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*as a manuscript*

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**Habesh Eyalet in the politics and economics of the Ottoman Empire  
in the 16th - 18th centuries**

**5.6.2. General history**

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## INTRODUCTION

**Relevance of the research topic.** The Red Sea has been mentioned in written tradition since ancient times. Its unusual geographical characteristics had a major impact on the history of the surrounding lands (see Appendix 2). The length of the sea (from north to south) reaches 2000 km, and the distance from the coast of Africa to the Arabian Peninsula slightly exceeds 300 km. The climate in the areas adjacent to the Red Sea is unfavorable: dry and very hot. There are shoals along its entire length, which makes navigation a risky endeavor and requires high skill from ship crews. The African coast of the Red Sea is separated from the Nile Valley by desert areas, which contributed to the formation of a separate culture and the establishment of a nomadic lifestyle of local tribes, among which the Beja, one of the Cushitic\* peoples, predominated.

By the 16th century, the history of active use of the Red Sea stretched back 3,500 years. Almost all the peoples who had access to it carried out trade contacts with other countries with its help. With the advent of Islam, we can talk about the formation of a trading system in which the Red Sea connected the Mediterranean Sea with the Persian Gulf, East Africa, Ceylon, Gujarat, the Malabar Coast, and Malacca. At the turn of the 15th – 16th centuries, its importance also increased as a result of instability in the territory of modern Iran, as well as other internal parts of Asia, which blocked land trade routes and forced traders to seek a route by sea.

At the beginning of the 16th century, the political map of the Red Sea area underwent significant changes: Mamluk Egypt was destroyed, and its territories one after another became part of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans formed an *eyalet*\* named

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\* *The Cushites* are a group of peoples in eastern Africa, living from the Eastern Desert of Egypt to the North-Eastern Province of Kenya. In modern Sudan they form the majority of the population in the Kassala province.

\* *Eyalet* is a province, the largest military-administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire. (Meyer M.S. The Ottoman Empire in the 18th century. Features of the structural crisis. MOSCOW: Nauka. Main editorial office of eastern literature, 1991. P. 244)

Habesh on the coast of Sudan and Eritrea, which became one of the most remote provinces of the state. This circumstance, as well as the proximity to major regional powers, such as the Funj Sultanate and Ethiopia, determined the peculiarities of the development of the eyalet.

Despite its peripheral status, the coastal areas of the Red Sea turned out to be closely connected with the most developed regions (Mediterranean, India), due to their favorable geographical location. The problem of external influence on the development of the Red Sea area, where the interests of world and regional powers are intertwined, is included in the range of pressing issues of world history. Moreover, the process of development of the Ottoman Empire cannot be comprehensively reconstructed without a comprehensive study of the characteristic features of the evolution of its periphery.

**Scientific novelty of the research.** Habesh Eyalet found itself at the intersection of interests of Arabists, Turkologists and Ethiopians, which greatly complicates the study of his history. Lack of systematic works in Russian devoted to the history of Habesh Eyalet, determines the scientific novelty of this work.

**The purpose of the study** is determined by the above factors: to determine the significance of the territories of Habesh Eyalet for the Politics and Economy of the Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea Area.

Achieving the purpose is possible by solving **the following tasks**:

1. determine the prerequisites for the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea area;
2. study the history of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the countries bordering Habesh Eyalet;
3. explore the features of the administrative and economic structure of Habesh Eyalet;

**The object of the study** is the development process of Habesh Eyalet during the XVI – XVIII centuries.

**The subject of the study** is the history of the province, primarily the administrative, political and economic systems that have developed in this territory. Other aspects of the history of Habesh Eyalet are touched upon in the dissertation

to the extent that they turn out to be important for understanding the features of its development.

**The chronological scope of the work** covers the period from 1517 to 1800. It should be noted that while studying the history of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, it is impossible to rely solely on periodization methods used in the historiography of Western countries. Due to the uneven historical development of countries and regions of the world, the designated period can be attributed to the Middle Ages.

At the beginning of the XVI century, a new stage of history begins in the entire Red Sea area: the Ottoman Empire occupies the territory of Egypt, having crushed the Mamluk Sultanate, and is not going to stop its expansionist policy. On the territory of Sudan, state entities are formed, traditionally called sultanates (the most developed and influential among them was the Sultanate of Sennar), and the Portuguese also appeared in the region, who opened the route to India around Africa in 1498. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt in 1798–1801 and the beginning of the reign of Muhammad Ali (1769–1849)\* in Egypt in 1805 marked the beginning of a new period in the history of the Red Sea area.

**The territorial scope of the study** is limited to the Red Sea area.

**The degree of knowledge of the topic.** Since Habesh Eyalet was one of the peripheral regions of the Ottoman Empire; its history remains poorly understood.

In the national Sudanese historiography of Habesh Eyalet has received much less attention than the history of the Funj and Darfur Sultanates. However, over the past 15 years, several books have been published by Sudanese scholars that focus on the Ottoman intrusion of Sudan between the 16th and 18th centuries.

When writing the work, research was used by such Sudanese authors as Yusuf Fadl Hasan<sup>1</sup>, Muhammad Salih Dirar<sup>2</sup>, Anam al- Kabbashi, Seyd Ahmad al-‘Iraqi, Qaisar

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\* Here and further in the work, when significant historical figures are first mentioned, their years of life are given in parentheses.

<sup>1</sup> Hassan YF The Intrusion of Islam in the Eastern Sudan // Sudan Notes and Records. 1963. Vol. XLIV. P. 1–8

<sup>2</sup> Dirār, Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ. Ta'rīḥ Sawākin wa al-baḥr al-'aḥmar ("History Suakina and Red seas"). Al-Ḥurtūm: Al-Dār al-sūdāniyya li al-kutub, 1988. 277 ṣ.

Musa Zein<sup>3</sup>, Hasan Makki<sup>4</sup>, ‘Ali Salih Karrar<sup>5</sup>, ‘Abd al-Hadi ‘Awad<sup>6</sup>, Qassem Uthman Nur<sup>7</sup>, ‘Abd ar -Rahman Ibrahim Sa‘id ‘Ali<sup>8</sup>.

The information presented in the only comprehensive specialized study on the history of Habesh Eyalet – monograph by the Turkish author Cengiz Orhonlu<sup>9</sup>, published in 1974 in Turkish – was used. The merit of the author of the book “Habesh Eyalet” is an active involvement of Ottoman sources, some of which were given in the appendix to his book. At the same time, C. Orhonlu did not turn to the research of Arab authors.

While writing the work, a voluminous monograph by the Lebanese scientist Na‘um Šuqayr was also studied<sup>10</sup>. His research is an important source on the history of Sudan. Šuqayr as a member of Egyptian military intelligence, had great advantages for collecting information. After the fall of Omdurman in September 1898, he was put in charge of researching the Mahdist archives, which allowed him to include many documents in his book. Other materials were obtained from Sudanese manuscripts and oral sources.

There are not so many domestic researchers, who studied the development of this region and mentioned Habesh Eyalet in one form or another: Yu.M. Kobishchanov<sup>11</sup>,

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<sup>3</sup>Qayşr Mūsā Zayn. Sawākin: dirāsāt fī Ta'rīḥ, al- ḥadārat wa al-tafā'ulāt al-dūwaliyya ("Suakin: studies in history, civilization and international interaction"). Al-Ḥurtūm: markaz al-tanwīr al-ma'ārifi, 2013. 376 ş.

<sup>4</sup>Makkī. Ḥasan. Al- ṭaqāfat al-sinnāriyya ("Culture of Sennar"). Al- ḡāmi'a al-'ifriqiyya. 88 ş.

<sup>5</sup>Karrar Ali Salih. The Sufi Brotherhoods in the Sudan. London: C. Hurst and Company, 1992. 234 p.

<sup>6</sup>‘Awad, ‘Abd Al-Hādī. Sawākin wa Maşaww‘a fī ‘ahd al-ḥukm al-turkī al-mişri ( "Suakin and Massawa in period of Turkish - Egyptian authorities") // History of the Ottoman Empire: some Aspects of the Sudanese-Turkish Relations. 2004. 77–109 p.

<sup>7</sup>Nūr, Qāsim ‘Uṭmān Aḥmad Muḥammad. Al-sūdān fī kutub al-raḥḥālat wa al-mu'arriḥīn ("Sudan in books of travelers and historians"). Al-Ḥurtūm: 2013. 392 ş.

<sup>8</sup>Sa‘īd, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Ibrāhīm. Al-āṭār al-‘uṭmāniyya fī al-sūdān min al-qarn al-sādis ‘aşr al-mīlādī ḥatta al-qarn al-tāsi‘ ‘aşr al-mīlādī (al-āṭār nusiyathu al-āṭār) (“Ottoman monuments in Sudan XVI–XIX centuries (Monuments that were forgotten that they were monuments)”). Al-Ḥurtūm: al-'amānat al-'amma li sinnār 'aşimat al-ṭaqāfat, 2017. 340 ş.

<sup>9</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Güney Siyaseti Habeş Eyaleti. Ankara: Türk tarih kurumu basımevi, 1996. 373 s.

<sup>10</sup>Šuqayr, Na'um. Ta'rīḥ al- sūdān al-qadīm wa al ḥadīt wa ḡuḡrāfiyatuhu ("Ancient And modern story Sudan and his geography"). Bayrūt, 1981. 1024 ş.

<sup>11</sup>Kobishchanov Ju. M. Istorija rasprostraneniya islama v Afrike. Moscow: «Nauka», 1987. 224 p. Id. Na zare civilizacii (Afrika v drevnejšem mire). Moscow: «Mysl'», 1981. 223 p. Id. Poljud'e: vsemirno-istoricheskoe javlenie. Moscow: Rossijskaja političeskaja enciklopedija (ROSSPEN), 2009.791 p.

S.R. Smirnov<sup>12</sup>, N.A. Ivanov<sup>13</sup>. A great contribution was made by S.B. Chernetsov<sup>14</sup>, who was primarily concerned with the history of the Ethiopian kingdom. One of the latest works by I.V. Gerasimov deserves special mention – “History and culture of Sudan in the 16th – 18th centuries.”<sup>15</sup>, written based on Ibn Dayfallah's hagiographic work "Tabakat".

In addition, while working on the study, materials from a number of Western researchers were used, among whom, first of all, it is necessary to name M. Abir<sup>16</sup>, A. Peacock<sup>17</sup>, J. Bloss<sup>18</sup>, P. Holt<sup>19</sup>, A. D'Avrey<sup>20</sup>, J. Miran<sup>21</sup>, J. Casale<sup>22</sup>, R. O'Fay and J. Spalding<sup>23</sup>. The books of M. Abir are devoted to the history of Ethiopia in the 16th – 19th centuries, while the books of J. Spalding and P. Holt are classic

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<sup>12</sup> Smirnov S. R. *Istorija Sudana: (1821 – 1956)*. Moscow: "Nauka", 1968. 296 p.

<sup>13</sup> Ivanov N. A. *Osmanskoe zavoevanie arabskih stran (1516 – 1574)*. Moscow: Vostochnaja literatura, 2001. 287 p.

<sup>14</sup> Chernetsov S.V. *Efiopskaja feodal'naja monarhija v XIII – XVI centuries*. Moscow: “Nauka”, 1982. 309 p.

<sup>15</sup> Gerasimov I.V. *Istorija i kul'tura Sudana XVI – XVIII vv.* St. Petersburg: Gallery Prints, 2018. 480 p.

<sup>16</sup> Abir M. *Ethiopia and the Red Sea (The rise and decline of the Solomonic dynasty and Muslim-European rivalry in the region)*. Abingdon: Frank Cass., 1980. 249 p.

<sup>17</sup> Peacock A.C.S. *Suakin: A Northeast African Port in the Ottoman Empire // Northeast African Studies*. 2012. Vol. 12.No. 1. pp. 29–50. Id. *The Ottomans and the Funj sultanate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries // Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*. 2012. Vol. 75. pp. 87–111.

<sup>18</sup> Bloss J. F. E. *The story of Suakin // Sudan Notes and Records*. 1936. Vol. 19. No. 2. pp. 271–300. Id. *The story of Suakin (Concluded) // Sudan Notes and Records*. 1937. Vol. 20. No. 2. pp. 247–280.

<sup>19</sup> Holt P. M. *A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*. Harlow, England: Longman, 2011. 199 p. Id. *Sultan Selim I and the Sudan // The Journal of African History*. 1967. Vol. 8.No. 1. pp. 19–23.

<sup>20</sup> D'Avray A. *Lords of the Red Sea: the history of a Red Sea society from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996. 311 p.

<sup>21</sup> Miran J. *Guest editor's introduction: Space, Mobility, and Translocal Connections across the Red Sea Area since 1500 // Northeast African Studies*. 2012. Vol. 12.No. 1. pp. 9–27. Id. *Power without Pashas: The Anatomy of Na'ib Autonomy in Ottoman Eritrea (17th–19th C.) // Eritrean Studies Review*. 2007. Vol. 5.No. 1. pp. 33–88. Id. *Red Sea citizens: cosmopolitan society and cultural change in Massawa*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2009. – 380 p. Id. *Red Sea Slave Trade // Oxford Research Encyclopedias, African History*. URL: [https://www.academia.edu/77209288/Red\\_Sea\\_Slave\\_Trade\\_2022](https://www.academia.edu/77209288/Red_Sea_Slave_Trade_2022) (accessed March 30, 2023).

<sup>22</sup> *The Ottoman Administration of the Spice Trade in the Sixteenth-Century Red Sea and Persian Gulf // Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*. 2006. Vol. 49.No. 2. P. 170–198. Id. *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 301 p.

<sup>23</sup> O'Fahey R.S., Spaulding J.L. *Kingdoms of the Sudan*. London: Methuen, 1974. 235 p.



publications on the history of Sudan before the Anglo-Egyptian condominium. A. Peacock published an article on the relationship between Funj Sultanate and the Ottoman Empire and an article on the history of the city of Suakin, as another researcher J. Bloss did. The works of J. Miran and A. D' Avrey reveal connections within the Red Sea after the 16th century. J. Casale wrote a work on the policy of the Ottoman Empire in the eastern direction, and on the role of the fleet in its implementation. Thus, the works of these authors did not focus on the history of Habesh Eyalet.

Special mention of the Turkish historian S. Ozbaran should be made<sup>24</sup>, who published a collection of articles about the confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and Portugal in the Indian Ocean in the 16th century.

**The source base of the work** is documentary sources related to administrative documents of the Ottoman Empire. While writing the study, we used published sources translated into Arabic in the book “Al-Sudan fi al- ahd al- usmani: min hilal wasaik al- arshif al- usmani”<sup>25</sup>: most of them are devoted to the events of the second half of the 16th century related to Habesh Eyalet.

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<sup>24</sup>Özbaran S. *The Ottoman Response to European Expansion: Studies on Ottoman-Portuguese Relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration in the Arab Lands during the Sixteenth Century*. Istanbul: ISIS, 1994. 224 p.

<sup>25</sup> ’Üğürhân Damîrbâş, ‘Alî ‘Uṭmân Tšanâr, Muğâhid Damîr’al; tarğama Sa’adâwî Şâlih. *Al-Sūdân fî al-‘ahd al-‘uṭmâniyya: min ḥilâl waṭâ’iq al-’arşif al-‘uṭmâni* (Sudan in the Ottoman era: in documents of Ottoman archive). ’Istânbûl, 2007. 426 ş.

While writing this work, the 10th volume of Evliya Çelebi's\* book "Seyahatname" was used (translated into German, Arabic and English)<sup>26</sup>, dedicated to his journey to Egypt, Funj Sultanate and Habesh Eyalet, was used. There continues to be considerable controversy surrounding the authenticity of the itinerary of his final voyage. However, most researchers agree that Evliya personally visited Habesh Eyalet, including the main cities of the province: Suakin and Massawa. Evliya Çelebi described in detail the state of affairs in the Red Sea area, paying attention to the most diverse aspects of the life of local residents.

Another important source is the report "On the Red Sea and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean"<sup>27</sup>, which is believed to have been authored by the Ottoman naval commander Salman Reis. Its text was published three times, including in the form of translations: the first time the report was published by Fevzi Kurtoglu in 1934. In 1974, its translation into English was carried out by the Turkish researcher Salih Ozbaran (quotations from this translation are used in the work), somewhat later, in 1976, its

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\* Evliya Çelebi (03/25/1611 – 1682) – Ottoman traveler. His father was the chief court jeweler, his mother was of Abkhaz origin. He received a good education: after elementary school, he studied at the madrasah of Sheikh-ul-Islam Hamid Efendi. Evliya Çelebi knew the text of the Koran by heart. After graduating from the madrasah, he was a hafiz at the Hagia Sophia mosque for some time. Soon, in 1636, he attracted the attention of Sultan Murad IV and was taken to the palace, where, being with the Sultan's retinue, he continued his studies. During his life Evliya Çelebi visited geographic areas, including the Balkans, the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, and the Levant. One of the last trips was his pilgrimage to the holy cities of Islam - Mecca and Medina, as well as travels through the countries of North Africa - Egypt, Cairo, Sudan and Abyssinia. All his travel notes were collected in a ten-volume book, Seyahatname. (Evliya Çelebi. «Kniga puteshestvija». Izvlecheniya iz sochineniya Osmanskogo puteshestvennika XVII veka. Zemli istoricheskoy Rossii i sopredel'nye oblasti / Vstup. st., per. i komment. E.V. Bahrevskogo. M.: Institut Naslediya, 2023. pp. 18-22

<sup>26</sup> Aūlīyā Ğalabī. Al-rihla 'ilā miṣr wa al-sūdān wa al-ḥabaša ("Journey to Egypt, Sudan and Habesh") / tarğama Muğīb al-Miṣrī, Ḥusayn. Dār 'Afāq al-'arabīyya,, 2006 Evliya Çelebi. Ins Land der geheimnisvollen Func: des türkischen Weltenbummlers Evliya Çelebi Reise durch Oberägypten und den Sudan nebst der osmanischen Provinz Habes in den Jahren 1672/73 / übersetzt und erläutert von E.Prokosch. Graz: Styria, 1994. 336 s.; Dankoff R., Tezcan N., Sheridan M. D. Ottoman Explorations of the Nile. Evliya Çelebi's Map of the Nile and The Nile Journeys in the Book of Travels (Seyahatname). London: Gingko Library, 2018. 442 p.

<sup>27</sup> Reis S. A Turkish report on the Red Sea and the Portuguese in the Indian ocean (1525) // Özbaran S. The Ottoman Response to European Expansion: Studies on Ottoman Portuguese Relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration in the Arab Lands during the Sixteenth Century. Istanbul: ISIS, 1994. P. 99-109

description and translation into French was published by Michel Lesure. Some parts were translated in 2012 by the American researcher A. Peacock.

Translations of Ethiopian chronicles XVI – XVIII centuries made by domestic Ethiopians B.A. Turaev<sup>28</sup> and S.B. Chernetsov<sup>29</sup> also provide valuable information about the Ottoman presence in the region and the fighting between the powers.

Separately, we should highlight the memories of the first Europeans who came to the Red Sea area – the Portuguese; many of them left memories of their stay in the region. The work used the works of Jerome translated into English Lobo<sup>30</sup>, Miguel de Castonoso<sup>31</sup>, Joao de Castro<sup>32</sup>.

In the XVIII century, noteworthy reports about the Red Sea area were written by the French physician Charles Jacques Ponce<sup>33</sup> and the Scottish traveler James Bruce<sup>\*34</sup>.

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<sup>28</sup> Abissinskie hroniki XIV–XVI vv. / per. s efiop. B. A. Turaeva, pod red. I. Ju. Krachkovskogo. Moscow; Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1936 (Trudy Instituta vostokovedenija, XVIII). 188 p.

<sup>29</sup> Efiopskie hroniki XVI–XVII vekov / Vstup. i zakl., per. s jefiop. i komment. S. B. Chernetsova. Moscow: Nauka, 1984. 390 pp.; Efiopskie hroniki of the 17th – 18th centuries Vstup. i zakl., per. s jefiop. i komment. S. B. Chernetsova. Moscow: Nauka, 1989. 384 pp.; Efiopskie hroniki XVIII veka / Vstup. i zakl., per. s jefiop. i komment. S. B. Chernetsova. Moscow: Nauka, 1991. 358 p.

<sup>30</sup> Lobo J. A Voyage to Abyssinia / translated by Samuel Johnson. London, Paris, New York, Melbourne: CASSELL & COMPANY, 1887. 208 p.

<sup>31</sup> The Portuguese expedition to Abyssinia in 1541-1543 as narrated by Castanhoso / translated and edited by RS Whiteway. London, 1902. 315 p.

<sup>32</sup> General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels / Kerr R., Edin FAS Edinburgh: William Blackwood, London: T. Cadell, 1824. Vol. 6. 506 p.

<sup>33</sup> The Red Sea and adjacent countries at the close of the seventeenth century as described by Joseph Pitts, William Daniel and Charles Jacques Poncet / edited by William Foster. London: University Press Oxford, 1949. 192 p.

\* James Bruce (December 14, 1730 – April 27, 1794) – Scottish traveler and writer. He graduated from the University of Edinburgh. After being appointed consul in Algeria in 1762, he spent more than ten years in Africa. Since 1768, he devoted himself to searching for the source of the Nile and became one of the first Europeans to reach the source of the Blue Nile (challenging the successes of his predecessors: Pedro Paes and Jeronim Lobo). He became the first European to follow the course of the Blue Nile to its confluence with the White Nile. After returning to Europe in 1774, he considered himself offended by the lack of confidence in the history of his journey and retired to his estate in Scotland, where he wrote a book about his travels in northeast Africa.

<sup>34</sup> Bruce J. Travels to discover the Source of the Nile, in the years 1768, 1769, 1770, 1771, 1772, and 1773. – Dublin: William Sleater, 1790. Vol. 1. 380 p.

Another important source for this region is the diary of the Swiss traveler Johann Ludwig Burckhardt\* <sup>35</sup>.

**Methodology and research methods.** The dissertation research is based on the principle of historicism, which requires studying any historical event in its development and taking into account the specific situation. When working with sources, the traditional historical and philological method was used. When analyzing the data obtained, the comparative-historical method was used. The theoretical basis is made up of various sources (chronicles, traveler records, official documents), as well as studies by domestic and foreign authors indicated when describing the degree of knowledge of the topic.

The dissertation uses a lightweight, diacritic-free **transliteration system**, which is explained by the historical rather than philological focus of this research. When transmitting Arabic names and titles in the text, the following order is used: names and titles, articles about which are presented in the Encyclopedia Britannica, are written in accordance with the established spelling of them in the English language. In other cases, a simplified system of Latin transliteration of Arabic script is used – the hamza (‘) is indicated in the middle and ending positions and the ‘ayn (ع); the definite article is rendered as (al-). Bibliographic records are presented in complete Latin transliteration (see Appendix 1). The titles of materials, sources and scientific works in European languages used or writing this work are presented in the original language.

**The structure of the study** follows from the stated goals and objectives. It consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, a list of references and two appendices.

In the Introduction substantiates the relevance and scientific novelty of the topic, establishes the goal, objectives, object, subject and methods of research, and also determines the source and theoretical basis, chronological and territorial scope of work.

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\* Johann Ludwig Burckhardt (November 24, 1784 – October 15, 1817) was a Swiss orientalist who became famous for his travels around the Near and Middle East under the name of Ibrahim Ibn Abdullah. He studied Arabic at Cambridge. In 1809 he arrived in Syria, where he studied Sharia law and mastered Arabic perfectly. Burckhardt remained in history thanks to the discovery of the ruins of ancient Palmyra and Petra. In addition, Burckhardt became one of the first Europeans to visit Mecca and Medina.

<sup>35</sup>Burckhardt JL Travels in Nubia. London, 1819. 548 p.

The first chapter of the study examines the reasons of the Ottomans expansion in the Red Sea area, after the conquest of Egypt.

The second chapter describes the history of the development of relations between the Ottoman Empire and neighboring state entities – Ethiopia and Funj Sultanate. During the 16th century, the Ottomans repeatedly tried to expand their territorial possessions in the region, but in the 17th century this policy was revised, and they moved to mutually beneficial cooperation.

The third chapter is devoted to the peculiarities of the functioning of Habesh Eyalet, including the problem of remoteness of the province, issues of governance, administrative-territorial division, financial system and military structure.

**Approbation of work.** The main provisions of the dissertation were presented in the form of publications in scientific publications (including three publications in journals listed by the Higher Attestation Commission) and presentations at conferences at various levels:

Publications:

1. Gerasimov I.V. Satarov A.A. Svedenija osmanskogo puteshestvennika Jevlii Chelebi o sultanate fundzh v Sudane // *Mezhdunarodnyj nauchno-issledovatel'skij zhurnal*, No. 1 (43), 2016. – pp. 82 – 85.
2. Satarov A.A. Ob otnoshenijah Osmanskoj imperii i sultanata fundzh v XVI – XVIII vekah // *Mezhdunarodnaja zhizn'*. – 2022. – No. 8. – pp. 120–126.
3. Satarov A.A. Rol' Salmana Reisa v zavoevanijah Osmanskoj imperii v Krasnomorskom bassejne // *Izvestija Saratovskogo universiteta. Novaja serija. Serija: Istorija. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija*. – 2020. – No. 2 (20). – pp. 195–198.
4. Satarov A.A. Ekspansija Osmanskoj imperii v Krasnomorskom bassejne v XVI v. // *Vestnik Jaroslavskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. P.G. Demidova, sr. Gumanitarnye nauki*. – 2019. – No. 1 (47). – pp. 32–36.

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\* Sanjak is an administrative unit in the Ottoman Empire, part of the eyalet. (Meyer M.S. *The Ottoman Empire in the 18th century. Features of a structural crisis*. P. 241)

## Conferences:

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stran Azii i Afriki “Azija i Afriki v menjajushhemsja mire”, April 22-24, 2015, St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Oriental Studies.

**The main arguments of the dissertation to be defended:**

1. The Red Sea area entered the zone of interests of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 16th century. Its continued expansion in the region was driven by a combination of factors, the most important among them being the desire to maintain a monopoly on the spice trade.

2. The nature of the relations of the Ottoman Empire with the Sennar Sultanate and Ethiopia in the period of the 16th – 18th centuries underwent significant changes. Funj Sultanate, although it did not fight the Ottomans during the 16th century, posed a serious threat to the newly acquired territories on the coast of Sudan: dependent on his tribes besieged one of the main cities of the eyalet several times Habesh – Suakin. At the same time, Ethiopia suffered an invasion by a small but modern Ottoman army. The war of the Ottoman Empire against Ethiopia continued with some interruptions until the very end of the 16th century, when the Ottomans due to the pressure of internal problems, they practically lost interest in this region. This contributed to the establishment of trade and other relations of Habesh Eyalet with neighbors.

3. Habesh Eyalet was one of the most inaccessible and most remote provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The work here was fraught with great difficulties, so the dispatched officials were not eager to get to it as quickly as possible. From the middle of the 17th century, the importance of the local elite grew noticeably, to which the management of affairs actually passed. Habesh Eyalet was a subsidized region, tied to financial assistance from Egypt. The military garrisons of the province were in a constant numerical minority compared to their neighbors. The reassignment of Habesh Eyalet Jeddah at the beginning of the 18th century in the status of a sanjak\* proves the loss of its former importance for the state. The Ottoman presence here becomes rather nominal. In the territories that were part of Habesh Eyalet, there is a power vacuum.

**The main scientific results** reflected in the author's publications, containing scientific novelty that is important for the study of the history of the development of Habesh Eyalet in the period of the 16th–18th centuries, are as follows:

1. It has been established that the Red Sea area entered the sphere of interests of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 16th century. The most important factor that pushed the Ottoman Empire to expand in the region was the desire to maintain a monopoly on the spice trade, which was threatened by the emergence of alternative routes around Africa<sup>36</sup>.

2. The development of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the regional powers bordering Habesh Eyalet – the Funj Sultanate and Ethiopia – is described. During the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire repeatedly took an aggressive stance towards Ethiopia. Despite its technological superiority, the Ottoman Empire failed to annex the interior regions of this neighboring country. The Sennar Sultanate posed indirect threats to the territories of Habesh Eyalet; dependent Arab tribes repeatedly besieged Suakin. The end of the 16th century marked the Ottoman Empire's abandonment of expansion in the region, its relations with its neighbours were normalized, which contributed to the development of trade relations in the region<sup>37</sup>.

3. It was revealed that the peculiarities of the administrative and economic development of Habesh Eyalet were mainly due to its geographical location: the remoteness of the province negatively affected the efficiency of governance. In addition, despite various incentives, officials avoided being sent to the eyalet. From the mid-17th century, governance of the province passed into the hands of the local elite. The subordination of Habesh Eyalet to Jeddah as a sanjak at the beginning

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<sup>36</sup> Satarov A.A. Rol' Salmana Reisa v zavoevanijah Osmanskoj imperii v Krasnomorskom bassejne // *Izvestija Saratovskogo universiteta*. Novaja serija. Serija: Istorija. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija. 2020. No. 2 (20). P. 197.

<sup>37</sup> Satarov A.A. Ekspansija Osmanskoj imperii v Krasnomorskom bassejne v XVI v. // *Vestnik Jaroslavskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. P.G. Demidova, sr. Gumanitarnye nauki*. 2019. No. 1 (47). P. 32-36; Satarov A.A. Ob otnoshenijah Osmanskoj imperii i sultanata fundzh v XVI-XVIII vekah// *Mezhdunarodnaja zhizn'*. 2022. No. 8. pp. 121-125.



of the 18th century indicates that the Red Sea basin had lost its former importance for the Ottoman Empire.

