above order reflected a very simple idea: defeat means slavery and death, not only for the soldier in the trenches, but also for his relatives in the rear³³⁶.

³³³ Ibid. August 16.

³³⁴ Zhukov G. K. Memories and reflections. Vol. 3. p. 12.

³³⁵ Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 dated July 28, 1942 // Military History magazine. 1988. № 8. p. 74.

³³⁶ Makarova O. S. The propaganda significance of the Order of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942 in raising the morale of Soviet soldiers and officers // XXVII Tsarskoye Selo Readings. 2023. Vol, 2 pp. 309—310.

During the war, it was not possible to find an order in the press, called "Not a step back!", it was read out in front of the Red Army soldiers. From the memoirs of the artillery scout G. V. Rybin: "At the beginning of August 1942, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 227 of July 28 was read to us, the cadets of the second Rostov Artillery School, which was located at that time in the city of Stalingrad. Listening to him, everyone felt responsible for the fate of the Motherland. The order was very clear about the complexity and danger of the situation. At all costs, the defenders of Stalingrad had to defend this last frontier and prevent the enemy from crossing the Volga!"³³⁷.

The structure of the order is simple and consists of two compositional parts: a preamble and an order. The preamble emphasizes the lack of iron discipline and order: "The word "discipline" is used in the order 13 times in a variety of grammatical forms and combinations. Based on the stating part of the order, it can be concluded that the degree of nobility of the goal facing the Red Army is directly dependent on the level of its discipline, and vice versa, the level of discipline and order is determined by the nobility of the goal set."³³⁸. The order is interpreted as a specially calibrated propaganda pressure that puts citizens in a state of struggle and counteraction to the invaders. I. V. Stalin personally worked out the logical construction of the text. The leader rewrote a document previously drawn up by the Chief of the General Staff, A.M. Vasilevsky.

In the summer of 1942, the Soviet leadership more adequately assessed the situation on the fronts, which was reflected in the orders they issued. Order No. 227 appeared on time as never before. He responded to the sentiments of not only the leadership, but also the army. Mass desertion led to catastrophes, as a result of which hundreds of thousands of soldiers and officers who fought for their country found themselves surrounded. There were frequent situations when the achievements gained as a result of the heroism of some servicemen lost their meaning due to the cowardice of others, which caused righteous anger in the army.

³³⁷ Rybin G. V. It was like that. The Battle of Stalingrad — "Not a step back!" // *Izvestia of higher educational institutions. The North Caucasus region. Social sciences.* 2003. No. 2. p. 24.

³³⁸ Kolmakova V. V., Shalkov D. Yu. Speech strategy of Order No. 227 "Not a step back!": a communicative and pragmatic aspect // *Young Researcher of Don* 2019. № 1 (16). p. 124..

The creation of penal military units and the issuance of Order No. 227 turned out to be timely and corresponded to the sentiments of the vast majority of soldiers defending their country. The mass flight stopped, the enemy was stopped. After the issuance of this order, the number of deserters, as well as soldiers who surrendered, sharply decreased. Many fighters got rid of uncertainty and depression, regained their spirits and found the will to win. For some soldiers, this order brought awareness of their importance for the protection of the motherland. Others sought to avoid a shameful death. Propaganda has changed its perspective, it has stopped hiding the true state of affairs and new facts. The scale of the territories captured by the Nazis was especially stunning. Despite this, the patriotic mood increased every day. Forceful methods were used to combat those who violated discipline and showed cowardice³³⁹.

By the end of 1942, Communist propaganda had fully formed the image of the Soviet warrior. At the very beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the readiness for self-sacrifice was considered the main heroic feature. By 1943, it had been replaced by confidence in victory: "The enemy did not want to accept the ultimatum of the Soviet command to surrender and is now paying the price. Wherever you look, there are piles of frozen corpses of German soldiers and officers everywhere. The spoils of our troops are huge. What the Germans did not want to accept with kindness... they now accept as inevitable. The blows of the Red Army made them more understanding and compliant. We were sitting yesterday in Karpovka, at the headquarters of one of our divisions. Until late in the evening, more and more batches of prisoners were brought to the headquarters. At seven o'clock in the evening, a Red Army soldier entered with a machine gun: — Allow me to report! He brought another hundred and four Krauts. Here they are — "pure—blooded" and "invincible". The fighters look at this lousy crowd with sullen contempt"³⁴⁰, — G. Grigorenko wrote in the newspaper Pravda.

³³⁹ Makarova O. S. The propaganda significance of the Order of the NCO of the USSR No. 227 of July 28, 1942 in raising the morale of Soviet soldiers and officers p . 313.

³⁴⁰ Pravda (Moscow). 1943. January 19.

In the initial period of the war, the spontaneous creation of a special fund for the Defense of the USSR became an important evidence of the patriotism of the Soviet people. Its function was to voluntarily raise funds to help the Red Army. The newspaper Pravda has repeatedly published telegrams from workers addressed to I. V. Stalin, in which they appealed to accept all possible financial assistance to fight the enemy. Based on the analysis of the above reports, we can observe how the image of the enemy was transformed during the crucial period of the war. For example, the chairman of the Alga collective farm in the Sargachensky district of the Gorky region, deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Saberov Mustafa Saberovich, wrote to Comrade Stalin in the Kremlin: "Dear Joseph Vissarionovich! Following the noble initiative of the Soviet patriots and the ardent unshakeable desire to help our valiant Red Army in the final defeat of the German invaders with all my might, I contributed 100,000 rubles from my personal savings to buy the Valery Chkalov aircraft and handed over 25 pounds of bread to the bread fund of the Red Army. Let my war machine, a gift to the defenders of the Motherland, given to the brave Stalinist falcon, mercilessly stabs the fascist vultures..."³⁴¹. It should be noted that such letters always had a response: "Accept my greetings and thanks from the Red Army, Comrade Sabirov, for your concern for the Red Army. I. Stalin"³⁴². All these headings were evidence of the unity of the front and rear. The following example can be given: "Dear Joseph Vissarionovich! The collective of workers, engineering and technical workers and employees of the Gorky Krasnaya Etna plant increased production by 48 percent during 1942. and he increased labor productivity by 45 percent, giving the country 3 million rubles of over—planned savings. Inspired by the offensive of the Red Army under your leadership, we promise in 1943 to give the front and the country even more products and better quality. To speed up the defeat of the fascist invaders, we contribute 725 thousand rubles from our savings for the construction of the Krasnoetnovets tank column. Let the Soviet tankers on these combat vehicles

³⁴¹ Ibid. March 12 .

³⁴² Ibid.

exterminate the fascist evil spirits, bringing the day of final victory closer. We wish you, dear Joseph Vissarionovich, health for many years to come. Director of the Romanov factory, party organizer of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) Novikov, chairman of the head committee of Fears, Secretary of the Komsomol Committee Preobrazhenskaya"³⁴³. These material donations were also accompanied by a response from I. V. Stalin: "I ask you to convey to the workers, female workers, engineering and technical workers and employees of the Gorky Krasnaya Etna plant, my brotherly greetings and gratitude to the Red Army"³⁴⁴. The belief in victory and comprehensive support greatly helped the Soviet fighters in the confrontation with the fascist occupiers. The image of the enemy expanded due to new epithets: "vultures", "fascist scum", etc.

Such appeals from the broad masses of Soviet society with messages about the provision of gratuitous assistance were indicative. The political leadership, the armed forces and the general population of the USSR were united in the fight against fascism. The spontaneity of the formation of the USSR Defense Fund is one of the clearest examples of this unity. The publication in the media of data on donations played an important ideological role, as citizens saw that their contribution did not go unnoticed and was accepted with gratitude. It was also important to personalize the appeals and responses to them with an expression of gratitude on behalf of the head of state. People assumed various increased obligations related to the work functions they performed, and this expressed their struggle with the enemy.

In the winter of 1943, Hitler's army was defeated at Stalingrad. For Nazi Germany, this was the biggest failure in World War II, which destroyed faith in the invincibility of the Wehrmacht. The fear of facing trial and imminent death were the driving forces for suicide. Suicide seemed to be one way out of a difficult situation. The situation with F. Paulus was both unique and ordinary for the German high command. As a rule, suicide was resorted to in case of despair or in

³⁴³ Ibid. March 7 .

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

order to avoid more serious consequences. F. Paulus, in fact, had to commit suicide out of fear of Soviet captivity and trial, as V. Model and R. R. Von Greim did later. However, he escaped trial, despite the war crimes committed, because he cooperated with the leadership of the USSR and this may have bought his life and freedom. As a result, a situation has arisen in which one can talk about undermining the legitimacy of the power of the Nazi leaders. If field marshals value their lives above orders, then how can they send subordinates to their deaths? Why should the privates and officers of the German army risk themselves if their command is not ready to make sacrifices?³⁴⁵

German propaganda could not provide answers to these questions. In the current situation, it was not the fact of the suicide of the commander of the 6th Army that was important, but the fact that the surrender demonstrated the cowardice of the high command and undermined its authority in the eyes of soldiers and the civilian population of Germany. The surrender of F. Paulus was the right and rational decision. The destruction of the 6th Army with the loss of many territories captured during Operation Blau became a landmark event. The Germans lost their faith in victory. It is important to note that subsequently, the vast majority of field marshals and generals of Nazi Germany preferred to choose life in captivity.

In contrast to this information from German propaganda about the causes of the death of the 6th army, K. G. Zhukov stressed that the experience of the first year of the war was taken into account: "Working in the troops, we studied in detail information about the enemy, the nature of its defense, the location of the main forces and the general fire system, the presence and location of anti—tank weapons and anti—tank strongpoints. <...> Practical instructions were immediately given: what you need to learn more about the enemy, what else you need to plan, what work to do directly on the ground and with the troops"³⁴⁶.

³⁴⁵ Makarova O. S. The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the turning point of the struggle against fascism (June 1942 — August 1943) p. 56.

³⁴⁶ Zhukov G. K. Memories and reflections. Vol. 2. p. 298.

Hitler's propaganda apparatus has lost its former initiative. Now the defensive period began for the German troops, which irritated the German people. Reports to Hitler on public sentiment were regular. Despair, despondency and fatigue from this large-scale war appeared in them.

In Soviet propaganda, immediately after the victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, the image of the enemy in caricature art was transformed. A. Hitler was depicted as the leader of a bandit gang before the end of 1942, but in early 1943 he was already represented by artists in the image of a beaten dog. The enemy soldiers on the posters appeared as living corpses, the SS army — grave crosses. In such associations, one could guess the idea that the soldiers of the Wehrmacht accept death, and do not carry it for the soldiers of the Red Army. When forming the image of the enemy among the people of the USSR, Soviet cartoonists in their works relied on humor, sarcasm, as well as the topicality of the themes of the war days³⁴⁷. Note the important role of the color game, which also carried a certain symbolic connotation on these posters. Bright colors encourage the viewer to take action. Red was the most common color, as it had several associations at once: blood, war, the Red Army. Black, white, and brown tones were used to enhance it. The composition of the posters is dynamic, the created images emphasize the energy and illusion of movement.

A year after the outbreak of the Great Patriotic War, many children were orphaned. It was this fact that in 1942 caused the tragic image of the baby to appear on posters. In 1943, the drama of a small child was no longer so acute, as an example, L. F. Golovanov's work "My dad is a hero, and you?" can be cited. In the turning point of 1943, the theme of the posters also changes, the notes of victory begin to sound in it.

Kursk was liberated on February 8, 1943. The next day, I. Flowers wrote in the newspaper Pravda: "...Kursk... Here he stands, Soviet again, free again. The Germans have been tormenting this city for more than a year. It is broken and

³⁴⁷ Makarova O. S. The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the turning point of the struggle against fascism (June 1942 — August 1943) p. 56.

destroyed. The Germans turned it into a huge cemetery. Suffice it to say that, according to incomplete data, in the first six months of the occupation alone, the Germans tortured thousands of residents. 25 thousand inhabitants were forcibly enslaved to Germany. The fighting in the square near the Medical Institute has just subsided. Now there are dead Germans lying here. Residents of Kursk remember how the Germans took 19 peaceful Soviet citizens to this square and shot them. Here, in this building, German monster doctors injected 400 children with poison and explained to the outraged population: "There is not enough bread in the city, and the children, suffering, will die of hunger. We have made it easier for them to move to a better world." <...> The Germans destroyed the museums. <...> The Germans opened brothels. <...> The Germans burned down beautiful houses. <...> The Germans crippled the city. Today is the hour of retribution. Fighters are walking through the city. They have just recaptured it from the barbarians. They are giving it back to those who created it, and who will revive it from the ashes and ruins again."³⁴⁸.

