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**Eurocommunism as a political phenomenon: Theory, History and
Ideology**

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INTRODUCTION

Relevance of the research topic. Eurocommunism is a modification of communist ideology, formed in the 1960s as a response to the contradictions between the theory and practice of building socialism in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe. Taking into account the specifics of democratic institutions and the peculiarities of the socio-economic development of their countries, European communist parties sought to find an alternative path to socialism between social democracy and Bolshevism¹. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the crisis of the "world socialist system" brought the European communist movement to a collapse, forcing communist parties to adapt their programmatic positions and organizational structure to the changed conditions.

Despite the disappearance of the factors that made possible the emergence of Eurocommunism as a political and ideological phenomenon, a significant part of modern communist and left-wing parties, which did not follow the path of social-democratization or preservation of orthodox Marxist-Leninist attitudes, continue to reproduce the political practices and ideological discourse of their Eurocommunist predecessors².

The research of historical preconditions for the emergence of Eurocommunism, its theoretical aspects and program and political attitudes of "Eurocommunist" parties allows us to predict the main trends in the development of modern radical left movements and possible scenarios of their further ideological transformation.

Extent of development of the topic. Much of the literature on the ideology and strategy of parties that can be characterized as Eurocommunist is extremely

¹ Berlinguer, E. La critica, la ricerca, l'azione del PCI nascono dall'impegno di aprire in Europa una fase nuova nella lotta per il socialismo // L'Unita. 1982. № 9. P. 8.

² Bozóki A., Ishiyama J.T. The communist successor parties of Central and Eastern Europe. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2020. P. 4.

ideologized and represents criticism by representatives of other strands of the communist movement - "anti-revisionists" (Enver Hoxha), "revolutionary Marxists" (Ernest Mandel) and Soviet Marxists³. It is also worth highlighting the work of Kate Hudson, a researcher of the Party of the European Left, who sees Eurocommunism as the starting point of her own ideological evolution, which must be overcome because of its "right-wing bias" and to "reinvent" anti-capitalist politics.⁴

Western academic studies of Eurocommunism in the 1970s were mainly focused on the possibility of communist parties functioning within the framework of European-style liberal democracy, the attitude of the "new communists" to the project of European integration and the NATO military bloc. In this group of sources we can mention the works of Richard Kindersley, Roy Godson and Stefan Haseler⁵.

The electoral successes of the left-wing populists of the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the Spanish Podemos (We Can) party in 2015 contributed to the return of interest in Eurocommunism among Western researchers, mainly from southern European countries. Noteworthy among them are the studies of Giorgos Charalambous, George Ross, Ioannis Balampanidis, Cas Mudde, Marina Prentoulis, Luke March and Richard Dunphy⁶. At the core of these studies is an attempt to trace

Hoxha E. Eurocommunism is anti-communism// E. Hoxha. Selected Writings. Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1985. Vol. 5. – P. 859–1092. [In Russian]; Mandel E. From Stalinism to Eurocommunism. 2 ed. Thetford: Lowe and Brydone, 1979. – 223 p.; Naumov V.K. The Italian Communist Party at the turn of the 70s and 80s // Problems of strategy and tactics of the communist movement. 1982. Iss. 12. 68 p. [In Russian].

⁴ Hudson K. The New European Left: A Socialism for the Twenty-first Century? London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 211 p.

⁵ Godson R., Haseler S. "Eurocommunism": Implications for East and West. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978. 144 p.; In search of Eurocommunism // edited by R. Kindersley. London, Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1982. 218 p.

⁶ Charalambous G. The European Radical Left: Movements and parties since the 1960s. London: Pluto Press, 2022. 338 p.; Katsourides Y. Radical left parties in government: The cases of SYRIZA and AKEL. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 170 p.; Balampanidis I. Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left. London: Routledge, 2019. 266 p.; Dunphy R., March L. The European Left Party. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019. 285 p.; Prentoulis M. Left Populism in Europe: Lessons from Jeremy Corbyn to Podemos. London: Pluto Press, 2021. 184 p.; Ross. G. Workers and communists in France: From Popular Front to Eurocommunism. California: University of California Press. 1982. 357 p.

the influences of Eurocommunism on the ideology of contemporary left-populist parties and movements.

In Russian science, the problem of the influence of Eurocommunism on modern radical leftist movements and their role in the political system of the European space is the subject of articles by such researchers as Boris Guseletov⁷, Ruslan Kostiuk⁸, Svetlana Knyazeva⁹. A special mention should be made of Leonid Popov's "Memories of Eurocommunism"¹⁰, which analyzes in some detail both the internal contradictions in the communist movement that led to the emergence of Eurocommunism and the international factors that contributed to its formation which analyzes in some detail both the internal contradictions in the communist movement that led to the emergence of Eurocommunism and the international factors that contributed to its formation.

Despite the existence of numerous studies on the reasons for the formation of Eurocommunism and its influence on the ideological discourse of modern left-wing parties, most works consider Eurocommunism mainly in the historical dimension. Attempts to draw parallels between the Eurocommunist strategy and the actual political practice of parties on the "left" of social democracy in the existing European political space have hardly been made.

Purpose and objectives of the research. The aim of this research is to analyze the most fundamental theoretical and ideological provisions of Eurocommunism and its influence on the ideology of modern leftist and communist parties. The aim determines the following research objectives:

⁷ Guseletov B. P. Party of the European Left - a new "ghost of communism" in Europe?// Scientific and Analytical Bulletin of the RAS Institute of Europe. 2020. №5. P. 16–23. [In Russian].

⁸ Kostiuk R.V. Left forces in Europe on the future of the European project// Bulletin of St. Petersburg University. International Relations. 2018. Vol. 11. Iss. 3. P. 245–265. [In Russian].

⁹ Knyazeva S. E. The emergence of Eurocommunism in Italy // Novaya i New and recent history. 2018. Iss. 5. P. 58 – 75. [In Russian].

¹⁰ Popov L.B. Medmories of Eurocommunism. Moscow: International relations, 2008. 136 p. [In Russian].

1. Consideration of historical prerequisites for the formation of Eurocommunism as a modification of communist ideology.
2. To identify the main factors of ideological evolution of Eurocommunist parties.
3. To characterize the main theoretical features of Eurocommunism and its differences from the orthodox Marxist-Leninist theoretical platform.
4. To outline the main currents and internal contradictions that existed in the Eurocommunist direction of the international communist movement.
5. To conduct a comparative analysis of the political strategy of Eurocommunist parties and political practices of modern "radical left" and left-populist parties (RLP).

Object and subject of the research. The object of this research is Eurocommunism as a political and ideological phenomenon, the subject is program and political attitudes of Eurocommunist and post-communist European parties.

Characteristics of Sources. The sources used in this thesis research include: 1) Materials of periodicals; 2) Program documents of communist and leftist parties; 3) Analytical works of modern researchers of the leftist movement 4) Works of classical Marxists; 5) Speeches and program articles of key leaders and theorists of the parties and other figures of the communist movement.

The first category of sources includes materials from the party news organs of European communist parties, such as L'Unita, El Socialista and other party media. Program documents include decisions of congresses¹¹, materials of national and

¹¹ Proceedings of the VIII Congress of the Italian Communist Party. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957. 344 p. [In Russian]; XVI Congress of the French Communist Party (1961; Sen Deni). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962. 176 p. [In Russian]; XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (14-25 February 1956). Verbatim Report. Vol. 1. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1956. 640 p. [In Russian]; XIV Congress of the Italian Communist Party. Moscow: Politizdat, 1976. 327 p. [In Russian]; XXIV Congress of the French Communist Party. Moscow: Politizdat, 1982. 184 p. [In Russian]; XXI (Extraordinary) Congress of the French Communist Party. Moscow: Politizdat, 1975. 128 p. [In Russian].

international conferences¹², party programs and statutory documents¹³ of the organizations under consideration. The analysis of these two groups of sources is conditioned by the need to form an idea of the program-political dimension of Eurocommunism and to make a comparative analysis of the discourse and actual political line of modern communist and left parties.

The use of the works of the classics of Marxism¹⁴, Eurocommunist theorists and their critics in the research helps to identify the main theoretical and conceptual provisions of Eurocommunism and trace the process of formation of its discursive-ideological complex.

A separate group includes analytical works by Russian and foreign researchers devoted to the ideological evolution of communist parties in the twentieth century and current trends in the European left movement.

Methodological basis of the research. The goal and objectives define the interdisciplinary nature of the methodology. Present research uses general scientific methods (descriptive method, modeling), historical-comparative method, methods of discourse and narrative analysis.

¹² European Forum Declaration // European Forum. URL: <https://europeanforum.eu/bilbao-2018/declaration-2018/> (accessed: 16.02.2024); Pour une Démocratie avancée, pour une France socialiste // Supplément au «Bulletin de propaganda». 1968. №. 7. 61 p.

¹³ European Left Manifesto // European Left. URL: https://www.european-left.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Manifesto-European-Left_ENG.pdf (accessed: 07.02.2024); European Left Statute // European Left. URL: <https://www.european-left.org/about-us/statutes/> (accessed: 07.02.2024).

¹⁴ Marx K. Engels F. German ideology// K. Marx, F. Engels. Essays. 2nd ed. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1955. Vol. 3. P. 7–544. [In Russian]; Marx K. Engels F. Manifesto of Communist Party// Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/russkij/marx/1848/manifesto.htm> (accessed: 12.12.2023). [In Russian]; Marx K. Engels F. On the critique of political economy// K. Marx, F. Engels. Essays. 2nd ed. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1959. Vol. 13. P. 1–167. [In Russian]; Lenin V. I. State and revolution // V. I. Lenin Complete Works. 5 ed. Moscow: Political Literature Publisher, 1969. Vol. 33. P. 1–120. [In Russian]; Lenin V. I. About compromises// V. I. Lenin. Complete Works. 5 ed. Moscow: Political Literature Publisher, 1969. Vol. 34. P. 133–139. [In Russian]; Lenin V.I. On “democracy” and dictatorship// Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/russkij/lenin/works/37-2.htm>. (accessed: 12.12.2023). [In Russian]; Lenin V. I. Regarding the two letters// V. I. Lenin. Complete Works. 5 ed. Moscow: Political Literature Publisher, 1968. Vol. 17. P. 290–307. [In Russian].

In this thesis, the methodology of Imre Lakatos' research programs is used in relation to ideology. Identifying the main provisions of communist ideology as a "hard core" (the need to overcome capitalism), its transformation and adaptation to the changed conditions of political and social reality can be called a "protective belt" (participation in electoral procedures, recognition of individual freedoms, expansion of the social base) defined by positive and negative heuristics. As positive heuristics we consider those provisions of classical Marxism and Leninism that contain attempts to anticipate possible anomalies of ideology. Under negative heuristics we mean the rejection of a number of methods of practical realization of the communist project (socialist revolution, single-party system, some practices of Stalinism).

While analyzing the mutual influence of the theoretical provisions of Eurocommunism and the political line of Eurocommunist parties, as well as the relationship between Eurocommunism and the previous stages of development of socialist thought, the author uses a dialectical approach. Marxist dialectics provides an opportunity to consider the dynamics of the transformation of communist ideology from the same positions from which the representatives of Marxism themselves considered the evolution of social relations.

Scientific novelty of the work. This research considers the formation of Eurocommunism from the perspective of the development of some provisions of "orthodox" Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, while the majority of researchers considered and continue to consider Eurocommunism solely as an attempt to abandon the ideological legacy of Stalinism and increase the autonomy of European Communist Parties from the CPSU and the political leadership of the USSR.

The phenomenon of reproduction of Eurocommunist political strategy by modern communist and left parties is considered, the classification of parties whose emergence was caused by the crisis of communist ideology after the disappearance of the so-called "world socialist system" is clarified and supplemented. Foreign and domestic researchers have mainly considered Eurocommunism as one of the stages in the development of communist ideology, engaging in its "museification" and emphasizing the external attempts of today's radical left to overcome it.

The author is also the first in Russian political science to analyze the influence of the internal contradictions of Soviet Marxism on the formation of Eurocommunism. Russian researchers, as a general rule, radically oppose these two directions of Marxism, referring to their mutual criticism and the polemics that took place in the communist movement of the 1970s - the first half of the 1980s, while the processes within the CPSU had a significant impact on European communist parties. It should be noted that the Belgian Marxist E. Mandel's work "From Stalinism to Eurocommunism: The Bitter Fruits of Socialism in One Country" was devoted to this issue, which, despite a number of valuable observations from the research point of view, is polemical in nature and, first of all, manifests the attitude of representatives of the Trotskyist direction in the communist movement to the Eurocommunists.

Theoretical and practical significance of the research. The analysis of historical preconditions that led to the emergence of Eurocommunism, as well as the theoretical and ideological dimensions of this modification of communist ideology allows us to trace the ideological evolution of parties to the left of social democracy and to determine their electoral prospects within the current political space.

The results of this research can be used in teaching political science disciplines related to the activities of political parties and interest groups, used in research in the field of comparative political science and history of political doctrines.

The results of the research can also be applied by think tanks and government agencies in developing strategies of interaction with political parties and public organizations.

The theoretical significance of the research lies in the author's development of a model of ideological transformation of communist and left-wing parties in Europe, reflecting the factors of formation of Eurocommunism, its main theoretical provisions and its relationship with previous and later variations of communist and left-socialist ideology.

Structure of the work. Present dissertation research consists of an introduction, two chapters, a conclusion and a list of used sources.

Approbation of the work and credibility. The results of this research were published in scientific publications included in the HAC list¹⁵ and presented for discussion at scientific conferences¹⁶.

Propositions for defense:

1. Eurocommunism is the natural result of the ideological evolution of European communist parties in the twentieth century under the conditions of European-style liberal democracy.

2. Despite the criticism of the socialist model in the Soviet Union by the European Communist Parties and mutual criticism by the CPSU, the Soviet interpretation of Marxism and its internal contradictions had a stimulating effect on the formation of Eurocommunism.

3. A number of theoretical positions characteristic of Eurocommunism (the diversity of paths to socialism, the need for interaction with the so-called "petty-bourgeois" or non-communist forces, the use of the mechanisms of bourgeois democracy) were formulated long before the term "Eurocommunism" appeared and originated in the works of the founders of classical Marxism and Marxism-Leninism.

¹⁵ Katorzhevskij P.N. The influence of Eurocommunism on the ideology and political practice of the contemporary "radical left" // Political expertise: POLITEX. 2023. Vol. 19. №. 1. P. 36–48. [In Russian]; Katorzhevskij P.N. Formation of the ideological discourse of Eurocommunism. On the example of the Italian Communist Party // Free Thought. 2022. №. 3 (1693). P. 77–88. [In Russian]; Katorzhevskij P.N. Left populism and the political legacy of Eurocommunism // Via in tempore. History. Political Science. 2022. Vol. 49. №. 4. P. 898–905. [In Russian].

¹⁶ Twelfth International Conference of Young Scientists and Specialists "CLIO-2022. New States in the Twentieth Century. To the 100th anniversary of the formation of the USSR". Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI), 15 B. Dmitrovka St., Moscow, April 14-15, 2022.; VI All-Russian Forum of Young Political Scientists "Youth and the World of Politics: the Boundaries of the Possible", Moscow, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, December 18, 2021; II Moscow Marxist Forum (MMF-2022) "Social Sciences in the USSR and their Role in the XXI Century (100th anniversary of the formation of the USSR is dedicated)", Moscow, Lomonosov Moscow State University, November 24-26, 2022; International Scientific Conference "Socialist Alternative for Humanity: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" (to the 50th anniversary of the defeat of the Chilean Revolution), St. Petersburg, Plekhanov House of the Russian National Library, 4th Krasnoarmeyskaya St., 1/33, October 19, 2023; X Ryazanov Readings "People who changed the world: in memory of V.I. Lenin". Centre for Social and Political History - branch of the State Public Historical Library of Russia, Moscow, 4 Wilhelm Pika St., b. 2, 15 - 16 April 2024.

4. The central problem of Eurocommunism is the question of the possibility of the functioning of communist parties and the implementation of their program of radical socialist transformations within the framework of the democratic political process.

5. The Eurocommunist parties considered their social ideal as "progressive democracy", which implied advanced social protection of wage workers, nationalization of a number of monopolies, development of cooperation and democratic planning of the economy. This model of a "non-capitalist and non-socialist" state was supposed to be a transitional stage in the subsequent movement towards socialism.

6. The result of the Eurocommunist transformation had different consequences for the left-wing parties in Europe. In some cases, there was social-democratization and subsequent de-ideologization of the party (Italian Communist Party), other parties retained their anti-capitalist orientation and continue to adapt their programmatic and electoral attitudes to the conditions of modern political space (French Communist Party, Spanish Communist Party).

7. The Eurocommunist strategy is being replicated by contemporary left-populist and "radical left" parties in the absence of the conditions that led to the formation of Eurocommunism.

Main scientific results:

1. The thesis considers the process of formation of the ideological discourse of Eurocommunism, offers the author's characterization of the ideology of Eurocommunism¹⁷, obtained by comparing it with social-democratic and orthodox communist attitudes.