4. Throughout its history, Habesh Eyalet was economically dependent on the neighboring provinces of the Ottoman Empire – Egypt and Yemen. Its main source of income was customs duties on transit goods<sup>38</sup>.

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<sup>38</sup> Satarov A.A. Ekspansija Osmanskoj imperii v Krasnomorskom bassejne v XVI v. P. 35

## **CHAPTER 1. PREREQUISITES OF OTTOMAN EXPANSION IN THE RED SEA AREA**

### **1.1. Features of the Red Sea area development in the period before 1517**

Trade on the Red Sea has been carried out since ancient times. Based on archaeological finds, it was established that obsidian came from Africa to the Arabian Peninsula back in the 7th millennium BC.

Ancient Egypt became the first state to actively use the Red Sea as a trade route. In the 3rd millennium BC, the Egyptians imported from the country they called Punt, myrrh, frankincense, gold, ivory, wood, spices and domestic animals. One of the earliest recorded sea expeditions dates back to the reign of the Fifth Dynasty pharaoh Sahure. The most famous expedition was undertaken during the reign of the female pharaoh Hatshepsut (1525–1503 BC), the history of the expedition is depicted on the walls of the Dayr al-Bahri temple. Where exactly the lands of Punt were located is still not known for certain: researchers place them in the territories of Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia<sup>39</sup>.

The Red Sea trade was important for Egypt: from Punt and Arabia, goods that were not in the Nile Valley arrived in the country. For expansion of trade opportunities in the 14th century BC. Pharaoh Seti I (1290–1279 BC) made an unsuccessful attempt to build a Nile-Red Sea canal, because the most developed cities of ancient Egypt were located in the Nile Valley and had no access to the Red Sea. Pharaoh Necho tried to bring this project to life (611–595 BC), but he did not have time to complete the work before his death. At the same time, according to the testimony of the Greek historian Herodotus, a huge number of slaves died during construction (approximately 120,000).

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<sup>39</sup> Kobishchanov Yu.M. Na zare civilizacii (Afrika v drevnejshem mire). Moscow: “Mysl”, 1981. p. 50-51, 87-89.

Darius I (522–486 BC) was practically able to implement this idea, but shortly before completion of construction, work was stopped, since it began to seem to Darius that the level of the Red Sea was higher than the level of the Mediterranean, construction was completed only under the Ptolemies - a dynasty founded by one of commanders of Alexander the Great. The canal was maintained under the Roman Emperor Trajan (98–117), but subsequent emperors stopped allocating money for it, and the canal between the Nile and the Red Sea fell into disrepair. It was restored after the annexation of Egypt to the Arab Caliphate during the reign of Caliph Umar (634-644), who planned to use it to ensure rapid delivery of wheat from Egypt to the center of the caliphate in Arabia. However, Caliph al-Mansur (754–775), fearing the intrusion of the Byzantine fleet from the Mediterranean Sea to the shores of Arabia, decided to finally close this ancient structure, which was the historical prototype of the current Suez Canal<sup>40</sup>.

Skilled sailors, the Phoenicians were also present in the Red Sea. The earliest mention of Phoenician navigation in the region is in the Bible. It reflects the fact of the construction by the Israeli king Solomon (974–932 BC) of a fleet for long-distance navigation on the Red Sea. The Phoenician king Hiram of Tiro (969–936 BC), who was in alliance with Solomon, provided ship timber at his shipyard, and when the fleet was ready, he crewed the ships with Phoenicians. Solomon's expedition went to the country of Ophir, from where, after a long time, it returned with countless treasures. Scientists have still not come to a consensus about the location of this country: some place it on the territory of Arabia, others on the East African coast, it is believed that Ophir was located in Western India. It is only clear that Solomon's expedition went in search of gold, precious stones and incense. After Solomon, the trade route through the Red Sea stopped for a long time, although some kings of Judah tried to revive it with new expeditions (for example, Jehoshaphat (873–849 BC))<sup>41</sup>.

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<sup>40</sup> Shumovsky T.A. *Araby i more: po stranicam rukopisej i knig*. Moscow: "Nauka", 1964. P. 60-61.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 64-69; Anfray F., Saurant-Anfay A. *Massawa and the Red Sea: History and Culture*. [Electronic resource]. URL: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001340/134093mb.pdf>.

In the 4th century BC after the campaigns of Alexander the Great, the Hellenistic era began in the Middle East. The appearance of the Greeks in the region posed a serious threat to the Phoenician and Arabian sailors who served trade routes along the Red Sea. Greek and later Roman traders were able to purchase rare goods directly from their regions of origin without resorting to intermediary trade of immigrants from Arabia and the Phoenicians. As a result, they began to attack Greek competitors, but this led to punitive expeditions being sent by Ptolemaic Egypt.

To trade with India and Arabia, Ptolemaic Egypt used old ports on the Red Sea coast – Berenice, Levkoe Limen, Myos Hormos. In addition to these ports, brisk activity in the Red Sea area was observed in the Abyssinian harbor of Adulis, located in the territory of modern Eritrea 50 km south of Massawa\*. Ivory and rhinoceros ivory were exported through it, although the most important goods were slaves and gold.

Under Ptolemy VII Physcon (146–116 BC), the Red Sea trade of Hellenistic Egypt actively developed: Greek merchants managed to reach Somalia and organized direct expeditions to India, getting rid of mediation of immigrants from southern Arabia.

In 30 BC power in Egypt passed from the Ptolemaic dynasty to Rome. The Romans also sought to establish complete control over the Red Sea area and wanted direct contact with India, so in 25 BC Roman naval military expedition led by Aelius Gallus was sent to southern Arabia, but due to poor preparation the campaign failed: a large number of ships were lost in the northern part of the Red Sea. At this time, the port of Adulis assumed the leading role in the Red Sea area. At Adulis, Roman goods were exchanged for products from the interior of Africa (Aksum, Kohaito, Metera).

In the 4th century, along with the general decline of the Roman Empire, the trading activity in the Red Sea began to decrease, and Aksum emerged as the strongest power in the region, which fought with the Persian state both in trade and for political influence in southwestern Arabia. Aksum was an ally of Byzantium in the region, the reason for this orientation was that the successor to the Roman Empire was the main consumer of goods. Byzantium brought Christianity to the region; a common religion made

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\* Massawa is a port located on the Red Sea in the northern part of modern Eritrea.

the political union between the powers even stronger. The struggle between Sasanian Iran and Aksum for southern Arabia created a danger for ships calling at southern Arab ports. The constant change of hands of ports in the 6th century paralyzed their activities: trade throughout the region began to fade.

### **The Red Sea area after the emergence of the Arab Caliphate**

In the 7th century, the Arabs took the first role in the Red Sea area: in one of their sea campaigns, they plundered Adulis in 640, although the city continued to exist here for some time and was probably destroyed by a natural disaster (possibly an earthquake or flood). The place of Adulis was taken by new Arab centers, among them the Dahlak archipelago\*, where Islam spread, and the port of Massawa appeared near the African coast, subordinate to the rulers from Dahlak. The main routes remained the same – from India and Southeast Asia, spices, valuable varieties of trees, fabrics and precious stones arrived in the Red Sea.

When the Arab Caliphate annexed the territories of modern Egypt, it began to supply Mecca and Medina with food by sea, as it had previously supplied it to Greece and Rome. Also, one of the routes of Radanite merchants\*\* passed through the Red Sea. During the first stage of Arab rule, the main port was Qulzum, which is located on the site of the modern port of Suez. It was here that the canal opened, connecting the Nile and the Red Sea by order of Caliph Umar. In the middle of the 8th century the canal was closed, but the port remained a thriving city for another century and a half. Then Qulzum faced climatic disasters (long droughts), in addition, the Seljuk Turks tore him away from Egypt.

### **Aidhab as the main port of the western shore of the Red Sea**

Egypt was not left without a port on the Red Sea. The lost Qulzum was replaced by Aidhab, located on the territory of the modern Halaib triangle. It became one of the most famous Muslim ports on the Red Sea. Almost every Arab geographer

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\* Dahlak is an archipelago in the Red Sea near the port of Massawa, belongs to modern Eritrea.

\*\* Radanites (or Radhonites) – Jewish merchants VIII – XI centuries, traveling and selling their goods both in Western Europe and the Middle East, reaching India and China. They were first mentioned by Ibn Khordadbeh around 847 in the “Book of Routes and Countries.”

or traveler has heard of it, many of them visited it, among them Ibn Jubayr, Ibn Battuta. The Persian poet Naser Khusraw made a forced stop here in 1080. Aidhab is mentioned in his works by al-Maqrizi, Abu al-Fida, Ibn Haukal, al-Idrisi. Al-Maqrizi considered it “one of the most important ports in the world”, Aidhab appears on the map of Daloroto (1325), the Catalan map (1375). Its fame was ensured not only by trade, but a huge number of pilgrims passed through it, forced to abandon the land route for almost 200 years due to the conquest of Palestine by the Crusaders. Almost all pilgrims from Egypt and the Maghreb passed through the bottleneck of Aidhab, bringing huge profits to the residents of the city<sup>42</sup>.

When Aidhab appeared remains unknown for certain, perhaps already in Ptolemaic time. It was absolutely definitely used by Arab pirates, Abu ‘Abd al-Rahman al-‘Omari in the 9th century during the development of gold spears in Wadi Allaqi; the caliphic commander Muhammad ‘Abdallah ibn Gami could also use it during the campaign against Beja in 854–55. Until the 11th century, it was not a significant center, when trade first began to develop here, and then the pilgrimage route to Mecca shifted. It was believed that Aidhab was out of danger of attack by the crusaders, but in 1183 the city was sacked by Reginald de Châtillon (according to other sources in 1182). This attack, however, did not affect the development of the city, which, in fact, was never anything more than a flourishing village on the coast of 100–200 houses in size. The natural conditions there were quite harsh: cold winds blew through the city in winter, and in summer it was covered with heat and sandstorms, so it is not surprising that Solomon, according to legend, used this place to imprison rebellious demons<sup>43</sup>.

Aidhab, even in its heyday, was not a large city in area. Its central part occupied only about 4 km<sup>2</sup>, stretching out into a narrow strip on the coast between the sea and the ridges that frame it from the west. While on the southern ridge there are still traces of several permanent buildings, on the northern ridge there was only a small cemetery.

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<sup>42</sup>Paul A. Aidhab: a medieval Red Sea port // Sudan Notes and Records. 1955. Vol. 36.No. 1. P. 64.

<sup>43</sup>Paul A. Op. cit., P. 65; Murray GW Aidhab // The Geographical Journal. 1926. Vol. 68. No. 3. P. 235–236.; Malett A. A trip down the Red Sea with Reynald of Chatillon // Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society. 2008. Vol. 18. No. 2. P. 142-143.

Beyond

the ridges are large cemeteries – a reminder of the horrendous mortality rate among pilgrims. The city itself consisted of square or rectangular buildings built close together. The houses were either lived in by the owners themselves, or were rented out to wealthy merchants or pilgrims during their stay in the city. Near the permanent buildings were beja tents, and near the shore dhows, as well as countless jallabs used to transport pilgrims<sup>44</sup>.

The city's main problem was the limited amount of water: the reservoirs, judging by their size, could supply only a small number of people. The northern reservoir was located about 3 km from the city at the far end of the northern ridge, judging by its appearance it could only be filled artificially, unless there was an underground source. It was very narrow, only about 240 cm wide, 18 meters long, 3 meters deep, built from coral blocks lined with limestone, topped with an arched roof of raw coral. The southern reservoir was located near the buildings on the southeastern edge of the southern ridge. At the height of the pilgrimage season, the city required large quantities of water, which could only be supplied by external supplies. In Khor Aidhab, 11 km from Aidhab, there was a well, currently this source no longer provides water. Abu Ramad a few kilometers to the north could provide a large supply of brackish water, and there was also a well with salt water at Khor Yoyeib. The closest source of fresh water today may have been Kansirob, 18.5 km from the city at the foot of Jebal Elba<sup>45</sup>.

All sources agree that the morals and behavior of the local population, Hadarib and Beja, did not evoke any sympathy. When the Arabs revived gold mining in East Africa, they readily converted to Islam, forming an alliance with rival Arab tribes, leaning towards the Rabi'a tribe: many members of this tribe took girls from the Hadarib milieu as wives. They did not have any pleasant character traits, and when it came to profit, the Hadaribs especially clearly showed their worst qualities: treachery and mercilessness. The famous traveler Ibn Jubayr said about them: "This is a tribe that does not deserve respect. There is no sin in hurling curses at them." When Aidhab began to develop

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<sup>44</sup>Paul A. Op. cit., pp. 65, 67.

<sup>45</sup>Paul A. Op. cit., p. 68.

as a port, the Hadarib seized the opportunity to control trade and the flow of pilgrims both by sea and on land. Some of them were engaged in pearl fishing, others bred camels and led caravans through the desert and from Qus, others supplied the port with everything necessary at exorbitant prices – water, firewood, milk, in addition, almost all of them provided their ships for transporting pilgrims across the Red Sea to Jeddah. At the same time, they showed absolute inattention to the conditions of transportation and ensuring the safety of ships, asked for huge sums of money for their services, entangled travelers in the desert in order to get even more gold from them, and in the end put them on overcrowded boats that crossed the Red Sea under favorable wind in one day<sup>46</sup>.

Almost all Hadaribs had at least one vessel, called a jallab. The Hadarib often overloaded them, because the main thing was that they had already received payment for the transportation. The usual fees for pilgrims were seven and a half Egyptian dinars, which were paid in Qus before the start of the trip. Many poor pilgrims did not have such means and were tortured by local authorities. The inhabitants of Aidhab, according to al-Maqrizi, were real animals, and those pilgrims who survived all this torment looked like people rescued from the grave. Not surprisingly, the mortality rate among the pilgrims was high; many of them left their bones in cemeteries outside the city. The return journey from Jeddah was even more difficult due to the instability of the winds, which carried the ships south of Aidhab. Ibn Jubayr wrote that “the Beja, and they are from black peoples, live in the mountains. Travelers rent camels from the Beja and set off along waterless paths, and sometimes most of them die of thirst, and the Beja receive what remains of them – money and so on, – the Sudanese who lived in the mountains came down to them from the mountains and provided camels, to lead them through the waterless desert”. Most likely they were the ancestors of modern Besharin living in the fortresses of Jebal Elba and Jebal Asotriba<sup>47</sup>.

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<sup>46</sup> Paul A. Op. cit., pp. 65-66; Ibn Jubayr. Puteshestvie prosveshhennogo pisatelja, dobrodetel'nogo, pronicate'l'nogo Abu-l-Husajna Muhammada ibn Ahmada ibn Dzhubajra al-Kinani al-Andalusi al-Balansi / transl. from Arabic, intro. and comment. by L. A. Semyonova, ed. S. Kh. Kyamilev. [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus7/Jubeir/frames1.htm>

<sup>47</sup> Paul A. Op. cit., P. 66; Ibn Jubayr. Op. cit.



The sultans of Egypt were so interested in taxes that they appointed an official representative to Aidhab, and sometimes organized punitive expeditions when the behavior of the Hadaribs became too outrageous. However, the Sultan was powerless against the Khidirbi – the head of the Hadarib: the Sultan barely managed to get even a third of all the port's revenues, the rest went to the Khidirbi. There were frequent disagreements and conflicts, some of them turning into armed ones. In 1326, Ibn Battuta was prevented from setting sail due to one of these conflicts, which paralyzed traffic in the Red Sea and resulted in a battle with pilgrims from West Africa. The flow of pilgrims began to decline shortly after the defeat of the troops of the Kingdom of Jerusalem at the Battle of Hattin, which undermined the power of the Christian state, as a result of which land routes began to operate again. Only Muslims from Sudan now passed through Aidhab. The gold and emerald mines of the Eastern Desert were exhausted by the middle of the 14th century, and by the end of the century most eastern trade had moved from Aidhab, either further south of the Red Sea to Suakin, where representatives of the Hadarib sought to transfer their trade to avoid taxes from Mamluk Egypt, or further north to the port of Quseir. Aidhab in turn continued to exist until 1426, when the looting of a caravan bound for Mecca prompted a punitive expedition by the Mamluk Sultan of Barsbay. Leo Africanus in his work “Description of Africa and the sights that are in it” speaks of the destruction of Aidhab: the inhabitants who survived the death of the city were killed by competitors from the city of Suakin, a port on the Red Sea, located 450 miles south of Aidhab. This version, however, is questionable, given that these ports, although to some extent competitors, still complemented each other. If the information given by Leo Africanus is correct, then it is clear that not only people from Aidhab suffered at the hands of the Mamluks and the inhabitants of Suakin. Perhaps Leo Africanus was describing the general decline of the hadarib elite in the region. There is also a version that after the fall at the beginning of the 14th century. During the Christian state of Mukurra in northern Sudan, trade routes from the Nile Valley to the Red Sea

shifted south. This happened due to the desire of the Hadarib to get rid of the interference of the Mamluk sultans in their affairs<sup>48</sup>.

### **Coast of Sudan in the period before the 16th century; Suakin Port**

The largest port on the Red Sea coast of Sudan was Suakin. The earliest mentions of it are found in Arab sources of the 10th century: then it was a minor port controlled by the Beja tribes, specializing in the supply of food to the Hijaz (it retained this role throughout its history). By the beginning of the 12th century, Suakin became a stopover for merchants engaged in trade with India, for whom Aidhab was the final destination from where spices were transported to Egypt.

However, Suakin's relations with Egypt politically were more distant, which would hardly be surprising if even Aidhab existed in the form of a kind of Mamluk-Beja condominium. In 1263 the Sultan of Egypt sent a delegation to the rulers of Suakin and Dahlak so that they would stop appropriating the property of dead traders for themselves. Two years later, the Mamluks decided to subjugate Suakin. There is no clear information about these trips. According to a contemporary of Sultan Baybars al-Mansuri, the campaign was led by the governor of Qus (a city in Upper Egypt), “to ensure the arrival of the Karimi traders and protect them from attacks by the ruler of Suakin ‘Alam al-Din Asbakbay”. In the long run, it proved more cost-effective for Egypt to maintain the existing arrangements and ‘Alam al-Din was restored as the city's ruler under the Mamluks<sup>49</sup>.

The desire to protect Indian trade alone was not enough to maintain Egyptian influence over Suakin. The postal service, one of the tasks of which at that time was reconnaissance, organized by the Mamluks in Suakin in the 13th century, was no longer used after a hundred years. By this time, Suakin remained formally under the sultanate

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<sup>48</sup>Leo Africanus. Afrika — tret'ja chast' sveta (Opisanie Afriki i dostoprimechatel'nostej, kotorye v nej est') / transl. from Italian, comment. and article by V.V. Matveev. Leningrad.: “Nauka”, 1983. pp. 313-314.; Paul A. Op. cit., p. 66.; Ibn Jubayr. Op. cit.; Popov V.A. Arabskie istochniki XIII-XIV vv. po jetnografii i istorii Afriki juzhnee Sahary. [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://www.vostlit.info/Texts/rus5/Battuta/frametext21.htm>; O'Fahey R.S., Spaulding J.L. Kingdoms of the Sudan. P. 19-21.

<sup>49</sup>Peacock A.C.S. Suakin: A Northeast African Port in the Ottoman Empire. P. 30-31.

through the sheriffs of Mecca. Sheriffs gained access to power through marriages with Hadaribs Suakin, who claimed descent from the Hadrami Arabs. The Hadarib ruled Suakin as an independent state, not always focusing on their leaders from Mecca and Egypt<sup>50</sup>.

Information about Suakin from the early 14th century was preserved in the memoirs of the Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta, who visited there when Sheriff Zeid ibn Abu Numa was the ruler of the city. Ibn Battuta's description does not contain much detail. He writes: "On the same day we reached the island of Suakin. The island is located about six miles from the mainland. There is no water, no crops, no trees. Water is brought to the island by boat. There are cisterns on the island that collect rainwater. This island is big. On it you can find meat from ostriches, gazelles and wild donkeys. These Arabs have many goats, milk and animal butter. They send part of all this to Mecca. The only grain they have is aljurjur, which is a type of millet with large grains. They also take him to Mecca." Ibn Battuta's remark about the lack of water in the city will be repeated in the future by almost all travelers who visited the city<sup>51</sup>.

In the 14th and 15th centuries, Suakin's role in international trade remains somewhat unclear, but additional taxes levied in Aden by the Rasulids forced Indian traders to extend their route to the Red Sea ports of Jeddah, Dahlak and Suakin – these were among the alternative ports used by them, at least since 1423, the Mamluks wanted spice trade routes to end exclusively in Jeddah, but they failed to achieve this. In the 15th century, several people of Meccan origin engaged in trade with India, using Suakin as their main base. According to sources of the 15th century, Suakin was also an important point for Ethiopian Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem. There were even fewer Muslim pilgrims here than Christian ones at this time; few references to Muslim pilgrims in the city at this time have reached us. Ethiopian pilgrims continued to pass through Suakin well into the 16th century<sup>52</sup>.

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<sup>50</sup>Ibid., P. 31.

<sup>51</sup> Popov V. A. Op. cit.

<sup>52</sup>Peacock A.C.S. Op. cit., pp. 31-32.

By the early 16th century, Suakin was firmly established as a major center of international and regional trade. Portuguese geographer Tomé Pires gives details of Suakin's place in trade routes around 1512. On the one hand, along with Zeila and Berbera, he took part in the supply of food (meat, fish, wheat, rice, barley and durra) to Jeddah; most of these products probably came from Kassala and Gezira. At the same time, Suakin plays an important role in the spice trade. Spices from Southeast Asia were transported to Aden and from there continued their journey along the Red Sea through Kamaran, Dahlak and Suakin to Quseir, from where they were transported overland to the Nile and then to Cairo. Security on this route was low, and some merchants preferred to sail from Suakin to Jeddah and from there overland to Cairo. Suakin also exported African gold and silver to India (via Aden) <sup>53</sup>.

Thus, by the beginning of the 16th century. The history of active use of the Red Sea dates back 3,500 years. Almost all the peoples who had access to it carried out trade contacts with other countries with its help. During the times of Islam, we can talk about the established trading system, when the Red Sea connected the Mediterranean Sea with the Persian Gulf, East Africa, Ceylon, Gujarat, the Malabar Coast, and Malacca. At the end of the XV – beginning XVI centuries its importance also increased as a result of instability in Persia and other interior parts of Asia, which blocked land trade routes and forced traders to seek a route by sea. This had a positive impact on the development of Suakin, the main port at that time in Sudan.

### **1.2. Main reasons for Ottoman interest in the region**

At the beginning of the 16th century, the Red Sea area was almost completely controlled by the Mamluk Sultanate, which was experiencing a deep crisis. The Mamluk Egyptian sultans for a long time occupied a leading position in the Islamic world: it was here that the Abbasid caliphs were located. Egypt acted as a defender of the Muslim world – in the 13th century, its rulers stopped the Mongol invasion, and the final liberation of the Middle East from the Crusaders is associated with them. The Sultan of Egypt led

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid. pp. 32–33.

the hajj, holding the title “Khadim al-Haramain”<sup>\*</sup>. The situation not in favor of Mamluk Egypt began to change at the end of the 15th – beginning of the 16th centuries along with the era of the Great Geographical Discoveries.

The Treaty of Tordesillas concluded by Spain and Portugal in 1494, divided the directions of ocean expansion between them, so that the sea route to India – around Africa through the Cape of Good Hope – was in the sphere of influence of Portugal. She hoped to redirect trade flows from the Far East and India through the Muslim states of the Middle East to Italy and Lisbon.

In 1498 the first Portuguese expedition led by Vasco da Gama<sup>\*</sup> reached India. Once in a new region, the Portuguese were faced with an extensive trading network with many participants and enormous linguistic, cultural, and political diversity. By this time, the Indian Ocean was the central link in the established trading system, which involved East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, India, Indochina, Indonesia, and China.

India found itself in a fragmented state, unable to repel the strong Portuguese fleet that arrived here with the second expedition of Pedro Alvares Cabral in 1500. Portugal started an undeclared war in an attempt to block local trade: the Portuguese captured and burned merchant ships and devastated the coasts of the Indian Ocean. Despite its small numbers and distance from the mother country, the Portuguese fleet found itself in a dominant position thanks to the best technology and overwhelming fire superiority. Since 1500, Portugal sent its squadrons to the Indian Ocean almost every year.

By 1502, the Portuguese had disrupted the region's established trade network by blocking passage to the Red Sea. The Egyptian merchant fleet was also under attack; Europeans destroyed local shipping in order to prevent local merchants from trading spices. By 1504, Egypt experienced a shortage of spices coming from India, and in 1505,

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<sup>\*</sup> Khadim al-Haramain (Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques) is a title used by Muslim rulers, including the Mamluk sultans of Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, and currently the kings of Saudi Arabia. The holder of the title takes responsibility for the protection and maintenance of the two main holy mosques in Islam: the Al-Haram Mosque in Mecca and the Prophet's Mosque in Medina.

<sup>\*</sup> Vasco Da Gama (1469 - 1524) - Portuguese navigator who completed the search for a sea route from Europe to India. He made three trips to India, before the last one he received the post of Viceroy of India. Five of his sons, besides the eldest Don Francisco da Gama, held various high positions in Portugal's Indian Ocean colonies.

as a result of the blockade, goods from the east completely disappeared from the market. To monopolize trade, the Portuguese began to extort “protection fees” from local rulers and redirect trade channels to controlled ports.

The advantage in military technology, especially in the design of ships and naval artillery, helped the Portuguese to create this kind of competition. Their limited forces made it possible to carry out successful operations to capture and hold key points on the coast.

It should be noted that trade in the Indian Ocean was close to the liberal utopia of free trade: government regulation was present only on the periphery, traders moved freely between countries, and low customs tariffs were applied. States did not seek sole control of trade routes. The Islamic legal system created a single legal space in this vast region, despite the participation in trade of representatives of other ethno-confessional groups: Jews, Armenians, Chinese, and some Indian castes <sup>54</sup>.

Portugal's actions in the Indian Ocean could not remain unanswered, so already in 1505, by decree of the Sultan of Egypt Qansuh al-Ghuri (1441–1516), the creation of a fleet began. Venice and the Ottoman Empire, through which trade routes from India passed, were also not interested in changing trade routes and provided assistance in preparing the Egyptian fleet. Egypt received building materials and weapons from its allies, and a little later volunteers from the Ottoman Empire began to arrive to the Mamluks. Among them were famous military leaders, for example, Salman Reis (?–1528). Nevertheless, even with the help of the Ottomans and Venetians, the fleet of Mamluk Egypt could not resist the Portuguese: off the coast of India, it was defeated in 1509 at the Battle of Diu. The second Mamluk naval expedition was interrupted by the complete collapse of the state, annexed to the Ottoman Empire in 1517.

By this time, the Portuguese fleet had already made several expeditions directly to the Red Sea: in 1513, the Mamluks were able to repel their attack on Aden \* and

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<sup>54</sup> Ermolov A.Yu. Liberal'naja utopija, superjetatizm i gibrudnoe gosudarstvo-korporacija: konkurencija mezhdju modeljami v XVI – XVIII vekah v Indijskom okeane // Voprosy teoreticheskoj ekonomiki. 2019. No.1. P. 148

\* Aden is a city in Yemen on the shores of the Arabian Sea, an important port for international trade.

Suakin\*\*, but allowed the capture of Kamaran Island in the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait\*\*\*. In 1517, the Portuguese fleet led by the third governor of Portuguese India, Lopo Soares de Albergaria approached Jeddah itself, but was forced to retreat due to the skillful actions of the Muslim fleet under the command of Salman Reis. Nevertheless, the Portuguese were in no hurry to abandon their interests in the region.

Many Sudanese scholars view the Portuguese threat to Islam's holy cities of Mecca and Medina as the main reason for Ottoman expansion in the Red Sea area (as well as the earlier conquest of Syria and Egypt)<sup>55</sup>. This idea is justified by the weakness of the Mamluk state, which allowed the Portuguese fleet into the Red Sea. In addition, the Arab population of the region was dissatisfied with the rule of the Mamluks<sup>56</sup>. In this regard, the Ottoman conquest could be considered by the population as salvation from the Portuguese invasion, as well as protection of Muslims in Ethiopia. The fears of the Muslim population were heightened by close contacts between the Ethiopian king Lebna Dengel (1496/97–1540) and Portugal: thus, in 1520, an embassy led by Rodrigo da Lima arrived in Ethiopia<sup>57</sup>. From that time on, taking advantage of the confusion in Egypt and Yemen, small Portuguese flotillas began to regularly enter the Red Sea, the main purpose of which was to collect information about the activities of the Ottomans, as well as maintaining contacts with Ethiopia.

It should be noted that Portugal hardly considered the possibility of territorial seizures in the Red Sea area: it did not have sufficient human resources to compete with Muslim states. In addition, such steps would force her to disperse her forces even further, which would undoubtedly lead to a weakening of her position in India and

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\*\* Suakin is a city on the Red Sea coast, located in modern Sudan.

\*\*\* The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is an intercontinental strait between the southwestern tip of the Arabian Peninsula and the northeastern part of Africa, connecting the Red and Arabian Seas.

<sup>55</sup> Qaysr Mūsā Zayn. *Sawākin: dirāsāt fī Ta'rīḥ, al-ḥadārat wa al-tafā'ulāt al-dūwaliyya* ("Suakin: Studies in History, Civilization and International Interaction") Ṣ. 143–144; Sa'īd, 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Ibrāhīm. *Al-ātār al-‘uṭmāniyya fī al-sūdān min al-qarn al-sādis ‘aṣr al-mīlādī ḥatta al-qarn al-tāsi ‘aṣr al-mīlādī (al-ātār nusiyyathu al-ātār)* ("Ottoman monuments in Sudan of the 16th–19th centuries (Monuments that were forgotten that they were monuments)"). Ṣ. 294.