In the spring of 1943, the German command planned a large-scale propaganda campaign "Silver Stripe". The calculation was made that Soviet soldiers would begin to surrender en masse. Russian Russians are running over to the Russians. A large number of leaflets (more than 32 million copies) were dropped on the front lines in the Kursk region, they featured the slogan "Russians are running over to the Russians." The emphasis was on the Russian Liberation Army (ROA) under the leadership of General A. A. Vlasov³⁴⁹. The result of this provocation was the defeat of the German fascist formations by Soviet troops in the Battle of Kursk on August 23, 1943. Currently, this date is the Day of Military Glory of Russia.

Such a propaganda move did not play its role. Already at this time, the name of A. A. Vlasov became a household name and odious. Soldiers and officers who defected to the Nazis were called "vlasovtsy " in everyday speech, and regardless

³⁴⁸ Pravda (Moscow) 1943. February 9.

³⁴⁹ Steinert M. G. Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen. Düsseldorf — Wien, 1970. S. 327—328.

of those military units where they served the Nazis. It is also important to note that these units were noted mainly for punitive actions against the guerrillas and the local population. Russian propaganda's emphasis on the fact of the formation of military units from traitors and the fact that "Russians are at war with Russians" was, on the whole, erroneous³⁵⁰. The traitors who were captured did not expect leniency and were relatively infrequently used in combat clashes with regular units of the Red Army.

Using the example of the formation and functioning of ROA units, the Nazis sought to show the illusion of a new national policy in which there would be no discrimination. Officers of the Russian Liberation Army of various nationalities were involved in propaganda work with the civilian population. They made presentations, including for radio and the press. At the same time, the falsity of such propaganda is confirmed by the fact that the "Vlasov" printed publications "Volunteer", "Zarya", etc. were not allowed to be distributed among working Soviet citizens in labor camps. The forced prisoners were not supposed to have any illusions about their fate³⁵¹.

The collaborationist formations formed by the Nazis underwent intensive training. It included combat, tactical field, shooting, physical and combat training. Self-defense companies were trained from one to three months, in turn, the auxiliary police for up to nine months. The main importance belonged to a special moral and psychological treatment, the most important component of which was precisely anti-Soviet propaganda. The training of employees opposed to the Soviet government was carried out under the supervision of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence and counterintelligence agency in 1920-1944.³⁵²

³⁵⁰ Makarova O. S. The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the turning point of the struggle against fascism (June 1942 — August 1943) p. 57.

³⁵¹ Romanko O. V. German occupation policy on the territory of Crimea and the national question (1941-1944). Simferopol, 2009. pp. 187-195.

³⁵² Romanko O. V. Combat and religious-ideological training of personnel of the Crimean Tatar collaborationist formations in the power structures of Nazi Germany (1941-1944) // Muslim World. 2016. No. 1. pp. 42-43.

Already on August 29, a small feuilleton appeared in the Soviet press. Viktorova's "Goebbels howls at the moon": "A dull, long—drawn, nasty howl rushes from the fascist gateway. That's Goebbels howling, a mangy fascist dog. The dog howls at the moon. To be, to be dead! There was a time. The dog had a crocheted tail. He was talking loudly and noisily, broadcasting the "lightning victories" of the bandit fascist gang. But ... the tail has long been clamped between the hind legs of the Hitler dog. The noisy chatter was replaced by a dull howl..."³⁵³.

During the crucial period of the Great Patriotic War, the image of the enemy was most often manifested in the following plots-appeals: to kill the invader, avenge the murdered loved ones, ridicule the leaders of the Third Reich, expose the low culture of German soldiers and officers, join the fight against fascist ideology.

The formation of the image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the specified war period was based on a thirst for revenge. Almost every company kept notes in notebooks, where short stories of military personnel were recorded. They resembled indictments³⁵⁴. The Soviet government suppressed the competition, who destroyed the fascists more, justifying this by saying that a Red Army soldier should not have such an immoral appearance and show bad behavior³⁵⁵.

As a result, it is necessary to note a number of features of the formation of the image of the enemy in communist propaganda in June 1942 — August 1943.

The naturalistic description of the crimes committed by the fascists was aimed at dehumanizing them. The Nazis had no right to cause the slightest pity as murderers of women and children, maniacs who committed atrocities against the civilian population. At the same time, we are not talking about the embodiment of a certain creative idea, but about providing the population with true information about the crimes committed by the enemy — without embellishment, in the most realistic form. The people should have known the truth about the war. Specific slogans contained an assessment of the enemy's actions, they contained one simple thought: if you don't kill a German, if you don't do anything to win, then the enemy

³⁵³ Pravda (Moscow). 1943. August 29

³⁵⁴ CAMO RF. F. 372. Op. 6570. D. 76. L. 304—305.

³⁵⁵ Sovetskij vojn (Moscow). 1943. April 14..

will come to your house, as he has already done in many thousands of small and large settlements³⁵⁶.

We must not forget that the enemy, given the difficult situation on the fronts, began to pay more attention to solving the problem of legitimizing its power in the occupied territories. The illusion of the possibility of an ordinary, peaceful life under the yoke of the occupiers began to be created. There was a false perception that there was a choice, and death or slavery were not inevitable under German rule. To solve this problem, churches, educational and social institutions were opened, mass media were established, and anti-Bolshevik propaganda was carried out. In order to wage a war of attrition, in addition to terror, it was necessary to create a certain positive image of the fascist government in order to mobilize the inhabitants of the occupied territories. In this regard, the demonstration to military personnel and the civilian population of the true appearance of the inhuman enemy has become especially important. No one should have had the illusions imposed on Soviet society by the fascists. Anyone who mutilates and burns alive women and children cannot be trusted. This was the harsh truth of the information provided to the public.

Of great moral and psychological importance was the publication of the order of the People's Commissariat of Defense No. 227, almost immediately called "Not a step back!". A distinctive feature of the document was the truthfulness of the description of the situation on the fronts. The order also spoke of the senselessness of retreating without an order due to the fact that the result would be death and slavery not only of the soldiers, but also of their loved ones. The manifested moral instability of some units offset the heroism of others during the breakthrough of the front. The order was greeted in the army as inevitable and fully in line with the prevailing situation. Fleeing and abandoning the position did not give a chance to survive and preserve freedom. Death in battle might not be the worst prospect in the fight against an inhuman enemy. It is precisely this kind of

³⁵⁶ Макарова О. С. The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda during the turning point of the struggle against fascism (June 1942 — August 1943). p. 57.

uncovered truth that has had a great moral and psychological impact on society and has become one of the keys to victory.

Nevertheless, this period was distinguished by a certain turning point in the formation of the image of the enemy. Heavy defeats, the exit of the Nazis to the Caucasus and to the Volga River were critical for the USSR and threatened with death. Despite this, the country withstood, the enemy was pushed back hundreds of kilometers and suffered irreparable losses. The most important thing is that the Nazis lost confidence in the inevitability of their victory. The Soviet society also took heart.

The image of the enemy was reflected in the telegrams to the country's leadership. In this case, it was not created by official state propaganda, but only used in it. The author was the people themselves, and the position of society in relation to the enemy was embodied in the pages of periodicals. The population of the USSR, which included representatives of various peoples and professions, expressed an individual and collective attitude towards the enemy, as well as expressed an opinion about the essence of the ongoing struggle. The position of Soviet propaganda did not differ from that of ordinary citizens. In addition, the spontaneously forming attitude of the people towards the enemy itself could set the leitmotif in the creation of various materials used in propaganda work. At the same time, there was military censorship and editorial work. Nevertheless, the texts of the published messages were written by real people both individually and in teams. Similarly, the financial assistance provided to the front was equally real. The image of the enemy as a brutal murderer, occupier and vulture was formed not only by the supervisory authorities and officials who carried out propaganda work, but also by the broad masses of the population, in the public consciousness itself. We can talk about the multilateral influence on the formation of the image of the enemy by the citizens of the country: from a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to an ordinary worker of an industrial enterprise. The existing ideas of people were used by the Soviet leadership and were reflected in the press.

Caricature has become dominant in the artistic embodiment of the enemy's image. Propaganda workers ridiculed the primitiveness of fascist ideology, the cowardice of the command, and the external ugliness of Germany's leaders. Victory over them gradually began to be perceived as inevitable, and the enemy no longer inspired terror in his incarnation. A significant event was the death of the 6th Army and the surrender of its commander, Field Marshal F. Paulus. The moral significance of such a fact is hard to overestimate. The battle was won, which the sides waged attrition, irretrievably losing several million people. At the same time, the command, which sent its soldiers to their deaths, chose to live in captivity. German propaganda failed to answer the inevitable questions in this situation. The morale of the soldiers and officers of Nazi Germany was undermined. The fundamental changes in the image of the enemy during the period under review were largely related to the above factual basis. The enemy can be defeated, and he shows cowardice. The attitude towards him is changing: yes, he is cruel and ruthless, but he is despicable.

2.3. Transformation of the enemy's image at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War in September 1943 — May 1945

At the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, it became obvious to society in the USSR that fascist Germany and its satellites were broken. The morale of the German army deteriorated due to the crushing blows of the Red Army, heavy losses in manpower and equipment. Thanks to this, the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda has increased. The propaganda apparatus of the USSR began to restructure its propaganda policy.

In 1943—1944, the Orthodox Church became one of the important patriotic landmarks of propaganda. As you know, on September 12, 1943, Patriarch Sergius of Moscow and All Russia was elected. The war made its own adjustments: previously, many Soviet citizens had to hide their religiosity, now the situation has changed, they could openly attend religious events. The Orthodox Church proclaimed the defense of the motherland to be the duty of every Christian and stated in its appeals that the fascist invaders were its enemies. Archbishop S. F. Garbet wrote: "There can be no doubt that the church service is unlimited. The Orthodox clergy told us this categorically. Stalin is a wise statesman who realizes that the church no longer supports the old regime, she loyally accepts the existing system, she began to help the national cause with her soul and body, she offers prayers and works for victory, and she did it immediately, without the slightest hesitation, on the first day war was declared"³⁵⁷.

Representatives of other Christian denominations, in particular Baptists and Evangelicals, also supported this confrontation. On July 8, 1941, the chairman of the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims, Ufa Mufti Gabdrakhman Zainullovich Rasulev called on all Muslims to pray for the gift of victory and bless their sons in this struggle. In 1942, the Muslim clergy declared jihad against the fascists³⁵⁸.

³⁵⁷ RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 117. D. 946. L. 81—122.

³⁵⁸ Krinko E.F. Religious life in the rear and at the front during the Great Patriotic War // Bulletin of the Orenburg State Pedagogical University. 2015. No. 1 (13). p. 100.

The Nazis, for their part, also drew attention to religious organizations in order to support them as opposed to Bolshevik ideology, to break them up so that they could not present a united front against Germany and for the occupation authorities to rely on them. At the same time, the Germans did not plan real support for the church. On the contrary, they sought to create many sects, each of which should have its own idea of God³⁵⁹.

There was another problem. During the war, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers defected to the enemy and fought in the ranks of the Wehrmacht in regular combat units, as well as national formations and various police units. The most common group were the so-called Hiwi volunteer assistants (from *Hilfswilliger, Ost-Hilfswilligen*). When captured by our troops, they were usually called "vlasovtsy" after the commander of the ROA, A. A. Vlasov, although in the vast majority of cases they had nothing to do with him.

Hiwi were originally supposed to perform the functions of assisting Wehrmacht soldiers as ammunition carriers, truck drivers, cooks, etc. Over time, the situation changed: as the losses of the German army increased, they were increasingly actively involved in combat operations. Traitors were involved in punitive actions, performed police functions, and guarded concentration camps.

The ranks of the hiwi were replenished due to the transfer of prisoners of war to the enemy, as a rule, this happened when there was a threat to life. It is important to note that the vast majority of the traitors who defected to the side of the Nazi administration in the Soviet occupied territories pursued a selfish interest. The collaborators received food and relative safety from the fascist administration. Subsequently, many of those who found themselves abroad said that they sided with the Nazis precisely for ideological reasons to fight Bolshevism, as they wrote in memoirs published abroad. Such writings do not correspond to reality. They were not fighters for their homeland, their goal was precisely to save their lives at the cost of her betrayal.³⁶⁰ Many surrendered voluntarily, for ideological reasons.

³⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 101.

³⁶⁰ Kovalev B. N. Novgorod under enemy occupation 1941-1944. // St. Petersburg Historical Journal. 2020. No. 3 (27). p. 127.

Representatives of the emigration were also widely used by the Nazis. They complemented professional German propagandists with their work, since they were fluent in Russian and other languages of the peoples of the USSR. This was important for German propaganda in order to influence the population of the occupied territories³⁶¹.

Since the beginning of the war, Russian emigration abroad has been divided into so-called "defencists" and "defeatists". The former spoke from the standpoint of the need for the victory of the USSR, since Hitler wants to destroy and enslave Russia. The latter, on the contrary, believed that he was only striving to liberate the country from Bolshevism. As a result, they considered it necessary to help the Nazis. These disagreements largely followed from the ambiguity of fascist propaganda. It was often multidirectional³⁶². For example, Nikolai Shepchenko, a member of the Union of Soviet Patriots, during an interrogation conducted on August 22, 1948, reported that the initiative group of the founders of this organization began to function already in the autumn of 1941 — winter of 1942. Emigrants opposed to the Nazis joined the People's Liberation Movement and were subordinate to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The members of this organization were declared accepted into the KPU. At the same time, the lists of members of the organization were not subject to disclosure³⁶³.

In addition, the male population in the occupied territories was conscripted into the ranks of the Wehrmacht and the SS troops. All these people took an oath to the enemy. The attitude towards these categories of citizens on the part of Soviet soldiers, as well as the civilian population, was generally sharply negative. The hiwis were clearly perceived as traitors. At the same time, the situation was not related to the stereotype of the enemy imposed by the authorities. A man who puts on the enemy's uniform and takes his side is worse in moral assessment than a German soldier. Once on the line of contact, hiwi and vlasovtsy often fiercely

³⁶¹ Kohan A. A. "My ideology was alien to the ideology of the Soviet man": on the issue of the composition and activities of the editorial boards of the newspaper *Golos Krym* in 1941-1944. // *Bulletin of the Russian State University*. 2016. No. 10. p. 156.

³⁶² Timofeev A. Y. *The Russian factor. The Second World War in Yugoslavia*. M., 2010. p. 16.

³⁶³ Timofeev A. Yu. Activity of the "Union of Soviet Patriots" in Serbia during the Second World War // *Slavic Almanac: collection of scientific papers*. 2013. pp. 243, 245.

resisted, realizing that they would not be considered prisoners of war. Society saw them as criminals who had betrayed their country. For this reason, hiwi was usually not captured, but killed on the spot. There were also cases when Soviet prisoners of war who put on enemy uniforms tried to return to their own at the first opportunity, and ended up in filtration camps for interrogation by Smersh employees³⁶⁴.

The leadership of the USSR sought to attract these people to its side. As a rule, Soviet citizens did not need to explain that the person who put on the enemy's uniform was a traitor. Many punitive detachments were formed from them. We must not forget the fact that the one who betrayed once for the sake of saving his life will do it again. There were not so many fanatical enemies of the Soviet government among the traitors. Most of them sought to save their lives at any cost. This is exactly what Soviet propaganda emphasized. Here is an example of one of the typical leaflets addressed to hiwi: "If you want to live, if you want to atone for your guilt before the Motherland, take the German weapons and go to the partisan detachment. Your native Russian people will meet you there. Together with them, you will be able to fulfill your sacred duty to the Motherland. Before the Russian people...»³⁶⁵. Let's pay attention to the following circumstance: it was pointed out here that the traitor is primarily a Russian man, and he serves the occupiers, who by their nature are his enemies. Yes, he stumbled, but no matter how the situation developed, he was and remains one of us, even if he became a criminal. He still had a chance to redeem himself.

As the end of the military conflict approached, such appeals became more and more relevant. The number of hiwis and other traitors in percentage terms became increasingly large in accordance with the increase in losses of the German army. At the same time, the inevitability of the defeat of their new owners became obvious. The propaganda directed at the traitors was quite effective. It is possible to note the case of the transition of the 1st Russian national brigade of the SS

³⁶⁴ Makarova O. S. Makarova O. S. Transformation of the enemy image in Soviet propaganda at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, September 1943 — May 1945 // The Bulletin of Ryazan State University named for S. A. Yesenin. 2024. No. 1 (82). p. 38.

³⁶⁵ RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 138.

"Druzhina" to the side of the partisans in 1943. More than a thousand people joined the 1st Anti-Fascist partisan brigade, which took an active part in the fight against the occupiers. Its commander, Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Gil-Rodionov, was awarded the Order of the Red Star³⁶⁶. Despite this, many of these SS units were sentenced to capital punishment as persons who took part in the commission of various crimes. There were also white immigrants among them.

It should be noted that, paradoxically, contradictory motives began to combine in the formation of the image of the enemy. On the one hand, the Soviet government treated collaborators as people who were considered enemies and criminals, and on the other hand, they were their own by origin. They had a chance to redeem themselves. In fact, the Soviet government did not need to explain to its people that a traitor was an enemy. The immorality of collusion with an inhuman opponent was not questioned. At the same time, there was no particular need to call for the destruction of the hiwi and the national SS battalions. The excessive bitterness of the Red Army soldiers against them gave them the fury of the doomed in battle. Despite this, propaganda aimed specifically at collaborators was necessary. She was morally corrupting people who had already committed betrayal once. Many hiwis who did not take direct part in the fighting and did not commit atrocities against the civilian population, according to the verdicts of the tribunals, saved their lives³⁶⁷.

We must not forget that the very fact of realizing guilt and returning to service was not an indulgence. Many people who became ideological accomplices of the fascists and took part in the extermination of the civilian population were brought to trial by military tribunals, and many of them faced the death penalty. As a rule, they were publicly hanged precisely as criminals. The image of the collaborator was the image of a traitor, Judas, an enemy in the eyes of Soviet soldiers and civilians³⁶⁸.

³⁶⁶ GARF. F. P7523. Op. 4. D. 194. L. 94.

³⁶⁷ Makarova O. S. Transformation of the enemy image in Soviet propaganda at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, September 1943 — May 1945 p. 38.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

In the territories liberated from the fascist invaders, it was necessary to re—create a propaganda apparatus, which was tasked with a super goal — the selection of communist cadres. Fascist agitation had a strong impact on the population of the occupied settlements. Soviet propagandists had to deal with this phenomenon. To solve this problem, lists of measures were prepared for the creation and operation of propaganda points abroad and on the territory of the USSR. This activity became particularly relevant during the period of repatriation of Soviet citizens from Germany and neighboring countries. The list of events included:

1. Oral propaganda and agitation. They were of exceptional importance. As part of their conduct, mass meetings were organized and thematic discussions were held. Great importance was attached to political rallies, which were attended by both agitators and people who showed heroism at the front or labor exploits. Political information was necessary so that soldiers and home front workers would know about the situation on the fronts, the victories and heavy defeats of our army. Various political information was brought to people, contained in orders and speeches by I. V. Stalin, newspaper articles, reports, radio broadcasts, etc.

2. Cultural events. Great importance was attached to cinematography and theatrical performances. Films shot already during the war were shown at the front and in the rear, including the following: "At six o'clock in the evening after the war", "Zoya", "Two Fighters", "Rainbow", "Leningrad in the Struggle", etc. There were also "Combat film collections". Theatrical performances mainly consisted of concert activities of well-known brigades, as well as amateur participants: actors, musicians, poets, singers, etc. Special attention was paid to the popularization of folk art and folklore. Various board games were used.

3. Visual agitation. Various visual materials were shown to the assembled citizens. In particular, posters with patriotic content were posted, since the Soviet population had to see and know the leadership of their country. Portraits of I. V. Stalin, members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), and others have become common in public places. Since the beginning of the war, photographs of people who showed heroism at the front have been posted.

Numerous photo exhibitions were organized. Special attention was paid to the equipment of newspaper storefronts. The printing of geographical maps of the USSR and Western Europe has become widespread ³⁶⁹.

Active exposure of Nazi policies and crimes began in the liberated territories. The following examples can be given, which are recorded in the Bulletin of front-line information of TASS, as well as in the materials of the Political Department of the Red Army. In a document entitled "On Liberated Land" dated July 9, 1944, a sixteen-year-old girl Nina Medyushko, who escaped from the Lecel concentration camp, said that "at three o'clock in the morning a German came and woke us up. Those who slept soundly were lifted with a stick. We worked late on the construction of the railway. They were fed once a day — two hundred grams of bread made from sawdust and rotten potatoes and a plate of balanda. Several people died daily in the camp from exhaustion and overwork. 10—12-year-old children also worked with us"³⁷⁰. The materials of July 18, 1944, include the "Story of Franz Krach", written by a resident of the village of Novoselki: "The German equally hates Russians, Belarusians, Poles, and Lithuanians. There was a camp for Russian prisoners in Berezvichi. Our people couldn't bear to watch them suffer. Dozens of them were shot every day, dozens died of hunger. Many of our people threw bread over the barbed fence, the Germans fired at the brave men. One day, the singing of the International was heard in the camp. The Germans opened machine-gun fire. The crowd rushed at the Nazis. Hundreds of corpses created an insurmountable barrier to fire. Then many Soviet people escaped from the camp. The Nazis committed a terrible massacre of Jews in the city of Glubokoe. A ghetto was set up there, in which 8 thousand women, children and the elderly languished. The Germans dealt with the unfortunate people in a few hours. A group of bombers arrived and started throwing bombs. The machine gunners opened fire. Not a single person left here

³⁶⁹ RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 314. L. 9—10.

³⁷⁰ GARF. F. 4459. Op. 21. D. 30. L. 72—73.

alive. We asked each other: why and where did such cruelty come from? And we answered each other — we are not dealing with a man, but with a beast"³⁷¹.

Employees of the collective farm named after ODVK of the Nadvinsky village council of the Rudnyansky district stated: "The Germans are beasts. We are eyewitnesses to the brutal destruction of the family of a partisan, the former chairman of the village Council from the village. Andronovka. They shot his wife, 4-year-old girl and 3-month-old son. All this was happening in front of the villagers. There is no limit to the brutality of the Germans. A three-month-old child was shot by a German monster, holding a canopy by the legs, and fired up to 15 shots from a pistol into the child's body, the whole corpse was riddled. Russian people will never forgive German executioners for these crimes"³⁷².

The Soviet government began actively collecting information about the mood among the population of the liberated and occupied territories. In this regard, the statement of one of the workers of the collective farm "Awakening" of the Pustoselsky village Council of the Krasnensky district is indicative: "The Germans used to tell us: "There were small and old ones in Russia, but we killed the Red Army," but we only began to hear that the Red Army began to beat the Germans, and here it came. All are young, beautifully dressed, with shoulder straps, machine guns, tanks, airplanes, everything is there and a lot. They eat well. We were very happy."³⁷³. The above material is taken from the documents of the Political Department of the 3rd Belarusian Front, which was engaged in propaganda work in the Krasnensky and Rudnyansky districts of the Smolensk region.

Nastya Indyukova, an employee of the collective farm "Honest Work" of the Tolstikovsky village Council of the Krasnensky district, said in an interview: "Something, Hitler, apparently, has already fought to the hilt, because he retreats everywhere, and they beat him everywhere. This is not his 41st year."³⁷⁴. An employee of Isaichenkova from the collective farm named after Voroshilova of the Rudnyansky district expressed the following opinion: "It will be difficult for our

³⁷¹ Ibid. JI. 144.

³⁷² RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 235. L. 71.

³⁷³ Ibid. L. 68.

³⁷⁴ Ibid. L. 69.

people to advance now, because there are only cripples and old people at the front, and you can't fight with such people"³⁷⁵. In the Bulletin of Front-line information of TASS dated October 26, 1944, under the heading "In East Prussia", there is a story by Valya Roshchupkina, a native of the village of Ozerki in the Shchigrovsky district of the Kursk region: "Me and hundreds of girls like me were brought to the market and began to sell. The German landlords were looking at us. They felt our muscles on our arms, looked at our legs, as if they were looking at horses instead of people. I haven't been bought for a long time. From the hard road and hungry life in Germany, I became thin. In the end, the owner of the restaurant bought me. And I've been through a lot here! You almost do something wrong, the owner beats, torments, mocks. Otherwise, he will take you to the police, and then they will beat you with rubber sticks"³⁷⁶.

