

North Caucasus Federal University

On the rights of the manuscript

Nikolaev Nikolai Petrovich

TRANSFORMATION OF CLIMATE POLICY INSTITUTIONS IN RUSSIA
DURING THE PERIOD OF GEOPOLITICAL INSTABILITY

Scientific specialty

5.5.2. Political institutions, processes, and technologies

DISSERTATION

for an academic degree

candidate of Political Sciences

Translation from Russian

Scientific Supervisor:

Doctor of Political Sciences, Associate Professor

Alexey Viktorovich Mikhalev

Stavropol - 2024

Table of contents

Introduction.....	3
Chapter 1. Climate policy as a model for managing global changes in the context of geopolitical instability	24
1.1. Theoretical approaches to the study of climate policy.....	24
1.2. Climate change management concepts	42
1.3. Hierarchy of political organizations that manage the international climate agenda.....	60
Chapter 2. Comparative analysis of institutions that determine the content of climate policy in Russia in 2014-2022	77
2.1. Russia's place in the system of international regulation of climate policy ..	77
2.2. Russian Institutes of Climate Policy Regulation	95
2.3. Climate policy transformation Scenarios in the Russian Federation.....	110
Conclusion	125
Bibliography	130

Introduction

Relevance. Climate policy is an area of activity that involves interaction not only within the borders of individual States, but also at the international level. The development of policy decisions in the field of ecology is placed in the context of relations with neighboring states, green policy actors, and international organizations that face global long-term adaptation goals¹. All of them had and still have an impact on the environmental policy of the Russian Federation. Many different factors shape its institutional design, which has determined the eclecticism of values transmitted at the state level and decisions taken at different times in this area.

Today, in the context of dramatic geopolitical changes, it is necessary to analyze the experience of domestic climate policy over the past ten years. The fact is that it is precisely at this time that the Paris Climate Agreement is signed, which has received the status of the main international regulatory document in this area, and its ratification began in 2015. Russia joined the agreement in 2019, although the attitude towards the Kyoto Protocol, which preceded the Paris one, was negative in Russia (despite this, Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2004). During the period considered in the framework of the dissertation research, Russia was also subjected to interest-free sanctions pressure from the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. This ultimately affected not only climate problems, but also the entire environmental sphere².

However, the regulatory field in Russia is transforming rather slowly and significantly lags behind the geopolitical realities. As a result, it is interesting to trace

¹ *Nikolaev N. P.* Issue of the statement of the problem of practical adaptation to the climate change in the conditions of Russia's participation in the global climate agenda [text] // Scientific Works of the Free Economic Society of Russia. 2022. Vol. 236. No. 4. P. 427–446. (in Russian)

² *Makarov I. A.* Russia and global environmental problems [text] // New international relations: main trends and challenges for Russia / ed. by A. V. Lukin. Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 2018. P. 211–235. (in Russian)

how the path of dependent development ensures the functioning and reproduction of norms in the field of climate policy in Russia. First of all, we are talking about norms related to globalist ideas of climate regulation, which have been criticized by the Russian expert community since 2002.

In the new global geopolitical architecture, Russia occupies one of the key roles due to the scale of its territory and the peculiarities of its geographical location. It includes several climate zones at once, which in cross-border regions intersect with neighboring states. At the global level, all political decisions made in Russia regarding the climate will be of particular importance. This explains why it is so important to examine the nature of climate policy in Russia, not only in terms of historical and political dynamics, but also in the context of a changing world. This dissertation is an attempt to understand how the institutions of climate policy in Russia are being transformed in the context of geopolitical turbulence, and how attitudes towards different models of climate change management are changing along with them.

Problem statement. The problem field of the study is limited to the institutional analysis of Russia's climate policy in the XXI century. We are talking about the competition of norms, as well as the content characteristics (morphology) of climate policy in our country. Such an approach will open up the problem field in a new way, where the institutions that produce norms that regulate the attitude to ecology, to nature, and to the place of politics in this area are being understood.

For this study, the key category is the concept of "climate policy". An example of a purely state approach to climate policy is its definition, adopted at the level of formal state documents and reflected on the website of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. This activity is characterized as public administration in the field of greenhouse gas emission control in terms of functions related to the development of public policy and regulatory regulation in the field of

greenhouse gas emission³ control. We, in turn, should note that climate policy is a more comprehensive term than "regulating greenhouse gas emissions". We define climate policy as political practices for regulating the entire range of issues that are somehow included in the climate agenda. Since climate as a phenomenon is total, it is closely related to the loyalties that divide people into opposite groups. At the same time, each of these groups offers its own institutional format for regulating climate issues formulated at the UN level. Despite the scale of their significance, this paper focuses on a specific aspect: climate policy. It is this phenomenon that will become the object of analysis. It is important to identify the relationships of agents, determine their hierarchy and axiological attitudes, and understand their role in climate policy and their place. This will allow us to determine the ratio of the institutions they form, their significance, and therefore compare them, consider their dynamics and competition.

In fact, this paper is one of the first attempts to characterize not only the system of institutions regulating climate policy in Russia, but also to clarify its categorical apparatus, as well as the language of description. However, the public climate discourse, which does not form the institutions of climate policy, remains outside the scope of the study. The presented dissertation is devoted to the study of policy in the regulatory sphere, and accordingly, we are only interested in institutions and actions of agents of institutional changes in climate policy.

The degree of development of the problem. An overview of the place of climate policy in Russia in the field of political analysis should begin with a list of the key institutions on the basis of which the most significant research was implemented. Climate policy is a fairly new branch of science for Russia, and therefore the strict disciplinary framework that restricts this area has not yet been

³ Climate policy [electronic resource] // Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/directions/investicionnaya_deyatelnost/obespechenie_razvitiya_ekonomiki_v_usloviyah_izmeneniya_klimata/klimaticheskaya_politika/ (accessed 10.07.2023). (in Russian)

formed. Political climate issues are not just addressed in the works of geographers and environmentalists, they often make a significant contribution to its development. For example, we can mention the research of Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences B. N. Porfiriev devoted to climate policy and risk analysis in this area⁴. In general, the greatest contribution to the study of climate policy issues is made by two scientific councils of the Russian Academy of Sciences: the Scientific Council on Earth's Climate and the Scientific Council on Global Environmental Problems. Among the basic humanitarian institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where relevant research is conducted, it is worth highlighting the Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Among political scientists, the situation is different: at the moment (end of 2023), within the key political science structures of Russia, such as the Russian Association of Political Science and the Russian Society of Political Scientists, no specialized units have been created, for example, a committee dealing with environmental or climate policy. As part of the International Political Science Association (IPSA), a similar research committee (RC52, on climate security and planetary policy) was created only in 2022.

Large-scale research programs in the field of environmental and climate policy are implemented by political scientists from the Higher School of Economics and Lomonosov Moscow State University. An important platform for presenting the results of political science research in the field of ecology and climate is the website of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC)⁵. The International Discussion Club "Valdai" pays great attention to political problems of the environment. Climate

⁴ *Porfiriev B.* Environmental Policy in Russia: Economic, Legal, and Organizational Issues [text] // Environmental Management. 1997. Vol. 21. P. 147–157.

⁵ Topic: Ecology [electronic resource] // The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/topics/ecology/> (accessed 10.07.2023). (in Russian)

and sustainable development issues were repeatedly discussed at the club's meetings⁶. In this connection, we should mention the works of A. S. Bepalov⁷, A. N. Zotin⁸, A. A. Kadomtsev⁹, and E. E. Prokopchuk¹⁰.

Since the 1990s, Russian political scientists have focused on defining the place of ecology in the political process in Russia. In these works, the climate theme is included in the general ecological canvas. We are talking not only about books and articles, but also about dissertations. Attempts to search for approaches and analytical models continued relatively sparsely. Among the most significant works of that time, it is important to mention the works of T. N. Mitrokhina¹¹, A. S. Panarin¹², V. G. Semenova¹³, O. N. Yanitsky.¹⁴

⁶ Valdai Club to Discuss Climate and Sustainable Development in the Aftermath of the Coronavirus Crisis (announcements) [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/events/announcements/ekologiya-klimat-razvitie-valdai-kruglyy-stol/> (accessed 10.07.2023). (in Russian)

⁷ *Bepalov A.* How climate change becomes a factor in international relations [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/kak-izmenenie-klimata-standovitsya-faktorom-mo/> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

⁸ The climate agenda: how to separate science from ideology? [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/klimaticheskaya-povestka/?sphrase_id=732062 (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

⁹ *Kadomtsev A. A.* How climate is changing politics [electronic resource] // International Affairs. URL: <https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/24971> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

¹⁰ *Prokopchuk Ye. E.* Climate vs justice [text] // *Russia in Global Affairs*. 2024. Vol. 22. No. 1. P. 196–212. (in Russian)

¹¹ *Mitrokhina T. N.* About some directions of the impact of environmental public organisations on political processes [text] // *Problems of political science and political history: a collection of articles*. Saratov: Saratov University Press, 1996. Vol. 6. P. 66–68. (in Russian)

¹² *Panarin A. S.* Global political forecasting in the context of strategic instability [text]. Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1999. 272 p. (in Russian)

¹³ *Semenova V. G.* Ecological component of the political culture of the Russian society [text]: dis. ... candidate of political sciences: 23.00.02. Saratov, 2004. 172 p. (in Russian)

¹⁴ *Yanitsky O. N.* Russia: ecological challenge (social movements, science, politics) [text]. Novosibirsk: Sibirsky Chronograph, 2002. 426 p. (in Russian) and *Yanitsky O. N.* Ecological thinking in the era of the “great redistribution” [text]. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2008. 224 p. (in Russian)

In 2004, a book by A. S. Shilov was published, which examines the genesis of ecopolitology as a form of scientific knowledge¹⁵. Another significant work on climate and environmental policy is A. I. Kostin's book "Ecopolitology and Global Studies", published in 2005. In the Russian political science tradition, the earliest fundamental works covering the problems of ecopolitology development were the works of D. V. Efremenko. His 2006 work " Ecological and political discourses. Emergence and Evolution " is one of the key topics for Russian political science discourse¹⁶. At the same time, a notable collective work by G. V. Kosov, Yu.A. Kharlamov and S. A. Nefedov "Ecopolitology: Political science in the context of environmental problems"¹⁷ was published. Based on this, we can state that the disciplinary space of Russian environmental political science was formed by 2005-2006, and climate issues, with rare exceptions, remained not isolated from the general context of research. In our opinion, it was at that time that the foundations of this direction were laid, basic categories were formed, and a dialogue with foreign colleagues was established.

In the future, the problems of environmental policy (including climate problems) were presented in the works of the following Russian researchers: V. M. Zhuikov¹⁸, A. I. Kostin¹⁹, E. V. Kolesnikov. Matveeva²⁰, V. N. Rastorguev²¹, V. A.

¹⁵ *Shilov A. S.* Emergence of ecopolitics as a new area of political science [text]. Moscow: Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN), 2004. 135 p. (in Russian)

¹⁶ *Efremenko D.* Environmental and political discourses. Emergence and evolution [text]. Moscow: Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN), 2006. 284 p. (in Russian)

¹⁷ *Kosov G. V., Harlamova J. A., Nefedov S. A.* Ecopolitology: political science in the context of environmental issues [text]. Moscow: A-PRIOR, 2006. 320 p. (in Russian)

¹⁸ *Zhuikov V. M.* Legal protection of natural resources is an important direction of environmental policies [text] // Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law. 2012. No. 1. P. 44–49. (in Russian)

¹⁹ *Kostin A. I.* State and countering global challenges [text] // Journal Moscow University Bulletin. Series 12. Political Science. 2017. No. 3. P. 94–97. (in Russian)

²⁰ *Matveeva E. V.* Environmental problems in the policy of modern states: theory and practice [text]. Kemerovo: Polygraph, 2010. 181 p. (in Russian)

²¹ *Rastorguev V. N.* Ecological Doctrine of Russia [text] // Ecology 21st century. 2009. Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 64–68. (in Russian)

Smyshlyaev²², N. V. Shulenina²³. We are talking about works that were published up to 2010. This is the period when the problem field of Russian environmental political science began to fill with regional research subjects. The main body of publications consisted of scientific articles published in leading political science publications in our country.

The next period in the development of the study of climate policy in Russia is associated with a shift in focus to the study of world regions. The most notable works of this period belong to N. G. Rogozhina and A. L. Demchuk. N. G. Rogozhina's monograph analyzes environmental policy in developing countries, as well as problems of the global South²⁴. Natalia Grigorievna's book pays great attention to the problems and risks associated with the climate²⁵. A. L. Demchuk, in turn, considers the specifics of regulating environmental conflicts²⁶. Artur Leonovich considered some aspects of climate policy in his dissertation²⁷. It is important to note that in the 2010s, the number of environmental conflicts began to grow rapidly, and many of them turned into local wars. All this eventually required a shift in the research focus to this plane.

An important place is occupied by the topic of water conflicts, mainly related to the sphere of international relations. Discussions of the problems of water resource allocation, including in relation to the climate agenda, as well as disputes and wars over them, were covered in the works of V. K. Belozerov²⁸, K. P. Borishpolets²⁹, V. I.

²² *Smyshlyaev V. A.* Ecopolitology (political ecology) [text]. Voronezh: Scientific Book, 2011. 362 p. (in Russian)

²³ *Shulenina N. V.* Some problems of definition of “ecopolitics” [text] // RUDN journal of political science. 2006. No. 8. P. 51–63. (in Russian)

²⁴ *Rogozhina N. G.* Environmental policy of developing countries [text]. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2015. 336 p. (in Russian)

²⁵ *Ibid.* P. 265.

²⁶ *Demchuk A. L.* Environmental conflict management policies: conceptual frameworks and national models [text]: dis. ... doctor of political sciences: 23.00.06. Moscow, 2020. 565 p. (in Russian)

²⁷ *Ibid.* P. 261.

²⁸ *Belozerov V. K.* Passion for water [text] // Russia in Global Affairs. 2009. No. 3. P. 150–160. (in Russian)

Danilova-Danilyan³⁰, A. B. Likhacheva³¹, I. A. Makarov³² and a number of other authors.

The legal aspects of climate policy development in a comparative country-specific context are discussed in the monograph 2022 edition edited by M. A. Abramovich. Yegorova Street. It analyzes in sufficient detail, from the standpoint of legal science, the factors of development of the regulatory framework in the field of climate policy regulation³³.

Much attention is also paid to Russian environmental and climate policy abroad. Out of a fairly large body of foreign research on Russian ecopolitics, we would like to draw attention only to some of the works that are most significant in terms of their contribution to the scientific discussion of political problems of the environment. An early study in this area (1994) was an article by Barbara Jancar-Webster, where she tries to raise the issue of environmental policy in Russia in a democratic transition³⁴. The author uncritically examines the collapse of the USSR, puts in this context a complex of environmental disasters and outlines trajectories for the prospects of environmental reforms in Russia. Much later, in 2014, David Feldman and Ivan Blokov published a monograph on the role of NGOs and civil society in Russia's post-Cold War environmental policy³⁵. Another work that is

²⁹ *Borichpolets K. P.* Water and energetic problems in Central Asia and eventual ways of the solution [text] // MGIMO Review of International Relations. 2013. Vol. 30. No. 3. P. 25–38. (in Russian)

³⁰ *Danilov-Danil'yan V. I.* Global water crisis and the role of Russia in its solution [text] // Biosphere. 2009. Vol. 1. No. 1. P. 106–110. (in Russian)

³¹ *Likhacheva A.* EU – Russia Relations Regarding Water Resources in Central Asia [text] // International Organisations Research Journal. 2014. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 47–67. (in Russian)

³² *Makarov I. A.* Russia and global environmental problems [text] // New international relations: main trends and challenges for Russia / ed. by A. V. Lukin. Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 2018. P. 211–235. (in Russian)

³³ Modern legal vectors of climate policy development: the experience of Russia and foreign countries [text] / M. A. Egorov (ed.). Moscow: Prospect, 2023. 456 p. (in Russian)

³⁴ *Jancar-Webster B.* Russian Environmental Policy in Transition [text] // The Journal of Environment & Development. 1994. Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 107–122.

³⁵ *Feldman D. L., Blokov I.* The Politics of Environmental Policy in Russia [text]. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014. 200 p.

significant for this dissertation research is the article by Ellie Martus, published in 2021. It examines the role that Russian President Vladimir Putin personally plays in environmental policy³⁶. This article has significant drawbacks. In particular, the author misunderstands the system of political decision-making in Russia. He does not fully realize that the country has a multi-stage model for developing legislative norms, as well as decisions of the President of the Russian Federation. But its appearance illustrates one of the views from abroad on environmental policy in modern Russia. One of the few English-language works where regulatory aspects of environmental policy in the Russian Federation are considered in detail is the article by E. Omelchenko, A. Serebrennikova, D. Gumenyuk, M. Chivragova, A. Anichkin, A. Mikhaleva, published in 2021 in the British edition of *Practical Law*³⁷. It provides an overview of the structures, both state and non-state, that influence the content of rule-making in Russia.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the transformation of climate policy institutions in Russia in 2014-2022.

Tasks:

1. Review existing theoretical approaches to climate policy research;
2. Compare the main models for managing climate issues.
3. Determine the target nature of international organizations that set the climate agenda;
4. Describe the role of Russia in the international climate management system;
5. Analyze the institutions of climate policy regulation in the Russian Federation and consider possible scenarios for its transformation.

³⁶ *Martus E.* Policymaking and Policy Framing: Russian Environmental Politics under Putin [text] // *Europe-Asia Studies*. 2021. Vol. 73. No. 5. P. 869–889.

³⁷ *Omelchenko E., Serebrennikova A., Gumenyuk D., Chivragova M., Anichkin A., Mikhaleva A., Chance C.* Environmental Law and Practice in the Russian Federation: Overview [electronic resource]. // *Practical Law*. URL: [https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-013-5609?transitionType=Default&contextData=\(sc.Default\)&firstPage=true](https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-013-5609?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true) (accessed 10.07.2023)

The object of the research - climate policy.

The subject of the research - the development of institutions that determine climate policy in the Russian Federation in the XXI century.

Hypothesis of dissertation research. It is assumed that under the influence of changes in the institutional design of the Russian climate policy in the period from 2014 to 2023, the transition to a new regulatory paradigm focused on the priority of Russia's national interests has been carried out.

Theoretical and methodological foundations of the study. In theoretical terms, the work is based on the neo-institutional theory and the theory of public choice associated with it. First of all, it is important for us to understand the institute. Here we start from the generalization of James March and Johan Olsen: "An institution is a relatively stable set of rules and organized practices embedded in structures of meaning and resources that are relatively unchanged in the conditions of changing individuals and relatively resistant to idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing external circumstances³⁸." Institutional theory provides an opportunity to understand how society constructs social institutions, how it emphasizes their endogenous nature. "Institutions are not just equilibrium contracts between calculating individual actors striving for survival or arenas for opposing social forces. They are a set of structures, rules and standard operating procedures that partially play an autonomous role in political life³⁹."

Neo-institutional theory allows us to consider international organizations as agents of institutional change. In fact, they are involved in changing institutions in the field of climate policy in Russia. It is important to understand exactly how they affect changes in the regulatory field. However, the institutional approach has its drawbacks. As B. Rothstein noted: "The emerging question of the source of

³⁸ *March J. G., Olsen J. P.* Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics [text]. New York: Free Press, 1989. 227 p.

³⁹ *March J. G., Olsen J. P.* Elaborating the New Institutionalism [electronic resource] // ARENA Centre for European Studies. 2005. No. 11. 28 p. URL: <https://cpp.amu.edu.pl/pdf/olsen2.pdf> (accessed 10.05.2024)

institutional change is a symptom of the general problem of institutional analysis, namely, its serious theoretical insufficiency. The statement about the "importance of political institutions" does not say anything about which institutions are more important and for which cases⁴⁰."

In this dissertation study, we attempt to combine a neo-institutional approach with climate policy research. Climate politics is a relatively new branch of political science, with its own middle-level theory. In Western science, it is customary to separate the concepts climate of climate policy and climate policy, so it is worth noting that this work was carried out in the climate policy format. In this context, a methodologically important work for us is the book "In Search of Climate Politics", published by the University of Cambridge in 2021. On the pages of this collective work, the most significant is the section written by Matthew Paterson, dedicated to conceptualizing the concept of climate politics⁴¹. In this situation, it is important for us to correlate the neo-institutional paradigm with the theorization of climate politics as a sphere of interstate relations and a set of state climate solutions. He writes: "First, we need to clearly define what we mean by politics. Second, we need to think about the political factors that contribute to (and hinder) climate change action, an issue that I suggest can be addressed through the concept of cultural political economy. Third, we need to think about the dynamics that arise from the first and second points, which, in my opinion, is twofold: on the one hand, the repetition of the movement from depoliticization to repoliticization and vice versa, and on the other hand, there is a contradiction (I call it "removing complexity") between the instinct to find simple "solutions" or enemies to encounter and the multi-dimensionality of the high-carbon world that needs to be transformed. First, however, it is worth thinking a little bit about how climate change is commonly conceptualized and formulated in

⁴⁰ *Rothstein B.* Political institutions: an overview [text] // A new handbook of political science; translation from English by M. M. Gurvits, etc. Moscow: Veche, 1999. P. 149–179 (in Russian)

⁴¹ *Paterson M.* In Search of Climate Politics [text] // Search of Climate Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. P. 14–29.

public discourse, as well as in various scientific disciplines, to find out what the policies of these specific climate change frameworks⁴²are."

Based on this, we build a model for our dissertation research, that is, we consider the formation of the regulatory field in the field of climate through the prism of public discussions and review the concepts of climate change.

The dissertation research is based on the application **of a set of methods** by which empirical material is analyzed:

The comparative method is used to compare the morphological characteristics of key climate policy institutions in Russia. This method allowed us to determine the ratio of various institutions in the political space of the Russian Federation, as well as to identify the degree of their influence.

The method of political and legal analysis is used when working with regulatory materials related to climate policy in Russia. We are talking about working with international agreements (the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement), as well as with laws and regulations of the Russian Federation.

The method of narrative analysis (i.e. thematic and structural narrative analysis) was used to study the minutes of meetings of interfactional working groups and committees of the State Duma of the Russian Federation on various issues of climate policy. In addition, narrative analysis was used when working with axiological materials in ideological texts.

Event analysis is used to identify the relationship between politically important events, such as UN meetings, and changes in the climate agenda in the country we are studying. Event analysis is also important for considering the most important for climate policy meetings of the Chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.

An equally important place in the study is occupied by the analysis of case studies. In particular, the analysis of situations related to qualitative methods is

⁴² Ibid.

necessary when considering cases related to individual foreign policy changes that have affected the nature of climate policy in Russia.

In the final part of the dissertation research, the method of scenarios was used: to predict the further development of climate policy in the Russian Federation in general and in the regulatory plane in particular. A special variant was chosen – the analytical method of scenarios. For this work, this choice is optimal (based on such characteristics of the research being conducted as genre and volume).

Provisions submitted for defense:

- 1) The institutional design of the Russian climate policy involves a multi-factor deliberation of environmental norms. Participants in the discussion of regulatory documents in the field of ecology are: parliamentarians, international NGOs and institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences. At the level of political theory, this process can be most fully characterized by applying the theory of public choice.
- 2) In the period from 2014 to 2023, the influence of international institutions on legislative activity in the field of environmental policy in the Russian Federation is developing according to the dependent development scenario. However, ideologically grounded values in rule-making activities have been replaced by a sovereign approach based on the specifics of the historical and geographical features of the Russian regions.
- 3) The adoption of the updated Concept of Russia's Foreign Policy (March 31, 2023) has had an impact on the nature of relations with international environmental institutions. In the future, the dynamics of climate policy development is predicted with a focus on domestic axiological guidelines.
- 4) The dissertation proposes an adjusted definition of climate policy. This definition is developed at the intersection of ideas in the field of political ecology and theoretical approaches that are strictly specialized in climatology.

- 5) During the study period, a gradual transition from mitigation practices to an adaptation model began to take place in the field of climate risk management in Russia⁴³. This transition is based on a science-based concept of the inexpediency of combating climate change, and the preparation of society for these changes. In this situation, state institutions act as regulators that can overcome the problem of rational ignorance and contribute to the development of policy solutions that are most relevant to the new picture of the world.

Territorial and chronological framework of the study. Geographically, the study is localized within the borders of the state – the Russian Federation - for the period from 2014 to 2023 (2022 inclusive). 2014 is the starting point for this study because it is the time when the development and implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement, officially adopted in 2015 and ratified by Russia in 2019, begins. In addition, this time is characterized by a change in the geopolitical landscape and unprecedented sanctions pressure on Russia in connection with the entry into its structure of the Republic of Crimea and the federal city of Sevastopol. During the eight years we studied, the status of many provisions of climate policy changed significantly. Some of them became irrelevant, as they were provisions that initially reflected the interests of global, rather than national projects. The bottom line of the study is 2022 inclusive. Despite the global geopolitical transformations caused by the conflict in Ukraine, Russia did not withdraw from international climate agreements in 2022. Moreover, according to the logic of dependent development, norms dictated by the requirements of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change are still being adopted and applied on its territory.

⁴³ *Romanovskaya A. A.* Risk can be managed and damage from climate change can be minimized [electronic resource] // The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/interview/riskom-mozhno-upravlyat-a-ushcherb-ot-izmeneniya-klimata-mozhno-minimizirovat/> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

In addition, it was during the period under review that trends towards regionalization and linking to local specifics were revealed at the level of climate policy. At this time, in our opinion, the dichotomy of the attitude to climate policy is finally being formed, on the one hand, as an institution of global governance, and on the other – as an important component of purely state interests.

Thus, the presented dissertation attempts to consider the climate policy in Russia during this period in its relationship with global processes. This is possible precisely because the chronological framework we have chosen represents an important milestone in the history of climate policy institutions in the Russian Federation.

The empirical base of the dissertation research is divided into five groups of materials. All these groups complement each other, creating a single system of data that characterizes the subject of research.

First, these are UN documents and international agreements in the field of climate that affect the nature of climate policy development in the Russian Federation. These are the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) and the Kyoto Protocol, the Doha Amendment and the Paris Agreement that replaced it, which were created to address climate problems. This also includes documents related to water and soil issues.

Secondly, these are laws and decisions adopted by the State Duma of the Russian Federation. The choice of these materials is connected with the fact that during the work of the parliament, a system for discussing environmental and climate policy has become operational, where deputies, scientists and representatives of NGOs participate. We are talking about creating environmental laws regulating the climate sphere. Let's make a reservation that the greatest attention is paid to the laws adopted in the period from 2014 to 2023 – during the period when the transformation of the right field towards the sovereignization of nature protection norms began. Here you should also mention the decrees of the President of the Russian Federation and the resolutions of the Russian Government in the field of ecology.

Third, these are working materials from meetings of interfactional working groups and committees of the State Duma and branches of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In May 2022, the State Duma of the Russian Federation established an Interfactional Working Group on legal support for the introduction of a "green" economy as one of the directions of sustainable development, at the very first meetings of which it was stated that it was necessary to revise the national climate agenda in favor of measures for practical adaptation to climate change.

Fourth, the empirical base is based on the materials of "Rossiyskaya Gazeta" (2000-2023), as well as minutes and rules of procedure of meetings of legislative and executive authorities of Russia. Based on them, the most significant events were selected, on the basis of which the event analysis was conducted.

Fifth, the study was based on documents in the field of climate policy in Russia, which are program documents for international environmental organizations. First of all, it implies doctrinal documents that manifest the values of various actors of the "green policy" in Russia. In a number of cases, theoretically based texts of an academic nature were considered. However, all of them fulfill political goals, since they are associated with political organizations with an environmental focus.

Compliance of the dissertation with the Passport of the scientific specialty of the Higher Attestation Commission.

This dissertation corresponds to the provisions of the passport of the specialty of the Higher Attestation Commission 5.5.2. Political institutions, processes, technologies on the following points:

- Ontological, morphological and procedural parameters of politics, current trends in its evolution.
- The political process: its essence, sources, structure, social foundations, and environmental factors.
- Political institutions: formation, development and modern transformations.

- Strategic management, political forecasting and design of political institutions and processes⁴⁴.

Scientific novelty of the study.

First, within the framework of the presented dissertation research, for the first time in domestic political science, a comparative study of the influence of international and national institutions on climate policy in Russia was conducted. The main actors that determine the institutional design of climate policy in the Russian Federation were identified, their significance was assessed, and an attempt was made to distribute them according to the degree of influence.

Secondly, for the first time in Russian political science, the relationship between the nature of foreign policy and the peculiarities of climate policy has been established. In particular, in the field of lawmaking, a historical period characterized by the transition to sovereign norms of environmental regulation (2014-2023) is highlighted.

Third, the dissertation reveals the transition from mitigation practices to adaptation practices, which has had an impact on climate policy. This is also an innovation, previously this process was not considered by political scientists and remained in the sphere of attention of Earth sciences.

Fourth, this dissertation is one of the first papers on climate policy based on institutional theory. Such a repertoire of theoretical tools was not used in ecopolitology.

The main scientific results.

In this dissertation, we proved that climate policy has a dual character: on the one hand, it is part of global policy⁴⁵, and on the other, national policy. Our research,

⁴⁴ Passport of scientific speciality 5.5.2. “Political institutions, processes, technologies” [electronic resource] // Official site of Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://vak.minobrnauki.gov.ru/uploader/loader?type=17&name=92259542002&f=15337> (accessed 10.07.2023). (in Russian)

which compared doctrines, concepts, protocols and regulatory documents, showed that climate change marked the beginning of a new stage in the history of international relations. They are based on the idea of cooperation on global changes, at the same time they are based on a complex of contradictions both in the field of economics of the "green transition" and in the field of understanding threats to sovereignty.

In this dissertation, we have adjusted the definition of climate policy. It is worth repeating the thesis stated at the beginning of the work that the author of the dissertation defines climate policy as political practices for regulating the entire range of problems included in the climate agenda⁴⁶ in one way or another. Since climate as a phenomenon is total, it is closely related to loyalties that divide people into opposite groups. At the same time, each of these groups offers its own institutional format for regulating climate issues formulated at the UN level. In addition, we believe that climate policy is an independent branch of political knowledge.

Russia's climate policy is based on a system of interconnections built in the world around the climate debate. Disputes about the Anthropocene and the boundaries of sovereignty directly affect decisions made in Moscow⁴⁷. The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement are documents that are not completely external to Russian realities. They were actively discussed by the Russian expert community.

Climate problems turn out to be part of the axiological sphere. For example, an imperfectly substantiated and recognized theory of the Anthropocene is taken on faith, becoming not so much a part of scientific knowledge as an object of belief⁴⁸. As

⁴⁵ *Nikolaev N. P.* On the issue of the problem of defining the concept of "planetarism" as a new religious phenomenon within the framework of the internal ideological policy of the state [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // *Socio-political sciences*. 2023. Vol. 13. No. 4. p. 170.

⁴⁶ *Nikolaev N. P.* Climate policy and human rights [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // *Questions of political science*. 2024. Vol. 14. No. 3 (103). p. 863

⁴⁷ *Nikolaev N. P.* Anthropocene – state of emergency – sovereignty [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // *Issues of national and federal relations*. 2024. No. 3. p. 830.