2. In the present dissertational research the influence of Eurocommunism on the ideology and political practice of modern "radical left" parties is analyzed, the scenario

¹⁷ Katorzhevskij P.N. Formation of the ideological discourse of Eurocommunism. On the example of the Italian Communist Party // Free Thought. 2022. №. 3 (1693). P. 87. [In Russian].

of their further ideological transformation is formulated. The possibility of their reproduction of Eurocommunist attitudes in qualitatively changed conditions is considered¹⁸.

3. Based on the research methodology of Imre Lakatos' scientific programs, the dissertation study developed a model of the ideological evolution of the communist movement, which allows to predict the main trends of its further development, taking into account Eurocommunist positions¹⁹.

¹⁸ Katorzhevskij P.N. The influence of Eurocommunism on the ideology and political practice of the contemporary "radical left" // Political expertise: POLITEX. 2023. Vol. 19. №. 1. P 44. [In Russian]

¹⁹ Eurocommunism as a factor in the ideological evolution of the Communist movement // Political science issues. 2024. № 7. Vol. 14. P. 2268–2269. [In Russian].

CHAPTER 1. HISTORICAL PREREQUISITES FOR THE FORMATION OF EUROCOMMUNISM. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

1.1. Historical prerequisites for the formation of the theoretical and conceptual foundations of Eurocommunism

There are several versions as to when Eurocommunism was finally conceptualized. Spanish journalist and one of the leaders of the Spanish Communist Party Manuel Azcarate wrote in one of his articles²⁰, that the starting point of Eurocommunism is 1968, marked by the events that gave impetus to the formation of Eurocommunism - the Paris "Red May", the uprising in Prague and the subsequent entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. The student "revolution" in France, in his view, revealed the need for fresh Marxist thinking and demonstrated the fact that "neo-capitalism" was incapable of solving the basic contradictions of capitalism. The Prague events, in turn, raised the question of the relationship between democracy and socialism, and put on the agenda the question of the independence of the communist parties of Europe from the Soviet Union²¹. I. Balampanidis, who also considers 1968 as the beginning of the Eurocommunist period, partially agrees with this position. Balampanidis, who also considers 1968 as the beginning of the Eurocommunist period, among the factors that led to the emergence of Eurocommunism highlights the loss of authority by the Soviet Union due to the disclosure of facts of repression and abuses that took place when Stalin was in power, and the beginning of "revolutions" in European countries, which, however, had little in common with the ideas of communists about revolutions and took them by surprise²². General Secretary of the

²⁰ Azcárate M. The Present State of Eurocommunism: its Main Features, Political and Theoretica // In Search of Eurocommunism / edited by R. Kindersley. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981. P. 28.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Balampanidis I. Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left. London: Routledge, 2019. P. 5.

Spanish Communist Party S. Carrillo in his program work "Eurocommunism and the State" in addition to the events of 1968 focuses attention on the importance of the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which proclaimed the diversity of paths to socialism, and mentions that shortly before that the British Communist Party was one of the first to propose a program suggesting a democratic path to socialism²³. A contemporary researcher of the European Left, Fabian Escalona, among the political events that influenced the formation of Eurocommunism, notes the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969, at which the Communist Parties of Italy and Spain criticized democratic centralism²⁴. Indeed, Enrico Berlinguer, then deputy secretary-general of the PCI, made a very veiled criticism of the ideological monopoly of the CPSU: "We reaffirm the thesis that international unity and the very unity of the socialist countries can only be based on the use of the original and creative capacity of each national community and each party"²⁵. S. Carrillo, at the same meeting, openly condemned the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia²⁶ and against "anathematizing" parties critical of the majority in the international communist movement²⁷. Immanuel Wallerstein believed that the distancing of European Communist Parties from the CPSU without a final break with it, on the one hand, was a consequence of "psychological shock from the revelations about the Stalinist era", on the other hand, it was a necessary condition for their survival in the European political space²⁸.

The complex of ideologemes and political practices that received the name "Eurocommunism" could not have been formed simultaneously with the emergence of the term itself. K. Marx in his Critique of Political Economy noted: "The task itself is only where the material conditions for its solution already exist or are in the process of

²³ Carrillo S. «Eurocomunismo» y Estado. Barcelona: Grupo Editorial Grijalbo, 1977. P. 130.

²⁴ Escalona F. The heritage of Eurocommunism in the contemporary radical left //Socialist Register. 2017. Vol. 53. P. 5.

²⁵ International Meeting of Communist Parties. Prague: «World and socialism»,1969. P. 492. [In Russian].

²⁶ Ibid. P. 465.

²⁷ Ibid. P. 467.

²⁸ Wallerstein I. Eurocommunism: Its Roots in European Working-Class History //Contemporary Marxism. 1980. №. 2. P. 5.

their emergence"²⁹. Thus, the preconditions that led to the theoretical formation of Eurocommunism began to appear long before the term itself entered the journalistic and political discourse, thanks to factors that can be divided into four main groups: international, domestic political, socio-economic and processes caused by internal contradictions in the communist movement, which stimulated its further transformation in the light of changing conditions. One of the leaders of the ICP, Antonio Rubbi, commented on the conceptualization of Eurocommunism as follows: "Eurocommunism blossomed in 1975 after a long 'incubation period'"³⁰. In our opinion, this period began with the formation of "popular fronts" and includes the following stages:

1. The period of Communist Parties' participation in the resistance to fascism during World War II and the underground struggle against right-wing authoritarian regimes (Spain, France);

2. Decentralization of the communist movement, which began after the dissolution of the Comintern and was theoretically formalized after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, which debunked the personality cult of J. Stalin and affirmed the position on the "diversity of paths to socialism";

3. The entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia and the distancing of a number of European Communist Parties from the Soviet Union and the CPSU.

E. Mandel, who viewed Eurocommunism as a natural result of the transformation of Stalinism, believed that, more than anything else, Eurocommunism represents the embodiment of the right-wing evolution of the Western European communist parties that began at the VII Congress of the Communist International in 1935³¹. The main ideological claims that the representatives of so-called "revolutionary Marxism" in its Trotskyist interpretation put forward to the strategy of the "fourth period" of the Comintern were the slogans of a "united popular front" and

²⁹ Marx K. Engels F. German ideology// K. Marx, F. Engels. Essays. 2nd ed. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1955. Vol. 3. P. 7. [In Russian].

³⁰ Rubbi A. World of Berlinguer. Moscow: «International relations», 1995. P. 66. [In Russian].

³¹ Mandel E. From Stalinism to Eurocommunism. 2 ed. Thetford: Lowe and Brydone, 1979. P. 42

a "broad anti-fascist popular front". This strategy implied a versatile interaction with non-communist political forces and segments of the population, which in Marxist phraseology were characterized as petty-bourgeois: "Under certain circumstances we can and must direct our efforts to draw these parties and organizations, or parts of them, in spite of their bourgeois leadership, to the side of the anti-fascist popular front. Such, for example, is the present situation in France with the Radical Party, in the United States with the various farmers' organizations, in Poland with "Stronnictwo ludowe", in Yugoslavia with the Croatian Peasants' Party, in Bulgaria with the Farmers' Union, in Greece with the agrarians, etc."³². L. Trotsky himself viewed this political turn negatively and considered it as the beginning of the "Menshevization" of the communist movement, the spread of social-patriotism and the reorientation of the Communist Parties from the proletariat to the "middle classes": "The Congress is important because it marks – after a period of acillation and fumbling – the final entry of the Communist International into its “Fourth Period” which has for its slogan – ”Power to Daladier!” for its banner – tricolor: for its hymn – the Marseillaise, drowning out the International"³³. The interaction of communist parties with non-communist and "bourgeois" forces, in our opinion, had a significant influence on the evolution of European communist parties and was not limited exclusively to "popular fronts".

Participation in the Resistance Movement was an important milestone in the history and ideology of the Italian and French Communist Parties. In 1944, the leadership of the ICP proclaimed a course of renouncing the revolutionary struggle for socialism and establishing a democratic government of popular unity. A resolution of the national council of the ICP declared: "The National Council of the Italian Communist Party reaffirms the policy pursued by the party for the unity of the working class and the fraternal and consistent cooperation with the Socialist Party, the unity of

³² VII Congress of the Communist International and the struggle against fascism and war: a collection of documents // Edited by A.I. Sobolev. [and others]. Moscow: Politizdat, 1975. P. 146. [In Russian].

³³ Trotsky L.D. On VII Congress of Comintern// Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/russkij/trotsky/works/trotm386.html> (accessed: 24.10.2023). [In Russian].

the democratic and liberal anti-fascist forces of the movement of the Committees of National Liberation, and the unity of the entire Italian nation in the struggle for its freedom, independence and its rebirth"³⁴. This political document should be seen as the result of the long interaction between the ICP and non-communist anti-fascist forces, the resulting ideological mutual influence, the Italian communists' de facto rejection of the role of "proletarian vanguard" and the recognition of certain consensus values with liberal and even conservative parties. Already in April 1945, the ICP's party publication *L'Unita* would announce the concept of a "new party" that "without changing its class essence" should become a party of unity and unite not only workers and peasants but also employees and all those "outside the factories"³⁵. The text concludes with P. Togliatti's words that it is the Communists who, against all odds, defend the interests of the country and the nation³⁶.

After 1945, the ICP leadership sought to suppress the radicalism emanating from some rank-and-file members and to attract as many representatives as possible from different strata of Italian society³⁷. The ICP's calls for the unity of the nation can also be seen as a desire to broaden the social base of the party and a manifestation of the transformation of its views on the ways of overcoming capitalism. An example confirming this political line is P. Togliatti's speech at the IX Congress of the ICP in January 1960: "In order for the democratic path of economic development to be realized, it requires a multifaceted activity that would be carried out on many fronts, using various means, and above all would be based on the movement of the broad

³⁴ Secchia P. The Salerno Turning Point // Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sections/italy/1975/salerno.htm> (accessed: 25.10.2023).

³⁵ Togliatti P. The New Party // Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sections/italy/1945/new-party.htm> (accessed: 25.10.2023).

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Gray L. From Gramsci to Togliatti: The Partito Nuovo and the Mass Basis of Italian Communism // *The Italian communist party: yesterday, today, and tomorrow* / edited by S. Serfaty and L. Gray. Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1980. P. 23.

masses of workers, on the movement of whole groups and categories of the population, cities and whole regions in support of their demands"³⁸.

In the above-mentioned speech of P. Togliatti, first of all, the desire to blur the orthodox Marxist rhetoric and appeal to the broadest possible strata of the population, speaking not only about "socialism" and "working class", but also about the democratization of the economy in the interests of the broadest possible strata of Italian society, attracts attention. P. Togliatti, referring to Antonio Gramsci, believed that the ICP should create a "new historical bloc": "To bring the new social groups to become the leading class of our (i.e. Italian) society"³⁹. It is worth noting separately that as early as 1925 A. Gramsci and P. Togliatti, in their co-authored "Lyon Theses", insisted on the unification of the "broad working masses" around the proletariat and criticized the ultra-left faction of Amadeo Bordiga for ignoring the peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals and other "non-proletarian" social strata⁴⁰. The American political scientist Jonas Pontusson believes that, guided by these ideas, the ICP began to resemble an extensive network seeking to connect with social groups beyond the working class and to strengthen its "presence" in society in order to prepare the conditions for socialism⁴¹. The Communists considered the struggle against fascism within the Resistance Movement, which they saw as a "great democratic revolution," as the basis for consensus among political forces and all sectors of Italian society⁴². Italian researcher Andrea Cossu believes that despite anti-fascism as a unifying element for all Italian political forces at the time, the burden of rebuilding the country and different visions of Italy's future led the Communists to gradually weaken

³⁸ Togliatti P. For the democratic renewal of Italian society, for the advance towards socialism. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960. P. 41. [In Russian].

³⁹ Ibid. P. 80.

⁴⁰ Gramsci A. Selections from Political Writings (1921-1926). London: Lawrence and Wishart Ltd, 1978. P. 363

⁴¹ Pontusson J. Gramsci and Eurocommunism: A Comparative Analysis of Conceptions of Class Rule and Socialist Transition // Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 1980. Vol. 24/25. P. 189.

⁴² Togliatti P. For the democratic renewal of Italian society, for the advance towards socialism. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960. P. 37. [In Russian].

coalitions⁴³. This was also noted by the ICP leaders themselves when they said that yesterday's allies in the Resistance Movement, in the course of political competition, began to have some disagreements about the further socio-economic and political development of Italy⁴⁴. Over time, after the final conceptualization of Eurocommunism, the ICP's desire to become the voice of as many Italians as possible was only confirmed. E. Berlinguer, secretary of the ICP from 1972-1984, responding to questions from *La Repubblica* journalists, stated that the party's policy was now oriented not only towards "non-proletarian" elements and broad sections of workers, but also towards groups that were vulnerable due to gender and age characteristics: "We have put at the center of our policies not only the interests of the working class itself and the working masses as a whole, but also the interests of the marginalized sectors of society, starting with women, young people and the elderly"⁴⁵. In the same interview, Berlinguer made a statement about the need to "give a voice to the disadvantaged" and "the ignored people"⁴⁶, which can be interpreted as a desire to attract to the ranks of the Communist Party supporters the "precarariat", which was in the process of formation at that time - precarious workers without any social, labor and other guarantees. In favor of this assumption, Guy Standing can be quoted as saying that the signs of precarization include restriction of political rights, excommunication from society, and the absence of a clear professional and other identity⁴⁷.

The Communist Party of Spain, which passed through the civil war and years of insurgency during the rule of Francisco Franco, somehow had to coordinate its actions and join forces with ideologically heterogeneous political forces - not only left-wing but also democratic. Despite the fact that the CPS in the early 1930s was forced to

⁴³ Cossu A. Commemoration and processes of appropriation: the Italian Communist Party and the Italian Resistance (1943–48) // *Memory Studies*, 2011. Vol. 4. №. 4. P. 392

⁴⁴ Togliatti P. For the democratic renewal of Italian society, for the advance towards socialism. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960. P. 39. [In Russian].

⁴⁵ Scalfari E. Dove va il PCI? – Intervista a Berlinguer // *Enrico Berlinguer: un Comunista Italiano*. URL: <https://www.enricoberlinguer.it/enrico/scritti/dove-va-il-pci-intervista-a-berlinguer/> (accessed: 12.11.2023).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Standing G. The precariat: a dangerous new class. Moscow: Ad Marginem Press, 2014. P. 278. [In Russian].

unconditionally endorse the Comintern's theory of "social fascism"⁴⁸, which equated social democracy and other reformist forces with fascist forces (the so-called "third period of the Comintern"), already in 1935 there were tendencies to unite leftist forces in Spain⁴⁹. Already in July of the same year, the general secretary of the CPS, José Díaz, will come up with the idea of creating a "Popular Bloc", whose program will combine economic reforms of a socialist nature (confiscation of landlords' and church lands without redemption) and democratic reforms (the right to self-determination of the peoples of Spain, political amnesty)⁵⁰. At that time, the Spanish Communists began to promote the idea of "triple alliance", which meant: unification with the Socialist Party and the predominance of the Communists within the new organization; the creation of a broad coalition of left-wing forces, including sympathetic part of the lower middle class; the development and strengthening of workers' organizations under the banner of the "pueblo laborioso" ("labor community"), uniting heterogeneous layers of workers - from peasants to the working aristocracy⁵¹. In January 1936, the Socialists, Communist Party, Anarchists, Independent Marxists, and Centrist parties signed a joint manifesto declaring political, economic, and agrarian reforms, as well as a political amnesty and the right to autonomy for the peoples of Spain⁵². At the same time, the policy of "left unity" was gradually limited by the demands of the Soviet leadership, which sought to isolate independent Marxists from the P.O.U.M. (Workers' Party of Marxist Unity) and anarcho-syndicalists from the CNT (National Confederation of Workers), with the result that many non-Stalinist leftists were imprisoned or killed during the Spanish Republic⁵³. Confirmation of such a position of the Soviet leadership can be found in the pages of "Pravda", where columnists approve of the expulsion of

⁴⁸ Sebares E. F. De los orígenes a la lucha guerrillera. Evolución histórica del PCE (I). Madrid: Partido Comunista de España Secretaría de Formación. 2012. P. 12

⁴⁹ Ibid. P. 17.

⁵⁰ Ibid. P. 16.

⁵¹ Payne S. G. The Spanish civil War, the Soviet Union, and communism. London; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. P. 66-67.

⁵² El pacto electoral de los partidos de izquierda // El Socialista. 1936. № 8.035. P. 1

⁵³ Richards V. Lessons of the Spanish Revolution. London: Freedom Press, 1995. P. 118.