<sup>56</sup> Qaysr Mūsā Zayn. *Op. cit.* Ṣ. 144; Ivanov N.A. *Osmanskoe zavoevanie arabskih stran (1516–1574)*. Moscow: Vostochnaja literatura, 2001. P. 18–20.

<sup>57</sup> Abir M. *Ethiopia and the Red Sea (The rise and decline of the Solomonic dynasty and Muslim-European rivalry in the region)*. P. 88

the Moluccas, the main sources of valuable goods. So, the main goal of Portugal was to prevent merchant ships from entering the Red Sea through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. To this end, the Portuguese fleet coped very successfully until the 1540s. Although some ships managed to break through this blockade, the spice trade in Egypt was significantly reduced, so that prices became extremely high.

In the XVI – XVII centuries the Mughal Empire, which controlled most of India, became the strongest state in the region. The main source of income for the empire was land tax, but its rulers understood the important role of trade and created a favorable regime to protect the rights of merchants. At the same time, the rulers of large states in India did not attach importance to the problem of who was doing the trading and did not protect maritime trade. In turn, smaller states interested in maintaining a free trade regime were too weak when the Portuguese tried to eliminate by force the main competitors in this part of the world. For this purpose, expeditions from the metropolis were sent here annually (their journey took on average almost six months). On average, up to 2,000 Portuguese arrived in Asia per year. Soon they began to create support bases along the entire sea route to India and Southeast Asia. So, at the beginning of the 16th century, the Portuguese captured the island of Socotra, Hormuz, Goa, Daman, Diu, Bombay, Malacca. Nevertheless, the scale of intrusion of the first Europeans was small compared to the development of the existing system<sup>58</sup>.

Sudanese researcher Seyd Ahmad al-‘Iraqi cites as one of the reasons for the Ottoman conquest in the region a change in the balance of power in Europe: European countries entered a phase of rapid technological development, which tipped the scales in their favor and left no room for continued expansion in Europe<sup>59</sup>. It is interesting to note that Sudanese researchers consider the seizure of Egypt, Syria and the Red Sea area within the framework of a single, indivisible policy of the Ottoman Empire.

Probably the main reasons for Ottoman expansion in the Red Sea area lay in the field of economics: the Ottomans sought to maintain a monopoly on trade

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<sup>58</sup> Ermolov A. Yu. Op. cit. pp. 148-149

<sup>59</sup> Qaysr Mūsā Zayn. Op. cit. Ş . 185.



with the east. The Portuguese were once again the rivals of the Ottomans: it was too difficult to resist them at sea, but the capture of Ethiopia and the entire Red Sea coast ensured almost complete security of part of the trade route.

Somewhat later, already in the middle of the 16th century, interest in the interior of Ethiopia could also be fueled by the search for new sources of gold and other precious metals due to the “price revolution” that swept across Europe.

Since trade in the Indian Ocean had a great influence on the development of Habesh Eyalet, we will outline the main trends in the struggle of European powers for influence in the Indian Ocean until the end of the 18th century.

Portuguese colonies continued to appear on the Indian Ocean coast until the end of the 16th century. Finding itself part of Spain for the period from 1580 to 1640, Portugal was unable to withstand the pressure of the new colonial powers: the Netherlands and England. By the middle of the 17th century, it lost almost all its possessions in Asia.

Speaking about the nature, significance and results of the activities of the Portuguese colonialists in this region, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that in Asia they encountered sufficiently strong states that could and did repel the attacks of the Europeans.

Portuguese colonialism was a commercial one: their ships carrying European goods and Indian textiles sailed from Goa to Malacca, where they sold some of the textiles and loaded them with spices. Then they headed to China, where they bought silk and proceeded to Japan, where they exchanged goods for silver. On the way back, they purchased the above-mentioned fabrics, silk, porcelain, and spices for Europe.

At the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th centuries, the leading role in European colonial expansion passed to the Netherlands and England, which brought a system of merchant capitalism: trading companies became the conductor of their colonial policy<sup>60</sup>. Their appearance on the scene coincided with the weakening

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<sup>60</sup>The East India Company is the name of trading societies in European countries of the colonial era. Leading European countries have established their own companies with monopoly rights to trade with the countries of South and Southeast Asia. The Dutch East India Company operated from 1602 to 1798, the English East India Company was established in 1600 by decree of Elizabeth I and was dissolved in 1874.

of Portugal, which was under Spanish rule. The main goal of the new players, however, remains the same - to monopolize trade to obtain maximum profits. The main target of the English and Dutch East India Companies was the Moluccas; It was here that the fiercest struggle between the European colonial powers took place.

In the second half of the 17th – first half of the 18th century, the Dutch East India Company gained a foothold in the Malay Archipelago, the Malabar Coast, Bengal, Ceylon, Arguin, Gura, Elmina, Sierra Leone, Mauritius, and the Cape of Good Hope. In the middle of 17th century, the Netherlands had 70 times more ships in the Indian Ocean than England. Having such an advantage in the early 20s. in the 17th century, the Dutch drove all their rivals out of the Moluccas, leaving them in control of the source of spices. In turn, the British focused their attention on India, where the rapid growth of trading posts began (Surat, Masulipatam, Madras, Pulicat). The situation began to change in the second half of the 17th century, when the Netherlands gradually lost their hegemony, losing to England in a series of wars<sup>61</sup>.

From the second half of the 17th century, France, where the era of civil wars ended, became involved in the struggle for colonies. India should also be included among the main areas of conflict between England and France: during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748), the French captured Madras, the center of English possessions in India, becoming the most powerful player in South India. However, in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), England inflicted a heavy defeat on France, so that it, in particular, renounced its possessions in India and promised not to build fortifications in the 5 returned cities. England's victory paved the way for her to establish dominance throughout India <sup>62</sup>.

The only state in the western Indian Ocean that offered sustained resistance to European powers on the high seas in the 17th - 18th centuries, became Oman. Almost throughout the 16th century, Muscat, Suhar and Hormuz were ruled by the Portuguese. Organized fighting against them began at the end of the century, when the Omanis

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<sup>61</sup>Istorija Vostoka: In 6 volumes / ed. L. B. Alaev, K. Z. Ashrafyan, N. I. Ivanov. Moscow: "Vostochnaja literatura" RAS, 2000. T. 3. P. 55

<sup>62</sup>Ibid. pp. 56-57

recaptured Sohar. With the rise of the Ya‘rubid Imamate in 1625, the Omanis set about retaking the coast. A quarter of a century later, a weakened Portugal lost Muscat, but Oman continued its fight against the Portuguese in India and East Africa. With a powerful naval force, he managed to create an empire spanning the territories of modern Oman, the United Arab Emirates, southern Balochistan, Zanzibar, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique<sup>63</sup>.

### 1.3. The failed campaign of Selim I

Some Western historians have previously put forward the theory that right after the conquest of Egypt, Sultan Selim I (1465–1520) continued his expansion in the region and led his army south: he invaded Lower Nubia, as well as the Beja tribal area between Suakin and Massawa. G. A. MacMichael, O. Crawford and A. Arkell linked the establishment of Ottoman control in these territories with Selim I. The English orientalist P. Holt examined in detail and substantiated the impossibility of such a development of events<sup>64</sup>.

Selim I was the first to “continue” the campaign south Lebanese historian Na‘um Šuqayr, author of “*Ta’rīḥ al- sūdān al-qadīm wa al ḥadīt wa ḡuḡrāfiyatuhu*”. It contains four passages relevant to this issue. Two of them only briefly present information that is given later in more detail. These passages can be ignored, but the two longer ones require translation.

Excerpt about Nubia:

“And they said concerning the entry of the Turkish troops into Nubia, that the Jawabira had gained power over the Gharbiyya, and these sent messengers to Sultan Selim. In the year 1520, he sent with them an expedition of Bosniak troops under the command of Hasan Qusi (قوسي), and they expelled the Jawabira to Dongola, so that

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<sup>63</sup> Payne L. *More i civilizacija. Mirovaja istorija v svete razvitija morehodstva* / transl. from English I.V. Maygurova . Moscow: AST, 2017. P. 520

<sup>64</sup>MacMichael H. A. *A history of the Arabs in the Sudan*, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge university press, 1922. P. 189.; Arkell AJ *A History of the Sudan to AD 1821*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974., P. 204.; Holt P.M *Sultan Selim I and the Sudan*. P. 19.

only a few of them remained in Halfa and al-Dirr. They repaired the ancient fortresses in Aswan, Ibrim and Say, and dwelt in them...

And Qusi Hasan was commandant of the troops and independent governor of Nubia... And Hasan Qusi died, and his offspring were appointed to the government of Nubia after him. They made their capital at al-Dirr, and were known as the Ghuzz Kashifs (الغزّ).

Then [they said] that the Funj, after subduing Upper Nubia in 1505 A.D., coveted Lower Nubia, and conquered it up to the Third Cataract, and wanted to advance northwards. It was said, 'And the governor from the Ghuzz at that time was Ibn Janbalan. When he heard of the advance of the Funj army to his country, he prepared a numerous army, and awaited them on the frontier, near to Hannak. The two armies met, and a great battle took place, in which the Ghuzz army won a great victory. They repulsed the Funj army with losses, after filling the earth with their slain.' It was said, 'And the blood collected in a pool there, and the place was called the Basin of Blood (Hawd al-Dam). They built a dome over it, and made it a boundary between themselves and the Funj.' This story is wellknown generally among the people of Dongola and al-Mahas".<sup>65</sup>

This passage contains two stories whose dates are somewhat distorted. The first story about Hasan "Qusi" comes from the account of Johann Ludwig Burckhardt, who visited Lower Nubia in 1813, although N. Šuqayr does not provide a reference to his work. The Nubian oral tradition cited by Burckhardt was translated into Arabic by N. Šuqayr with minor changes. Burckhardt himself does not give an exact dating of the event, he only indicates that it occurred during the reign of Sultan Selim. The traveler does not in any way connect this incident with Selim's conquest of Egypt, saying that the Gharbia "sent an embassy to Constantinople". Additionally, Burckhardt calls the commander of the Bosnian warriors "Hassan Coosy"<sup>66</sup>, whose name when transliterated would have been (غزي), meaning "Mamluk" or "Turk". Šuqayr, in his turn, translated his name as (قوسي).

<sup>65</sup> Šuqayr, Na'um. Ta'rīḥ al- sūdān al-qadīm wa al ḥadīṭ wa ḡuḡrāfiyatuhu. Ṣ. 143.

<sup>66</sup>Burckhardt J.L Travels in Nubia. London, 1819. pp. 133-134; Holt P. M. Sultan Selim I and the Sudan. P. 20.

The second story was probably first recorded by N. Šuqayr himself. Most likely, it talks about the battle with the Mamluks, who had already been conquered by the Ottomans. According to P. Holt, the story cited by Šuqayr was intended to explain the toponym while preserving the legend of the border battle, and the introduction of the date 1505 does not mean that the battle in the Hannaq region took place in that year or even shortly after it<sup>67</sup>.

The story tells of a supposed connection between Selim and the Red Sea coast. N. Šuqayr gives these events in the chapter on the Sultanate of Sennar during the reign of ‘Amara Duncas (?–1533/34), the first ruler of the Funj Sultanate.

“It was said that in his days [the reign of ‘Amara Duncas] Sultan Selim advanced to Suakin and Massawa and took possession of them both. He entered Ethiopia [al-Habash], aiming to march towards Sennar. Selim wrote to his ruler, urging him to submit. He answered him [Selim] as follows: “I do not know what prompted you to fight me and seize my country. If this is connected with supporting Islam, then I and the population of my kingdom are Muslim Arabs. We profess the religion of the messenger of God. If this is for some material purpose, then know that most of the people in my kingdom are desert Arabs, they migrated to this country in search of their daily bread. They do not have anything from which you can collect annual tribute”. Along with the letter, he [‘Amara Duncas] sent him a book of genealogy of the Arab tribes living in his kingdom, which was collected for him by Imam al-Samarkandi, one of the ulema Sennar. When these messages reached Sultan Selim, he was amazed at what they [contained] and abandoned the war with Sennar. It was said that he took the genealogy book with him to Istanbul, and it remains in his book depository to this day”<sup>68</sup>.

The story of the capture of Suakin and Massawa by Selim I and his subsequent invasion of Ethiopia, as well as the planned campaign of conquest against the Sultanate of Sennar, is entirely legendary. However, some Sudanese researchers until recently continue to adhere to this version of the entry of some territories of modern Sudan

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<sup>67</sup>Holt P.M. *Sultan Selim I and the Sudan*. P. 22.

<sup>68</sup>Šuqayr, Na'um. *Op. cit.* § . 100-101.

into the Ottoman Empire <sup>69</sup>. It should be noted the existence of a similar legend, where the place of the ruler of Sennar was occupied by the head of the union of Arab tribes, al-‘Abdallab, who controlled the area of the confluence of the White and Blue Nile, acting as governor in the northern part of the Funj Sultanate. Initially, this story probably arose among the al-‘Abdallab, who, unlike the Funj, were actually of Arab origin. The story containing the variant with the governor al-‘Abdallab, unfortunately, was recorded late and confusingly. It was published only once in English translation<sup>70</sup>.

Thus, there are three different stories connecting Sultan Selim I with Sudan. They all come from Sudanese tribal traditions that were only recorded in the 19th century. It should be noted that these stories are completely fictitious: a detailed account of the actions of Selim I in Egypt, recorded by the Arab historian Ibn Iyas (1448–1524), completely excludes the possibility of the Sultan’s campaign against Suakin and Massawa or in Lower Nubia; even a link to the time of Selim’s reign is impossible: the Ottomans’ annexation of these territories occurred later (this process is discussed in more detail in Chapter II ) during the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1494–1566), and even plans for a possible conquest also appear after the death of Selim I (more on this in the next subsection of the chapter). However, the legends cited by N. Šuqayr can be associated with some events that occurred during the establishment of the Ottoman Empire in Sudan. The appearance of Ottoman garrisons in Aswan, Ibrim and Say is associated with the Ottoman campaigns in the period 1555–1570. Hasan “Qusi”, founder of the Kashif dynasty of Nubia, may have been one of the participants in this campaign, but his name is not given by sources other than J.L. Burckhardt. Attributing the achievements of his heir to Selim could serve as a purpose of increasing his authority: Selim was already very popular among the people, in addition, he was the only ruler of the Ottoman Empire until the 19th century who personally visited Egypt<sup>71</sup>.

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<sup>69</sup> Qaysr Mūsā Zayn. Sawākin: dirāsāt fī Ta’rīḥ, al- ḥadārat wa al-tafā‘ulāt al-dūwaliyya ("Suakin: studies By history , civilization And international interaction"). Š. 314.

<sup>70</sup>Penn E.A.D. Traditional stories of the Abdullab tribe // Sudan Notes and Records. No. 1. 1934. Vol. 17. P. 66; Holt, P. M. Sultan Selim I and the Sudan. P. 21.

<sup>71</sup>Holt P.M. Sultan Selim I and the Sudan. P. 22.

The second story, related by N. Šuqayr, related to Ibn Janbala and the Battle of Hannaq, probably dates back to a relatively late stage in Ottoman-Nubian relations. Ibn Janbala may have been Suleiman Bey; the firman about his appointment as governor of Upper Egypt is dated March 1576. According to the text of this firman, Suleiman was tasked with establishing direct control of the Ottoman administration in Upper Egypt, ending the dominance of the Bani Umar in this area. Thus, N. Šuqayr's story of the battle of Hannaq may be a memory of this attempt to establish the Ottoman Empire.

The account of correspondence between the ruler of the Sultanate of Sennar (or the leader of the tribal union al-‘Abdallab) and Selim may well reflect actual contacts between the Funj and the Ottoman governor in Suakin, but the timing of this correspondence remains unknown.

Thus, the connection between Sultan Selim I and the events described is not traced; it is excluded by the chronicle of Ibn Iyas. The annexation of the Red Sea coast and the Ottoman advance into Lower Nubia occurs during the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent, and the legend of a border battle may go back even further <sup>72</sup>.

#### **1.4. Salman Reis and his role in establishing the dominance of the Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea area**

The Ottoman Empire immediately laid claim to all the lands that were part of Mamluk Egypt. A message intended to report the Ottoman conquest of Egypt to the Caucasian ruler, the Shirvanshah, indicates that the Red Sea coast of Sudan was among those territories claimed by Selim I.

“The entire territory of the Hejaz and the two holy cities, as well as Suakin and Jizan, Calicut, Yemen, the lands of Egypt to the borders with Ethiopia, Zanzibar and the far west were annexed to the land of Syria (i.e. Ottoman territory) and came into the possession of the servants of the Almighty (i.e. the Ottomans)”<sup>73</sup>.

In 1524, the Grand Vizier of Süleyman the Magnificent, Ibrahim Pasha (1493–1536), personally arrived in Egypt to restore order. He needed people who could take part

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<sup>72</sup>Ibid. P. 23.

<sup>73</sup>Peacock A.C.S. Suakin: A Northeast African Port in the Ottoman Empire. P. 32–33.

in developing a strategy in the Red Sea area, because this region was little known to the Ottoman Empire. In this situation, Ibrahim Pasha turned to the experienced naval commander Salman Reis, who had previously served with the Mamluk sultans, and invited him to go to Jeddah to inspect the Mamluk fleet left there<sup>74</sup>. The result of the inspection was the report “On the Red Sea and the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean,” written in 1525.

Sources do not reveal details about the early life of Salman Reis. It is known that his homeland was the island of Lesbos, and he may have had Greek roots<sup>75</sup>. Some researchers believe that he took part in an expedition against the Portuguese in 1507–1509<sup>76</sup>. It has been established that in 1515 Salman Reis became one of the commanders of the last naval expedition of Mamluk Egypt. On September 30, a fleet of 19 ships left Suez, heading for India to drive the Portuguese out of there<sup>77</sup>. The plans for this expedition were spoiled by the Tahirid Sultan Amir II ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (reigned: 1489–1517). In violation of his vassal obligations, he refused to provide men, food and bases. These circumstances forced the campaign to be postponed: for eight months the Mamluk fleet was engaged in the construction of a naval base on the island of Kamaran, and then a campaign against Amir II was organized. The local sultan managed to hold Aden, and the Mamluk expedition was evacuated to Jeddah after receiving news of the outbreak of hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt. Salman Reis was one of those who repelled an attack on Jeddah by a Portuguese fleet led by the third governor of Portuguese India, Lopo Soares de Albergaria in April 1517<sup>78</sup>. After Selim I captured Egypt, Salman Reis arrived in Cairo, but was arrested there and deported to Istanbul. The sources do not indicate the reasons for this conclusion. It can be assumed that it was associated with the service of a naval commander with the former enemies of the Ottoman Empire

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<sup>74</sup>Casale G. *The Ottoman Age of Exploration*, New York: Oxford University Press. P. 39.

<sup>75</sup>Soucek S. *Five Famous Ottoman Turks of the Sixteenth Century // The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 2012. No. 40. P. 326.

<sup>76</sup>Brummett P. *Ottoman Seapower and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age of Discovery*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. P. 115.

<sup>77</sup>İnalçık H. *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. P. 321.

<sup>78</sup>Ivanov N. A. *Op. cit.* pp. 98–99.



– the Mamluks<sup>79</sup>. Salman Reis was probably released only after the death of Selim I and went as a mercenary to Yemen. By the time Ibrahim Pasha arrived in Egypt, Salman Reis had returned to Cairo, but he was still in disgrace<sup>80</sup>.

In the report, Salman Reis describes a number of coastal areas of the Indian Ocean: the eastern coast of Africa, Yemen, India, and the Malay Archipelago. He conducts a detailed analysis of the economic situation of the regions, and also assesses the possibility of their conquest by the Ottoman Empire.

The report begins with a list of ships, guns and men available in Jeddah for active operations. Salman Reis comes to the conclusion that the unpreparedness of the Ottoman fleet in the Red Sea makes the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina defenseless, as well as Egypt against possible attacks by the Portuguese: “It has been because of the fear that these ships and guns might have been sent that [the Portuguese] have not entered the sea of Tawr (Gulf of Suez). But if they hear that these ships are not operational and lack crews they will inevitably come with a big armada for, apart from these ships, there is nothing to deter these accursed Portuguese.”<sup>81</sup>

Further in his report, Salman Reis names and briefly describes the fortresses controlled by the Portuguese in the region. He concludes that they can be effectively countered: “It is said that the accursed Portuguese hold the aforementioned ports with [only] two thousand men. Therefore, when our ships are ready, and, God willing, move against them, their total destruction will be inevitable, for one fortress is unable to support another and they are not able to put up united opposition.”<sup>82</sup>

In the last part of the report, the naval commander sets out some proposals for the implementation of conquests, and also gives them economic and military justification. Thus, Salman Reis calls Yemen and Aden the key to the Indian market: “At the moment the Yemen has no lord – an empty province. It deserves to be a fine

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<sup>79</sup>Soucek S. Op. cit. P. 327

<sup>80</sup>Casale G. The Ottoman Age of Exploration. P. 39

<sup>81</sup>Reis S. A Turkish report on the Red Sea and the Portuguese in the Indian ocean (1525) // Özbaran S. The Ottoman Response to European Expansion: Studies on Ottoman Portuguese Relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration in the Arab Lands during the Sixteenth Century. Istanbul: ISIS, 1994. pp. 100-102.

<sup>82</sup>Reis S. Op. cit. P. 103.

sanjak. It would be easy and possible to conquer. Should it be conquered it would be possible to master the lands of India (Vilâyet-i Hindustan) and send every year a great amount of gold and jewels to Istanbul (Devlet-I Asitâne). Yemen also produces madder toot (*kızıl boya*) which is also grown in India and is a great source of revenue from tax-farming... It is said that not even in India does there exist a similar harbour [Aden]. The revenue of the port alone is every year about two hundred thousand sultanis (*sikke-I sultâniye*) but they governor (*bey*), is a certain ‘Abd al-Malik who is very unjust. It is impossible to describe how much injustice and oppression he practices upon the Muslims. Therefore it is more important first to remove the evil of him from the Muslims than that of the accursed Portuguese. He continuously does harm to the Muslims and accumulates great quantities of merchandize and treasure. They say that he is so unjust that it is a duty that he be killed (according to the shari’ah)”<sup>83</sup>

Another goal of the conquest, according to Salman Reis, should be Suakin, the largest port at that time, located on the Red Sea coast of modern Sudan. Control of Suakin would allow the Ottoman Empire to increase tax revenues, since many merchants from India preferred to unload there due to the large fees in Ottoman-controlled Jeddah: “Opposite to the port of Jedda, on the side of Red Sea, and two hundred and fifty miles away from the land of Egypt, stands another port known as Suakin (al-Sawakin). Merchants who come from India often land at this port, fleeing from the excessive injustice at the port of Jedda. There, too, come to each ship naked Arabs to collect at the proper time the tithe (*‘ushr*) by one from the aforesaid ships. They share out the amount and then disperse again. It is related that the Sharif Barakat (of Mecca) also takes his share, and nothing goes into the treasury of the Sultan. If at the proper time a ship with fifty musketeers on board arrived from the port of Jedda, this time [it] might be seized for the State”<sup>84</sup>

In addition, through Suakin, according to the report, horses were supplied from Egypt to the “infidels” in Ethiopia, which caused discontent among the potential

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<sup>83</sup>Reis S. Op. cit. pp. 103–104.

<sup>84</sup>Reis S. Op. cit. pp. 104, 108.

allies of the Ottoman Empire in Africa, the Muslim rulers of Zeila\*: “To the port of Suakin mentioned above come every year one thousand Arab horses from the land of Sa’id (Upper Egypt) and they are sold to the Infidels in the province of Abyssinia. It is related that the Muslims of the aforesaid Zaila’ send letters to the tribesfolk (*A’rab*) of Suakin asking ‘why are you selling horses to the Infidels in your country? Though these horses they become powerful and fight against us. Are you, too, not Muslim?’ But they do not take any notice of that.”<sup>85</sup>

To ensure the safety of navigation in the Red Sea, Salman Reis also recommended capturing the port of Dahlak: “To the aforesaid port came an envoy with twenty Infidels from accursed Portugal to construct a fortress. The aforesaid Infidels are still kept there as prisoners. However if the accursed Portuguese were to build a fortress at the aforesaid port (of Dahlak), they would be able to control the sea as far the port of Tawr.”<sup>86</sup>

In the final part of the report, Salman Reis proposes to subjugate the Funj Sultanate (this is the first mention of the sultanate in Ottoman documents) and Ethiopia; he believes that with a small military outlay it is possible to gain control over territories rich in mineral resources, as well as various exotic goods: “On the edge of the Nile below the mountains that rise the other side of Suakin there is a province to reach which is three months’ journey, ruled by a black slave called ‘Ammārah. The tribes of these lands are so weak that they give every year nine thousand camels to the Infidels of Abyssinia... The amount of merchandize (which pours into these lands) from the province of Abyssinia and from other provinces, the names of which are unknown, also is limitless. Most of this merchandize consists of gold, musk and ivory. The capital of the province of Abyssinia is in fact called Bab al-Muluk, the Infidels of which are barefooted weak footmen with wooden bows and shields made of elephant-hide These people are dominant in that country for there is no one to put up resistance against them. God knows that not

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\* *Zeila* is a port in the territory of modern Somalia, located in the western part of the Gulf of Aden near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

<sup>85</sup> Reis S. Op. cit. P. 108.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. P. 108.

only is it easy to take the town called Tabārah with a thousand men since they could come from their province three months away but also all the country of Abyssinia”<sup>87</sup>.

Thus, Salman Reis developed a strategy for the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea area: to establish control over the region, it was necessary to capture all the main ports, which would bring significant income from trade with India. He understood all the consequences of Portuguese dominance in the Indian Ocean: “Now the spices go to Portugal. Formerly, before the Portuguese captured those ports from our hands, there used to be a great deal of revenue from spices in Egypt and a great deal of goods available”<sup>88</sup>. The peculiarities of the report include the fact that Salman Reis gave economic justification for his proposed goals of conquest.

The Ottoman authorities carefully studied the report of Salman Reis. All of his recommendations in one form or another were implemented by the authorities of the Ottoman Empire in the following years or decades. One could say that the report became a kind of program for Ottoman expansion in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. He suggested to Ibrahim Pasha the first concrete steps towards establishing a real presence of the empire in the region<sup>89</sup>.

### **1.5. The emergence of the Ottoman Empire on the coast of Sudan**

Shortly after receiving Salman Reis's report in 1525, Ibrahim Pasha ordered the restoration of the Mamluk fleet in Jeddah for a military expedition to Yemen. Other proposals by Salman Reis, such as the capture of Suakin, were also quickly implemented: Suakin was probably subjugated to the Ottoman Empire by 1528, as its revenues are included in the 1527–1528 Egyptian financial account<sup>90</sup>. However, the sources do not describe exactly how Suakin became part of the empire.

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<sup>87</sup>Ibid. pp. 108-109.

<sup>88</sup>Ibid. P. 103.

<sup>89</sup>Satarov A.A. Rol' Salmana Reisa v zavoevanijah Osmanskoj imperii v Krasnomorskom bassejne. P. 197.

<sup>90</sup>Peacock A.C.S. Suakin: A Northeast African Port in the Ottoman Empire. P. 33; Casale G. The Ottoman Age of Exploration. P. 41

However, the Sudanese researcher of the first half of the 20th century, Muhammad Salih Dirar, dates the appearance of the Ottomans in Suakin a little later, 1530–1531, connecting it with the expedition of Sinan Pasha in the Red Sea against the Portuguese. During this expedition, the Ottomans captured a number of ports in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, including Suakin, Massawa and Zeila. Dirar, unfortunately, does not provide links to his sources when describing these events<sup>91</sup>.

The sources also did not preserve information about the early period of Ottoman rule in Suakin: most likely, the central authorities of the empire gave significant autonomy to the local elite – the Hadarib<sup>92</sup>. Administratively, the new territories were to belong to Egypt; Sudanese author Anam al-Kabbashi reports that the sanjak of Suakin was created here in 1553 (which specific territories were part of this administrative entity remains unknown). A certain ‘Abd al-Baki Bey became the first representative of the central government appointed to the city. The amount of his salary was equal to the salary of the governor in Jeddah; he served as the local commander of the Ottoman forces and also exercised administrative control over the sanjak<sup>93</sup>.

### **1.6. War of Adal Sultanate\* with Ethiopia**

One of the main opponents of the Ottoman Empire in the region was Ethiopia. At first there was no direct clash with it: the Ottoman Empire supported its ally, Adal Sultanate, which occupied a strategic position at the entrance to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. In 1526, Imam Ahmad Gran (1506–1543), who was the de facto ruler of Adal Sultanate, made his first campaign against Christian Ethiopia, invading the province of Dawaro: it did not bring complete success, the Muslims suffered heavy losses, but the campaign

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<sup>91</sup> Dirār Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ. Ta’rīḥ Sawākin wa al-baḥr al-’aḥmar ("History of Suakin and the Red Sea"). Ṣ. 52

<sup>92</sup> Peacock A.C.S. Suakin: A Northeast African Port in the Ottoman Empire. P. 33.

<sup>93</sup> Qayṣr Mūsā Zayn. Sawākin: dirāsāt fī Ta’rīḥ, al-ḥadārat wa al-tafā’ulāt al-dūwaliyya. Ṣ. 314; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, KK. Ruus, no. 211, sh.78 // Al-Sūdān fī al-’ahd al-’uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā’iq al-’aršif al-’uṭmāni. Ṣ. 77

\* *Adal Sultanate* is a Muslim state in East Africa in the Horn of Africa during the period of the 15th–16th centuries.

resulted in rich spoils<sup>94</sup>. After this, Imam Ahmad for some time switched to trying to integrate the Somali tribes into the sultanate and preparing the army for a new war.