⁴⁸ *Nikolaev N. P.* On the issue of setting the problem of practical adaptation to climate change in the context of Russia's participation in the global climate agenda [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // *Scientific Works of the Free Economic Society of Russia*. 2022. Vol. 236. No. 4. p. 435

a result, depending on the ideologically determined picture of the world, there is a division of judgments in the field of climate policy. They mostly boil down to a dichotomy between globalist and polycentric approaches to climate change management.

Practical significance of the study.

The results of this study can be used in the work of the legislative bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in the field of environmental and climate policy. The materials of the dissertation can also be used in the development of courses for universities in the disciplines "Environmental Policy in Russia" and "International Environmental Policy".

Results and approbation of the study.

The main provisions and results of this dissertation research were reflected in articles published in various scientific journals, including those included in the List of Peer-reviewed scientific publications of the Higher Attestation Commission under the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation.

In particular, the article "On the issue of setting the problem of practical adaptation to climate change in the context of Russia's participation in the global climate agenda"⁴⁹ examines in detail the issue of forming a state policy in the field of adaptation to climate change. By analyzing the current regulatory legal acts and statements of government officials (both foreign and Russian representatives) on the topic of climate change, a justification was presented for the need to change the state approach to solving the problem of climate change in the territory of the Russian Federation by including adaptation measures.

In the article "On the problem of defining the concept of 'planetarianism' as a new religious phenomenon within the framework of the internal ideological policy of

⁴⁹ *Nikolaev N. P.* On the issue of setting the problem of practical adaptation to climate change in the context of Russia's participation in the global climate agenda [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // Scientific Works of the Free Economic Society of Russia. 2022. Vol. 236. No. 4. pp. 427-446.

the state"⁵⁰, the axiological influence of planetarism on international politics in general, as well as on the national policy of individual states in solving the problem of climate change was demonstrated.

At the same time, the article "Climate Policy and human rights"⁵¹ provides a justification for the fact that the concept of anthropogenic climate change is currently the basic doctrine on the basis of which the state climate policy is based. In the context of the problem of human rights protection, it was noted that the vector of development of climate policy as a political sphere inevitably leads to further devaluation of the concept of human rights.

In turn, in the study "Anthropocene – state of Emergency – sovereignty"⁵², the influence of the Anthropocene theory on the global political space was demonstrated in terms of the transformation of climate policy institutions through competition between proponents of the Anthropocene theory and adherents of sovereignty for the right to declare a state of emergency.

At the same time, the results of the dissertation research were presented at the IV and V All-Russian Water Congress (Moscow, 2020 and 2021). Significant provisions of the dissertation were announced as part of a speech at the "National Forest Forum" (Moscow, Tambov, Tyumen, Perm, Syktyvkar and Krasnoyarsk, 2019). Presentations were made at international scientific forums: the XII International Forum "Ecology" (Moscow, 2021) and the XI International Forum "The Arctic: Present and Future" (Moscow, 2021). In addition, the materials of the dissertation were tested within the framework of the scientific conference of the Free Economic Society Abalkin Readings (Moscow, 2022). A plenary report was made at

⁵⁰ *Nikolaev N. P.* On the issue of the problem of defining the concept of "planetarism" as a new religious phenomenon within the framework of the internal ideological policy of the state [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // *Socio-political sciences*. 2023. Vol. 13. No. 4. pp. 166-172.

⁵¹ *Nikolaev N. P.* Climate policy and human rights [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // *Questions of political science*. 2024. Vol. 14. No. 3 (103). pp. 863-877

⁵² *Nikolaev N. P.* Anthropocene – state of emergency – sovereignty [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // *Issues of national and federal relations*. 2024. No. 3. pp. 827-837.

a joint meeting of the Inter-Factional Working Group of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation "On legal support for the introduction of a green economy as one of the directions of sustainable development", the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences on Earth Climate Problems and the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences on Global Environmental Problems (Moscow, 2023).

The structure of the paper consists of an introduction, two chapters, a conclusion, a list of sources, literature, and appendices.

Chapter 1. Climate policy as a model for managing global changes in the context of geopolitical instability

1.1. Theoretical approaches to the study of climate policy

The relationship between politics and climate change is the subject of political science research. The answer to the question of what exactly this relationship lies in, political theorists began to look only in the XXI century. At the same time, the greenhouse effect, the central topic of modern discussion of climate problems, was discovered in the XIX century by Jean-Baptiste Fourier. For more than a hundred years, climate was considered a natural phenomenon, and its relationship to political processes remained unobvious. Today, however, climate has become more than just an important subject of study. When it comes to the social sciences, it has come to be seen as an important factor in the development of socio-economic relations at completely different levels. Whole areas of humanitarian knowledge have been formed, highlighting climate as a determinant of historical and civilizational development. Moreover, a branch of knowledge was formed, which was called climate history. It examines the development of human societies through the lens of climate change⁵³.

These processes have changed the structure of political discourse. Climate has become an important part of the political agenda, as have many related concepts⁵⁴. Today, most policy programs address climate policy and reducing CO2 emissions in

⁵³ *Lumb H. H.* Climate, History and the Modern World [text]. London: Routledge, 1996. 464 p.

⁵⁴ *Nikolaev N. P.* On the problem of defining the concept of "planetarianism" as a new religious phenomenon within the framework of the internal ideological policy of the state [text] // Socio-political sciences. 2023. Vol. 13. No. 4. pp. 166-172.0

one way or another⁵⁵. Political parties and activists have formed a request for ideological reflection on the environment. Under these conditions, climate ceased to be an existential, almost transcendental phenomenon; on the contrary, it was naturalized in political doctrines. In some concepts, the main idea was the need for a "green transition" (transition from an economy based on carbon – based energy sources to a so-called "green" economy using alternative energy sources) and building a global climate management system, while in others, the requirement to pay attention to regional features and the urgent need for a polycentric management system. The attitude to climate has been defined through the prism of the political orientation of an actor writing, commenting or speaking on climate issues.

At the level of political theory, current climate change has given rise to ideas of "erosion of national sovereignty" and the destruction of the established world order. Political theorists began to speak out for and against revising the basic rights of member States of the international community⁵⁶. Such debates at the level of political philosophy have formed a discourse based on global values and planetary justice, which are opposed to the traditional theory of sovereignty⁵⁷. The alarming statements of environmentalists and "green activists" stimulated the process of ideological deconstruction of traditional geopolitics and state theory⁵⁸. I must say that not only political scientists, but also environmental organizations have joined this process.

As an illustration of this thesis, we can quote from the work of A. N. Zotin, who notes: "In recent years, the IPCC (The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

⁵⁵ For ex.: *Carter N., Little C.* Party competition on climate policy: The roles of interest groups, ideology and challenger parties in the UK and Ireland [text] // *International Political Science Review*. 2021. Vol. 42. No. 1. P 17.

⁵⁶ *Gupta J.* Climate Change and the Future of International Order [text] // *The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order* / H. W. Maull (ed.). Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2018. P 44–63.

⁵⁷ *Habib B.* Climate Change and the Re-imagination of State Sovereignty [electronic resource] // *E-International Relations*. URL: <https://www.e-ir.info/2015/11/08/climate-change-and-the-re-imagination-of-state-sovereignty/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

⁵⁸ *Werrell C. E., Femia F.* Climate Change, the Erosion of State Sovereignty, and World Order [text] // *Brown Journal of World Affairs*. 2016. Vol. 22. No. 2. P. 221–235.

Change) reports have become more and more politicized. Reports now contain special summaries for "decision makers", in which information is presented in a form adapted for non-professionals, which means that it is more or less distorted. Politicians and journalists hardly even look at the four-thousand-page reports themselves. At the same time, there are a lot of questions about the methodology of IPCC alarmist models from independent scientists⁵⁹."

Finally, what was originally seen as a cosmogonic, academic, religious, and ecological subject becomes a political one. Most of the discussions about climate in the twenty-first century are not strictly scientific or strictly limited to the framework of "green discourse". Climate discussions are conducted with the participation of political structures, and often they have begun to have one or another ideological modality. For example, new ideological dilemmas have emerged, such as climate and sovereignty, climate and the right to security, and climate and power. A.V. Losev notes that: "Climate risks and diverse reactions of states to the use of geoengineering technologies can have a negative impact on both international politics and the internal political dynamics of various countries, which can lead to international tension, economic wars and armed conflicts. It is also unclear how the global community will react if geoengineering technologies lead to unforeseen consequences⁶⁰."

Moreover, the climate agenda and geopolitics in some cases are opposed⁶¹. Although, in our opinion, climate policy is an independent branch of political knowledge, we are still not inclined to oppose it to geopolitics. In particular, during the discussion of the Council on Foreign Relations in 2020, participants came to the

⁵⁹ *Zotin A.* The climate agenda: how to separate science from ideology? [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/klimaticheskaya-povestka/?sphrase_id=732062 (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

⁶⁰ *Losev A. V.* Geoengineering and geopolitics [electronic resource] // Russia in Global Affairs. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/geoinzheneriya-i-geopolitika/> (accessed 10.10.2023). (in Russian)

⁶¹ For ex.: The Future of Energy, Climate, and Geopolitics [electronic resource] // Council on Foreign Relations. URL: <https://www.cfr.org/event/future-energy-climate-and-geopolitics> (accessed 10.10.2023).

conclusion that the political and climate maps do not contradict, but complement each other. At the 2012 Royal Geographical Society plenary session on political geography, Stuart Elden outlined the possibilities of a new interpretation of the term geopolitics, which included the earth's interior and atmosphere to get a complete picture. This has become an alternative to geopolitics as a synonym for global politics with its two-dimensional cartography. Elden noted that something more than just political geography is needed: in order to talk about security and geography, you need a sense of the material, but not associated with traditional deterministic formulations. In many ways, this need is due to the task of managing the climate on a global scale⁶².

The basic postulate of globalism as a political ideology is climate management on a global scale. Here we can clearly see the relationship between political judgments about the climate and ideological attitudes about those who represent this judgment. The fact is that initially globalism, as a philosophical doctrine, was one of the first to assign the right to publicly present climate problems. In fact, most of the developed tools used to "manage" the climate were created in one way or another under the influence of globalist attitudes. Going beyond this discursive framework became possible much later, but the influence of ideas related to regional and national approaches to climate problems is no less great today than globalism.

In this context, the most significant role is played by Russia and the countries of the global South, which together with China come up with sovereign climate control programs. However, the role of ideology and political values laid down at the initial stage of climate reflection is still very important. One of the largest ideologies used in the analysis of climate policy is the concept of the Anthropocene. It sets the framework for a whole liberal-globalist theory that explains climate problems and the role of man in the "failure" of the environment.

⁶² Dalby S. The geopolitics of climate change [text] // *Political Geography*. 2013. Vol. 37. P. 38–47.

The authors of the term "Anthropocene" are ecologist Eugene Storer and chemist Paul Krutzen⁶³. The term was first published in 2000 in the brochure of the International Program on Geosphere and Biosphere. The Anthropocene refers to the estimated geological epoch that dates from the beginning of significant human impacts on the Earth's geology and ecosystems, including, but not limited to, anthropogenic climate change. There is no agreed point of reference for the arrival of the Anthropocene, but different versions agree that this era occurred in the second half of the twentieth century and is closely related to the testing of atomic weapons. However, discussions about the final date of the beginning of the Anthropocene are still ongoing. The peak radionuclide fallout caused by the atomic bomb tests in the 1950s is considered to be a more significant phenomenon than others. In January 2015, 26 of the 38 members of the International Working Group on the Anthropocene published a document proposing to establish the first nuclear weapons test (Trinity), i.e. July 16, 1945, as the starting point of the proposed new era⁶⁴.

At the same time, the term "Anthropocene" still has a semi-formal character, since it has not been approved by the International Commission on Stratigraphy and other authoritative structures dealing with the periodization of the Earth's history⁶⁵. However, the term has become well naturalized and is in demand in political discourse. In just twenty years, the Anthropocene as a category of political responsibility has become one of the most widely used words in the political dictionary about climate. Its popularity led to the emergence of a related term – the

⁶³ *Crutzen P. J., Stoermer E. F.* The Anthropocene [text] // Global Change Newsletter. 2000. Vol. 41. P. 17–18.

⁶⁴ Was first nuclear test the start of new human-dominated epoch, the Anthropocene? [electronic resource] // News Center. University of California, Berkeley. URL: <https://news.berkeley.edu/2015/01/16/was-first-nuclear-test-dawn-of-new-human-dominated-epoch-the-anthropocene#:~:text=An%20international%20group%20of%20scientists,humans%20increasingly%20shape%20the%20planet> (accessed 10.10.2023).

⁶⁵ Working Group on the Anthropocene [electronic resource] // Subcommittee on Quaternary Stratigraphy. URL: <http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/working-groups/anthropocene/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

geopolitics of the Anthropocene. Thus, Simon Dalby, describing the difference between classical geopolitics and Anthropocene geopolitics, writes : "If classical geopolitics reflected on how climate and environment shape societies, culture and, consequently, politics, then it is the opposite processes that are the key to the future in the Anthropocene. The human activities and decisions currently made, mostly by the rich and powerful members of our species, will have profound implications for the future climate of the planet. Climate does not determine the fate of individual peoples in specific places, but instead the part of humanity that is considered rich and powerful will shape the future climate conditions for all of us with their decisions about where to invest, what to build and produce⁶⁶."

Discussions of the Anthropocene in the sphere of geopolitics are mainly reduced to global politics and problems of planetary governance. By and large, the geopolitics of the Anthropocene takes the state-centered world out of the spotlight, putting the politics of planetary problems at the center. Despite this, the concept of the Anthropocene has attracted the attention of politicians of various orientations. For example, Marxist theorists criticize the Anthropocene as a myth that justifies the costs of the era of so-called "fossil capitalism"⁶⁷. "Fossil capitalism", in other words, an economy based on predatory coal mining and its use, is considered by the left to be the main cause of climate change. According to Anthropocene theorists Will Steffen, Paul Krutzen, and John McNeil: "The mastery of fire by our ancestors provided humanity with a powerful monopoly tool that was not available to other species, which firmly defined our path as the long road to the Anthropocene»⁶⁸." It is in this context that the term describing the man of this era appears: *Homo pyrophilus*

⁶⁶ Dalby S. A. New Geopolitics for the Anthropocene [electronic resource] // Green European Journal. URL: <https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/a-new-geopolitics-for-the-anthropocene/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

⁶⁷ Malm A. Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming [text]. New York: Verso book, 2016. 496 p.

⁶⁸ In Malm A. The Anthropocene Myth [electronic resource] // Jacobin. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2015/03/anthropocene-capitalism-climate-change/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

(Fire-loving Man)⁶⁹. The left-wing critique of the Anthropocene negates the importance of universal influence on environmental pollution, placing the responsibility strictly on the owners of big business and on the system of capitalism. Marxists point out that the desire to blame climate change on the entire Homo species is an attempt to lighten the burden of responsibility that lies on the most affluent segments of the population. For example, Andreas Malm states: "Only 19 million people in New York State consume more energy than 900 million people in sub-Saharan Africa. The difference in energy consumption between a subsistence cattle farmer in the Sahel and the average Canadian can easily exceed a thousand times – and that's the average Canadian, not the owner of five homes, three SUVs, and a private jet⁷⁰."

Such rhetoric reduces climate issues to an asymmetry in the field of climate justice, when the global South is the most discriminated against. At the same time, the climate justice agenda itself is controlled by the countries of the global West in their own interests. The way out of the situation proposed by the modern left is seen in structural restrictions, primarily in relation to the core of the capitalist system. As a result, all the assumptions of the Anthropocene theory are presented only as tools of political rhetoric, and not as scientifically proven facts.

In the political theory of the new right, which is opposed to the left, the anthropocene also acts only as a political tool of globalization, which they criticize. The ideas of regionalism and decentralization promoted by them completely exclude attempts to create planetary climate management institutions proposed by proponents of the Anthropocene theory. Moreover, at the level of theory, the new right advocates regionalization of climate management, taking into account the characteristics of each region, civilization, and country. The new right's own concept of climate policy

⁶⁹ *Lynas M.* The God Species [text]. London: Fourth Estate, 2011. 288 p.

⁷⁰ *Malm A.* The Anthropocene Myth [electronic resource] // Jacobin. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2015/03/anthropocene-capitalism-climate-change/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

exists despite disagreements within this current ⁷¹. This concept denies the effectiveness of regulatory and prohibitive measures in the field of climate management, first prescribed in the Kyoto Protocol, and then in the Paris Agreement. The new right focuses on reducing the growth of economies and markets, on the need to change the capitalist system and the people inside it, who are used to large-scale consumption. In the criticism on the right, the phenomenon of unlimited capital accumulation is central, since, from their point of view, it has led to a large-scale natural and climatic crisis.

One of the leaders of the new right – Alain de Benoist – in his "Ecological and Philosophical treatise" notes: "The measures proposed in the framework of sustainable development are, therefore, first of all bans or norms, and then-tax rules and incentives that force people to get used to more "eco-friendly" behavior. The problem is that all these measures, even if they are added together, cannot prevent the global deterioration of the situation. Bans are rarely effective, even less often enforced, the amount of taxes or fines is sometimes ridiculous compared to the damage, and eco-friendly behaviors, no matter how much you admire them, are not able to reverse the trend⁷²."

In support of this, it is worth quoting Anatol Lieven, an expert from another camp – environmental realism: "Although appeals to international communities have helped to mobilize useful activist movements, they have so far failed to encourage a solid majority of voters in key countries to support policies that will require them to make personal sacrifices. Thus, it seems clear that if the ruling elites of these countries (and in democratic states, a sufficient number of voters) ever agree to serious and economically painful measures to limit carbon dioxide emissions, they

⁷¹ *de Benoist A. Tomorrow, degrowth! Thinking ecology through to the end* [text]; translation from French by S. Denisov. Moscow: Institute of Humanities, 2013. 103 p. (in Russian).

⁷² *Ibid.* P. 35-36.

will need to be convinced that both the direct and indirect effects of climate change pose a serious threat to the security of their states and modes"⁷³.

A likely way out of the crisis created by the boundless growth of capitalism, according to the new right, is the relocalization of production as the basis of bioeconomics. Relocalization is the idea of producing products as close as possible to the place of consumption, based on local enterprises funded at the local level⁷⁴. In turn, this will reduce production volumes, and along with them, emissions into the atmosphere. The potential for this is illustrated by Russia's 35% reduction in harmful air emissions after the fall of the Berlin Wall and unprecedented deindustrialization⁷⁵.

In these matters, the new right is becoming close to the left, which also sees the cause of negative climate changes in the development of global capitalism. At the same time, the new right's Anthropocene model is outside the discursive field, and it is not considered viable. In contrast, the liberal theory develops the idea of the Anthropocene to the level of metatheory, which can describe any modern changes in society and the natural environment. For the new right, the focus of attention is on the ethical and metaphysical choice of a person, dictated by his axiological attitudes. These attitudes are associated with criticism of "Progressivism" and "Enlightenment", because thanks to them all social relations are "reified" and become a commodity⁷⁶. De Benoit's thesis boils down to the need to promote ethics that will help defeat the endless race of consumption, and then climate challenges⁷⁷. However, this point of view is still limited by the same framework of consumption, which pushes it to the periphery of the public sphere.

Another influential paradigm is climate justice. Like the Anthropocene, it is of Western origin. The concept implies the existence of climate justice and,

⁷³ *Lieven A.* Climate Change and the State: A Case for Environmental Realism [text] // Survival. Global Politics and Strategy. 2020. Vol. 62. No. 2. P. 26.

⁷⁴ *de Benoist A.* Tomorrow, degrowth! Thinking ecology through to the end [text]; translation from French by S. Denisov. Moscow: Institute of Humanities, 2013. P. 83. (in Russian)

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* P. 85.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.* P. 102-103.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* P. 82-83.

consequently, climate injustice, which emerged as a result of a technocentric approach to climate decision-making. The injustice lies primarily in the uneven demand for countries to reduce their emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere: the world's poorest countries have contributed least to the emergence of climate and environmental problems, but today they suffer more from their consequences than others. Climate justice, on the other hand, is "mainly about drawing attention to the fact that climate change affects people differently, unevenly and disproportionately, and also about correcting the resulting injustice in fair ways with equal rights."⁷⁸

In this situation, the idea of a planetary justice system as a regulator of relations in the field of climate justice arises. This is largely a political idea, which is being discussed as a possible scenario for the development of relations in the field of regulating cooperation on harmful emissions. In this situation, the main dilemma for political science arises – the dilemma of different ethics. Recall that since the time of Aristotle, political knowledge is usually referred to the sphere of ethics, so the development of certain universal axiological attitudes belongs to the sphere of politics today. Hence the conclusion that discussions about the possibility of a planetary justice system are also political rather than legal⁷⁹.

Climate policy researchers Lina Lefstad and Jouni Paavola note that: "Liberal egalitarianism attempts to combine equality, personal freedom, and personal responsibility, and to use social institutions to distribute rights. Here, justice depends on how institutions, usually a nation-state, distribute these rights and responsibilities, and the subjects of justice will be the citizens of this nation-state. Cosmopolitanism views justice in a similar way to liberal egalitarianism, but on a global level, trying to

⁷⁸ *Biermann F., Kalfagianni A.* Planetary justice: A research framework [text] // *Earth System Governance*. 2020. No. 6. P. 1.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

define what constitutes a globally equitable distribution of benefits and burdens in the context of a globalized world⁸⁰."

Thus, when considering the problems of climate justice we are still faced with the same politicization of problems as when considering the Anthropocene. In most cases, discussions are reduced to a clash of opinions expressed from diametrically opposite poles of the political coordinate system. Robert O. Cohain noted that the concept of justice cannot be an object of research, since it is a subject of political beliefs⁸¹. This thesis is a confirmation of the principle that climate policy is based more on axiological principles, rather than on a natural science foundation.

Following the spread of the idea of climate justice, the concept of planetary justice appears in public discourse. Planetary justice is based on the idea of a global society and social systems, as well as ideas about the obligations of justice that people have towards other people (on a global scale), and to a lesser extent to the nature of the earth system in the Anthropocene, where social and ecological systems have become inseparable, and non-human beings also have obligations⁸². For this model, the anthropocene theory is immutable, it is an axiom. Planetary justice as a theory places responsibility for climate change on global society as a whole, using as abstract categories as possible. Both the global West and the global South are outside the scope of responsibility. From the Marxist point of view, the model of planetary justice does not stand up to criticism simply because it accepts the system of capitalism and a society of unequal consumption uncritically.

Planetary justice refers to the concept of justice that treats everyone equally and impartially. The second foundation of planetary justice is liberal egalitarianism. Justice here is defined by the way institutions distribute fundamental rights and

⁸⁰ *Lefstad L., Paavola J.* The evolution of climate justice claims in global climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC [text] // *Critical Policy Studies*. 2023. July. P. 1.

⁸¹ *Keohane R. O., Buchanan A.* The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions [text] // *Ethics and International Affairs*. 2006. Vol. 20. No. 4. P. 405–437.

⁸² *Biermann F., Kalfagianni A.* Planetary justice: A research framework [text] // *Earth System Governance*. 2020. No. 6. P. 1–11.

responsibilities, as well as economic opportunities in society, in order to correct the arbitrariness of a person's life expectations due to factors beyond their control. This theory is supplemented by cosmopolitan concepts that allow us to go beyond national states and national interests and form thinking at the level of the planet and global society with unified regulatory institutions. It is believed that for planetary justice there should be no national borders, moreover, their presence is the basis of planetary injustice, as well as the sovereign rights of States. It is assumed that the institutions of planetary justice will have a purely libertarian nature in the spirit of the concept developed by Robert Nozick⁸³.

In this regard, planetary justice acts as one of the ambitious geopolitical concepts that imposes a liberal model of the world order based on the hegemony of one of the ideologies. In fact, climate management models implicitly contain the potential for global hegemony, which causes criticism and skepticism, especially at the level of countries in the global South. The imposition of regulatory systems that regulate the principles of social life on the planet is not just one of the ways of hegemony, but, importantly, a model for the future.

Another important political project is the idea of a transition to a green economy, that is, the idea of creating a system for the production of material goods that uses strictly environmentally friendly decarbonized production facilities. However, many experts note that environmentally friendly production facilities still need to be created, and this will lead to additional emissions into the atmosphere and pollution of the surrounding landscape with waste from the production of new means of production. In addition, the requirement for a "green transition" will increase the debt burden on countries that are not able to independently implement this

⁸³ Ibid, and *Nozick R. Anarchy, State, and Utopia* [text]; translation from English by B. Pinsker. Moscow: IRISEN Press, 2008. 426 p. (in Russian)

transition⁸⁴. In turn, "green" transformations can lead to an increase in inequality in the world and ultimately to a conflict between rich and poor states.

At the same time, the new model of explaining political relations on a planetary scale (the Anthropocene), which also claims to be a new meta-narrative, insists on rejecting national interests. However, it ignores the possibility of using geoengineering technologies to capture greenhouse gases and carbon dioxide⁸⁵. Discussions about technology are outside the scope of ideologies based on the promotion of regulatory regulation at the planetary level. In the long run, such disagreements can lead to climate wars.

Climate wars are a way to solve climate contradictions and inequalities in access to resources by armed means⁸⁶. The most common symptoms of approaching climate wars are the spread of water conflicts, including armed clashes over access to water. At the level of political theories, the relationship between geophysics and geopolitics is noted. In this situation, we are talking about a large-scale geophysical crisis that provokes the melting of glaciers. Its consequences, according to climate war theorists, can lead to world-class geopolitical crises⁸⁷. By and large, these are wars for basic human needs in a rapidly changing world. Such future scenarios are considered by skeptics who criticize liberal normativism as potentially capable of creating large-scale inequality at the planetary level, which threatens a round of violence and chaos⁸⁸.

⁸⁴ *Zotin A.* The climate agenda: how to separate science from ideology? [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/klimaticheskaya-povestka/?sphrase_id=732062 (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

⁸⁵ *Losev A. V.* Geoengineering and geopolitics [electronic resource] // Russia in Global Affairs. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/geoinzheneriya-i-geopolitika/> (accessed 10.10.2023). (in Russian)

⁸⁶ *Valantin J-M.* What are Climate Wars? [electronic resource] // The Red Team Analysis Society. URL: <https://redanalysis.org/2021/11/02/what-are-climate-wars/> (accessed 10.10.2023)

⁸⁷ *Mann M.* The New Climate War: The Fight to Take Back Our Planet [text]. London: Public Affairs, 2021. 272 p.

⁸⁸ *Meyer R.* The World Could Be Entering a New Era of Climate War [electronic resource] // The Atlantic. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2022/11/climate-change-world-conflict-america-china/672255/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

A clear example is the conflict over semiconductors between the United States and China, without which a complete transition to decarbonization is impossible⁸⁹. Realist political theory predicts the politicization of technology in the near future, since access to it will be the basis of environmental inequality. It will consist in the fact that countries that are not capable of producing semiconductors will be forced to buy them abroad in order to produce "green technology" with zero or close to zero carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions⁹⁰.

The threat of climate wars has given rise to another significant political theory that is close to conservative philosophy – environmental realism. Describing this trend Anatol Lieven writes: "The task of realists in addressing climate change is not to change their basic philosophy or basic premise about the central role of states, state power and public interests. Instead, they should become more sober and practical about what constitutes modern State interests, recognizing that States are threatened not only by internal instability, but also by external attack. History confirms this. In China, as already noted, environmental threats and their management are central to ensuring State security and legitimacy⁹¹." It was A. Lieven who drew attention to the Schmittian nature of ecological realism. However, he notes that it is precisely the Schmittian methods that can cope with epidemics and natural disasters in the near future⁹². A. Lieven systematically appeals to China's experience in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. At the same time, his judgments about the Chinese experience are not based on the doctrinal documents of the PRC both in the field of combating the pandemic and in the field of climate management.

In turn, China is rapidly developing in the field of decarbonization and climate change regulation. So, in a report at the XX National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 16, 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that it is

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Lieven A. Climate Change and the State: A Case for Environmental Realism [text] // Survival. Global Politics and Strategy. 2020. Vol. 62. No. 2. P. 7–26.

⁹² Ibid.

necessary to: "...accelerate the process of planning and creating a system of new energy sources, plan the development of hydropower and environmental protection in a unified manner, ensure the active, safe and systematic development of nuclear energy, strengthen work on creating a system for the production, supply, storage and marketing of energy resources, reliably guaranteeing energy security. The system of statistical recording of data on carbon emissions should be improved, and the system of trading carbon quotas based on market principles should be improved. Increase the ability of ecosystems to absorb carbon. Take an active part in the global governance of the climate change response⁹³."

The main documents in the field of climate change in the PRC are the Law on Renewable Energy Sources of 2005, the White Paper on Energy Conditions and Policies of 2007, the Strategy for Revolutionary Transformations in the field of energy production and consumption (2016-2030) of 2016, the 14th five-year plan (2021-2026), the Long-term Development Strategy of China low-level greenhouse gas emissions until mid-century 2021, as well as the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy until 2035 (2022)⁹⁴.

Behind Xi's statement is a science-based theoretical model for the development of a low-carbon economy, or LTS economy. In essence, it is a political doctrine focused on state regulation and support for the development of low-carbon sectors of the economy. At the political level, it is declared that by 2060, China will receive 80% of its energy from non-fossil sources⁹⁵. According to Chinese scientists, an important obstacle to a sharp reduction in CO₂ emissions into the atmosphere is the

⁹³ Xi Jinping Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 16 October 2022 // The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Russian Federation. URL: http://ru.china-embassy.gov.cn/rus/zgxw/202210/t20221026_10792071.htm (accessed 10.10.2023). (in Russian)

⁹⁴ *Veselova D. N.* Climate policy in China: the procedural component [text] // Eurasian Integration: Economics, Law, and Politics. 2023. Vol. 17. No. 2. P. 123. (in Russian)

⁹⁵ *Gao Lei* On the Problems and Prospects of China's Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy [text] // Russian and Chinese Studies. 2022. Vol. 6. No. 3. P. 163–171. (in Russian)

geopolitical landscape of the PRC, as well as the growing tension in relations with the United States, which increases the need to ensure energy sovereignty⁹⁶.

The Chinese factor is significant for the development of climate policy in Russia, since Chinese developments in the field of regulating CO2 emissions have an impact on the Russian Far East. In the medium term, it is possible to combine Chinese projects in the field of climate policy and Russian initiatives intended for the Far Eastern Federal District.

The Asian paradigm of climate policy fluctuates between overtly globalist models and conservative regionalism. Understanding of climate policy in China takes place at the level of the state leadership and is further developed by scientific structures. In Japan, on the other hand, think tanks, which are close to the UN or to supranational "green" organizations, determine the agenda both at the level of mass media and at the level of philosophical reflection⁹⁷. These two models exist in one form or another in the Asian region, dividing countries into supporters and opponents of global climate change management. However, only China has an absolutely sovereign political doctrine that offers solutions to climate problems. It should also be noted here that this country consistently promotes its format for solving climate problems, including within the framework of the "One Belt, One Road" project. In particular, China proposed the "Green Silk Road" strategy⁹⁸.