P.O.U.M. members from republican municipalities: "The provocative and sabotage activities of a group of Trotskyists in the municipality of Valencia - insignificant but proven by numerous treacherous acts - led to the refusal of the political parties of the Popular Front and trade unions to participate in the work of the municipality, in case of the continued presence of Trotskyist provocateurs in it. With the exclusion of POUM members from the municipality of Valencia, an environment is being created to ensure the normal work of the municipality"⁵⁴. In the memoirs of Vilebaldo Solano, one of the leaders of the P.O.U.M. writes about a conference of young Spanish socialists held in January 1937, where S. Carrillo, who was already a member of the CPS at that time, branded the independent left "agents of the Frankists"⁵⁵. In May 1937, political disagreements between the Republican government and the extreme left erupted into armed confrontation⁵⁶. It can be stated that the Left and Centrist parties that were part of the republican government were united not only in their program positions, but also in their obstruction of the anti-Stalinist Left, Russian historian Alexander Shubin, in his work on the role of the SSWP in the civil war, characterized the Communist Party's policy towards the Left that did not fit into the "general line" as follows: "The Communists, who had their snouts in their mouths, attacked the anarcho-syndicalists and 'Trotskyists' of the P.O.U.M. with the support of the SSWP' centrists"⁵⁷. In addition to the anarchists and P.O.U.M., the CPS also had disagreements with the left wing of the Socialists under the leadership of Largo Caballero ⁵⁸. Nevertheless, despite its competition with other leftist forces and its alignment with the position of the USSR leadership and the Comintern, the interaction within the Popular Front with other democratic and leftist forces had an impact on the ideology of the CPS, forced it to

⁵⁴ Expulsion of Trotskyists from the municipality of Valencia// «Pravda». 1937. № 356. P. 5. [In Russian].

⁵⁵ Solano V. Against Franco, against Stalin: The Workers' Party of Marxist Unity (POUM) in the Spanish Revolution and Civil War (1936-1939). Moscow: «LIBROCOM» Book House, 2017. P. 56. [In Russian].

⁵⁶ Shubin A. V. POUM: Long History and Star Hour// Latin American Historical Almanac. 2021. № 30. P. 75-76. [In Russian].

⁵⁷ Shubin A. V. Spanish Socialist Labor Party in the Revolution of the 1930s// Latin American Historical Almanac. 2018. № 20. P. 301. [In Russian].

⁵⁸ Ibid. P. 295.

fight for the sympathies of segments of the population, which in Marxist-Leninist discourse were considered "non-proletarian" and "petty-bourgeois", and also pushed it to recognize party pluralism and the need to search for political compromises. The victory of the Francoists further encouraged the CPS's focus on building broad coalitions and finding supporters in social groups that had not previously been considered a traditional social base for communists. Moreover, after the final defeat of the Spanish Republic and the consolidation of the Francoist regime, the Communists who remained in Spain were forced to use the legal trade unions under the control of the authorities as a platform, which disgruntled many activists⁵⁹. Later, the CPS's position on the need to build broad coalitions between the working class and the petty bourgeoisie was confirmed by the successful experience of the bloodless Portuguese Carnation Revolution in 1974, which was seen by party leaders as a possible scenario for Spanish conditions⁶⁰.

The French Communist Party (FCP) followed a somewhat different path. After the attempted right-wing putsch in Paris in February 1934, the French Communist Party organized mass counter-demonstrations, joined by socialists from the French section of the Workers Internationale (SFIO). Against the backdrop of the rise of the far right, the FCP and SFIO began to converge, resulting in a declaration of unity of action signed by both parties in July 1934⁶¹. The FCP had previously adhered to the Comintern's official theory of "social fascism," which equated fascism and social democracy, but by 1934 the line was already being proclaimed for unity among leftist forces "at any cost" in the face of the onslaught of fascism⁶². Socialist leader Leon Blum noted in the July 1934 in party newspaper that the FCP had previously rejected

⁵⁹ Sebares E. F. De los orígenes a la lucha guerrillera. Evolución histórica del PCE (I). Madrid: Partido Comunista de España Secretaría de Formación. 2012. P. 35.

⁶⁰ Preston P. The Dilemma of Credibility: The Spanish Communist Party, the Franco Regime and After // Government and Opposition. – 1976. – T. 11. – №. 1. – P. 66.

⁶¹ Trofimov V. A. Popular Front: conceptual framework, historical experience// Bulletin of Moscow State Regional University. Series: History and Political Science. 2014. №. 5. P. 43. [In Russian].

⁶² Raymond G. G. The French Communist Party During the Fifth Republic. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. P. 20.

Socialist proposals for unity of action: "Everything changed in an instant, but why? Probably because Moscow sent new instructions, formally contradicting past instructions"⁶³. In 1936, the Popular Front government, composed of ideologically diverse political forces - communists, socialists, trade unions, radicals and republicans - came to power⁶⁴. FCP leader Maurice Thorez then openly called for the inclusion of the middle classes in a "front" government⁶⁵. Historian George Ross, believed that it was participation in the Popular Front government that brought the Communists into the mainstream of French politics and paid significant political dividends⁶⁶.

Not long before the outbreak of World War II, M. Thorez, at the May 1939 plenum of the FCP Central Committee, made a speech calling for national unity under the title "Frenchmen, unite!"⁶⁷. After the establishment of the Vichy regime in 1940, the Communists called for the creation of a front fighting for the freedom, independence, and revival of the country in a proclamation that expressed the FCP's political goals of "the establishment of people's power" and "social and national liberation"⁶⁸. Following the ICP, the French Communists considered it necessary to establish a democratic republic after the de-occupation of the country; the theses on the necessity and inevitability of social revolution were absent from the Communists' calls. In 1944, M. Thorez issued a proclamation to the people of France, reiterating the theses on the need for "national unity": "We must establish a true democracy...National unity is more necessary than ever"⁶⁹. British FCP researcher Gino J. Raymond characterizes the FCP as a "child of the Resistance," implying that it was through its fight against

⁶³ Blum L. Les données du problème // *Le Populaire*. 1934. № 4.167. P.1

⁶⁴ Dell S. *The image of the Popular Front: the masses and the media in interwar France*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. P. 45

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Ross. G. *Workers and communists in France: From Popular Front to Eurocommunism*. California: University of California Press. 1982. P. 10.

⁶⁷ Adereth M. *The French Communist party: a critical history (1920-1984), from Comintern to "the colours of France"*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. P. 91.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* P. 111.

⁶⁹ Thorez M. Long Live the Unity of French nation! // Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/thorez/1944/long-live.htm> (accessed: 12.11.2023).

fascism during World War II that the party gained enormous political credibility and became an influential political force for at least three postwar decades⁷⁰. In the short term, the goal of the FCP was not socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the broadest restoration of democracy after the disasters caused by the war⁷¹. After J. Stalin's death, the FCP announced the need to create a "New Popular Front", trying to return to the tactics of 1934-1936 and renew the alliance with the socialists⁷². According to G. Ross, the coalition of the FCP with the socialists was to solve the following problems: the creation of an electoral bloc around the program of socialist reforms, electoral victory, strengthening of the FCP and implementation of the program taking into account the aspirations of the communists.⁷³ The FCP sought to become a constituent force in the left coalition. The CGT (General Confederation of Labor) unions provided some support for the Communists, but this was not enough to fill the niche of the leading leftist party, which prompted the FCP to seek support from the "new middle class," whose rapid growth was an integral feature of social change in France in the 1960s and 1970s⁷⁴. G. Marchais in 1976 spoke about the changes in the social structure of French society, where the traditional working class was a minority of the economically active population of France, he emphasized that society had become more heterogeneous and the new strata needed to be offered a new kind of unity that would take into account, among other things, their interests⁷⁵.

In 1959, the FCP would continue its course towards a "united front of left-wing and democratic forces", the condition for which was considered to be the traditionally established multiparty system and the consolidation of part of the French political

⁷⁰ Raymond G. G. *The French Communist Party During the Fifth Republic*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. P. 7.

⁷¹ Martelli R., Vigreux J., Wolikow S. *One Hundred Years of History of the French Communist Party: The Red Party*. Berlin, London, New York: Springer Nature, 2022. P. 91.

⁷² *Ibid.* P. 134-135.

⁷³ Ross G. *Crisis in Eurocommunism: The French Case // Socialist Register*. 1978. Vol. 15. P. 172.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Raymond G. G. *The French Communist Party During the Fifth Republic*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. P. 123.

forces against the strengthening of presidential power and the concentration of powers in the hands of Charles De Gaulle⁷⁶. The FCP leader M. Thorez justified such tactics by the threat of "the development of the presidential regime in the direction of a fascist dictatorship"; at the 16th Congress of the FCP (1961) he declared: "The Degolese power carries a constant threat of fascism. It is important never to forget this in order not to lead to a dangerous disorientation of the struggle of the workers, democratic and national forces"⁷⁷. Thus, in 1961, the French Communists actually began to reproduce the narratives of the Comintern's "fourth period" under significantly changed conditions, reaffirming a policy of "national unity" designed to unite all political forces and sectors of the population interested in transforming the French socio-political system of the time. Political scientist Donald Blackmer, in his work on the history and ideology of the Italian and French Communist Parties, writes that from 1968 onwards, the FCP began to emphasize in its rhetoric the need to find more effective ways of reaching out to social and economic groups beyond the traditional Communist electorate, i.e., different sectors of the growing heterogeneous middle class⁷⁸.

Although the specific political and historical circumstances in which the ICP, the FCP and the CPS operated differed considerably, the basic trends in the communist movement coincided and internal political factors developed in dialectical relationship with the general situation in the communist movement. The need for unity with other political forces and the need to broaden the social base led Eurocommunists to the idea of "national unity" and the opposition of the majority of the exploited, including the petty bourgeoisie, to state-monopoly capital. British researcher Mike Makin-Waite, discussing the "reboot of Menshevism" by Eurocommunists, noted that this policy was conceptualized differently in different countries: the "forces of labor and culture"

⁷⁶ Radeckij V. T. The struggle of the French Communist Party for the unity of the democratic left// Publications of the Vitebsk Technological Institute of Light Industry. Vitebsk: VGTU, 1970. Vol. 1. P. 35. [In Russian].

⁷⁷ XVI Congress of the French Communist Party (1961; Sen Deni). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962. P. 147. [In Russian].

⁷⁸ Blackmer D. L. M. Continuity and Change in Postwar Italian Communism //Communism in Italy and France / edited by Blackmer D. L. M. and Tarrow S. Princeton University Press, 2015. P. 58

(Spain), the "new historical bloc" (Italy), the "alliance of the French people" (France), and the "broad democratic alliance" (Great Britain)⁷⁹.

The expansion of the social base of the analyzed European communist parties was caused by objective circumstances, such as the growing popularity of fascist and extreme right-wing parties in the 1920s-1930s, the outbreak of World War II, and the need to involve the masses in the anti-fascist struggle. These factors stimulated the Comintern's refusal to equate social democracy and fascism (the theory of "social-fascism") and the transition to the policy of "popular fronts". The result of the Communist Parties' interaction with social-democratic, liberal and other democratic forces within the framework of coalitions and the resistance movement was the Communists' recognition of political pluralism and multipartyism, as well as their orientation towards the middle class and other "petty-bourgeois" groups. This subsequently led the communist parties to seek to express the interests of the "whole nation" and to fight for the implementation of their program through parliamentary means. In his article "A Critique of Eurocommunism", E. Mandel wrote: "One party after another rejects the dictatorship of the proletariat and officially recognizes the existing state as an 'arena of class struggle' which must be 'conquered' by the workers movement"⁸⁰.

The development of Soviet Marxism and its contradictions, conditioned by the practice of socialist construction in the USSR, which was considered the center of the international communist movement, had a significant impact on the ideology and political strategy of European communist parties. After the adoption of the "21 Conditions of Admission to the Communist International", the Bolshevization of the European communist movement was in fact officially consolidated⁸¹. Ultra-centralist tendencies began to strengthen in the "world communist party" after Lenin's death, as

⁷⁹ Makin-Waite M. *Communism and Democracy: History, debates and potentials*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2017. P. 211.

⁸⁰ Mandel E. *A Critique of Eurocommunism* // Ernest Mandel Internet Archive. URL: https://www.ernestmandel.org/en/works/txt/1979/a_critique_of_eurocommunism.htm (accessed:17.11.2023).

⁸¹ Lenin V. I. *21 Terms of Admission into Communist International*. Moscow: Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 1933. P. 41. [In Russian].

American researcher Joan Barth Urban writes, "the rapid rise of Stalinists in the Comintern hierarchy soon turned it into a personal tool of the Soviet leader"⁸². After J. Stalin came to power, the decisions of the Comintern, which already had an imperative character for the member parties, were adopted by the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) virtually unilaterally. L. Trotsky commented on the change in the decision-making process in his work "The Communist International after Lenin" as follows: "With Lenin's departure from work, however, an extremely centralist attitude prevailed. The Executive Committee was declared to be the complete Central Committee of the world party, responsible only to its congresses. What do we see, however, in reality? The congresses were not convened when they were most needed..."⁸³ (Comintern congresses were not held from 1924 to 1928, then from 1928 to 1935 - P.K.). Despite the fact that the foundations of the Soviet economic and political system remained the same, the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU and the preceding dissolution of the Comintern gave a significant impetus to the formation of the principle of polycentrism in the communist movement and the search by the communist parties for "national paths" to socialism, which meant taking into account specific historical circumstances, the social stratification of society and the peculiarities of the development of the political system. In particular, in the report of N.S. Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the thesis of the diversity of paths to socialism was expressed, which actually consolidated the decentralization of the international communist movement: "Demonstrating the diversity of paths in the construction of socialism, the experience of the states belonging to this camp expands to an unprecedented degree the possibilities and scope of the influence of socialism"⁸⁴. This thesis found support among the leaders of the European Communist Parties and was interpreted by them as an opportunity to independently determine their

⁸² Urban J. *Moscow and the Italian communist party: from Togliatti to Berlinguer*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1986. P. 63.

⁸³ Trotsky L.D. *The Communist International after Lenin*. Moscow: Spartacist 1993. P. 22. [In Russian].

⁸⁴ XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (14-25 February 1956). Verbatim Report. Vol. 1. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1956. P. 455. [In Russian].

political strategy at the national level, without resorting to copying the Bolshevik experience and made it possible to interpret the concept of "class struggle" as broadly as possible, limiting it mainly to legal forms. E. Mandel believed that the search for "national paths to socialism" or "national communism", which was to be achieved separately and gradually, was a natural conclusion from the theory of the possibility of building socialism in a single country⁸⁵.

In P. Togliatti's 1956 interview with *Nuovi Argomenti*, one can trace two groups of factors he identified that led to dissociation from the USSR and the CPSU, which can be divided into "positive" and "negative". On the one hand, it is the desire to distance oneself from the repressive and authoritarian practices of Stalinism: "Soviet democratic life was limited, partly stifled by the prevalence of bureaucratic, authoritarian management methods and violations of the regime's legality. This is theoretically possible, since the socialist regime is not in itself immune to error and danger. Anyone who would believe this would fall into naive infantilism"⁸⁶. On the other hand, the assertion that the communist movement in Europe had been strengthened and had become capable of moving from slogans to practical action: "...we had reached a point at which the communist movement outside the Soviet Union had become so strong that it could go beyond mere agitation and propaganda, correct many of the mistakes made before Hitler came, and carry out a wide range of positive political activities of action, in the struggle against fascism, against the war that was being prepared, in the attempts to save the Spanish Republic, for the unity of the workers' and democratic movement, and so on. The conditions were being created which recommended then, during the war, the dissolution of the Communist International"⁸⁷.

One of the central political documents that gave justification to the principle of polycentrism in the communist movement was the so-called "Memorial Note" written

⁸⁵ Mandel E. *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism*. 2 ed. Thetford: Lowe and Brydone, 1979. P. 36.

⁸⁶ Togliatti P. Intervista a «Nuovi argomenti» // Associazione Stalin. URL: https://www.associazionestalin.it/togliatti_4_nuoviargomenti.html (accessed: 21.11.2023).

⁸⁷ Ibid.

by P. Togliatti in Yalta, days before his death. Togliatti in Yalta a few days before his death⁸⁸. In it, P. Togliatti advocates the necessity of a broad discussion between the Communist Parties of different countries, denies the need for a new centralized international organization like the Comintern, and warns against the isolation of the Communist Party of China, which at that time was in conflict with the USSR and sought to become an alternative center of the international communist movement. He justifies the need to take into account national specificity in European countries, describing the main trends in the development of monopolistic capitalism, arguing for the need for agitational work with Catholic believers, and advancing the thesis of "communist penetration" in the intellectual, philosophical, and artistic spheres. Togliatti also points to "violations of socialist legality and Leninist principles under Stalinism" and concludes that it is impossible to impose uniformity in socialist countries and the international communist movement: "We know, however, that national feeling remains a constant in the workers' and socialist movement for a long time even after the conquest of power. Economic gains do not weaken it, but strengthen it. And in the socialist camp, perhaps (I emphasize the word 'perhaps' because many concrete facts are not known to us), we must beware of the imposition of uniformity from outside and consider that unity must be stabilized and maintained under the conditions of diversity and complete autonomy of the individual countries"⁸⁹. Later, in 1969, at the 12th Congress of the ICP, L. Longo spoke in favor of "a socialism qualitatively different from the current one"⁹⁰.

P. Togliatti's ideas were developed by E. Berlinguer at the 14th Congress of the ICP in 1975. E. Berlinguer emphasized that national sovereignty is an absolute good for the Italian people, the Communists oppose any attempt on it, and the party itself "advocates the movement towards socialism along a peculiar path, taking into account the specific features of Italy, political traditions and ideological attitudes of the Italian

⁸⁸ Togliatti P. Memorial note// Rabkrin. URL: <https://rabkrin.org/tolyatti-palmiro-pamyatnaya-zapiska-1964/> (accessed: 21.11.2023). [In Russian].