The core of the army consisted of Arabs, as well as Afar and Somali warriors. Unlike the army of the Ethiopian king Lebna Dengel, Ahmad Gran's army was disciplined, although less numerous. She was also armed with a firearm<sup>95</sup>.

In 1527–28, the Sultanate carried out regular raids into the territory of provinces of Ethiopia such as Fatagar, Dawaro and Ifat; the raids did not meet with organized resistance. On March 9, 1529, Imam Ahmad defeated a large Ethiopian army at the Battle of Shimbra Kure: the victory was difficult for the Muslim army, and Imam Ahmad then returned to his territory. However, before the end of the year he began a new campaign against Ethiopia, while Lebna Dengel could not raise a new army to repel the Muslim invasion<sup>96</sup>. Ahmad Gran successively captured the provinces of Dawaro and Tigre (in 1531), Amhara (1533); dozens of cities, including Aksum, came under Muslim control. Many local residents were converted to Islam. By the beginning of 1540, Muslims occupied all of southern and central Ethiopia, as well as some areas in the north of the country. Remains of Lebna's army Dengel barely held the small mountainous regions of the country, and the king himself with a small detachment took refuge in “desert places and the Tigray mountains.” On September 2, 1540 Lebna Dengel died in the north of the country near the Debre Damo monastery<sup>97</sup>.

Ethiopian sources attribute Ahmad Gran's successes in the war to military and material assistance provided by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans probably closely followed developments in Ethiopia through the administration in Zabid (Yemen), but Ottoman sources do not contain information about assistance to the Adal Sultanate. Nevertheless, connections between Adal and the Ottoman Empire did exist. For example, in 1538, Ahmad Gran sent Ethiopian prisoners to Zabid, among them was the future king

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<sup>94</sup> Faroqhi S.N., Fleet K. *The Cambridge History of Turkey: In 4 vols.* New York: Cambridge University press. 2013. Vol. 2. *The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453–1603.* P. 169.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.* P. 169; Ivanov N. A. *Op. cit.* pp. 143–144.

<sup>96</sup> Faroqhi S. N., Fleet K. *The Cambridge History of Turkey: In 4 vols.* New York: Cambridge University press. 2013. Vol. 2. *The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453–1603.* P. 172–173; Turaev B.A. *Abissinskie hroniki XIV – XVI vv.* P. 123.

<sup>97</sup> Ivanov N.A. *Op. cit.* P. 144.

of Ethiopia, Menas (?–1563). The Ottoman Empire recognized Ahmad Gran as the ruler of Ethiopia, as confirmed by a surviving document from 1541/42. In it, Ahmad Gran is called Sultan Ahmad, the ruler of Ethiopia: the Caliph personally bestowed upon him the title of Sultan<sup>98</sup>.

However, 5 years before his death, King Lebna Dengel sent João Bermúdes, whom he appointed Patriarch of Ethiopia, to Europe for help. Bermúdes had been in Ethiopia since the embassy of Dom Rodrigo arrived in Ethiopia in 1520. Bermúdes, according to his own statements, was received by the Pope Pavel III (1468–1549), who also appointed him Patriarch of Alexandria, Bermúdes was then received by King João III of Portugal (1502–1557). Bermúdes got him to organize an expedition to the Red Sea to help Ethiopia: the victories of Ahmad Gran forced the Portuguese king to take more decisive action<sup>99</sup>.

Succeeded to the throne of Lebna Dengel his son Claudius (Galawdevos, 1521/22–1559). He managed to prevent the final collapse of the army and regain the trust of the population. On December 7, 1540, the new king won his first victory, and soon the Portuguese came to his aid<sup>100</sup>.

After two years of preparation, in 1541, the Portuguese fleet began a major operation in the Red Sea area - its famous campaign, recorded by pilot Joao de Castro. The main goal of this expedition was the complete destruction of the Ottoman Red Sea fleet in Suez. On December 31, 1540, a Portuguese fleet of more than 70 ships (research gives different data: 72<sup>101</sup>, 80<sup>102</sup> or 84<sup>103</sup> ships) under the command of the Viceroy of India,

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<sup>98</sup> Faroqhi S. N., Fleet K. *The Cambridge History of Turkey: In 4 vols.* New York: Cambridge University press. 2013. Vol. 2. *The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453–1603.* P. 176; Orhonlu Ç. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Güney Siyaseti Habeş Eyaleti.* S. 23–28.

<sup>99</sup> Sanceau E. *The Land of Prester John (A Chronicle of Portuguese Exploration).* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944. P. 108–109.

<sup>100</sup> Satarov A.A. *Ekspansija Osmanskoj imperii v Krasnomorskom bassejne v XVI v.* P. 33

<sup>101</sup> Whiteway R.S. *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India 1497–1550.* Westminster: Archbald Constable & Co. P. 271.

<sup>102</sup> Kerr R., Edin F.A.S. *General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels.* Edinburgh: William Blackwood, London: T. Cadell, 1824. Vol. 6. P. 289, Kennedy Cooke B. *The Red Sea coast in 1540// Sudan Notes and Records.* 1933. Vol. 16. No. 2. P. 151.

<sup>103</sup> Faroqhi S. N., Fleet K. *The Cambridge History of Turkey.* Vol. 2. *The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453–1603.* P. 180.

Don Estêvão da Gama, left Goa. On February 12, 1541, the Portuguese fleet appeared in the Massawa roadstead<sup>104</sup>. The city found itself subjugated to Muslims affiliated with the Adal Sultanate; residents refused to provide pilots to Suez, citing their absence, and to pay tribute, despite Portuguese threats to destroy the city. Nevertheless, the Muslims provided the fleet with pilots who knew the route to Suakin. It was decided to leave the large ships in the Massawa roadstead: sailing in the Red Sea, unfamiliar to the Portuguese, on large ships was dangerous<sup>105</sup>. Estêvão da Gama appointed his uncle Manuel da Gama to command<sup>106</sup> this detachment. During his command of the detachment, he experienced an incident when a detachment of Portuguese sailors (80–100 people) deserted, hoping to find a better life in Ethiopia. All but one of the deserters died on the shore after being ambushed by Muslims. Manuel da Gama organized a punitive campaign, which, however, did not bring results<sup>107</sup>.

The expedition reached Suakin on March 1<sup>108</sup>. On March 8, after unsuccessful attempts to take pilots to continue sailing inside the Red Sea, troops were landed in Suakin (this is evidenced by the records of another participant in the campaign, Manuel da Lima). There was only a small garrison in the city: 40 or 50 Turks (these Turks were not necessarily representatives of the Ottoman Empire; Christians at this time could call any Muslim a Turk). The garrison and townspeople abandoned the city, leaving it to be plundered by the Portuguese, who completed the robbery by setting fire to the buildings and ships in the harbor. At the same time, Hadrami chronicles\* indicate that the population of Suakin concluded a peace treaty with the Portuguese<sup>109</sup>. De Castro left a description of the port (see Appendix 2), which he called “one of the richest cities of the East”: the future Viceroy of Portuguese India noted Suakin's trade links with Southeast Asia,

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<sup>104</sup>Kerr R., Edin F.A.S. General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels. Vol. 6. P. 304.

<sup>105</sup> Sanceau E. Op. cit. P. 110.

<sup>106</sup>Whiteway R. S. The Portuguese expedition to Abyssinia in 1541-1543 as narrated by Castanhoso . London, 1902. P. 138.

<sup>107</sup> Sanceau E. Op. cit. P. 112-116.

<sup>108</sup> Kerr R., Edin F.A.S. General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels. Vol. 6. P. 315.

\* The Hadrami are an ethnic group inhabiting the Hadhramaut region of Yemen.

<sup>109</sup> Peacock A.C.S. The Ottomans and the Funj sultanate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, P. 92; Ivanov N. A. Op. cit., P. 145.



India and Egypt, which are confirmed by archaeological finds. De Castro compared the port's shipping activity to that of Lisbon, which is probably an exaggeration<sup>110</sup>.

The next day, March 9, the fleet left Suakin. Having no pilots, he moved north between the shoals and reefs with great difficulty. After 2 weeks, it was decided to continue sailing with only 16 small rowing ships; all the rest were sent to Massawa<sup>111</sup>. Coastal cities encountered along the path of the small flotilla were attacked: for example, on April 15–17, al-Quseir was sacked, and on April 22, the port of at-Tur, located on the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Finally, on April 26, the Portuguese fleet approached Suez, but the Ottomans managed to withdraw their ships under the protection of coastal batteries. In such a situation, the Portuguese did not dare to attack the port and on April 28 they took the opposite course<sup>112</sup>.

On 22 May, Estêvão da Gama returned to Massawa. Here, at the request of Ethiopia, a decision was made to land a small detachment of volunteers consisting of 400 people, whose commander was appointed the younger brother of the governor, Christopher da Gama. The landing force was well equipped; it was equipped with 9 artillery pieces. On July 7 he was landed, and the next day the Portuguese fleet headed for Aden. On July 9, Christopher da Gama's detachment headed for Debaroa. He avoided encounters with the enemy, moving forward and not paying attention to the persecution of Ahmad Gran and the demands of the Muslims to leave Africa. By the beginning of winter, the Portuguese detachment took refuge in a remote mountainous area. In mid-December 1541, he continued his journey and on April 4, 1542, reached Anasa, where he united with the troops of the king of Ethiopia. Claudius himself with the main forces had not yet approached, but Christopher da Gama decided to attack

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<sup>110</sup>Mallinson M. *Ottoman Suakin 1541–1865: Lost and Found // The Frontiers of the Ottoman World* / edited by ACS Peacock. Oxford: Oxford University, 2009, pp. 486-490; Kennedy Cooke B. *Op. cit.* pp. 152-154.

<sup>111</sup>Kerr R., Edin F.A.S. *General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels*. Vol. 6. pp. 317–320.

<sup>112</sup>Kerr R., Edin F.A.S. *General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels*. Vol. 6. pp. 320, 332–333, 339–340, 345; *The Cambridge History of Turkey (The Ottoman Empire as a World Power, 1453–1603)*, Vol. 2. P. 180.

the Muslims without waiting for him. The first battle ended in a draw, but in the second the Portuguese inflicted a serious defeat on the Afro-Somali forces<sup>113</sup>.

Ahmad Gran was extremely worried about the defeat by the Portuguese and turned to the Ottoman administration in Zabid for help. The Yemeni beylerbey allocated him 900 Janissaries and 2000 Arab horsemen. Until reinforcements arrived, Ahmad Gran refused to take decisive action. However, after this, without waiting for the end of the rainy season, the ruler of Sultanate Adal attacked the Christian camp in Anas on August 28, 1542. Unable to withstand the onslaught of the Janissaries, the Ethiopians fled. The Portuguese also succumbed to panic and began a disorderly retreat, leaving behind wounded and killed comrades, about 200 people in total. The defeat of the Christians was complete; Christopher da Gama was wounded, captured and executed; his head, as well as twelve Portuguese prisoners, were transported to Zabid. Akhmad Gran also received captured weapons<sup>114</sup>.

At this time, Don Estêvão da Gama tried to restore contact with his brother: at the beginning of 1542, a small expedition of 5 ships under the command of Enrique de Vasconcellos was sent to the Red Sea. Local residents did not allow him to carry out landings at Massawa (20 February) and Suakin (6 March), and the squadron was forced to return to India without establishing contact with Christopher da Gama<sup>115</sup>.

After the defeat of the Ethiopian-Portuguese troops in the Anasa area, Ahmad Gran released most of the soldiers who were sent by the Ottoman Empire, leaving only 200 Turks with him. This may be due to his desire to have greater independence and make decisions without interference from the Ottomans. King Claudius still had about the same number of Portuguese with him. After a confident victory over the Christians, the ruler of Sultanate Adal intended to complete the defeat of the enemy, but his too risky actions cost him his life. He was killed on February 22, 1543 at the Battle of Wayna Daga, east of Lake Tana, when Claudius defeated the Muslim army. His family, as well as many

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<sup>113</sup> Ivanov N. A. Op. cit. P. 146.; Kerr R., Edin F.A.S. General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels. Vol. 6, pp. 347-348; Sanceau E. Op.cit. P. 119.

<sup>114</sup> Ivanov N. A. Op. cit. P. 147; Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 27-28.

<sup>115</sup> Danvers F. Ch. The Portuguese in India: In 2 vols. London: W. H. Allen & Co., 1894. Vol. 1. Being a History of the Rise and Decline of their Eastern Empire. pp. 451-452.

soldiers, were taken prisoner. The Battle of Wayna Daga had great consequences and prevented the further spread of Islam in Ethiopia. Also, for some time, the Ottoman Empire lost interest in this country. After the victory, Claudius began to quickly return the previously lost territories, restoring the former borders of the state<sup>116</sup>.

The Portuguese threat in the Red Sea area continued to persist: for example, in 1544, two Ottoman ships under the command of Sefer Reis left Suez to patrol the Red Sea in response to the possible appearance of the Portuguese fleet in the region<sup>117</sup>.

At this time, the Portuguese decided to begin negotiations with the Ottoman Empire: they demanded recognition of their dominance in the Indian Ocean. In 1544, Portugal sent an embassy to Istanbul. The ambassadors offered Süleyman to make peace for 10 years, while Portugal assumed obligations to deliver 127 tons of pepper to the Iraqi port of Basra (which belonged to the Ottoman Empire), in exchange the Ottomans were to supply about 250 tons of wheat. The Portuguese demanded a ban on the resale of pepper obtained by the Ottomans and a ban on its purchase from a third party: thus, free trade in spices was prohibited. Another condition for Portugal was control of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait with the right to inspect all ships. The Porte was required to abandon the fleet in the Red Sea, freeze the number of troops in Aden, and recognize the Portuguese as having complete freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, as well as the possibility of trade in the ports. Ottoman merchant ships had to buy special licenses from the Portuguese; ships without such a license could be inspected by the Portuguese with the possibility of confiscation of the cargo. The Turkish Sultan was prohibited from building new warships and producing weapons that could pose a danger to Portuguese shipping in the Indian Ocean. If necessary, the Ottoman Empire was to supply Portugal with 125 tons of wheat at market prices<sup>118</sup>.

Such peace terms were unacceptable to Istanbul, and Süleyman the Magnificent rejected them. The war between the countries continued. By the middle of the 16th

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<sup>116</sup> Ivanov N. A. Op. cit. P. 147; Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 29; Turaev B. A. Op. cit. pp. 134-135; Whiteway R.S. The Portuguese expedition to Abyssinia in 1541-1543 as narrated by Castanhoso. P. 192.

<sup>117</sup> Peacock A.C.S. Suakin: A Northeast African Port in the Ottoman Empire. P. 34.

<sup>118</sup> Ivanov N. A. Op. cit. pp. 147-148.

century, the Portuguese strengthened their position in Ethiopia, and missionaries and settlers from Europe gradually began to arrive there. Construction of Catholic churches began. Claudius allowed local peasants to convert to Catholicism. Under Claudius, the Catholic clergy took a leading position in socio-political life, becoming the pillar of Portugal's policy in East Africa <sup>119</sup>.

### 1.7. Conclusions

Ottoman expansion in the Red Sea area was caused by a complex of reasons, the main one of which was maintaining a monopoly on trade with eastern countries, which required ensuring the security of maritime trade routes from possible attacks from the Portuguese fleet.

Information that Sultan Selim I did not stop at conquering Egypt and annexed the coast of Sudan does not correspond to reality. These stories are of a legendary nature and are associated with other events. Sources indicate that the campaign attributed to Selim I, in fact, took place under his son Süleyman the Magnificent.

The Ottoman Empire laid claim to all the territories that had previously been part of the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt, some of which became part of Habesh Eyalet in the 16th century. A strategic plan for expansion in the Red Sea area appeared in 1525, its author was the naval commander Salman Reis. A special feature of the document that proposed a strategy for implementing expansion is the economic justification for all the proposed goals of conquest.

Soon after the report was compiled by Salman Reis, the Ottoman Empire annexed Suakin to its possessions. However, the sources preserve virtually no information about the first period of Ottoman control.

The Ottoman Empire intervened in the struggle between the Adal Sultanate and Ethiopia: the Ottomans helped the Muslim allies with weapons and also sent volunteers. Ethiopia received support from Portugal. The death of the de facto ruler of the sultanate,

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<sup>119</sup>Ibid. P. 148.

Imam Ahmad Gran, disorganized the state and temporarily stopped the expansion of Muslims.

## CHAPTER 2. FOREIGN POLICY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE RED SEA AREA

### 2.1. Creation of Habesh Eyalet and the Ottoman Empire struggle with Ethiopia

The restoration of Ethiopia as a combat-ready ally of Portugal changed the situation in the Red Sea area. The Portuguese fleet still had superiority at sea. The Ottoman naval expeditions of Piri Reis (1552), Murad Pasha (1553) and Sidi Ali (1554) in the region ended in failure. The Red Sea coast remained unprotected from possible Portuguese raids <sup>120</sup>.

Under these conditions, the Ottoman Empire decided to occupy the interior of Sudan and the African coast of the Red Sea in order to cut off direct contacts between the Portuguese and Ethiopia. The author of this plan was the former beylerbey of Yemen, Özdemiş Pasha\* , who convinced Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent of the need for its implementation. The Yemeni chronicler al-Nahrawālī\*\* reports that Özdemiş Pasha was interested in being appointed to this area because of its prosperity.

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<sup>120</sup>Ivanov N. A. Op. cit. pp. 148-149.

\* Özdemiş Pasha (? – 1559, 1560, 1562) – statesman and military leader of the Ottoman Empire, beylerbey of the provinces of Yemen and Habesh, who played the most important role in establishing the Sultan's power in both provinces. Özdemiş was an Egyptian Mamluk of Circassian origin, his master was a certain Keykavus Shavkat Bey. Özdemiş entered the service of the Ottomans after the conquest by Selim I Egypt in 1517. He held a number of minor positions in the provincial administration until he became kashif in 1538. In the same year, he became part of the Ottoman naval expedition against the Portuguese in India under the command of Suleiman Pasha. On his way back from India, Özdemiş remained in Yemen as an emir. The next time he was mentioned was only in February 1547 as one of the participants in the capture of Taizz. When the Ottoman beylerbey Uveys Pasha was soon killed in Yemen, Özdemiş (one of the sanjakbeys of the province) was chosen as serdar. He managed to capture Zaydi capital Sanaa in August 1547. Although Özdemiş was appointed beylerbey only 2 years later, he continued to put pressure on the weakened Zaydis. The high point of Ottoman dominance in Yemen was reached in 1542, when, after five years of war, the Zaydi leader al-Muzahar and Özdemiş Pasha concluded a peace by which al-Muzahar recognized Ottoman suzerainty. Özdemiş was relieved of his post as governor of Yemen in April 1554. (Blackburn Q.R. Özdemiş Pasha // Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition / Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995. Vol. VIII. P. 235–236).

\*\* Qutb al-Dīn Muhammad al-Nahrawālī is famous Meccan mufti, qadi, chronicler. He was born in 1511/12 in Lahore (India) in a family of scientists originally from Aden. Nahrawālī received his

Özdemir Pasha was appointed to carry out this plan. Troops and the necessary funds for the expedition were allocated in Egypt. After the campaign was approved, Özdemir Pasha, with a high degree of probability, returned directly to Egypt. Initially, 1,000 people were allocated to participate in the campaign; another 3,000 soldiers could be enrolled voluntarily<sup>121</sup>. Because of its small numbers, Özdemir Pasha's campaign appears to have been a personal endeavor rather than a deliberate decision in Istanbul.

Özdemir Pasha immediately began to prepare for the campaign “to Ethiopia” (in this case it cannot be argued that the Ethiopian kingdom was the goal: in the Ottoman Empire, vast territories from Egypt to Mozambique were called *Ethiopia*) as soon as he arrived in Egypt, but he encountered some difficulties in recruiting soldiers: it was difficult for him to achieve the initially planned size of the expedition: there were not many people willing to take part in it due to the distance of the upcoming campaign. Ultimately, Özdemir Pasha managed to recruit the required number of fighters, and the campaign began in mid-1555. The army was divided into two parts: the first detachment went on ships up the Nile, the second detachment went overland on horses. The expedition was only able to reach the cataracts of the Nile. Here a conflict arose among the participants of the expedition, because of which it was not possible to continue the expedition. The reasons for this conflict remain unknown; there is a high probability that the troops were not well prepared for crossing long distances, and an unfamiliar enemy also inspired fear. In addition, the time to start the hike was chosen poorly – the summer season. According to some sources, Özdemir Pasha then returned to Istanbul

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primary education from his father, a mufti and hadith expert. At a young age, Qutb al-Din went to Mecca, where he continued his education with famous scholars. Fluency in Turkish allowed him to become an intermediary in communication between Turkish officials and sheriffs of Mecca. Twice during his life he traveled to Istanbul, where he met with Sultan Süleyman: in 1536/37, Qutb al-Din accompanied the vizier Bahadur Shah from Gujarat to negotiate military assistance. The second trip took place in 1557/58 on behalf of the Sheriff of Mecca. Nahrawālī's chronicle of Yemen was completed in 1573 and was commissioned by the Ottoman vizier Sinan Pasha, who provided information about his eighteen-month campaign of 1568-1570. The probable date of death of Nahrawālī is May 20, 1582. (Blackburn Q. R. Al-Nahrawali // Encyclopedia of Islam, Second Edition / Edited by: C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, Ch. Pellat. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993. Vol. VII. P. 911–912).

<sup>121</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 35–36; Peacock A.C.S. Suakin: A Northeast African Port in the Ottoman Empire. P. 34.

and was able to achieve the formation of Habesh Eyalet. Other sources claim that during this campaign, Özdemir Pasha had already been appointed beylerbey of Habesh Eyalet<sup>122</sup>.

Habesh Eyalet was officially established on July 5, 1555. Özdemir Pasha's annual salary was 1.4 million akçe\*. From Istanbul, Özdemir Pasha headed to Suez, where he began preparations for a new, now naval, expedition. With great difficulty he managed to recruit 3–5 thousand volunteers. From official documents we know the number of fighters belonging to some groups: 150 of them were shooters, 150 people were Circassians, 500 were Gönüllü\*\*. The number of other fighters remains unknown. Their maintenance was paid from the Egyptian treasury. All fighters were transported by ship from Suez, along with weapons and ammunition, to the center of a new eyalet – Suakin<sup>123</sup>.

The first target of Özdemir Pasha's forces was the city of Massawa and its surrounding areas. The Ottomans began to appear in this city in the 20s of the 16th century: there was an Ottoman trading colony there, and some trade representatives were engaged in monitoring the Portuguese embassy that arrived for negotiations in Ethiopia. Massawa was the most important port that provided Ethiopia's connection with the sea. Almost all contacts between Portugal and Ethiopia passed through it. Özdemir Pasha divided his forces into 2 groups, personally leading the one that set out by sea from

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<sup>122</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 37.

\* Akçe is a small silver coin, the official monetary unit of the Ottoman Empire. They first began to be minted under Orhan (1326 – 1359) in Bursa in 1328. The original whole was equal to 6 qirat or 0.25 mithqal (1.154 g) at 90% purity. In Arab countries where dirhams and dinars were in circulation, the Turkish coin was called akçe and osmani or otmani. From the period of Mehmed II depreciation and damage to the acche began. So, in the middle of the 16th century, its weight was equal to 3.5 qirat with a sample of 85%, at the beginning of the 17th century - 1.5 qirat and 80%, and by the middle of the 17th century – 1 qirat and 50%. Since 1601, along with the previous ones, new coins were minted in denominations of 10 akçe, called onluk Ottoman. The extreme depreciation of the akçe necessitated a change in the monetary system, and in 1687, a kurush was introduced to replace the akçe. (Agrarnyj stroj Osmanskoj imperii XV-XVII vv.: dokumenty i materialy / ed. A.S. Tveritina. Moscow: «Vostochnaja literatura» 1963. P. 193).

\*\* Gönüllü (volunteers) is a type of light cavalry army created by provincial pashas from among the volunteer soldiers of the provincial militia, recruited mainly from landless peasants. They did not receive a salary, but only enjoyed the honorary position and benefits provided to the Janissaries. (Ihsanoglu E. History of the Ottoman state, society and civilization: In 2 vols. Moscow: "Oriental Literature" RAS, 2006. Vol. 1. History of the Ottoman state and society. P. 285; Meyer M. S. The Ottoman Empire in the XVIII century: Features of a structural crisis, pp. 236, 239).

<sup>123</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 37-41; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, KK. Ruus, no. 213, sh. 212// Al-Sūdān fī al- 'ahd al- 'uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā'iq al- 'aršif al- 'uṭmāni ("Sudan in the Ottoman era: in documents from the Ottoman archive"). Ş. 78



Suakin. The second group moved overland. The capture of Massawa occurred on April 2, 1557. After this, Arkiko, another important port subordinate to Ethiopia, was captured. The island of Dahlak, which covered Massawa, and its surrounding islands were already under Ottoman control; they were reassigned administratively to the newly formed eyalet. Evliya Çelebi reports that the ports of Zeila and Beylul were also captured by Özdemiş Pasha. Thus, the entire Red Sea coast of Africa, as well as the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, quickly came under Ottoman control <sup>124</sup>.

After this, the Ottomans began to advance into the interior of Ethiopia. To travel deep into the mainland, guides were required who, in addition, could tell about the local tribes and the situation in the country. So, under Özdemiş Pasha, a guide named Khattab served. An invasion of the Ethiopian interior also occurred in 1557. The lands of Tigre came under attack. In 1558, the Ottoman army reached them and established a foothold here. Ottoman sources provide no information about this campaign. King Claudius of Ethiopia was very concerned about the actions of the Ottomans on the coast. Despite the large size of his army, its technical equipment left much to be desired. Claudius remembered the advantage Ottoman firearms provided to Ahmad Gran's army in the war with Ethiopia <sup>125</sup>.

According to Ethiopian sources, fighting began in 1557, in the 17th year of the reign of King Claudius. The Ethiopian forces were constantly defeated by Özdemiş Pasha's small but mobile forces. His army launched an invasion of Tigray lands and northern Ethiopia. Particularly important was the Ottoman success at Debre Damo, a sacred site for Ethiopia. They destroyed the monastery, destroying the tomb of its founder Lebna-Dengel. One of the Ottoman detachments captured the Buri Peninsula,

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<sup>124</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 43-44; Dankoff R., Tezcan N., Sheridan M. D. Ottoman Explorations of the Nile. Evliya Çelebi's Map of the Nile and The Nile Journeys in the Book of Travels (Seyahatname). P. 323-324; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, KK. Ruus, no. 213, sh. 212 // Al-Sūdān fī al- 'ahd al- 'uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā'iq al- 'arşif al- 'uṭmāni. Ş. 78

<sup>125</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 41,42, 44; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi , İstanbul, Mühimme Def., no. 2, hkm.1313// Al- Sūdān fī al- 'ahd al -' uṭmāniyya : min ḥilāl waṭā'iq al- ' arşif al- ' uṭmāni. Ş. 81

defeating Bahr Negash\* Isaac. At the same time, the invasion of Ethiopia by the Oromo\*\* tribes began. Emperor Claudius left Isaac to fight the Ottomans on his own, traveling south to personally confront the invasion from these tribes. Also, difficulties for Ethiopia were created by the Muslim sultanate in Harar, whose ruler was Ahmad Gran's nephew Nur ibn Mujahid. After the reorganization of the Sultanate, he also went on the offensive: in 1559, he invaded Fatagar. Claudius died in a battle against the army of Nur ibn Mujahid on March 23, 1559<sup>126</sup>.

At the end of 1558 or beginning of 1559, the Ottomans captured Debaroa. Özdemiş Pasha decided to make this town a springboard for an operation to capture the interior of the country. Fortifications were built here: the town was surrounded by walls, and a large observation tower was built. The spoils obtained during the campaign were brought and stored here. Özdemiş Pasha left a small garrison in the town, since the Ottoman presence in the province as a whole was small. However, we must not forget that he had allies within Ethiopia. One of these allies was Bahr Negash Isaac, who switched from one side of the conflict to the other several times. The Mazaga tribe, living in Valkayat region (Tigre province), whose leader was the woman Gaeva, also supported Özdemiş Pasha<sup>127</sup>.

In Debaroa, captured by the Ottomans, a large cathedral mosque and several small mosques were built, many Christians and pagans converted to Islam. Özdemiş Pasha asked for help from the central authorities to ensure control over the lands captured with great difficulty, but his request was not granted. At the same time, Ethiopia concentrated its forces on the Ottoman invasion and began fighting against their allies. Bahr Negash Isaac, loyal to King Claudius, defeated Gaeva, who took refuge with Özdemiş Pasha, asking him for help. However, beylerbey left the conquered booty in Debaroa and headed to the northeast, where the Beja tribes lived (southeast of modern Sudan). The reason why Özdemiş Pasha headed to this region is unknown. The climate

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\* Bahr Negash is the title of the governor of the northern coastal province of Ethiopia, whose position was important because it was through his territory that the kingdom had access to the sea (Chernetsov S.V. Ethiopian feudal monarchy in the XIII - XVI centuries).

\*\* Oromo are a Cushitic people of Ethiopia and northern Kenya. The ancestors of the Oromo, nomadic pastoralists, moved to Ethiopia as a result of mass migration in the 16th century.

<sup>126</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 45-46; Turaev B.A. Op. cit. pp. 154, 164, 165.

<sup>127</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S 46; Turaev B.A. Op. cit. P. 155.

turned out to be more destructive for him and his army than any enemy: the soldiers suffered from the sun, Özdemiş Pasha himself fell ill. He could not walk or ride a horse on his own, so the campaign to the Beja lands had to be stopped. After returning to Debaroa in 1560, Özdemiş Pasha died. He was buried right in the town. Somewhat later, his remains were transferred to Massawa, where his son built a mausoleum <sup>128</sup>.