Thus, Chinese political scientists Lin Chu and Ligu Ma state that: "... the construction of the Green Silk Road is not only the need to achieve the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for the period up to 2030, but also the practice of applying new concepts for the development of ecological civilization around the world. The construction of the "Green Silk Road" has clear guidelines and

⁹⁶ *Sofer K.* Climate Politics in Japan [electronic resource] // Sasakawa USA Forum. 2016. No. 1. URL: <https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Sofer-Climate-Politics-in-Japan.pdf> (accessed 10.10.2023).

⁹⁷ *Gao Lei* On the Problems and Prospects of China's Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy [text] // Russian and Chinese Studies. 2022. Vol. 6. No. 3. P. 163–171. (in Russian)

⁹⁸ *Chu L., Ma L.* Stages of the development of Chinese "Green Silk Road" [text] // Society: Politics, Economics, Law. 2022. No. 3. P. 13–14. (in Russian)

goals. "China's 13th five-year plan" considers "green development" as one of the five main reform concepts, it provides for its comprehensive implementation in terms of promoting a low-carbon closed-loop economy, preserving and efficiently using resources, improving environmental management and creating barriers to environmental safety. Thus, since launching the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese Government has attached great importance to the implementation of the green development concept, which has gradually become an integral part of the Belt and Road Initiative."⁹⁹.

This strategy is purely regionalist (polycentric) in nature and does not pretend to global climate justice. In essence, this is an attempt to build a dialogue based on economic cooperation in the region. This dialogue is partly an alternative to the EU's initiatives in Central Asia, which impose a European climate justice format based on the ideas of the Anthropocene and green transition for the region's notoriously "weak" economies¹⁰⁰. Thus, the need and importance of taking into account national climate management formats is clearly visible on the example of Asia. In turn, regional dialogue in this area becomes possible on the basis of a variety of national formats.

In this section, we have examined the relationship between the political and the climate through the prism of the main ideologies: Marxism, liberalism, and the new right. The main conclusion, based on the analysis, is that climate issues, becoming

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ The European Union supports Central Asia in green recovery [electronic resource] // Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%8E%D0%B7-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B6%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%B5%D1%82-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%81-%C2%AB%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE%C2%BB-%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B2_ru?s=222 (accessed 10.10.2023). (in Russian)

the subject of public discussion, are transformed under the influence of ideological attitudes. Moreover, countries that promote certain ideologies use climate problems either to expand their geopolitical influence, or on the contrary, to preserve their sovereignty¹⁰¹. However, less attention is paid to solving climate problems directly than to the clash of values.

As a result, climate problems are part of the axiological sphere. For example, an incomplete and accepted theory of the Anthropocene is accepted on faith and becomes not so much a part of scientific knowledge as a subject of beliefs. As a result, depending on the ideologically determined picture of the world, there is a division of judgments in the field of climate policy. They mostly boil down to the dichotomy between globalist and polycentric approaches to climate change management. Along with this, there is also the position of skeptics who admit that climate change management is impossible in principle.

At this level, the opposing groups are divided. It is this division that Karl Schmitt called political¹⁰². On the example of the climate, changes in which lead to serious crises in the life of humans as a species, it is precisely the Schmittian characteristic of the political that is clearly traced. It comes from a confrontation at the axiological level, it is a conflict of beliefs, to varying degrees confirmed or refuted by natural science knowledge.

At the same time, which is fundamentally important for this dissertation research, the process of forming climate policy management institutions is taking place at the level of ideologies. The ideas of climate justice and even a planetary climate tribunal are the result of an axiological confrontation between proponents of globalism and polycentricity. By and large, polycentricity is becoming a way of countering the global climate dictatorship promoted by Western countries. The

¹⁰¹ *Werrell C. E., Femia F. Climate Change, the Erosion of State Sovereignty, and World Order [text] // Brown Journal of World Affairs. 2016. Vol. 22. No. 2. P. 221–235.*

¹⁰² *Schmitt C. The concept of the Political [text]; translation from German by Yu. Yu. Korinets and A. P. Shurbelev edited by A. F. Filippov. St. Petersburg: Science, 2016. 568 p. (in Russian)*

phenomenon of this dictatorship is of the same Schmittian nature¹⁰³ as the political one. Thus, considering the political theories that come up with a variety of proposals for solving climate problems, we can formulate the final conclusion of this section. It consists in the fact that the climate agenda at the present stage is becoming the subject of political struggle, and depending on its outcome, institutions for managing climate policy will be formed. At the present stage, we are dealing with a special form of discursive struggle, in which each of the discourses claiming to be true has not only axiological, but also eschatological potential.

1.2. Climate change management concepts

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, scientific discussions were held about whether it was possible to manage the climate using a set of political and engineering solutions. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the political and academic elite of a number of countries, including Russia, had established the view that climate risks can either be limited or eliminated. To do this, a whole range of policies must be implemented. However, this point of view is just a dominant opinion based on scientific reasoning. This scientific argument, in turn, is based on the international scientific consensus on this issue. The main thesis of this consensus was the idea that the causes of climate change are anthropogenic in nature.

However, in the 1990s, a current of climate skepticism emerged, denying the influence of humans on climate change. A small group of scientists presented this point of view in the mass media, but did not substantiate it with scientific arguments, and the corresponding publications in scientific publications did not appear. In the scientific community, there are several points of view on how to properly call this

¹⁰³ For ex.: *Schmitt C. Dictatorship* [text]; translation from German by Yu. Yu. Korinets. Moscow: Ripol-classic, 2022. 440 p. (in Russian)

phenomenon: "climate skepticism" or "climate change denial"¹⁰⁴. The fact is that skepticism is defined by most dictionaries as one of the scientific methods that presuppose the presence of a certain argument. However, representatives of climate skepticism do not support their position with arguments based on research.

American climatologist and geophysicist Michael E. Mann, criticizing climate skepticism, identified six basic theses of this theory:

1. The CO₂ level doesn't actually increase;
2. Even if this is the case, the increase has no effect on the climate, as there is no conclusive evidence of warming.
3. Even if there is warming, it is caused by natural causes;
4. Even if warming cannot be attributed to natural causes, the anthropogenic impact is small and the impact of ongoing greenhouse gas emissions will be negligible.
5. Even if the current and future projected impacts of humans on the Earth's climate are not insignificant, changes in general will benefit us;
6. Regardless of whether the changes will benefit us or not, people are very good at adapting to changes; besides, it's too late to do anything about it, and/or a technological solution is bound to come along when we really need it¹⁰⁵.

Criticizing climate skepticism, its opponents in the academic community write: "Conservative think tanks... and their supporters launched a full-scale counter-movement... We believe that this counter-movement played a central role in removing American support for environmental protection, both domestically and internationally. This tactic challenges the seriousness of environmental concerns and

¹⁰⁴ *Labohm H.* Climate Scepticism in a Nutshell [text] // *Energy & Environment*. 2006. Vol. 17. No. 5. P. 767–776.

¹⁰⁵ *Mann M.* The Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars: Dispatches from the Front Lines [text]. Columbia University Press, 2013. P. 23.

undermines environmental science by promoting what we call 'environmental skepticism'¹⁰⁶."

The most strident critic of climate skepticism was Bruno Latour. Throughout the 2010s, he devoted his work to this topic, which was eventually published in a series of relevant articles and interviews. Despite being considered the main post-truth theorist, Latour has consistently taken the side of academic science, although the press has repeatedly written that it was Bruno Latour who created the tools that climate skepticism relies on in his critique of scientific knowledge. In the 2015 text "Facing Gaia: Eight Lectures on the New Climate Regime"¹⁰⁷, he speaks of the Anthropocene as an irreversibly impending reality. It is from this point on that he ceases to oppose the environment and political institutions. In part, this is an attempt to go beyond the limits set out in his book "Politics of Nature. How to Bring the Sciences Into Democracy"¹⁰⁸, which climate skeptics rely on when criticizing proponents of the Anthropocene.

In subsequent works, Bruno Latour explicitly identified the main beneficiaries of climate skepticism. In his opinion, they are the American industrialists behind Donald Trump. Such a blatantly politically biased judgment raises the question of its objectivity. Here, Latour says that the lack of scientific evidence is the basis of climate skepticism, which is based on a part of the American elite. This judgment, in turn, is based on the fact that Donald Trump, being elected to the post of president, withdrew the United States from the Paris climate Agreement¹⁰⁹. It wasn't until 2021

¹⁰⁶ *Jacques P. J., Dunlap R. E., Freeman M.* The organisation of denial: Conservative think tanks and environmental scepticism [text] // *Environmental Politics*. 2008. Vol. 17. No. 3. P. 349–385.

¹⁰⁷ *Blinov E. N., Savchenko I. A.* Bruno Latour against climate skepticism: the mission of a scientist and the crisis of political institutions [text] // *Philosophy Journal*. 2019. Vol. 12. No. 4. P. 70–84. (in Russian)

¹⁰⁸ *Latour B.* Politics of nature: how to bring the sciences into democracy [text]; translation from French by E. Blinov. Moscow: Ad Marginem Press, 2018. 336 p. (in Russian)

¹⁰⁹ *Blinov E. N., Savchenko I. A.* Bruno Latour against climate skepticism: the mission of a scientist and the crisis of political institutions [text] // *Philosophy Journal*. 2019. Vol. 12. No. 4. P. 80. (in Russian)

that the new President, Joseph Biden, signed a decree returning to the Paris Agreement.

However, Latour still does not deny his previous dichotomy between Nature and Society. It just doesn't contrast them. He notes that the main task is to ecologize the relationship between Nature and Society. An important act for him is the anti-Copernican revolution, which will allow him to truly return to Earth, in Latour's terminology – to Gaia. Nevertheless, an important statement of his theory is that no one will be able to avoid the consequences of climate change, since they will affect all social groups¹¹⁰.

Although Bruno Latour's ideas seem to be the most radical both in the field of criticism of science and in the field of criticism of climate skepticism, it should be noted that they have a great influence on the expert community. Arguments about the need for democracy in climate decision-making are largely an attempt to provide broad popular support for structures that promote "climate risks" in political threat markets. However, to this day, discussions about climate are still the prerogative of the expert community.

Discussions about the possibility of managing climate risks are not only scientific, but also political in nature. It is at the political level that climate discussion takes the form that becomes most public and is discussed in the mass media. Moreover, there is an opinion that the problem of climate change by its nature is not so much ecological as political. This approach takes political science's interest in climate change to a new level. The fact is that the politicization of the topic of climate risk management creates grounds for the development of a special branch of political research, which deals with the expediency of choosing a particular set of risk management methods.

The rationale for choosing a specific set of climate risk management measures at the state level leads to the adoption of a whole series of management decisions.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

Natural science approaches practically do not consider these solutions and their institutional foundations. The focus of their attention remains directly on climate change and human economic activity that affects them. However, policy decisions are equally important, especially since risk management is an important branch of the social sciences.

In this situation, two levels of climate discussions are being formed. The first level is natural science and environmental, describing the nature of the problem and the scale of the tasks set. The second level is political. This is the level of political parties, analytical centers, and ideological structures. At the present stage, each level has something that influences the choice of tools for preventing climate risks. However, each of these two levels can be either national or global. Finding common ground between these levels of discussion of the problem we are studying is a topic for a separate work. Nevertheless, in the framework of this study, it is advisable to mention the existing division of discussion levels and the problem of interaction between them.

As a result of the current situation, most States are inclined to believe that climate risks are real. Political forces that hold the opposite view at the global level are in the minority, although they actively promote their agenda. As a result, it is important for us to analyze the political component of each of the methods to overcome climate risks, especially since their set is relatively small.

Before looking at the main policy approaches to climate risk mitigation, such as mitigation and adaptation, we will look at two approaches to understanding climate justice. We are talking about isolationism and integrationism¹¹¹. Both approaches define the nature of policy concepts that claim to be the basis for managing the effects of climate change. In terms of content, both integrationism and

¹¹¹ *Caney S.* Just Emissions [text] // *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. 2012. Vol. 40. No. 4. P. 255–300.

isolationism represent an attempt to solve the problems caused by climate change in the world politics.

According to Simon Caney, isolationism is a theory that views climate responsibility " ... in isolation from considerations of global and intergenerational equity in general (including issues such as trade, development, poverty, and health)¹¹²". Isolationism is the source of the politically important hypothesis of "equality per capita". It claims that the atmosphere is capable of consuming a certain, fixed amount of greenhouse gases. This ability of the atmosphere is seen as a common good, and therefore, all inhabitants of the planet have an equal right to emissions. Thus, John Broome states that "[it seems] obvious that no one in the world has stronger rights to this resource [i.e. on greenhouse gas emissions] than anyone else, so it should be shared equally among people"¹¹³.

At the present stage, the isolationist model is associated with the right, since it allows us to justify anti-globalist postulates. First of all, it restricts the right to interfere in the sovereign climate policy of individual countries. In addition, isolationism denies the close relationship between living standards, national development, and emissions. The latter postulate makes it possible to deny the right of more developed and richer countries to interfere in the affairs of less developed countries under the pretext of regulating or controlling policies in the field of managing greenhouse gas emissions.

Isolationism is fiercely criticized by supporters of integrationism, who link together the totality of a whole variety of factors that caused the onset of climate change. This criticism is both scientific and political in nature and can be presented both on the pages of the academic journal *Environmental Politics*¹¹⁴, and in the more

¹¹² *Caney S.* Humanity, Associations, and Global Justice [text] // *The Monist*. 2011. Vol. 94. No. 4. P. 506–534.

¹¹³ *Broome J.* *Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World* [text]. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012. P. 43.

¹¹⁴ *Torpman O.* Isolationism and the equal per capita view [text] // *Environmental Politics*. 2021. Vol. 30. No. 3. P. 357–375.

popular and popular Harper's Magazine¹¹⁵. Aggression against integrationism is caused by the desire of globalists to ensure inequality in access to greenhouse gas emissions. However, it is isolationism that for a number of countries has become the main idea for climate concepts that form the basis of public policy.

An alternative to isolationism is integrationism¹¹⁶. The latter implies that emission permits should be distributed with other equity considerations in mind. According to integrationists, the right to emissions is directly dependent on factors such as lifestyle, investment, preferences, future plans and much more. As can be seen from this, integrationism manifests itself gradually, since more or less equity considerations can be taken into account when determining the fair distribution of emission allowances¹¹⁷. In this concept, the idea of climate justice is contrasted with the idea of equal emissions per capita. At the same time, the criteria of fairness are complex, combining many political, economic and cultural factors. Integrationism today is the most politically active ideology promoted by various "green movements".

In February 2019, integrationist students organized a climate strike in London. The main slogan of the strikers was the statement that "isolationism is deadly." In addition, student leaders said that "Brexit is reversible, but climate change is not"¹¹⁸." A Guardian article on the strike notes: "The time of isolationism is over. Instead, as a global collective, we must follow the example of the younger generation, as their unity is a direct confirmation of the only option left to us: international action"¹¹⁹."

¹¹⁵ *Solnit R.* The Ideology of Isolation [electronic resource] // Harper's Magazine. URL: <https://harpers.org/archive/2016/07/the-ideology-of-isolation/> (accessed 10.12.2023).

¹¹⁶ *Caney S.* Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change [text] // *Leiden Journal of International Law*. 2005. Vol. 18. No. 4. P. 747–775.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁸ *Levy-Rapoport N.* Isolationism is deadly. Only global collective action can save us [electronic resource] // *The Guardian*. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/15/isolationism-climate-change-global-collective-action> (accessed 10.12.2023).

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Thus, integrationism and climate justice, based on relatively well-founded theses about the interconnectedness of climate change with all aspects of human society, have become the doctrines of globalists. The most radical proponents of climate justice claim that they rely on feminism in their struggle and oppose racial and sexual intolerance. Another important component is the idea of energy democracy: "Energy democracy recognizes the many broader socio-political changes in economic and political power that may be associated with a transition to a future more based on renewable energy sources."¹²⁰

As a result, climate justice was transformed from a scientific hypothesis into a left-liberal and globalist ideology. Therefore, it seems appropriate to distinguish between climate justice as a scientific hypothesis and as an integral part of political ideology. It is obvious that theories that consider ways to overcome climate change are linked to policies, but this complicates their effectiveness in the fight to overcome the consequences of climate change.

In addition to macro-concepts, applied models for overcoming climate risks are also proposed. In essence, they come down to two main solutions: mitigation and adaptation. Both terms came to climate science from the field of risk management and have been operationalized quite successfully. At the same time, for the risk theory used by social sciences, they are not unambiguously indisputable. Mitigation and adaptation are not just categories that describe the actions taken by national Governments to address climate risks, they have become widely used at the international/global level. They can be found in the documents of the UN and even UNESCO. These terms are not only related to climate change, but are also used in law, management, and social philosophy. At the same time, the epistemological roots of these concepts are found in the field of management and public administration sciences. In management, there is also a third category of risk management –

¹²⁰ *Stephens J. C.* Energy Democracy: Redistributing Power to the People Through Renewable Transformation [text] // *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*. 2019. Vol. 61. No. 2. P. 4–13.

contingency ("Black Swan" in the terminology of N. N. Taleb)¹²¹. It is assumed that adaptation and mitigation are models of risk prevention, and contingency is designed to work with their consequences.

In this situation, it is worth mentioning the approach to working with risks proposed by Ulrich Beck – one of the most popular social theorist of the twentieth century, who developed the model of the "risk society". W. Beck argued that there can be three types of risk management: preventive, symptomatic and symbolic. The main emphasis of W. Beck was on the need to create technologies for preventive risk management¹²². At the same time, the author himself sharply criticized the way in which work was carried out in the 1980s to overcome technological and environmental risks.

In his 2010 article "Changing the Climate, or how to create green Modernism"¹²³, Ulrich Beck noted that climate change, for all its irreversibility and negative impact on people's lives and health, does not cause a new "Great Green October". W. Beck sees the reason for this as follows: "The discussion of climate policy takes on the character of an elite and expert discourse, the interests, views and voices of people, societies, citizens, workers, and voters are largely ignored¹²⁴." Climate policy is indeed quite complex to understand, with a large number of ambiguous conclusions and still unproven hypotheses. In order to influence this situation, it is necessary to change educational policies and make knowledge about climate change accessible to all segments of the population. In this case, public participation in setting climate policy priorities will bring real results.

¹²¹ *Taleb N. N.* The Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable [text]; translation from English by A. Berdichevsky, etc. Moscow: CoLibri, 2021. 736 p. (in Russian)

¹²² *Beck U.* Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity [text]; translation from German by B. Sedelnik and Sh. Fedorova. Moscow: Progress-Tradition, 2000. P. 41. (in Russian)

¹²³ *Beck U.* Climate for Change, or How to Create a Green Modernity? [text] // *Theory, Culture & Society*. 2010. Vol. 27. No. 2–3. P. 254–266.

¹²⁴ In *Skvortsov L. V.* Beck U. Change the climate, or how to create green modernism? [text] // *Human Being: Image and Essence. Humanitarian Aspects*. 2011. Vol. 22. No. 1 (22). P. 289–298. (in Russian)

Beck notes the need to involve sociologists in climate discussions. Demanding to "bring down from heaven to earth" the discussion of climate change, he focuses primarily on measuring public opinion about the readiness of society to make political decisions in the field of overcoming the consequences of climate change. Beck writes: "If you do not have a majority among various groups of people who not only speak, but act and often vote against their own personal interests, then climate policy will fail. If we do not find answers to the urgent and taboo questions of everyday policy protection and support from below, from ordinary people of different classes, nations, political ideologies, and different countries that feel and perceive climate change differently, then climate change policy will not be able to prevent the risk of turning the Earth into a region inhabited only by a flock of birds¹²⁵."

Noting the role of social inequality and corruption in shaping the climate crisis situation, W. Beck noted that it is necessary to work with the political agenda. In particular, he believes that it is important to recognize the role of inequality as a major obstacle to effective climate policies. In addition, Beck emphasizes the role of cosmopolitanism and the need to abandon national interests, as well as the benefits of the common good. For example, he writes: "Climate change exacerbates existing inequalities between the poor and the rich, between the center and the periphery, but at the same time smooths them out. The more serious the planetary threat, the less opportunities the richest and most powerful have to avoid it. Climate change is hierarchical and democratic. It creates a cosmopolitan imperative - "cooperate or fail." It can and should be translated into an updated "green policy" that makes it clear that the widespread naive catastrophic realism is wrong. Climate risks are not the same as climate disasters¹²⁶."

The concept of a "risk society" by W. Beck was supported by the British sociologist E. Giddens. Giddens introduced the concept of "life policy" as a tool for

¹²⁵ Ibid. P. 290.

¹²⁶ Ibid. P. 293-294.

living in a changing environment. Giddens, speaking about the politics of life, combines the spheres of ethical and political, considering only such a combination the most viable. Returning to the topic of the greenhouse effect, Giddens writes about it in the context of a whole range of problems and risks. Accordingly, it does not offer any algorithms for overcoming climate risks¹²⁷.

Climate risks today are the subject of attention in several fields of knowledge at once, - W. Beck wrote about the need for such interconnectedness. Despite this, there is still an imbalance in favor of environmentalists and representatives of natural science. Social sciences still do not provide an ideologically objective answer to the issues of overcoming climate risks. As a result, policy decisions are based on mitigation and adaptation tools. In most cases, mitigation and adaptation are considered interrelated phenomena, and experts believe that it is inappropriate to separate them.

Mitigation and adaptation have become the tools offered by the European Union's Nature-based Solutions Concept¹²⁸. Natural climate solutions (in Western science, "natural solutions") are ways of sustainable management and use of natural features and processes to solve socio-ecological problems. These challenges include climate change (mitigation and adaptation), water security, water pollution, food security, human health, biodiversity loss, and disaster risk management. In 2020, the definition was updated to further emphasize that "natural solutions should benefit biodiversity and support the provision of a range of ecosystem services"¹²⁹.

¹²⁷ Giddens A. *The Consequences of Modernity* [text]. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990. 188 p.

¹²⁸ Bulkeley H., Naumann S., Vojinovic Z., Calfapietra C., Whiteoak K., Freitas T. Nature-based solutions. State of the art in EU-funded projects [electronic resource] // Publication office of the European Union. URL: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/8bb07125-4518-11eb-b59f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-203252411> (accessed 10.12.2023).

¹²⁹ Ibid.

The idea of natural climate solutions was originally put forward by the International Union for Conservation of Nature¹³⁰. Since 2009, the idea of natural climate solutions has entered the lexicon at the level of international climate negotiations. These methods of coping with climate change are promoted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established in 1988. The IPCC currently includes 195 countries¹³¹, including Russia.

The IPCC secretariat is located in Geneva, Switzerland, at the headquarters of the World Meteorological Organization. Its highest body is the plenary session, which is attended by national delegations of the participating countries. The research is led by the IPCC Bureau, which currently has 34 members, including a representative from Russia. The IPCC budget consists of contributions from UNEP, WMO and voluntary contributions from participating countries. As of 2023, the IPCC is chaired by Professor Hoesung Lee (Republic of Korea).

The IPCC consists of three working groups focusing on the following issues:

1. Principles from the natural sciences;
2. Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability;
3. Climate change mitigation¹³².

So, mitigation is the alleviation of the impact of climate change on the geocosystem by reducing greenhouse gas emissions or absorption. Adaptation is a large-scale process of adapting the economy and the living conditions of society and people to climate transformations. Adaptation is considered to be the most expensive process, so it is assumed that the countries of the global South are less ready for it than the rest. Adaptation is aimed at changing the norms of creation, consumption and processing. For example, this can be most clearly seen in the transformation of

¹³⁰ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) // The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. URL: https://archive.ipcc.ch/home_languages_main_russian.shtml (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

construction standards, which assume protection from temperature changes and resistance to changing external conditions (heat, cold, ground deformation).

Both methods, as we noted earlier, are global in scope. Their effect on the level of one state can be traced, but it necessarily fits into the global context. For example, the mitigation effect of reforestation is primarily assessed as part of interrelated global processes. This is possible when it comes not only to the Amazon forests, but also to the forests of Siberia or Europe. To measure the contribution of individual countries, a special indicator "Nationally Determined contribution" has been created. This indicator is enshrined in the international Paris Climate Agreement of 2015, signed by 196 countries¹³³.

In addition, the IPCC has established a climate change monitoring and mitigation system. It consists of six assessment cycles that assess not only the pace of climate change but also the impact of mitigation and adaptation measures¹³⁴. The scope of these monitoring activities covers most countries of the world, and recommendations based on their results form the basis of political decisions taken by Governments.

As a result, mitigation and adaptation become important factors in the political process, as they are part of a globally significant concept of natural climate solutions. At the same time, it should be said that the work on overcoming the consequences of climate change has formed a new political economy of our time. This political economy is based on the idea of a "green transition" in the economy as the main final goal of the entire process of mitigation and adaptation. And the new economic model, which is the result of political decisions in the field of nature protection, begins to operate with the categories of climatology as the main ones.

¹³³ *Kovalev Yu. Yu.* Five years of the Paris agreement: the past, present and future of the global climate treaty [text] // *History and Modern Perspectives*. 2021. Vol. 3. No. 1. P. 20–29. (in Russian).

¹³⁴ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 to provide policymakers with regular scientific assessments on the current state of knowledge about climate change [electronic resource] // The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. URL: <https://www.ipcc.ch/languages-2/russian/> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

The IPCC reports, despite their advisory nature, still have a direct impact on the global economy. For example, the categorical statements made in the IPCC's sixth Assessment Report in 2023 that greenhouse gases are choking our planet, and that there is a clear warming trend, directly affected the state of stock markets. Entire industries associated with "green technologies" have received a boost to growth. At the same time, the report itself does not quite show the ability of human society to influence or resist the effects of climate change. At the same time, the sectors of the economy that, according to the IPCC, negatively affect the climate through an increase in greenhouse gas emissions (primarily carbon dioxide) are indicated in the report quite specifically.

The development of approaches to understanding the theory of climate change has led to the emergence of the idea of ecosystem services. Its authors are American environmentalists, among whom the most prominent figure is Gretchen Daily. Ecosystem services are benefits that people receive free of charge from the environment and well-functioning ecosystems, and they are an integral part of providing clean drinking water, decomposing waste, and naturally pollinating crops and other plants¹³⁵. The idea of ecosystem services provided by the state has also spread in Russia. In particular, the Department of Economic Cooperation of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation is responsible for implementing ecosystem services¹³⁶. Ecosystem services are closely linked to natural climate solutions. These services are divided into three groups: regulatory, production, and cultural.

Gretchen Daily's work was published in 1997 under the title "Nature Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems". It laid the foundations for what

¹³⁵ *Daily G.* Nature's Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems [text] // *The Future of Nature: Documents of Global Change*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. P. 454–464.

¹³⁶ Relevance of the concept [electronic resource] // Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/departments/d31/koncepciya_gos_regulirovaniya_cifrovyh_platform_i_ekosistem/aktualnost_koncepcii/ (accessed 10.10.2023). (in Russian)

individual Governments are trying to put into practice today. It is with the advent of Gretchen Daily's work that it becomes clear that a new political economy is being formed in the world, based on overcoming the risks associated with climate change. This is confirmed by another book by Gretchen Daly, co-written with Catherine Ellison and published in 2002 – "The New Economy of Nature: The Quest to Make Conservation Profitable"¹³⁷. In this work, the idea of trading the right to greenhouse emissions was proposed, as well as a number of other commercial solutions aimed at making climate protection profitable¹³⁸.

By 2015, proponents of this approach introduced a new political economic term "Gross Ecosystem Product", denoted by the abbreviation GEP. Justifying this category, scientists write: "Gross ecosystem product – GEP) is a measure of the total monetary value of final goods and services related to ecosystems in a certain area and for a certain reporting period. GEP accounting records the use of many ecosystem services in production processes in the economy, which are then evaluated in terms of their benefits to society. GEP has five key elements that make it transparent, traceable, and understandable. The first element is an emphasis on the contribution of nature to people's lives. The second element is the measurement of ecosystem assets as reserves and ecosystem services as flows. The third element involves consideration of quantifying the use of ecosystem services. The fourth is to understand the supply chains of ecosystem services through the realization of value. The fifth is the disaggregation of benefits by group¹³⁹."

The ambiguity of this approach to the ecosystem increases doubts among climate skeptics who claim that the problem of climate change is a political and economic myth. During the first two decades of the twenty-first century, expert

¹³⁷ *Daily G. C., Ellison K.* The New Economy of Nature: The Quest to Make Conservation Profitable [text]. Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2002. 260 p.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹³⁹ *Hua Zheng, Tong Wu, Zhiyun Ouyang, Polasky S., Ruckelshaus M., Lijuan Wang, Yi Xiao, Xiaolong Gao, Cong Li, Daily G. C.* Gross ecosystem product (GEP): Quantifying nature for environmental and economic policy innovation [text] // *Ecological Civilization*. 2023. Vol. 52. P. 1952–1967.

communities engaged in various structures offered a variety of options for dealing with climate risks: from limiting sovereignty to ecosystem services. All this formed a complex political context around the ongoing climate change. First, a significant number of states, while recognizing the reality of climate change and the need for a "green transition", are still not inclined to trust only one ideological vector of this process. We are talking about the ideas of integrationism and the Anthropocene¹⁴⁰. Second, at the domestic political level, most rightists tend to view the bulk of initiatives to introduce ecosystem services as a purely globalist project. For them, this means that he is engaged with certain political circles and is aimed at making a profit, and not at achieving the common good.

Summing up the paragraph, it should be said that the concepts of climate management that emerged in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries are symptomatic. This is exactly the understanding of the most common risk management model given by Ulrich Beck. Working with the symptoms of climate change is not completely useless. According to the same classification of W. Beck, symbolic work with environmental problems is the most dangerous. This approach is also widespread and even theoretically justified. It is based on nominalism and the desire to extract rents from the limits of greenhouse emissions. The mentioned nominalism consists in borrowing the categorical apparatus from various economic theories. As a result, not only ecosystem services have emerged, but also ecosystem goods.

Based on this, we postulate the second conclusion from our review of climate management concepts. It consists in the fact that by the beginning of the, a new political economy was formulated in the West¹⁴¹, based on obtaining rents from measures to overcome the risks caused by climate change. In this situation, we are

¹⁴⁰ *Caney S.* Just Emissions [text] // *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. 2012. Vol. 40. No. 4. P. 255–300 and *Crutzen P. J., Stoermer E. F.* The Anthropocene [text] // *Global Change Newsletter*. 2000. Vol. 41. P. 17–18.

¹⁴¹ *Daily G. C., Ellison K.* The New Economy of Nature: The Quest to Make Conservation Profitable [text]. Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2002. 260 p.

talking about a system of economic decisions through which it is planned to stimulate or fine certain corporations and even states that are participants in the ecosystem market. However, this political economy faces significant opposition from actors concerned about limiting their sovereignty through ecosystem-based market mechanisms¹⁴².

All of this is becoming part of the modern geopolitical imagination. Description of the modern world is virtually impossible without a narrative that tells about climate change and the lack of resources necessary for life support (clean water, air, a comfortable temperature, and much more). The need for a "green transition" has intensified the struggle for the sources of resources needed for such a transition. Many geopolitical theorists argue that the implementation of the concepts of a carbon-free world is impossible without establishing control over the sources of resources mentioned above, which are so important for the "green transition"¹⁴³.