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Rubbi A. World of Berlinguer. Moscow: «International relations», 1995. P. 66. [In Russian].

workers' movement"⁹¹. Despite the fact that the ICP placed considerable emphasis on the consideration of local specifics and, in general, pursued a fairly independent policy from the CPSU, E. Berlinguer criticized the Soviet model within a strict framework, not questioning the fact that socialism had been built in the Soviet Union, but making a reservation that the ICP was looking for a specific, "national" path to socialism: "According to our assessment," he stated, "a socialist society has been built in this great country. In the USSR and, to a greater or lesser extent, in other socialist countries, there are problems, including significant and serious ones, which are still unsolved. These are economic problems, as well as social problems, but mainly they are problems connected with political democracy"⁹².

The ideologists of the FCP, which was also a participant of the "Eurocommunist process", criticized the Soviet model in a much more limited way, referring to the documents and materials of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and limiting themselves to a laconic statement: "We condemned Stalin's personality cult."⁹³ The FCP's first reaction to the publication of Khrushchev's "secret" report was to claim that the words were "attributed" to the Soviet General Secretary and that the report itself did not even exist; it was only after its wide publication that the FCP Politburo was forced to issue a cautious statement calling for a deepening of Marxist analysis to explain Stalin's mistakes and the reasons for it.⁹⁴ M. Thorez, finally forced to admit the obvious, stated that despite some distortions in the USSR, there had never been a personality cult in the FCP, and Khrushchev's report only confirms the correctness of the Party's strategic decisions⁹⁵. The assessment of the Soviet practice of building socialism was much more complementary than that of the ICP and the CPS: the FCP was initially critical of the Italian concept of polycentrism, believing that the Italian communists were trying to take over the leadership of the European communist movement, and

⁹¹ XIV Congress of the Italian Communist Party. Moscow: Politizdat, 1976. P. 27. [In Russian].

⁹² Rubbi A. World of Berlinguer. Moscow: «International relations», 1995. P. 22. [In Russian].

⁹³ XXIV Congress of the French Communist Party. Moscow: Politizdat, 1982. P. 27. [In Russian].

⁹⁴ Adereth M. The French Communist party: a critical history (1920-1984), from Comintern to «the colours of France». Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. P. 229.

⁹⁵ Ross G. Crisis in Eurocommunism: The French Case // Socialist Register. 1978. Vol. 15. P. 94.

demanded that the USSR condemn the ICP for "revisionism"⁹⁶. The position of the FCP after the Twentieth Congress is summarized quite succinctly in the work of foreigners Roger Mortelli, Jean Vigreux and Serge Volikov, written for the centenary of the French Communist Party: "As usual, the FCP acted in a Stalinist manner, according to the molds forged within the framework of Thorez, ignoring democratic trends and striving to be the "guardian of the temple"⁹⁷. It is also worth paying attention to the speech of Georges Marchais at the XXI Congress of the Party: "Socialist countries do not know crisis. There is no unemployment in these countries, no slowdown in economic growth"⁹⁸. Moreover, J. Marchais spoke negatively about critics of the Soviet experience and ultra-leftists who believed that socialism had not been built in the USSR⁹⁹. The rejection of the Soviet experience took place in the case of the FCP indirectly, by putting forward its positive program and, similarly to the ICP, emphasizing the need to search for a national path to socialism. The party sought grounds for this in the ideas of M. Thorez, referring to his positions in 1946: "The progress of democracy observed throughout the world, with rare exceptions which confirm the rule, makes it possible to consider the transition to socialism by other paths than the one followed by the Russian Communists. In any case, the path of each country is bound to have its differences"¹⁰⁰. As M. Di Maggio notes, after the Sino-Soviet conflict became ideological and discussions on this topic spread throughout the communist movement, the French communist student magazine "Clarté" began to raise in its pages the themes of national paths to socialism, the principle of "unity in diversity", and the columnists called for an open discussion between activists, and the journal "Clarté" started to promote the idea of "unity in diversity".¹⁰¹ Moreover, communist students openly demanded freedom of discussion, criticizing a situation in

⁹⁶ Di Maggio M. *The Rise and Fall of Communist Parties in France and Italy*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. P. 4.

⁹⁷ Mart Martelli R., Vigreux J., Wolikow S. *One Hundred Years of History of the French Communist Party: The Red Party*. Berlin, London, New York: Springer Nature, 2022. P. 140.

⁹⁸ XXI (Extraordinary) Congress of the French Communist Party. Moscow: Politizdat, 1975. P. 14. [In Russian].

⁹⁹ *Ibid.* P. 19.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* P. 29-30.

¹⁰¹ Di Maggio M. *The Rise and Fall of Communist Parties in France and Italy*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. P. 46.

which the development of party strategy had become the prerogative of the top leadership¹⁰². M. Di Maggio considers: "Thus, the theoretical reflections of the communist students led to a general questioning of the FCP strategy" ¹⁰³. Gradually, the thesis of the search for "national paths to socialism" became one of the mainstays in the political discourse of the FCP. It can be assumed that the pressure on the leadership by the party youth may not have been a decisive factor, but was a manifestation of objectively existing tendencies, formed in the light of the political events of those years and discussions in the international communist movement. It can be assumed that the FCP was forced to change its position because of the loss of its monopoly on the communist idea, which was caused by the growing popularity of the non-party left (Trotskyists, Maoists and so on), as well as by the examples of the Cuban Revolution and the Cultural Revolution in China, which inspired the left intellectuals and especially its young part, who were looking for new radical ideas¹⁰⁴. In addition, after the events of the "Red May" of 1968, the party began to show signs of dissidence on the part of intellectuals who, in addition to participating in the activities of their grassroots party organizations, were involved in party structures "on the periphery" between the party cells and the central governing bodies, where some freedom of discussion was allowed¹⁰⁵.

The result of the reflection on the events of May 1968 and intra-party discussions in this regard was the manifesto "For advanced democracy, for socialist France!", which, among other things, also notes the need to take into account national specifics. It should be emphasized that this Eurocommunist in essence political document is kept within the traditional communist rhetoric of the time and the need to search for national paths to socialism is justified in it with references to certain differences between the USSR and other countries of socialist orientation, without any direct criticism of their

¹⁰² Ibid. P. 49.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Mart Martelli R., Vigreux J., Wolikow S. One Hundred Years of History of the French Communist Party: The Red Party. Berlin, London, New York: Springer Nature, 2022. P. 167.

¹⁰⁵ Di Maggio M. The Rise and Fall of Communist Parties in France and Italy. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. P. 135.

economic and political systems: "Following it [Russia], other countries also took the path of building socialism. All of them benefited from the experience of the USSR and its support, but each of them brought its own original elements to the formation of people's power, related to the specific conditions of their country"¹⁰⁶.

I. Balampanidis characterizes the "emancipation" of the Eurocommunist parties from the USSR as a continuous process with its retreats and detours¹⁰⁷. In the speeches of FCP leaders, "international solidarity" and support for the Soviet Union were combined with a desire to emphasize the party's independence from the Soviet leadership, the most illustrative expression of this position can be traced in the speech of Jean Canapa, a member of the FCP leadership: "We are the unwavering defenders of French independence. Our party is the party of those executed [during the Resistance]. Our solidarity with the USSR is class-based and we are not going to abandon it...but no feudal subordination to Moscow! Our party is sovereign...decisions are not taken abroad!"¹⁰⁸.

G. Marchais, characterizing the possibility of a socialist future in France, stated that it would be determined by the history and democratic traditions of the country¹⁰⁹. In 1974, at the previously mentioned congress of the French Communist Party, the wording "socialism of the color of France" appeared in the report of G. Marchais¹¹⁰, a more elaborate definition of which would be expressed by him at the XXIV Party Congress in 1982: "Socialism cannot be grafted on the national trunk. It is no longer a question of transplanting into France a 'model', at least acclimatizing it, or of creating a 'model' or 'anti-model' of socialism. It is a question of creating socialism in the French way, on the basis of the national reality of France..."¹¹¹.

¹⁰⁶ Pour une Démocratie avancée, pour une France socialiste // Supplément au «Bulletin de propagande». 1968. №. 7. P. 38.

¹⁰⁷ Balampanidis I. Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left. London: Routledge, 2019. P. 102.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ XXI (Extraordinary) Congress of the French Communist Party. Moscow: Politizdat, 1975. P. 14. [In Russian].

¹¹⁰ Ibid. P. 34.

¹¹¹ XXIV Congress of the French Communist Party. Moscow: Politizdat, 1982. P. 30. [In Russian].

The Spanish Communist Party, whose leader, S. Carrillo, became the personification of Eurocommunism on a par with E. Berlinguer, took the most independent position with regard to the CPSU. Unlike the French, who sought not to enter into an open conflict with the Soviet Communist Party, which embodied the international communist movement, the representatives of the CPS were extremely critical, stating that "the characteristic feature of Eurocommunism is the rejection of the Soviet model"¹¹². Soviet party ideologists criticized the Spanish Communists for what they saw as excessive autonomy and claimed that the CPS had a "mystical, irrational fear of organization and discipline within the Communist movement," refusing the concept of "proletarian internationalism and avoiding even such a cautious term as 'coordination of actions'"¹¹³.

After Franco's death, the CPS became one of the leading opposition parties in Spain due to its principled stance and image as fighters against the dictatorship. As the Spanish researcher José M. Faraldo believed, Eurocommunism was to become a "powerful weapon" through which the Communist Party claimed a place in the post-Franco democratic political system¹¹⁴. Unlike the FCP, which referred to the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and the ICP, which initially criticized the Soviet model without questioning its socialist character, the leaders of the CPS sought to unequivocally dissociate themselves from the Soviet experience and leadership, which S. Carrillo, in a rather provocative tone, called "old frail people who are no longer capable of anything"¹¹⁵. A kind of Rubicon in the conflict with Moscow was the expulsion of the pro-Soviet wing of the CPS, something that no other Eurocommunist party could dare to do¹¹⁶. The situation was also aggravated by a personal conflict

¹¹² Rubbi A. *World of Berlinguer*. Moscow: «International relations», 1995. P. 75. [In Russian].

¹¹³ Sokolov Y. V. *On the Causes of the Crisis in the Spanish Communist Party (based on the discussion in the CPS press)// Problems of strategy and tactics of the communist movement*. 1984. Iss. 16. P. 90. [In Russian].

¹¹⁴ Faraldo J. M. *Entangled Eurocommunism: Santiago Carrillo, the Spanish Communist Party and the Eastern Bloc during the Spanish Transition to Democracy, 1968–1982*. // *Contemporary European History*, vol. 26. № 4. 2017. P. 654.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* P. 656.

¹¹⁶ Balampanidis I. *Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left*. London: Routledge, 2019. P. 103-104.

between the CPS leadership and Mikhail Suslov, considered at that time to be one of the main ideologues of the CPSU ¹¹⁷. Unlike the CPS, the ICP tried to critically rethink the Soviet experience and only later openly criticized the USSR for its repression of dissidents. The FCP, meanwhile, put forward its own model, citing different objective conditions and a different "concrete-historical environment" and praising the social achievements of the Soviet system. Defending and developing the Italian concept of polycentrism in the international communist movement, S. Carrillo declared: "In the international communist movement there is no longer a party that is the sole leader or leader! All parties are equal and responsible for the direction of their movement... We are no longer, nor have we ever assumed the role of a mere group of propagandists for the achievements of socialism in one country or in several. Our aim is to make our own revolution...The fulfillment of this task necessarily requires that our line take into account the reality and peculiarities of our country"¹¹⁸.

S. Carrillo gave a detailed justification of the principles of polycentrism, the need to search for national paths to socialism, including the concept of "new internationalism" in his work "Eurocommunism and the State", questioning the need for unconditional support of the USSR and orientation towards the "center" of the international communist movement represented by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: "We communists strive for the rise and elevation of the country in which we were born in such a way as to contribute to the progress of mankind and in no way to contribute to the subordination of our country to the Soviet Union".¹¹⁹.

Another factor that influenced the formation of Eurocommunism was the entry of the Soviet army into Czechoslovakia, which was ambiguously perceived by a significant part of the international communist movement, including Eurocommunist parties.

Scottish researcher Maud Bracke characterizes the policies of the Eurocommunist parties after the Czechoslovak events as a "reboot of internationalism":

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Preston P. *The last Stalinist: the life of Santiago Carrillo*. London: William Collins, 2014. P. 265.

¹¹⁹ Carrillo S. «Eurocomunismo» y Estado. Barcelona: Grupo Editorial Grijalbo, 1977. P. 198.

"These shifts were necessary because of the strategic (in both cases, the FCP and the ICP), doctrinal (mainly in the case of the FCP) and organizational (mainly in the case of the FCP) problems with Soviet internationalism that the Czechoslovak crisis revealed. Whereas in the case of the ICP internationalism was narrowed down to a strategic dimension, in the FCP a historical view of internationalism, including all three of its dimensions, prevailed. This was in connection with the internal strategy of the parties, with their internal sources of legitimization, with the international position of their country, and within the margin of maneuver allowed by the conditions of their renewed connection with the world communist movement"¹²⁰. The Czechoslovak events were perceived most radically by the Spanish Communists, their leader S. Carrillo wrote: "For us, for the Communist Party of Spain, the fact is that the culmination of the conquest of our independence was the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968...Czechoslovakia was the drop that overflowed the cup, and it made our party say: "No"! This "internationalism" was over for us. It is precisely what we called the "old internationalism", which we are convinced must end. Real internationalism is something else, it must be something else"¹²¹. It can also be assumed that the position of the CPS was influenced by the fear of the possibility of normalization of relations between the Francoist government and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, which the CPS repeatedly protested against¹²². And these fears had real grounds: socialist Poland sold coal to Francoist Spain during the strike of Austrian miners, and trade and economic ties between Spain and the USSR were gradually improving¹²³. While the Warsaw Pact countries sought "peaceful coexistence" and normalization of relations even with ideologically opposed European governments, CRPD members were forced to operate underground, subjected to political repression or, at best, in political exile. This policy of the "socialist commonwealth" forced the

¹²⁰ Bracke M. Which Socialism, Whose Detente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2007. P. 273.

¹²¹ Carrillo S. «Eurocomunismo» y Estado. Barcelona: Grupo Editorial Grijalbo, 1977. P. 153.

¹²² Faraldo J. M. Entangled Eurocommunism: Santiago Carrillo, the Spanish Communist Party and the Eastern Bloc during the Spanish Transition to Democracy, 1968–1982. // Contemporary European History, vol. 26. № 4. 2017. P. 657.

¹²³ Ibid.

CPS to draw its own conclusions from what was happening and to revise the concept of "proletarian internationalism", which implied the need to support the "fatherland of the proletarians of the whole world" - the USSR. It can be concluded that the above-mentioned circumstances pushed the CPI not only to embrace the principles of "polycentrism", but also to the point that the party actually found itself in the vanguard of the movement for the decentralization of the international communist movement.

The FCP, which had always believed that the defense of the USSR was above all other considerations, this time broke with tradition and, following many communist parties, condemned the Soviet troops' entry into Czechoslovakia ¹²⁴.

FCP leaders rightly believed that the actions of the Soviet political leadership would give the anti-communists an additional argument and create a negative image of the European Communist parties ¹²⁵. However, the statement was later softened somewhat and the term "condemnation" was changed to "disapproval" ¹²⁶. Although the FCP was forced to criticize the USSR's actions in Czechoslovakia and to assert its right to pursue an independent policy in an effort to rid itself of the image of a party "controlled from Moscow", the party continued to claim that it continued to believe that the CPSU had a crucial role in the international communist movement ¹²⁷. The French Communist Party's condemnation of the Soviet leadership's actions later proved to be rather limited; later the FCP supported a policy of "normalization" with regard to Czechoslovakia, and returned to "normalcy" itself. According to J. Ross, despite the attempt to stabilize relations with the CPSU, these events were the starting point for the French Communists to rethink the Soviet model and their role in the international communist movement ¹²⁸.

¹²⁴ Martelli R., Vigreux J., Wolikow S. *One Hundred Years of History of the French Communist Party: The Red Party*. Berlin, London, New York: Springer Nature, 2022. P. 176-177.

¹²⁵ Balampanidis I. *Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left*. London: Routledge, 2019. P. 42.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.* P. 176.

¹²⁷ Tarrow S. *Party Activists in Public Office: Comparisons at the Local Level in Italy and France // Communism in Italy and France / edited by Blackmer D. L. M. and Tarrow S.* Princeton University Press, 2015. P. 107.

¹²⁸ Ross. G. *Workers and communists in France: From Popular Front to Eurocommunism*. California: University of California Press. 1982. P. 222.

The ICP condemned the intervention, albeit with some reservations, the day after the troops were deployed. Even a few months before the intervention, the ICP newspaper *Rinascita* had written approvingly about Czechoslovak innovations, democratization of political and cultural life and reforms in the economic sphere¹²⁹.