There are also facts of negative sentiments among citizens towards the Soviet government. An employee of Barashkov from the collective farm named after him. Voroshilova of the Mervinsky village Council of the Rudnyansky district refused to feed her son, who was assigned to defense work, motivating it as follows: "I won't give you food, you're going to dig trenches for Stalin, and I hate this government, I expect the Germans, I lived several times better with the Germans"³⁷⁷. Sharakova, an employee from the same collective farm, said: "You can live under German rules. The Germans are good people, they didn't offend the people, but our bastards are policemen and partisans, they just didn't give us a living. If it wasn't for them, we wouldn't have seen the grief"³⁷⁸. The negative and clearly hostile sentiments of a part of the population of the occupied territories were associated with fears about possible confiscation of property, dissatisfaction with mobilization into the army, national bourgeois sentiments, etc.

The negative sentiments of the population were mainly associated with the introduction of collective farms. Latvian peasant Rudolf Tuner said: "We are for the Soviet government, but without collective farms. If representatives of Soviet

³⁷⁵ Ibid. L. 70.

³⁷⁶ GARF. F. 4459. Op. 21. D. 33. L. 178.

³⁷⁷ RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 125. D. 235. L. 73

³⁷⁸ Ibid.

Latvia had now declared that we would not have collective farms, then the peasants of Latvia would have welcomed the Red Army with special joy"³⁷⁹. Peasant Aigle, a resident of the town of Balvi, who has about 30 hectares of land, refused the request of the Red Army soldiers to spend the night in her barn. To the question: "Why don't you regret the houses and property burned by the Germans?" she replied: "The Germans defended us and defended themselves. They had to burn houses, that's why they burned." In the village of Petrova, a peasant woman, Grievs, did not give water to our fighter, while saying: "I do not have and will not have water for the Russians." In the village of Sala, Latvian Piems, during the passage of a column of captured Germans, took out two cans of milk and bread and tried to hand them over to the Nazis. The well-to-do peasants of the Carey farm declared: "We don't need collective farms and the Red Army. Estonians will defend their Estonia together with the Germans"³⁸⁰.

The fascist policy in the occupied territories was characterized by the following features:

1. The forced withdrawal of everything necessary for the needs of the German economy and the army without taking into account the interests of the local population. Terror and the revival of many institutions of non-economic coercion. As a result, the share of seizures exceeded the minimum required to provide food, which caused mass starvation. It was possible to survive only by hiding food and other basic necessities from the occupiers. At the same time, the strict restriction of consumption, which led to hunger and was negative in itself, did not matter much, since the invaders were engaged in looting.

2. The Nazis pursued a deliberate policy of mass extermination of the population. Hunger was created artificially and was one of the means to achieve this goal, regardless of the need to withdraw food. Carrying out punitive actions, the occupiers burned thousands of villages and destroyed cities. People in their daily lives have lost most of what was guaranteed by the Soviet government.

³⁷⁹ Ibid. L. 119.

³⁸⁰ Ibid.

3. The destruction of the institutions of national culture was part of the policy of the occupiers. Monuments, books, theaters, etc. were deliberately destroyed in order to lower the overall cultural level of the survivors and their descendants. Representatives of the intelligentsia who did not cooperate with the enemy were destroyed.

4. Attempts were made to destroy the national unity of the country. Intensive propaganda was carried out with certain groups of the population in order to turn them against Russians, Gypsies, Jews, etc.

5. The enemy made false promises to grant independence or broad autonomy to a number of national suburbs of the country.

6. Deception and outright lies were the companions of German propaganda against the Soviet government, its leaders, Red Army soldiers, etc. The enemy tried to convince the survivors that it was not Germany, but the USSR, that was the enemy. Such propaganda against the background of mass terror, the enslavement of both the able-bodied population and women and children was absurd and could not find a wide response among the population.

The enemy stopped at nothing to achieve their goals ³⁸¹.

The leadership of the USSR was concerned about the reaction of the population of the territories liberated from occupation to the Soviet propaganda policy. Special documents were being worked out, where citizens were asked to answer a number of questions. The topics covered in the questionnaires addressed to the population of the liberated areas can be seen in the cover letter of G. F. Alexandrov and M. T. Iovchuk addressed to the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) A. A. Zhdanov to one of these documents for December 1943. The leadership was interested in the opinion of citizens about the military situation of the country, the Soviet rear, Nazi Germany, international the situation of the USSR³⁸². Until the very end of the war, the topics of the issues remained unchanged, while they became more detailed, their content expanded.

³⁸¹ Ibid. L. 112.

³⁸² Ibid. D. 242. L. 1—7.

In 1943—1944, work was carried out in the liberated areas to restore the radio network, regional, regional and district newspapers were published, propaganda machines were created, bookstores were opened. In their patriotic reports and lectures, Soviet agitators drew attention to the liberation mission of the Red Army, the atrocities of the fascists, the guerrilla struggle behind enemy lines, assistance to the population of areas liberated from the German invaders, the unity of the front and rear, etc.³⁸³ Special emphasis was placed on historical examples of love for the motherland and the ethics of the behavior of a Russian officer. Educational work was carried out in military and civilian supervisory organizations. The political authorities singled out caring for people as their main goal. As a result, the confrontation of Soviet propagandists with the consequences of the occupation led to regular scientific and educational work, which massively exposed the invader. Since the autumn of 1943, with the beginning of the large-scale battle for Smolensk, TASS reports have drawn an analogy with the war of 1812.³⁸⁴ In speeches at rallies by Major General Gorshkov, who was one of the prominent leaders of the partisans of the Orel region, historical parallels went back centuries. He compared the hardships happening to our country with the era of the Time of Troubles, the Northern War, the wars with Napoleon I and the revolutionary events³⁸⁵. By early 1944, such rhetoric was often criticized. Revolutionary and party themes began to come to the fore, where the life of the leaders and the experience of the Soviet army were highlighted.

A significant event took place in Moscow, which played an important propaganda role — the so-called parade of the vanquished. Military parades are a centuries-old tradition. They can be accompanied not only by the march of their victorious troops, but also by the passing of columns of prisoners of war, the display of captured trophies, etc. Invincible German troops marched triumphantly through the streets of many European capitals. They were supposed to march

³⁸³ GARF. F. 8265. Op. 1. D. 168. L. 113.

³⁸⁴ Ibid. F. 4459. Op. 21. D. 21.L. 45.

³⁸⁵ Ibid. L. 100.

triumphantly through the streets of Moscow, but the situation turned out to be different than planned.

In the summer of 1944, the German army suffered a number of severe defeats. First of all, Operation Overlord is meant, which involves the landing of the Allies in Normandy, as well as the successful completion of Operation Bagration. These maneuvers turned the course of military operations on the Soviet-German front. During Operation Overlord, the irretrievable losses of the German army exceeded 450 thousand people, this campaign ended with the liberation of Paris. During Operation Bagration, the enemy's losses also exceeded 400 thousand people, including more than 100 thousand people who were captured³⁸⁶.

L. P. Beria was appointed the head of the event for the expulsion of German prisoners of war called the "Big Waltz". This operation was being prepared in strict secrecy, and the passage of columns of captured Germans was not announced in advance. In total, more than 57 thousand captured soldiers and officers were selected who were physically able to take part in the march. Already on March 14, 1944, they began to arrive in the capital. The prisoners of war were kept in the dark about the reasons for their movement, and upon arrival they were placed at the Dynamo racetrack. The population was informed about the German convoy on July 17, 1944, only a few hours before the start of the movement of columns of prisoners of war.

The operation was provided by 12 thousand soldiers and NKVD officers. The direct leader of the column movement was the commander of the troops of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General P. A. Artemyev. It should be noted that the choice of P. A. Artemyev, on the one hand, was logical. He held the position of commander of the Moscow Military District. On the other hand, such a choice was symbolic. This military commander became a hero, who was responsible for the defense of Moscow in the autumn of 1941, since he was the head of the garrison. P. A. Artemyev headed the command of the Mozhaisk line of defense in July 1941.

³⁸⁶ Frieser Karl—Heinz. Germany and the Second World War. The Eastern Front 1943—1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2017. Vol. VIII. P. 590.

In addition, he commanded the significant parade on Red Square on November 7, 1941, from which Soviet soldiers and officers went to the front. Now, in 1944, he commanded the march of the defeated enemy. Subsequently, after the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Victory Parade captured in newsreel footage on June 24, 1945, will become a significant event, and P. A. Artemyev will again lead the overall management of this event³⁸⁷.

According to the movement of prisoners of war, it was decided to divide them into two columns, preceded by a group of 1,227 officers, including 19 generals, 6 colonels and lieutenant colonels. The Germans participated in the parade in their uniforms, which by that time were extremely dilapidated. Since the event was secret, they were not given the opportunity to clean themselves up. At the end of the march, they were taken to their places of detention³⁸⁸.

This event was recorded in many photographs, as well as in the documentary "Escorting German prisoners of war through Moscow" (special edition of the newsreel). Cameramen I. Belyakov, V. Dobronitsky, M. Glider, R. Carmen, A. Krichevsky, F. Korotkevich, A. Kairov, B. Nebylitsky, M. Ocep, S. Semenov, R. Halushakov, M. Tsirulnikov, B. Eyberg worked on the film. Assistant operator — G. Monglovskaya, sound engineer — V. Kotov. A unique event has remained in the memory of thousands of residents of the capital.

The importance of Operation Big Waltz cannot be overestimated. This symbolic event played a quite pragmatic role. Tens of thousands of captured Wehrmacht soldiers were shown around the world as proof of the defeat of Army Group Center. At the same time, they were delivered for the march just a few days or weeks after their capture, exactly in the form in which they surrendered. They were ragged, unshaven, often with expressions of fright, horror and despair on their faces. This cannot be explained only by the fact of being in Soviet captivity. Many soldiers were still in their positions less than a month ago. Tens of thousands of such prisoners of war, presented to the whole world, demoralized Nazi Germany

³⁸⁷ Order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief No. 370 of June 22, 1945 // Orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union: Collection. M.: Voenizdat, 1975. p. 512.

³⁸⁸ State security bodies of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War: A collection of documents. M., 2007. Vol. 5. In Book 2. pp. 138—139.

and its henchmen and inspired confidence in the inevitability of victory for the USSR and its allies. It was shown to the world community that the German army no longer looked like the army that marched through the streets of Paris, Warsaw, Belgrade and other cities. In addition, it was demonstrated that in many ways the success of the Normandy landings was ensured by the USSR, but victory is achieved through the joint efforts of the allies. The audience of the "parade of the vanquished" was not only the Soviet people, but the whole world³⁸⁹.

The internationality of demonstrating the image of the enemy has become decisive. Yes, indeed, the event was being prepared in secret. We must not forget that the country was under martial law, and the capital was one of the key targets of the enemy, even if the front had already moved significantly away from it. It was also important to remember the danger that the prisoners themselves posed to the residents of Moscow. They were deliberately kept in the dark about the reasons for the temporary delivery to the capital. The secrecy of the event was observed mainly for security reasons. Nevertheless, the process of the prisoners' march itself was purely demonstrative and was widely covered in the media, through diplomatic channels and in newsreels.

A number of factors are characteristic for forming the image of the enemy, among which the following should be noted:

1. Ironic attitude towards the enemy. He wanted to march through the capital and as a result he did it. However, it was a march of the vanquished. The enemy has been defeated, and his soldiers, in fact, are themselves a trophy of the Soviet army. They laid down their arms and chose their lives instead of fulfilling their military duty. It is significant that at the head of the column were officers, including 19 generals, who sent their soldiers to their deaths, but themselves cowardly chose to live in captivity.

2. The appearance of the prisoners of war was unrepresentable: their uniforms were torn, empty tin cans hung on ropes. We must not forget about

³⁸⁹ Makarova O. S. Transformation of the enemy image in Soviet propaganda at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, September 1943 — May 1945 p. 40.

digestive problems caused by insufficient nutrition and fatty foods received the day before. The watering machines driving behind the columns of prisoners had a purely utilitarian function. There was mockery of a cruel and ruthless enemy who spared neither women nor children. Such an enemy could cause not so much pity as disgust.