As a result, we suggest that most of the concepts of climate management or countering climate risks, along with the declared environmental objectives, are also aimed at solving purely political tasks. Many of these concepts can be used to establish political control and limit economic growth, including for the purposes of unfair competition. However, it is worth emphasizing once again that this assumption is based on an analysis of climate theories, many of which are only partially implemented in political practice.

However, the complex discussions between ecologists, climatologists, economists, and philosophers described above have also significantly enriched political theory. Climate policy has become more than just a set of management decisions or political technologies to manage society in the face of climate uncertainty. Climate policy has acquired a variety of doctrinal foundations, including

¹⁴² For ex.: *de Benoist A.* Tomorrow, degrowth! Thinking ecology through to the end [text]; translation from French by S. Denisov. Moscow: Institute of Humanities, 2013. 103 p. (in Russian)

¹⁴³ *Ince M., Sikorsky E.* The Uncomfortable Geopolitics of the Clean Energy Transition [electronic resource] // Lawfare. URL: <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-uncomfortable-geopolitics-of-the-clean-energy-transition> (accessed 10.12.2023).

conflicting ones. As a result, concepts for managing climate or society in the face of climate change have become part of the repertoire of climate policy as a broader concept. This view can be considered a political science claim to the sphere of public climate risk management. But we are not trying to fully extrapolate it to the entire field of climate science. For political theory, both the characteristics of climate change and the causes that cause it remain inaccessible.

Climate change management in its symptomatic format is primarily focused on the relationship between the state, business and civil society. This thesis is based not only on macro-concepts, but also on the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, which states that it is the anthropogenic factor that has the greatest impact on climate¹⁴⁴ change. Along with this, preventive methods of combating climate risks are also possible. They are indicated in the forecast part of the report and in the field of geosciences and geoengineering. Undoubtedly, geoengineering is one of the most promising preventive methods for overcoming climate risks.

The concepts discussed in this section only reflect the reaction of various socio-political circles to the impending climate crisis. Through these theories, you can clearly see what forces of the political and academic spectrum are behind certain ideas. To date, there are three such interest groups: globalists, right-wing conservatives, and a part of the scientific community that advocates depoliticizing climate problems and making strategic decisions as soon as possible.

It should be noted, that an analysis of the political commitment of climate change and climate risk management concepts is necessary to develop unbiased environmental decisions. Political analysis allows identifying the strengths and weaknesses of these concepts, tracing their evolution and transformation in relation to the political agenda. In fact, today a special approach to the study of the history of climate ideas is already urgently needed. It is necessary to carefully analyze the

¹⁴⁴ The Sixth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2022 [electronic resource] // The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). URL: <https://www.unep.org/ru/resources/doklad/shestoy-ochochnyy-doklad-mgeik-izmenenie-klimata-v-2022-godu> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

climate dictionary, which describes both the climate crisis and models for countering climate risks.

1.3. Hierarchy of political organizations that manage the international climate agenda

Initially, the topic of climate change was raised by scientists, but it was developed thanks to political organizations. First of all, these are international political organizations. Their significance is due to the transnational nature, in other words, the global nature of the climate problem. This section draws attention to the fact that the debate about climate change and the Anthropocene started with the help of politically engaged structures¹⁴⁵. The author of this dissertation does not deny the fact of climate change, but would like to draw attention to the political bias of this topic. In our opinion, this negatively affects the discussion of climate change in the public space, and sometimes even completely devalues the real achievements of science.

It should also be said here that the involvement of international political organizations was the only way, if not to start taking any actions, then at least to pay attention to them. It would be wrong to consider this decision as having either negative or definitely positive consequences. It is important to show the existing mechanism of functioning of the climate agenda and identify the hierarchy of organizations that influence the discussion of climate issues.

When analyzing the hierarchy of political organizations, it is necessary to understand the goals of organizations and answer questions about who and why has more and less influence when discussing climate. Climate issues are addressed at the policy level not only because there are no alternatives, but also because politicians, together with scientists, have formed the language of climate discussion. The categorical

¹⁴⁵ For ex.: *de Benoist A. Tomorrow, degrowth! Thinking ecology through to the end* [text]; translation from French by S. Denisov. Moscow: Institute of Humanities, 2013. 103 p. (in Russian)

apparatus of most state programs for regulating the negative effects of climate change was created at the level of international organizations.

There are relatively few such organizations involved in climate change discussions. In our view, they determine the institutional framework for climate change policy. This creates a key context for discussions about the common good, when the focus falls on combating the negative effects of climate change. The context of the common good forms an institutional design that can change the framework of the political order at the global level. This implies a dilemma: State sovereignty or the common good. Discussions about what is more important are already being held today, at the suggestion of international political structures based on certain ideological attitudes. In essence, climate issues have split political discourse, dividing actors into supporters and opponents of a particular point of view on what is happening with the climate.

In this section of the dissertation, we make a clear reservation: these organizations manage the climate agenda. To be more precise, we are talking about managing information about climate change and how people can relate to these changes. All political and economic decisions about climate stem from the climate agenda. Within the framework of the climate agenda, there is a polarization and division of organizations involved in climate discussion.

Let us recall that according to K. Schmitt, the political is there and then, where and when there is a public confrontation of large groups divided among themselves on the principle of "friend — enemy"¹⁴⁶. According to this definition, all organizations involved in the discussion of the climate agenda become political, because they are forced to take one of the parties in the climate debate. Many of them were a priori political - in accordance with their goals set out in the statutory documents - while others became political through participation in the climate debate. In any case, the

¹⁴⁶ *Schmitt C.* The concept of the Political [text]; translation from German by Yu. Yu. Korinets and A. P. Shurbelev edited by A. F. Filippov. St. Petersburg: Science, 2016. P. 176. (in Russian)

organizations discussed in this section of the dissertation are political in both form and content.

The global nature of the topic of climate imposes specifics on the activities of the organizations studied here. Thus, today the climate agenda can only be managed through transnational mass media, while many of the global structures have a large political weight and can shape the agenda without any traditional mass media. For example, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Meteorological Organization, and the International Energy Agency directly promote their point of view on climate issues through their own websites, and it gets an international response.

Among the organizations that determine the nature of climate policy, there are many scientific committees created primarily in the United States. They promote or refute various hypotheses about the changes that are taking place. It is enough to mention how the scientific community discussed the problem of the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch in the history of the Earth. For example, the position of the American Geological Society was known to almost everyone in the world, because they were the ones who said that there is common sense in justifying the Anthropocene¹⁴⁷. Despite the purely academic nature of this statement, we note that it had very specific political consequences. In particular, this statement was used by left-liberal ideologues as confirmation of the recognition of the Anthropocene by the scientific community. At the same time, the International Geological Association in 2024 refused to consider the Anthropocene a geological epoch¹⁴⁸.

The BRICS and SCO interstate associations stand apart: they have their own view on climate justice. These structures demand that States comply with their obligations under the standards for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In 2022, the SCO

¹⁴⁷ *Castree N.* The Anthropocene and Geography I: The Back Story [text] // *Geography Compass*. 2014. Vol. 8. No. 7. P 436–449.

¹⁴⁸ *Papish A.* Geologists have rejected the Anthropocene epoch [electronic resource] // *Naked science*. URL: <https://naked-science.ru/article/geology/geologi-otvergli-epohu-an> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

initiated an appeal to *developed countries* to comply with their environmental obligations. In particular, it was noted that the implementation of these commitments should be timed to coincide with the Conference of the Parties-27¹⁴⁹. These commitments relate not only to greenhouse gas emissions, but also to large-scale efforts to adapt the economy and society to new conditions.

At the BRICS level, the climate agenda is mainly promoted by Russia, China and India. What makes BRICS special is that it seeks to overcome the system of economic coercion based on speculation about climate issues. President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping said: "The BRICS countries should be partners on the path of development and revival, resist disconnection and severing ties, as well as economic coercion¹⁵⁰." In the run-up to the BRICS Climate Forum scheduled for August 2024, the Russian Federation faced the challenge of countering attempts to use climate topics to create unilateral barriers and artificial restrictions. Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Mikhail Reshetnikov noted: "We will continue to promote our proposals for creating cross-border trade in carbon units. We are well aware of our capabilities, and we understand that zero balance cannot be achieved only by reducing emissions. We need to actively work with acquisitions and create the necessary infrastructure for this¹⁵¹." Although it should be noted that the rapidly growing influence of the SCO and BRICS on the climate agenda is still poorly institutionalized. Moreover, political scientists note that these structures have

¹⁴⁹ Shanghai Cooperation Organization called on developed countries to honour their climate commitments [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/16216013> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

¹⁵⁰ BRICS green horizons: who will become the global leader of the new economy [electronic resource] // RBK Daily. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/industries/news/651fbbc19a7947008ce7ba1f> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

¹⁵¹ Zadera S. Reshetnikov: BRICS Climate Forum could take place in August [electronic resource] // Russian Gazette. URL: <https://rg.ru/2024/02/13/reshetnikov-forum-briks-po-klimatu-mozhet-projti-v-avguste.html> (accessed 10.04.2024). (in Russian)

yet to take shape as a serious political force to promote their own climate policy¹⁵²format.

One of the first organizations involved in political regulation of climate issues was the United Nations. The UN website notes: "Climate change refers to long-term temperature changes and changes in weather conditions. These changes can be natural, caused by changes in the activity of the Sun or large volcanic eruptions. However, since the 1800s, human activity has been a major driver of climate change, mainly through the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas.

As a result of burning fossil fuels, greenhouse gas emissions are generated, which like a blanket envelop the Earth, holding the solar body and increasing the temperature. The main greenhouse gases that cause climate change are carbon dioxide and methane. They are formed, for example, when using gasoline in cars or coal for heating buildings. Clearing land and forests can also lead to the release of carbon dioxide. The main source of methane emissions is agriculture, the oil and gas industry. The main producers of emissions include energy, industry, transport, buildings, agriculture and land¹⁵³use."

Climate change is the focus of most UN-affiliated organizations. These include the Committee on Human Rights. It acts as one of the actors of the climate agenda: attention is drawn to how climate change directly affects basic human rights¹⁵⁴. The Human Rights Committee holds meetings on the Earth's climate, the need for a green transition, and a low-carbon economy¹⁵⁵.

¹⁵² *Makarov I. A., Shuranova A. A.* Climate Change as a New Factor of International Relations [text] // Journal of International Analytics. 2023. Vol. 14. No. 4. P. 52–74. (in Russian)

¹⁵³ What is climate change? [electronic resource] // UN. URL: <https://www.un.org/ru/climatechange/what-is-climate-change> (accessed 10.12.2023).

¹⁵⁴ *Nikolaev N. P.* Climate policy and human rights [text] // Political Science Issues. 2024. Vol. 14. No. 3 (103). P. 863–877. (in Russian)

¹⁵⁵ OHCHR and climate change [electronic resource] // The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights). URL: <https://www.ohchr.org/ru/climate-change> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) has become another important UN body influencing climate policy. And climate is not the only topic around which it builds its political activities. For example, in 2024, the WMO website published a speech by the Secretary-General of WMO, Professor Celeste Saulo: "Climate change and meteorological disasters disproportionately affect women and girls, who, in turn, have unrealized potential as leaders in the fight against climate¹⁵⁶ change." This statement clearly illustrates the concept of a gender-based approach to climate policy. In fact, such a doctrine is a special form of politicization of climate change. Although the World Meteorological Association has less authority to act as an actor in global climate policy, the statements published on its website indicate the rapid politicization of the WMO's activities. Its approach is based on the idea of replacing a highly specialized expert approach to climate change with a gender-based one.

WMO is a member of the United Nations Conference of the Parties (COP). As noted on the WMO website: "As part of this work, the WMO submits reports, including on the state of the global climate, and a Bulletin on greenhouse gases to the Conference of the Parties, the highest decision-making body of the Convention. By promoting and coordinating the many observing systems and research networks that underpin climate science, WMO highlights the need for Governments to address climate change¹⁵⁷."

As a result, the WMO acts as an important institution and regulator in the field of climate policy. The results of this organization's activities are claimed as materials required by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which means that the WMO announces the importance of its contribution to the global forum for international cooperation and action on climate. To do this, the WMO:

¹⁵⁶ Homepage [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization. URL: <https://wmo.int/ru> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian).

¹⁵⁷ WMO at COP28 [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization WMO. URL: <https://wmo.int/ru/node/22126> (accessed 10.12.2023).

1. Coordinates observation systems, manages the collected data and their exchange;
2. Prepares reports on greenhouse gas concentrations, global climate trends, recent successes and future monitoring systems;
3. "Develops opportunities to help governments monitor and forecast climate trends"¹⁵⁸;
4. Uses climate information to "reduce the risk of natural disasters";
5. Works on raising public awareness about climate change and training in this area;
6. Is one of the sponsors and organizers of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, as well as the World Climate Research Program and the Global Climate Observing¹⁵⁹ System.

The Global Framework for Climate Services (GFCS) was established with the assistance of WMO. It is a multi-governmental and multi-stakeholder partnership, including, inter alia, United Nations agencies, international organizations, climate service-related programmes, sponsors, Governments, non-governmental organizations, private sector organizations, and national meteorological and hydrological services¹⁶⁰.

Under the auspices of the United Nations and with the participation of the WMO, an Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was established, which we already wrote about in the previous paragraph. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme. The purpose of creating this group was to obtain objective scientific data. Its creation served as the beginning of global

¹⁵⁸ Conference of the Parties (COP) [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization WMO. URL: <https://wmo.int/activities/conference-of-parties-cop> (accessed 10.12.2023).

¹⁵⁹ Climate Services Information System [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization WMO. URL: <https://wmo.int/activities/climate-services-information-system> (accessed 10.12.2023).

¹⁶⁰ About the GFCS [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization WMO. URL: <https://wmo.int/site/global-framework-climate-services-gfcs/about-gfcs> (accessed 10.12.2023).

monitoring of climate problems, and the IPCC assessment report became the main reference point for many states working in the field of coping with the consequences of climate change, it performs a significant political function, defining strategic development vectors for mitigation and adaptation of human society¹⁶¹.

It is important to note that it was in the framework of the IPCC report that the claim that climate change occurs under the influence of humans was recognized as valid. This almost directly legitimizes the Anthropocene theory, since statements made by an organization affiliated with the United Nations have a broader response in the international community than statements made by scientists. In this situation, the UN and the IPCC have become the key structures that determine the climate agenda at the international level. In the hierarchy of organizations that influence climate policy, they can be placed in the main positions.

UNESCO also matters when it comes to climate and politics. This organization conducts more than 30 programs in the fields of science, education, culture and communications, which are designed to promote the deepening of knowledge, dissemination of information about climate change, development of education in this area, and understanding of the ethical consequences of these changes for the present and for future generations.

The organization's website notes that the current task of UNESCO is to save cultural monuments from impending climate change. Thus, it turns out that UNESCO is one of the most interested parties involved in the process of overcoming the negative consequences of climate change. Moreover, addressing climate issues that are global in nature directly affects the interests of this organization: "Climate change is one of the main problems of our time and one of the biggest threats to cultural and natural

¹⁶¹ The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 to provide policymakers with regular scientific assessments on the current state of knowledge about climate change [electronic resource] // The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. URL: <https://www.ipcc.ch/languages-2/russian/> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian).

monuments among the UNESCO World Heritage Sites. Every third natural site and every sixth cultural heritage site is currently under threat due to climate change¹⁶²."

UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova said in an interview with the Russian media: "Climate problems and natural disasters, which are becoming more frequent, are destroying cultural heritage sites, and there are many examples of this. For example, you can recall the monuments that were threatened in the Sahara, in Pakistan, in Haiti¹⁶³." This interview details the list of cultural heritage sites that are most vulnerable to destruction from climate change. This enumeration specifies the list of objects that need protection. I. Bokova's interview reveals a complex spectrum of relations between completely different spheres of politics: cultural policy and climate policy. She drew attention to their connection: "We must not forget that in the UNESCO list of Cultural Heritage more than 200 monuments are natural monuments. For example, such as a park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Great Barrier Reef in Australia, and others. And we see that climate change, including global warming, is harming these natural monuments¹⁶⁴."

UNESCO bases its climate change initiatives on the interdisciplinary potential of the organization. Back in 2009, at the 15th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, Bokova spoke about UNESCO's role in mitigation and adaptation: "UNESCO can make a unique contribution ... by implementing various activities in the fields of education, science, culture, communication and information. All these efforts are closely coordinated with the UN system-wide response to the new global challenge. In particular, as a first step of its initiative, UNESCO continues to contribute to the development of climatology and the creation of the necessary knowledge base through its Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), in close cooperation with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and its

¹⁶²About the GFCS [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization WMO. URL: <https://wmo.int/site/global-framework-climate-services-gfcs/about-gfcs> (accessed 10.12.2023).

¹⁶³Bokova: global warming harms UNESCO-listed monuments [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/3783270> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

International Hydrological Programme (IHP)¹⁶⁵." Education was declared as a separate activity of UNESCO-assistance to States in revising curricula, training teachers and educational strategies at all levels. UNESCO's implementation of climate change knowledge was also planned through "assistance to States" in the use of World Heritage¹⁶⁶Sites. In the fight against climate change, UNESCO also justifies the organization's attention to "ethical and social aspects", that is, assessing the feasibility of actions on a larger scale, "studying the social aspects of climate change, including migration issues"¹⁶⁷.

Concluding the discussion of the meanings promoted by UNESCO in the field of climate policy, it is important to cite one more quote. It is of great importance because it more fully reveals the ambitions of this organization in the field of climate change regulation. In particular, they are not limited to information policy and raising the level of culture of the population, they extend further to influencing public administration: "The challenges that we face require increased progress in education, public awareness and training, so that societies around the world can better understand, mitigate and adapt to climate change. Such progress will enable the formation of informed citizens, a competent workforce, and enlightened government officials¹⁶⁸."

Climate challenges have significantly transformed the nature, but not the content, of the challenges facing international organizations. They brought to the fore the problems, and after them the need for a state of emergency, the content of which will be determined by the impact of climate change on certain areas of human life. Based on this, it is acceptable to assume that it is international organizations that are able to determine the expediency/inexpediency of introducing a state of emergency in the

¹⁶⁵ Director General presents UNESCO climate change initiative at Copenhagen Conference [electronic resource] // UNESKO. URL: <https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/575> (accessed 05.04.2024).

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Climate Change [electronic resource] // UNESKO. URL: <https://www.unesco.org/en/climate-change> (accessed 10.12.2023).

future as a reaction to the current "exceptional situation"¹⁶⁹. Thus, one of the model exceptional situations may be a threat to UNESCO natural Heritage sites caused by climate change. In this situation, meaningful transformations of the concepts of jurisdiction and sovereignty are possible, since we will be talking about global challenges.

It is also important to pay attention to the imbalance of economic resources in different countries, which can be used to prevent such emergencies, as well as to change economic policies. The latter thesis assumes a "green transition" and low-carbon energy. For this purpose, a system of financial support from international economic institutions, which act as regulators of development, has been created at the global level. In this situation, the question of the limits of development and the vectors of development is the most important, so the role of a number of structures as regulators of development is noticeable, determining the limits of growth in the sense in which they were defined in the Club of Rome report on the project "problems of humanity" back in 1972¹⁷⁰.

A good example is the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is involved in the financial regulation of structures involved in climate change adaptation and green transition activities. On its website, the IMF notes that the organization acts as an international donor, helps its members solve adaptation problems, supports the work of the World Bank, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other international organizations, and the work carried out by the fund includes an analysis of climate change adaptation problems for regions and individual countries in the framework of annual consultations. Examples of such studies and consultations in 2022 included the Maldives, the Republic of the Congo, the Commonwealth of

¹⁶⁹ *Nikolaev N. P.* Anthropocene – emergency – sovereignty [text] // Issues of National and Federative Relations. 2024. Vol. 14. No. 3. P. 827–837. (in Russian)

¹⁷⁰ *Meadows D. H., Meadow D. L., Randers J., Behrens III W. W.* The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind [text]. New York: Universe Books, 1972. 205 p.

Dominica, sub-Saharan Africa, the Western Hemisphere and for Asia and the Pacific¹⁷¹.

Acting as one of the institutions of global governance, the IMF tries to interfere in the affairs of sovereign states through expert activities. In essence, we are talking about evaluating macroeconomic development programs in the context of climate change. Here it is worth quoting the materials of the official website of this organization: "The Fund also provides assistance by expanding its capacity development support, which now includes programs for macroeconomic climate assessment, assessment of the management of climate-oriented public investments, and management of green public finances¹⁷²."

Today, we can confidently say that the IMF can potentially act as both a regulator and a financial institution supporting green transformation. For this purpose, money is directly allocated, which can be invested in state programs, on the basis of which economic reforms will be implemented.: "We are working with member countries and partners to develop financial solutions, such as the Resilience and Long-Term Sustainability Trust Fund (PCT), to channel financial resources from countries with strong external positions into affordable long-term financing for vulnerable countries. This will help recipients address structural issues such as climate change through policy reforms aimed at ensuring balance of payments stability¹⁷³." The fund was launched in the fall of 2022¹⁷⁴.

¹⁷¹ *Georgieva K., Gaspar V., Pazarbasioglu C.* Poor and Vulnerable Countries Need Support to Adapt to Climate Change [electronic resource] // International Monetary Fund Blog. URL: <https://www.imf.org/ru/Blogs/Articles/2022/03/23/blog032322-poor-and-vulnerable-countris-need-support-to-adapt-to-climate-change> (accessed 10.04.2024). (in Russian)

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva Announces Operationalization of the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) to Help Vulnerable Countries Meet Long-Term Challenges [electronic resource] // International Monetary Fund Blog. URL: <https://www.imf.org/ru/News/Articles/2022/10/12/pr22348-md-announces-operationalization-of-rst> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

The International Energy Agency (IEA) plays an important role in climate change management, as well as in global economic policy. The IEA is an autonomous international body within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The IEA consists of 31 member countries, 13 associate countries and 5 candidate countries. The main goal of the association's existence, which it officially declares – is to work with governments and industrial enterprises to create a safe and sustainable energy future for all¹⁷⁵. Members of the association should share common goals: the desire to create conditions in which the energy sector of their countries can make the greatest possible contribution to sustainable economic development, the well-being of the population and the environment. While free and open markets are a fundamental starting point for developing energy policies, Governments need to pay particular attention to energy security and environmental protection¹⁷⁶. As the scientific and business portal Atomic Energy 2.0 writes: "In reality, it defends the interests of countries that import energy¹⁷⁷ resources."

Over the past twenty years, the IEA has been acting not only as a regulator, but also as an actor in the discussion of climate policy. Discussions at the IEA level have a significant impact on the development of modern energy, as they change the format of interpretation of what is considered or not considered green energy. Since energy is important for economic development and, consequently, for politics, the IEA determines global energy policy.

In 2024, the IEA concluded an agreement with the UN on climate change. "The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the International

¹⁷⁵ Mission [electronic resource] // IEA. URL: <https://www.iea.org/about/mission> (accessed 10.05.2024).

¹⁷⁶ IEA Shared Goals [electronic resource] // IEA. URL: <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/b01dc266-6b76-4cb6-846b-b236cb50af93/IEASharedGoals-1993.pdf> (accessed 10.05.2024).

¹⁷⁷ Homepage [electronic resource] // Atomic Energy 2.0 portal. URL: <https://www.atomic-energy.ru/organizations/mezhdunarodnoe-energeticheskoe-agentstvo-iea> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

Energy Agency today announced a new phase of cooperation designed to facilitate progress in meeting the energy commitments made at the recent COP28 climate summit in Dubai to limit global warming to 1.5 °C,"¹⁷⁸ it said. This task is complex in nature, as it is also aimed at regulating water problems. It is clear that the IEA has an impact on water allocation policies. In particular, the world's existing hydroelectric power system with large-scale water intakes is a significant political resource. As a result, the IEA acts as an influential international organization that solves global integration tasks aimed at overcoming the consequences of climate change. The IEA notes: "Water and energy are two closely interrelated major resources. Water is essential for almost all aspects of energy production, from generating electricity to extracting fossil fuels and growing biofuels. The energy sector accounts for about 10% of the world's total freshwater consumption. Meanwhile, maintaining the global water supply depends on energy. Energy is needed to extract water from lakes, rivers, and oceans; lift groundwater from aquifers and pump it through pipes and channels; and purify water and deliver it to consumers"¹⁷⁹.

The International Scientific Council (IOC) has become another politically significant body providing expert assessment of climate change. "The International Scientific Council (ISC) is a non-governmental organization with a unique global membership that brings together more than 245 international scientific unions and associations, national and regional scientific organizations, including academies and research councils, international federations and societies, as well as young academies and Associations"¹⁸⁰. The description of this organization on its website reflects the great importance of integration processes in the field of science in the XXI century.

¹⁷⁸ UNFCCC and IEA launch new phase of cooperation on tackling climate change [electronic resource] // IEA. URL: <https://www.iea.org/news/unfccc-and-iea-launch-new-phase-of-cooperation-on-tackling-climate-change> (accessed 10.12.2023)

¹⁷⁹ *Bredariol T., Lim J., Staas L.* Energy is vital to a well-functioning water sector [electronic resource] // IEA. URL: <https://www.iea.org/commentaries/energy-is-vital-to-a-well-functioning-water-sector> (accessed 10.12.2023).

¹⁸⁰ Who we are [electronic resource] // ISC. URL: <https://council.science/ru/about-us/> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

Combining different scientific councils is associated with solving pressing global problems. At the same time, the enlargement of scientific councils, respectively, led to an increase in their political importance in the world. The International Scientific Council is an international non-governmental organization created in 2018 as a result of a merger between the International Council for Science (ICSU) and the International Council for Social Sciences (ISSC). The Council is headquartered in Paris, but also has regional offices in Asia and the Pacific (the Australian Academy of Sciences), Latin America and the Caribbean (the Colombian Academy of Exact, Physical and Natural Sciences), a mission to the United Nations in New York (USA), and a partnership with Future Africa, a pan-African organization based in the United States. in South Africa, created to explore opportunities for a regional presence in Africa¹⁸¹.

As noted on the organization's website, one of its main activities is to work on the implementation of the Paris Agreement. This cooperation is conducted at the UN level: "In recent years, the International Scientific Council has actively participated in the annual meetings of the UN Conference of the Parties, organizing side events that highlight current scientific knowledge and bring to the attention of politicians the importance of the scientific community for the implementation of the Paris Agreement. The main contribution of the MNC to the climate change community is that it is a co-sponsor of the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), along with the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the Intergovernmental Oceanic Commission (IOC) of UNESCO¹⁸².

The involvement of global organizations such as the United Nations, UNESCO and the IMF in addressing the challenges caused by climate change shows that today this issue is given political significance at the international level. All three listed structures, despite the fact that they avoid harsh assessments, still adhere to two key

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Climate change [electronic resource] // ISC. URL: <https://council.science/ru/what-we-do/our-work-at-the-un/climate-change/> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian).

theses. The first is that climate change is caused by human activity. The second is that the Anthropocene is an important category for describing ongoing changes. It follows from this that the main political structures involved in the climate agenda hold a solid opinion on the causes and nature of what is happening on the planet. This means that representatives of certain expert circles managed to impose their point of view on the international community. Moreover, today the main way of describing existing climate problems in political language has been formed.

In this situation, we can assume the existence of a doctrinal bias of international political structures on climate issues. This means that we are not just talking about some academic consensus on what should be understood as climate problems and their causes. We are talking about the fact that the doctrines formed with the participation of ideologues of various plans have influenced the political and managerial discourse on climate. Although initially it was assumed that climate policy would be influenced only by the results of natural science monitoring. This monitoring is carried out systematically and fairly objectively at the IPCC level, but its interpretation is in the realm of politics. This creates conditions for a wide variety of ways to interpret them.

It should also be noted here that all of the above contributes to the formation of national structures working in the field of climate policy analysis. They can be divided into two types. The first type is organizations created at the national level to ensure the implementation of the IPCC recommendations and the Green Transition concept, including with the participation of the IMF. The second type is national structures, whose main purpose is to verify the relevance of the conclusions of global bodies on the extent of climate responsibility at the regional level. At this level, the idea of creating and promoting a model of sovereign climate policy is being formed, as much as possible in the context of global climate change. Nevertheless, such attempts exist at least at the level of control of the monitoring data received from international structures.

The hierarchy of international organizations that influence climate policy is divided into four main structures: the UN, UNESCO, the IEA and the IMF. The most

extensive structure was created on the basis of the UN. It is the United Nations, as a global governance body, that actively promotes the Western format of overcoming climate change. All UN-based structures involved in climate policy are collegial in nature and have international representation. At the same time, the format they create is considered global and often goes beyond the traditional idea of the limits of the sovereignty of individual countries. Most climate structures created on the basis of the UN, in addition to strictly scientific analysis, are also engaged in promoting an ideological agenda. Thus, they note the need for gender and LGBT*¹⁸³ balance when making political decisions in the field of eliminating the negative consequences of climate change. This approach is more typical not for the natural science paradigm, but for the politically engaged gender sociology. In this connection, it is suggested that climate issues have finally moved beyond the limits of scientific expertise and have become the subject of discussions at the level of competing political languages promoted by various ideological groups of influence.

As a result, at the national level, the structures that perform the functions of regulating climate policy become purely executive. They are faced with a choice: to adopt or not to adopt globally defined strategies. Thus, the UN, the IMF, the IEA and UNESCO form not only a standard for understanding climate change mitigation as a common good, but also define the norms for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the limits of development of individual sectors of the economy for a number of countries.

¹⁸³ * - The international LGBT social Movement and its structural divisions are included in the List of public associations and religious organizations in respect of which the court has adopted a decision that has entered into force to liquidate or ban activities on the grounds provided for by Federal Law No. 114-FZ dated 07/25/2002 "On Countering Extremist Activities" (decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dated 11/30/2023)

Chapter 2. Comparative analysis of institutions that determine the content of climate policy in Russia in 2014-2022

2.1. Russia's place in the system of international regulation of climate policy

The main purpose of this section is to trace the dynamics of relations between Russia and international organizations that hold key positions in the field of climate policy. Considering the place of Russia in the system of international regulation, we need to understand the periodization of this cooperation. The fact is that to this day, such periodization needs justification, and the existing argumentation requires significant additions, since the ongoing global changes make their own adjustments. Moreover, periodization allows you to focus more carefully on the analysis of the declared research subject. The selected stages will allow us to understand why we chose the stated periodization of the dissertation research.

We identify three stages of Russian cooperation on international climate regulation. The first stage was held from 1992 to 1999. The second stage is from 1999 to 2015. The third stage - from 2015 to the present day. All these stages are related to the adoption by the international community and subsequent ratification by Russia of key documents on managing the consequences of climate change¹⁸⁴. In the institutional analysis of political processes, they are fundamental. The fact is that it is these climate agreements that form the institutional framework for climate policy, but at the same time, this framework is often quite rigid, since it sets standards for state development.

The first stage - from 1992 to 1999 - is the period since Russia signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Recall that it was ratified by

¹⁸⁴ *Veselova D. N.* Climate policy of the Russian Federation: legislative and institutional aspects [text] // Scientific journal "Discourse-P". 2021. Vol. 18. No. 3. P. 96–111. (in Russian)

decree of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin in 1994.¹⁸⁵ This is the period when the fundamentals of climate policy are being developed in our country. In fact, Russia has entered a conglomerate of countries that make decisions in the field of managing the mitigation of climate change risks. It is worth noting that in the 1990s, the role of the UN as an international institution for cooperation in solving global problems was significantly more important than in the XXI century.