Before Özdemiş Pasha's death, envoys sent to Istanbul reported the conquest of Ethiopia. After the start of the campaign, the authorities realized how difficult it could be: the Ottoman forces in the region were in a clear minority, and in addition, the climate was unusual. Despite these problems, the Ottomans still managed to expand their territories to certain limits <sup>129</sup>.

The death of Özdemiş Pasha caused confusion among the Ottomans and their allies, who began to retreat to the coast. The consolidation of Ethiopia played a role in the retreat: its army regained control of Debaroa, all buildings built by the Ottomans were destroyed<sup>130</sup>. However, Bahr Negash Isaac did not completely oust the Ottomans, leaving them part of the Red Sea coast. By this, Isaac tried to preserve the opportunity to conduct business relations with the Ottoman Empire, which was ready to sell firearms and buy slaves here.

Özdemiş Pasha was succeeded by his son, Osman Pasha. The exact date of his appointment to the position of beylerbey is unknown: Qutbuddin of Mecca dates this event to 1560, 'Abdurahman Sheref – to 1561–1562. In 1560, Osman Bey held the position of sanjakkbey in Egypt. On December 8, 1560, Emri-haji was appointed to the post in Egypt, therefore, it is likely that Osman's appointment as governor of Habesh Eyalet falls in 1561. Before his arrival in Habesh, the eldest bey in the province was the temporarily acting bey<sup>131</sup>.

Osman Pasha's appointment turned out to be very accurate: he knew this region and people well. His arrival was received with enthusiasm in the eyalet due to the great

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<sup>128</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 46-47; Turaev B.A. Op. cit. pp. 155-156.

<sup>129</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S 47-48.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. 48.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid. 48-49.

authority of his father. In addition, Osman Pasha brought with him a number of soldiers as reinforcements. During his seven-year governorship, his main actions were connected with the Danakil region. In Ethiopian sources, Özdemiş Pasha and Osman Pasha are presented as one person<sup>132</sup>.

After the ascension of Menas in Ethiopia (1559–1563), the country was again struck by turmoil and Bahr Negash Isaac found himself in opposition to the king. In 1560, Menas began a war against Isaac. After being defeated at the Battle of Vágara in July 1561, Isaac retreated to Massawa and turned to the Beylerbey for help. Osman Pasha took advantage of this to regain lost lands. Ottoman sources give no information about the capture of Debaroa and the surrounding area. Portuguese sources state that Debaroa returned to Ottoman control in January 1562. With the help of the Ethiopians, Osman Pasha defeated Menas's army on April 20, 1562 in the region of Enderta, in the south of Tigre Province. Victory in the battle was brought by technical superiority – firearms<sup>133</sup>.

Jesuit monks, led by Andrea de Oviedo, also joined Isaac. Menas's anti-Catholic policy pushed the monks to take such a step; he did not give any privileges to Catholic priests. Moreover, the king was accused of being a Muslim, recalling his time in captivity. Osman Pasha was worried about a possible alliance between Isaac and the Portuguese, especially since Isaac allowed them to request help from India against Menas<sup>134</sup>.

In 1563, King Menas died and Sarsa Dengel (1550–1597) took the throne. The country was in a state of crisis: Portugal did not send new military missions, despite a request sent by Oviedo. By 1568, Bahr Negash Isaac again abandoned the alliance with the Ottomans, siding with the new king<sup>135</sup>.

The son of Özdemiş Pasha even managed to somewhat expand the boundaries of the eyalet. He served as beylerbey until January 16, 1568, although he left the province on August 22, 1567: his continued tenure was only a formality. Although, probably

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid. S. 49.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid. S. 50.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. S. 51; Chernetsov S.V. Efiopskaja feodal'naja monarhija v XIII–XVI vv. P. 259.

<sup>135</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 51.

on the recommendation of Osman Pasha, under his successor additional soldiers and weapons were sent to Habesh Eyalet. Hussein Pasha was appointed the new beylerbey<sup>136</sup>.

Hussein Pasha did not remain governor of Habesh Eyalet for long: already on December 3, 1570, he was replaced by Iskander Pasha's son Ahmad Pasha. During his governorship, the eyalet received the necessary reinforcements at the request of local authorities. However, Ahmad Pasha faced problems in paying the soldiers' salaries and providing provisions in the province: this was caused by famine in Egypt and military operations in Yemen. Ahmad Pasha feared a possible attack from Ethiopia and asked that additional equipment be sent to the eyalet: guns and ammunition. Also at this time, fortifications began to be built in the eyalet. Ahmad Pasha monitored Sarsa's activities, realizing that he would eventually act against the Ottoman Empire. Ahmad Pasha resigned from his post of his own free will<sup>137</sup>.

In his position on March 2, 1573, Ridvan Pasha was appointed, he was well aware of the current situation in the region. It took him a long time, more than 5 months, to reach the eyalet. After peace reigned in Yemen, Habesh Eyalet again began to receive supplies from this province. Thus, on June 12, 1574, the beylerbey of Yemen allocated 500 arquebuses\*, 100 kantars\*\* of gunpowder, 500 Zaydi fighters. Also, for Habesh Eyalet guns were ordered in Egypt<sup>138</sup>.

Isaak started the fighting against the eyalet, his goal was Debaroa. In 1574, his forces attacked the town, but the Ottomans successfully defended themselves and were able to force him to retreat. The Ottomans even began pursuing Isaac's troops. The pursuing detachment was led by Kethuda Murad, who successfully completed the task. The name of the commander of the Debaroa defense remains unknown. Isaac later made another attempt to attack, this time targeting the port of Arkiko, but he again

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid. S. 52.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid. S. 53-54.

\* Arquebus is an ancient matchlock gun, loaded from the muzzle.

\*\* Kantar is a unit of weight used in various countries of the Middle East and Mediterranean. In different countries it had different meanings from 45 to 320 kg.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid. S. 54-55.

failed. Soon Ridvan Pasha also resigned from his post; the exact date of his resignation is unknown, but at least until July 1574 he remained in the position of beylerbey<sup>139</sup>.

Mustafa Pasha became the next governor. The earliest document bearing his name dates from December 4, 1574. He remained in office until 1576. During his tenure, no incidents were noticed in the eyalet. Mustafa Pasha died while remaining at his post, in Suakin or Massawa. Sanjakbey Mehmed bey became the acting beylerbey. Suleiman Bey, who served as a sanjakbey in Egypt, was appointed to the position of beylerbey, but he did not go to Habesh Eyalet. Documents indicate that he did not arrive in the eyalet until February 17, 1577. On June 25, 1577, he was dismissed, and his brother Ahmad was appointed to the position of beylerbey<sup>140</sup>.

At this time Bahr Negash Isaac was mentioned for the first time in Ottoman documents: the Ottomans considered him as a contender for the kingdom. At the same time, the documents do not mention who he fought against, and in general they did not even mention the existence of Ethiopia. The document calls Isaac's vizier a certain Badunay, or Raptunay, who is Isaac's son-in-law (according to other sources, his brother). His defection to the Ottomans is defined as “political asylum”. In his letter to Istanbul, Ahmad Pasha advised taking advantage of Badunay's knowledge; according to him, thanks to him it was possible to easily capture new lands. The central authorities approved this approach. On November 3, 1574, Badunay became a sanjakbey with a salary of 200 thousand akçe. The sanjak, which Badunay ruled, included the areas of Sham'a, Akele, Dabbe, Korbaniye<sup>141</sup>.

According to available information, Ahmad Pasha lost control of Debaroa for some time, but then was able to regain it. A new wall was built around Debaroa, and the palace of beylerbey appeared in the town. The Hamasen, Roja, and Ashele tribes were subordinated to the Turkish authorities. The areas of Bur, Hindiye, Matrer, which formed

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<sup>139</sup> Ibid. S. 55.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid. S. 56.

<sup>141</sup> Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Mühimme Def., no. 25, hkm. 2885 // *Al-Sūdān fī al-‘ahd al-‘uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā’iq al-‘aršif al-‘uṭmāni*. Ş. 99; Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 56–57.

the sanjaks of the same name, came under the control of Ahmad Pasha: they cannot be identified, they were probably recorded incorrectly<sup>142</sup>.

Ethiopian chronicles report that Isaac again found himself in opposition to the king of Ethiopia and entered into an alliance with Ahmad Pasha, receiving from him firearms: cannons and hand weapons. Sarsa Dengel decided to deal with the rebellious vassal, who again went over to the side of the Ottoman Empire<sup>143</sup>.

For the first time, the army of the Ethiopian king was better equipped: it had more firearms at its disposal. Ahmad Pasha had at his disposal only 8 guns, which had a short range. Ahmad Pasha, realizing the inevitability of a new war with Ethiopia, asked the central authorities to send him help. No help was sent to him until Habesh Eyalet did not receive the news that the Ethiopian king had begun a campaign in the direction of Turkish possessions. Then 200 fighters from Yemen were sent to Habesh Eyalet under the command of a certain Bayram. But this small reinforcement did not have time to reach Ahmad Pasha<sup>144</sup>.

The decisive clash took place at Addi Carro. In Ottoman documents, the battle is called the “Battle of Ahmad Pasha”. It was preceded by a series of small skirmishes. During one of them, the center of the Ottoman army was pushed through by the Ethiopian army with attacks from the left and right. The ensuing panic spread throughout the army. Isaac died in the skirmish: he separated from a detachment of Turkish cavalry (30 horsemen) and fell into the hands of the Ethiopians. The Turkish cavalry was surrounded and also suffered heavy losses. Ethiopian sources indicate that among the dead in this group was beylerbey of Habesh, but in reality this group was led by the Agha, not Ahmad Pasha. The main battle took place later, and the Ethiopian king won it: Ahmad Pasha also died (it is not known exactly during the battle or as a result of injury after), fighting in the front ranks of the army. His death also played a role and brought confusion to the Ottoman army. The total losses of the Ottomans in the battle

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<sup>142</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 57.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid. S. 58; Efiopskie hroniki XVI–XVII vekov / intro., transl. and comment. by S.B. Chernecov. Moscow: Nauka, 1984. P. 58.

<sup>144</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 58.

amounted to 500 people, but these were the best wars in the entire eyalet: sanjakbey Arkiko Numan, commanders of the Janissaries, Yemeni detachment, Gönüllü died<sup>145</sup>.

Sarsa Dengel went to Debaroa after the battle. The city did not resist; the inhabitants even greeted the Ethiopian king with a cannon shot as a winner. Probably, Ahmad Pasha did not leave Ottoman soldiers in the city; they were all in his detachment; only militias formed from local residents remained in the city. The Ethiopian army received cannons and rifles from the city arsenal. In Debaroa, walls and a mosque were destroyed. The king took local soldiers into his army and even appointed one of them as commander<sup>146</sup>.

Different sources give different dates for the battle of Addi Carro: Trimingham places it in 1578, Ethiopian sources – in 1580, Seyyid Lokman – in 1579, Conti Rossini also dates it in 1578. In official documents it is mentioned only on December 17, 1579 due to the death of Ahmad Pasha. The Ethiopian king also suffered heavy losses in clashes with the Ottomans and was unable to continue his offensive against Habesh Eyalet, limiting himself to the conquest of Debaroa and Arkiko. The actual merger of the eyalet also played against him Habesh with the emirate in Harare<sup>147</sup>.

After the defeat at Addi Carro, the remnants of the Ottoman army retreated to the coast. At this moment, support arrived from Yemen in the form of a detachment of 200 fighters under the command of Bayram Bey. However, instead of helping, this detachment unexpectedly turned to robbery and captured the treasury of the eyalet. One of the local beys, Khizir Bey, made great efforts to reorganize the Ottoman army. On March 1, 1579, Suleiman Pasha, who had previously held this post but never reached the province, was reappointed to the post of beylerbey. The second time he did exactly the same; however, despite such disobedience, he did not suffer any punishment. On December 15, 1579, Khizir Pasha was appointed beylerbey<sup>148</sup>.

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<sup>145</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 59; Efiopskie hroniki XVI–XVII vekov. pp. 72-73.

<sup>146</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 60; Efiopskie hroniki XVI–XVII vekov. pp. 74-75.

<sup>147</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 60.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. S. 61.



After receiving reinforcements from Yemen, Khizir Pasha had the opportunity to remove Ethiopian pressure on Massawa and Arkiko. Clashes occurred in the Arkiko area, which fell under Ethiopian control for a time. The Ethiopian king handed over Arkiko to his ally Ahmed, the son-in-law of Emir Beylul Sheikh Kamil. At this time, the commander of eyalet's Gönüllü Mehmed, the Janissary commander Osman and the commander of the Yemeni detachment Hussein, joined their forces and headed for Arkiko. They were able to liberate the city from the Ethiopians and Arabs, defeating them. With a decisive blow, the Ethiopians were driven back from Massawa, and all the territories of the eyalet, except Debaroa, returned to the control of the Ottoman Empire<sup>149</sup>.

This victory was achieved with a clear shortage of fighters. A hundred *nefers*\* were stationed in the Massawa fortress before the battle of Addi Carro. Of these hundred fighters, forty people died during the campaign of Ahmad Pasha. Only 61 people from among the “conquerors and children” remained in the fortress. After *dizdar*\*\* Massawa reported the situation to the Egyptian beylerbey, and help arrived from Yemen. But the Yemeni detachment plundered Massawa – primarily the property of the deceased Ahmad Pasha. This example shows that even the main cities of the eyalet Massawa and Suakin were guarded only by small detachments. According to Bayram's own statement, he sacked the city only to provide salaries for his soldiers. Military operations in Habesh Eyalet were supported by the sheriffs of Mecca, as the campaigns of the local beylerbeys were directed against Christians. It is reported that the sheriffs assisted the eyalet by providing it with food <sup>150</sup>.

According to a document of 1582, the “upper part” of the eyalet was actually under the control of the “infidels”. The “upper part” in the document refers to the cities of Debaroa, Debre Damo, located in the Tigre province. In 1582, a 30,000-strong

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid S. 61-62.

\* Nefer is an ordinary warrior in the Ottoman Empire.

\*\* Dizdar was a military leader who commanded the guards and military units located in the fortress. Dizdar had a deputy - *kahya* and other subordinates, reporting to the captain or *sanjakkbey*.

<sup>150</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 62.

Ethiopian army under the command of Bahr Negash and Dejazmach<sup>\*\*\*</sup> raided the Durbeite tribe living in the territory of Habesh Eyalet: Their livestock was taken away and some residents were killed. Khizir Pasha gathered an army of 7,000 people, and it (perhaps under the command of beylerbey himself) advanced to the “upper part” of the province and gave battle to the Ethiopian army. Despite the numerical superiority of the Ethiopians, they were defeated, and Dejazmach, the commander of the Ethiopian army, died in the battle. As a result of this battle, Debaroa and the surrounding area were once again under the control of the Ottoman Empire. Khizir Pasha reported to the central authorities that after the heavy defeat, the king of Ethiopia began large-scale preparations<sup>151</sup>.

According to another document, Hussein Bey, probably one of the sanjakbeys of the eyalet, headed to the site of Andiya to stop the Ethiopian army; in this place a battle took place in which the Ethiopians were defeated. After this battle, a detachment (7,000 people) was sent to Debaroa. Also, one of the documents mentions a letter from the Ethiopian king, which was immediately sent further to Istanbul (its contents are unknown and have not been preserved in Turkish archives)<sup>152</sup>.

On December 21, 1582, Mustafa Pasha was appointed beylerbey; the last document mentioning him is dated May 5, 1589, but it is known that he remained in the province until 1590. Mustafa Pasha monitored everything that happened in Ethiopia with the help of agents: he had the widest network of spies compared to his predecessors. So, in 1585, thanks to the work of agents, he managed to find out that Ethiopia was preparing for a big war (King Sarsa Dengel arrived in the province of Sireh with an army of 40,000 people), while the future enemy was not identified. Following this, a notice was immediately sent to all tribes and sheikhs to exercise caution. Mustafa Pasha also sent a letter

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<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Azmach is the title of major Ethiopian military leaders. This is a general designation, since they were divided into three categories. The younger ones were called grazmach (“azmach on the left”), the middle ones were called kenazmach (“azmach on the right”), and the older ones were called dejazmach (“azmach of the vanguard”). These names corresponded to the usual formation of the Ethiopian army in battle, when the left and right regiments led by grazmach and ken-azmach were located on the flanks of the royal regiment, and in front was the advanced regiment led by dejazmach. The closest Russian equivalent to the title is voivode. (Efiopskie hroniki XVI - XVII vekov. p. 368).

<sup>151</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 62-63.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid. S. 63-64.

to the Ethiopian king to find out about his intentions. Despite the fact that he received a response, the Ottoman governor took defensive measures: ditches were dug around the fortifications in the provinces<sup>153</sup>.

At the same time, the ruler of the Funj Sultanate Dakin died, ascended the throne, according to Ottoman documents, by his eldest son Daura (1585/86–1587/88). He thought about “cutting a window to the sea” by reaching Suakin. Possibly Sarsa Dengel and the former ruler of the Sultanate of Sennar had an agreement to jointly act against the Ottomans to drive them out of the region. However, it should be noted that relations between the Sennar Sultanate and Ethiopia were not always friendly: on the contrary, there was tension between the states. Thus, in 1618–1619 there was a war between the countries over the slave trade<sup>154</sup>.

To prevent an attack by the Funj, Mustafa Pasha sent sanjakbey Arkiko Yusuf with a detachment of soldiers to Suakin. He also requested help from Egypt, including 150 nefers, 200 guns, 200 sabers, gunpowder and other equipment. However, the Funj campaign did not take place due to the outbreak of a power struggle between the Sultan and his uncles<sup>155</sup>.

Sarsa Dengel at the end of his reign had connections with the beylerbeys of Habesh. It is impossible to determine whether Ethiopian kings had such connections before. Besides Mustafa Pasha's correspondence, evidence of communications is the use of Ottoman mercenaries by the Ethiopian king in civil wars. For example, he invited Ottoman riflemen for an operation in the Semen region. He probably asked for such help from the beylerbey himself. In 1587, he took 30 Turkish riflemen with him to suppress the uprising: Turkish mercenaries played an important role in defeating the rebels and capturing the leaders of the uprising<sup>156</sup>.

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<sup>153</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 64-65; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Mühimme Def., no. 60, hkm.13 // Al-Sūdān fī al- ‘ahd al-‘uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā’iq al-’aršif al-‘uṭmāni (“Sudan in the Ottoman era : in documents Ottoman archive”). Ş. 112–113.

<sup>154</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 65; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Mühimme Def., no. 60, hkm.13 // Al-Sūdān fī al- ‘ahd al-‘uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā’iq al-’aršif al-‘uṭmāni. Ş. 112–113.

<sup>155</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 65; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Mühimme Def., no. 60, hkm.13 // Al-Sūdān fī al- ‘ahd al-‘uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā’iq al-’aršif al-‘uṭmāni. Ş. 112–113.

<sup>156</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 66.

In 1588, the period of friendship between the king of Ethiopia and the beylerbey probably ended. Ethiopian sources report that an Ottoman force advanced from Dakhano and reoccupied Debaroa. Sarsa Dengel gathered an army against the Ottomans, which included warriors from the Oromo tribes. These events took place during the governorship of Khudaverdi Pasha. His appointment as beylerbey occurred in 1588, but the exact date remains unknown<sup>157</sup>.

According to Ethiopian sources, Sarsa Dengel defeated a small Ottoman force on the approaches to Debaroa. After this defeat, the Pasha (presumably) decided to abandon Debaroa and retreat to Dakhano. The Ethiopian army failed to take the Dakhano fortress by storm, but the Ottoman Pasha offered peace to Sarsa Dengel, pledging not to attack Ethiopia in the future<sup>158</sup>.

These clashes took place in territories with a Muslim population that were not under the control of the Ottoman beylerbey. Probably, the sanjakbey took part in the operation, who coordinated actions with the local Muslim emir. Sarsa Dengel killed Sheikh Ali Gerad, who had relations with the Ottomans (although he did not help them during the operation), accusing him of converting from Christianity to Islam. During the campaign Sarsa Dengel's army suffered from food shortages. On their way to Debaroa, they plundered the areas of Derfo and Hamasen<sup>159</sup>.

Also, Sarsa Dengel had to fight the Ottoman-appointed Bahr Negash Wad Ezum. His move was quickly crushed: Wad Ezum was captured and killed by the Ethiopian king, after which his forces marched towards Sira<sup>160</sup>.

Ali Pasha became the next governor after Khudaverdi Pasha. Documents give different dates for his appointment: July 12, 1593 or March 24, 1594. However, both of these dates conflict with the appointment of the next governor, Hasan Pasha: in a letter dated August 20, 1593, Hasan Pasha praises Ali Pasha for the fact that the province is in good condition. The last beylerbey of the 16th century was Ibrahim Pasha. Known

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<sup>157</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 66-67, Efiopskie hroniki XVI - XVII vekov. pp. 114–115.

<sup>158</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 67, Efiopskie hroniki XVI - XVII vekov. pp. 115–118.

<sup>159</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 67, Efiopskie hroniki XVI - XVII vekov. pp. 117–118.

<sup>160</sup> Efiopskie hroniki XVI - XVII vekov. pp. 117-118

sources do not report any clashes with Ethiopia during the viceroyalty of these beylerbeys <sup>161</sup>.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Ottoman beylerbeys enjoyed peaceful relations with the rulers of Ethiopia, and the Ottoman Empire abandoned its claims to Debaroa. Peaceful coexistence helped make money from trade: caravans arriving from Ethiopia to the ports of the eyalet were subject to customs duties. It is also necessary to note the better equipment of the Ethiopian army: it borrowed a lot from the Ottoman army. For example, in the Ethiopian army a separate detachment of riflemen appeared, which was headed by a commander called “basha”, i.e. pasha. Some Ottoman specialists served the Ethiopian king and were used in military expeditions against the Oromo tribes. They especially distinguished themselves during the 1699 campaign <sup>162</sup>.

Beylerbey of Habesh Eyalet allowed diplomatic missions and missionaries to pass through Massawa or Suakin into Ethiopia. Usually, in order to obtain permission to pass through the territory of the eyalet to Ethiopia, it was necessary to obtain permission from the beylerbey, who made a request to the Ethiopian authorities. All procedures took about two and a half months. Notable among the missionaries who arrived in this way was Pedro Páez, who landed in Massawa in 1603 and was granted permission to travel freely. He lived in Ethiopia for 19 years, and his name is associated with the greatest successes in promoting Catholicism in the country. Under him, in 1622, Emperor Susenyos (1572–1632) openly converted to Catholicism <sup>163</sup>.

The peak of the Jesuits' influence at the Ethiopian court was 1628: then another mission arrived in the country, and the total number of Jesuits reached 90 people. After the accession of Fasilides (1603–1667) to Ethiopia, Ethiopia and the Ottoman Empire probably entered into an agreement to prevent Portuguese missionaries from entering the country. In 1634, the king of Ethiopia ordered all Jesuits in the country to leave the country. They did not immediately obey the orders of Fasilides, but when it became

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<sup>161</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 68.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid. S. 83.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid. S. 84-85, Tellez B. The Travels of the Jesuits in Ethiopia. London: J. Knapton, 1710. pp. 161-162, 216.

clear that the Ethiopians would use force, the Jesuits fled to the lands of Yohannis Akay, who handed them over to the Ottomans at Massawa, from where they were transported to Suakin. The local pasha decided to make money from the missionaries who had fallen into his hands, among them even the head of the entire Jesuit mission, Patriarch Mendes, and demanded a ransom from them. The Pasha released several monks, including Jeronimo Lobo, to India, so that they would bring ransom for the remaining Jesuits. However, they did not have to return to the region: Indian merchants paid a ransom for Patriarch Mendes. Lobo, having reached India, tried to organize a military expedition to forcefully establish Catholicism throughout the Red Sea area. The last Portuguese Jesuits remained in Ethiopia until 1640, when they were discovered and executed.<sup>164</sup>

It is interesting to note that Evliya Çelebi, who visited Habesh Eyalet in 1672, mentions the presence of the Portuguese on Ethiopian territory, although about 40 years had already passed since the expulsion of the Jesuits by that time: perhaps the agreement on the exclusion of Europeans had lost its force during this time and Ethiopia used these rumors to protect against likely attack by the Ottoman Empire<sup>165</sup>.

## **2.2. Habesh Eyalet and the Sultanate of Sennar**

The Funj Sultanate, the formation of which dates back to 1504, was located on the territory of modern Sudan. Centered at Sennar, located on the Blue Nile, the sultanate controlled trade and pilgrimage routes, extending its immediate authority to Dongola in the north and imposing tribute on the eastern part of Sudan, inhabited by the Beja tribes. It is with the Sultanate of Sennar that the gradual Islamization of the local population is associated, since previously Christian states were located in the Nile Valley. The Ottoman Empire, having annexed the territories of the former

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<sup>164</sup>Bloss, J.F.E. The story of Suakin. P. 290-292; Lobo P. 131-145; Tellez B. Op. cit. 255-257; Rey Ch.F. The romance of the Portuguese in Abyssinia, an account of the adventurous journeys of the Portuguese to the empire of Prester John; their assistance to Ethiopia in its struggle against Islam and their subsequent efforts to impose their own influence and religion, 1490-1633. London: H.F. & G. Witherby, 1929. P. 290-297.

<sup>165</sup>Dankoff R., Tezcan N., Sheridan M.D. Ottoman Explorations of the Nile. Evliya Çelebi's Map of the Nile and The Nile Journeys in the Book of Travels (Seyahatname). P. 297-298.

Mamluk Sultanate, became the northern neighbor of the Funj Sultanate, but they were separated from each other by sparsely populated desert areas.

It is reliably known that the existence of the Funj Sultanate was known in the Ottoman Empire by 1525, when Salman Reis put forward a proposal to conquer it (See Chapter I). Despite the mention of the sultanate in this report, it did not attract any attention from the central authorities of the Ottoman Empire for a long time. However, it is likely that Özdemir Pasha's first campaign along the Nile to the south was aimed specifically at the Sultanate of Sennar, and not at Ethiopia. It would have been much easier to get to Ethiopia by sea, which was done later.

Soon after the start of the war against Ethiopia, the Sultanate of Sennar itself attracted attention: Arab tribes associated with the Funj sultanate attacked the Suakin area. These tribes did not recognize Ottoman control and even laid siege to the capital of the eyalet. In 1564, the governor of Habesh Eyalet complained to Istanbul: “Funj Arabs from the rebel Arabs in the vicinity of the Suakin Port cut off the flow of water to Suakin, killing many Muslims. In addition, they sell water at an exorbitant price. We know about the need to build a fortress in the indicated place, to appoint a sanjakbey to control the affairs of the province”.<sup>166</sup> After this attack, it was decided to build a fortress and also establish the position of sanjakbey of Suakin. The first sanjakbey was a certain Yakub, who previously held the position of *chaush*\* in Egypt. He was given a salary of 200 thousand akçe per year and was given the task of “defending these places and suppressing the uprising of the Funj tribe” during the absence of the Beylerbey in Suakin. The name “funj” in these documents may mean that the nomads were allied with or dependent on the Sultanate of Sennar. Probably, in this context, “funj” is not an ethnonym, but indicates political affiliation. Taking into account the proximity to Suakin, one could mistake this tribe for the Beja or Hadarib<sup>167</sup>.

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<sup>166</sup> Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Ruus KK, no. 218, sh.168 // *Al-Sūdān fī al-‘ahd al-‘uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā’iq al-‘aršif al-‘uṭmāni*. Ş. 81

\* *Chaush* – 1) lower rank in the army; 2) bailiff; 3) a minister who carried out special assignments (Mejer M. S. *Osmanskaja imperija v XVIII veke. Cherty strukturnogo krizisa*. P. 243).

<sup>167</sup> Orhonlu Ç. *Op. cit.* . S. 186; Peacock A. C. S. *The Ottomans and the Funj sultanate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*, P. 94; Satarov A.A. *Ob otnoshenijah Osmanskoj imperii i sultanata fundzh v XVI-XVIII vekah*. pp. 121-122.

The construction of fortifications did not solve the problem with the nomads: a few years later, in 1571, the beylerbey reported another major attack, which was repulsed by the defenders with heavy losses. On July 4, 1571, while there was no beylerbey in Suakin, rebel tribal leaders attacked the city and fought fiercely with the defenders of the fortress. They retreated only when they learned of the return of the beylerbey (and, probably, his army) <sup>168</sup>.

Sudanese historian Qaisar Musa Zein notes that the attacks on Suakin described in Ottoman sources can be correlated with the activities of the al-‘Abdallab tribal union: under the leadership of sheikh Ajib al-Manjaluka, it experienced its heyday, the tribes living in the territories in the immediate vicinity of Suakin were subordinate to it<sup>169</sup>.

Sudanese historians report a visit to Suakin by sheikh Ajib during the Hajj: he learned about problems with water in the city and even ordered a well to be dug not far from it. He also took one of the daughters of the emir of the Artega tribe as his wife and forced the local population to pay taxes to the ruler of the Sultanate of Sennar <sup>170</sup>.

Al-‘Abdallab tribal alliance, which ruled the northern part of the Sultanate of Sennar, may have posed indeed a serious threat to Ottoman control of the northern part of Habesh Eyalet, putting pressure directly on the provincial capital. However, al-‘Abdallab did not aggravate relations with the Ottomans, so the sources do not mention other cases when Arab tribes besieged Suakin.