The communiqué adopted by the ICP Politburo on August 22, 1968, stated: "The Political Bureau of the ICP considers this decision unjustified and inconsistent with the principles of autonomy and independence of each communist party and each socialist state, as well as with the need to defend the unity of the international workers' and communist movement. In the spirit of the most convinced and firm proletarian internationalism, reaffirming the fraternal and open relations between the Italian communists with the Soviet Union and the CPSU, the ICP Politburo considers it its duty to express its profound disagreement, leaving it to the Party leadership to make a more thorough assessment of the situation and its further development"¹³⁰. However, the statement said the ICP reaffirms its solidarity with the Czechoslovak Communist Party's "renewal policy"¹³¹. Defending Czechoslovakia's right to a path to socialism different from that of the Soviet Union, the ICP drew distinctions between Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1956. One of the ICP leaders, L. Longo, declared: "The unity of the Communist Party was inviolable, the socialist character of the state was not questioned, and the Czechoslovak leadership confirmed its loyalty to the Warsaw Pact Organization (WTO) and Soviet foreign policy"¹³². In addition, the ICP defiantly refused to sign most of the outcome document of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in 1969¹³³.

The entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia pushed all European Communist Parties to dissociate themselves from Soviet foreign policy and forced them to pursue

¹²⁹ Urban J. *Moscow and the Italian communist party: from Togliatti to Berlinguer*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1986. P. 255.

¹³⁰ Il comunicato dell'Ufficio politico // *L'Unita*. 1968. № 222. P. 1

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² Urban J. *Moscow and the Italian communist party: from Togliatti to Berlinguer*. New York: Cornell University Press, 1986. P. 255.

¹³³ Rubbi A. *World of Berlinguer*. Moscow: «International relations», 1995. P. 45. [In Russian].

a more independent political and ideological line. First, this can be explained by the fear of losing voters and supporters who, in case of approval of the Soviet leadership's actions, could perceive the Communist parties of their countries not as independent political forces, but as an instrument of the USSR's foreign policy. Second, even the more CPSU-loyal European Communist Parties, such as the FCP, considered alternative, different paths to socialism from the Soviet one possible and identified themselves with the Czechoslovak reformers, who also spoke of a special "Czechoslovak path" to socialism. In fact, it was the thesis of the "Czechoslovak path to socialism" that became one of the arguments of the Soviet leadership explaining the troops' entry.

Of course, the Eurocommunist parties protested against the very fact of the "violation of the sovereignty" of one country of the socialist commonwealth, which, moreover, did not question its socialist choice¹³⁴, but, in our opinion, such a categorical and unanimous position was caused, among other things, by the fact that the aspiration of the Czechoslovak communists to create "socialism with a human face" was in harmony with the programmatic guidelines of the Eurocommunist parties, which saw in the Czechoslovak way some aspects of their vision of building socialism, taking into account the aspiration to guarantee certain democratic rights, to preserve the diversity of various forms of property, to take into account national specificity and to maintain a certain autonomy from the center of international relations. Czechoslovak reforms included both economic and political components and, most importantly in the analyzed case, were carried out under the auspices of the Communist Party¹³⁵. In particular, economic reforms in the Czechoslovak SSR implied moving away from strict central planning and giving more power to enterprise managers, introducing anti-monopolistic policies, abandoning isolation from the world market, and opening credit

¹³⁴ Urbanek L. Some difficulties in implementing the economic reforms in Czechoslovakia // Soviet Studies. 1968. Vol. 19. №. 4. P. 564.

¹³⁵ Bracke M. Which Socialism, Whose Detente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2007. P. 133.

lines for individual enterprises¹³⁶. Political reforms, although not implying multipartyism in the liberal-democratic spirit, presupposed the strengthening and relative independence of the non-communist forces within the Czechoslovak National Front¹³⁷. In addition, some separation of state and party organs was planned, as well as liberalization in the cultural sphere and freedom of the press¹³⁸.

Thus, the long "incubation period" of the formation of Eurocommunism began with the Comintern's rejection of the theory of "social fascism" in relation to the social democrats and the transition to the policy of "popular fronts", called the "fourth period". The line of European communist parties to build "united fronts" was dictated by the growth of ultra-right sentiments in a number of European countries and implied interaction with non-communist forces opposed to fascism. On the one hand, this led to a rejection of the aspiration to radically dismantle the old "bourgeois" state apparatus and replace it, in Lenin's words, with a proletarian state or a "dying-out semi-state"¹³⁹. Instead, the state was seen as an "arena of class struggle" where the labor movement must win a majority¹⁴⁰. On the other hand, the traditional social base of the Communists began to erode and was supplemented by those social groups that had previously been characterized by them as "petty bourgeois". This process continued after the end of World War II with the beginning of the growth of the middle class and the complication of the social structure of society in capitalist countries. In an effort to reach the largest possible number of people, the Communist Parties gradually abandoned the concept of proletarian dictatorship and sought to become the spokesmen for the interests of the "whole nation". The broadening of the social base was also

¹³⁶ Urbanek L. Some difficulties in implementing the economic reforms in Czechoslovakia // *Soviet Studies*. 1968. Vol. 19. №. 4. P. 558-559.

¹³⁷ Bracke M. *Which Socialism, Whose Detente? West European Communism and the Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968*. Bupadest, New York: Central European University Press, 2007. P. 136.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.* P. 137.

¹³⁹ Lenin V. I. *State and revolution* // *V. I. Lenin Complete Works*. 5 ed. Moscow: Political Literature Publisher, 1969. Vol. 33. P. 18. [In Russian].

¹⁴⁰ Mandel E. *A Critique of Eurocommunism* // Ernest Mandel Internet Archive. URL: https://www.ernestmandel.org/en/works/txt/1979/a_critique_of_eurocommunism.htm (accessed:17.11.2023).

influenced by participation in the resistance movements against fascism, which also helped the Communist Parties to target the broader population and to embed themselves in the political system of their countries and subsequently participate in the democratic political process. In the case of the Spanish Communist Party, a similar role was played by its resistance to the Francoist dictatorship and its subsequent participation in the democratic transit process. As a result, the Communist Parties recognized the pluralist multiparty system and democratic "traditions" of their countries, which was one of the reasons for the search for "national paths" to socialism.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU, which condemned Stalin's cult of personality and put forward the thesis of the diversity of paths to socialism, gave a new impetus to an increased emphasis on the independence of Eurocommunist parties and the democratic component of their ideology. The thesis of the Soviet communists, which began to appear everywhere from the 1960s onwards, about the transition to a "nationwide socialist state", which was considered at that time to be a higher degree of development of socialist society than the dictatorship of the proletariat¹⁴¹, could not but affect the ideology of the Eurocommunist parties, which increasingly claimed to express the interests not only and not so much of the working class, but of "all the people", opposed to state-monopolistic capitalism.

The formation of a consensus on democratic freedoms and polycentrism among Eurocommunist parties can be considered to have been completed after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Regardless of the degree of criticism of the socialist project in the USSR (from loyalty to the FCP to extreme rejection by the CPS), most of the Communist Parties operating in the capitalist countries took an extremely negative view of the actions of the Soviet leadership and issued critical statements of varying degrees of radicality.

The unanimity of the European Communist Parties can be regarded as a kind of realization of the principle of "negation of negation" from Marxist materialist

¹⁴¹ Nikandrov A. V. From the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to the Nation-State: "liquidation of dogmatism" or revisionism?// *Filosofiya i obshchestvo* [Philosophy and society]. 2018. Vol. 86. №1. P. 20. [In Russian].

dialectics: the Euro-Communist Parties, against the background of the events in Prague, stood up to defend the theoretical position on the diversity of paths to socialism, which had been repeatedly proclaimed by Soviet Marxists and party figures and ignored by them, as the Czech-French writer and researcher Antonin Jaroslav Liehm, who was a witness of those events, wrote: "The concept of the independence of the communist parties, of the national character of the various communist experiences, was proclaimed long ago, even under Stalin, and was repeatedly confirmed. And so, the Eurocommunist parties were only reminding the Soviet party of its own words"¹⁴².

The expansion of the social base of the Communist Parties, the desire to find alternative paths to socialism, the recognition of political pluralism and multi-partyism and, as a consequence, the desire to implement their program using legal methods of political struggle determined the central element of the ideology of Eurocommunism - the implementation of socialist transformations and the overcoming of capitalism by democratic means, without violent revolution, civil war, with the participation of non-communist forces and non-proletarian social groups.

¹⁴² Liehm A.J. The Prague Spring and Eurocommunism // *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*. 1978. Vol. 33. № 4. P. 808.

1.2. The Phenomenon of Eurocommunism: Theoretical and Methodological Foundations and Key Concepts of the Research

Starting to consider the main prerequisites for the formation of Eurocommunism, it is necessary to outline the origin of the term itself, list the main approaches to its definition and explain which parties the author of this research characterizes as "Eurocommunist".

Eurocommunism as a modification of communist ideology emerged due to the coincidence of a number of objective and subjective, domestic and international factors and does not represent a coherent ideological system. Greek-French left-wing political scientist and sociologist N. Poulanzas in one of his interviews for "Marxism today" stated that a reformist tendency can be found in Eurocommunism and it makes sense to talk about left and right directions in Eurocommunism¹⁴³.

Analyzing its fundamental ideological provisions it is necessary to use some generalizations that can be derived from the similarity of political practices, electoral tactics of European communist parties, their theoretical justification, as well as ideologems and narratives promoted by the leaders and theorists of these parties and movements. As K. Marx and F. Engels noted: "It is necessary to bring together the most general results, which in isolation from real history have no value, but may be useful for organizing the historical material"¹⁴⁴.

There are several approaches regarding the emergence of the term, as Yannis Balampanidis writes in his book *From Communism to the Modern European Radical Left*, the term "Eurocommunism" was not invented by Eurocommunist parties¹⁴⁵.

As H.T. Willetts points out, the term "Eurocommunism" was coined by a journalist of Yugoslav origin writing for Italian periodicals, and was at first rejected or ignored by the communists themselves, and later adopted by the leaders of the most

¹⁴³ Hall S., Hunt. A Interview with Nicos Poulantzas // *Marxism today*. 1979. July. P. 196.

¹⁴⁴ Marx K. Engels F. *German ideology*// K. Marx, F. Engels. *Essays*. 2nd ed. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1955. Vol. 3. P. 26. [In Russian].

¹⁴⁵ Balampanidis I. *Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left*. London: Routledge, 2019. P. 59.

influential communist parties in Europe - E. Berlinguer, G. Marchais and S. Carrillo¹⁴⁶. The Soviet researcher V. Naumov, in his research of ICP politics in the 1970s, notes that despite the multiplicity of versions about the origin of the term, they all agree that it first appeared in the Italian "bourgeois" press as a suggestion of the emergence of a new current in the communist movement¹⁴⁷.

Grigoros Charalambous, characterizing Eurocommunism, identifies three of its components: an electoral strategy focused on the middle class; revision of the Soviet interpretation of Marxism-Leninism; and growing dissatisfaction with the USSR in the West¹⁴⁸. Richard Dunphy defines Eurocommunism as an attempt to combine the Leninist ideas of the vanguard party, democratic centralism and class politics with pluralistic multi-party democracy¹⁴⁹. A rather detailed definition of Eurocommunism is given in Marco Di Maggio's "The Rise and Fall of the Italian and French Communist Parties. He sees Eurocommunism as an instrument that legitimizes the abandonment of the revolutionary path in favor of a national strategy for each party and a conglomeration of programmatic demands of the Western Communist Parties declared by them since the 1960s"¹⁵⁰.

The majority of researchers focus on the program-political level, Eurocommunism is considered mainly as an electoral strategy. The Marxist theorist E. Mandel, who noted that Eurocommunism was "an opportunistic electoral policy aimed at the working class and the lower strata of the petty bourgeoisie", held similar views¹⁵¹. Enver Hoxha, a representative of the "anti-revisionist" direction in the communist movement and head of socialist Albania, critically evaluated Eurocommunism, noting

¹⁴⁶ Willetts H. T. *The USSR and Eurocommunism // In Search of Eurocommunism* / London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1981. P. 1

¹⁴⁷ Naumov V.K. *The Italian Communist Party at the turn of the 70s and 80s // Problems of strategy and tactics of the communist movement*. 1982. Iss. 12. P. 22. [In Russian].

¹⁴⁸ Charalambous G. *The European Radical Left: Movements and parties since the 1960s*. London: Pluto Press, 2022. P. 164

¹⁴⁹ Dunphy R. *Contesting capitalism? left parties and European integration*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004. P. 34

¹⁵⁰ Di Maggio M. *The Rise and Fall of Communist Parties in France and Italy*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. P. 167.

¹⁵¹ Mandel E. *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism*. Thetford: Lowe and Brydone, 1979. P. 49

such components as parliamentarism, pluralism, and the desire to incorporate Eurocommunist parties into the basis and superstructure of capitalist societies¹⁵².

One of the most comprehensive definitions of Eurocommunism was offered by the French structuralist philosopher Louis Althusser: "'Eurocommunism,' if its geographical connotation is set aside, can easily be defined as a strategy of democratic transition to democratic socialism, or, more precisely, as a strategy of democratic preparation of an advanced democracy that will democratically pave the way to democratic socialism. The essential feature of this strategy is the assertion that the end (democratic socialism) and the "democratic" means are identical. In short, strategy, tactics and means must be thought of within the concept of 'democracy'"¹⁵³. The merits of this approach include the consideration of the mutual conditionality of the political strategy and social ideal of the Eurocommunists, which are considered by a large part of researchers in isolation from each other.

One of the main methodological difficulties in analyzing Eurocommunism and identifying the Communist parties that influenced its formation and establishment is the fact that their leaders and theorists did not use such self-identification, in some cases publicly rejecting the "Eurocommunist" label. For example, the representative of the Italian Communists, G. Chiaromonte, stated that the term "Eurocommunism" was "just a verbal expression"¹⁵⁴.

One of the ICP leaders, J. Amendola, declared that "there is no such thing as Eurocommunism".¹⁵⁵ ICP theorists and leaders, characterizing the party's political line, preferred to describe it as "the third way to socialism"¹⁵⁶. The Italian Communist leader E. Berlinguer used a similar formulation in his programmatic speeches. In an interview

¹⁵² Hoxha E. Eurocommunism is anti-communism// E. Hoxha. Selected Writings. Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1985. Vol. 5. P. 817. [In Russian].

¹⁵³ Althusser L. What is to be Done? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020. P.76

¹⁵⁴ Iribarne M.F. El eurocomunismo y el problema de Europa // El Pais. URL: https://elpais.com/diario/1978/07/05/opinion/268437606_850215 (accessed: 01.09.2023).

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Naumov V.K. The Italian Communist Party at the turn of the 70s and 80s // Problems of strategy and tactics of the communist movement. 1982. Iss. 12. P. 22. [In Russian].

with the party newspaper L'Unita in February 1982, he justified the use of this term by the need to give a European dimension to the struggle for socialism¹⁵⁷. Nevertheless, the term "Eurocommunism" was present in the discourse of the Italian communists. Commenting on the difference between the ICP and the Socialists, E. Berlinguer in July 1981 called the ICP strategy "Eurocommunist", while the term "third way" referred to the rhetoric of the French Socialists¹⁵⁸. It can be concluded that the use of the term "Eurocommunism" is situational and in a number of cases, especially in relations with the CPSU, the ICP leaders considered their strategy as the application of Marxist-Leninist principles taking into account national specifics and denied the existence of the term itself, but used it when there was a need to emphasize the difference from social democracy or to emphasize the democratic component of the ideology of European communist parties.

One of the few communist leaders and theorists who openly called themselves Eurocommunists was the Spanish communist leader Santiago Carrillo. In his work *Eurocommunism and the State*, he argued for the use of the term as follows: "The reader may be surprised at the frequency with which later in the text I use the term 'Eurocommunism'. It is very fashionable, and, although it was not invented by communists and its scientific value is doubtful, it already has significance in the eyes of public opinion and differentiates in general terms one of the modern communist tendencies".¹⁵⁹.

Although the term itself was rejected by some communist figures, who are considered to be among the founders of Eurocommunism¹⁶⁰, and the question of its origin remains debatable, some provisions of communist ideology and their development in the theory and political practice of European and world communist

¹⁵⁷ Intervista a Enrico Berlinguer. Ragioniamo su pace e terza via // L'Unita. 1982. №41. P. 2.

¹⁵⁸ Scalfari E. Questione morale, la storica intervista di Enrico Berlinguer // Enrico Berlinguer: un Comunista Italiano. URL: <https://www.enricoberlinguer.it/questione-morale-berlinguer/> (accessed: 01.09.2023).

¹⁵⁹ Carrilo S. «Eurocomunismo» y Estado. Barcelona: Grupo Editorial Grijalbo, 1977. P. 7

¹⁶⁰ Amendola G. A choice for life. Memories. Moscow.: Politizdat, 1983. P. 320-321. [In Russian].

parties have a stable association with this term, which has been consolidated, among other things, due to its use in polemics within the international communist movement.

Philosopher Slavoj Žižek notes that ideology is not a "ghostly illusion" but an "illusion" structuring real, concrete social relations or a "phantasmatic construction" serving as a support for reality¹⁶¹. Using the Marxist thesis of the impossibility of the existence of form without content¹⁶², it can be concluded that Eurocommunism includes a number of theoretical positions and political practices that were formed under the influence of objective international and domestic political factors and existed regardless of how the parties themselves, which are essentially Eurocommunist, treated this term.