The second stage is the period of signing and ratification of the Kyoto Climate Agreement. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005. This is the time of implementation of planned indicators (standards) to reduce carbon dioxide emissions into the atmosphere. It was during the period from 1997 to 2015 that large-scale political discussions took place in Russia on the feasibility of meeting the targets set out in the Kyoto Protocol. As a result, Russia has successfully met all the standards. In particular, in 2004, the Russian Academy of Sciences submitted a document signed by the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yu. S. Osipov that the Kyoto Protocol is not scientifically sound¹⁸⁶. The debate on the Kyoto Protocol, as well as on the Doha Amendment to this document, has moved far beyond political discourse and into the realm of public debate¹⁸⁷. It should be noted that it was in the period from 1997 to 2015 that a public position was formed in relation to the fight against climate change.

The third phase begins in 2015, when the Paris Climate Agreement is signed. This period is characterized by the fact that Russia opposes the asymmetry of requirements and supports the mandatory implementation of standards by all parties to the agreement. It is at this time that the results of the Kyoto Protocol and the ratification of the amendment to the second period of this agreement are discussed.

¹⁸⁵ Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (reference information) [electronic resource] // The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://www.mid.ru/tv/?id=1704445&lang=ru> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

¹⁸⁶ The Kyoto Protocol is not in Russia's interests [electronic resource] // Izvestia. URL: <https://iz.ru/news/290059> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

¹⁸⁷ Kyoto Protocol: Pros & Cons [electronic resource] // Russia in Global Affairs. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/kiotskij-protokol-za-i-protiv/> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian).

Since 2015, the climate agenda and climate policy have become an important part of the public sphere of international relations. These aspects of the policy go far beyond the expert community and become the focus of public and media attention.

It is important to point out that all the listed agreements have not lost their meaning after signing newer versions. The Kyoto Protocol, as well as the Montreal Protocol, serve as guidelines for policy action to this day. Addressing them, first of all at the level of evaluating indicators, is of great political importance today. The experience of implementing the two fundamental protocols is important for discussing and adjusting current climate policy programs. Relying on the numbers of set standards and assessing the impact of these standards once they are achieved has become an important part of the debate about what policies are appropriate today¹⁸⁸.

Russia's cooperation on greenhouse gases and climate change was inherited from the USSR. Thus, in 1987, the USSR joined the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer¹⁸⁹. This protocol was attached to the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. The Vienna Convention was agreed at the Vienna Conference in 1985 and entered into force in 1988. The Vienna Convention provided the framework needed to establish regulatory measures in the form of the Montreal Protocol. The Montreal Protocol declared the need to phase out emissions of chlorofluorocarbons, hydrochlorofluorocarbons and hydrofluorocarbons that deplete the ozone layer. According to UN representatives, if the protocol's provisions are implemented, the Earth's ozone layer can recover by 2050. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Russia confirmed continuity with the obligations of

¹⁸⁸ Prokopchuk Ye. E. BRICS+ can give a second chance to the international climate regime [electronic resource] // Russia in Global Affairs. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/briks-vtoroe-dyhanie/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian).

¹⁸⁹ The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 16.09.1987 [electronic resource] // UN. URL: https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/montreal_prot.shtml (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

the Soviet Union under the Montreal Protocol¹⁹⁰. By 2024, several amendments have been adopted to the Montreal Protocol, which govern limits on the release of an increasingly broad list of substances harmful to the ozone layer.

The Russian Federation is an active and responsible party to the Montreal Protocol and its annexed amendments. However, the political and academic debate about the effectiveness of this protocol is not over. There is a whole range of work that calls into question the effectiveness of this agreement¹⁹¹. It is obvious that such a point of view may be politically biased and reflect the opinion of some industrial lobbyists. Equally, promoting the results of the Montreal Agreement is also a political area, rather than an environmental one. The policy becomes the basis for developing solutions to prevent certain harmful emissions into the atmosphere.

In 1994, the Russian Federation ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. On November 4, 1994, Federal Law No. 34-FZ "On Ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change" was adopted¹⁹². From that moment, the process of Russia's participation in regulating greenhouse gas emissions began. The ratification of the law coincided with a large-scale decline in industrial production in Russia, caused by the transformation of the economic system. As a result, Russia has reduced its greenhouse gas emissions several times in a short period of time. This effect has gone down in history, and many analysts still point out that the required reduction in CO₂ emissions can only be achieved if entire industries are shut down.

The Second biennial Report of the Russian Federation, submitted in accordance with Decision 1 / CP. 16 of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, notes: "From 1990 to 1998, total

¹⁹⁰ For ex.: Ibid. and Parson E. Protecting the Ozone Layer: Science and Strategy [text]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 400 p.

¹⁹¹ Syvorotkin V. L. Uselessness of the Montreal Protocol to save the earth's ozone layer [text] // Space and time. 2014. Vol. 170. No. 3. P. 256–265. (in Russian)

¹⁹² Ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: Federal Law № 34 of 04.11.1994 [text] // CL RF. 1994. № 28. Art. 2927.

emissions (excluding land use, land-use change and forestry) decreased by 1552.9 million tons of CO₂-eq, and from 2000 to 2008 it increased only by 358.6 million tons of CO₂-eq. In 2009, there was a decline in emissions due to the global economic crisis affecting the Russian Federation. In 2010-2012, during the post-crisis economic recovery, emissions increased again, but in 2013 there was a slight decrease (by 2.2 % compared to the previous year)¹⁹³."

Such indicators have made Russia one of the world leaders in reducing harmful emissions into the atmosphere. These achievements were noted at the UN level and are still among the most exemplary. So, in 2020, the Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation Mikhail Reshetnikov said: "We have completed the task of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 to no more than 70 % of 1990 values¹⁹⁴." This trend remains stable to this day, despite the economic changes caused by geopolitical processes at the global level.

Reports to the UN show that Russia's consumption of coal and petroleum products is significantly reduced. This affects qualitative changes in greenhouse gas emissions. Indicators from both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Agreement suggest a reduction in the use of fossil energy sources. The latter usually include coal and oil. Russia's participation in the Kyoto and Paris Agreements has its own political history, which is least connected with the UN's declared goals on climate change. The fact is that even at the time of the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and its entry into force in 2005, the non-ecological contexts of this document became obvious.

¹⁹³ Second biennial report of the Russian Federation submitted in accordance with Decision 1/CP.16 of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [electronic resource] // United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). URL: https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/submitted_biennial_reports/application/pdf/2br_rus.pdf (accessed 10.05.2024). P. 4. (in Russian).

¹⁹⁴ Russia reduced greenhouse gas emissions to 70% of the 1990 level [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/8964347> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian), and Russia in the Paris Agreement. What will it give to the environment and enterprises? [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/10230505> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

One of the key stages of Russia's participation in the system of international climate regulation was the implementation of the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol. This is a rather complex and politically saturated period of transformation. The Kyoto Protocol, as an annex to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, set the first-ever standards for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The political assessment of the Kyoto Protocol both in Russia and abroad is ambiguous. The attitude to it is formed on the basis of the asymmetry of requirements for regulating emissions in relation to Russia and the countries of the global West. Nevertheless, Russia has exceeded the standards laid down in this document.

This statement is based on a statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2015 in Paris. "We have exceeded our obligations under the Kyoto Protocol," the Russian leader said. According to him, in 1991-2012, Russia "not only prevented an increase in greenhouse gas emissions, but also significantly reduced them, thanks to which about 40 billion tons of carbon dioxide equivalent did not enter the atmosphere. That is, we can say that Russia's efforts made it possible to slow down global warming for almost a year. As a result of the implementation of the energy efficiency and energy development program, we expect to achieve a reduction of another 13.5 percent by 2020¹⁹⁵."

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. A. Dynkin, commenting on the situation with the Kyoto Protocol, noted that, on the one hand, "the Kyoto process arose in connection with the idea of combating global warming", and on the other - "geologists, for example, claim that the main greenhouse gas is water vapor, and its concentration is practically independent from anthropogenic impacts". In addition, recalls Dynkin, "in addition to water vapor, there is another problem. Emissions from thawing permafrost and tundra will exceed anthropogenic impact in

¹⁹⁵ Putin: Russia has "slowed" global warming for almost a year [electronic resource] // United Russia. URL: <https://er.ru/activity/news/putin-utverzhdает-chto-rossiya-zatormozila-globalnoe-poteplenie-pochti-na-god> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

20 years"¹⁹⁶, so the Kyoto Protocol is not an answer to the question of climate change. A. A. Dynkin "strongly opposed the consumer, simplified view of the Kyoto process - to ratify, immediately sell, receive hundreds of billions... The Kyoto Strategy is generally costly, but it certainly encourages businesses to invest in clean, energy-efficient technologies. It is important to understand that there is a chance for our technologies to grow and for the demand for these technologies to increase"¹⁹⁷.

The ambiguous situation with natural science conclusions regarding the greenhouse component of the Kyoto Protocol has caused large-scale discussions. In the political field, they have transformed and mostly come down to the question of whether to go along with the so-called "international community" and its globalist agenda. At the same time, there is another cross-section of the discussion about the Kyoto Protocol, it fully concerns the issues of combating the effects of climate change. The fact is that the Kyoto Protocol was the first attempt to build a model not only for limiting greenhouse gas emissions, but also for refusing to buy and sell "hot air". This model was far from perfect, but it was still the first experience of global cooperation between States on the issue of solving a global climate problem. This experience has both negative and positive aspects. One of the positive aspects is that in the framework of cooperation under the Kyoto Protocol, Russia not only exceeded all the indicators, but also significantly strengthened its international authority in dealing with environmental challenges¹⁹⁸.

In 2024, the statement of the Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation on Climate Issues on Russia's position on the main issues on the agenda of the 20th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change / 10th Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol was published. It

¹⁹⁶ Kyoto Protocol: Pros & Cons [electronic resource] // Russia in Global Affairs. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/kiotskij-protokol-za-i-protiv/> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Putin: Russia has "slowed" global warming for almost a year [electronic resource] // United Russia. URL: <https://er.ru/activity/news/putin-utverzhdает-chto-rossiya-zatormozila-globalnoe-poteplenie-pochti-na-god> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

noted: "2014 marked the 20th anniversary of the entry into force of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). During this period, the Russian Federation actively worked to meet its obligations under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (KP). We have successfully fulfilled our commitments at a rate 32 % below the baseline level of 1990, while maintaining a steady GDP growth. The overall decline in emissions from the energy sector in Russia over the past twenty years has reached the 5-year emission of EU countries and exceeds the 3-year emission of the United States. In the context of the implementation of political statements under the Copenhagen Agreement in Russia, the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, establishes an internal national goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 to no more than 75 % of their emissions in 1990¹⁹⁹."

This document contained, in addition to a number of important decisions of a purely ecological nature to combat climate change, including political rhetoric. In many respects, they concerned the so-called procedural rules for regulating the volume of harmful emissions. In particular, the Russian representatives stated the need for mandatory compliance with the norms and the need for universal ratification of the amendment to the second period of the Kyoto Protocol, which was ratified by only 19 countries, of which only 2 were classified as Annex 1 countries in 2014. Annex I Parties strive to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions, not regulated by the Montreal Protocol, as a result of the use of bunker fuel in air and sea transport, acting through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively²⁰⁰. The current situation at that time indicated the threat of applying double standards in the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.

¹⁹⁹ Statement by Special Presidential Representative on Climate Issues Alexander Bedritsky [electronic resource] // Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/administration/47115> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

²⁰⁰ Kyoto protocol to the United Nations framework convention on climate change of 11.12.1997 [electronic resource] // UN. URL:

From the point of view of international relations, the climate factor has become a serious reason for cooperation at the interstate level. Claims by parties involved in the climate change mitigation process regarding compliance and non-compliance with regulations, such as the Kyoto Protocol, have become an important part of international processes. Today, every international affairs expert platform has a section dedicated to climate policy. Climate regulations have become another tool of international pressure, and the climate agenda in one form or another has become an openly politicized collection of judgments.

Describing this trend, one of the program directors of the Valdai International discussion club, A. Beshpalov, noted: "So, the main actors in the climate drama unfolding on the stage of international relations are societies, governments and corporations. The growing public concern about climate issues is leading to an increasing role for them in policy programs. The sense of urgency of climate change issues varies from country to country and from generation to generation²⁰¹." Based on this statement, we can conclude that summing up preliminary results on the Kyoto Protocol indicators at the international level was carried out taking into account the interests of not only individual countries, but also corporations. In this regard, we can say that climate diplomacy, as well as climate lobbying, are becoming integral parts of modern foreign policy processes.

In this situation, it is worth quoting A. A. Kadomtsev from his article in the journal "International Life" in 2019: "Most countries of the world are characterized by a "mixed" picture of the consequences, "pros" and "cons" of global warming. At the same time, in the context of ever-increasing competition between states, the ecological idea becomes a convenient and attractive tool for discrediting opponents. Finally, for some environmental organizations, the slogans of the struggle for

https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/kyoto.shtml (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

²⁰¹ *Beshpalov A.* How climate change becomes a factor in international relations [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/kak-izmenenie-klimata-stanovitsya-faktorom-mo/> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

environmental protection outweigh any objective needs for the development of both individual territories and entire states. And, sometimes, it is almost impossible to separate reckless sincere idealism from "lobbying for a new type of corporate interests. "As a result, criticism of the development model based on hydrocarbon raw materials turns out to be a competitive tool that promotes the interests of the "green economy" – not always, as it turns out in recent years, so environmentally sound²⁰²."

The last stage in the creation of a system of international relations on climate issues was the signing of the Paris Climate Agreement. The Paris Agreement was adopted on December 12, 2015, following the 21st Conference of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Paris²⁰³. It was supported by all 197 UNFCCC participants (193 UN member states, as well as Palestine, Niue, the Cook Islands and the EU). The Paris Agreement aims to implement the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, in particular by keeping global average temperature growth "well below" 2°C and "efforts" to limit temperature growth to 1.5 °C. The conditions for Russia specified in this agreement are that by 2030 it must achieve greenhouse gas emissions of no more than 70 % of the 1990 level. The Paris Agreement is intended to replace the Kyoto Protocol, which was in force since 2005 (the second period of its validity ended in December 2020). The obligations of the Paris Agreement participants are calculated for 2021-2030.²⁰⁴

The Kyoto Protocol aimed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from industrialized countries and countries with economies in transition by 5.2% compared to 1990. The Paris Agreement, according to the information provided on the UN website, is positioned a little differently. "The Paris Agreement provides a solid foundation that will guide global efforts over the coming decades. The goal is to

²⁰² *Kadomtsev A. A.* How climate is changing politics [electronic resource] // International Affairs. URL: <https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/24971> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

²⁰³ History and main items of the Paris Climate Agreement [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/info/9913445> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, and What is the Paris Agreement? [electronic resource] // United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). URL: <https://unfccc.int/ru/informaciya-ob-onuv/chto-takoe-parizhskoe-soglashenie> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

increase the ambition of countries' actions to combat climate change over time. To facilitate this, the Agreement establishes two review processes, each of which is carried out over a five-year cycle. The Paris Agreement marks the beginning of a transition to a low-carbon world, with much work still to be done. The implementation of the Agreement is essential for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, as it provides a roadmap for climate-related actions that will reduce emissions and increase resilience to climate²⁰⁵ change."

The key difference between the Paris Agreement and the Kyoto Protocol is the lack of clearly defined standards. This causes varying degrees of concern in political circles. On the one hand, the Paris Agreement is perceived as a kind of delay in making radical climate decisions. On the other hand, this agreement can be considered the most ambitious climate document that can radically change the state of affairs in the field of climate. The criticism of the Paris Agreement by experts who adhere to the idea of sovereignty as an immutable value is no less radical than the criticism of the Kyoto Protocol, which is why we consider the Paris Agreement an important political event and since 2015 we have marked a new stage in Russia's foreign policy on climate change.

Almost immediately after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, its criticism began. The first major statement was an article in *The Guardian* in 2015, in which the American scientist James Hansen subjected the agreement to devastating criticism. Since 2014, Hansen has led the Climate Science, Awareness, and Solutions Program at Columbia University's Earth Institute, which aims to "stop the global movement

²⁰⁵ The Paris Agreement [electronic resource] // UN. URL: <https://www.un.org/ru/climatechange/paris-agreement#:~:text=%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B6%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B5%20%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%88%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%B5%D1%82%20%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%BD%D1%83%D1%8E%20%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%83,%D0%BF%D0%BE%20%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8C%D0%B1%D0%B5%20%D1%81%20%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%BC%20%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

toward catastrophic climate change with a strategy that will lead to near-universal carbon charges as quickly as possible»²⁰⁶."

James Hansen said: "It's actually a scam, a fake. It's just nonsense when they say "We'll have a 2C warming target, and then we'll try to achieve a little bit more every five years". These are just useless words. No actions, just promises. As long as fossil fuels remain the cheapest form of fuel, they will continue to be burned²⁰⁷." According to Hansen, an international convention does not make sense if greenhouse gas emissions are not taxed across the board. He argues that only this will reduce emissions quickly enough to avoid the worst of the devastating effects of climate change. Hansen's words are not just statements of an expert drawn from the world of science. He has long been involved in the political discussion of the problem of anthropogenic influence on climate. Back in 1989, as director of NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Research, he testified before the US Congress about the prospects for climate change caused by human activity, and a little later other scientists corrected his data, including Patrick Michaels, who also spoke before the US Congress, assessing the viability of Hansen's forecasts 9 years later (for many years, Michaels was a research professor of environmental sciences at the University of Virginia, as well as a member of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007). Proponents and opponents of the idea of human influence on the climate constantly confronted these scientists²⁰⁸. Each of them could be declared incompetent, providing not just erroneous, but deliberately irrelevant forecasts. At the same time, political forces that refute the statements of scientists actively sought opportunities to devalue their data.

²⁰⁶ Our Mission [electronic resource] // Earth Institute, Columbia University. URL: <https://csas.earth.columbia.edu/about/our-mission> (accessed 10.10.2023).

²⁰⁷ James Hansen, father of climate change awareness, calls Paris talks a fraud [electronic resource] // The Guardian. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/12/james-hansen-climate-change-paris-talks-fraud> (accessed 10.05.2024).).

²⁰⁸ 30 years later, deniers are still lying about Hansen's amazing global warming prediction [electronic resource] // The Guardian. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2018/jun/25/30-years-later-deniers-are-still-lying-about-hansens-amazing-global-warming-prediction> (accessed 10.05.2024).

For example, Patrick Michaels for many years suffered from accusations about his financing by the oil industry, after he himself gave a report in which he explained the degree of influence of economic agents on experts. These statements were truncated, their source was kept silent, and many information platforms, including major media²⁰⁹ outlets, reprinted data about its dependence on fossil fuel suppliers.

Russian experts are also actively discussing the Paris Agreement, which began immediately after its adoption. For example, Dr sc. pol. V. Pavlenko in his article noted the threats to sovereignty from this document: "The analysis of the main aspects of the Paris Agreement encourages a broader, interdisciplinary view of environmental and nature reservation issues. Obviously, the Agreement, as well as maneuvers with its submission "The draft decision of the 21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change" is only a separate element embedded in the global system of transforming the international order. The impact of this system on global processes, which entered an active phase with the creation of the Club of Rome, has already led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and threatens to continue in the form of the destruction of the Russian Federation. In essence, we are dealing with a global mechanism focused on the interests of a number of transnational actors interested in undermining sovereignty, damaging economic and political interests, and eliminating Russia as a global competitor that has returned to the "big game"²¹⁰.

Both narratives (Hansen and Pavlenko) criticizing the Paris Agreement represent two polar points of view. One is from an American environmental activist who is dissatisfied with the insufficiently radical nature of the Paris Agreement. Another narrative is presented by a scientist representing the Russian Academy of Geopolitical Problems and defending the values of state sovereignty. As a result, this

²⁰⁹ Climate sceptic misled Congress over funding from oil industry [electronic resource] // The Guardian. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jan/25/michaels-climate-sceptic-misled-congress> (accessed 10.05.2024).

²¹⁰ *Pavlenko V.* The Paris Agreement as a threat to national security of Russia [text] // Astrakhan Bulletin of Ecological Education. 2017. Vol. 42. No. 4. P. 38. (in Russian)

document became the target of political attacks. Its character, which does not sufficiently meet the political needs of various political forces, has created a rather large-scale field for debates that have revealed a variety of contradictions in climate policy.

However, the new version of the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation, signed on October 26, 2023 by Russian President Vladimir Putin, retains the basic principles of the Paris Agreement. The doctrine was adopted on the eve of the next round of climate COP28 in Dubai in November–December 2023 and for the first time aims to achieve Russia's carbon neutrality – an equilibrium of CO₂ emissions and removals – by 2060. The special feature of the doctrine is that it cemented Russia's independence "in its assessments and conclusions about the ongoing and expected consequences of climate²¹¹ change. "In the difficult geopolitical conditions of 2023, such a formulation ensured the country's sovereign right to protect its own interests from biased assessments and political speculation in the climate sphere.

In this case, the Paris Agreement remains an important institutional framework that determines the direction of development in the field of preventing the negative effects of climate change. The elimination of these consequences is part of the concept of managing shared resources, even, - human resources. In this situation, Elinor Ostrom's model²¹² makes it possible to understand why it is currently impossible to completely abandon global institutions and move to purely national paradigms of managing the common good. The understanding of climate as a shared resource is already formed at the level of public discourse.

²¹¹ Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 812 of 26.10.2023 [electronic resource] // Official Internet portal of legal information. URL: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202310260009> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²¹² *Ostrom E. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* [text]; translation from English by T. Montyan. Kiev: CUP, 2013. 400 p. (in Russian)

Withdrawing from the Paris Agreement on the model of D. Trump's decision means withdrawing from the international system of regulating global problems²¹³. Their global nature makes it necessary to update another aspect of shared resources – resources to address the challenges caused by climate change. The Russian climate doctrine is focused on cooperation with the international community on global challenges facing humanity, which is why we maintain that Russian climate policy continues the principles laid down by the Paris Agreement and the Doha Amendment.

The principle of jointly solving common problems through achieving carbon neutrality is the basis of modern climate policy. The same principles were confirmed by the Russian government in 2023. It brings to the fore the main criterion – the fairness of institutions. The fact that the Russian Climate Doctrine declares that it is unacceptable to violate sovereign rights is more evidence of an attempt to create an effective system for regulating the work of these institutions, but the entire strategy to combat climate change is based on maintaining international cooperation in this area. Moreover, in our view, the climate agenda, as well as real climate issues, are the foundation that holds the United Nations together. The current state of the UN in the context of the global geopolitical crisis is becoming less significant against the background of the growing interests of powerful military and political blocs. In these circumstances, the problem of climate change is almost the main topic around which the UN builds its activities. For Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, this circumstance is a significant resource for cooperation and maintaining channels of communication with both allies and political opponents. In essence, the topic of climate is the basis for future cooperation between states after overcoming geopolitical turbulence.

²¹³ The United States has completed its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/9910097> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

Climate policy or geopolitics, depending on the approach to the topic, is becoming an important part of the political future. We are talking about what will be the reflection on this policy/geopolitics in Russia. It is obvious that it is inappropriate to repeat an ill-founded thesis about the geopolitics of the Anthropocene to the detriment of national interests. Consequently, there is a demand for an alternative paradigm through which the BRICS, the SCO, or the global South can explain what is happening with the climate and offer their own versions of the future²¹⁴. In this situation, it is worth referring to the opinion of I. A. Makarov: "The problem is not that the Western countries offer something wrong, but rather that the collective "non-West" does not offer alternatives. Leading developing countries (in particular, the BRICS countries) should not withdraw from solving environmental problems, on the one hand, and should not copy Western approaches, on the other. On the contrary, it is time to take responsibility for solving environmental problems, as well as formulate your own view on how exactly they need to be solved²¹⁵."

This perspective is seen as the most realistic, since it is the states united in these unions that rely more on the logic of cooperation, including within the UN framework. Even today, it is becoming clear that the models of shaping the future proposed primarily by the United States are controversial, since they reflect the interests of only a small number of countries that are already ready for the "green transition".

In this connection, we return to the idea of the common good proposed by Elinor Ostrom²¹⁶, but the content of this idea (in relation to climate) requires serious refinement. Moreover, most likely in the near future, either Russia or China will simply be forced to offer their own interpretation of the common good. In this

²¹⁴ *Prokopchuk Ye. E.* Climate vs justice [text] // *Russia in Global Affairs*. 2024. Vol. 22. No. 1. P. 196–212. (in Russian)

²¹⁵ Why a greener economy will hardly be more just [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/projects/climate/economy/> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

²¹⁶ *Ostrom E.* *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* [text]; translation from English by T. Montyan. Kiev: CUP, 2013. 400 p. (in Russian)

situation, the common good should become a conventional concept, and not unilaterally justified by groups of often politically biased experts. In essence, the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation is the first step towards the formation of a conventional content of the concept of universal climate benefit. The entire climate diplomacy of the modern world, in which Russia is a key actor, is built around this doctrinal principle.

In conclusion of the section, it is worth noting that the Russian Federation, despite the difficult geopolitical situation, continues to cooperate at the international level on the elimination of the negative consequences of climate change. This cooperation takes place through the UN, UNESCO and other international organizations. Russia's full implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change continues. Moreover, on the issue of the Kyoto Protocol parameters, the country's leadership declared their full implementation. The history of Russia's cooperation with international climate structures is one of the longest among UN member states. The duration of Russia's climate cooperation with the UN dates back to the Soviet era - since 1989, which is why today Russia is making a number of proposals for revising certain provisions of the climate protocols. For example, as we noted earlier, Russia offers its own climate justice format.

In particular, it was the representatives of Russia who stated the need for mandatory compliance with greenhouse gas emission standards and mandatory ratification by all countries participating in the Kyoto Protocol of the documents of the second period of this agreement. Moreover, Russia has officially opposed the policy of double standards in climate issues, as well as the political use of climate standards. This will make it possible to preserve the existing system of relations between States, transnational structures and the scientific community at the international level. The loss of the existing system will cause irreparable damage to all the work carried out over the past thirty years to overcome the consequences of climate change.

Another aspect of international cooperation in the field of climate is the development of a common understanding of climate as a common good for humanity.

The content of this concept is necessary for further work with climate doctrines. Today, the consensus on how to understand climate as a common good for humanity varies significantly depending on the belonging of states to a particular bloc (West, Global South and others). For Russia, which closely cooperates with the countries of the Global South, this task has its own parameters.

Explaining this need, it is advisable to quote from an article by A. N. Zotin for the Valdai International Club: "In the West, either they do not understand that without cheap, that is, hydrocarbon energy sources, any sustainable growth of most developing countries is impossible, or they understand this, but they deliberately limit the economic growth of other countries, fearing the loss of the country's economic potential. own dominance. Many experts are inclined to the second option and call the climate policy of the West nothing more than "green colonialism".

Finally, the West is hardly aware of the medium - and long-term consequences of the large-scale introduction of RES (*renewable energy sources-note N.N.*) and the restructuring of the existing energy balance. Many physical and social phenomena have so-called threshold effects – up to a certain level, everything goes as before, but when a certain value is reached, phase transitions occur²¹⁷."

The Russian climate doctrine, as amended in 2023, basically corresponds to the conventionally accepted principles of climate value and the danger of climate change at the UN level. And the principal issue on which consensus has not yet been reached is the Anthropocene, since this hypothesis is not yet scientifically well-founded²¹⁸. Many of the proponents of this idea continue to insist on its relevance and promote its postulates at the international level. The Russian format of the climate doctrine remains rather restrained and far from poorly grounded concepts with unpredictable

²¹⁷ Zotin A. The climate agenda: how to separate science from ideology? [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/klimaticheskaya-povestka/?sphrase_id=732062 (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

²¹⁸ Working Group on the Anthropocene [electronic resource] // Subcommittee on Quaternary Stratigraphy. URL: <http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/working-groups/anthropocene/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

consequences. On the other hand, the national paradigm of understanding climate policy is significantly inferior to the block one. In this regard, we should expect the appearance of the BRICS or SCO climate doctrine, that is, a document that is binding and based on the values inherent in the countries of this bloc. But before such a document can be written, it is necessary to have a general consensus on values and create a whole range of norms based on them that have global potential.

2.2. Russian Institutes of Climate Policy Regulation

In 2014, the Russian Federation joined as a full participant in the international dialogue on preventing the negative consequences of climate change. Its participation in the Kyoto Protocol illustrates the desire to solve global problems at the global level. In the same year, the preparation of the Paris Agreement, which was to replace the Kyoto Protocol, was in full swing. International cooperation was focused on domestic structures that provided work with climate change at the domestic level, including in the production of standards for regulating greenhouse gas emissions.

At that time, Russia was considering the possibility of building a paradigm of climate cooperation within the framework set by theorists of climate justice norms. Moreover, at the level of the domestic expert community, there was a division in the assessments of the future of climate policy. Representatives of the natural sciences advocated cooperation at the international level and the essence of their proposals was reduced to the choice between mitigation and adaptation to climate risks²¹⁹. A different position was taken by international experts and economists, who reminded that the climate agenda can be used in the political interests of individual countries

²¹⁹ *Romanovskaya A. A.* Risk can be managed and damage from climate change can be minimized [electronic resource] // The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/interview/riskom-mozhno-upravlyat-a-ushcherb-ot-izmeneniya-klimata-mozhno-minimizirovat/> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

and as a justification for establishing unequal relations, especially with regard to Russia²²⁰.

The events described were an important context in which draft laws, decrees and resolutions were adopted. Taking into account the fact, that we consider 2014 as the starting point in the chronology of our research, it should be said that at that time the Climate Doctrine as amended on December 17, 2009 was in force in Russia. In addition to this document, the "Comprehensive Plan for the Implementation of the Climate Doctrine until 2020" was adopted in 2011. This indicates that at the time of 2014, climate policy in Russia as a sphere of public administration was formed and went beyond the boundaries of the general environmental agenda. As a result, it covered a wide variety of areas of law and policy, from energy strategy to taxes and socio-economic development. The successful implementation of the Kyoto Protocol regulations has given grounds to consider Russia one of the leaders in achieving carbon neutrality.

By 2014, the very concept of carbon neutrality was firmly established in public and political usage. A special field of expertise has been formed, involving a large number of scientists from various disciplinary fields, starting with physics, chemistry, ecology and ending with representatives of socio-humanitarian knowledge. One of the "flagships" of the climate agenda is Rosgidromet (the Federal Hydrometeorological and Environmental Monitoring Service). The Federal Hydrometeorological Service operates a Climate center, established in 2012. It is the Climate Center that is responsible for monitoring greenhouse gas emission control indicators²²¹. By 2014, it was possible to create a fairly effective model of work both on domestic climate tasks and on international obligations in this area. This example is the result of Russia's effective cooperation on climate issues at the global level.

²²⁰ *Lieven A. Climate Change and the Nation State: The Case for Nationalism in a Warming World* [text]. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. P. 23.