Water supply was a critical issue for the existence of Suakin, because the island did not have its own sources: water was delivered there from the mainland. To guarantee uninterrupted supplies, by the end of the 16th century the Ottomans were forced to build three small fortresses, which Evliya will write about separately Çelebi. The traveler clearly identified the problem of water resources in Suakin, so that ships passing through the Red Sea, instead of replenishing their supplies, on the contrary, shared water

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<sup>168</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 190-191.

<sup>169</sup> Qayşr Mūsā Zayn. Sawākin: dirāsāt fī Ta’rīḥ, al- ḥaḍārat wa al-tafā’ulāt al-dūwaliyya ("Suakin: Studies in History , Civilization and International Interaction"). Al-Ḥurtūm: markaz al-tanwīr al-ma‘ārifī. 2013. Ş. 313-314.

<sup>170</sup> Qayşr Mūsā Zayn. Sawākin: dirāsāt fī Ta’rīḥ, al- ḥaḍārat wa al-tafā’ulāt al-dūwaliyya. Ş. 124, 172.



with the residents of the city. According to Evliya Çelebi, only some houses had water storage tanks, but the residents had their own ships to deliver water from mainland sources<sup>171</sup>.

At the same time, all the supplies of Habesh Eyalet with such an important resource as grain was provided by the Funj sultanate in exchange for cloth, which was used as an instrument of exchange in the sultanate. This confirms one of the instructions sent to the beylerbey of Egypt about the need to supply Habesh Eyalet with a sufficient amount of tissue. “Beylerbey Habesh Mustafa sent a message in which he mentioned that the supply of this eyalet comes from the rebel Funj. For this they take 200 bolts of fabric from the port every year... [The eyalet] has run out of fabric, so there is a serious supply shortage. We have received a request to receive fabric from Egypt... If you receive an application from the specified [beylerbey Habesh Eyalet] with a request for fabric, you need to provide it [the fabric] to him in a form that you consider acceptable. Don't let them suffer from supply shortages”<sup>172</sup>. The attacks described above could have served as a way to put pressure on the local Ottoman administration to obtain any preferences<sup>173</sup>.

The Ottoman Empire throughout the existence of Habesh Eyalet did not show aggression towards the Sultanate from the Red Sea coast. Another was the situation in the Nile Valley, where she undertook several expeditions from Egyptian territory. The southernmost point of her possessions was the Sai fortress, located on an island between the 2nd and 3rd Nile cataracts<sup>174</sup>. The earliest document that confirms the Ottoman presence in Lower Nubia dates back to 1570: in it, the sanjakkbey of Ibrim Mustafa was allowed to receive food and an army from Egypt, as was previously practiced in relation to beys and kashifs to protect territories<sup>175</sup>. Thus, Ottoman dominance in this region was established somewhat earlier, between 1555 (this included the interrupted

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<sup>171</sup> Evliya Çelebi . *Ins Land der geheimnisvollen Func.* S. 249-250

<sup>172</sup> Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, Mühimme Def., no. 28, hkm. 563 // *Al-Sūdān fī al-‘ahd al-‘uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā’iq al-’aršif al-‘uṭmāni.* Ş. 96-97

<sup>173</sup> Orhonlu Ç. *Op. cit.* S. 200, 202.

<sup>174</sup> Gerasimov I.V. Satarov A.A. *Svedeniya osmanskogo puteshestvennika Jevlii Chelebi o sultanate fundzh v Sudane // Mezhdunarodnyj nauchno-issledovatel'skij zhurnal.* No. 1 (43), 2016. pp. 82–85.

<sup>175</sup> Menage V.L. *The Ottomans and Nubia in the Sixteenth Century // Annales Islamologiques.* 1988. No. 24. P. 145

campaign of Özdemir Pasha in the Nile Valley) and 1570. At the same time, the request to increase the garrison shows a certain threat to the borders of the empire from the Sultanate of Sennar and in this northern direction <sup>176</sup>.

The Ottomans themselves also made attempts to advance in the Nile Valley: for example, in a firman dated April 12, 1577, addressed to the beylerbey of Egypt, it is written: “You report that the beylerbey of Habesh Suleiman has not yet gone on a business trip, but has various plans for seizure of Funj territories ...” <sup>177</sup>. If Suleiman’s initiative in the region can be attributed to personal motives and reluctance to hold the position of beylerbey of Habesh Eyalet, the actions of the Ottoman Empire in the next decade are definitely of a different nature. On January 15, 1584, a certain Mehmed was appointed to the position of sanjakbey of Ibrim with a significant increase in annual salary to 60,000 akçe for participation in active hostilities against the Funj Sultanate. Only a month later, Ibrim sanjak was turned into an eyalet, and Mehmed became its beylerbey. He managed to advance 90 km from Sai fortress in a southerly direction and captured Sis fortress which was located just north of the third cataract. The annexed territories formed the sanjak of Mahas, its leader was Ridwan Bey, the former sanjakbey in Yemen. However, these administrative changes were soon canceled and already in December 1585<sup>178</sup> the eyalet of Ibrim was again turned into a sanjak and annexed to Egypt. In 1589, an anonymous traveler from Venice visited this region and left the most complete description of the Ottoman attempt to advance south: “It is impossible to pass by boats [the third cataract – A.S.] due to the very large number of large rocks that can be seen there. Several years ago, the Turks equipped several boats to capture Dongola, which is 10-12 days from this threshold. Regarding Dongola, everyone I asked told me that it was dominated by Nubians, which is why the Turks wanted to take it over. It belongs to the ruler of the Funj. If not for the obstacle in the form of rocks on the river, the Turks could easily have captured it and the entire kingdom

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<sup>176</sup>Satarov A.A. Ob otnoshenijah Osmanskoj imperii i sultanata fundzh v XVI-XVIII vekah. P. 123

<sup>177</sup>Menage V.L. Op. cit. P. 151

<sup>178</sup>Ibid. P. 151

of the Funj. But the merciful, almighty God has set boundaries throughout the world. As for the fate of the boats equipped by the Turks, only one returned safe and sound, all the others were broken. The state of the Turks extends to Sukkot [the region where the Sai fortress is located – A.S.]”<sup>179</sup>. These events correlate with the oral traditions of al-‘Abdallab , according to which the Ottomans were defeated at Hannik in the area of the third cataract, where the border between the states was established<sup>180</sup>. The unsuccessful Ottoman campaign probably dates back to 1584–1585. It was the last known military campaign against the Sultanate at Sennar in the Nile Valley until Muhammad Ali's expedition of 1820–1821.

In the 17th century, increasing internal problems forced the Ottomans to abandon their plans to expand in Africa. During this period, the Funj Sultanate was at the height of its power, while becoming increasingly open to foreign influence. Sennar, with its significant colonies of foreign merchants, became a cosmopolitan city, and the Funj sultans attempted to modernize the army by importing handguns and cannons. Ottoman Egypt and Habesh Eyalet became channels through which information about modern trends in the development of the army and technology entered the Sultanate. By the 17th century, the Funj Sultanate viewed the Ottoman Empire less as a potential enemy and more as a source of military technology and religious legitimacy, despite the various madhhabs. There is a known case when one of the greatest Sudanese sheikhs, Idris wad al-Arbab, sought clarification on the issue of the ban on smoking tobacco from one of the major Egyptian theologians, Sheikh ‘Ali al- Ajhuri, who did not agree with the opinion of Sheikh Idris, but as a sign of respect and recognition his merits sent him a gift of a tip (“al-Ajhuriyya”) and clothes<sup>181</sup>.

In its turn, the position of the Ottoman Empire in relation to the Sultanate also softened significantly: Suakin continued to play the role of the main port for the Sultanate, there was a regular connection between Cairo and Sennar. The new attitude of the central

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<sup>179</sup>Peacock A.C.S. *The Ottomans and the Funj sultanate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*. P. 96-97

<sup>180</sup>O'Fahey R.S., Spaulding J.L. *Kingdoms of the Sudan*. P. 35

<sup>181</sup>Gerasimov I. *Svjashhennye dary i simvoly v bratstvah Sudana (bratstvo kadirija v gorodke al-Ilafon) // Seminar: GERAL'dika – vspomogatel'naja istoricheskaja disciplina*. St. Petersburg., 2015. P. 21

Ottoman authorities can be seen in a message to the beylerbey Habesh, written by the Porte in July 1701 in response to a letter from the Funj Sultan (he was supposed to be Badi III, however the name is not given in the letter). Unlike the Ottoman rhetoric of the 16th century, when one could come across the concept of “rebellious tribes”, now the letter used the respectful address “ruler of the land of Sennar in Sudan”. The Governor of Habesh province is accused by Istanbul of levying excessive taxes on slave caravans traveling from Sennar to Hejaz via Suakin: instead of taking one gold coin for one slave and one kurush\* for a camel, 5 akçe was charged for one slave, regardless of age, and 3 akçe for a camel. The Porte demanded an immediate end to this oppression of traders from the Sultanate, since it was a violation of the law established during the time of Sultan Selim <sup>182</sup>.

It is also interesting to note that in the 18th century, the rulers of the Funj Sultanate used Suakin as a place of exile: it is believed that the first such exile to the Red Sea coast was Sultan Badi IV Abu Shulukh (1724–1762). Suakin also became a place of exile for Sultan Ismail (1769–1776)<sup>183</sup>.

### 2.3. Conclusions

In 1555, Habesh Eyalet was formed on the basis of the Suakin sanjak. Özdemir Pasha played a big role in its creation, and personally convinced Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent of the need for such a step. The eyalet was to include parts of the territories of Ethiopia and the Funj Sultanate.

The main enemy of the Ottoman Empire was Ethiopia: despite the best technical equipment, the Ottomans were unable to secure the interior of the country. The decisive

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\* Kurush is a Turkish silver coin introduced into circulation in 1687, designed to replace the Austrian thalers then in circulation in the Ottoman Empire. Initially, the coin weighed 19g. and was made of high-grade silver. Subsequently, the standard of the coins constantly deteriorated, their weight decreased (Piastr tureckij // Jenciklopedičeskij slovar' Brokgauza i Efrona. St. Petersburg, 1898. T. XXIIIa. P. 773).

<sup>182</sup> Peacock A.C.S. *The Ottomans and the Funj sultanate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries*, P. 110; Orhonlu Ç. *Op. cit.* S. 247–249.

<sup>183</sup> Gerasimov I.V. *Istorija i kul'tura Sudana XVI—XVIII vv.* pp. 67-69; Qaysr Mūsā Zayn Sawākin: *dirāsat fi Ta'rīh, al- ḥaḍārat wa al-tafā'ulāt al-dūwaliyya.* Ş. 124; Holt P.M. *The Sudan of the Three Niles: the Funj Chronicle 910-1288 / 1504-1871.* Leiden; Boston; Köln, 1999. P. 21.

battle was the Battle of Addi Karo in 1578 or 1579, during which the beylerbey of the province and his most powerful ally Bahr Negash Isaac died.

The Funj Sultanate, although separated from the Ottoman possessions by desert areas, posed a danger to Habesh Eyalet. Tribes associated with it besieged Suakin several times.

In general, during the 16th – 18th centuries, the Ottoman Empire did not develop a permanent political course towards the Funj Sultanate and Ethiopia. Despite the distance of northeast Africa from the center of the Ottoman Empire, local policies were directly dependent on the state of affairs in Istanbul. We can point to several bursts of activity of the Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea area, which occurred in the periods from 1525 to 1528, from 1555 to 1558, and also in the 1580s. The first period was associated with the activities of the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha and the struggle of the Ottomans for control of trade routes through the Red Sea from India. Under the Grand Vizier Rustem Pasha (1544–1553; 1555–1561), the Ottoman Empire showed virtually no interest in expansion in this direction. Establishment of Habesh Eyalet in 1555 took place under the Grand Vizier Kara Ahmed Pasha (1553–1555). The last period of the aggressive policy of the Ottoman Empire in the region occurred at a time when there was an influential group at the Sultan's court that supported expansion in the east. Perhaps this activation in East Africa is connected with the desire to take revenge for the major defeat of the Ottomans at the Battle of Addi Karo against the Ethiopian army in 1579.

At the end of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire abandoned further expansion in the region, and relations with neighboring states improved: the Ottomans even cooperated with Ethiopia to prevent the Portuguese from entering the Red Sea area. Until the end of the 18th century, the nature of relations with Ethiopia and the Funj Sultanate did not undergo any changes; the Ottomans no longer had plans to carry out new conquests.

## CHAPTER 3. FEATURES OF THE FUNCTIONING OF HABESH EYALET

### 3.1. Administrative-territorial division of the Ottoman Empire

The prototype of the future system of provincial division of the Ottoman Empire began to take shape in the second half of the 14th century. It was at this time that several elements of rule appeared: the delegation of military command functions to governors and the provision of plots with the obligation to perform military service. However, the concept of a province as a basic territorial unit with a governor appointed by the Sultan did not yet exist in the Ottoman Empire by the end of the 15th century<sup>184</sup>.

During the early years of the Ottoman Beylik, Osman and Orhan divided the territory among their sons and other family members. This was not yet a system of division into provinces, and the Ottoman state itself at that time was little larger than a province in size. However, some elements of the later system appear to have already taken shape. The brief description of Ibn Battuta in the early 1330s suggests that Orhan was a ruler who personally exercised control rather than delegating power to governors. However, in the 1350s with increasing age and with the increasing size, he entrusted the conquest and settlement of Thrace to his son Suleiman, who essentially became viceroy of the western "province". Thus, towards the end of Orhan's reign, two elements of rule seem to have emerged: one was the transfer of military command, at that time in the family of the ruler, the other was the granting of appanages, which apparently entailed the obligation to perform military service<sup>185</sup>.

By the second half of the 14th century, it became a tradition to allocate lands under the control of the sultan's sons, who performed military duties and had the highest administrative power, holding the position of sanjakbey in the sanjak they. Initially, it was the main unit of the administrative-military structure of the Ottoman Empire.

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<sup>184</sup>Imber C. *The Ottoman Empire 1300–1650: the structure of power*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. P. 178

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.* P. 178

Until 1595, the sultans continued to send their eldest sons to the provinces as governors, but constant internal conflicts between possible heirs to the throne eventually led to the abolition of this practice<sup>186</sup>.

Towards the end of the 14th century, following the conquests of Murad I (1362-1389) and his son Bayezid I (1389-1402) between 1362 and 1400, there was a clear need for a formal organization of the territory of the Ottoman Empire. It was probably during the first years of Bayezid's reign that the first two administrative provinces of the Ottoman Empire arose. To the west of the Dardanelles lay Rumelia, which included all the conquered lands in Europe. To the east lay Anatolia, which included all the conquests of Asia Minor. With the expansion of Bayezid's dominions to the east in the 1390s, a third province arose - the province of Rum, with Amasya as the capital, which became the residence of Bayezid's youngest son, the future ruler Mehmed I (1413–1421). With the annexation of the previously independent beylik of Karaman in 1468, a fourth province was formed. Mehmed II (1451–1481) appointed his son Mustafa as governor of the new province with his seat in Konya. In the 16th century the greatest increase in the number of provinces was observed. This was mainly due to the conquests of Selim I (1512–1520) and Süleyman I (1520–1566), which created the need to incorporate new territories into the structure of the empire, and also partly through the reorganization of old possessions<sup>187</sup>.

The list, dated 1527, shows eight provinces, with Egypt, Syria, Diyarbakir and Kurdistan added to the original four. Süleyman's conquests in eastern Turkey, Iraq and Hungary also led to the creation of new provinces. For example, the former principality of Dulkadir became an Ottoman province some time after the conquest in 1522. After the Iranian campaign of 1533–1536, the new provinces of Erzurum, Van, Shahrizor and Baghdad were called upon to cover the border with Iran. In 1541, the province of Buda was created on the territory of the former Kingdom of Hungary. By 1609, according to Ain Ali's list, there were thirty-two provinces in the Ottoman Empire.

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid. P. 178

<sup>187</sup> History of the Ottoman State, Society and Civilization, P. 176

Some of them, such as Tripoli, Cyprus or Tunisia, were the result of conquest. Others were formed as a result of administrative changes<sup>188</sup>.

The largest administrative unit of the empire, the province, was the beylerbeylik, which was gradually replaced by the concept of eyalet from the middle of the 16th century. The provinces were divided into two types - timarlı and salyaneli. On the territory of the former, the sanjak system, Ottoman law and Ottoman administration were already firmly established, and a timar\* system had emerged. There was no timar system in salyaneli provinces, so all taxes were collected on behalf of the state and distributed for local needs: salaries for the military, officials, the rest went to the state treasury. All Arab eyalets were based on the salyane system\*\*<sup>189</sup>.

Beylerbeys occupied the highest place in the military-administrative hierarchy, heading the eyalet and controlling the troops of the subordinate sanjaks. Early in Ottoman history, beylerbeys were commanders of the provincial troops. The meaning of the word governor-general appeared only in the 15th century. However, this was not so much a change in meaning as an expansion of his range of responsibilities, since the main role of beylerbeys was to command the troops recruited in the provinces. During the war, they gathered under his banner and as part of the Sultan's army. However, as governor, beylerbeys now had broader responsibilities. They played a major role in the distribution of possessions in their provinces and were responsible for maintaining order and

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<sup>188</sup>Imber C. *The Ottoman Empire 1300–1650: the structure of power*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. P. 179.

\* Timar – 1. General name for fief land holdings. 2. Land grant with an annual income of up to 99,999 akçes. Timars were divided depending on size into “with tezkere” and “without tezkere”. For timars with tezkere, usually with an income of more than 5-6 thousand akçes, according to the representation of the beylerbey, called tezkere, a letter of grant (berat) was issued on behalf of the sultan. For timars with an income of 1 to 4 thousand akçes, the berat was issued by the beylerbey himself, without submitting a tezkere in the name of the sultan. (*Agrarnyj stroj Osmanskoj imperii XV-XVII vv.: dokumenty i materialy* / ed. A.S. Tveritina. Moscow: «Vostochnaja literatura», 1963. P. 216).

<sup>189</sup>Istorija Osmanskogo gosudarstva, obshhestva i civilizacii, pp. 176-177

\*\* Salyane is the annual income of some provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which went directly to the state treasury in the form of tribute. Only part of this income - the annual maintenance of the beylerbey and the salary for the garrison of the Janissary army - remained in the treasury of the local governor. The list of provinces in which the salyane system existed is given in the treatise of Ali Chaush. (*Agrarnyj stroj Osmanskoj imperii XV-XVII vv.: dokumenty i materialy*. P. 213).



administering justice. The beylerbey's house, like the Sultan's house in the capital, was the political center of the province.

One of the important factors for the appointment of a governor was his loyalty to the court. Upon receiving the appointment, a beylerbey was given instructions for his tenure. The duration of his work was not determined; some of them held the posts for a short period of time, while the powers of others stretched for decades.

Beylerbeys headed their provincial government, which included the defterdar\*, qadi\*\*, divan effendi, and secretaries. The provincial divan was engaged in solving current problems and analyzing complaints, most of which concerned the timar system. Income of beylerbeys in the 16th century exceeded 800 thousand akçes<sup>190</sup>.

Below beylerbeys in the hierarchy were sanjakbeys, who stood at the head of the sanjak that was an administrative-military unit smaller than the eyalet. Sanjakbeys were rulers of the territory where the timars were owned by their sipahis. As commanders of provincial troops, sanjakbeys had numerous responsibilities that were not limited only to wartime. Under their banners, they collected sipahi\*\*\* and jebelu\*\*\*\*, together with the qadis, they had the right to judge those who did not show up for the army, and looked for a replacement for them. In peacetime, they were engaged in sending letters

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\* Defterdar is the highest rank in the capital or provincial financial department, treasurer (Mejer M.S. Osmanskaja imperija v XVIII veke. Cherty strukturnogo krizisa. S. 237).

<sup>190</sup>History of the Ottoman State, Society and Civilization, P. 181

\*\* Qadi is a judge. Usually, he stood at the head of the administrative-judicial district, called kaza, where he carried out legal proceedings and monitored the implementation of orders by local officials. Depending on the rank, the qadi received a salary of 500, 300, 150 and 60-70 akche. In addition, they independently collected fees from the population for the execution of legal acts, the preparation and certification of papers, etc. (Agrarnyj stroj Osmanskoj imperii XV-XVII vv.: dokumenty i materialy. P. 202).

\*\*\* Sipahi - horseman, cavalryman - warriors of two categories of the feudal army: 1. Ulufeli sipahi - "sipahi with a salary" - warriors of the courtier, who were on salary, of the cavalry army. It consisted of six regiments, with a total strength reaching in the 16th V. up to 6000 people. 2. Sipahitimarots - warriors of the cavalry feudal militia who owned fiefs (timars, zeamets, etc.) and, in accordance with the income from them, were obliged to go on campaign themselves and bring out the required number of horsemen. In the 16th century their number reached 200 thousand people. (Agrarnyj stroj Osmanskoj imperii XV-XVII vv.: dokumenty i materialy. P. 214)

\*\*\*\* Jebelu - "armourer" - is a warrior-horseman of the feudal militia. The owners of small timars themselves went on campaigns as jebelus; the owners of large timars withdrew a certain amount of jebelu in accordance with their income. (Agrarnyj stroj Osmanskoj imperii XV-XVII vv.: dokumenty i materialy. P. 199)

asking for the provision of land to those timariots who distinguished themselves in a campaign or in war. The sanjakbey's competence included issues of local public safety and determination of punishment: "The choice of punishment for robbers, swindlers, thieves and murderers is the responsibility of the guardian of order and peace in the region, i.e. sanjakbey." One of the beneficial aspects of the position of sanjakbeys was the opportunity to collect some taxes in his favor. A sanjakbey could not punish on his own without receiving the qadi's sentence, just as the qadi did not independently carry out his sentences. Sanjakbeys received from 150 to 200 thousand akçes per year<sup>191</sup>.

The lowest level in the military-administrative echelon of control was occupied by timariot sipahis. Sipahis had to live in the sanjak where their timar and other property were located, therefore they were attached to a certain area: "The habitat of the subashi and sipahi of the sanjak and all their property should be in [this] sanjak. And let [he] not be anywhere else except [his] sanjak. If they find themselves outside the sanjak, then this should be the reason for their dismissal"<sup>192</sup>.

Sipahis did not hold positions, but rather performed certain administrative functions in timars, which they received not to own, but to use (mainly, sipahis collected taxes for the state and for themselves) for the time they performed their military service. Firstly, they supplied rayah\* with land. In order to receive taxes from rayah, it was desirable for sipahis to first find an allotment for them; secondly, sipahis controlled the timely receipt of taxes and fines from peasants. From rayah, who paid the resm-i chift\*\*, sipahis had no right to demand a second payment: "The owner of the land should not demand resm-i chift a second time, forcing those for whom

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<sup>191</sup>Imber C. *The Ottoman Empire 1300–1650: the structure of power*. P.189

<sup>192</sup>Agrarnyj stroj Osmanskoj imperii XV-XVII vv.: dokumenty i materialy. P. 82

\* Rayah is a feudal-dependent peasant attached to the land of the feudal lord, obligated to perform certain duties and pay taxes in favor of the land owner and military taxes in favor of the treasury. The position of rayah on the lands of the owners of timars, zeamets, khasses, mulks and waqfs did not differ significantly. Until XVII centuries, all assigned peasants were called rayah, regardless of religion. From the mid- 17th century, this name began to be commonly applied to non-Muslims. (Agrarnyj stroj Osmanskoj imperii XV-XVII vv.: dokumenty i materialy. pp. 210-211).

\*\* Resm-i chift is a land tax in favor of the landowner from Muslim rayah who had a full allotment (chift). Its size varied depending on the province. (Agrarnyj stroj Osmanskoj imperii XV-XVII vv.: dokumenty i materialy. P. 212).

the chift or half-chift is recorded<sup>193</sup>.” Also, when transferring powers, the newly arrived sipahi received profits from the previous sipahi, and not from the peasants<sup>194</sup>. Together with sanjakbeys, sipahis collected fines, and with beylerbeys, they collected fees for crimes and violations, which were divided equally<sup>195</sup>. An owner of rayah had the right to collect a fine from robbers, murderers, and thieves if the perpetrator received forgiveness according to Sharia or custom<sup>196</sup>. With the help of qadis, he collected jizya\* and ispenje\*\* from rayah who did not want to pay these taxes<sup>197</sup>. At the same time, sipahis paid part of the taxes they received to the benefit of the same sanjak bey and beylerbey, under whose jurisdiction it was, and to the state treasury. Thirdly, they were required to monitor the condition of the land so that peasants did not leave the land uncultivated, and to control the quality of sowing. If a peasant left his village, then the sipahi of the timar where the rayat came had to find out where he came from and inform the sipahi to take his rayat<sup>198</sup>. Timar owners had the right to force peasants to cultivate the land and perform their duties<sup>199</sup>. In addition, the sipahis carried out land surveys, measured the harvest, controlled the transfer of land to other owners – together with the qadis, they resolved situations related to inheritance, sale of land, and finally regulated the relations between the settled and the newly arrived population<sup>200</sup>.

The organization of judicial power in the province was based on a system of special judicial districts (kaza), which were under the administrative jurisdiction of qadis, who, in addition to resolving administrative issues, dealt with the problems of cities in their territories. Qadis shared their powers with beylerbeys and sanjakbeys, occupying an important place in provincial government. Qadis received instructions directly

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<sup>193</sup> Ibid. P. 66

<sup>194</sup> Ibid. P. 58

<sup>195</sup> Ibid. P. 72

<sup>196</sup> Ibid. P. 43

\* Jizya is a poll tax on the non-Muslim population that went to the Sultan's treasury.

\*\* Ispenje is a poll tax on the non-Muslim population. It was collected from the male population, regardless of property and family status, at 25 akche per person. Corresponded to the land tax from Muslims, resm-i chift. (Agrarnyj stroj Osmanskoj imperii XV-XVII vv.: dokumenty i materialy. P. 201)

<sup>197</sup> Ibid. P. 91

<sup>198</sup> Ibid. P. 82

<sup>199</sup> Ibid. P. 71

<sup>200</sup> Ibid. pp. 42, 48

from the Sultan and did not depend on the local authorities in their legal decisions. Employees, subashis, sipahis who exercised administrative control over different groups of the population were responsible to them. The judicial power functioned in parallel with the military-administrative management, therefore, on the one hand, this gave rise to the independence of branches of local government and, on the other, their mutual control.

In order to carry out a fair trial, a qadi held his post in one place for a short time, usually about a year. It was believed that during this time he would not have time to establish close relations with the population of the territory over which his jurisdiction extended<sup>201</sup>.

In the Ottoman Empire, qadis were firmly integrated into the state system – starting from the period of their training and appointment, they simultaneously represented the Islamic state and the secular bureaucratic one, being intermediaries between people and the state and an interpreter of moral, religious and legal meanings at the local level.

Judges in the Ottoman Empire had a wide range of powers: in addition to resolving judicial disputes, they also monitored the collection of taxes, the activities of waqfs, controlled the setting of food prices, regulated the income of sipahis, traders, and artisans who participated in the procedure for preparing for the sale of fugitive slaves who were caught in free timarah. Qadis monitored the fulfillment of the duties of the raiyat –if they did not fulfill them, a qadi had to force them to do so. He had the authority to prohibit the sanjakhbey and the sipahi from collecting more than the amounts of fines established in the laws in the sanjak. Qadis were guided by Sharia and secular legislation to carry out their tasks.

Each kaza, in turn, included several nakhiyas (districts) under the control of mudyurs and kariye (villages) under the control of mukhtars.

The financial branch of local government was headed by defterdars, who collected government revenues from each territory and resolved financial issues. Defterdars were assisted by ketkhudas and tahrir eminis, who worked in preparing the registers together

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<sup>201</sup>History of the Ottoman State, Society and Civilization, P. 206

with katibs; they also administered the charters for khas and zeamet. Usually, candidates for these positions were selected from among the ulema, noted for their merits and honesty. He could contact the capital directly and file complaints against the beylerbey and other administrators. On the other hand, the beylerbey could remove from office a qadi or defterdar who abused their power, but he had to immediately report this to the capital. This created a balance of power in the province.

The considerable distance of Habesh Eyalet from the center of the Ottoman Empire determined some features of its development: it was difficult for the governors to communicate with the central authorities. From Massawa or Suakin, messages were sent by sea to Suez, from there to Alexandria and then again by ship to Istanbul. Another option for departure from Alexandria was Antalya, and from there by land to the capital. From Egypt, Yemen and Habesh, messages were most often sent in the second way. It took a lot of time to send instructions and orders – usually several months. The eyalet occupied large territories, while at the same time the forces ensuring its control were very small and needed reinforcements. They were constantly needed here, since for a long time there was a war with Ethiopia on these lands. The eyalet did not have sufficient income to service all the armed forces present on its territory; financial assistance was sent from Egypt. This caused the problem of delays in paying salaries to the military. Officials, deprived of close control, were reluctant to perform their duties<sup>202</sup>.

The indigenous population of Habesh Eyalet were Beja nomads. Despite their proximity to the sea, they practically did not use it in their economic activities. It is believed that the ancestors of this people could have lived here as early as the 4th millennium BC. Beja tribes were divided into two groups: northern and southern. The northern ones include Bisharin, Hadendowa, Amara; to the south – the Beni-Amer tribe. The first three tribes speak the Cushitic Tubdhawi language, while the Beni Amer tribe, living on the border with Ethiopia, uses the Semitic Tigre language.

Another prominent ethnic group in the province were the Hadarib. In the 19th century, Johann Ludwig Burckhardt wrote about them the following:

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<sup>202</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 93.

“The inhabitants of Suakin, as well as the inhabitants of other cities on the Red Sea coast, are representatives of different peoples, but one group stands out noticeably among them. The ancestors of the main Arab families from Suakin come from Hadhramaut, mainly from the city of Shihr on the Indian Ocean coast. Some say that they appeared here a century ago, others claim that the Hadarib came soon after the rise of Islam”<sup>203</sup>. The Hadaribs had great independence, but relations between them and the Beja were very strained. The Hadaribs carried out active trading activities: their caravans went far into the interior regions of Africa, and their ships reached the shores of India and even Indonesia.