In order to clarify which parties the author considers "Eurocommunist", it is necessary to analyze the political declarations and theoretical texts that are considered programmatic for Eurocommunists, as well as to consider the assessments of other researchers.

The most general definition of Eurocommunist parties is formulated by the American political scientist Carl Boggs, who sees them as communist parties advocating a "democratic" transition to socialism through the political institutions of advanced capitalism¹⁶³. A significant shortcoming of this definition is that, as with the term itself, the focus here is on only one aspect of Eurocommunism's political strategy. Croatian researcher Branko Pribičević, comparing the "Leninist-type party" and the Eurocommunist parties, cites the following characteristics that he believes are inherent in the latter: recognizing the importance of democracy and political freedoms, party pluralism, fighting for broad social alliances and political coalitions; the possibility of using the existing state as an instrument of change and rejecting the Marxist position of the state's extinction¹⁶⁴. He also notes that Eurocommunists considered one of the

¹⁶¹ Žižek S. The sublime object of ideology. Moscow: «Hudozhestvennyj zhurnal» Publisher. P. 52. [In Russian].

¹⁶² Steigerwald R. Introduction to Marxist Philosophy. Moscow: Politizdat, 1982. P. 89. [In Russian].

¹⁶³ Boggs C. The democratic road: new departures and old problems // The politics of Eurocommunism. Socialism in transition / edited by Carl Boggs and David Plotke. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press LTD, 1980. P. 431.

¹⁶⁴ Pribičević B. Eurocommunism and the New Party // In search of Eurocommunism / edited by R. Kindersley. London, Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press, 1982. P. 161.

necessary conditions for the transition to socialism to be the need for popular majority support for such reforms¹⁶⁵. Summarizing the conclusions of these two researchers, Eurocommunist can be called a party that invokes the Leninist tradition and seeks to move beyond capitalism on the basis of a broad social consensus, respecting the limits set by liberal democracy.

In classifying communist parties, it is necessary to refer to the political documents that are considered programmatic for Eurocommunism and constitute its fundamental political positions. One of them is the "Livorno Statement"¹⁶⁶ of the Italian and Spanish communist parties, adopted after a meeting in July 1975. This political document states the principles that are fundamental to the ideology of Eurocommunism. When classifying a party as Eurocommunist, they can be divided into "necessary" and "sufficient". Among the necessary ones we can single out the following: adherence to the communist ideology at the level of rhetoric and dissociation from social democracy; expansion of the social base and orientation towards "non-proletarian" strata of the population; recognition of the possibility of coexistence of state, public and private forms of property. Among the sufficient ones are the recognition of the progressive achievements of liberal democracy and the desire to use its tools for socialist transformations; the recognition of the need to preserve and expand civil rights and freedoms; the principle of unity with non-communist "progressive forces"; the thesis of the need for an intermediate stage between capitalism and socialism ("progressive democracy").

¹⁶⁵ Ibid. P. 62

¹⁶⁶ L'appello di Carrillo e Berlinguer. Il movimento operaio popolare antifascista unito per un'Europa democratica e autonoma // L'Unita. 1975. № 188. P. 15.

1.3. The Eurocommunist social ideal and the problem of the democratic path to socialism

The main element of the ideology of Eurocommunism can be called the realization of the widest possible range of democratic rights and freedoms in their entirety, which also determined the political strategy of Eurocommunist parties that sought to move beyond capitalism without significant social upheavals. Whereas in the Leninist interpretation of Marxism the Bolshevik representatives used the tools of bourgeois democracy only "for a special kind of auxiliary party activity"¹⁶⁷, the Eurocommunists no longer rejected liberal democracy and considered democratic rights as part of the system they were going to create in the future¹⁶⁸. E. Berlinguer considered parliament to be the most important institution of political life not only at the stage of struggle for winning the majority, but also at the stage of transition to socialism and in the course of its construction¹⁶⁹. At the same time, the possibility and necessity of such a political strategy was argued by the achievements of the working class, the special place of the Communist Parties in the political system, and the transformation of bourgeois democracy, which was achieved, among other things, thanks to the influence of the USSR. Here it is also appropriate to quote from his speech in Moscow on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution: "Our experience has led us to the conclusion, as in the case of other communist parties in capitalist Europe, that democracy today is not only a territory from which the class enemy is forced to retreat, but also a historically universal soil on which the original

¹⁶⁷ Lenin V. I. Regarding the two letters// V. I. Lenin. Complete Works. 5 ed. Moscow: Political Literature Publisher, 1968. Vol. 17. P. P. 298. [In Russian].

¹⁶⁸ Makin-Waite M. Communism and Democracy: History, debates and potentials. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2017. P. 206 – 207.

¹⁶⁹ Berlinguer E. Via democratica e violenza reazionaria // Enrico Berlinguer: un Comunista Italiano. URL: <https://www.enricoberlinguer.it/enrico/scritti/via-democratica-e-violenza-reazionaria> (accessed: 10.12.2023).

socialist society can be founded"¹⁷⁰. In the same speech, the Italian Communist leader stressed the importance of the specificity of the activities of each Communist Party, while calling for building on the achievements of the October Revolution and moving towards a non-capitalist society through the "universalization of democracy and freedom"¹⁷¹. No less important is the way in which E. Berlinguer characterized the outlines of a socialist society in the vision of the Italian communists: "That is why our joint struggle, which is constantly seeking agreement with other forces of socialist and Christian inspiration in Italy and Western Europe, aims at the creation of a new, socialist society, guaranteeing all personal and collective, civil and religious freedoms, the non-ideological character of the state, the possibility of the existence of different parties, pluralism in social, cultural and ideal life"¹⁷².

For the Eurocommunists, democracy was a goal and a means at the same time. On the one hand, the Eurocommunist parties sought to use the democratic path for the realization of socialist transformations; on the other hand, they saw socialism as a system where the elimination of exploitation of man by man would ensure the greatest freedom of individual, cultural, political and social rights. This position can be most accurately expressed in the words of Karl Mannheim from his work "Ideology and Utopia": "On the one hand, socialism has the task of radicalizing the liberal utopia, the "idea" even more, on the other hand - to paralyze or, if necessary, to overcome completely the internal opposition of anarchism in its extreme expression"¹⁷³. A different view was held by Antonio Negri, who criticized Eurocommunism from left-radical positions: "As for the aims of Eurocommunism, they are more than clear: the

¹⁷⁰ Berlinguer E. La Democrazia è un valore universal. Discorso in occasione del 60° anniversario della Rivoluzione d'Ottobre // Enrico Berlinguer: un Comunista Italiano. URL: <https://www.enricoberlinguer.it/enrico/scritti/la-democrazia-valore-universale> (accessed: 10.12.2023).

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

¹⁷³ Mannheim K. Ideology and Utopia. // Socialistica. URL: http://socialistica.lenin.ru/txt/m/manheim_1.htm (accessed: 10.12.2023). [In Russian].

conscious extension of the capitalist mode of production to the whole of society and its ('socialist') state administration"¹⁷⁴.

The use of predominantly electoral mechanisms for the struggle for power and the desire to express the interests of the widest possible strata of the population also determined the model of transformation of the existing system and the coalition policy of Eurocommunist parties. While classical Marxism and Marxism-Leninism regard socialism as the first phase of communist society, which still contains some traces of capitalist society, the distinctive feature of Eurocommunism is the idea of transition to socialism through the stage of "progressive" or "advanced" democracy, which can be characterized as a non-socialist but not capitalist society. Some prototype of "progressive democracy" can be seen in the policy of the Popular Front in Spain, which was considered by the communists as a "democracy of a new type" and, in the words of the American historian Stanley George Payne, represented "an indirect path to socialism," implying nationalization of some sectors of the economy and redistribution of land to the poorest peasants¹⁷⁵. A similar model was described by S. Carrillo, characterizing the social ideal of the Eurocommunists, which he called "democratic socialism": "Of course, the democratic path to socialism involves a process of economic transformation different from what we might consider the classical model. That is, it presupposes the coexistence of public and private forms of property over a long period. Thus, the phase of political and economic democracy envisaged in our program takes on all its significance: in this phase, which is not yet socialism, but which is no longer dominated by state-monopolistic capital, it is a question of preserving to the greatest possible extent the productive forces and social services already established, while recognizing the role of private initiative"¹⁷⁶. The transition stage between bourgeois democracy and socialism was viewed differently by the various

¹⁷⁴ Negri A. *Books for burning: Between civil war and democracy in 1970s Italy*. London, New York: Verso, 2005. P. 253-254.

¹⁷⁵ Payne S. G. *The Spanish civil War, the Soviet Union, and communism*. London; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008. P. 63.

¹⁷⁶ Carrillo S. «Eurocomunismo» y Estado. Barcelona: Grupo Editorial Grijalbo, 1977. P. 90.

Eurocommunist parties, depending on the "concrete-historical situation". The manifesto of the French Communists "For Advanced Democracy, for Socialist France" names the main condition for the transition to progressive democracy as the elimination of state-monopoly capitalism: "That is why it is appropriate to recall in the draft document that the main objective at the present stage is to replace the Gaullist power of the monopolies by an advanced political and economic democracy capable of carrying out profound and courageous reforms to open the way to socialism"¹⁷⁷. The Italian Communists considered "progressive democracy" as a guarantee against a right-conservative turn, both internal and controlled from countries considered imperialist. The basis for the transition to such a form of democracy was considered to be maximum social consensus and a significant influence of communist forces: "A progressive democracy in Italy, which would rid the country of the danger of a reactionary - American or internal - coup, had to be created by a constant expansion of the democratic space. For this it needed as large a communist 'army' as possible, as broad unions as possible, as broad a trade union unity as possible and, above all, a mass party"¹⁷⁸.

The need to attract the sympathies of various social groups and non-communist democratic parties was necessitated by the overthrow of the socialist government of Salvador Allende in Chile. The Popular Front government in Chile, which came to power through democratic elections, largely implemented socialist reforms along the lines declared by Eurocommunist theorists, taking into account the preservation of political pluralism, unconditional respect for civil rights and freedoms, and orientation to specific national conditions. S. Allende, characterizing the Chilean path to socialism, as well as the Eurocommunist leaders, emphasized the desire to remain in the constitutional line in the implementation of socialist reforms: "It is well known that the Chilean process is more difficult, because we are carrying it out within the framework

¹⁷⁷ Pour une Démocratie avancée, pour une France socialiste // Supplément au «Bulletin de propaganda». 1968. №. 7. P. 13

¹⁷⁸ Letters from inside the Italian Communist Party to Louis Althusser / edited by Macciocchi M. A. London: NLB, 1973. P. 121

of bourgeois democracy, observing the laws of bourgeois democracy, the constitution of our country, which was not developed by us. We will amend the constitution and issue new laws, laws of revolutionary government"¹⁷⁹. Like Eurocommunist theorists, S. Allende noted that he admired the heroism of those who had to fight for socialism with arms in their hands, having no other way, but insisted that, due to national specifics, such an option was not applicable in Chile¹⁸⁰. The military coup and the rise to power of the right-wing government led by Augusto Pinochet became an occasion for theoretical reflection among Eurocommunist leaders and theorists. E. Berlinguer devoted a series of articles to reflecting on the Chilean events, in which he partly projected the Chilean experience onto European conditions, seeking to analyze the possible risks of democratic progress towards socialism. Berlinguer wrote: "Communists and democrats must not lose sight of the profound differences between the situation in Chile and Italy. Chile and Italy are located in two quite different regions of the world: Latin America and Western Europe. The respective social structure, economic structure and degree of development of the productive forces are as different as the institutional system (presidential republic in Chile, parliamentary republic in Italy) and governmental systems. Other differences exist in the traditions and orientation of political forces, in their weight and relations. But along with differences there are similarities, in particular the fact that Chilean communists and socialists also proposed to follow a democratic path to socialism. Therefore, from the set of differences and analogies, it is necessary to take the occasion to dig deeper and better define what the Italian path to socialism consists of and how it can move forward"¹⁸¹. The experience of the Chilean peaceful revolution, according to Berlinguer, showed that the unity of the left forces and the workers' parties is not sufficient for the transfer to a non-capitalist society, and that the formula of "50%+1%" of the vote in favor of

¹⁷⁹ Allende S. History belongs to us: Speeches and articles 1970-1973. Moscow: Politizdat, 1974. P. 9. [In Russian].

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Berlinguer E. Imperialismo e Coesistenza alla luce dei fatti cileni // Enrico Berlinguer: un Comunista Italiano. URL: <https://www.enricoberlinguer.it/enrico/scritti/imperialismo-e-coesistenza-alla-luce-dei-fatti-cileni> (accessed: 10.12.2023).

the left forces is in itself progress, but such an arrangement of forces does not guarantee the survival and successful functioning of a socialist government¹⁸². On this basis, he concludes that one of the necessary conditions is also to prevent the creation of a bloc of centrists with right-wing forces, and the immediate task of the Communists is to fight not for a left-wing but for a democratic alternative, implying the unity of socialist, communist, Christian-democratic and other "popular" forces and taking into account the existing "bloc of social forces"¹⁸³.

The defeat of the Chilean peaceful revolution leads E. Berlinguer to the idea of the need for a "historical compromise" between socialist and Christian-democratic forces: "The gravity of the country's problems, the ever looming threat of reactionary adventures and the need to finally open to the nation a safe path of economic development, social renewal and democratic progress, make it increasingly urgent and ripe for us to achieve what can be characterized as a new great 'historical compromise' between the forces that unite and represent the overwhelming majority of the Italian people"¹⁸⁴. This thesis traces the influence of the ideological and theoretical heritage of A. Gramsci, to whom the leaders and theorists of the Eurocommunist parties referred, starting with P. Togliatti and his aspirations to theorize the possibility of consolidating the popular majority to achieve a consensus for the further socialist transformation of society.

In his "Prison Notebooks", A. Gramsci meant by the historical block "a complex, contradictory, heterogeneous complex of superstructures", which is a reflection of the totality of social production relations¹⁸⁵. It is worth noting here that A. Gramsci uses the concept of "historical bloc" in several meanings. Analyzing the structure of South Italian society, he understands a block as a general composition of social groups and the correlation of political forces: "South Italian society is a huge agrarian complex

¹⁸² Berlinguer E. Riflessioni sull'Italia dopo i fatti del Cile // Enrico Berlinguer: un Comunista Italiano. URL: <https://www.enricoberlinguer.it/enrico/scritti/riflessioni-fatti-del-cile> (accessed: 10.12.2023).

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Gramsci A. Prison notebooks// A. Gramsci. Selected Works. Moscow.: Politizdat, 1959. Vol. 3. P. 59. [In Russian].

consisting of three social strata: the amorphous and fragmented peasant mass, the intelligentsia, which emerged from the small and medium rural bourgeoisie, large landowners and the top of the intelligentsia"¹⁸⁶. In another case, A. Gramsci characterizes a "bloc" as a relatively stable alliance of certain political forces: "It is always necessary to have the initiative to free the economic movement from the shackles of traditional politics, that is, to change the political direction of certain forces, which must be attracted to their side to create a new, monolithic, devoid of internal contradictions historical bloc, which has the character of an economic-political bloc"¹⁸⁷. Adopting these theoretical positions, the Eurocommunists sought to take into account the balance of social groups and to find compromises with political forces expressing the interests of the non-communist electorate in order to implement their program and achieve a socio-political consensus for the transition to a "new phase of democracy". According to Jonas Pontusson, who believed that the democratic phase, as envisioned by the Eurocommunists, was based on an alliance of social forces opposed to monopolies, without necessarily aspiring to socialism¹⁸⁸. An example of the implementation of such a policy is the Salerno turn, when, by making a number of compromises, the ICP was able to become the nucleus of the anti-fascist resistance and to unite around a common goal even those social groups and political forces that were not sympathetic or opposed to the Communists. The creation of a "new historical bloc" became one of the main elements of the ICP's policy thereafter. At the IX Party Congress in January 1960, P. Togliatti, referring to A. Gramsci, said: "We propose to create what Gramsci called a new historical bloc, in other words, to bring new social groups to become the leading class of our entire society. Gramsci said: "We propose to create what Gramsci called a new historical bloc, in other words, to bring the new social groups to the point where they become the leading class of our whole society" ¹⁸⁹. This

¹⁸⁶ Gramsci A. Prison notebooks// A. Gramsci. Selected Works. Moscow.: Politizdat, 1959. Vol. 1. P. 494. [In Russian].

¹⁸⁷ Gramsci A. Prison notebooks// A. Gramsci. Selected Works. Moscow.: Politizdat, 1959. Vol. 3. P. 59. [In Russian].

¹⁸⁸ Pontusson J. Gramsci and Eurocommunism: A Comparative Analysis of Conceptions of Class Rule and Socialist Transition // Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 1980. Vol. 24/25. P. 205.

¹⁸⁹ Togliatti P. For the democratic renewal of Italian society, for the advance towards socialism. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960. P. 80. [In Russian].

position was also reproduced by G. Marchais, characterizing the French path to socialism: "Our path to socialism is a democratic path. It is not the path of illusions, but the path of taking into account the reality that actually exists both nationally and internationally"¹⁹⁰.