3. Demonstrativeness of the action. The Soviet people were shown a real image of the enemy that the Red Army is fighting. The prisoners of war were deliberately led through the capital, notifying citizens in advance who could freely watch this spectacle. The enemy has been defeated, and the Soviet people should know about it. He still resists, but Victory Day is coming. Many residents of Moscow did not see the ruthless enemy, but they knew about his crimes. Now they have been given this opportunity. Vengeance on him was being carried out right now, at this moment, and in front of people who had become victims of the war. The image of the defeated enemy was clearly shown to the society.

4. In the newsreel footage, the disproportion between the number of prisoners of war and the convoy is striking. Many thousands of German soldiers are marching through the streets of the capital in dense columns. Along the edges of these columns, in a very thin line, tenfold inferior in numbers, mainly NKVD soldiers are marching on foot and on horseback. The danger of a possible riot can be rationally assessed. Despite this, it seems that the Soviet soldiers are actually protecting the captured Germans from the numerous crowds of residents of Moscow. They have nowhere to run, and these columns are most likely formed by the fear of being in the hands of former or potential victims. Civilians feel their strength and see the fear of these tens of thousands of German soldiers walking silently.

5. Newsreel footage captured the deliberate contrast of the appearance of prisoners of war and residents of Moscow. The cameraman highlights Soviet soldiers and officers dressed in clean uniforms, with orders and medals sparkling on their chests. An intentional exception was made for generals and officers of the German army, who also wear awards. Such a feature of the enemy's image has an

important symbolic meaning. This exception is significant: the orders of German prisoners of war mean nothing, because their owners were defeated and showed cowardice, marching now in these columns. The vaunted holders of fascist awards could not resist the Soviet soldiers.

6. The attitude of Moscow residents towards prisoners of war was different. There were facts of both swearing and bullying, as well as deaf silence. It is important to note that, despite the enormous sacrifices that the Soviet people suffered, none of the prisoners were killed or maimed by people who lost their loved ones. The amazing self-control shown by the residents of the capital has remained forever in history. None of those present doubted how cruelly these Nazis would have behaved with the civilian population. The courage and endurance of our people were manifested in contrast with the behavior of the invaders in the occupied territories. The high moral qualities of Soviet society and the cowardice of a cruel enemy who had literally lost the human face were demonstrated to the whole world.

It should be noted the peculiarities of the change in propaganda policy as the Red Army troops advance outside the USSR. Normative documents regulating the rules of conduct of the Soviet troops were issued gradually. These materials prescribed how to behave in the occupied territories of foreign countries, as well as in relation to prisoners of war and civilians. The documents were prepared as our military forces approached the borders of the Soviet Union or when they occupied certain areas of other countries³⁹⁰.

The leadership of the USSR changed the direction of propaganda activities even before the entry of its troops into the territory of Nazi Germany. It was impossible to allow hatred of the enemy to result in revenge against the civilian population of the invading country. Earlier, official propaganda purposefully held rallies and meetings on the topic "My personal account of revenge against the enemy." Now all the previous slogans and appeals were being put out of use, including the image of the enemy "the German is a fascist and a beast". The

³⁹⁰ Ibid. P. 41.

newspaper Pravda published an article by the head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), G. F. Alexandrov: "The Red Army, fulfilling its great liberation mission, is fighting for the elimination of the Hitlerite army, the Hitlerite state, the Hitlerite government, but has never set and does not set its goal to exterminate the German people"³⁹¹. The Soviet people were not immediately able to adopt such a policy, as can be seen from the fears of German citizens: "The Russians will take revenge on us for the Jews. The Russians will do to the Germans what we did to the Jews"³⁹².

Acts of revenge after such active Soviet propaganda were inevitable. The leadership of the USSR had to settle these issues at the legal level by adopting special directives and passing convictions in the framework of show trials. As an example, we can cite the Directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 220282, addressed to the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front on the attitude towards the population and to the rebel units of Czechoslovakia dated December 18, 1944.³⁹³ The document states that Czechoslovakia is a friendly state for our country and the attitude towards the civilian population and the rebels fighting the Nazis should be appropriate. Unauthorized seizure of any property from the local population is prohibited. Soldiers were not prohibited from staying in the homes of ordinary people, but the needs of the population themselves had to be taken into account when placing them. The use of local resources was allowed, but this was to be done only through the civil administration and the rebel units of Czechoslovakia. These rules had to be followed under threat of severe punishment.

The Directive of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command dated April 2, 1945 No. 11055 was similar³⁹⁴. It was addressed to the commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts, who were instructed to make an appeal to the population of Austria. In particular, it was required to inform that the Red Army was at war with the German occupiers. The goal of the USSR is the liberation of Austria, not the seizure of its territory. For this, the defeat of the German troops is

³⁹¹ Pravda (Moscow). 1945. April 14.

³⁹² CAMO RF. F. 236 Op. 2727 D. 33 L. 15.

³⁹³ CAMO RF. F. 148a. Op. 3763. D. 167. L. 137.

³⁹⁴ Ibid. D. 212. L. 10—11.

necessary. The inhabitants of the state should return to peaceful work and provide assistance to the Soviet command. Industry, life support systems, etc. must operate normally. The population needs to stay in their places and help the Red Army maintain order. Austria is perceived by the Soviet leadership as an occupied country, whose independence was violated in 1938, and it will contribute to its restoration. The order that existed in Austria before this date must be restored. At the same time, ordinary members of the National Socialist Party, despite the rumors spread by the German command, will not be persecuted. This rule was valid only if the conditions of their loyalty to the Soviet army were met. At the same time, the National Socialist Party itself will cease to exist. Leaflets with this information were to be distributed on the territory of Austria, both occupied by our troops and occupied by the German invaders. The Soviet troops should have been informed that the attitude towards the Austrian population should be humane, and the attitude towards the German occupiers should not be transferred to civilians. The Mayor of Vienna was supposed to be informed confidentially that nothing was changing in his position as head of the city, and he could form a temporary Austrian civil administration with the involvement of non—Nazi forces. At the same time, it was not planned to report this in writing. In the liberated territories, it was prescribed to create military commandant's offices with the involvement of Austrian burgomasters and elders.

Similar was the Directive of the General Staff of the Supreme Command No. 11072 to the commander of the troops of the 1st and 2nd Belarusian and 1st Ukrainian fronts regarding behavior on the territory of Germany itself³⁹⁵. In this case, there was no question that this country and its people were not enemies. At the same time, the general tone of the directive was similar to the previous one. In particular, the attitude towards the German population must be changed. The treatment of military personnel and civilians needed to be improved. Cruelty provoked despair and unwillingness to surrender, as a result, the enemy fought harder. The local population, fearing revenge, formed gangs. This situation was

³⁹⁵ Ibid.L. 13.

unfavorable for the Soviet command and delayed the victory offensive. It was assumed that a humane attitude would bring victory closer, since the Germans would no longer be afraid to surrender. It was necessary to facilitate the advance of our troops. In addition, it was emphasized that ordinary members of the National Socialist Party should not be persecuted on condition of obedience to the Red Army, but Nazi leaders who did not manage to escape should be detained. It is important to note that the directive emphasized the following idea: a good attitude towards the Germans does not make them friends, they still remain enemies, fraternization with them is not allowed. Vigilance should not have been lowered.

These directives were supplemented by orders on the need to report this information to the command of military units and every ordinary soldier. It was necessary to report on the execution of such orders, as well as on the revealed facts of violations.

The above normative documents reflect the position of the Soviet command, which makes it possible to clarify who exactly was the enemy. It should be noted that the attitude towards the population of the occupied territories was characterized by considerable softness. Civilians who did not raise their weapons should not be considered an enemy. At the same time, NSDAP members were initially perceived as aggressors and opponents, especially if they held senior positions. At the same time, ordinary members of the Nazi Party who showed loyalty to the Red Army were not persecuted, although this did not mean their amnesty, they retained the status of enemies. Familiarity with them was not allowed.

Civilian authorities were formed from representatives of the German population under the control of the Soviet command. The Red Army came not as an invader, but as a liberator from the Nazis. The population of the occupied states, including Austria, had to separate from the German occupation forces. At the same time, Czechoslovakia was called a union state. Looting and looting in various forms were not allowed. The treatment of prisoners of war by German soldiers was also prescribed as humane. The main purpose of such a policy was to prevent

bitterness. It would be a crime to postpone the date of the end of the war due to the increased resistance of the enemy and the civilian population. In fact, it is not so much about humanism as about a pragmatic assessment of the situation. Moreover, in the past tense, the provision on the attitude towards civilians and prisoners of war is mentioned. It was prescribed to improve it and prevent bitterness towards Soviet soldiers in the future. At the same time, the groups of the local population resisting were directly called gangs. Anyone who did not show loyalty to the Soviet troops became an enemy, but even in this case, when captured, they had to be treated with humanity. Repeated conversations were held with the soldiers of the Red Army, because the USSR wanted to demonstrate to the peoples of Europe that it was not savages who entered their land, but the liberating army.

The image of the enemy in the Soviet directives was determined quite pragmatically. This is a person who resists the Red Army and does not express loyalty to the military command. Those who surrendered had the right to humane treatment. At the same time, the civilian population could count on protection, since Soviet soldiers engaged in looting were sharply censured and punished.

The image of the enemy in German propaganda was largely irrational. He was perceived through fear of the harsh retribution that awaits the German population for crimes committed by the Nazi army in the USSR. This fear even drove Germans to commit suicide, as many of them believed that death was not the worst way out of the situation. Understanding the image of the enemy took place through the prism of understanding how the Wehrmacht soldiers behaved in the occupied territory. In this case, the transfer of the principles of one's own behavior to the enemy gave rise to fear.

In turn, the Soviet directives reflected the negative attitude of the Red Army soldiers towards the Germans, but pragmatically urged not to postpone the days of the end of the war. An indication of the inadmissibility of fraternization with prisoners is also indicative. The Germans remained enemies by definition, and no warm feelings were allowed to them. The war is not over yet. To forget about it means to let down your guard, which in itself can become a security threat. Any

German, both a civilian and a soldier, is an enemy, but deserves humane treatment when showing loyalty to the Red Army.

The fear inspired by Nazi propaganda, as well as fanatics, was so great that cases of mass murder and suicide were recorded, which were committed by the Germans in the territories occupied by the Red Army or when Soviet troops approached. The active participation of the German population itself in the atrocities was indicative. As an example, the report of the head of the 7th department of the political administration of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the head of the 7th department of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army on the killing of German citizens by a fascist on April 2, 1945 can be cited. In the village of Zybitz, near the city of Danzing, 16 people were found dead or dying, including 11 children with their throats cut or veins opened in their hands. After providing medical assistance and as a result of investigative actions, it was established that the murder was committed by Schwartz Erwin, who had killed his wife and children the day before, and also incited other people to suicide. When he refused to commit suicide, he killed them. As it turned out, S. Erwin was convinced and convinced the others that the soldiers of the Red Army would commit rape, robbery and hijack the local population for forced labor. Such behavior was common for German soldiers in the occupied lands of the USSR. In this case, according to Sh. Erwin, suicide was the only way out of this hopeless situation. A number of residents listened to such propaganda and committed suicide³⁹⁶. Sh Erwin himself died without waiting for the trial. Erwin bled to death in a suicide attempt.

Such fanatical fascist propaganda was notable for its significant effectiveness in influencing the non—German population. The German population was aware of the crimes committed by German soldiers both in the USSR and in other countries. The orders of the Nazi leadership, which contained theses that moral norms were inapplicable to the war in the East, were not a secret. The inhabitants of Germany expected the arrival of Soviet troops and feared such an

³⁹⁶ CAMO RF. F. 32. Op.. 11306. D. 569. L. 427—428.

attitude towards themselves as retribution for the inhumane crimes committed by the soldiers of the Wehrmacht. For example, the diary of 16-year-old Dieter Borkovsky contains an entry dated April 15, 1945 about the moods of ordinary Berliners fleeing from the advancing forces of the Red Army. In particular, he spoke about the haste in which women packed their belongings to leave the Anhalt railway station with their children: "Horror froze on their faces, anger and despair filled people! I've never heard such swearing before. But the general mood of despair was interrupted by the cry of a soldier awarded two iron and a gold cross: "I want to tell you something! Even if you don't want to listen! Stop whining! We must win this war, we must not lose our courage. If others win — Russians, Poles, French, Czechs — and at least one percent do to our people what we have been doing to them for six years in a row, then in a few weeks not a single German will be left alive. This is being told to you by someone who has been in the occupied countries for six years himself!" It became so quiet on the train that you would have heard a hairpin fall"³⁹⁷. At the same time, the author himself took part in the defense of Berlin, was captured and was released at the end of the summer of 1945.