It should be noted that the port cities of the eyalet were very cosmopolitan, their population fluctuating depending on the season.

### **3.2. Beylerbey**

In the 16th century, beylerbeys of Habesh Eyalet were usually selected among candidates serving near the province. The best example of this is the founder of the eyalet, Özdemir Pasha and his son Osman Pasha. Other examples include the beylerbeys Suleiman and Mustafa Bey, who ruled the sanjaks in Egypt, as well as Khizir Pasha, who arrived from Yemen. At the beginning of the 17th century, the appointed beylerbeys were selected from the sanjakbeys of Egypt. Later, by the middle of the century, officials from other places began to receive appointments. For example, on March 8, 1660, Hasan Pasha, the former defterdar of Karaman, became beylerbey. Mehmed Pasha, who was appointed beylerbey in 1640, had previously also served as beylerbey in Karaman. Arnaut Hasan Pasha, appointed on August 4, 1701, served as defterdar in Egypt. As throughout the Ottoman Empire, the service life of beylerbeys in the province was short. Due to the remoteness of the province, a new beylerbey could arrive here only after a few months, which further reduced the efficiency of its administration <sup>204</sup>.

Before the arrival of a new beylerbey to Habesh Eyalet, the senior sanjakbey of the province was the acting governor. For example, in 1577, when Suleiman Pasha was

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<sup>203</sup>Burckhardt J. L. *Travels in Nubia*. London: John Murray, Albemarle street, 1819. P. 488.

<sup>204</sup>Orhonlu Ç. *Op. cit.* S. 94-96.

appointed to the position of beylerbey, until his appearance in the province (which never happened), the janissary commander Mehmed Bey was acting temporarily. He replaced the governor for almost a year from the moment of Mustafa Pasha's death. Since he had no official appointment, he was referred to in documents as “Commissioner of the Province of Habesh”<sup>205</sup>.

Despite the strict attitude of the central authorities, the beylerbeys did not strive to quickly find themselves in the place of their future service in Habesh Eyalet, and this behavior was not unique to the beylerbeys. There is a known case when someone named Khabir, having received an appointment to the position of sanjakbey, did not immediately strive to go to his place of service. To make him do this, it was necessary to send a repeated order from Istanbul to the Egyptian beylerbey.

After the administrative reform of the beginning of the 18th century, beylerbeys ceased to be in Massawa or Suakin; instead of himself, he sent his trusted person here. However, government officials had no power here; instead, the territories were governed by representatives of the local elite<sup>206</sup>.

At the same time, after the administrative reform, appointment to the province became more prestigious, for this reason more famous officials began to be appointed here. Beylerbeys had new responsibilities related to the reception of pilgrims: providing them with food and accommodation. During the period from 1756 to 1792, there were 29 beylerbeys in the province, all of whom had the rank of vizier<sup>207</sup>.

### **3.3. Officials in Habesh Eyalet**

The creation of the eyalet was followed by a series of administrative appointments. On November 30, 1555, at the request of Özdemir Pasha, a qadi was appointed to the province – ‘Abd al-Wahhab: “Özdemir Pasha, beylerbey of Habesh [eyalet] sent a letter in which he said regarding ‘Abdel Wahab Efendi, to whom we have granted [the position] qadi of Habesh [eyalet] with [salary of] 100 akçe per day, that he is a person

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid. S. 94-95.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid. S. 132-133.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid. S. 133-134.

who is distinguished by perfection, honor, adorned with the beauty of knowledge. He is able to maintain law and order in the said eyalet, but at the same time he is in a poor position and cannot even arrange his life”<sup>208</sup>. The judge was probably of Egyptian origin, and his local connections and good knowledge of the region played a role in his appointment. The judges of Habesh Eyalet resided permanently in Suakin; this continued even after the center of the eyalet was moved to Massawa<sup>209</sup>.

The judge's salary reached 150 akçe per day. There was no specific period of tenure for a judge; the longest period of tenure is considered to be 13 years. A change of provincial qadi could be due to various reasons: death, transfer to another province, resignation<sup>210</sup>.

Little information has been preserved about the activities of judges: there is a known case of turning to a qadi related to property disputes. The old beylerbey Bayezid Pasha, who was going to Istanbul, loaded all his property onto the ship, and he himself went to Egypt by land. However, his ship was captured by Perviz Kethuda\*, an adviser to the new beylerbey. Having learned about this, Bayezid Pasha turned to the qadi with a request to return the confiscated property<sup>211</sup>.

The official in charge of the financial affairs of the province was called *nazyri emval*. The first nazyri emval Ahmad Bey was appointed to the position even a little earlier than the judge, on November 17, 1555. His salary was equal to that of the sanjakkbey of Massawa. It is known that in 1565 another person was appointed to this position. No documents have been preserved describing the activities of the provincial financial department<sup>212</sup>.

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<sup>208</sup>Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, KK., no. 214, sh. 24 // Al-Sūdān fī al- ‘ahd al- ‘uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā’iq al-’aršif al-‘uṭmāni. Ş. 78-79.

<sup>209</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 114-115; Evliya Çelebi. The Book of Travels. P. 310.

<sup>210</sup>Qayşr Mūsā Zayn. Sawākin: dirāsāt fī Ta’rīḥ, al- ḥadārat wa al-tafā’ulāt al-dūwaliyya. Ş. 152; Evliya Çelebi. The Book of Travels. P. 310.

\* Kethuda is the manager of the affairs of a rich or noble person, a village or neighborhood headman, a foreman of artisans (Mejer M. S. Osmanskaja imperija v XVIII veke. Cherty strukturnogo krizisa. P. 238).

<sup>211</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 115.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid. S. 115-116; Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul, KK., no. 214, sh.13// Al-Sūdān fī al- ‘ahd al- ‘uṭmāniyya: min ḥilāl waṭā’iq al-’aršif al-‘uṭmāni (“Sudan in the Ottoman era: in the documents



Sheikh al-Arab was in charge of relations with nearby tribes: his duties included forming a militia from among them. In 1580, it was Sheikh al-Arab, together with the dizdar of Suakin, who were able to prevent the robbery of the Yemeni detachment of Bayram<sup>213</sup>.

### 3.4. Indirect administration of the province, naibs

At the beginning of the 17th century, the Ottoman presence in Habesh Eyalet decreased noticeably. Leaving a small garrison in Massawa, the Ottoman Empire handed over Arkiko to the administration of the leaders of the Balau\* ethnic group, who were called *Naibs*. Authoritative sources do not make it possible to establish the exact time of the transfer of power and the appointment of the first naib. Another aspect of the issue that remains unknown is the procedure for the transfer of power, namely whether it was documented. Perhaps this process occurred gradually, and therefore not received reflections in the sources. It is known that at least in 1633 the Pasha's kaymakam\*\* ruled Massawa. However, in 1673, Evliya Çelebi noticed that the naib ruled the province; by this time, the pashas only retained control over customs duties, and outside the ports of the eyalet, their words had no weight. Thus, the transfer of power to the naibs occurred in the middle of the 17th century. The chronicle of King Iyasu I (1654–1706) confirms the power of the naibs in Habesh Eyalet: Naib Musa ibn 'Umar Kunna took from a certain merchant Murad, who was bringing gifts to the king of Ethiopia, part

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of the Ottoman archive”) / 'I'adād 'Ūgūrḥān Damīrbāš, 'Alī 'Uṭmān Tšanār, Muğāhid Damīr'al; tarğama Sa'adāwī Şālīḥ. 'Istānbūl, 2007. Ş. 79

<sup>213</sup> Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 99-100.

\* The Balau are an ethnic group formed as a result of the mixing of Beja nomads and Arabs, with their original origins in the Suakin region. Migrated to the territory of modern Eritrea in the 14th century (Miran J. Power without Pashas: The Anatomy of Na'ib Autonomy in Ottoman Eritrea (17th – 19th C.) P. 36–37).

\*\* Kaymakam is a governor, the ruler of a sanjak, or district, subordinate to the wali, or governor, who is at the head of the vilayet (Kajmakam // Enciklopedicheskij slovar' Brokgauza i Efrona. St. Petersburg, 1894. T. XIII a. P. 994).

of the goods as a duty, but the naib did not dare to come into conflict with Iyasu I and was forced to give in to him<sup>214</sup>.

In general, relations between the naibs and the rulers of Ethiopia remained tense during the 17th and 18th centuries: Habesh Eyalet provided access to the sea, and disagreements arose over the issue of paying duties. Probably, during the 18th century, the power of the naibs only grew, and at a certain stage they stopped being afraid to enter into confrontation with the kings of Ethiopia: for example, in 1745, the Ethiopian embassy to Cairo, sent for a new abuna\*, was detained in Arkiko. The ambassadors had to give up most of the money to continue their mission, but on the way back in 1746, the embassy with the abuna was again stopped and forced to pay. Traveler James Bruce, who personally visited Massawa in 1768, reported that the naibs did not pay tribute to either the pashas of Jeddah or the kings of Ethiopia. This was facilitated by the weakening of central power in Ethiopia and the loss of interest of the Ottoman Empire in the region. The naibs were able to take advantage of this power vacuum and achieve great independence<sup>215</sup>.

The fact that the naibs represented the Ottoman Empire added to their prestige. In the second half of the 18th century, they proved to be the most powerful rulers in the territories from the coast to the mountainous regions. They were able to achieve growth in their influence and power primarily thanks to the ability to correctly use force and coercion. Naibs were able to ensure the functioning of the economic system

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<sup>214</sup>Miran J. Power without Pashas: The Anatomy of Na'ib Autonomy in Ottoman Eritrea (17th–19th C.) // *Eritrean Studies Review*. No. 1, 2007. Vol. 5. P. 39-40; Evliya Çelebi. *The Book of Travels*. P. 251-259; *Efiopskie hroniki 17th – 18th vekov*. pp. 144-145.

\* Abuna is a respectful address to a clergyman (not a bishop) among Arabic-speaking Christians, corresponding to Russian. "otec, batjushka" This term is also used in proper names, where it denotes church veneration of a person as a saint; in this case it roughly corresponds to sire. ma r - lord, saint. In Ethiopia, this word was divided into 2 terms - "abuna" and "abun". The first is an appeal and application to the name of any spiritual mentor, starting from the abbot (for the monks of his monastery) or the saint (for believers, especially those who honor his memory) to the highest church hierarchs, such as the Metropolitan of Ethiopia or the Copts. Patriarch of Alexandria. In the same way, another term appeared - "abun", which was no longer an address or an epithet: this was the name in the third person for the metropolitan, and after the Ethiopian Church gained autocephaly (1948) - both the metropolitans and the patriarch of Ethiopia (Muravyov A.V. Chernetsov S.B. *Abuna // Pravoslavnaja Enciklopedija*. URL: <https://www.pravenc.ru/text/62532.html> (access date 04/20/2023)).

<sup>215</sup> Miran J. Power without Pashas. P. 42-43; *Efiopskie hroniki 18th veka*. P. 81-83.

by protecting nomadic pastoralists from raids from neighboring territories and controlling trade routes to the coast. They could independently conduct small military campaigns to expand their zone of influence or protect the tax-paying population. Thus, Naib Ahmad Hasan at the end of the 18th century (reign: 1781–1801) entered into a long confrontation with the inhabitants of Debaroa, who supported some villages in the Serae region where people refused to pay the naibs <sup>216</sup>.

During the period of maximum power, the authority of naibs extended to the entire population of Semhara as far as Akik (more than 200 km north of Massawa). An early 19th century source reports that the population of Massawa traded with the Suakin region and the naib established a relationship with its local ruler <sup>217</sup>.

The foundation of naibs' power was their military organization; in addition, through the Ottoman Empire, they had access to firearms. At the end of the 16th century, the Ottomans withdrew most of their forces from Massawa, leaving only a small militia and customs. This militia was divided into Arab and Turkish. Both militias were controlled by naibs. The commander of the Turkish militia bore the title of sirdar and was often related to the naib. The commander of the Arab militia, which included slaves and poor natives of the Balau, was called kehya. Both posts became hereditary. The Ottoman garrison gradually mixed with the local population<sup>218</sup>.

There is less information about the system of indirect control in Suakin in the 17th – 18th centuries than about the system of naibs in Massawa. French physician Charles Jacques Poncet, who passed through Massawa in October 1700, wrote: “The Pasha of Massawa appointed a governor in Suakin, dependent on the Ottoman Empire...”. Perhaps the traveler named naib as Pasha of Massawa <sup>219</sup>.

James Bruce, who traveled to the sources of the Nile, reported on the crisis of trade in the Red Sea area, including due to extortion by officials: “They extort money and become downright robbers, seizing cargo from ships... Because of this, trade

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<sup>216</sup>Miran J., *Power without Pashas*, pp. 44-47.

<sup>217</sup>Ibid. P. 44.

<sup>218</sup>Ibid. P. 45.

<sup>219</sup>Foster W. *The Red Sea and adjacent countries at the close of the seventeenth century as described by Joseph Pitts, William Daniel and Charles Jacques Poncet*. P. 154.

was abandoned and stopped... Agha in Suakin unsuccessfully tried to get the Arabs and his entourage to work without wages, so they left all types of work except for the execution of punishments; they grew up ignorant of the trades in which they were once so experienced and knowledgeable”. Bruce did not specifically say who ruled in Suakin, but he pointed to the general decline of Ottoman influence in the region, and also noted that power in Suakin, Massawa and Dahlak had returned to the local elite <sup>220</sup>.

Most likely, the system of management of Suakin during the 18th century and before the arrival of Muhammad Ali's expeditionary force in the city did not undergo significant changes, so it would be appropriate to mention the report of the Swiss traveler Johann Ludwig Burckhardt. The administration of the city, he said, was in the hands of the “emir al-Hadarib”, who was chosen from among the first families of the tribe, presumably a continuation of the system of alliances with the sheikh al-Arab known from 16th century Ottoman documents. He was confirmed in his position by the governor in Jeddah, and every year in Jeddah there was a procedure for confirmation of the position by the local beylerbey. To properly resolve this issue, Emir Hadarib sent a “gift” to Jeddah (Burckhardt writes about 40 ounces of gold). At the same time, the Ottoman government was represented by a customs official in the position of agha, whose power was severely limited by the emir Hadarib. The agha whom Burckhardt met was named Emak, he was from Jeddah and did not know Turkish well. Burckhardt notes that Emak “proved himself ridiculous in imitating Ottoman customs in a place like Suakin”. The Ottoman garrison consisted of five or six Yemeni mercenaries who were afraid to go into the city because they might just be attacked. For the same reason, agha also never visited Geif\*. The local residents themselves told Burckhardt that only the threat of a large expedition from Jeddah was the reason why Suakin did not completely overthrow Ottoman power<sup>221</sup>.

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<sup>220</sup>Bruce J. Travels to discover the Source of the Nile, in the years 1768, 1769, 1770, 1771, 1772, and 1773. P. 373-374.

\* Geif is a district in Suakin, located on the mainland in contrast to the island historical part of the city.

<sup>221</sup>Burckhardt J. L. Op. cit., pp. 434-438.

### 3.5. Economy

Despite the complexity of navigation in the Red Sea, there was active trade through it, connecting the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. The peculiarities of navigation in the Red Sea include a small number of convenient anchorages. The African coast was a sparsely populated desert, and most of the population were nomads. Severe climatic conditions led to food shortages and made the development of large cities impossible. Thus, Burkhart at the beginning of the 19th century estimated the population of Suakin at 8,000 people, of which approximately 3,000 lived on the island, in the historical center of the city.

Until the mid-19th century, long-distance trade was dependent on weather and natural conditions. In the Red Sea area, the determining factor was the prevailing seasonal winds of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean monsoons.

When moving from east to west in the immediate vicinity of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, it was necessary to move cargo to ships more suitable for navigation in the inland sea, so most ships from the east were unloaded in the Yemeni ports of Aden, Shihr, Moha<sup>222</sup>. Thus, trade with India and China was carried out indirectly.

One of the confirmations of the existence of such contacts is the preserved samples of ceramic products discovered during archaeological research. In addition, due to wood shortages, Habesh province imported wood. The only type of wood discovered that was brought here from southern or southeastern Asia was saya, used for making decorative elements on the windows of buildings. Due to the fact that most of the goods supplied from Habesh Eyalet consisted of unprocessed agricultural products, gold and slaves, their presence in Asian markets is almost impossible to establish.

A significant factor of trade stimulation in the Red Sea area was the numerous pilgrimage routes that flocked to the Muslim holy cities of Hejaz and Jerusalem, where Christian pilgrims from Ethiopia were heading across the Red Sea.

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<sup>222</sup>Tuchscherer M. Trade and Port Cities in the Red Sea-Gulf of Aden Region in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century. P. 29

In the mid-16th century, the Ottoman Empire turned the Red Sea into an “inland lake”: for the first time in history, the entire coastline of this sea was under the control of one state. The establishment of a delicate balance of power between Portugal and the Ottoman Empire in the Indian Ocean, as well as the safety of shipping through the Red Sea, provided favorable conditions for the resumption of old trade routes, so that the volume of spices transported in 1550 reached its 15th century peak <sup>223</sup>.

Since 1580, there has been a decline in the spice trade through the Red Sea, as its main flows were redirected to eastern Asia. The problem worsened in the 17th century with the creation of the European East India Companies. By 1625, the Ottoman Empire had lost the European spice market, so that spice flows through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf satisfied only its domestic demand <sup>224</sup>. At the same time, the trade in coffee expanded significantly, the consumption of which became widespread in the Ottoman Empire by the 1570s–80s. In addition, more and more textile products came from India in exchange for gold and silver.

The province's main source of income was customs fees at the ports of Suakin, Massawa and Beilul. They occupied an important place in trade between East and West. The most valuable goods were spices (the most expensive and mass-produced goods) and slaves. At the same time, travelers visiting the region mentioned, among other goods passing through the ports, gold, ivory, coffee, pearls, tortoiseshells, gum arabic, myrrh, frankincense and cassia. A characteristic feature of the Red Sea trade was that these goods could be transported together on one ship. When entering each port, ships sold part of their cargo. In fact, the cargo left at the ports generated income. Indian merchants bought gold and ivory in Suakin and transported them on their ships to their country. In each port there was a person who provided contact between traders and the administration. The functioning of the ports was highly dependent on this person: it was port managers who were responsible for all operations in the port and had official status<sup>225</sup>.

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<sup>223</sup>Ibid. P. 36

<sup>224</sup> Ibid. P. 38

<sup>225</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 98-99.

Suakin and Massawa were the main ports for the Sultanate of Sennar and Ethiopia respectively. Most of the income came from customs receipts of arriving ships. The income of Suakin, like other ports, was farmed out; administration in this form began in 1554<sup>226</sup>.

Wars had a great influence on the well-being of ports; merchant ships preferred not to enter them at this time. For example, in 1581, trading ships began to stop at Beylul, ceasing to call at Suakin and Massawa. However, the revenues of the ports never covered the expenses of the eyalet. Another important source of income was pearl fishing. The annual customs tax of the ports of Habesh Eyalet was 15,000 florins<sup>227</sup>.

### **Indian presence in Habesh Eyalet**

Centuries-old trade ties with India have led to the appearance of Baniyan\* communities in Red Sea port cities, including Massawa and Suakin. By the end of the 16th century, the Indian community in Massawa was well known. In 1597 it was mentioned by the Indian Catholic priest Melchior da Silva. In 1603, the Jesuit Pedro Paez stayed with the head of the Banyans, who provided him with a boat to travel to Ethiopia and gave him a young Muslim servant to accompany him. Jesuit Manuel Barradas reported that Indian traders bought ivory and civet\*\* here. Baltasar Telles noted that the religion of the Banyans allowed them to engage in usury, which brought them great income<sup>228</sup>.

Evliya Çelebi mentioned traders from India both when visiting Suakin and Massawa. So, according to the Ottoman traveler, their warehouses with expensive goods were located near the pier in Suakin. In addition, Evliya Çelebi argued that the Banyans occupied a central role in the financial sphere of the entire province: “The work

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<sup>226</sup>Ibid. S. 99-100

<sup>227</sup>Ibid. S. 100

\* *Banyan* are merchants of Indian origin, distinguished by their clothing, food consumed, behavior when conducting trade and religion.

\*\* *Civet* is a strongly musky-smelling substance, similar to a yellow or brownish ointment, representing the secretion of the glands of a civet or civet (an animal found in India, Iran, Ethiopia). Used in perfumery (*Civet* // Large Dictionary of Foreign Words (2007)). URL: <http://rus-yaz.niv.ru/doc/foreign-words-big/fc/slovar-214.htm#zag-2252>. (date appeal 04/20/2023)).

<sup>228</sup> Pankhurst R. The “Banyan” or Indian Presence at Massawa, the Dahlak Islands and the Horn of Africa // Journal of Ethiopian Studies. P. 188.

of all departments related to finance and customs fees throughout Habesh is concentrated in their hands. In the offices they calculate and record with incredible accuracy and intelligence, as well as mathematical skill, information about each facet – these are such phenomenal mathematicians!... They enjoy complete trust; they know no lies or forgery. They do not drink wine, do not eat pork or anything living. Everyone always eats alone, they never eat together, and no one eats another's dish or invites him to taste the food, otherwise it only happens if guests come... These are very rich, but highly respectable businessmen who would never commit any dishonest act. They trade with Sindh and Hind, Funjistan and Dumbistan, and they are excellent accountants. Not a single person has heard of these people violating laws with their actions: such reasonable, decent and kind people! In general, they are just as kind to foreigners. From your humble servant they bought heavily transported goods worth almost a thousand piastres, which was a much higher price than usual, and they did not object or interfere at all”<sup>229</sup>.

In turn, James Bruce wrote about the flourishing of trade with India: the Banyan, according to him, exported pearls, tortoise shells, ivory, myrrh, and incense from Massawa and Suakin to China. They exchanged all this for goods from India. The Dahlak archipelago was also involved in trade with India. Charles Ponce saw merchant ships from India off its coast, which came there to replenish their supplies of water and food. James Bruce has argued that regional instability in the 18th century resulted in the Banyan community in Massawa being reduced to just 6 people. They were engaged in the jewelry business, producing silver jewelry and appraising gold with generally small incomes. The Scottish traveler wrote that, as before, textile products were brought from India, including blue cotton, clothing from Surat, and cashmere<sup>230</sup>.

### **Slave trade**

Morocco, Tunisia, Tripolitania, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, the Arabian Peninsula – all these lands received slaves exported from Habesh eyalet and neighboring state entities. Trade took place both by land and by sea. There were two caravan routes from the south: one from Darfur, the second from Sennar.

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<sup>229</sup> Evliya Çelebi. *Ins Land der geheimnisvollen Func.* S. 249, 257-258

<sup>230</sup> Pankhurst R. *Op. cit.* P. 189



Until the second half of the 18th century, Darfur maintained connections through caravan routes with Tripolitania and Egypt. Caravans from Darfur at the end of the 18th century consisted of 5,000 camels and 500 slave traders – jallab. Every year 5000–6000 slaves were exported. When a caravan entered Girga, a customs fees were paid for each slave and each camel. 75% of slaves were women and girls aged from 6 to 30, most of them were 10–15 years old. The caravan from Darfur passed through Asyut, Beni Adin and Manfalut and reached Cairo. At intermediate points, traders also sold slaves. The best healthy boys aged 8–10 years were selected from the Abu Tiga area in southern Cairo. In Cairo, customs duties were again paid for every slave and camel. The average cost of a slave was 35 gold coins. Some slaves were sold not to Cairo merchants, but to traders from other parts of the Ottoman Empire. Some of the slaves were bought by local Mamluk beys. The caravan remained in Egypt for 6–8 months and then began its return journey<sup>231</sup>.

From the Funj Sultanate, the caravan left directly from the capital Sennar. From here the caravan left several times a year. Small caravans converged at Ibrim and became one large caravan. Before Egypt, the caravan was guarded by the Ababde\* tribe , who were paid 3 gold coins for each captive and 1.5 gold coins for one camel. In Esna, the caravan paid the bey of the Girga sanjak 4 gold coins for a slave and 2 gold coins for a camel, from here the caravan headed to Cairo. There were about 150–200 slaves in the caravans (most of them women), and the main commodity was resin. The cost of slaves reached 60 gold coins. During the French expedition to Egypt, caravans continued to enter the country, but the sale of slaves was abolished and the income of merchants decreased. Traders transported slaves to Egypt either along the Nile or across the desert in caravans. Most slaves from Ethiopia came from the Galla region<sup>232</sup>.

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<sup>231</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 100-101.

\* Ababde is a Bedouin tribe settled in upper Egypt and Nubia. Ababde were engaged in herding camels, sheep and goats; they cannot be considered nomads, since they leave their homes only during a lack of water (Ababde // Encyclopedic Dictionary of Brockhaus and Efron. St. Petersburg, 1890. T. I. P. 10).

<sup>232</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 101-102

The Damuto region, located in the country of Shoa, was one of the centers for sending slaves. Another region of slaves' origin was the province of Angot. Slaves from Ethiopia were exported through the ports of Zeila and Beylul, having previously been castrated. Many of them died on the way to the ports<sup>233</sup>.

When transporting slaves by sea, most of them went from Suakin and Massawa to Jeddah and on to Egypt. The slave markets in these ports were the largest after Istanbul. The Ottomans were directly involved in the maritime slave trade, controlling taxes and organizing expeditions to capture slaves. Another direction of the maritime slave trade was India. Some slaves were used as soldiers in India, some of them played a significant role in its history (for example, Malik Ambar\*)<sup>234</sup>.

According to the calculations of researcher P. Lovejoy, about 1,000 slaves per year were transported across the Red Sea between 1500 and 1700. At the same time, trade volumes doubled in the period 1700–1800 - up to 2,000 slaves per year. One of the reasons for such an increase in the slave trade in the region was the decline of the Crimean Khanate and ultimately its liquidation, so that in total during the 16th – 18th centuries, up to 400 thousand slaves were transported across the Red Sea<sup>235</sup>.

### **Salyane**

The province of Habesh belonged to the so-called salyane eyalets. In total, there were 8 salyane eyalets in the Ottoman Empire: Egypt, Baghdad, Habesh, Lahsa, Basra, Yemen, Jazair Gharb, Tripoli Gharb, Tunisia. It is known that the annual income of the first beylerbey, Özdemir Pasha, in 1561 was 1.4 million akçe. After some time, the contents of the beylerbeys were reduced. In 1564, during the governorship of Osman Pasha, the province experienced financial difficulties, for this reason part of the beylerbey's salary was paid by Yemen and Egypt. In 1567, Hussein Pasha received 1 million akçe, in 1573 Ridvan Pasha received 1.2 million akçe. Until 1582 this amount remained unchanged. The province's low income did not allow it to support itself, and it

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<sup>233</sup>Ibid. S. 102.

\* Malik Ambar (1548–1626) - a major statesman of Ethiopian origin in the history of India. He was the first minister and regent of the Ahmednagar Sultanate (1607-1626).

<sup>234</sup> Miran J. Red Sea Slave Trade // Oxford Research Encyclopedias, African History. P. 11.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid. P. 6-7

received financial assistance from Egypt. So, in 1567, Egypt sent 1 million akçe to Hussein Pasha. Those who were appointed to Habesh Eyalet from Egypt received their salaries from its funds for a year – this scheme was used when appointing people to important positions: beys, sanjakbeys, janissary commanders, etc. The amount of their salary in the eyalet remains unknown<sup>236</sup>.

In some cases, the beylerbeys of Habesh Eyalet requested money from Egypt. The request was made after obtaining permission from the central authorities and was given in the form of a loan. Similar requests have been received from beylerbeys more than once. Thus, on July 21, 1573, Ridwan Pasha received 5,000 akçe in Egypt to reach his province. Greater severity was manifested in the fact that money issued as a loan had to be repaid in a timely manner. For example, Ahmad Pasha received a complaint to Istanbul from the governor of Egypt and the defterdar for not paying 8,200 akçe. At the beginning of the XVII centuries in the province, the beylerbey changed every three years, its contents amounted to 1.1 million akçe<sup>237</sup>.

The treasury of Habesh Eyalet also experienced a constant deficit – aid from Egypt was sent here in the form of loans. According to a document dated July 22, 1582, the Salyane of the beylerbey was paid by Egypt in the amount of 4,000 florins. From time to time, the beylerbeys tried to obtain additional funds from other provinces, such as Yemen. The governors claimed that they were unable to effectively govern the province due to financial problems and asked for resignation. There were also periodic personal conflicts between the beylerbeys of neighboring provinces, which interfered with their interaction. But despite such incidents, the central authorities did not make administrative changes, demanding cooperation from the governors. For example, the Egyptian beylerbeys were obliged to send 40 thousand akçe annually to Habesh Eyalet for the repair of fortresses in the province. There were cases when beylerbeys did not receive maintenance for about 2 years. This could coincide with the difficult situation in Egypt or problems with communication between provinces<sup>238</sup>.

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<sup>236</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 103-104.

<sup>237</sup>Ibid. S. 104.

<sup>238</sup>Ibid. S. 105.

In the 17th century, the eyalet received new sources of income: thanks to normalization of relations with Ethiopia, the port of Massawa received additional income from customs duties on caravans. However, some beylerbeys abused their powers and demanded additional money from traders in violation of customs payment procedures<sup>239</sup>.

### **3.6. Administrative organization of the province**

Before the formation of Habesh Eyalet, Suakin was administratively subordinate to Egypt. The first sanjakbey of Suakin was ‘Abd al-Baki bey, appointed on April 10, 1554.