²²¹ Homepage [electronic resource] // Roshydromet Climate Centre. URL: <https://cc.voeikovmgo.ru/ru/> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

According to the regulations of the Roshydromet Climate Center, the main goals of the center are:

1. Preparation of information products on systematization of knowledge about current and expected climate changes and their consequences;
2. Improvement of climate services in the Roshydromet system;
3. Promote the creation of a national segment of the Global Framework for Climate Services of the World Meteorological Organization in the Russian Federation;
4. Establishing a dialogue between developers/suppliers of climate products and users of climate services;
5. Increase of "climate literacy" in the user community;
6. Development of optimal methods for presenting climate information for effective assimilation by user communities;
7. Assess progress in improving climate services in the Roshydromet system and develop proposals for its development²²².

In this context, the language of the Russian climate policy, which deals with the concepts of climate services and categories of developers and suppliers of climate products, is interesting. It is also worth mentioning ecosystem services that complement the vocabulary of climate policy in our country. In addition, all these terms are part of the Concept of Natural Climate Solutions. These categories directly affect the language of legislation. The fact is that this system, borrowed from the economy, allows the state to address climate issues under the influence of the works of Gretchen Daily and in particular her book "The New Economy of Nature: The

²²² About the Climate Centre of Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring: Resolution of the Government of the Russian № 833 of 29.12.2012 [electronic resource] // Official site of the Climate Centre of the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring. URL: <https://cc.voeikovmgo.ru/images/polCC.pdf> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

Quest to Make Conservation Profitable"²²³. As a result, politics aligns with the economy. For example, in Russia, the Ministry of Economic Development is responsible for working with ecosystem services. In particular, within the framework of the Department of Multilateral Economic Cooperation, work was carried out on the implementation of the Concept of Natural Climate Solutions. The department's documents stated that: "Natural climate solutions can provide more than 30% of the cost-effective mitigation measures needed by 2030 to stabilize global warming below 2C°²²⁴." This theoretical framework can also be traced in most other significant texts on preventing the negative impact of climate change. Monetization of ecosystem services is a global trend that has hardly been discussed in Russia, with the exception of a number of closed expert platforms. In this regard, climate policy in our country turns out to be part of a complex system of relations between Russia and world powers that determine the nature of global policy.

Recall that in the spring and summer of 2014, the first package of illegitimate sanctions was adopted against the Russian Federation, which represent illegal restrictive measures by Western countries against Russia. The 2014 sanctions marked the beginning of a long period of changes in the global architecture of international relations. Their impact on the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals was undoubtedly negative. As a result, the system of relationships over key environmental issues began to degrade. However, it was in 2014-2015 that the impact of sanctions on the global agenda was still relatively small. This can be explained by their "delayed effect" as well as the "snowball effect" which gave the result only a few years later. By the result, we mean that at the level of the SCO, BRICS and EEU, their own model of combating climate change has begun to be developed. At the end

²²³ *Daily G. C., Ellison K.* The New Economy of Nature: The Quest to Make Conservation Profitable [text]. Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2002. 260 p.

²²⁴ Natural climate solutions [electronic resource] // Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/file/4cc45c240a939c79ffd2ca08b0d57715/071122.pdf> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

of 2023, this model was under discussion and adjustment with the participation of the partner countries of these unions. We assume that it was the sanctions of 2014-2015 that marked the beginning of a long transition from a global dialogue on climate change to block thinking in the field of general planetary issues. Recall that in 2015, at the UN General Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin criticized the block thinking that Western countries rely on: "The key task of the entire world community is to abandon block thinking. This is the only way to ensure stability, both on a regional scale and globally, on the entire planet²²⁵." A similar position was repeatedly voiced by Chinese President Xi Jinping, so at the APEC summit in 2023, he said: "Peace and development will not be easy, it is necessary to join forces in protecting the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, to adhere to dialogue and cooperation instead of a confrontational and block approach in interstate relations in the interests of prosperity and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. Our region should not and cannot turn into an arena of a geopolitical game, much less a place of unleashing a "new cold war" or a block confrontation²²⁶."

Within the framework of this facility, there was cooperation in the development and signing of the Paris Climate Agreement. In the text of the Paris Agreement of December 12, 2015, it was stated that the UNFCCC member countries can sign, approve or ratify it. On behalf of the Russian Federation, the Paris Agreement was signed on April 22, 2016 in accordance with Government Order No. 670-r of April 14, 2016. According to the law "On International Treaties of the Russian Federation", ratification applies to treaties that require changes or adoption of new federal laws, relate to territorial delimitation, and more. It was recognized that the Paris Agreement did not meet any of these criteria. By Decree of the Government

²²⁵ Vladimir Putin addressed the UN General Assembly [electronic resource] // Channel One Russia. URL: https://www.1tv.ru/news/2015-09-28/10328-vladimir_putin_vystupil_na_genassamblee_oon (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

²²⁶ Xi Jinping Overcoming challenges together to open a new chapter of co-operation in the Asia-Pacific [electronic resource] // Russian Gazette. URL: <https://rg.ru/2023/11/17/soobshcha-preodolet-vyzovy-vo-imia-otkrytiia-novoj-glavy-sotrudnichestva-v-atr.html> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

of the Russian Federation No. 1228 of September 21, 2019 "On the adoption of the Paris Agreement", this document entered into force on the territory of our country.

At the level of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, it was stated, that the signing of a new international climate agreement is due to the fact, that Russia is striving to fulfill its obligations to the UN and the international community. In particular, it has adopted the Paris Agreement and is fully involved in its implementation. Konstantin Kosachev noted: "Our country has successfully fulfilled its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol in its work. Last November, we set national targets for reducing greenhouse gas²²⁷ emissions." This statement by a member of the Upper House of the Russian Parliament illustrates well the position of Russia and its allies in the international arena on climate issues. It emphasizes, that at the time of signing the Paris Agreement, the political leadership of the Russian Federation was focused on compliance with international norms and on continuing cooperation within the UN and global institutions to counteract the negative consequences of climate change.

Russia's obligations under the Paris Agreement are quite high. The declared standards should ensure carbon neutrality in most of the vast country in almost fifteen years. This threshold cannot be called a compromise or soft one, since it is assumed that: "Russia has stated that it will reduce emissions by 2030 by 25-30% from the 1990 level, taking into account the maximum possible absorption capacity of forests. So far, this commitment has been met: in recent years, emissions including uptake have averaged 2 billion tons of CO₂-eq, which is 51.6% of the 1990 level. Another difference is that States are committed to developing a climate change adaptation plan. Vulnerable countries will receive financial assistance from the UN Green Climate Fund, to which developed countries contribute, and report on their

²²⁷ K. Kosachev: Russia considers the Paris Agreement to be a reliable international legal basis for a long-term climate settlement [electronic resource] // Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. URL: <http://council.gov.ru/events/news/130393/> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

implementation every five years. Russia is not obliged to report or make contributions. But she can do it voluntarily²²⁸."

The ratio of emission standards to forest area is an important indicator for the Russian economy because it allows you to regulate climate standards. However, just signing the Paris Agreement could not trigger a regulatory mechanism for greenhouse gas emissions. This required the creation of a separate system of national legal institutions. Their development included the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, the Parliament, ministries and the Russian Academy of Sciences. The global problem required extraordinary legal measures. This extreme situation is characterized both by the pace of development of laws and decrees, and by the creation of a categorical apparatus through which it would be possible to describe and record the changes that are taking place.

First of all, a separate federal law was needed, which would become the basis for efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This law was supposed to define key categories of legal relations such as: register of carbon units, climate projects, state accounting of greenhouse gas emissions, circulation and offset of carbon units, and much more. It was important to legislate the very concept of greenhouse gas emission targets, as well as their specific features for Russian economic sectors. It took two years to develop, adjust and discuss such a document.

As a result, in addition to the Paris Agreement, Russia adopted the Federal Law "On Limiting Greenhouse Gas Emissions" No. 296-FZ of 02.07.2021. Article 1 of this law states: "This Federal Law defines the basis for legal regulation of relations in the sphere of economic and other activities that are accompanied by greenhouse gas emissions and are carried out on the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as on the continental shelf, in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation, and in the Russian sector of the Caspian Sea. The purpose of this Federal Law is to create

²²⁸ Russia in the Paris Agreement. What will it give to the environment and enterprises? [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/10230505> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

conditions for sustainable and balanced economic development of the Russian Federation while reducing greenhouse gas²²⁹ emissions."

With the signing of the Paris Agreement, Russia became part of a new climate regime. This regime is generally considered formally polycentric due to the fact that international institutions lose their controlling function in it. This function passes to states and even municipalities. The new climate regime should use a polycentric approach to gently mitigate negative climate impacts. Moreover, thanks to this approach, State sovereignty ceases to be an obstacle and becomes an important auxiliary tool. However, the effectiveness of such a regime remains controversial. In this regard, it is worth highlighting two points of view expressed by critics: constructive and radical. Proponents of constructive criticism of formal polycentrism are in favor of preserving it, provided that the system of monitoring the fulfillment of obligations is improved, and for expanding the powers of regional interstate associations (BRICS, SCO, APEC, and other "Climate Clubs")²³⁰. Opponents who adhere to a radical approach insist on abandoning polycentrism and establishing strict supranational control while significantly limiting the sovereignty of countries.

After the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2019, the national project "Ecology" was launched, aimed, among other things, at solving climate problems in the period from 2019 to 2024. The national project included 11 federal projects, among which the "Clean Air" direction was indicated. It was supposed to be responsible for reducing emissions of harmful substances, including greenhouse gases, into the atmosphere. On the website of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation, it was stated: "The Federal project "Clean Air" of the national project "Ecology" is aimed at improving the environmental situation and

²²⁹ Limiting greenhouse gas emissions: Federal Law № 296-FZ of 02.07.2021 [electronic resource] // Official Internet portal of legal information. URL: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107020031> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

²³⁰ *Makarov I. A., Shuranova A. A.* Climate Change as a New Factor of International Relations [text] // *Journal of International Analytics*. 2023. Vol. 14. No. 4. P. 66–67. (in Russian)

reducing emissions of pollutants into the atmospheric air. Project participants – 12 large industrial centers: Bratsk, Krasnoyarsk, Lipetsk, Magnitogorsk, Mednogorsk, Nizhny Tagil, Novokuznetsk, Norilsk, Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Cherepovets and Chita. Since August 2021, the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of Russia has been responsible for managing the federal Clean Air project. The measures taken will dramatically reduce the level of air pollution in 12 cities, including reducing emissions by at least 20%, and by 2030 - by half. It is planned to achieve the goals through measures to reduce emissions from industrial enterprises, municipal and transport infrastructure facilities²³¹."

This approach fully corresponds to the polycentric model of working with climate change. In Russia, this activity has been transferred to the level of a federal project, within the framework of which the interaction of the subjects of the federation with the federal center is carried out. At the same time, the entities allocated to a special group should significantly reduce their emissions of harmful substances into the atmosphere with funding from Moscow. It is worth noting that the introduction of standards for regulating greenhouse gases is not carried out simultaneously throughout the country, but progressively starting with large industrial centers. This reduces the negative economic impact of environmental reforms.

The Clean Air project in 2023, under the influence of the global geopolitical situation, found itself in a difficult financial situation. Its funding was reduced by more than 6 billion rubles. There were reports in the press about a possible failure to meet the deadlines for completing its tasks. It should be noted that in 2023, several environmental programs fell under the sequester at once, including "Clean Country",

²³¹ The Clean Air Federal Project [electronic resource] // Official site of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.mnr.gov.ru/activity/directions/natsionalnyy_proekt_ekologiya/federalnyy_proekt_chistyy_vozdukh/?ysclid=lwcvrrk75h175931127 (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

"Improvement of the Volga" and some others²³². The consequences of the geopolitical crisis will continue to affect the implementation of climate programs in Russia. Moreover, the expansion of sanctions in the field of banning the supply of technologies may suspend work in a number of monitoring areas.

In 2021, the Strategy of Socio-economic Development of the Russian Federation with low greenhouse gas emissions until 2050 was adopted (approved by Order of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 3052-r of 29.10.2021). Within the framework of this strategy, priority areas of economic activity were specified, due to which it is planned to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Its task is to ensure that the Russian Federation implements its obligations under international climate agreements. The document outlines both positive and negative effects for Russia in the event of global warming. For example, the development of crop production and the reduction of the heating season are among the positive aspects of warming. Within the framework of the strategy, two scenarios for the development of the situation on greenhouse emissions are identified: inertial and target (intensive). If the inertial scenario involves working strictly within the framework of already concluded agreements, then the intensive one involves the interrelation of national and international climate obligations and the signing of agreements regulating them.

The document notes that: "In the inertial scenario, net greenhouse gas emissions from the current level of 1,584 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent will increase by 8 percent by 2030 (to 1,718 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent) and by 25 percent by 2050 (to 1,986 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent). Such dynamics of net emissions will be possible if the current level of absorption capacity is maintained (at least 535 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent)²³³."

²³² *Maleva Yu.* Funding for the federal project Clean Air was cut almost in half [electronic resource] // *Vedomosti*. URL: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2023/10/12/1000151-finansirovanie-federalnogo-proekta-chistii-vozduh-sokratili> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

²³³ Strategy of socio-economic development of the Russian Federation with low greenhouse gas emissions until 2050: Resolution of the Government of the Russian № 3052-r of 29.10.2021

Another aspect concerns the target (intensive scenario), which implies the possibility of additional "green projects" that will open up an opportunity for the future under the sign of carbon neutrality. These projects are expected to attract additional investment from high-tech segments of the economy. This thesis is also reflected in the strategy text: "The targeted (intensive) scenario provides a mutual link between the goals of the international climate agenda to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the country's economic opportunities to switch to technologies with low greenhouse gas emissions, and ensuring the national interests of socio-economic development. The main parameters of infrastructure renewal set out in the Strategy until 2024-2026 have already been defined and included in state programs and national projects. Additional measures to reduce emissions provided for in the target (intensive) scenario were selected based on the principle of return on investment in them²³⁴."

The strategy of Russia's socio-economic development has become an important stage in the implementation of the strategic objectives of the Paris Agreement in practice. At the same time, it has become part of the foundation of the Russian system of managing both greenhouse gas emissions and building a carbon-neutral future. Along with a whole series of decrees and departmental orders, the "Strategy for the Development of the Russian Federation" reveals the institutional content of long-term work to prevent the negative consequences of climate change.

As one of the leaders of the global climate policy, the Russian Federation was the first in the world to advocate for the implementation of a climate experiment on its territory. This experiment runs from 2022 to 2028 on Sakhalin (the entire island complex). This area has become a testing ground for an experiment on the reasons for the presence of a sufficient number of forests, a favorable carbon situation, isolation and low population density. According to the pilot plan, the region plans to achieve

[electronic resource] // Official site of the Government of Russia. URL: <http://static.government.ru/media/files/ADKkCzp3fWO32e2yA0BhtIpyzWfHaiUa.pdf> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²³⁴ Ibid.

full carbon neutrality by 2025 through strict quotas for greenhouse emissions and penalties for exceeding them. It is on Sakhalin that an innovative technology for capturing and sequestering carbon dioxide is used. For this purpose, the technology of creating so-called "carbon farms" is used, in other words, forest plantations or other plantings that pump atmospheric carbon into the soil or wood²³⁵.

To implement the experiment, hundreds of solar panels were built, and automobile transport began to be converted to gas-powered fuel. Within the framework of environmental activities, the practice of separate garbage collection was initiated. More than 90% of illegal landfills have been eliminated. This project is being implemented with the direct participation of both the state and local businesses. In many respects, it is a reference climate project for the whole world, since its monitoring, and verifiability of indicators are provided at the highest technological level and have already been presented to the world community. Rosatom is responsible for verification: "Verification is the verification of a statement on greenhouse gases for the correctness of information and compliance with the GHG program standards. It is conducted by a body that has passed state accreditation. Such a body was created in Rosatom on the basis of JSCRusatom Infrastructure Solutions²³⁶.

At the same time, the discussion of the Sakhalin experiment in Russia does not have only unambiguously positive conclusions. The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs was criticized, saying that until the positive effects of the experiment on Sakhalin are proven, other regions should not be connected to it. In addition, the Sakhalin project has caused widespread criticism from unfriendly countries under the influence of current geopolitical circumstances. Nevertheless, the Sakhalin initiative remains one of the most advanced climate solutions adopted by

²³⁵ *Skokov R., Guzenko M.* Sakhalin experiment to achieve carbon neutrality [text] // Energy policy. 2023. Vol. 80. No. 2. P. 86–99. (in Russian)

²³⁶ «ROSATOM and Sakhalin implement projects of carbon footprint reporting verification [electronic resource] // Energy RU. URL: <https://www.eprussia.ru/news/base/2023/7854611.htm> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

States and parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and implemented within the framework of the climate concept of these documents.

The final stage in the development of a new regulatory system for regulating climate threats in the context of geopolitical turbulence was the adoption of a new version of the Climate Doctrine in Russia. The climate doctrine of the Russian Federation was approved by presidential decree on October 26, 2023. According to the definition: "The climate doctrine is a political and legal document on the basis of which the climate policy of the Russian Federation is developed and implemented. Like other state doctrines, it serves for long-term planning and coordination of actions, as well as declares the position of the country's leadership in this area." As most experts note, the text of the 2023 climate doctrine largely reproduces the 2009 version of this document. This similarity demonstrates the continuity of climate values and norms in Russia adopted at the level of the UN and international organizations. The climate doctrine of the Russian Federation follows the ideas laid down in the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement and is a document that summarizes the principles that the world community shares regarding the problem of climate change. It should be noted that this document was adopted in conditions of maximum aggravation of the international situation, and therefore it reflects the idea of respecting the national interests of the country: "The key long-term goal of climate policy is to achieve a balance between anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions and their absorption, taking into account national interests and priorities of socio-economic development, no later than 2060²³⁷."

Russia's climate doctrine aims to achieve carbon neutrality across the country by 2060. The doctrine encourages companies to reduce direct carbon dioxide emissions and creates conditions for working in the field of greenhouse gas neutralization. Moreover, the new Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation was

²³⁷ Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 812 of 26.10.2023 [electronic resource] // Official Internet portal of legal information. URL: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202310260009> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

created taking into account the geographical features of the country. In addition, this document notes, that human activities have a negative impact on climate change, this thesis has become part of its scientific justification. Although scientists note, that achieving carbon neutrality is only an intermediate goal in the fight against global warming. On the other hand, Igor Makarov noted that according to the doctrine, Russia is outside the system of "European cross-border carbon regulation"²³⁸, since it decides to independently assess and draw conclusions about the ongoing and expected consequences of climate change. The Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation is a political document that contains specific measures to combat climate change. This document primarily defines the institutional design of climate policy in our country. Its provisions are both binding and operational guidelines for the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and large corporations.

Russia's climate policy in the era of geopolitical turbulence is characterized by the formation of an updated regulatory field, the task of which is to reduce the amount of harmful emissions into the atmosphere. This regulatory framework will determine the further development of policies in the field of combating the negative effects of climate change. We are talking, first of all, about global warming. Pointing to the role of anthropogenic factors in climate issues, Russian laws also address the environmental problem of clean air as a necessary resource for the normal life of citizens. In this section of the dissertation, we did not set out to analyze in detail all the regulatory acts adopted for the period from 2014 to 2023. First of all, we identified a trend that characterizes the regulatory side of climate policy. Indeed, there are a lot of laws, decrees and resolutions that, affect climate issues in one way or another during the period under review²³⁹. Climate issues have become an important part of Russia's regulatory framework, and they are found in both tax

²³⁸ *Cherkasova M.* Doubts about the effectiveness of the Russian Climate Doctrine [electronic resource] // Lenta RU. URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2023/10/30/v-effektivnosti-rossiyskoy-klimaticheskoy-doktriny-usomnilis/> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

²³⁹ For ex.: Modern legal vectors of climate policy development: the experience of Russia and foreign countries [text] / M. A. Egorov (ed.). Moscow: Prospect, 2023. 456 p. (in Russian)

legislation and energy strategy. This allows us to conclude that rule-making in Russia is focused on the formation of a "green future".

Among the important climate documents adopted in 2023 regulating climate standards in Russia, it is necessary to mention GOST and PNST. GOST R 71115-2023 is a system of standards for the implementation of climate projects. It regulates the methodology for quantifying emissions of greenhouse gas leaks associated with the extraction and transportation of fossil fuels. PNST 900-2023 is a system of standards for the implementation of climate projects. It also offers a methodology for projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by using associated petroleum gas from oil wells as a feedstock instead of flaring (or dispersing).

In this section of the dissertation, we analyzed documents that allow us to judge the emerging trends. In fact, we are talking about what can be described by the term "green fracture". We are referring to the tendency to change the logic of decision-making in the whole sector of fundamentally important industries, and we are talking about a change in thinking at the level of legislative activity, which in most cases develops norms taking into account the climate agenda. The changes also apply to the activities of enterprises that receive benefits subject to compliance with the "green requirements". This trend is the result of numerous efforts by Russian scientists and diplomats who have worked at both the IPCC and the Conference of the Parties on Climate Change.

In modern Russia, public opinion on climate change has been formed. The mass media cover the activities of legislative bodies, often criticizing, but bringing constructive ideas to the field of rule-making. There is an expert community of scientists from various disciplines studying the physical, atmospheric and social aspects of climate change. The expert community in Russia works closely with the legislative authorities. In May 2022, the State Duma of the Russian Federation established an Interfactional Working Group on legal support for the introduction of

the "green" economy as one of the areas of sustainable development²⁴⁰. All of this makes up the national level of climate policy in the Russian Federation.

2.3. Climate policy transformation Scenarios in the Russian Federation

Russia's efforts to design and implement policies aimed at controlling global climate change cannot be implemented in isolation. As we can see, working under long-term sanctions has not thrown Russia out of the global discussion of climate issues. The Russian Federation is still one of its main participants, setting the direction and pace. But the politicization of the climate issue (as one of its most important characteristics), the manifestations of hostility, the negative attitude against individual participants in the discussion, which is caused by external political aspects, and not by specific issues of climate and its changes – through all this, an attempt has recently been made to put pressure on Russia. Being open to discussing climate issues and their consequences at the international level, creating within its own borders a multitude of policies to reduce the negative impact in this area, and implementing programs aimed at achieving the goals set at the global level for individual states, for example, efforts to meet the planned decarbonization targets—despite all this, the Russian Federation is constantly they are accused of unwillingness to improve the climate situation, in mercantile interests, and its success in this area is often ignored or devalued. This happens both at the level of political dialogue and at the level of public discussion: not only by journalists, but often also by experts in the field of climate and climate policy, when Russia is blamed formal accession to the Paris Agreement, when an external expert assesses Russian domestic policy in the categories "decarbonisation is not on the agenda", "skepticism about the

²⁴⁰ Joint meeting on climate issues of scientists, politicians and officials (postrelease) [electronic resource] // Russian Academy of Sciences. URL: <https://www.ras.ru/news/shownews.aspx?id=1c9cbbe1-8803-49ce-8937-c9bf56e50d42> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

problem of global climate change", "Russian legislation diligently ignores the trend towards decarbonisation", is accused of the lack of correct terms in legal acts, increasing exports of coal and oil. They also offer "efficient" energy use models that require urgent implementation²⁴¹. Such rhetoric is repeated in many texts, they are published on authoritative resources, become part of official statements of politicians, and it is in Russia that gas is clearly defined as a fossil fuel²⁴², and, for example, in Europe or at the UN level, gas can be nominated as a transitional or even green energy²⁴³ resource.

In such a situation, it is important to find new points of support at the international level, and for this Russia needs to update the climate issue through various interstate associations, not limited to UN initiatives. This will make it possible to strengthen our own climate policy, coordinate efforts at the supranational level, and solve climate problems against the backdrop of complicated relations with Western countries. In the conditions that developed in the second half of the 2010s and the first half of the 2020s, the promotion of interests in discussing the consequences of anthropogenic impact on the climate looks promising through interstate associations, which have long been present in the concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation as platforms for increasing interaction with partners²⁴⁴. First of all, we are talking about BRICS+, the SCO and the EAEU. This will allow us not to clash with the UN, but on the contrary, to ensure collective leadership,

²⁴¹ *Mitrova M.* The Geopolitics of Decarbonization: The Russian Case [electronic resource] // The Wilson Center. URL: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/geopolitics-decarbonization-russian-case> (accessed 15.06.2024).

²⁴² Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2035: Resolution of the Government of the Russian № 1523-r of 09.07.2020 [electronic resource] // Official site of the Government of Russia. URL: <http://static.government.ru/media/files/w4sigFOiDjGVDYT4IgsApssm6mZRb7wx.pdf> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁴³ *Prokopchuk Ye. E.* Climate vs justice [text] // Russia in Global Affairs. 2024. Vol. 22. No. 1. P. 196–212. (in Russian).

²⁴⁴ Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 640 of 30.11.2016 [electronic resource] // Official site of the President of Russia. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201612010045.pdf> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

representation in geographical and civilizational relations²⁴⁵, to develop a dialogue on climate issues, and to move faster and more effectively towards their solution. The nature and scale of these organizations, their value to Russia, and its status in them – these characteristics become incentives for analyzing their significance in Russian climate policy. But the main impetus for increasing attention to the climate issue is that its discussion here is based on the principles of integration and partnership, which is very important for Russia in the current situation. The analysis will help assess the prospects for the transformation of climate policy in the Russian Federation.

Cooperation in identifying climate change, dealing with its consequences, and reducing their own impact on the overall climate picture – all these issues have long been on the agenda of these organizations, and the intensity of their discussion and concrete actions carried out as a result has recently increased. Already in 2014, which is the starting point of our research, BRICS, SCO, and EAEU addressed the topic of climate change. However, at that time, climate was not yet a self-sufficient and central topic of discussion. Climate was discussed in the context of other issues, usually fitting it into the general context of ecology. The use of the term "climate" at that time was more likely to be used figuratively when referring, for example, to the investment climate, business climate, or tax²⁴⁶ climate. Then the climate is fixed as one of the "conditions" in which urgent issues are placed, around which one of these organizations is currently building its activities. At this stage, the differences between the SCO, EAEU and BRICS+ on the issue of addressing the climate are beginning to appear. If the Shanghai Cooperation Organization begins to address the issue of climate change in the second half of the 2010s, the Eurasian Economic Union has long considered climate as such as a condition for the economic activity of its

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

²⁴⁶ Main directions of economic development of EAEU: The order of the Eurasian economic council № 28 r of 16.10.2015 [electronic resource] // The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/upload/medialibrary/59e/Reshenie-_28-ONER.pdf (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

members. If the SCO can already talk about the relationship of sustainable transport with energy and climate change in 2016²⁴⁷, then the issue of climate in the context of the EAEU is ignored during this period, and a little later appears as part of the geography of the Eurasian economic system²⁴⁸. The EAEU came up late to the idea of climate change, and for a long time focused on the uniqueness of the climate of its members, when the conditions are not climate change, but itself. BRICS, on the other hand, addressed the topic of climate change long before the SCO and the EAEU showed any attention to it. For example, back in the spring of 2012, during the BRICS summit, the fourth annual scientific forum of BRICS expert centers "Partnership for Stability, Security and Development" was held, where climate change was one of the central issues of discussion.

The next stage in the dynamics of the climate theme in the work of the SCO, EAEU and BRICS was a surge in its popularity, which can be chronologically attributed to the 2020s. The topic has become self-sufficient and, most importantly, a central feature of describing the development prospects of the SCO, EAEU and BRICS member states. These organizations began not only to address the topic of climate change or constantly articulate it when discussing other issues, but also to integrate it into policy documents, that is, this topic somehow began to be integrated into the very basis of the activities of these international associations. An important role in this process has been played by the current deterioration of both the international political situation and specific, often regional, factors related to climate change. The rapidly changing interaction in this area needs to be rethought. It is important to analyze not only the current situation, but also its prospects, how the

²⁴⁷ SCO Secretary-General to attend the UN Global Sustainable Transport Conference [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectsko.org/20161124/160154.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁴⁸ Report: the geography of the Eurasian Economic Union: from challenges to opportunities [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/17984/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

current situation affects the future of climate policy and determines the role of Russia in its successful implementation.

It is possible to consider scenarios for the future of Russian climate policy, which is built through the activation of relations in the SCO, BRICS+ and the EAEU – since the problem of climate change cannot be solved only within the borders of one state. To do this, it is necessary to identify the circumstances that set its direction, analyze their impact today, and also assess the probability of a change in course in the future or stable development according to a given trajectory. The specifics of the presence of the climate theme in the work of these organizations are of paramount importance in this situation, and they will allow us to assess the future prospects.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization initially publicly emphasized its integration into the global system of combating climate change. This can be seen in the mid-2010s, when the topic of climate was not yet independent and popular, and the SCO's rare references to it were immersed in the general context of building global relations, especially with the UN. In 2014, the SCO addressed the environmental catastrophe of the Aral Sea, but as one of many participants in the discussion, including the UN, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and OPEC²⁴⁹. The change of SCO Secretaries-General did not change the situation – the topic of climate change was voiced in the context of UN efforts, in the framework of the Kyoto and Paris Agreements, including at high-level meetings, which made it possible to emphasize "readiness to fully complement the efforts of the UN²⁵⁰."

Now the Shanghai Cooperation Organization does not just declare the importance of paying attention to climate, but also builds its activities around this

²⁴⁹ The SCO delegation took part in the international conference on the Aral Sea region problems [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectSCO.org/20141029/9652.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁵⁰ SCO, UN Secretary-Generals held a meeting [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectSCO.org/20190929/582976.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

issue. One of the latest events is a meeting of senior officials of the authorities responsible for environmental issues, held in Astana in the spring of 2024. Russia was represented by Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and Ecology Sergey Anoprienko, who finally approved for Russia the common approaches to solving environmental problems for SCO members, the corresponding plan according to which they should be implemented, as well as the plan of joint actions within the SCO. All this is for the next 2-3–years. The future actions of Russia as a member of the SCO are based on the idea of regional projects, as well as the large-scale joint program "SCO Green Belt"²⁵¹.

The regional approach is the main model around which the SCO's influence on climate policy was initially built. The SCO speaks about the literal consequences of climate problems that are observed in the territories of its members. This model allows you to implement specific programs in a limited space, while those that affect several States at the same time. However, the SCO as an organization emphasizes involvement in global climate policy, doing so through close cooperation with the UN. This concept of close cooperation with the UN as a tool for implementing climate policy has recently become more complicated, as the political situation in the international arena leads to some contradictions in the official position of the SCO and its members, as well as other international organizations and States. The SCO is linked to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and discusses, together with its senior officials, its own response to climate change. The Memorandum of Understanding became the basis for "attracting the expertise of UNEP to the work of the SCO"²⁵², it was signed in 2024 in Kenya. The SCO

²⁵¹ Representatives of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation took part in the fifth meeting of the heads of SCO environmental ministries and agencies [electronic resource] // Official site of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. URL: [https://www.mnr.gov.ru/press/news/predstaviteli_minprirody_rossii_prinyali_uchastie_v_pyatom_prirodookhrannom_soveshchanii_gosudarstv_/](https://www.mnr.gov.ru/press/news/predstaviteli_minprirody_rossii_prinyali_uchastie_v_pyatom_prirodookhrannom_soveshchanii_gosudarstv/) (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁵² SCO and the UN Environment Programme signed a memorandum of understanding [electronic resource] // Official site of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian

emphasizes its desire to attract "the attention of the international community, represented by the UN, in particular, UNEP, to the problems of ecology and environmental protection in the SCO space. The SCO expects to be heard, supported and develop cooperation, and is ready to make a greater contribution to the global response to challenges related to the environment and climate²⁵³ change." At the same time, joint events of the SCO states are characterized by discussing the complex transformation of the world and its multipolarity, that is, the desire to emphasize the legitimacy of their own definition of directions, including climate policy, priorities that can be set within its framework in the SCO territory, as well as their own assessment. In this situation, the SCO does not seek to cut ties with the UN; rather, it seeks to assert greater independence and the importance of its own regional problems. As the heads of delegations stated at the 2023 meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the SCO member States: "the profound and large-scale changes taking place in the world have accelerated the formation of a more just and multipolar world order with the central coordinating role of the UN²⁵⁴." Work in the SCO on climate change issues is accelerating, special bodies are emerging, and a document is being developed approving the special working group of SCO member States on climate change²⁵⁵.