It is also necessary to note the facts of critical remarks addressed to some creative figures who did not reflect in their works the change in the official ideological position towards the enemy. Thus, I. Ehrenburg was publicly censured in the article "Comrade Ehrenburg simplifies"³⁹⁸ in the newspaper Pravda on April 14, 1945 for its publication entitled "Enough is enough!"³⁹⁹ In the newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda dated April 11, 1945, the author described the atrocities committed by the Fascists during the war. He pointed out the need for revenge for the troubles caused to the peoples of the USSR and other countries that they tried to enslave. One of the main ideas of I. Ehrenburg was the inadmissibility of forgiving an inhuman enemy. He also noted the fact that the Allies, faced with the atrocities of the Fascists against Soviet prisoners of war and others, could not find punishment for them. The worst that could be thought of seemed too good for these

³⁹⁷ Germany's War against the Soviet Union, 1941—1945: Documentary exposition / Ed. Rurupa R. (translated from German. Pereverzevoy T.) Berlin: Blank & Reschke, 1994. 287 p.

³⁹⁸ Pravda (Moscow). 1945. April 14.

³⁹⁹ Krasnaya zvezda (Moscow). 1945. April 11.

fiends. What was the criticism of this article? In the fact that we cannot become like them, we ourselves, creating judgment, cannot become monsters. Soviet soldiers are hardened by the horrors of war, they cannot be further pushed to lynch and commit other illegal actions. It is all the more dangerous to call for revenge from the pages of an official publication. It is also important to remember the ferocity with which the Nazis fought on the streets of their cities. Such propaganda could play a bad role, putting into the minds of Soviet soldiers and leading resistance fascists the idea of the imminent destruction of the latter following the collapse of Germany. In this situation, the Nazis will not be able to count on a return to peaceful life after the war. They will expect death, and therefore they will begin to fight with the tenacity of the doomed, which will further multiply the number of victims of the war and delay the inevitable victory. The enemy should be aware of his guilt, but should not consider that his people are doomed and have no future.

Sources of personal origin indicate that many Soviet soldiers still gave their rations to German children, saving them from hunger, and field kitchens fed the local population. The role of the enemy was played only by the Germans, who provided armed resistance to the forces of the Red Army. After the end of the war, the Soviet command in Berlin provided local residents with food, restored public utilities, launched the subway, opened theaters, etc.

In the light of these events, it is necessary to note a number of features of the transformation of the image of the enemy at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War in September 1943 — May 1945. During this period, the victory over Nazi Germany became obvious, it was only a matter of time during which it could still hold out under the blows of the troops of the USSR and its allies. However, the enemy should not be underestimated, he was still cruel and inhuman. As more and more territories were liberated, his atrocities against civilians and prisoners of war became known. At the same time, the German army, as well as the troops of its allies, did not have the opportunity to inflict critical damage to the Red Army. The

situation on the fronts stabilized, and after the Battle of Kursk, the initiative passed to the Soviet troops.

For this reason, the tasks of propaganda work have been adjusted to ensure an early victory. The ideas of total war have become irrelevant. The front was moving further to the west, the Soviet troops began to liberate not only their territory, but also other states captured by the Nazis, including Germany itself. Thus, the concept of "enemy", identical to the word "German", has become impractical. The USSR did not become like its opponents and did not develop an all-out war to destroy Germany and its allies⁴⁰⁰.

In the image of the enemy, the dominant idea was the assertion that persons from among the military personnel, as well as civilians, including ordinary members of the Nazi Party, loyal to the Soviet command and not resisting, deserve humane treatment. The slogans "Kill the German!", "Stop forgiving!" and others like them have lost their relevance. The German Nazis have not ceased to be enemies, and the perpetrators must be punished, but humanity must also be shown to the enemy if he does not take up arms. A number of Soviet creative figures were criticized for being too emotional and not understanding the essence of the change in the situation.

At the same time, it cannot be said that the image of the Nazi German invader as an implacable enemy of the Soviet people has softened. This did not happen. Many Soviet soldiers who had lost their loved ones wanted revenge. In this environment, the enemy's appearance became more personalized. It was not any of the accomplices of the fascists who were subject to destruction, but only those who did not lay down their arms and posed a danger. Such a change in propaganda policy was purely pragmatic. Soviet soldiers should not have become like the evil they were fighting. Besides, it was impossible to give the enemy confidence that he was doomed. The persistence of people who knew that death awaited them caused great losses and only delayed Victory Day. Such a softening

⁴⁰⁰ Makarova O. S. Transformation of the enemy image in Soviet propaganda at the final stage of the Great Patriotic War, September 1943 — May 1945 p. 41.

of propaganda policy, reflected in the issued directives, had a completely logical justification⁴⁰¹.

In Germany, panic was growing as Soviet troops approached. The Germans, for the most part, knew about the crimes committed by the Wehrmacht soldiers and were waiting for revenge. There have even been cases of mass suicide. Such a situation was unacceptable, which necessitated a change in propaganda policy.

The image of a traitor who defected to the enemy also played a significant role in the final stage of the war. Prisoners of war, as well as various defectors who swore allegiance to the Nazis, did not need special propaganda condemnation. They were traitors to their people. At the same time, the low moral qualities of such people were beyond doubt. Punitive actions, the protection of concentration camps, auxiliary functions in army units and real participation in battles in conditions of despair were their main tasks. As the losses of the German army increased, the importance of such people, as well as their numbers, grew. Falling into the hands of Red Army soldiers, hiwis could not be considered prisoners of war and had no right to expect humane treatment. At the same time, Soviet propaganda addressed them as well. They were promised forgiveness at atonement if they turned their weapons against the Germans and their allies again. Propaganda called for awareness of commonality with the Russian people and an irreconcilable struggle against foreigners⁴⁰². It was the voice of blood that she was crying out for. hiwi, vlasovtsy and the like, you are criminals, but you do not cease to be Russians. Foreigners are enemies to you, and you are strangers to them. You can always go back to your own. In this case, it was possible to observe the doctrine of the image of the enemy on the basis of one's own-another's. A foreigner is an enemy and an invader, he is alien to the Soviet people by his very nature. A traitor is a man who has stumbled, his compatriots are waiting for his return, and he can atone for his guilt. The image of a traitor in Soviet propaganda at the final stage of the war became softer than the attitude of Red Army soldiers and civilians towards him.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

⁴⁰² Ibid. P. 42.

In July 1944, the citizens of the USSR and the world community had the opportunity to personally see and evaluate the appearance of the soldiers of the once victorious German army. It was a completely different image of the enemy than at the beginning of the war. During the "parade of the vanquished", columns consisting of tens of thousands of German soldiers, most of whom were captured during the brilliant offensive operation Bagration, marched through Moscow. It was the image of a real enemy. Recently captured German soldiers walked in silence, with an expression of fear on their faces. The image of a defeated and cowardly enemy was shown to the world for the first time. The contrast of dense columns of thousands and a rare chain of guards was especially striking. The courage of the residents of the capital, which was manifested in their restraint, also looked amazing. This propaganda campaign has had no equal in importance and impact on public consciousness since the very beginning of the war.

CONCLUSION

Conducting propaganda work is extremely important for any State. It acquires special importance during difficult periods in the history of a country's existence. Propaganda is a necessary means of promoting certain ideas in the public consciousness. As a mechanism of influence on society, it can play both a positive and a negative role. The mere fact of the existence of propaganda activities and purposeful ideological influence on society by representatives of the ruling elite cannot be assessed in a negative or positive way. Evaluation is possible only on the basis of achieving the goals set by such work and the actual social content of the ideas promoted to the masses. In any case, propaganda is a tool in the hands of the ruling elite, which is used mainly to ensure the legitimacy of its power.

The Soviet ideological struggle during the Great Patriotic War was aimed at fostering devotion to one's people and self-sacrifice for the sake of saving the Fatherland. She had a pronounced international character, her images conveyed the idea of the inadmissibility of military action and the killing of people. War is an evil that befell the peoples of the USSR. At the same time, his noble confrontation with an inhuman opponent was perceived as a blessing. The war for the sake of saving the fatherland was considered sacred, it was aimed at achieving peace and saving the motherland, as well as other countries from a merciless enemy. In this, it was opposed to the propaganda of fascist Germany. There, the war was presented as a continuation of the natural course of things, in which it was necessary to seize new living spaces for representatives of the German race, and for this it was necessary to physically exterminate other peoples. The aforementioned goal was to justify any atrocities. The cruelty of such ideas and crimes committed by the fascists became the basis for the formation of the image of the enemy in Soviet ideology.

The image of the invader turned out to be one of the central symbols for wartime propaganda work in the Soviet Union. It should be noted that during the

war, Soviet propaganda underwent significant changes. They also touched upon the legislative regulation of this sphere. The image of the enemy, replicated by the communist leadership, as well as its artistic embodiment in works of literature and art, also underwent noticeable transformations.

It should be noted that the special propaganda that was conducted during the war was focused not only on the citizens of the USSR, but also on the enemy. Soviet agitation appealed, among other things, to residents and military personnel of Germany. At the same time, the content of the messages addressed to Soviet citizens and opponents differed significantly. The appeal to the courage and heroism of the population of the USSR was side by side with the desire to undermine the morale of supporters of Nazi Germany. It is important to note that in any case, we are talking about the introduction of postulates about the inadmissibility of killings during the course of military operations and the inevitability of achieving peace. Slogans calling for the destruction of the enemy and asserting the inevitability of imminent retribution, common in Soviet propaganda, were often diametrically opposed to the ideas that were being introduced into the society of the opposing side. In relation to the Nazi army, there were calls for the preservation of life, there were reports of the senselessness of resistance and the inevitability of Germany's defeat. The fear of death and the hope of a future life after the war were supposed to undermine the morale of enemy soldiers. In addition, it was planned to sow social discord in the enemy camp. The ideas of the senselessness of death on the battlefield of peasants and workers who put on gray overcoats for the sake of the interests of the capitalists were introduced. It is possible to note the general humanistic message of Soviet ideology. The idea of the possibility of saving the lives of German servicemen in the event of voluntary surrender was promoted. The general peaceful goals of the USSR were emphasized, for which the war was not aggressive, but liberating. The enemy of the German soldier should have been the Nazi leadership, not the Soviet man, because it was they who led ordinary people to the firing line with false promises.

Soviet propaganda was distinguished at the same time by unity in promoting the ideas of humanism and ambivalence in appeals to Soviet citizens. The latter were inspired with the idea of an inevitable victory in the holy war for the preservation of their fatherland, while maintaining pacifism directed at the enemy. Soviet propaganda was notable for its truthfulness in describing the inadmissibility of a misanthropic war and demonstrated the USSR's desire for a just peace after the victory over the fascist regime. The idea that a German soldier was serving a criminal system was dominant for both internal and external agitation. Despite the difference in appeals, the purpose of propaganda in any case was the same: a victorious end to the war, which would save the lives of the population of the warring parties. If the Soviet soldier is obliged to win, then the enemy soldier is forced to lay down his arms and save his life for the sake of the future of his country.

Political propaganda structurally includes two elements: legal psychology and legal ideology. They correspond to the levels of individual and group consciousness. Logic and emotions determine the behavior of both an individual and the whole society. Legal ideology is associated with a certain level of knowledge of people regarding the institutions of law and the state.

It's about the dogma of law. It implies knowledge of the basic terms defining legal categories, laws and acts of the application of law, their rights and obligations towards other people, organizations, society and the state. The text of the military oath, disciplinary statutes, various laws of wartime, etc., in addition to their effect as normative acts sanctioned by the state, were distinguished by an important ideological impact. In orders and other official documents, there was often a justification for the need for their adoption, as well as the importance of the goals that were planned to be achieved as a result of these actions. It should also be noted the importance of special orders and directives issued for internal use. The documents were intended for employees of departments that carried out propaganda work, as well as for the command of military units.

Legal psychology is closely related to legal ideology. The texts of the published normative acts and acts of application of the law affected the feelings and emotions of people. For example, the well-known order No. 227 of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, I. V. Stalin, dated July 28, 1942, was extremely important, which received the short and at the same time emotionally strong name "Not a step back!" among the military and civilian population.