Another important aspect of the democratic path to socialism in the Eurocommunist interpretation is the desire to dissociate itself from centrists and social democrats, while remaining in line with the communist tradition. The leader of socialist Albania, E. Hoxha, and other representatives of the "anti-revisionist" trend in the communist movement actually identified the social democrats and the Eurocommunists, accusing the latter of attempting to "integrate revisionism into capitalism"¹⁹¹. A similar opinion was held by the Trotskyist E. Mandel, who, on the whole, was less critical of the Eurocommunists, but believed that the Eurocommunist parties were turning into social-democratic parties of the classical model - along the lines of the German and Austrian social-democratic parties "immediately before, during and after the First World War"¹⁹². We should also mention the position of the representatives of Social Democracy of that time, who did not see any tactical divergence with the Eurocommunists. One of the leaders of the SPD, Horst Ehmke, after the death of E. Berlinguer, commented on his attitude to the Eurocommunist line pursued by the ICP as follows: "A reading of the documents of the OCP...and an acquaintance with its political activity...lead to the conclusion that the positions of the Italian communists correspond almost in all respects to the positions of the majority of social democrats"¹⁹³.

The Eurocommunists themselves pointed out that the fundamental difference between them and the Social Democrats is the desire to finally go beyond the redistribution of capitalism, and not just to increase social guarantees within the

¹⁹⁰ XXI (Extraordinary) Congress of the French Communist Party. Moscow: Politizdat, 1975. P. 29. [In Russian].

¹⁹¹ Hoxha E. Eurocommunism is anti-communism// E. Hoxha. Selected Writings. Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1985. Vol. 5. P. 992. [In Russian].

¹⁹² Mandel E. A Critique of Eurocommunism // Ernest Mandel Internet Archive. URL: https://www.ernestmandel.org/en/works/txt/1979/a_critique_of_eurocommunism.htm (accessed:17.11.2023).

¹⁹³ Rubbi A. World of Berlinguer. Moscow: «International relations», 1995. P. 137. [In Russian].

existing system. In this connection, E. Berlinguer, responding to the criticism of the ultra-left, stated: “We are not affected by parliamentary cretinism, but some are affected by anti-parliamentary cretinism”¹⁹⁴. The term “revolution” was largely reinterpreted by Eurocommunists and was seen as a fundamental political and socio-economic transformation without an armed uprising or revolutionary war on the model of the Bolsheviks, as well as the Chinese and Cuban communists. Here we should quote from the article by E. Berlinguer from the “Chilean Cycle”, mentioned earlier, where he defines “revolution” in the Eurocommunist view: “The profound transformation of society through democracy requires a very precise meaning of ‘consensus’: in Italy it can only be achieved as a revolution of the overwhelming majority of the population; and only under this condition ‘consensus and force’ are integrated and can become an invincible reality”¹⁹⁵. S. Carrillo, while generally recognizing that socialist revolutions along the classical path have made more progress than in the past, notes that socialists who come to power in this way face many social problems, such as the living standards of the population, the persistence of inequality and the unresolved problem of democracy¹⁹⁶, as well as the bureaucratization of the new revolutionary regimes¹⁹⁷. Thus, the main arguments of the Eurocommunists against socialist revolution by armed coup were:

1. The thesis of the transformation of bourgeois democracy and the favorable balance of “social class forces”.
2. The desire to avoid civil war and the adverse consequences associated with it.
3. Provision on the movement towards socialism, taking into account multi-partyism, democratic traditions and taking into account the interests of broad social groups.
4. Fear of the emergence of a “revolutionary bureaucracy” and the deformation of socialism under extraordinary conditions.

¹⁹⁴ Berlinguer E. *Via democratica e violenza reazionaria* // Enrico Berlinguer: un Comunista Italiano. URL: <https://www.enricoberlinguer.it/enrico/scritti/via-democratica-e-violenza-reazionaria> (accessed: 10.12.2023).

¹⁹⁵ Berlinguer E. *Riflessioni sull’Italia dopo i fatti del Cile*. // Enrico Berlinguer: un Comunista Italiano. URL: <https://www.enricoberlinguer.it/enrico/scritti/riflessioni-fatti-del-cile> (accessed: 10.12.2023).

¹⁹⁶ Carrillo S. «Eurocomunismo» y Estado. Barcelona: Grupo Editorial Grijalbo, 1977. P. 95

¹⁹⁷ Ibid. P. 89.

In our opinion, Eurocommunists raised not so much the question of the necessity of social revolution as of the possible ways of achieving it in each particular case. The very discussion within the socialist and communist movement about the possibility of coming to power peacefully began long before the formation of Eurocommunism and is characteristic not only of the reformist, social-democratic tradition. Even K. Marx and F. Engels in the “Manifesto of the Communist Party” stated that the goals of the communists can be achieved only “by violent overthrow of the entire existing social order”, at the same time, in Section IV of the Manifesto it is stated that the communists fight in the name of the immediate goals of the working class and, depending on the current concrete-historical situation, can cooperate with other democratic parties¹⁹⁸. Within the framework of Bolshevik theory this question was raised by Lenin in his 1917 article “On Compromises”, where discussing the possibility of forming a coalition with “petty-bourgeois” left-wing parties and “peacefully moving forward the entire Russian revolution” the Bolshevik leader wrote: “But if there is even one chance in a hundred, an attempt to realize such a possibility would still be worthwhile”¹⁹⁹. However, the possibility of the peaceful formation of a socialist government was not considered by Lenin as a permanently existing possibility, which socialists could realize on the basis of their subjective desires: “Only in the name of this peaceful development of the revolution - an opportunity extremely rare in history and extremely valuable, an opportunity extremely rare, only in the name of it can and must the Bolsheviks, supporters of the world revolution, supporters of revolutionary methods, in my opinion, make such a compromise”²⁰⁰. The relationship between “revolutionary” and “reformist” methods and their optimal combination for the subsequent achievement of qualitative change continues to occupy one of the central places in Marxist discussions. The West German Marxist scholar Robert Steigerwald pointed

¹⁹⁸ Marx K. Engels F. Manifesto of Communist Party// Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/russkij/marx/1848/manifesto.htm> (accessed: 12.12.2023). [In Russian].

¹⁹⁹ Lenin V. I. About compromises// V. I. Lenin. Complete Works. 5 ed. Moscow: Political Literature Publisher, 1969. Vol. 34. P. 135. [In Russian].

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

out: “Whoever recognizes only an evolutionary form of development in politics makes the same fundamental mistake as he who sees or seeks to ‘make’ only revolutions everywhere”²⁰¹. Thus, communists did not deny the struggle for reform, ultimately seeking not to reform exploitation but to eliminate it²⁰².

A. Gramsci, comparing political strategy with military strategy, distinguished three types of "war" - positional, manoeuvre and clandestine: "Boycott is positional war, strikes are manoeuvre war, secret preparation of troops and strike elements is clandestine war. The last type of warfare is a form of “brave” movement, but it is applied with “great caution”²⁰³. Gramsci compared the structure of modern democracies to “a system of trenches and long-term front-line fortifications”²⁰⁴. Thus, most of the legal methods of political struggle are referred to the stage of “positional” warfare: the struggle for parliamentary mandates in representative bodies and ministerial posts in the bourgeois state apparatus; the propaganda of socialist ideas, the achievement of limited social reforms within the framework of liberal democracy. Having taken the course to embed themselves in the bourgeois-democratic political system, the Eurocommunist parties adopted only the stage of “positional warfare”, concentrating exclusively on gaining seats in representative bodies of power, postponing indefinitely the stage of “maneuver warfare”, without which the use of the mechanisms of capitalist democracy turned from a stage of achieving program objectives into an end in itself²⁰⁵.

I. Balamanidis believes that different political circumstances brought Eurocommunist parties to a common denominator, at least in the question of participation in democratic political institutions: “The Italian historical compromise, the French ‘common program’, the position of the Spanish communists in the velvet democratic transit, the National Anti-Dictatorial Democratic Union of the Communist

²⁰¹ Steigerwald R. Introduction to Marxist Philosophy. Moscow: Politizdat, 1982. P. 65. [In Russian].

²⁰² Ibid. P. 56.

²⁰³ Gramsci A. Prison notebooks// A. Gramsci. Selected Works. Moscow.: Politizdat, 1959. Vol. 3. P. 191. [In Russian].

²⁰⁴ Ibid. C. 213.

²⁰⁵ Katorzhevskij P.N. Formation of the ideological discourse of Eurocommunism. On the example of the Italian Communist Party // Free Thought. 2022. №. 3 (1693). P. 84. [In Russian].

Party of Greece (internal), were variants of a joint strategic quest: to turn the ‘comparative advantage’ of the communists into a ‘democratic’ one²⁰⁶.

The aspiration to arrive at socialism democratically and the view of socialism as a society where democratic rights and freedoms find their highest expression mutually conditioned each other in Eurocommunist theory. Eurocommunist ideologues believed that a broad public consensus on socialist transformation would minimize the likelihood of a right-wing coup on the Chilean model and ensure the possibility of radical economic and political reforms without civil war and armed rebellion. The stage on the road to socialism was to be a “progressive” (or “advanced”) democracy in which political pluralism, a multi-party parliament, and a diversity of property forms were to be preserved. The Bolshevik experience was not denied by the Eurocommunists in the historical dimension, but the rejection of it was justified by the changed socio-political conditions that allowed the use of “reformist” methods to achieve “revolutionary” goals.

²⁰⁶ Balampanidis I. *Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left*. London: Routledge, 2019. P. 12.

1.4. Eurocommunism in the ideology of non-European communist parties

Although etymologically the term "Eurocommunism" implies a geographical scope limited to the countries of Europe, it also encompassed some communist parties outside it that had ideological differences with both the CPSU and the ruling parties of Eastern Europe and the Communist Party of China²⁰⁷. Ernest Mandel, emphasising the global character of the Eurocommunist phenomenon, wrote: "The term 'Eurocommunism' poorly reflects the important political process taking place in a number of communist parties. In fact, this process began outside Europe and has embraced many non-European parties: the Venezuelan, Japanese, Australian, and now, in part, the Mexican"²⁰⁸. The consideration of Eurocommunism and its elements in the ideology of non-European Communist Parties allows us to expand the boundaries of the thesis research and identify the factors that influenced the formation of Eurocommunism in the absence of specific socio-political and historical conditions that are characteristic of European countries alone. The Communist Party of Japan (CPJ) and the Communist Party of Mexico (CPM), which, in our opinion, were the most consistent exponents of Eurocommunism among non-European Communist parties, were chosen as the objects of analysis.

The CPJ was founded on 15 July 1922 after a long preparatory period²⁰⁹. At the founding congress of the party it was decided to join the Comintern²¹⁰. The Japanese communists themselves emphasised the "nationwide" and "national" character of their party, stating that the CPJ was founded on the "revolutionary and progressive traditions of the nation"²¹¹. The First Party Programme called for the abolition of the imperial

²⁰⁷ Willetts H. T. *The USSR and Eurocommunism // In Search of Eurocommunism / edited by R. Kindersley*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981. P. 9.

²⁰⁸ Mandel E. *A Critique of Eurocommunism // Ernest Mandel Internet Archive*. URL: https://www.ernestmandel.org/en/works/txt/1979/a_critique_of_eurocommunism.htm (accessed:17.11.2023).

²⁰⁹ Kovalenko I.I. *Communist Party of Japan: Essays of History*. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1987. P. 72. [In Russian].

²¹⁰ *Ibid.* P. 73.

²¹¹ *Japanese Communist Party Program and Constitution*. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1997. P. 1.

system, the Privy Council, the House of Peers, the General Staff, military conscription, as well as the introduction of the eight-hour day and guarantees of freedom of speech, press, assembly and organisation²¹². The newly formed party included not only communists but also representatives of other left tendencies, including anarchists and right-wing social democrats²¹³. The ideological heterogeneity of the first composition of the CPJ caused the inability of its leaders to formulate the party's attitude towards the imperial system and the use of legal methods of political struggle, which by 1923 led to the loss of the Communists' influence²¹⁴. Since its founding, there have been several groups within the CPJ, one favouring exclusively parliamentary methods of struggle, the other favouring "direct action"²¹⁵. Intra-party conflicts led to the termination of party activities in 1924 without a decision of the congress²¹⁶, but as early as 1926 it was reinstated at the behest of the Comintern, whose leadership did not recognise the dissolution of the CPJ.²¹⁷ It should be noted that the Comintern initially regarded Japan as a key target for advancing the socialist revolution in the region because of its developed industrial base and large number of industrial workers. But the formation of the "united front" of the Communists with the Gomindang nationalists in China changed the vector of the Soviet leadership's international policy, which ensured partial autonomy of the CPJ's activities²¹⁸ from the centre of the world communist movement and, from our point of view, influenced the peculiarity of its ideological evolution.

Immediately after the restoration of activity in the CPJ, an intra-party struggle broke out, which became a kind of "reflection" of the processes taking place in the

²¹² Emmerson J.K. The Japanese Communist Party after Fifty Years// Asian Survey. 1972. Vol. 7. № 12. P. 564.

²¹³ Kovalenko I.I. Communist Party of Japan: Essays of History. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1987. P. 74. [In Russian].

²¹⁴ Napier J.P. The Survey of Japan Communist Party. Tokyo: The Nippon Times Ltd, 1952. P. 3.

²¹⁵ Kovalenko I.I. Communist Party of Japan: Essays of History. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1987. P. 93. [In Russian].

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid. P. 95.

²¹⁸ Hasegawa K. The Japanese Communist Party Has Been a Vital Presence in Japan's Politics // Jacobin. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2022/07/japan-communist-party-history-politics-100-anniversary> (accessed: 12.05.2024).

centre of the world communist movement - the RCP(b). The ultra-left faction led by Kazuo Fukomoto favoured violent revolution and believed that "the party had become too intellectual"²¹⁹. The more moderate wing of the party, led by Kin Yamakawa, promoted a "parliamentary modification of Comintern policy"²²⁰. In the end, the scale of the conflict led to intervention by the Comintern: the position of K. Yamakawa was declared "opportunistic" and the extreme left-wing platform of K. Fukomoto was characterised as "destructive"²²¹. As a result, the CPJ adopted the "theses of 1927", which proclaimed the possibility of socialist revolution only through bourgeois-democratic revolution and set the course for a "united front"²²², which was in line with the official policy of the Comintern and, as in the case of the European Communist Parties, oriented Japanese Communists towards co-operation with non-Communist forces opposed to the monarchy and in favour of democratic change. The CPJ programme at this stage included demands for an 8-hour working day, a rejection of aggressive expansionist policies, independence for the colonies and the abolition of landlordism²²³. In 1932, the CPJ adopted new programme theses, which remained in force until the defeat of militarist Japan in World War II, which stated that the working day should be reduced to 7 hours and described the Japanese political regime as "a combination of extremely strong elements of feudalism with the far-reaching development of monopolistic capitalism"²²⁴. It should be noted that it was the formulation "state-monopolistic capitalism" that would later become one of the key formulations for Eurocommunist discourse. At the same time, the CPJ proclaims a slogan that implied the unification of different social groups ("non-mainstream" or "transitional" classes): "People's Revolution against Imperialist War and Police

²¹⁹ Napier J.P. *The Survey of Japan Communist Party*. Tokyo: The Nippon Times Ltd, 1952. P. 4.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ *Ibid.*

²²² Kovalenko I.I. *Communist Party of Japan: Essays of History*. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1987. P. 119. [In Russian].

²²³ *Ibid.* P. 120.

²²⁴ *Ibid.* P. 154

Monarchy!"²²⁵. Such rhetoric of the Japanese Communist Party, in our opinion, is the first symptoms of the ideological evolution of the CPJ in the direction of Eurocommunism. After a wave of repressions and arrests by the government in 1934-1935, the CPJ virtually ceased its activities until the end of World War II. After a wave of repression and arrests by the government in 1934-1935, the CPJ virtually ceased its activities until the end of World War II, and some of its members clustered around social-democratic parties in an attempt to form a "united anti-fascist front"²²⁶. Centralised leadership was virtually non-existent and the communists operated in the format of disparate groups ²²⁷. Soviet researcher I.I. Kovalenko, characterising the political strategy of the CPJ in the second half of the 1930s - early 1940s, wrote: "At that time, the CPJ was banned, so it had only one way to participate in elections - to vote for social-democratic parties"²²⁸.

In October 1945, the leaders of the CPJ were released from prison, and on December 1, the Japanese Communists held their first legal congress in a long time, adopting an updated programme, which contained the following provisions: the abolition of the monarchical system and the establishment of a people's government; strict observance of the Potsdam Declaration; support for the peace policy of democratic countries; dissolution of all anti-democratic organisations; abolition of the constitution granted from above and the creation of a truly democratic constitution by the people themselves; the establishment of a democratic society; and the establishment of a democratic society.²²⁹. It can be stated that the outlined programme demands do not imply a course of socialist revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but assume fundamental social and political reforms within the framework of a pluralist democratic system, which is quite in line with the Eurocommunist thesis of "progressive democracy", which was supposed to be an

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ Ibid. P. 206-207.