Regionality helps the participating countries to promote their interests. At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the SCO member States in 2024, the

Federation. URL: https://mnr.gov.ru/press/news/shos_i_programma_oon_po_okruzhayushchey_srede_podpisali_memorandum_o_vzaimoponimanii/ (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁵³ Special SCO-UNEP event and other activities in Nairobi [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectSCO.org/20240301/1286102.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁵⁴ Joint communique following the 22nd meeting of the Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectSCO.org/20231026/SOVMESTNOE-KOMMYuNIKE-poitogam-dvadsat-vtorogo-zasedaniya-Soveta-glav-pravitelstv-962639.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁵⁵ Press release on the Fifth Meeting of the Heads of SCO Environmental Ministries and Agencies [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectSCO.org/20240522/1358443.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

Kyrgyz Republic focused on climate change, the problems that follow (from melting glaciers to desertification), in the context of its own interests to change the situation of water scarcity: "We call on the parties to mutually beneficial investment cooperation in the hydroelectric complex and development renewable energy sources in general"²⁵⁶. Energy and the corresponding economic sphere are one of the main topics of discussion on the climate agenda. For Russian politics, all this has become a common topic not only in the context of the work of SCO bodies, but also in domestic politics. The SCO climate agenda is interwoven with the work of senior officials, ministries and other authorities, it is not only about the Ministry of Natural Resources and ecology²⁵⁷, that is, the SCO climate agenda has become a daily issue for Russian State Administration.

The interplay of climate change and energy markets, as well as production, is of interest not only to the SCO, but also to the EAEU. The EAEU was initially built as an association created for economic integration. The topic of climate change, which appeared in its activities, was and remains tied, first of all, to economic issues. The EAEU also seeks to denote its independence from the dominant organizations in the international arena. In 2023, the Eurasian Economic Union member states adopted their own criteria for green projects, which allow them to be independent in their assessments²⁵⁸. At the same time, the EAEU project is based not on the climate issue as such, but on the functioning of the common financial market and ensuring non-discriminatory access to it. The EEU quickly brought the climate issue into its

²⁵⁶ Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic J. M. Kulubaev at the meeting of the SCO Foreign Ministers Council meeting [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectesco.org/20240523/1373472.html> (accessed 25.05.2024). (in Russian)

²⁵⁷ Activities [electronic resource] // Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/events/seminar_klimaticheskaya_povestka_shos_v_sovremennyyh_usloviyah.html (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁵⁸ Criteria for green projects of the Eurasian Economic Union countries (model taxonomy) [electronic resource] // The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/upload/medialibrary/df7/Kriterii-dlya-opublikovaniya-_Modelnaya-taksonomiya_.pdf (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

activities, given that it has long talked only about the investment climate, leaving climate change topics on the agenda of other international organizations. However, the current situation in world politics, the impact of new opportunities and threats on the economy has led to active actions in the field of climate policy. In 2021, a high-level Working Group was established to develop proposals for convergence of positions on the climate agenda²⁵⁹, and a little later, the EAEU formulated the position of its members on the global climate agenda in the general context of joint actions²⁶⁰. Since that time, the coordination of concrete actions in this direction has begun, first of all we are talking about the "First package of measures (Roadmap) on cooperation of the EAEU member states in the framework of the climate agenda". These actions were taken to prevent the appearance of barriers and restrictions on the domestic market and to preserve the competitiveness of the EAEU economies²⁶¹. The EAEU officially announced seven areas of work, including the development of a common approach to legislative regulation in the climate sphere, joint carbon regulation mechanisms (according to the Paris Agreement), transformation of transport, energy, metallurgy, chemical industry, construction, and agriculture for greater energy conservation, creation of its own Eurasian low-carbon development initiatives, financing of green projects, and the formation of a unified energy system. The Bank for Climate Technologies and Digital Initiatives, as well as cooperation to promote the interests of the EAEU members, primarily in the field of international

²⁵⁹ High-level Working Group (HLWG) on proposals for convergence between EAEU member states within the framework of the climate agenda: The order of the Eurasian economic council № 150 of 28.09.2021 [electronic resource] // The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). URL: https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/01430200/err_30092021_150 (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁶⁰ Statement on economic cooperation of the EAEU member states within the climate agenda [electronic resource] // The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/upload/medialibrary/ec0/Zayavlenie-ramka-.pdf> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁶¹ EAEU Climate Agenda [electronic resource] // The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/comission/department/dotp/klimaticheskaya-povestka/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

trade relations. The EAEU is trying to see the climate agenda not as an instrument that restricts economic development, but rather as one that accelerates it²⁶².

As we can see, the EAEU's work in this area is based on the same principle of regionalism as in the SCO framework. On the other hand, while recognizing the absolute importance of international climate policy institutions, including the Paris Agreement, the EAEU does not emphasize public relations with the UN, as the SCO does. The EAEU highlights its economic orientation and tries to develop its own programs for both changes and evaluation. But both the SCO and the EAEU actually recognize the absolute importance of developing the UN climate change issue, suggesting that the goals set at the global level should be implemented taking into account regional specifics. The SCO only more clearly articulates its embeddedness in this global model in the information space.

BRICS (and today it's already BRICS+) Just like the SCO and the EAEU, it emphasizes the shift in the modern world from West to East, that is, a global multipolar world order in which there is a climate context. In the modern world, the BRICS+ Group is understood as a new consensus that makes it possible to build protection against global threats, among which the "climate collapse" is on a par with international terrorism, transnational organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction²⁶³. For Russia, as for other countries, BRICS+ is an opportunity to implement alternative projects, including decarbonization, which is at the center of efforts of both the SCO and the EAEU. The transition to a low-carbon economy makes it possible to fit the economies of the member countries of these associations into global climate impact goals, and relying on the SCO, BRICS+ and the EAEU – to take into account national interests and development priorities, as the Russian Federation also states in its climate doctrine 2023, where it sets goals for the

²⁶² *Myasnikovich M. V., Kovalev V. S.* New pages of integration in the Eurasian Economic Union [text] // *Russia in Global Affairs*. 2023. Vol. 21. No. 2. P. 207–218. (in Russian)

²⁶³ Results of the 38th Meeting of the Eurasian Online NRU HSE Seminar [electronic resource] // *Russia in Global Affairs*. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/brics-i-mirovoj-poryadok/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

second half of this century²⁶⁴. The climate agenda is becoming central to BRICS+. Climate issues became one of the main points of the joint statement made by the BRICS+ Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations at the meeting 10 on June 10, 2024 in Nizhny Novgorod²⁶⁵.

Experts now recognize scientific support for BRICS+ initiatives in the field of climate policy, which is seen as a catalyst for trade-offs and "second breaths" for the international climate regime, and the BRICS+ review of "the impact of anthropogenic and natural factors on global warming allows us to change the approach to assessing the impact of individual countries on global warming"²⁶⁶.

Similar models of addressing the climate issue lead to the convergence of the SCO, the EAEU and BRICS (and later BRICS+) in this area. Russia, as a member, not only takes part in this process, but often becomes a platform for discussing joint actions. At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum 2023, one of the sessions was devoted to the common goals of the SCO, EAEU and BRICS climate agenda. They discussed the prospects of carbon regulation on a global scale, the contribution of the EAEU, SCO and BRICS members to it. Consideration of this

²⁶⁴ Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 812 of 26.10.2023 [electronic resource] // Official Internet portal of legal information. URL: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202310260009> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian).

²⁶⁵ Joint Statement of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations [electronic resource] // Website of the Russian Federation's Chairmanship of BRICS in 2024. URL: <https://brics-russia2024.content.rcmedia.ru/upload/docs/2024-06-10->

https://brics-russia2024.content.rcmedia.ru/upload/docs/2024-06-10-%D0%A1%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5_%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%8F%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%9C%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80_%D0%B2_%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BB-

https://brics-russia2024.content.rcmedia.ru/upload/docs/2024-06-10-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85_%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%20%D0%91%D0%A0%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%A1-

https://brics-russia2024.content.rcmedia.ru/upload/docs/2024-06-10-%D0%9D%D0%B8%D0%B6%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4_%D0%A0%D0%A4_2.pdf (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁶⁶ Prokopchuk Ye. E. BRICS+ can give a second chance to the international climate regime [electronic resource] // Russia in Global Affairs. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/briks-vtoroe-dyhanie/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

topic moves in the direction of planning favorable conditions for members of associations, analyzing the impact of necessary measures on the economy, not only at the national level, but also at the international level. Such platforms allow us to talk about transformations taking into account the climate and economic priorities of states, and raise the issue of a fair price for carbon²⁶⁷. Climate problems and changes are already embedded in international politics and economics, the future and its planning, and are closely intertwined with low – carbon development – present on the agenda of the EAEU, SCO and BRICS+ in full accordance with the main ideas, areas of work and indicators that have been established at the global level. In other words, the climate agenda of these organizations is now fully aligned with the Paris Agreement, but it also essentially reflects the need to take into account regional specifics: "the trend is to create and develop regional partnerships and coalitions, taking into account objective regional features of the development of the climate agenda and different levels of climate ambitions of countries and regions"²⁶⁸.

The climate issue cannot be resolved within the national borders, but cooperation at the international level is necessary. Russia is a central element of global institutions for climate policy transformation. It constantly interacts with the UN and its subordinate organizations, participates in the development of plans, their discussion and approval. But for their implementation, Russia needs to be supported by partners at the global level, which will allow it to successfully move in the direction of reducing the negative impact on the climate while reducing the negative consequences of the necessary changes for itself. In the current conditions of tension in the international arena, including prolonged illegitimate sanctions, it is important

²⁶⁷ Climate agenda of the EAEU, SCO, and BRICS: partnership for sustainable development [electronic resource] // St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). URL: <https://forumspb.com/programme/business-programme/131468/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

²⁶⁸ *Turanova M.* Carbon neutrality of the EAEU and the SCO: barrier or opportunity for development? [electronic resource] // Roscongress. URL: <https://roscongress.org/materials/uglerodnaya-neytralnost-eaes-i-shos-barer-ili-vozmozhnost-dlya-razvitiya/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

for Russia to promote the national climate policy directions together with partners who are open to dialogue and interaction. The most successful option is to update the topic of climate in those relationships that have existed for a long time, and where there are prospects for successful cooperation and implementation of current and future projects for Russia. An analysis of the activities of the SCO, BRICS+ and the EAEU has shown that their specific initiatives fit into a single model, when mutual support in achieving the established goals of climate policy comes to the fore: joint consideration of regional conditions, the softest possible transition to a new production model, respect for national characteristics that are of paramount importance in the context of climate, cooperation as part of efforts to adapt to climate change. This model is consistent with the general model of Russia's already implemented climate policy, which can be observed not only in its activities in the SCO, EAEU and BRICS, but also at the national level, for example, when emphasizing the uniqueness of Russian risks arising from climate, change in program documents²⁶⁹.

The future of climate policy in the Russian Federation inevitably includes the SCO, BRICS+ and the EAEU, including in the short term, even the daily work of relevant departments is focused on the topic of climate and cooperation with these organizations. For example, the public Council under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology of the Russian Federation has scheduled for September 2024 to consider the participation of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment in the work of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. BRICS+ and SCO on Climate regulation and assessment of ecosystem

²⁶⁹ Strategy of socio-economic development of the Russian Federation with low greenhouse gas emissions until 2050: Resolution of the Government of the Russian № 3052-r of 29.10.2021 [electronic resource] // Official site of the Government of Russia. URL: <http://static.government.ru/media/files/ADKkCzp3fWO32e2yA0BhtIpyzWfHaiUa.pdf> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

services²⁷⁰. Other authorities have also included the topic of Russia's relations with the SCO, BRICS+ and the EAEU in their work when building climate policies. The main question that appears in this situation is: on whom is it preferable for Russia to bet? And how can this affect the transformation of climate policy in the Russian Federation? After the analysis, it can be concluded that drastic changes in the general direction of the Russian climate policy are not expected in the near future. Russia acts in this area in accordance with the Paris Agreement, has developed and implemented an internal transformation policy, and most importantly, has full-fledged programs that determine the future of transformation to reduce the impact on the climate and to protect against current and future threats. It is now moving closer to partner international organizations that are actively developing prospects for action to manage the effects of climate change. Partnership and coordination of interests here allows us to solve the problem of sanctions and aggravation of relations at the international level. At the same time, for Russia, the SCO, BRICS+, and EAEU, within the framework of the climate agenda, currently do not have fundamental differences. Planning for future changes in the climate sphere here is built around the economy, regionalism and interests of their members. At the same time, this allows Russia to create a common foreign policy model of interaction, take advantage of the large coverage of its territory and population, correlate domestic and foreign climate policies, reduce the negative consequences of political clashes with Western countries, while specializing in the directions of actions of these organizations and not entering into conflict with the main international institutions that currently determine the global climate mark. The existing closeness of attitudes to climate

²⁷⁰ Activity Plan of the Public Council with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation for 2024: Resolution of the Government of the Russian № 68/1-pl of 23.01.2024 [electronic resource] // Official site of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.mnr.gov.ru/upload/iblock/40f/uoyjfrnx00truggc7lsy613ve11tapk7/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%20%E2%84%96%2068_1-%D0%BF%D0%BB%20%D0%BE%D1%82%2023.01.2024.PDF (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

issues makes it impossible to consolidate individual scenarios for the development of Russian climate policy when working with each of the organizations we are considering. Now it is rather a single scenario of movement in the direction already outlined by the Russian authorities.

The Eurasian Economic Union, BRICS+, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization act as like-minded partners of Russia in shaping a new architecture of international relations²⁷¹. This leads to the prospect of further strengthening cooperation with them on climate issues, since this topic is politicized in the international arena, accompanied by threats of political pressure and overestimation of Russian indicators on the level of climate impact and achievements in this area. Rapprochement with these organizations will make it possible not to depend on individual political forces, but to define their own language for discussing the climate in the field of politics and institutions for assessing the success of the tasks set for national states, and for Russia in particular. Thus, the transformation of the Russian climate policy in the near future will go in the direction already defined at the moment. And now the stage of its large-scale conceptualization is underway, including within the framework of BRICS+, SCO, and EAEU.

²⁷¹ Speech by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a meeting with the staff of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow, 03/25/2016 [electronic resource] // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1524970/ (accessed 06/15/2024).

Conclusion

In this paper, we have considered the climate policy of the Russian Federation implemented in conditions of geopolitical instability. We have been counting down since 2014 – when the first large-scale illegitimate sanctions against Russia were introduced. Since that time, the solution of a number of global tasks by members of the international community, collectively known as the "Sustainable Development Goals", has become significantly more complicated. Among them, the most important goal was to eliminate the negative consequences of climate change. Its achievement is possible only on the basis of consensus among the world powers – the main actors in global politics, as well as with the direct participation of supranational organizations.

It is climate change that has created the need for a global policy—a policy aimed at solving the problems of global development of the world. In this regard, climate policy has a dual character: on the one hand, it is part of global policy, and on the other, it is part of national policy. This point of view was followed in the presented dissertation research. We reviewed Russia's climate policy in the context of its relationship with global processes. It was important for us to follow not only the formation of institutions and structures that regulate the climate agenda, but also the genesis of the theories and doctrines that underlie the institutions.

In this dissertation, we corrected the definition of climate policy. It is worth repeating the thesis stated at the beginning of the work that the author of the dissertation defines climate policy as political practices for regulating the entire complex of problems that are somehow included in the climate agenda. Since climate as a phenomenon is total, it is closely related to the loyalties that divide people into opposite groups. At the same time, each of these groups offers its own institutional format for regulating climate issues formulated at the UN level. In addition, we believe that climate policy is an independent branch of political knowledge.

As shown by the materials of the study, and we analyzed the data of key expert centers specializing in climate policy, global politics today is largely reduced to discussing the climate future. The problem of this future is both part of the global and part of the national, which, in our opinion, allows us to insist on the view that climate policy is an independent discipline. Such a branch of knowledge is still in the process of being formed, and the relationship between climate and political needs to be rethought and the boundaries of their interaction determined. Understanding climate policy not only as a political practice, but also as a form of knowledge is critical. The reason for this high importance is quite simple: reflection on climate policy forms the climate agenda, that is, public discussion of climate issues, as well as the format of political decisions taken. The fact is that in the framework of our dissertation research, we have identified the features of axiological and ideological commitment to climate solutions at the international level.

Climate policy is a subject for large-scale discussion within a wide variety of disciplines. It is interdisciplinary in nature, but it is based on the political, and that is why it is closest to the political sciences. Moreover, the acuteness of the discussion of key documents on the climate agenda indicates that they are backed by interest groups and lobbyists from various structures. The current discussion of climate change has also come to the attention of ideologues, both on the left and on the right. In fact, each of these doctrines has formulated its own interpretation of the problem of preventing the negative consequences of climate change. As a result, almost all the pros and cons of certain decisions in this area are reduced either to a discussion of interest groups or to ideological determinism.

Russia's climate policy is located in a system of interlinkages built in the world around the climate debate. Disputes about the Anthropocene and the boundaries of sovereignty directly affect decisions made in Moscow. The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement are documents that are not completely external to Russian realities. They were actively discussed by the domestic expert community. Russia is also doing a lot of work at the level of the UN and the Conference of the Parties to discuss and develop solutions on climate. However, at the moment, at the level of international

institutions, an asymmetry of the regulatory field is fixed, which is overloaded with Western values of a liberal nature. At the same time, European conservatives (Alain de Benoit and others) they also speak negatively about the international format of institutions that regulate climate policy.

Russia, despite unprecedented sanctions pressure, remains one of the key actors in international climate policy. Moreover, Russia is a state that raises the question at the UN level about the inadmissibility of political speculation around greenhouse gas emission standards. Here we should also note the position on the inadmissibility of double standards in relation to the formation of norms for a carbon-free future. All this is part of Russia's involvement in global politics, which should determine the format of the near future of the planet Earth. It should also be noted that the Russian expert community, represented by the Russian Academy of Sciences, participates in the development of solutions at the international level to eliminate the negative consequences of climate change.

Adopted on October 26, 2023, the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation is the result of many years of cooperation between Russia and the UN, UNESCO and their affiliated climate structures. The Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation, as amended in 2023, includes among its tasks the formation of "regulatory and economic mechanisms for stimulating emission reduction and increasing uptake". This task is fundamentally new for the Russian doctrine and involves a very specific decision on emissions and removals. This document sets the goal of achieving net emissions by 2030 to 54% of the 1990 level. In addition, the Russian Climate Doctrine stipulates the inadmissibility of "unjustified discrimination in taking measures to combat climate change affecting international trade."

Such theses set the institutional design of Russia's climate policy during the period of geopolitical instability. As before, the theses of the doctrine are aimed at fulfilling Russia's obligations to the world community on CO₂ emissions and absorption. In addition, the "National Action Plan for the Second Stage of Climate Change Adaptation until 2025" adopted in Russia in 2023 includes the national plan itself, but also sectoral and regional plans, and, in addition, the institutional and

methodological basis for planned adaptation. In fact, despite external pressure, Russia has remained in the system of climate plans and commitments as one of the countries most consistently striving to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.

In the same year, 2022, the Russian Federation adopted the law "On conducting an experiment to limit greenhouse gas emissions in certain regions of the Russian Federation". This law on limiting greenhouse gas emissions was applied to the Sakhalin Region as a pilot site. Its validity period was initially determined until 2025, and eventually extended until 2028. The start of the experiment in the context of a special military operation and in close proximity to the borders of unfriendly states, such as the United States and Japan, indicates Russia's unwavering desire to preserve its reputation as a key actor in global climate policy.

Our research, which compared doctrines, concepts, protocols and regulatory documents, showed that climate change marked the beginning of a new stage in the history of international relations. They are based on the idea of cooperation on global changes, but at the same time they are based on a set of contradictions both in the field of the green transition economy and in the field of understanding threats to sovereignty. Drawing the line between climate change and sovereignty is a very broad problem that goes beyond the scope of a PhD thesis. But it is precisely in this thematic gap that the regulatory framework of the Russian Federation in the field of climate policy was formed. First of all, we are talking about the orders of the Russian Government and certain federal laws that have been adopted since 2004, since the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.

Since 2004, the Russian regulatory framework (on climate policy) totals 3 decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, 2 editions of the Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2 sectoral strategies, 9 orders of the Government of the Russian Federation, 6 resolutions of the Government of the Russian Federation, 2 orders of the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation and 1 order of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. Such a picture shows an attempt to find one's own place in the system of solving global climate problems. Many regulatory acts are attempts to find a balance between international

agreements and the tasks of preserving Russia's sovereign interests in industry and trade.

At the same time, reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the context of geopolitical instability in the world has its own characteristics. Russia, which is under enormous sanctions pressure, is also facing pressure in the field of climate policy. For example, since March 2022, the REPowerEU strategy has been implemented in Europe, according to which the European Union should completely abandon energy resources from Russia by 2030. This is just one of the examples when the tasks of solving global problems collide with the foreign policy interests of world powers and come into conflict with them. The Sustainable Development Goals, shifting from the level of global politics to the level of foreign policy, are becoming only part of the sanctions rhetoric.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the climate policy of the Russian Federation in the period from 2014 to 2023 is aimed at achieving the Sustainable Development Goals based on a balance of global and national interests. Russia offers its own format of cooperation on climate change issues within the SCO and BRICS. These initiatives can form the basis for a multi-pronged climate dialogue between Russia, the West, and the global South.

Bibliography

List of references

Normative legal acts and official documents

1. Statement on economic cooperation of the EAEU member states within the climate agenda [electronic resource] // The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/upload/medialibrary/ec0/Zayavlenie-ramka-.pdf> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)
2. Kyoto protocol to the United Nations framework convention on climate change of 11.12.1997 [electronic resource] // UN. URL: https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/kyoto.shtml (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)
3. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 16.09.1987 [electronic resource] // UN. URL: https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/montreal_prot.shtml (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)
4. High-level Working Group (HLWG) on proposals for convergence between EAEU member states within the framework of the climate agenda: The order of the Eurasian economic council № 150 of 28.09.2021 [electronic resource] // The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). URL: https://docs.eaeunion.org/docs/ru-ru/01430200/err_30092021_150 (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)
5. Ratification of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: Federal Law № 34 of 04.11.1994 [text] // CL RF. 1994. № 28. Art. 2927.
6. Limiting greenhouse gas emissions: Federal Law № 296-FZ of 02.07.2021 [electronic resource] // Official Internet portal of legal information. URL: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107020031> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)
7. Main directions of economic development of EAEU: The order of the Eurasian economic council № 28 r of 16.10.2015 [electronic resource] // The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). URL:

https://eec.eaeunion.org/upload/medialibrary/59e/Reshenie-_28-ONER.pdf (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

8. Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 812 of 26.10.2023 [electronic resource] // Official Internet portal of legal information. URL: <http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/document/0001202310260009> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

9. Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation: Decree of the President of the Russian Federation № 640 of 30.11.2016 [electronic resource] // Official site of the President of Russia. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201612010045.pdf> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

10. Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period until 2035: Resolution of the Government of the Russian № 1523-r of 09.07.2020 [electronic resource] // Official site of the Government of Russia. URL: <http://static.government.ru/media/files/w4sigFOiDjGVDYT4IgsApssm6mZRb7wx.pdf> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

11. Passport of scientific speciality 5.5.2. “Political institutions, processes, technologies” [electronic resource] // Official site of Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://vak.minobrnauki.gov.ru/uploader/loader?type=17&name=92259542002&f=15337> (accessed 10.07.2023). (in Russian)

12. Activity Plan of the Public Council with the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation for 2024: Resolution of the Government of the Russian № 68/1-pl of 23.01.2024 [electronic resource] // Official site of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.mnr.gov.ru/upload/iblock/40f/uoyjfrnx00truggc7lsy613ve11tapk7/%D0%9F%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B6%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%20%E2%84%96%2068_1-

%D0%BF%D0%BB%20%D0%BE%D1%82%2023.01.2024.PDF (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

13. About the Climate Centre of Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring: Resolution of the Government of the Russian № 833 of 29.12.2012 [electronic resource] // Official site of the Climate Centre of the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring. URL: <https://cc.voeikovmgo.ru/images/polCC.pdf> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

14. Joint Statement of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations [electronic resource] // Website of the Russian Federation's Chairmanship of BRICS in 2024. URL: [https://brics-](https://brics-russia2024.content.rcmedia.ru/upload/docs/2024-06-10-)

%D0%A1%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B5_%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%8F%D0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5_%D0%9C%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80_%D0%B2_%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85_%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BB-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%B6%D0%B4%D1%83%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85_%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%88%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%20%D0%91%D0%A0%D0%98%D0%9A%D0%A1-%D0%9D%D0%B8%D0%B6%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%9D%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B4_%D0%A0%D0%A4_2.pdf (accessed 15.06.2024) (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

15. Strategy of socio-economic development of the Russian Federation with low greenhouse gas emissions until 2050: Resolution of the Government of the Russian № 3052-r of 29.10.2021 [electronic resource] // Official site of the Government of Russia. URL: <http://static.government.ru/media/files/ADKkCzp3fWO32e2yA0BhtIpyzWfHaiUa.pdf> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

Monographs, articles in periodicals, dissertation research

16. Beck U. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity [text] / U. Beck; translation from German by B. Sedelnik and Sh. Fedorova. Moscow: Progress-Tradition, 2000. 383 p. (in Russian)
17. Belozеров V. K. Passion for water [text] / V. K. Belozеров // Russia in Global Affairs. 2009. No. 3. P. 150–160. (in Russian)
18. Blinov E. N., Savchenko I. A. Bruno Latour against climate skepticism: the mission of a scientist and the crisis of political institutions [text] / E. N. Blinov, I. A. Savchenko // Philosophy Journal. 2019. Vol. 12. No. 4. P. 70–84. (in Russian)
19. Borichpolets K. P. Water and energetic problems in Central Asia and eventual ways of the solution [text] / K. P. Borichpolets // MGIMO Review of International Relations. 2013. Vol. 30. No. 3. P. 25–38. (in Russian)
20. Veselova D. N. Climate policy in China: the procedural component [text] / D. N. Veselova // Eurasian Integration: Economics, Law, and Politics. 2023. Vol. 17. No. 2. P. 121–131. (in Russian)
21. Veselova D. N. Climate policy of the Russian Federation: legislative and institutional aspects [text] / D. N. Veselova // Scientific journal “Discourse-P”. 2021. Vol. 18. No. 3. P. 96–111. (in Russian)
22. Gao Lei On the Problems and Prospects of China's Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy [text] / Lei Gao // Russian and Chinese Studies. 2022. Vol. 6. No. 3. P. 163–171. (in Russian)
23. Danilov-Danil’yan V. I. Global water crisis and the role of Russia in its solution [text] / V. I. Danilov-Danil’yan // Biosphere. 2009. Vol. 1. No. 1. P. 106–110. (in Russian)
24. de Benoist A. Tomorrow, degrowth! Thinking ecology through to the end [text] / A. de Benoist; translation from French by S. Denisov. Moscow: Institute of Humanities, 2013. 103 p. (in Russian)
25. Demchuk A. L. Environmental conflict management policies: conceptual frameworks and national models [text]: dis. ... doctor of political sciences: 23.00.06 / A. L. Demchuk. Moscow, 2020. 565 p. (in Russian)

26. Efremenko D. Environmental and political discourses. Emergence and evolution [text] / D. Efremenko. Moscow: Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN), 2006. 284 p. (in Russian)
27. Zhuikov V. M. Legal protection of natural resources is an important direction of environmental policies [text] / V. M. Zhuikov // Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law. 2012. No. 1. P. 44–49. (in Russian)
28. Kovalev Yu. Yu. Five years of the Paris agreement: the past, present and future of the global climate treaty [text] / Yu. Yu. Kovalev // History and Modern Perspectives. 2021. Vol. 3. No. 1. P. 20–29. (in Russian)
29. Kosov G. V., Harlamova J. A., Nefedov S. A. Ecopolitology: political science in the context of environmental issues [text] / G. V. Kosov, etc. Moscow: A-PRIOR, 2006. 320 p. (in Russian)
30. Kostin A. I. State and countering global challenges [text] / A. I. Kostin // Journal Moscow University Bulletin. Series 12. Political Science. 2017. No. 3. P. 94–97. (in Russian)
31. Latour B. Politics of nature: how to bring the sciences into democracy [text] / B. Latour; translation from French by E. Blinov. Moscow: Ad Marginem Press, 2018. 336 p. (in Russian)
32. Chu L., Ma L. Stages of the development of Chinese “Green Silk Road” [text] / L. Chu, L. Ma // Society: Politics, Economics, Law. 2022. No. 3. P. 13–14. (in Russian)
33. Likhacheva A. EU – Russia Relations Regarding Water Resources in Central Asia [text] / A. Likhacheva // International Organisations Research Journal. 2014. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 47–67. (in Russian)
34. Makarov I. A. Russia and global environmental problems [text] / I. A. Makarov // New international relations: main trends and challenges for Russia / ed. by A. V. Lukin. Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 2018. P. 211–235. (in Russian)

35. Makarov I. A., Shuranova A. A. Climate Change as a New Factor of International Relations [text] / I. A. Makarov, A. A. Shuranova // Journal of International Analytics. 2023. Vol. 14. No. 4. P. 52–74. (in Russian)
36. Matveeva E. V. Environmental problems in the policy of modern states: theory and practice [text] / E. V. Matveeva. Kemerovo: Polygraph, 2010. 181 p. (in Russian)
37. Mitrokhina T. N. About some directions of the impact of environmental public organisations on political processes [text] / T. N. Mitrokhina // Problems of political science and political history: a collection of articles. Saratov: Saratov University Press, 1996. Vol. 6. P. 66–68. (in Russian)
38. Myasnikovich M. V., Kovalev V. S. New pages of integration in the Eurasian Economic Union [text] / M. V. Myasnikovich, V. S. Kovalev // Russia in Global Affairs. 2023. Vol. 21. No. 2. P. 207–218. (in Russian)
39. Nikolaev N. P. Anthropocene – emergency – sovereignty [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // Issues of National and Federative Relations. 2024. Vol. 14. No. 3. P. 827–837. (in Russian)
40. Nikolaev N. P. Issue of the statement of the problem of practical adaptation to the climate change in the conditions of Russia's participation in the global climate agenda [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // Scientific Works of the Free Economic Society of Russia. 2022. Vol. 236. No. 4. P. 427–446. (in Russian)
41. Nikolaev N. P. To the Question of the Problem of Defining the Concept of “Planetarism” as a New Religious Movement Within the Framework of the Internal Ideological Policy of the State [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // Sociopolitical Sciences. 2023. Vol. 13. No. 4. P. 166–172. (in Russian)
42. Nikolaev N. P. Climate policy and human rights [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // Political Science Issues. 2024. Vol. 14. No. 3 (103). P. 863–877. (in Russian)
43. Nikolaev N. P. New World Religion. Experience of comparative reflection on planetarism [text] / N. P. Nikolaev. Moscow: Gorodets, 2023. 472 p. (in Russian)