With regard to the conduct of propaganda work, one of its most characteristic features should be noted. It was addressed primarily to an ordinary citizen of the country: for both civilians and military personnel. It was the man, and in his person the entire multinational Soviet people with their hopes, daily needs, and pain for the preservation of their family and homeland, who was the main target of the influence of Soviet propaganda. Through the creative work of outstanding figures of culture and art, numerous works were created, which contained calls for revenge on the inhuman enemy, selfless work in the rear and the manifestation of heroism at the front. At the same time, in addition to the negative motivation that encourages hatred of the enemy, artistic works were created, thanks to which a person could touch the peaceful life that awaits him after defeating the enemy. A large number of works of poetry, painting, music, and cinema devoted to the theme of war were created. Many of them have become widely known outside our country and enjoy well-deserved attention in our time. The Communist Party saw in the Soviet citizen and soldier not a blind mechanism for fulfilling his will, but first of all a person with his own needs for a quiet life, family, happiness, etc. Calls for the need for self-sacrifice were combined with the introduction of the belief that every Soviet person deserves a better life, his family and loved ones will receive help from the state and the whole society.

Society itself was like a living organism with a beating heart. In this regard, the beats of the metronome in besieged Leningrad were perceived as the rhythm of the heart. The symbolic heartbeat increased during times of danger, when the city was subjected to aerial bombardment and massive artillery shelling. The emotional impact of such a propaganda device is difficult to overestimate.

It is also important to note the fact that a distinctive feature of Soviet propaganda during the war years was the emphasis on the traditional type of legitimacy. Revolutionary romanticism and critical attitude towards the monarchical period in the history of our country, which preceded the coming to power of the Communist Party, were relegated to the background. The Soviet government sought to find support in the resurrection of images of the struggle for freedom and independence of the fatherland in the public consciousness. It cannot be said that such a coup took place during the war years. Interest in the figures who carried out state transformations and strengthened the power of Russia was already evident in the 1930s. It intensified during the war period of 1941—1945. The names of Alexander Nevsky, M. I. Kutuzov, P. S. Nakhimov and other commanders were used in the names of orders and medals. Their images were captured on a variety of posters. In Soviet propaganda, allusions were made to the Patriotic War of 1812, when the enemy approached the walls of Moscow, but was defeated, to the overthrow of the Tatar-Mongol yoke, which left an indelible mark on the history of our country, etc. It should also be noted the turn in the attitude of the Soviet government to the church and traditional values. A striking example is the appeal of I. V. Stalin to the common people in the spirit of the Christian tradition as "brothers and sisters".

The continuity of the power of the Communist Party with the power of the rulers of our country for more than a thousand years of history has been the leitmotif of Soviet wartime propaganda. The restoration of many elements of the royal form also had significant significance. In the given example, a kind of marker is meant along the line of friend or foe. The multinational Russian state, as a family of many peoples, was opposed to foreign invaders. This idea replaced the policy of communist internationalism based on the common interests of the oppressed social classes of different peoples. German workers and peasants, wearing military uniforms, became mortal enemies for the Soviet people. They were perceived not as socially congenial to the workers of the USSR, but as foreign invaders. The ruling political party and its leadership have become the successors of the national

traditions of Russian statehood. The ideas of the world revolution and the communist dogmas of solidarity of the workers of all countries, on which the government of the USSR relied, crashed into the harsh reality.

In this regard, the Soviet propaganda policy was characterized by considerable flexibility. Without denying the principles of internationalism in building a communist society, as well as the leading leadership role of the CPSU(b), she turned to the centuries-old experience of the history of our country, which played an important role. The connection of generations and awareness of not only international, but also religious, as well as social unity of representatives of various strata of the country's population were necessary to overcome disunity and mobilize all resources. The leaders and generals were designated as the continuers of the glorious traditions of the Russian statehood. The gap between revolutionary ideas about the fundamentally new nature of the Soviet political system and the rejection of the old institutions of law and the state has been overcome. For propaganda purposes, the leaders of the Communist Party were ostentatiously portrayed as the successors and guardians of the legacy of Russian statehood. The USSR is just one of the stages in the development of this unified system, whose history goes back more than a thousand years. It should be noted that continuity was also observed with the traditions of many peoples who inhabited the Country of the Soviets. The international character of the USSR was not denied. The basis of the legitimacy of the communist government lies in the observance of ancient norms and traditions, as well as the preservation of the common goals and functions that the country has faced for centuries, including the difficult years of the war. Allusions were made to the First Patriotic War of 1812.

The image of the enemy is one of the central ones in Soviet propaganda. It is based on the formation of the values of a communist society along the lines of friend and foe. There is an opposition of one social group to another, one nation to another. On the one hand, there is some personification of the image of the enemy in the person of representatives of a certain group of people. On the other hand, the

image of an invader is a complex category associated with influencing people's logic and feelings. It has features of some abstraction.

The Nazis were the bearers of an alien misanthropic ideology, they came to destroy and enslave the peoples of the USSR. The above statements are not based on the theoretical postulates of Soviet propaganda. They are fully verified based on the analysis of the behavior of the invaders. Soviet propaganda presented to the public numerous photographs and documentary recordings in which the atrocities of the fascists were recorded. Millions of soldiers and civilians of the USSR saw with their own eyes the crimes of the German army. As a result, the enemy is quite specific — these are people made of flesh and blood, wearing the uniform of the troops of Nazi Germany and its allies. These are societies of states fighting against the USSR and its allies, in which the Nazis and their accomplices came to power.

At the same time, the image of the enemy has a certain degree of abstraction in people's minds. This is a dark, terrible force with its atrocities, which seeks to destroy our country. It did not appear in 1941, the peoples of the USSR had previously survived numerous invaders who committed inhuman crimes. This is just one of the episodes of the struggle for the independence of the peoples of our homeland. Soviet propaganda contains many allusions to the war of 1812, the struggle against the Crusaders, the overthrow of the Tatar-Mongol yoke, etc. As a result, an abstract image of absolute evil is created, which the Soviet people are opposed to. This attack is by its nature timeless. The propaganda begins to trace, among other things, the biblical motives of the struggle against the unholy enemy.

The current situation leads to the dehumanization of the enemy. He can no longer be perceived by Soviet soldiers as a representative of the human race, for whom it is necessary to have compassion. The conscription of millions of workers, peasants, teachers, engineers and representatives of many other peaceful professions into the army should have had an immediate effect on the state policy of their motivation. An unprofessional military man, a man who initially did not choose a profession to defend his homeland, needs to break down the inevitable internal barrier associated with the prohibition to commit murder. Soviet soldiers

had to see their opponents as inhumans who came to enslave their families, deprive them of their future and destroy the most precious thing in their lives. As a result, the image of the enemy being formed is not just the image of a criminal who has the right to leniency and a fair trial. No, this is the physical embodiment of all the darkest things that human consciousness can imagine, the image of a beast that deliberately and without any inner doubt came to kill, rob, rape and enslave. In this regard, the appeal of I. G. Ehrenburg "Kill the German!" was voiced. Not only emotions, but also logic suggested to the Soviet soldiers and home front workers that there was no alternative to the ongoing war, which had become a struggle for survival. It should also be noted the attitude towards prisoners and other persons who voluntarily refused to fight the enemy. In this case, they embarked on the path of cooperation with the enemy and also crossed the line separating good from evil. But the attitude towards them within the framework of Soviet propaganda, including those addressed both to their own population and to collaborators, differed significantly.

To form the image of the enemy, a certain deliberate mythologization was required. He should have been captured in various works of literature and art. The image of the enemy, formed by propaganda, had to be perceived by Soviet citizens through very specific works created by the creative work of cultural figures. Symbolism came to the fore. For example, when depicting enemy soldiers and commanders, black and other dark colors were used, thereby the authors emphasized their similarity to representatives of the forces of darkness. The image of the serpent represented universal biblical evil. Black crows or birds of prey were depicted as an allusion to enemy aircraft. At the same time, the image of the enemy should not initially look intimidating. The method of caricaturing and ridiculing the opponent was used. He introduced himself in comical situations. The fascist leaders had various physiological hypertrophied features, indicating their ugliness and undeveloped intelligence. The enemy must be defeated anyway. D. D. Shostakovich's Sixth Symphony creates by means of musical art a mechanical image of the enemy as a soulless machine with an increasing rhythmic hum

approaching us. At the end, the sound turns into a cacophony, symbolizing its destruction.

The enemy was perceived as a source of adversity for the state. He was a bearer of values alien to society and, accordingly, those who compromised with him became the aggressor himself, sharing his values. The enemy was personified in the personality of the ruler, the people, the state, or a broader community that included representatives of various countries, but shared a hostile, socially negative ideology. There is a confrontation along the line of friend and foe. Everything that is dear to us is alien to him, and vice versa. It is the image that is being formed that is important here. The propaganda did not set out the task of giving a detailed and truly objective analysis of the current situation. It could generally correspond to the surrounding reality, but at the same time its purpose was to emphasize only the negative sides of the enemy, which caused negative emotions and were accepted on the basis of logical reasoning by Soviet society. The enemy could not evoke compassion, on the contrary, his image was supposed to activate the desire to fight him, and in practice this meant justifying the self-sacrifice and murder of the invaders.

The dehumanization of the enemy, who was forbidden to be considered as an ordinary representative of the human race, was necessary so that yesterday's workers and peasants who took up arms were ready to use it, while risking their lives. The image of the enemy combined all those qualities that were perceived as negative in this society: cruelty, greed, treachery, betrayal, cowardice, etc. At the same time, for an objective assessment of the enemy, it was necessary to emphasize his strength, cunning, perseverance in achieving illegal goals, etc. A warrior on the battlefield had to adequately assess the real danger.

It should be noted that during the war, the image of the enemy underwent significant changes in relation to the subject, object and conditions of perception. In this case, a multilateral process took place. The image of the enemy, formed in the public consciousness, and the image of the enemy, created by the creative work of specialists who carried out the functions of propaganda work, largely coincided.

This refers to the image of the enemy, developed within the framework of the professional work of the relevant state authorities and actually taking shape, in many ways spontaneously, in the very public consciousness of Soviet soldiers and civilians. The perception of the enemy changed during the war due to successes and failures at the front, heavy losses and the perception of the real horrors of the military conflict. The experience of a single person of a certain social group (military personnel, civilians of the occupied territories, home front workers, representatives of the communist authorities, etc.) and society as a whole has undergone significant changes. The subject of perception — the Soviet citizen and the entire society — changed during the war as the experience of fighting the enemy and the hardships suffered accumulated. Similarly, the object of perception — the opponent — was evaluated in different ways. There was a steady process of accumulation of information about the invaders. Soviet society increasingly objectively assessed both the degree of threat from the enemy and its actual weakness.

The Wehrmacht itself was changing. The high training of enemy soldiers, which allowed them to win victories in 1941—1942, gradually disappeared, especially starting in 1943. The enemy was still dangerous and fought fiercely, but more and more experienced soldiers were dying, entire enemy units surrendered, confidence in the inevitable victory disappeared, doubts appeared about the weakness of the Red Army. In turn, despite heavy losses, the professionalism of the Soviet military grew, the industry produced more and more military equipment, as a result of which the enemy began to retreat.

In this regard, the image of the enemy in the initial period of the war had fundamental differences from the image of the enemy when the soldiers of the Red Army advanced to the pre-war borders of the USSR. Accordingly, the tasks of Soviet propaganda also changed. Fighting on the enemy's land, it was impossible to be like him. Calls for the total destruction of the enemy have already lost their relevance in the conditions when Soviet soldiers approached the cities of Germany.

The slogan "Kill the German!" could not be addressed to the women and children of the German people.

The circumstances at the front had a decisive impact on the content of propaganda and the image of the enemy being formed. The enemy was not any German, but only one who was not ready to lay down his arms, who had to be punished for the atrocities committed. In turn, in the conditions of the defeats of the spring of 1942 in the besieged Leningrad, the image of the enemy was distinguished by its greater uncompromising nature, it did not need any special qualifications or differentiation. It was about the survival of a multinational people. The motives of humanism were inappropriate and not understood by the Soviet society. In addition, the use of various tools, types and forms of propaganda was determined by the situation, time and place, as well as the addressee. Leaflets, films, theatrical performances, posters, broadcast messages, musical productions, sculpture and painting could not be equally represented in the dugout of a partisan detachment, at a defense plant or in the trenches. Each time, the forms of propaganda implementation and the specific tools necessary to bring it to various social groups in a given situation were flexibly selected.