When Habesh Eyalet was formed on July 5, 1555, Suakin became its center. Information about the administrative-territorial division of the new province has not reached us in full: only a few sanjaks, that were part of the province, are known; their complete list has not survived to this day. It is also difficult to determine the territories that these sanjaks occupied.

In 1563, to repel the threat from the Funj tribes (see Chapter II), the first known sanjak of Habesh Eyalet was established in Suakin. On May 22, 1564, a certain Yakub was appointed sanjakbey of the city and was supposed to provide security for the fortress and its surroundings; his annual salary was 200 thousand akçe. During the fight against Ethiopia, the sanjaks of Akik, Arkiko, Shama, Akele, Dabbe, Korbarie, Bor, Matrer, Hindiye, Sarawe, and Andi appeared in the province<sup>240</sup>.

At the request of beylerbey Ridwan Pasha in 1573, Habesh Eyalet expanded to include the territories that were part of Egypt – Ibrim sanjak, which became part of the Ottoman Empire in the period from 1555 to 1570, was annexed to it. Its connection with Egypt, despite its location in the Nile Valley, was very fragile. In turn, Habesh Eyalet, immediately after these territories became part of the empire, began to receive food from this region. The fact that Ibrim originally belonged to Egypt increased the bureaucratic difficulties in preparing grain supplies. In addition, administrative

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<sup>239</sup>Ibid. S. 107.

<sup>240</sup>Ibid. S. 107-111.

changes could have a positive impact on the financial well-being of the province and made Habesh Eyalet more independent. However, soon, in 1584, the Ibrim sanjak was transformed into a separate province, which is likely due to the Ottoman Empire's plans to expand its southern borders into the territories of the Funj Sultanate. The province of Ibrim did not last even a year: after an unsuccessful campaign undertaken by the Ottomans in 1584–1585 against the Funj Sultanate, it was abolished and its territories were reincorporated into Egypt<sup>241</sup>.

At the beginning of the 18th century, Habesh Eyalet was effectively abolished: in 1701, the province was administratively reassigned to the sanjak of Jeddah<sup>242</sup>.

### **3.7. Military organization of the province**

Soldiers for service in the eyalet were recruited mainly on a voluntary basis: the amount of support for soldiers in the province was larger than in others. Also, the beylerbeys of Egypt were ordered not to retain soldiers, but, on the contrary, to encourage them in every possible way for their desire to go to Habesh Eyalet. The names of the soldiers sent to the province were entered in special notebooks, and they themselves were sent accompanied by a commander (chaush). The soldiers were paid six months' salary in advance and were sent along with weapons and food supplies. The center controlled the number of troops in the province, so the authorities demanded that lists be sent indicating the names, amount of pay, and qualifications of the fighters. The soldiers needed by the eyalet were sometimes hired personally by the beylerbey. This occurred when the beylerbey was newly appointed and was traveling to the province via Egypt, or when a major military operation was underway, or when there was a threat of attack from Ethiopia<sup>243</sup>.

The soldiers who came from Egypt served in the garrison troops (nebetchi) for three years. For example, in 1582–1583, 100 horsemen and 200 janissaries were sent from Egypt as garrison troops. However, there were soldiers in the province who were

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<sup>241</sup>Alexander J. The Ottoman empire in Nubia: the “First Turkia” // History of the Ottoman Empire: some Aspects of the Sudanese-Turkish Relations. 2004. P. 21-22.

<sup>242</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 132-133.

<sup>243</sup>Ibid. S. 94, 117, 120, 121.

constantly serving in Habesh Eyalet. Those who served temporarily continued to receive their salaries from the funds of their province <sup>244</sup>.

The beylerbeys of Habesh Eyalet, in order to resolve issues regarding the supply of fighters and weapons, had to contact directly the central authorities, from where an order was sent to Egypt or an explanation was sent to Habesh on this request. Most supplies were provided by Egypt, and in some cases by Yemen. Thus, in a document dated September 24, 1596, beylerbey Ali Pasha reports to Istanbul that in the entire province, except Suakin and Arkiko suffers from a shortage of gunpowder and ammunition, and the coast remains unprotected from possible attacks by the Portuguese. In the same message he writes about the need to build several fortifications on the coast to get rid of this danger, and requests weapons, ammunition and other equipment. The request was approved and the Egyptian beylerbey was ordered to grant it<sup>245</sup>.

During the war with Ethiopia, the province received large numbers of troops and supplies. From a document dated December 16, 1579, it follows those 100 horsemen from Yemen and 1000 archers from Egypt were sent to the province of Habesh, and Yemen was entrusted with ensuring the salaries of the sent soldiers. This expedition was allocated for the operation of Khizir Pasha to return the lands lost after the attack of the Ethiopian king, including Arkiko. At this time, he did not yet hold the position of beylerbey; he was appointed only after this campaign<sup>246</sup>.

From a document dated February 25, 1580, it becomes known about the composition of the troops in the province: for example, there were 100 nefers in the port of Massawa, of which 40 died along with Ahmad Pasha in the Battle of Addi Karo: the dizdar of Massawa informed the Egyptian beylerbey that in the city 61 nefers remained. Bayram, sent from Yemen, with a detachment of 200 people arrived in Massawa and plundered the property of the dead soldiers and residents of the city. Also, as a result of his actions, Hussein chaush, one of Ahmad Pasha's men, and Khizir Pasha's assistant (su-bashi) Hamza were killed. Thanks to this document, we know that even

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<sup>244</sup>Ibid. S. 116.

<sup>245</sup>Ibid. S. 116.

<sup>246</sup>Ibid. S. 117.

in the main cities, Suakin and Massawa, there were no more than a hundred of their own fighters<sup>247</sup>.

In October 1580, in connection with the threat against the eyalet from Ethiopia, 2 groups were sent to the province from Egypt: the first consisting of 200 horsemen and 300 shooters, the second – 200 fighters and 400 shooters; at the same time, 1,200 soldiers were sent as garrison forces. At the same time, the eyalet again did not have the funds to provide for their maintenance from its budget<sup>248</sup>.

In 1582–1583, despite the province's needs for 500 fighters (300 riflemen and 200 horsemen), only 150 Janissaries were sent here, provided with a salary for 5 years. At the same time, the eyalet did not have horses and mules suitable for service, and the beylerbey did not receive a *salyane* for two years<sup>249</sup>.

The Ottomans' main allies in the region were local Muslim tribes, some Ottoman documents call them Arab, although they are most likely of Ethiopian origin. Thanks to them, the Ottoman army was able to resist the Ethiopians, despite the latter's large numerical superiority<sup>250</sup>.

Not many 17th- century Ottoman documents about Habesh Eyalet have survived; one of them is related to the processes that took place with the garrisons of this remote province. In 1655, the former *defterdar* of Bosnia, Mustafa Pasha, managed to pay a bribe in order to receive an appointment to the post of beylerbey in Habesh Eyalet. He appointed a certain Mustafa Agha as his representative (*mutaselim*) in Suakin, while at the same time secretly appointing another person to the same position to replace Mustafa Agha if he could not perform his duties correctly. Upon arrival in Suakin, Mustafa Agha's first action was to try to collect tax from the ships in the port in cash, and not in goods, contrary to the established taxation. Notable residents of the province and large merchants protested this decision, fearing that trade would leave the port, which would result in large financial losses. The Janissary garrison of Suakin acted

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<sup>247</sup>Ibid. S. 117.

<sup>248</sup>Ibid. S. 118.

<sup>249</sup>Ibid. S. 118.

<sup>250</sup>Ibid. S. 63.

together with the nobility and merchants against this innovation. At this moment, the second secret mutaselim announced himself, but his authority was questioned, and both representatives were imprisoned, and power was seized by the Deli Dervish, one of the Janissaries. Meanwhile, the viceroy Mustafa Pasha reached Jeddah, intending to recapture Suakin, but his first attempt was unsuccessful due to opposition from the Ottoman garrison; according to some reports, the rebels received help from the Ethiopians. Eventually, reinforcements from Egypt allowed Mustafa Pasha to regain control of the city, although the Deli Dervish and his supporters were able to escape. Nothing more is known from Ottoman sources to date, but these disturbances may have been more than just local unrest, since a letter from this period (admittedly of dubious authenticity) from the Funj to the Ethiopian Emperor suggests that Ethiopia was involved in eliminating the Ottoman governor of Suakin and providing military assistance in the event of an attack by the Ottoman army. Although the Ottomans retained control of Suakin in the long term, the Deli Dervish rebellion is intriguing for several reasons. First, it emphasizes that, despite the paucity of references to Suakin in 17th century Ottoman archival documents, the city was an important trading post: although the lack of precise statistics makes speculation on this point dangerous, the enthusiasm of Mustafa Pasha and his subordinates in the fight for control of port revenues contrasts with the apparent financial lack of independence of the province, which received financial assistance from Egypt and Yemen. Secondly, the uprising shows that the Ottoman garrison defended the interests of the local nobility and merchants, whose interests suffered. It is very likely that, as happened in Nubia, the Janissaries became related to the local population and became more and more integrated into it. Burckhardt drew attention to the assimilation of Ottoman soldiers with the local population. He wrote: “Of Turkish origin there are, for the most part, descendants of Turkish soldiers... Many of them claim their ancestors came from Diyarbakir or Mosul; but their appearance and manners have African features and are in no way distinguishable from the Hadaribs”<sup>251</sup>.

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<sup>251</sup>Burckhardt JL *Travels in Nubia*. P. 433; Peacock A.C.S. *Suakin: A Northeast African Port in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 38-39.



During the governorship of Mustafa Pasha, the Oromo tribes invaded the province, caused great damage to it and captured some of the military equipment. For the Massawa fortress, 300 riflemen, 100 horsemen, 200 guns, 200 iron cantars, 5 engineers, 10 artillerymen, 10 cannons, 2 blacksmiths were sent <sup>252</sup>.

Habesh systematically needed animals to transport goods and conduct military operations. Some were sent from southern Egypt, but most of the animals came from Yemen. The sheriffs of Mecca also provided assistance in ensuring the supply of horses. A large number of animals died due to climate and disease: for example, one document from the late 16th century states that out of 200 horses and mules recently sent from Yemen, only 40–50 survived. The Ottomans had a great need for horses, as they provided balance against their outnumbered opponents <sup>253</sup>.

Either warriors of foreign origin or slaves were sent from Egypt. Although it was easier to transport soldiers from Yemen, most of them came to Habesh Eyalet from Egypt. Soldiers arriving from Yemen were also paid by the province of Yemen, they were called shaggals. These soldiers were Zaydis, which could have caused further problems. So, in 1584, a Yemeni detachment captured the Arkiko fortress<sup>254</sup>.

Fighting within Yemen itself cut off Habesh Eyalet from military assistance from Egypt: all reinforcements in this case were sent to help Yemen, and Habesh Eyalet had to cope on its own <sup>255</sup>.

The province experienced problems with firearms, with the help of which the numerical advantage of the Ethiopian army was leveled. The province did not have its own production of gunpowder, cannons and handguns. New weapons were supplied from Egypt, and in some cases from Yemen. The biggest problems were with gunpowder; sometimes the weapon could not be used due to its lack. From time to time, construction equipment was supplied to the province for fortification work<sup>256</sup>.

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<sup>252</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 118.

<sup>253</sup>Ibid. S. 119.

<sup>254</sup>Ibid. S. 119.

<sup>255</sup>Ibid. S. 94.

<sup>256</sup>Ibid. S. 121

Fortresses were built to protect the occupied territories from possible attacks from the Funj Sultanate and Ethiopia. Fortifications appeared in Suakin after attacks by tribes associated with the Funj Sultanate. Evliya Çelebi left a description of them: he mentioned three fortifications – “towers”, built within a rifle shot of each other to protect water sources located on the mainland southeast of the island. The traveler noted: “If there were no towers, the blacks would not have given Suakin a drop of water, and the city would have perished from thirst”. The towers were known as “Tash-kale” (Stone Fortress), “Orta-kale” (Middle Fortress) and “Bogaz-kale” (Strait Fortress). Although they were already old (presumably not rebuilt since the 16th century), the fortifications were in very good condition, artillery was installed on them: the good defense of Suakin is confirmed by the first unsuccessful attempt to suppress the Deli Dervish uprising in 1655. According to Evliya Çelebi, “the garrison is constantly on guard with weapons; both day and night small boats bring water to the island”. Evliya Çelebi estimates the garrison at 50–60 men at each of the fortifications; he also says that 500 people assisted the kaymakam in governing the island. Such a significant increase in the garrison for the end of the 16th century seems unlikely, but it could be explained if the figures in the Istanbul archives do not include the Beja allies under the command of Sheikh al-Arab, because they did not receive constant pay <sup>257</sup>.

It was decided to build a fortress in the second largest city of the eyalet - Massawa, but the lack of building materials delayed its construction. On October 19, 1576, a request was made to the Egyptian beylerbey for the supply of necessary building materials. The request was justified by the fact that from Debaroa to Suakin it takes about 25 days to travel and it is not always possible to get there quickly. In addition, the fortress was supposed to provide control over certain tribes <sup>258</sup>.

Due to its location, Massawa was well protected from attacks from land, so the fortifications built were quite simple. Thus, Almeida wrote that the city was

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<sup>257</sup> Evliya Çelebi. *Op. cit.*, S. 249-250.

<sup>258</sup>Orhonlu Ç. *Op. cit.* S. 122

defended only by a small bastion with several cannons. In turn, Lobo mentioned a small fort built opposite the strait that separated Massawa from the mainland<sup>259</sup>.

Another fortress was in Debaroa: this city was considered by the Ottomans as a springboard for advancing deeper into Ethiopia. A fortress was built around it. For a short time Debaroa became the center of Habesh.

Fortifications were also built in some other cities in the province. Thus, the existence of the Bender-i-Abdallah fortress is known, and there were fortifications in Arkiko. During the construction of fortresses in Habesh Eyalet, prisoners could be used<sup>260</sup>.

One of the factors reducing the income of Habesh Eyalet was the Portuguese fleet, due to which merchant ships did not enter the ports. He sought to reduce Ottoman pressure on Ethiopia by attacking Ottoman ports. In some cases, aggressive Portuguese actions coincided with Ethiopian attacks on Habesh Eyalet. Thus, in 1580, the beylerbey of Habesh Eyalet reported to Istanbul about the joint actions of the Portuguese and Ethiopians<sup>261</sup>.

The fortresses, indeed, saved the Ottomans from attacks from Ethiopia. According to a report dated December 16, 1579, after an attack by the Ethiopian king Sarze Dengel, the Massawa fortress was in need of repairs. The Arkiko fortress, lost for a while by the Ottomans, also needed restoration work. At the end of the 16th century, due to the danger of the Spaniards, the fortresses in Habesh Eyalet were repaired: in 1582, two Spanish spies were caught in the region, collecting information about the Ottoman forces in the region. Also, to repel attacks by Oromo tribes in the south, construction began on a new fortress<sup>262</sup>.

To protect the coast from the Portuguese, special measures were taken: ships patrolled the Red Sea. They belonged to the so-called Indian or Suez fleet. Part of the southern fleet was stationed off the coast of Yemen for security: Mokha and Aden

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<sup>259</sup>Pankhurst R. Some notes on the historical and economic geography of the Mesewa area (1520-1885) // *Journal of Ethiopian Studies*. 1975. Vol. 13.No. 1. – P. 92

<sup>260</sup>Orhonlu Ç. Op. cit. S. 123-124

<sup>261</sup>Ibid. S. 123.

<sup>262</sup>Ibid. S. 124-125.

were constantly subject to raids by the Portuguese, as they were important trading centers<sup>263</sup>.

A certain number of ships of the fleet were allocated specifically for transporting troops and equipment from Suez to Massawa and Suakin (usually 2 or 3 ships were allocated for these purposes). In 1577, beylerbey of Habesh requested another ship for these needs in Suez. The request for it was granted, and the wood for its construction had to be sent by Habesh Eyalet itself. No ship repairs were carried out in Massawa and Suakin; all work was carried out in Suez. To do it, it was necessary to make a special request<sup>264</sup>.

The man who commanded the ships of Habesh Eyalet had the rank of captain, but he did not necessarily have needed qualifications. A document dated June 26, 1573 reports that chaush Hassan was appointed captain, his salary was 60 akçe per day<sup>265</sup>.

At the end of the 16th century, the presence of a coast guard became even more important. Indian merchant ships called at the port of Mokha, which was under the authority of the Yemeni imam. This led to a decrease in income from the Ottoman ports of Jeddah, Suakin and Massawa. At the beginning of the 17th century, the Dutch and British also tried to penetrate the Red Sea. For this reason, Ottoman ships began to patrol between Yemen and Habesh Eyalet. Ethiopia also sought access to the sea through Beylul, whose ruler supported the rebel Imam of Yemen <sup>266</sup>.

At the beginning of the 17th century, patrol ships did not allow Christian ships passage into the Red Sea. In some cases, these ships could be used to transport soldiers. It is not known exactly how long patrols of the entrance to the Red Sea continued. It is reliably known that it was preserved at least until the middle of the 17th century. At the same time, the ban on Christian ships entering the Red Sea was lifted in the middle of the 17th century: Christians were allowed to sail to Jeddah: the sheriff of Mecca realized that it was very profitable to trade with Europeans and the Sultan's firman was

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<sup>263</sup>Ibid. S. 125, 127.

<sup>264</sup>Ibid. S. 125, 127.

<sup>265</sup>Ibid. S. 126.

<sup>266</sup>Ibid. S. 127.

changed. In addition to the countries mentioned above, the French showed interest in the Red Sea, who at the end of the 16th century centuries they tried to discover a shorter route to India <sup>267</sup>.

### 3.8. Conclusions

Judging by the fact that officials well familiar with the situation in the region were appointed to Habesh Eyalet, it can be said that the Ottoman Empire maintained an interest in the province until the beginning of the 17th century. The service in the eyalet was difficult; the governors who received the assignment did not strive to get to it as soon as possible. From the middle of the 17th century, the role of the local elite, which actually administered these territories, increased.

There is practically no information about the nature of the work of other officials, as well as about the administrative-territorial division of the province. It is known that in 1701 Habesh Eyalet became part of the sanjak of Jeddah.

The province received its main income from customs fees from ships coming from India. Another source of income was pearl fishing. However, their totality was not enough to meet its financial needs. The province received financial assistance from Egypt.

Soldiers in the province also came mainly from Egypt, in some cases from Yemen. The Ottomans were in a permanent numerical minority in relation to Ethiopia. There was also no production of firearms in Habesh Eyalet; they, like the soldiers, came from Egypt. Gunpowder was in short supply in the province, which in some cases made it impossible to use cannons and rifles.

The recruitment of soldiers into the province was carried out on a voluntary basis, and they were encouraged to receive increased pay, which in some cases was delayed. To protect against attacks, fortifications were erected in many cities.

To supply Habesh Eyalet, there was a special detachment of 2-3 ships. Until the mid-17th century, the Ottoman fleet carried out patrols to prevent enemy ships from entering the Red Sea.

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<sup>267</sup>Ibid. S. 127-128.

## CONCLUSION

Despite the high degree of knowledge of the history of the Ottoman Empire of the 16th – 18th centuries, the history of its individual regions remains insufficiently developed. Meanwhile, understanding the political and economic role of the provinces that make up it allows us to draw a holistic picture of the Ottoman state system.

As part of the study, the prerequisites for the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the Red Sea area were determined, the history of relations with the countries bordering Habesh Eyalet was studied, the features of the political-administrative and economic structure of the province are revealed.

For a long time, important trade routes connecting Europe and Asia passed through the Red Sea. However, until the beginning of the 16th century, the territories located on the western coast of the Red Sea were on the periphery and were practically excluded from the system of state relations. The nomadic tribes who lived here remained only formally subordinate either to the Christian rulers of the Nile Valley or, later, to the Mamluk sultans of Egypt.

After the fall of Mamluk Egypt in 1517, the entire Red Sea area found itself in the sphere of interests of the Ottoman Empire. However, Selim I stopped at the conquest of Egypt; the continuation of the conquests of the coast of modern Sudan and Eritrea dates back to the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent. Already by 1525, the Ottomans, thanks to the naval commander Salman Reis, had a strategy to counter Portuguese expansion and extend their own possessions, in which key points in the Red Sea area were identified. Among the main goals of the conquest was the port city of Suakin, control over which made it possible to count on increased tax revenues and weakening the position of Ethiopia, hostile to the Ottoman Empire. Already at the end of the 1520s, after short-term preparation, the Ottomans continued their expansion in a southern direction and gained control over part of the coast of Sudan.

Soon, economic interests (protection of sea trade routes from India from the Portuguese fleet, search for new sources of gold) pushed the Ottoman Empire to intensify its intervention in the region, entering into a confrontation with Ethiopia. Initially, this struggle was not direct: the Ottoman Empire only helped with the supply of weapons and sent volunteers to support the Adal Sultanate, led by Imam Ahmad Gran. However, his death and the subsequent weakening of the allied sultanate forced the Ottomans to act independently.

It is necessary to note the support provided to Ethiopia by Portugal, which established direct relations with Ethiopia at the beginning of the 16th century. Despite the great distance between the countries from each other, Portuguese assistance came at a decisive moment, allowing the Ethiopian army to reduce the technological gap and defeat the forces of the Adal Sultanate, from which it could not recover.

In 1555, Habesh Eyalet was formed on the coast of Sudan on the basis of the Suakin sanjak. The eyalet was to include lands that belonged to Ethiopia and the Sultanate of Sennar. Difficult climatic conditions and serious resistance from neighbors, primarily Ethiopia, prevented the Ottomans from implementing their plans to include internal territories into the eyalet. The Battle of Addi Karo in 1578 or 1579 was of decisive importance, after which the Ottomans lost a strong, albeit unreliable ally - Bahr Negash Isaac. After this, the initiative in the war belonged to Ethiopia. At the end of the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire refused to continue the fight against it.

At the same time, the northern territories of the eyalet suddenly found themselves under threat: local tribes, who may have been politically dependent on the Funj Sultanate, actually approached Suakin itself several times – fortifications were erected to protect it.

The newly formed province coped with its main task – ensuring the security of maritime trade routes from the east, but it did not generate any income. Even the establishment of relations with neighbors in the 17th century did not help, which allowed trade caravans from Ethiopia and the Sultanate of Sennar to use the ports of Suakin, Massawa, and Beylul. Habesh still could not exist without the support of the neighboring provinces of the Ottoman Empire (Egypt and Yemen), which

from the moment of the formation of the eyalet helped him financially: they sent people, weapons, equipment, animals.

The Ottoman presence in the province itself, even during the period of active foreign policy, was not large, and after its revision, only a few Janissary garrisons (about 100 people) in the main cities of the province remained in the eyalet. This limited Ottoman presence was due to several reasons, including the remoteness of the province, harsh climatic conditions, lack of threats from neighboring countries, and low Ottoman interest coupled with the state's growing internal problems. The garrisons stationed in the eyalet, as in some other provinces, mixed with the local population. In the end, the Janissaries became so integrated with their environment that they even rebelled in 1655, protesting against changes in the form of taxation of merchants, which proves the close connection between them.

The changing balance of power in Europe also had an impact on the situation in the Red Sea area: the unification of Spain and Portugal under the Union of Iberia led to the decline of Portugal's colonies in India, which became a target for the growing power of England, and the Spaniards were not decisive in their defense. Thus, the potential for Portuguese military intervention in the Red Sea area was undermined. At the same time, the Ottoman Empire, until the mid-17th century, continued to adhere to the ban on the entry of European merchant ships into the Red Sea, without preventing Jesuit missionaries from entering Ethiopia on the ships of Arab or Indian traders. For several years, Catholicism even became the state religion of Ethiopia. A sharp change of course under Emperor Fasiledes in religious matters and the end of the Jesuit mission in Ethiopia brought it closer to the Ottoman Empire, which helped ensure that European missionaries were prevented from entering.

Perhaps the Ottoman Empire did not give up claims to neighboring regions, because Evliya Çelebi's trip in the second half of the 17th century in the region can also be explained by a reconnaissance mission, considering the attention which the traveler paid to the description of the fortresses, including the neighboring Funj Sultanate. In Çelebi's description Suakin appears to be a prosperous city that had connections with India, Yemen, the Sennar Sultanate, and Ethiopia. At the same time, the traveler



understood the fragility of Ottoman power in the Red Sea area and even mentioned one of the rebellions in the province.

In the 18th century, Habesh Eyalet has finally lost its former meaning: mention of the territories that were part of it practically disappear from Ottoman sources. In addition, the status of the eyalet changed: it was reassigned to Jeddah as a sanjak. Assigned to the reformed province, the beylerbeys no longer appeared in Suakin and Massawa, dealing primarily with the holy cities of Islam. Ottoman administration of the territories that were previously part of the province was only nominal: for example, local officials had poor command of the Turkish language. Weak control from the center led to the arbitrariness of local authorities, who sought primarily to enrich themselves.

The importance of the local elite increased – the Hadarib in Suakin and the Balau in Massawa – which retained their influence throughout the entire period of the existence of the province, and from the second half of the 17th century received almost complete autonomy from the central authorities, so that the Naibs of Massawa appear repeatedly in Ethiopian chronicles.

The region turned into an ordinary peripheral region within the Ottoman Empire. We can say that the Red Sea coast of Sudan and Eritrea was once again experiencing a kind of power vacuum. The local population agreed to maintain this situation, which did not oblige them to practically anything in relation to the Ottoman Empire, but guaranteed some absence of shocks. An attempt to secede from the Ottoman Empire could provoke it to conduct a punitive expedition.

At the beginning of the 19th century, the Red Sea coast of Sudan and Eritrea remained under the formal control of the Ottoman Empire, which had lost interest in the region. This affected the economic development of the territories, where, according to the observations of travelers of the early 19th century, devastation reigned: Suakin was in ruins, there was practically no trade in the city, although once a year a large caravan from Sennar still arrived in it, which maintained its existence cities. With the capture of Sudan by the army of Muhammad Ali in 1822, the region's connection with Egypt greatly increased and in 1865 it was formally transferred to Egypt.

Based on the above, the first conclusion is that the Red Sea area entered the sphere of interests of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 16th century. Its further expansion in the region could be due to a number of factors, including the Portuguese threat to the holy cities of Islam Mecca and Medina, the rapid technological development of European states and the impossibility of conquest in Europe. But the most important factor that pushed the Ottoman Empire to pursue an active policy in the Red Sea area was probably the desire to maintain a monopoly on the spice trade, which was threatened by the emergence of alternative routes opened by Europeans around Africa.

The second conclusion is that in the period of the XVI - XVIII centuries, the nature of the Ottoman Empire's relations with regional powers bordering Habesh Eyalet, the Funj Sultanate and Ethiopia, has changed significantly. During the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire did not have a unified political course towards its neighbors: the policies implemented locally were directly dependent on the situation in Istanbul.

Throughout the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire repeatedly showed aggression against Ethiopia: despite their unconditional technological superiority, the Ottomans failed to achieve their initial goals and gain a foothold in the interior. Fighting of varying degrees of intensity between the Ottoman Empire and Ethiopia continued until the end of the 16th century. However, at a later stage, these countries coexisted peacefully, establishing trade ties among themselves.

In turn, the Sultanate of Sennar, albeit indirectly, posed a threat to the possessions of the Ottoman Empire on the coast of modern Sudan: Arab tribes dependent on it several times besieged one of the main cities of Habesh Eyalet – Suakin.

Features of the administrative and economic structure of Habesh Eyalet was largely due to its geographical location: the province was one of the most remote from the center of the Ottoman Empire, which noticeably slowed down operational leadership. Despite the incentives and rewards available for appointments to positions of responsibility, Ottoman officials tried to avoid posting to the eyalet. The decline in Ottoman attention to the region allowed the local elite to gain greater influence, and from the middle of the 17th century, the administration of the province actually passed to them.

Throughout its history, Habesh was economically dependent on the empire's neighboring provinces: Egypt and Yemen. The main source of income was duties on goods passing through. The number of Ottoman military garrisons stationed in cities was noticeably inferior to the armies of the Sultanate of Sennar and Ethiopia.

Administrative transformations at the beginning of the 18th century, when Habesh Eyalet was reassigned to Jeddah in the status of a sanjak, are proof that the Red Sea area had lost its former importance for the Ottoman Empire. De jure, these territories continued to be part of the Ottoman Empire, but the Ottoman leadership did not have the opportunity to in any way influence the local elites, who actually controlled the situation in the main centers of Habesh sanjak.

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## APPENDIX 1. Arabic script transliteration table

ء	'
ا، آ	ā
ب	b
ت	t
ث	<u>t</u>
ج	ǧ
ح	ḥ
خ	ḫ
د	d
ذ	<u>d</u>
ر	r
ز	z
س	s
ش	š
ص	ṣ
ض	ḍ
ط	ṭ
ظ	ẓ
ع	'
غ	ǧ
ف	f


ق	q
ك	k
ل	l
م	m
ن	n
ه	h
و	w/ū
ي	y/ī

## APPENDIX 2. Illustrative materials




Picture 1. Outline map of Northern Sudan and surrounding areas, showing major cities and trade routes<sup>268</sup>

<sup>268</sup>Fitzenreiter M. Geschichte, Religion und Denkmäler der islamischen Zeit im Nordsudan, Teil I: Die Geschichte des Sudan in islamischer Zeit . MittSAG 6. 1997. S. 38.



Picture 2. Scheme map of the Red Sea area<sup>269</sup>

<sup>269</sup>Peacock A.C.S The Ottomans and the Funj sultanate in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. P. 88.



*Figure 3. Plan of the Suakin Port, created by J. de Castro, 1541.<sup>270</sup>*

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<sup>270</sup>16th Century, Suakin // Libraries UMedia. University of Minnesota [Electronic resource].  
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