44. Nikolaev N. P. Political influence of international environmental institutions on legislative activities in Russia: axiological aspect [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // *Political Science Issues*. 2024. Vol. 14. No. 2 (102). P. 592–606. (in Russian)
45. Nikolaev N. P. Orthodox View on the Philosophy of Ecologism [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // *Orthodoxia*. 2022. No. 3. P. 103–124. (in Russian)
46. Nikolaev N. P. Religious phenomenon of planetarism as a challenge to the future of traditional beliefs [text] / N. P. Nikolaev // *Sociology of Religion in Late Modern Society*. 2023. Vol. 1. No. 12. P. 112–131. (in Russian)
47. Nozick R. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* [text] / R. Nozick; translation from English by B. Pinsker. Moscow: IRISEN Press, 2008. 426 p. (in Russian)
48. Ostrom E. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action* [text] / E. Ostrom; translation from English by T. Montyan. Kiev: CUP, 2013. 400 p. (in Russian)
49. Pavlenko V. The Paris Agreement as a threat to national security of Russia [text] / V. Pavlenko // *Astrakhan Bulletin of Ecological Education*. 2017. Vol. 42. No. 4. P. 25–39. (in Russian)
50. Panarin A. S. Global political forecasting in the context of strategic instability [text] / A. S. Panarin. Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1999. 272 p. (in Russian)
51. Prokopchuk Ye. E. Climate vs justice [text] / Ye. E. Prokopchuk // *Russia in Global Affairs*. 2024. Vol. 22. No. 1. P. 196–212. (in Russian)
52. Rastorguev V. N. Ecological Doctrine of Russia [text] / V. N. Rastorguev // *Ecology 21st century*. 2009. Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 64–68. (in Russian)
53. Rogozhina N. G. Environmental policy of developing countries [text] / N. G. Rogozhina. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2015. 336 p. (in Russian)
54. Rothstein B. Political institutions: an overview [text] / B. Rothstein // *A new handbook of political science*; translation from English by M. M. Gurvits, etc. Moscow: Veche, 1999. P. 149–179 (in Russian)

55. Semenova V. G. Ecological component of the political culture of the Russian society [text]: dis. ... candidate of political sciences: 23.00.02 / V. G. Semenova. Saratov, 2004. 172 p. (in Russian)
56. Skvortsov L. V. Beck U. Change the climate, or how to create green modernism? [text] / L. V. Skvortsov // Human Being: Image and Essence. Humanitarian Aspects. 2011. Vol. 22. No. 1 (22). P. 289–298. (in Russian)
57. Skokov R., Guzenko M. Sakhalin experiment to achieve carbon neutrality [text] / R. Skokov, M. Guzenko // Energy policy. 2023. Vol. 80. No. 2. P. 86–99. (in Russian)
58. Smyshlyaev V. A. Ecopolitology (political ecology) [text] / V. A. Smyshlyaev. Voronezh: Scientific Book, 2011. 362 p. (in Russian)
59. Modern legal vectors of climate policy development: the experience of Russia and foreign countries [text] / M. A. Egorov (ed.). Moscow: Prospect, 2023. 456 p. (in Russian)
60. Syvorotkin V. L. Uselessness of the Montreal Protocol to save the earth's ozone layer [text] / V. L. Syvorotkin // Space and time. 2014. Vol. 170. No. 3. P. 256–265. (in Russian)
61. Taleb N. N. The Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable [text] / N. N. Taleb; translation from English by A. Berdichevsky, etc. Moscow: CoLibri, 2021. 736 p. (in Russian)
62. Shilov A. S. Emergence of ecopolitics as a new area of political science [text] / A. S. Shilov. Moscow: Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION RAN), 2004. 135 p. (in Russian)
63. Schmitt C. Dictatorship [text] / C. Schmitt; translation from German by Yu. Yu. Korinets. Moscow: Ripol-classic, 2022. 440 p. (in Russian)
64. Schmitt C. The concept of the Political [text] / C. Schmitt; translation from German by Yu. Yu. Korinets and A. P. Shurbelev edited by A. F. Filippov. St. Petersburg: Science, 2016. 568 p. (in Russian)

65. Shulenina N. V. Some problems of definition of “ecopolitics” [text] / N. V. Shulenina // RUDN journal of political science. 2006. No. 8. P. 51–63. (in Russian)
66. Yanitsky O. N. Russia: ecological challenge (social movements, science, politics) [text] / O. N. Yanitsky. Novosibirsk: Sibirsky Chronograph, 2002. 426 p. (in Russian)
67. Yanitsky O. N. Ecological thinking in the era of the “great redistribution” [text] / O. N. Yanitsky. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 2008. 224 p. (in Russian)
68. Beck U. Climate for Change, or How to Create a Green Modernity? [text] / U. Beck // Theory, Culture & Society. 2010. Vol. 27. No. 2–3. P. 254–266.
69. Biermann F., Kalfagianni A. Planetary justice: A research framework [text] / F. Biermann F., A. Kalfagianni // Earth System Governance. 2020. No. 6. P. 1–11.
70. Broome J. Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World [text] / J. Broome. New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012. 224 p.
71. Caney S. Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change [text] / S. Caney // Leiden Journal of International Law. 2005. Vol. 18. No. 4. P. 747–775.
72. Caney S. Humanity, Associations, and Global Justice [text] / S. Caney // The Monist. 2011. Vol. 94. No. 4. P. 506–534.
73. Caney S. Just Emissions [text] / S. Caney // Philosophy and Public Affairs. 2012. Vol. 40. No. 4. P. 255–300.
74. Carter N., Little C. Party competition on climate policy: The roles of interest groups, ideology and challenger parties in the UK and Ireland [text] / N. Carter, C. Little // International Political Science Review. 2021. Vol. 42. No. 1. P 16–32.
75. Castree N. The Anthropocene and Geography I: The Back Story [text] / N. Castree // Geography Compass. 2014. Vol. 8. No. 7. P 436–449.

76. Crutzen P. J., Stoermer E. F. The Anthropocene [text] / P. J. Crutzen, E. F. Stoermer // Global Change Newsletter. 2000. Vol. 41. P. 17–18.
77. Daily G. Nature's Services: Societal Dependence on Natural Ecosystems [text] / G. Daily // The Future of Nature: Documents of Global Change. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013. P. 454–464.
78. Daily G. C., Ellison K. The New Economy of Nature: The Quest to Make Conservation Profitable [text] / G. C. Daily, K. Ellison. Washington D.C.: Island Press, 2002. 260 p.
79. Dalby S. The geopolitics of climate change [text] / S. Dalby // Political Geography. 2013. Vol. 37. P. 38–47.
80. Feldman D. L., Blokov I. The Politics of Environmental Policy in Russia [text] / D. L. Feldman, I. Blokov. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014. 200 p.
81. Giddens A. The Consequences of Modernity [text] / A. Giddens. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990. 188 p.
82. Gupta J. Climate Change and the Future of International Order [text] / J. Gupta // The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order / H. W. Maull (ed.). Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2018. P 44–63.
83. Hua Zheng, Tong Wu, Zhiyun Ouyang, Polasky S., Ruckelshaus M., Lijuan Wang, Yi Xiao, Xiaolong Gao, Cong Li, Daily G. C. Gross ecosystem product (GEP): Quantifying nature for environmental and economic policy innovation [text] / Zheng Hua [et al.] // Ecological Civilization. 2023. Vol. 52. P. 1952–1967.
84. Jacques P. J., Dunlap R. E., Freeman M. The organisation of denial: Conservative think tanks and environmental scepticism [text] / Jacques P. J. [et al.] // Environmental Politics. 2008. Vol. 17. No. 3. P. 349–385.
85. Jancar-Webster B. Russian Environmental Policy in Transition [text] / B. Jancar-Webster // The Journal of Environment & Development. 1994. Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 107–122.

86. Keohane R. O., Buchanan A. The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions [text] / R. O. Keohane, A. Buchanan // Ethics and International Affairs. 2006. Vol. 20. No. 4. P. 405–437.
87. Labohm H. Climate Scepticism in a Nutshell [text] / H. Labohm // Energy & Environment. 2006. Vol. 17. No. 5. P. 767–776.
88. Lefstad L., Paavola J. The evolution of climate justice claims in global climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC [text] / L. Lefstad, J. Paavola // Critical Policy Studies. 2023. July. P. 1–26.
89. Lieven A. Climate Change and the Nation State: The Case for Nationalism in a Warming World [text] / A. Lieven. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. 240 p.
90. Lieven A. Climate Change and the State: A Case for Environmental Realism [text] / A. Lieven // Survival. Global Politics and Strategy. 2020. Vol. 62. No. 2. P. 7–26.
91. Lumb H. H. Climate, History and the Modern World [text] / H. H. Lumb. London: Routledge, 1996. 464 p.
92. Lynas M. The God Species [text] / M. Lynas. London: Fourth Estate, 2011. 288 p.
93. Malm A. Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming [text] / A. Malm. New York: Verso book, 2016. 496 p.
94. Mann M. The New Climate War: The Fight to Take Back Our Planet [text] / M. Mann. London: Public Affairs, 2021. 272 p.
95. Mann M. The Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars: Dispatches from the Front Lines [text] / M. Mann. Columbia University Press, 2013. 448 p.
96. March J. G., Olsen J. P. Elaborating the New Institutionalism [electronic resource] / J. G. March, J. P. Olsen // ARENA Centre for European Studies. 2005. No. 11. 28 p. URL: <https://cpp.amu.edu.pl/pdf/olsen2.pdf> (accessed 10.05.2024).
97. March J. G., Olsen J. P. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics [text] / J. G. March, J. P. Olsen. New York: Free Press, 1989. 227 p.

98. Martus E. Policymaking and Policy Framing: Russian Environmental Politics under Putin [text] / E. Martus // *Europe-Asia Studies*. 2021. Vol. 73. No. 5. P. 869–889.

99. Meadows D. H., Meadow D. L., Randers J., Behrens III W. W. *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*. [text] / D. H. Meadows [et al.]. New York: Universe Books, 1972. 205 p.

100. Parson E. *Protecting the Ozone Layer: Science and Strategy* [text] / E. Parson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. 400 p.

101. Paterson M. *In Search of Climate Politics* [text] / M. Paterson // *Search of Climate Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. P. 14–29.

102. Porfiriev B. *Environmental Policy in Russia: Economic, Legal, and Organizational Issues* [text] / B. Porfiriev // *Environmental Management*. 1997. Vol. 21. P. 147–157.

103. Stephens J. C. *Energy Democracy: Redistributing Power to the People Through Renewable Transformation* [text] / J. C. Stephens // *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*. 2019. Vol. 61. No. 2. P. 4–13.

104. Torpman O. *Isolationism and the equal per capita view* [text] / O. Torpman // *Environmental Politics*. 2021. Vol. 30. No. 3. P. 357–375.

105. Werrell C. E., Femia F. *Climate Change, the Erosion of State Sovereignty, and World Order* [text] / C. E. Werrell, F. Femia // *Brown Journal of World Affairs*. 2016. Vol. 22. No. 2. P. 221–235.

Publications on websites of public authorities, analytical, reference, statistical, reporting and news information

106. Relevance of the concept [electronic resource] // Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/departments/d31/koncepciya_gos_regulirovaniya_cifrovyyh_platform_i_ekosistem/aktualnost_koncepcii/ (accessed 10.10.2023). (in Russian)

107. Bepalov A. *How climate change becomes a factor in international relations* [electronic resource] / A. Bepalov // Valdai Discussion Club. URL:

<https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/kak-izmenenie-klimata-stanovitsya-faktorom-mo/> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

108. Bokova: global warming harms UNESCO-listed monuments [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/3783270> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

109. Shanghai Cooperation Organization called on developed countries to honour their climate commitments [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/16216013> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

110. Vladimir Putin addressed the UN General Assembly [electronic resource] // Channel One Russia. URL: <https://www.1tv.ru/news/2015-09-28/10328-vladimir-putin-vystupil-na-genassamblee-oon> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

111. Second biennial report of the Russian Federation submitted in accordance with Decision 1/CP.16 of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [electronic resource] // United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). URL: https://unfccc.int/files/national_reports/biennial_reports_and_iar/submitted_biennial_reports/application/pdf/2br_rus.pdf (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

112. Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic J. M. Kulubaev at the meeting of the SCO Foreign Ministers Council meeting [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectsco.org/20240523/1373472.html> (accessed 25.05.2024). (in Russian)

113. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks at a meeting with the staff of the Diplomatic Academy, Moscow, March 25, 2016 [electronic resource] // The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1524970/ (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

114. SCO Secretary-General to attend the UN Global Sustainable Transport Conference [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectsco.org/20161124/160154.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

115. Report: the geography of the Eurasian Economic Union: from challenges to opportunities [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/17984/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

116. Georgieva K., Gaspar V., Pazarbasioglu C. Poor and Vulnerable Countries Need Support to Adapt to Climate Change [electronic resource] / K. Georgieva, etc. // International Monetary Fund Blog. URL: <https://www.imf.org/ru/Blogs/Articles/2022/03/23/blog032322-poor-and-vulnerable-countris-need-support-to-adapt-to-climate-change> (accessed 10.04.2024). (in Russian)

117. Homepage [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization. URL: <https://wmo.int/ru> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

118. Homepage [electronic resource] // Roshydromet Climate Centre. URL: <https://cc.voeikovmgo.ru/ru/> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

119. Homepage [electronic resource] // Atomic Energy 2.0 portal. URL: <https://www.atomic-energy.ru/organizations/mezhdunarodnoe-energeticheskoe-agentstvo-iea> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

120. The SCO delegation took part in the international conference on the Aral Sea region problems [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectsco.org/20141029/9652.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

121. IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva Announces Operationalization of the Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) to Help Vulnerable Countries Meet Long-Term Challenges [electronic resource] // International Monetary Fund Blog. URL: <https://www.imf.org/ru/News/Articles/2022/10/12/pr22348-md-announces-operationalization-of-rst> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

122. The European Union supports Central Asia in green recovery [electronic resource] // Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Kazakhstan. URL: <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kazakhstan/%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B5%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9->

%D1%81%D0%BE%D1%8E%D0%B7-
 %D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B6%D0%B8%D
 0%B2%D0%B0%D0%B5%D1%82-
 %D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%81-
 %C2%AB%D0%B7%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B3%
 D0%BE%C2%BB-
 %D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D
 0%B2%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B2_ru?s=222
 (accessed 10.10.2023). (in Russian)

123. Zadera S. Reshetnikov: BRICS Climate Forum could take place in August [electronic resource] / S. Zadera // Russian Gazette. URL: <https://rg.ru/2024/02/13/reshetnikov-forum-briks-po-klimatu-mozhet-projti-v-avguste.html> (accessed 10.04.2024). (in Russian)

124. Statement by Special Presidential Representative on Climate Issues Alexander Bedritsky [electronic resource] // Official Internet Resources of the President of Russia. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/administration/47115> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

125. BRICS green horizons: who will become the global leader of the new economy [electronic resource] // RBK Daily. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/industries/news/651fbbc19a7947008ce7ba1f> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

126. Zotin A. The climate agenda: how to separate science from ideology? [electronic resource] / A. Zotin // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/klimaticheskaya-povestka/?sphrase_id=732062 (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

127. Climate change [electronic resource] // ISC. URL: <https://council.science/ru/what-we-do/our-work-at-the-un/climate-change/> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

128. Press release on the Fifth Meeting of the Heads of SCO Environmental Ministries and Agencies [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

URL <https://rus.sectesco.org/20240522/1358443.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

129. History and main items of the Paris Climate Agreement [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/info/9913445> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

130. Results of the 38th Meeting of the Eurasian Online NRU HSE Seminar [electronic resource] // Russia in Global Affairs. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/brics-i-mirovoj-poryadok/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

131. K. Kosachev: Russia considers the Paris Agreement to be a reliable international legal basis for a long-term climate settlement [electronic resource] // Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. URL: <http://council.gov.ru/events/news/130393/> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

132. Kadomtsev A. A. How climate is changing politics [electronic resource] / Kadomtsev A. A. // International Affairs. URL: <https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/24971> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

133. Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (reference information) [electronic resource] // The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://www.mid.ru/tv/?id=1704445&lang=ru> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

134. The Kyoto Protocol is not in Russia's interests [electronic resource] // Izvestia. URL: <https://iz.ru/news/290059> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

135. Kyoto Protocol: Pros & Cons [electronic resource] // Russia in Global Affairs. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/kiotskij-protokol-za-i-protiv/> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

136. EAEU Climate Agenda [electronic resource] // The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). URL: <https://eec.eaeunion.org/comission/department/dotp/klimaticheskaya-povestka/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

137. Climate agenda of the EAEU, SCO, and BRICS: partnership for sustainable development [electronic resource] // St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). URL: <https://forumspb.com/programme/business-programme/131468/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

138. Climate policy [electronic resource] // Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/directions/investicionnaya_deyatelnost/obespechenie_razvitiya_ekonomiki_v_usloviyah_izmeneniya_klimata/klimaticheskaya_politika/ (accessed 10.07.2023). (in Russian)

139. Criteria for green projects of the Eurasian Economic Union countries (model taxonomy) [electronic resource] // The Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). URL: https://eec.eaeunion.org/upload/medialibrary/df7/Kriterii-dlya-opublikovaniya-Modelnaya-taksonomiya_.pdf (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

140. Losev A. V. Geoengineering and geopolitics [electronic resource] / A. V. Losev // Russia in Global Affairs. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/geoinzheneriya-i-geopolitika/> (accessed 10.10.2023). (in Russian)

141. Maleva Yu. Funding for the federal project Clean Air was cut almost in half [electronic resource] / Maleva Yu. // Vedomosti. URL: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/articles/2023/10/12/1000151-finansirovanie-federalnogo-proekta-chistii-vozduh-sokratili> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

142. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) // The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. URL: https://archive.ipcc.ch/home_languages_main_russian.shtml (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

143. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 to provide policymakers with regular scientific assessments on the current state of knowledge about climate change [electronic resource] // The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. URL: <https://www.ipcc.ch/languages-2/russian/> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

144. Activities [electronic resource] // Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/events/seminar_klimaticheskaya_povestka_shos_v_sovremennyh_usloviyah.html (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

145. Who we are [electronic resource] // ISC. URL: <https://council.science/ru/about-us/> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

146. Papish A. Geologists have rejected the Anthropocene epoch [electronic resource] / A. Papish // Naked science. URL: <https://naked-science.ru/article/geology/geologi-otvergli-epohu-an> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

147. The Paris Agreement [electronic resource] // UN. URL: <https://www.un.org/ru/climatechange/paris-agreement#:~:text=%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B6%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B5%20%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BB%D0%B0%D1%88%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5%20%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%87%D0%B8%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%B5%D1%82%20%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%BD%D1%83%D1%8E%20%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%83,%D0%BF%D0%BE%20%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%8C%D0%B1%D0%B5%20%D1%81%20%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B5%D0%BC%20%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

148. Why a greener economy will hardly be more just [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/projects/climate/economy/> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

149. Representatives of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation took part in the fifth meeting of the heads of SCO environmental ministries and agencies [electronic resource] // Official site of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.mnr.gov.ru/press/news/predstaviteli_minprirody_rossii_prinyali_uchasti

e_v_pyatom_prirodookhrannom_soveshchanii_gosudarstv_/ (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

150. Natural climate solutions [electronic resource] // Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. URL: <https://www.economy.gov.ru/material/file/4cc45c240a939c79ffd2ca08b0d57715/071122.pdf> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

151. Prokopchuk Ye. E. BRICS+ can give a second chance to the international climate regime [electronic resource] / Ye. E. Prokopchuk // Russia in Global Affairs. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/briks-vtoroe-dyhanie/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

152. Putin: Russia has “slowed” global warming for almost a year [electronic resource] // United Russia. URL: <https://er.ru/activity/news/putin-utverzhdает-что-rossiya-zatormozila-globalnoe-poteplenie-pochti-na-god> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

153. Romanovskaya A. A. Risk can be managed and damage from climate change can be minimized [electronic resource] / A. A. Romanovskaya // The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/interview/riskom-mozhno-upravlyat-a-ushcherb-ot-izmeneniya-klimata-mozhno-minimizirovat/> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

154. ROSATOM and Sakhalin implement projects of carbon footprint reporting verification [electronic resource] // Energy RU. URL: <https://www.eprussia.ru/news/base/2023/7854611.htm> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

155. Russia in the Paris Agreement. What will it give to the environment and enterprises? [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/obschestvo/10230505> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

156. Russia reduced greenhouse gas emissions to 70% of the 1990 level [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/8964347> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

157. Xi Jinping Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 16 October 2022 // The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Russian Federation. URL: http://ru.china-embassy.gov.cn/rus/zgxw/202210/t20221026_10792071.htm (accessed 10.10.2023). (in Russian)

158. Xi Jinping Overcoming challenges together to open a new chapter of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific [electronic resource] // Russian Gazette. URL: <https://rg.ru/2023/11/17/soobshcha-preodolet-vyzovy-vo-imia-otkrytiia-novoj-glavy-sotrudnichestva-v-atr.html> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

159. Joint meeting on climate issues of scientists, politicians and officials (postrelease) [electronic resource] // Russian Academy of Sciences. URL: <https://www.ras.ru/news/shownews.aspx?id=1c9cbbe1-8803-49ce-8937-c9bf56e50d42> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

160. Joint communique following the 22nd meeting of the Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectsko.org/20231026/SOVMESTNOE-KOMMYuNIKE-po-itogam-dvadsat-vtorogo-zasedaniya-Soveta-glav-pravitelstv-962639.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

161. SCO, UN Secretary-Generals held a meeting [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectsko.org/20190929/582976.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

162. Special SCO-UNEP event and other activities in Nairobi [electronic resource] // Shanghai Cooperation Organization. URL: <https://rus.sectsko.org/20240301/1286102.html> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

163. The United States has completed its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement [electronic resource] // TASS, Russian news agency. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/9910097> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

164. Topic: Ecology [electronic resource] // The Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/topics/ecology/> (accessed 10.07.2023). (in Russian)

165. Turanova M. Carbon neutrality of the EAEU and the SCO: barrier or opportunity for development? [electronic resource] / M. Turanova // Roscongress. URL: <https://roscongress.org/materials/uglerodnaya-neytralnost-eaes-i-shos-barer-ili-vozmozhnost-dlya-razvitiya/> (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

166. OHCHR and climate change [electronic resource] // The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights). URL: <https://www.ohchr.org/ru/climate-change> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

167. The Clean Air Federal Project [electronic resource] // Official site of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. URL: https://www.mnr.gov.ru/activity/directions/natsionalnyy_proekt_ekologiya/federalnyy_proekt_chistyy_vozdukh/?ysclid=lwcvrrk75h175931127 (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

168. Cherkasova M. Doubts about the effectiveness of the Russian Climate Doctrine [electronic resource] / M. Cherkasova // Lenta RU. URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2023/10/30/v-effektivnosti-rossiyskoy-klimaticheskoy-doktriny-usomnilis/> (accessed 10.06.2024). (in Russian)

169. What is climate change? [electronic resource] // UN. URL: <https://www.un.org/ru/climatechange/what-is-climate-change> (accessed 10.12.2023).

170. What is the Paris Agreement? [electronic resource] // United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). URL: <https://unfccc.int/ru/informaciya-ob-onuv/chto-takoe-parizhskoe-soglashenie> (accessed 10.05.2024). (in Russian)

171. The Sixth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2022 [electronic resource] // The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). URL: <https://www.unep.org/ru/resources/doklad/shestoy-ocenochnyy-doklad-mgeik-izmenenie-klimata-v-2022-godu> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

172. SCO and the UN Environment Programme signed a memorandum of understanding [electronic resource] // Official site of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment of the Russian Federation. URL: https://mnr.gov.ru/press/news/shos_i_programma_oon_po_okruzhayushchey_srede_podpisali_memorandum_o_vzaimoponimanii/ (accessed 15.06.2024). (in Russian)

173. Valdai Club to Discuss Climate and Sustainable Development in the Aftermath of the Coronavirus Crisis (announcements) [electronic resource] // Valdai Discussion Club. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/events/announcements/ekologiya-klimat-razvitie-valdai-kruglyy-stol/> (accessed 10.07.2023). (in Russian)

174. UNESCO: climate change is a serious threat to natural sites and cultural heritage [electronic resource] // UN. URL: <https://news.un.org/ru/story/2022/04/1422062> (accessed 10.12.2023). (in Russian)

175. 30 years later, deniers are still lying about Hansen's amazing global warming prediction [electronic resource] // The Guardian. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-percent/2018/jun/25/30-years-later-deniers-are-still-lying-about-hansens-amazing-global-warming-prediction> (accessed 10.05.2024).

176. About the GFCS [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization WMO. URL: <https://wmo.int/site/global-framework-climate-services-gfcs/about-gfcs> (accessed 10.12.2023).

177. Bredariol T., Lim J., Staas L. Energy is vital to a well-functioning water sector [electronic resource] / T. Bredariol [et al.] // IEA. URL: <https://www.iea.org/commentaries/energy-is-vital-to-a-well-functioning-water-sector> (accessed 10.12.2023).

178. Bulkeley H., Naumann S., Vojinovic Z., Calfapietra C., Whiteoak K., Freitas T. Nature-based solutions. State of the art in EU-funded projects [electronic resource] / H. Bulkeley [et al.] // Publication office of the European Union. URL: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/8bb07125-4518-11eb-b59f-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-203252411> (accessed 10.12.2023).

179. Climate Change [electronic resource] // UNESCO. URL: <https://www.unesco.org/en/climate-change> (accessed 10.12.2023).

180. Climate sceptic misled Congress over funding from oil industry [electronic resource] // The Guardian. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jan/25/michaels-climate-sceptic-misled-congress> (accessed 10.05.2024).

181. Climate Services Information System [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization WMO. URL: <https://wmo.int/activities/climate-services-information-system> (accessed 10.12.2023).

182. Conference of the Parties (COP) [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization WMO. URL: <https://wmo.int/activities/conference-of-parties-cop> (accessed 10.12.2023).

183. Dalby S. A. New Geopolitics for the Anthropocene [electronic resource] / S. Dalby // Green European Journal. URL: <https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/a-new-geopolitics-for-the-anthropocene/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

184. Director General presents UNESCO climate change initiative at Copenhagen Conference [electronic resource] // UNESCO. URL: <https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/575> (accessed 05.04.2024).

185. Habib B. Climate Change and the Re-imagination of State Sovereignty [electronic resource] / B. Habib // E-International Relations. URL: <https://www.e-ir.info/2015/11/08/climate-change-and-the-re-imagination-of-state-sovereignty/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

186. IEA Shared Goals [electronic resource] // IEA. URL: <https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/b01dc266-6b76-4cb6-846b-b236cb50af93/IEASharedGoals-1993.pdf> (accessed 10.05.2024).

187. Ince M., Sikorsky E. The Uncomfortable Geopolitics of the Clean Energy Transition [electronic resource] / M. Ince, E. Sikorsky // Lawfare. URL: <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-uncomfortable-geopolitics-of-the-clean-energy-transition> (accessed 10.12.2023).

188. James Hansen, father of climate change awareness, calls Paris talks a fraud [electronic resource] // The Guardian. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/12/james-hansen-climate-change-paris-talks-fraud> (accessed 10.05.2024).

189. Levy-Rapoport N. Isolationism is deadly. Only global collective action can save us [electronic resource] / N. Levy-Rapoport // The Guardian. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/15/isolationism-climate-change-global-collective-action> (accessed 10.12.2023).

190. Malm A. The Anthropocene Myth [electronic resource] / A. Malm // Jacobin. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2015/03/anthropocene-capitalism-climate-change/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

191. Meyer R. The World Could Be Entering a New Era of Climate War [electronic resource] / R. Meyer // The Atlantic. URL: <https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2022/11/climate-change-world-conflict-america-china/672255/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

192. Mission [electronic resource] // IEA. URL: <https://www.iea.org/about/mission> (accessed 10.05.2024).

193. Mitrova M. The Geopolitics of Decarbonization: The Russian Case [electronic resource] / M. Mitrova // The Wilson Center. URL: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/geopolitics-decarbonization-russian-case> (accessed 15.06.2024).

194. Omelchenko E., Serebrennikova A., Gumenyuk D., Chivragova M., Anichkin A., Mikhaleva A., Chance C. Environmental Law and Practice in the Russian Federation: Overview [electronic resource] / E. Omelchenko [et al.] // Practical Law. URL: [https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-013-5609?transitionType=Default&contextData=\(sc.Default\)&firstPage=true](https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-013-5609?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true) (accessed 10.07.2023).

195. Our Mission [electronic resource] // Earth Institute, Columbia University. URL: <https://csas.earth.columbia.edu/about/our-mission> (accessed 10.10.2023).

196. Sofer K. Climate Politics in Japan [electronic resource] / K. Sofer // Sasakawa USA Forum. 2016. No. 1. URL: <https://spfusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Sofer-Climate-Politics-in-Japan.pdf> (accessed 10.10.2023).

197. Solnit R. The Ideology of Isolation [electronic resource] / R. Solnit // Harper's Magazine. URL: <https://harpers.org/archive/2016/07/the-ideology-of-isolation/> (accessed 10.12.2023).

198. The Future of Energy, Climate, and Geopolitics [electronic resource] // Council on Foreign Relations. URL: <https://www.cfr.org/event/future-energy-climate-and-geopolitics> (accessed 10.10.2023).

199. UNFCCC and IEA launch new phase of cooperation on tackling climate change [electronic resource] // IEA. URL: <https://www.iea.org/news/unfccc-and-iea-launch-new-phase-of-cooperation-on-tackling-climate-change> (accessed 10.12.2023).

200. Valantin J-M. What are Climate Wars? [electronic resource] / J-M. Valantin // The Red Team Analysis Society. URL: <https://redanalysis.org/2021/11/02/what-are-climate-wars/> (accessed 10.10.2023).

201. Was first nuclear test the start of new human-dominated epoch, the Anthropocene? [electronic resource] // News Center. University of California, Berkeley. URL: <https://news.berkeley.edu/2015/01/16/was-first-nuclear-test-dawn-of-new-human-dominated-epoch-the-anthropocene#:~:text=An%20international%20group%20of%20scientists,humans%20increasingly%20shape%20the%20planet> (accessed 10.10.2023).

202. WMO at COP28 [electronic resource] // World Meteorological Organization WMO. URL: <https://wmo.int/ru/node/22126> (accessed 10.12.2023).

203. Working Group on the Anthropocene [electronic resource] // Subcommittee on Quaternary Stratigraphy. URL: <http://quaternary.stratigraphy.org/working-groups/anthropocene/> (accessed 10.10.2023).