The image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda went through three stages of development. Each of them was directly related to the events that took place on the fronts, and reflected the degree of bitterness of the ongoing struggle. In addition, an important role was played by changing the goals of ongoing propaganda, as well as the means of influencing the consciousness of the Soviet population and the enemy.

At the first stage, during the initial period of the war in June 1941 — May 1942, there was a rethinking of the stereotypes of Soviet propaganda of the pre-war period. This period of time is characterized by a fundamental change in the political propaganda of the USSR. In the pre-war period, the image of the enemy was considered mainly based on class positions and the policy of internationalism, in which a person's class affiliation played a greater role than ethnic or state. The enemies were mainly representatives of reactionary social groups, including the

bourgeoisie, the aristocracy, and the clergy. In turn, workers and peasants, as well as representatives of other professions who do not have the main source of livelihood through the use of hired labor, should be united by common signs of internationalism and common values. In addition, the coming struggle was perceived as a continuation of the revolutionary one and the reactionary circles of the "white Poles", "white finns", etc. were embodied in the image of the enemy.

With the outbreak of the war, such assumptions were shattered by the harsh reality. In practice, class internationalism turned out to be just a myth of Soviet propaganda. The appeals in posters and newspaper publications to overthrow the yoke of the rich, addressed to German workers, were not just ineffective, they were naive. They showed that the Soviet propaganda agencies were unable to adequately assess the situation on the fronts and the threat posed by the enemy to the very existence of the society of the Country of Soviets. The victims of the war, failures at the fronts, the loss of vast territories, accompanied by primitive slogans of the common interests of the workers and peasants of the USSR and Germany, as well as the need for a joint struggle against the capitalists, steadily led to the threat of loss of legitimacy of the Communist Party and its leadership. Calling for a world revolution in the face of the country's demise was itself perceived as a crime. Forming the image of the enemy as a socially close worker or peasant from Germany, Soviet propaganda automatically endowed him with universal human traits, which called into question the very possibility of his murder. The printed publications even conveyed greetings to the German people, who were supposed to overthrow Hitler.

Thus, the largest crisis in the history of the USSR began within the framework of political propaganda, which turned out to be inadequate to the threats facing the country. The continuation of such propaganda work in itself created a problem in mobilizing public resources to fight the enemy. The image of the enemy as an ordinary German worker who wants to fight the capitalists, who was forced to put on a military uniform, was in fact a fantasy divorced from reality. It

was all the more dangerous because it undermined the people's faith in the faithfulness of the path by which the ruling party led them to victory.

But the situation was changing. If in the summer and early autumn of 1941 the fascist occupiers were mentioned in the appeals of I. V. Stalin, then in November 1941 the German people and Germany were already called enemies. The ideas of world internationalism of workers gradually disappeared from Soviet propaganda. The slogan "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" was replaced by the slogan "Death to the German occupiers!".

An important role in the initial period of the war was played by wartime acts on the mobilization of Soviet citizens both to the front and to work in the rear. At the same time, despite the mass heroism and the fulfillment of pre-war plans for mobilization, there were also critical reviews among the people regarding the need for struggle. The work of state security agencies in monitoring public opinion and identifying traitors, as well as preventing the spread of panic rumors, was of great importance. The fight against panic was recognized as the most important task of propaganda work. At the same time, the mythologization of war has become a common feature of the warring parties. Soviet propaganda contained information regarding the exaggeration of enemy forces and, accordingly, inflated the losses suffered by them. The image of the enemy receiving irreparable damage was planted, which in itself would lead to his defeat. The image of the Pyrrhic victory of the German troops, who could not defeat the Soviet army, was created. The enemy's victories were discredited. The occupation of the territories of the USSR could not be justified by the losses suffered by Germany, so the victory of the Soviet Union was presented as inevitable.

Such sentiments were especially intensified after the Soviet counterattack near Moscow and the stabilization of the front in the winter of 1941—1942. Propaganda turned to images of the war of 1812, associated with the retreat of French troops from Moscow. Friedrich II, Otto Von Bismarck and other German leaders were quoted as saying that the war with Russia was hopeless.

During this period, there was also an accumulation of factual material about the ongoing hostilities. The staff of the propaganda units received thousands of photographs and a significant number of film materials documenting the crimes committed by the Nazis in the territories liberated by the Red Army. The image of an inhuman enemy was being shown to the whole world. Quotes from the criminal orders of the German command were given and the results of their implementation were shown. The image of the enemy became less and less mythologized. He acquired quite real features, reflected in the works of propaganda. Similarly, the information provided to Soviet citizens through propaganda became more and more truthful. It lost its fundamental ideas about the class character of the ongoing war and was further formed on the basis of provisions on the purely national character of the struggle of the peoples of the USSR against Germany and its allies. The true description of the atrocities committed by German troops was shocking and did not fit into the usual notions of morality and morality. The enemy — the German soldier and his leaders, primarily Hitler — was perceived as something devoid of human essence, he was the embodiment of evil. The dehumanization of such an opponent has become the key to success in the fight against him. The enemy has acquired in the works of propaganda not a human, but rather an animal appearance.

In the second period of the development of Soviet propaganda in June 1942 — August 1943, there was a further transformation of the enemy's image. This stage began with the defeat of the Soviet troops during the battles that ended with the Nazis entering the North Caucasus and the Volga in the spring of 1942. This time was the most dramatic in the history of the Great Patriotic War. Plans to implement the lightning defeat of the Red Army troops were thwarted, and the enemy was pushed back from the capital. But Operation Blau brought the Red Army to the brink of defeat. The situation on the fronts has become catastrophic. It was already about the survival of the country, and the reality of such a development was not only soberly assessed by the Soviet command, but also

firmly understood by the society of the Soviet Country. Defeat meant slavery and the physical destruction of many peoples of the USSR.

In the image of the enemy, the differences between the concepts of a fascist, a national socialist and a German have finally been erased. Order No. 227 "On measures to strengthen discipline and order in the Red Army and the prohibition of unauthorized withdrawal from combat positions" became a landmark and played an important propaganda role. It told the Soviet people and the army objectively and without embellishment about the situation on the fronts and the senselessness of retreats and flight from the battlefield. The rear will not become a refuge. Death in battle was actually opposed to slavery or death under the yoke of the occupiers.

It was this time that became a turning point in the fight against the enemy. In the Soviet press, leaflets and other materials it was reported about the selfless struggle of the citizens of the USSR, about the voluntarily transferred property for the needs of the front. The image of the enemy as a bloodthirsty beast was already firmly formed. After the defeat of the Germans in February 1943 during the Battle of Stalingrad, the Soviet people had no hope, but a firm confidence in the inevitability of victory. The image of the enemy as a soulless evil, taking the form of a predator or a mechanism, transformed into the appearance of a cowardly animal. The enemy is still dangerous, but he has shown his weakness, he flees and surrenders. Many senior officers of the Wehrmacht, who sent their soldiers to their deaths, chose captivity when their own lives were at risk.

As a result, the image of the enemy has undergone fundamental changes. There was no return to the stereotypes of pre-war propaganda. The enemy is still inhuman and subject to total destruction without compassion, but now it is the image of a beaten anthropomorphic or bestial creature. He does not inspire fear and, rather, emotionally should cause a feeling of disgust and disgust.

The morale of the German troops was undermined. By the spring of 1943, the attitude towards the enemy had changed. The enemy can be beaten, he is weaker than the army of the USSR. The Soviet population under the control of the Communist Party is distinguished by great courage and the ability to sacrifice

themselves. Such an attitude was rigidly opposed to the deceitful and cowardly policy of the German elite. The image of a selfless and strong soldier of the Red Army was contrasted with a fanatic and a robber who could not resist him. The caricature of the enemy has become dominant. The tension of June 1942 — February 1943 gave way to confidence in the inevitable victory and a calmer mood in Soviet society. The threat of a military catastrophe has passed, and the fear of the enemy's image has been replaced by a squeamish attitude towards him. The horde, which brings death and enslavement, has turned into a gang of looters in the works of propaganda, headed by individuals with obvious degenerative features.

At the same time, work with the population of the liberated territories became particularly relevant. The total nature of the war and the exhaustion of the resources of Germany and its allies necessitated a more flexible policy on their part towards the population of the occupied territories of the USSR. The massacres were accompanied by the formation of an image of a possible future peaceful life under German rule. The idea was planted that it was possible to save life in these conditions. As a result, counter-propaganda has become extremely important. The image of a deceitful and dodgy enemy, who pretends to be good and tries to ingratiate himself into trust, has become dominant in conducting counter-propaganda. Flexible political work was carried out with the population of the liberated territories in order to open their eyes to the crimes committed by the Nazis and to the fact that it was the Soviet army that was the liberator. In general, the enemy failed to achieve success even on the national outskirts. The crimes he committed were too eloquent.

The third stage of the development of Soviet propaganda occurred in September 1943 — May 1945. It is characterized by the end of the war. During this period of time, numerous crimes were committed against the peoples of the USSR, the enemy fought fiercely. In contrast to the critical nature of the previous period, the goals and objectives of propaganda activities have undergone significant changes at this time. This statement may be perceived as paradoxical, but in reality there is no contradiction. The enemy, in fact, had already been

defeated, and the question of ending Germany's resistance became a matter of time, how long its agony would last. The task of inspiring the Soviet people and encouraging them to selfless struggle has already, in fact, been achieved. The certainty of victory is firmly rooted in the public consciousness. Another task came to the fore — to determine the price of achieving an inevitable victory. Does it make sense to continue waging an all-out war against an entire nation and bring it to collective responsibility? The image of an enemy who did not deserve mercy hardened the Soviet soldiers. Many of them had lost their loved ones and were eager for just revenge. In these circumstances, two problems have become particularly relevant. The imposition of such an image of the enemy led to the realization of the hopelessness of the situation on both sides. In any case, German soldiers were expected to die either on the battlefield or in the rear after the defeat of their country. Such a situation only gave them strength as doomed to death. In addition, could a Soviet soldier become like Hitler when he himself enters the lands of Germany and its allies? Is collective responsibility acceptable for entire nations?

As a result, the image of the enemy in Soviet propaganda underwent a significant transformation. He differentiated himself from the image of the German people. The enemy is someone who has committed monstrous crimes and continues to commit them senselessly. German soldiers who laid down their arms, as well as members of the National Socialist Party, military or civil administration, who recognized Soviet power and did not resist, deserve leniency. The Red Army soldier comes as a liberator, not as a robber and murderer. At the same time, fraternization with the Nazis is unacceptable. The question of their fate has yet to be resolved. Propaganda work among Soviet civilians and military personnel who cooperated with the enemy has also acquired significant relevance. The propaganda carried out in this environment formed the image of the enemy based on the opposition of one's own and another's. A traitor who realized his guilt could atone for it, but the invader will forever remain an enemy, including for those who cooperated with him. This period of Soviet propaganda, long before May 1945,

was characterized by the formation of the image of the defeated enemy. The passage of tens of thousands of prisoners of war in Moscow in July 1944 played a significant propaganda role not only for the peoples of the USSR. The world saw not the victorious Wehrmacht, but thousands of columns of emaciated and ragged soldiers who preferred life in captivity to death on the battlefield. Their columns were led by senior officers and generals who cowardly chose life. This image of the German army was demonstrated to Soviet society and the whole world for the first time.

It should be noted that the formation of the image of the enemy was based on the opposition of one's own and another's. Such a gradation was initially based on the dehumanization of the enemy, his dehumanization. All the negative human sides were personified in the image of the enemy. At the same time, Soviet propaganda was focused on maintaining humanism in Soviet society and achieving its unity. The propaganda images contained pictures of a future peaceful life. The lyrical works of Soviet cultural and artistic figures were juxtaposed with calls for the destruction of the enemy. At the final stage of the war, there was a differentiation of the image of the enemy, who has already been defeated and must save his life by laying down his arms. The image of the Soviet warrior—liberator was sharply opposed to the image of the Nazi beast. The peoples of Germany and its allies should not be collectively responsible for crimes committed by the military. Not to become like the enemy, who has now been defeated, and to preserve humanity in oneself becomes the most important task of Soviet propaganda.

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