²²⁷ Napier J.P. *The Survey of Japan Communist Party*. Tokyo: The Nippon Times Ltd, 1952. P. 5 – 6.

²²⁸ Kovalenko I.I. *Communist Party of Japan: Essays of History*. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1987. P. 209. [In Russian].

²²⁹ Topekha P.P. *Labour Movement in Japan*. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1973. P. 22. [In Russian].

intermediate stage on the road to socialism. In 1946, the leader of the CPJ, Kyuichi Tokudo, became critical of the USSR, seeking to disassociate himself from the "centre" of the world communist movement, which would also later become a hallmark of Eurocommunism. "At present at the present time," K. Tokudo declared, "we have no relations with the Soviet Union..... I would like to state here that in the future our Party will never have relations with the Soviet Union either"²³⁰. In 1949, the CPJ, continuing to follow the policy of uniting all democratic forces, unsuccessfully tried to unite with the socialists and consolidated the slogan of fighting for "people's democratic power"²³¹.

In general, the CPJ lacked the advantages enjoyed by European Communist parties in the post-war period. Japanese researcher Kenji Hasegawa characterises this period in the history of the Japanese Communist Party: "The dependence of CPJ leaders on the American occupation for post-war prison release reflected a disadvantage compared to other communist parties, such as those in Europe. French and Italian communists entered the post-war period with an organisational base built up through the wartime Resistance Movements. Lacking such a base, the post-war CPJ relied heavily on Korean activists in Japan to fund and build its organisation"²³². However, communist ideas were rapidly gaining popularity in East Asia and the CPJ was again the victim of repression, this time by the American occupation administration ²³³. The CPJ's response to the repressive policies of the occupation authorities was to adopt a "military course", which involved sending militants, mostly students, into the villages to organise gerilla and prepare a violent revolution²³⁴. This policy led the CPJ to lose

²³⁰ Langer P. Swearingen R. The Japanese Communist Party, the Soviet Union and Korea// Pacific Affairs. 1950. Vol. 23. № 4. P. 345.

²³¹ Kovalenko I.I. Communist Party of Japan: Essays of History. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1987. P. 292. [In Russian].

²³² Hasegawa K. The Japanese Communist Party Has Been a Vital Presence in Japan's Politics// Jacobin. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2022/07/japan-communist-party-history-politics-100-anniversary> (accessed: 12.05.2024).

²³³ Andrews W. The Japanese Left Has a Complex and Turbulent History// Jacobin. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2022/07/japan-new-old-left-jcp-long-60s> (accessed: 12.05.2024).

²³⁴ Ibid.

its influence among the electorate and all seats in parliament, after which the party resolutely abandoned the armed struggle at the Sixth Congress in 1955²³⁵. 'Although the party existed only in embryonic form at the time,' writes American researcher Lonnie Carlile, 'the Sixth National Conference marked the beginning of the party's journey towards Japan's brand of independent Eurocommunism and its return to being a legitimate player in Japanese party politics'²³⁶.

The Japanese communists favourably responded to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and at the VII Congress of the Communist Party of Japan in 1968 endorsed its decisions, reaffirming the rejection of violent methods of struggle for power and accepting the thesis of the diversity of paths to socialism²³⁷.

One of the turning points for the CPJ is its 8th Congress, held in 1961, which adopted a programme that continued in force with some changes and additions until the early 2000s²³⁸. William Andrews, a researcher of the Japanese left movement, commenting on the main thrusts of CPJ ideology in the 1960s, concludes, "The three main goals of the CPJ were surprisingly conservative given the lifestyle of the 1960s: genuine Japanese independence, pacifism in international relations, and democracy"²³⁹. Despite the appearance of a return to a pro-Soviet orientation, the CPJ adopts some programme provisions that can be characterised as Eurocommunist. In the area of immediate political transformation, the CPJ argued for the introduction of a proportional electoral system and for the consolidation of electoral districts²⁴⁰. The political demands also included provisions for the defence of freedom of speech, press,

²³⁵ Ibid.

²³⁶ Carlile L. E. *Divisions of labor: globality, ideology, and war in the shaping of the Japanese labor movement*. University of Hawaii Press, 2005. P. 225.

²³⁷ Kovalenko I.I. *Communist Party of Japan: Essays of History*. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1987. P. 381. [In Russian].

²³⁸ *Japanese Communist Party Program and Constitution*. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1997. P. 1.

²³⁹ Andrews W. *The Japanese Left Has a Complex and Turbulent History*// Jacobin. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2022/07/japan-new-old-left-jcp-long-60s> (accessed: 12.05.2024).

²⁴⁰ VIII Congress of the Communist Party of Japan (Tokyo, 25-31 July 1961). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961. P. 92. [In Russian].

broadcasting, assembly, demonstration, and association²⁴¹ and the prohibition of bodies acting as "political police"²⁴². The programme also noted that the CPJ had always fought to win "people's sovereignty", against the imperial regime ("Tenno")²⁴³. Considering the stage of bourgeois-democratic reforms unfinished, the Japanese communists advocated the destruction of all semi-feudal vestiges remaining in various spheres of social life, the eradication of "semi-feudal class discrimination of the population" in admission to service, marriage, and place of residence²⁴⁴. In the area of defence policy, the CPJ considered it necessary to disband the "self-defence forces" and employ former military personnel in peaceful sectors of the economy²⁴⁵. A strong Communist Party in alliance with the United National Democratic Front was to be the driving force behind the social and political transformation, which was defined by the Japanese Communists as the "democratic revolution of the people"²⁴⁶. There was also a strong emphasis on the formation of a "democratic coalition government" to be an instrument of democratic change²⁴⁷. The transition to socialism was not denied, but the condition for socialist transformation, according to the 1961 CPJ programme, was a democratic revolution: 'On the basis of these specific conditions of the regime, the Party pursued a policy aimed primarily at achieving a peaceful and democratic Japan and a democratic revolution, which could then develop into a socialist revolution and the construction of a socialist Japan'²⁴⁸. The CPJ considered "monopolistic capitalism, the core of the reactionary Japanese regime, strengthened under the US protectorate" as the main obstacle to the implementation of its 1961 programme²⁴⁹.

²⁴¹ Ibid. P. 91.

²⁴² Ibid. P. 92.

²⁴³ Japanese Communist Party Program and Constitution. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1997. P. 2.

²⁴⁴ VIII Congress of the Communist Party of Japan (Tokyo, 25-31 July 1961). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961. P. 93. [In Russian].

²⁴⁵ Ibid. P. 92.

²⁴⁶ Ibid. P. 166.

²⁴⁷ Berton P. The Japan Communist Party: The "Lovable" Party// The Japanese Party System 2 ed./ Ronald J. Hrebemar with contributions by Peter Berton [et al.]. Westview Press: Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1992. P. 123.

²⁴⁸ Japanese Communist Party Program and Constitution. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1997. P. 1.

²⁴⁹ Ibid. P. 6.

Following the communist parties of Europe, the CPJ sought to unite the heterogeneous "non-proletarian" social groups, which traditionally had not belonged to the social base of communists and were considered "petty-bourgeois", and to organise them to fight state-monopolistic capitalism and the vestiges of feudalism: "The CPJ regards all democratic parties and groups, as well as non-party workers, as "brothers in class" and calls for united efforts to achieve common goals"²⁵⁰. In addition to workers, peasants, fishing industry workers, intellectuals, women, youth and students, the CPJ intended to unite also small and medium-sized producers in the National Democratic Front²⁵¹, that is quite in line with the economic platform of Eurocommunism formulated by the General Secretary of the Spanish Communist Party S. Carrillo²⁵². The 1961 CPJ programme declared: "The Party fights for the improvement of business and living conditions for artisans, small traders, workers in the free professions and other categories of workers"²⁵³. Thus, the CPJ reproduced Eurocommunist rhetoric and sought to unite various population groups dissatisfied with the then existing political-economic system, but not directly interested in building socialism.

In the late 1960s, the process of normalisation of relations between the CPJ and the CPSU was interrupted by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia ²⁵⁴. After this, there were several more attempts to stabilise relations between the Japanese and Soviet Communist Parties, but after the CPSU attacked CPP General Secretary S. Carrillo over the publication of his book "Eurocommunism and the State". Carrillo because of the publication of his book "Eurocommunism and the State", the CPJ, together with the Western Communist Parties, solidarised with him by publishing an article in the

²⁵⁰ Japanese Communist Party Program and Constitution. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1997. P. 23.

²⁵¹ Ibid. P. 24.

²⁵² Carrillo S. «Eurocomunismo» y Estado. Barcelona: Grupo Editorial Grijalbo, 1977. P. 94.

²⁵³ VIII Congress of the Communist Party of Japan (Tokyo, 25-31 July 1961). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961. P. 291. [In Russian].

²⁵⁴ Berton P. The Japanese Communists' Rapprochement with the Soviet Union// Asian Survey. 1980. Vol. 20. № 12. P. 1214.

party newspaper in defence of Eurocommunism and condemning the interventionism of the Soviet leadership²⁵⁵.

One of the most important party ideological documents is the "Manifesto of Freedom and Democracy" adopted by the CPJ in 1976 (with amendments and additions in 1990 and 1996), which remains relevant to the party to this day. In it, the CPJ declared its intention to overcome the influence of U.S. imperialism, which, according to the party, limits Japan's independence and its right to national self-determination: "U.S. imperialism restricts Japan's freedom through numerous agreements and treaties, and the Japan-U.S. Security Pact is the basis of these restrictions"²⁵⁶. This programme and ideological document makes numerous references to the Japanese Constitution, whose democratic provisions the CPJ believes need to be protected from right-wing forces²⁵⁷. This political strategy resembles the line of the Italian Communist Party, which believed that the condition for fundamental socio-political transformation and the prevention of a right turn was the defence of progressive constitutional provisions²⁵⁸. Among the fundamental values enshrined in the Manifesto are: the right to life²⁵⁹, the right to national self-determination²⁶⁰ and civil and political liberties²⁶¹.

The CPJ did not deny multi-partyism and political pluralism out of a desire to unite heterogeneous social groups with different interests and all democratic forces²⁶². The Japanese Communists state the need to co-operate with other democratic parties, not only at the tactical level to form coalitions, but all the way to building socialism²⁶³. The CPJ also declares that there will be no one-party system in socialist Japan and

²⁵⁵ Ibid. P. 1216.

²⁵⁶ Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1996. P. 12.

²⁵⁷ Ibid. P. 5.

²⁵⁸ Togliatti P. For the democratic renewal of Italian society, for the advance towards socialism. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960. P. 40. [In Russian].

²⁵⁹ Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1996. P. 6.

²⁶⁰ Ibid. P. 8.

²⁶¹ Ibid. P. 11.

²⁶² Kovalenko I.I. Communist Party of Japan: Essays of History. Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1987. P. 451. [In Russian].

²⁶³ Ibid. P. 453.

that the activities of parties critical of socialism will not be banned²⁶⁴. Based on the position of "people's sovereignty", the CPJ emphasised: "In both independent and democratic Japan and socialist Japan, a democratic political system must be established and firmly rooted. The government should be formed by a party coalition voted for by a majority of voters on the basis of equal universal suffrage. The multi-party system, including the opposition, must be maintained, and freedom of activity must be guaranteed to all parties without exception"²⁶⁵.

The CPJ gradually abandoned the use of the term "Marxism-Leninism" in favour of the formulation "scientific socialism". The 1961 CPJ programme (as amended and supplemented) stated: "The Party does not regard the theory of K. Marx, F. Engels, and V. Lenin as dogma. This is the main reason why we have adopted the generalised term 'scientific socialism' instead of 'Marxism-Leninism'"²⁶⁶. Describing the further ideological evolution of Japan's communist movement in the 1970s, Japanese researcher Tomonaga Tairako notes: "It [Eurocommunism] had an enormous impact on former followers of Marxism-Leninism who joined student movements under the leadership of the CPJ and helped them break with Stalinism and Soviet Marxism. "Gramsci's Prison Notebooks, a new complete edition of which was published by the Italian publisher Einaudi only in the late 1970s, influenced many Japanese Marxists"²⁶⁷.

It should be stressed that, like other Eurocommunist parties, the CPJ combined a democratic political programme with an authoritarian internal party structure. Canadian researcher Gavin Walker, in his interview with the American leftist publication *Jacobin*, notes: "The CPJ throughout the 1970s was very successful in maintaining its organisational culture - a deeply Stalinist, 'democratic-centralist'

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1996. P. 37.

²⁶⁶ Japanese Communist Party Program and Constitution. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1997. P. 30.

²⁶⁷ Tairako T. A criticism of Postwar Japanese Marxism – in the context of Postwar Japanese history// *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies*. 2021. Vol. 52. № 1. P. 7.

one"²⁶⁸. The CPJ party charter, adopted in 1958 and amended only in the 1990s, strictly regulates the duty of every party member to familiarise himself with the decisions of elected bodies, to "read the daily party newspaper *Akahata*"²⁶⁹ and to "maintain a fighting spirit to fight enemies and overcome difficulties"²⁷⁰.

In 1986. Japanese scholar Peter Berton described the social ideal of the CPJ in the post-war period as aspiring to an advanced post-industrial society with an orientation towards the Eurocommunist model: "But over the past thirty-odd years one can see an evolution from an almost unqualified acceptance of parliamentary tactics to an understanding of the transformation of post-war (especially post-occupation) Japan into an advanced industrial (in many respects even post-industrial) democratic society in which neither Soviet, nor Chinese, but only Eurocommunist, and in which the post-war (especially post-occupation) Japan has been transformed into an advanced industrial (in many respects even post-industrial) democratic society."²⁷¹. P. Berton also sees in the Japanese variation of Eurocommunism some elements of nationalism²⁷², which, in our view, can be interpreted as a realisation of the Eurocommunist thesis about the search for "national paths" to socialism and the need to take into account the "concrete-historical situation".

Among the main reasons for the CPJ's "Eurocommunisation" are the following:

1) The need to cooperate with non-communist forces to implement the programme of "bourgeois-democratic" transformations and overcome the vestiges of feudal relations.

2) The influence of the Comintern and the policy of the "popular fronts" on the political strategy of the CPJ.

²⁶⁸ Finn D. The Theory and Practice of Marxism in Japan. An interview with Gavin Walker// Jacobin. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2021/07/the-theory-and-practice-of-marxism-in-japan> (accessed: 12.05.2024).

²⁶⁹ Japanese Communist Party Program and Constitution. Tokyo: Japan Press Service, 1997. P. 2.

²⁷⁰ Ibid. P. 33.

²⁷¹ Berton P. The Japan Communist Party: The "Lovable" Party// The Japanese Party System 2 ed./ Ronald J. Hrebennar with contributions by Peter Berton [et al.]. Westview Press: Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford, 1992. P. 119.

²⁷² Ibid. P. 123.

3) Co-operation and attempts to unite the CPJ with the socialist and social-democratic parties.

4) Joint struggle against the Japanese militarist regime ("Nipponism") in the 1930s-1940s and attempts to unite all pacifist-minded forces.

5) The complex and heterogeneous social stratification of Japanese society due to the combination of capitalist and feudal relations and the presence of many "non-proletarian" groups of workers (fishermen, artisans), which the CPJ sought to unite to fight "state-monopolistic capitalism"

6) The desire to dissociate itself from Stalinism, the Soviet expansionist policy towards Czechoslovakia and its own left-extremist policy during the "war course" in the 1950s.

7) Ideological influence from European communist parties, which publicly opposed the Soviet leadership from Eurocommunist positions.

Among the non-European Communist parties that have adopted Eurocommunist attitudes, the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) also stands out. It was founded in 1919 under the influence of the October Socialist Revolution in Russia and became one of the first communist parties in Latin America²⁷³. A year after its founding, the CPM created the "Mexican Communist Federation of the Proletariat", with Sen Katayama, a representative of the Comintern and one of the leaders of the Japanese communist movement, participating in its founding²⁷⁴. The capitalist development of Mexico was assessed by CPM theorists and leaders in terms of the increased penetration of foreign capital and stated "the economic and political conquest of the country by the United States"²⁷⁵. The conditions in which the CPM was established were not favourable for the rise of a revolutionary communist movement due to the fact that the labour movement developed under the aegis of the state regime that emerged from the 1910

²⁷³ Schmitt K. M. *Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration*. Austin: Austin University of Texas Press, 1965. P. 3.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.* P. 9.

²⁷⁵ Heifetz V.L. *Comintern and the Evolution of the Left Movement in Mexico*. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2006. P. 119. [In Russian].

revolution²⁷⁶ - the largest workers' organisation, the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers, had the reputation of an "official" trade union and was controlled by President Álvaro Obregón²⁷⁷.

In 1923 and early 1929, the Mexican leftist movement became a kind of "testing ground" for the Comintern to practice several tactics at once²⁷⁸. The III International actively encouraged the Mexican left to participate in national and local elections and to form a coalition of communists and the independent radical peasant movement²⁷⁹. It is worth noting that since its foundation, the CPM has taken extremely radical anti-parliamentary positions²⁸⁰, and the Comintern's demands to participate in electoral processes were realised but met with rejection by party members.²⁸¹ The anti-reformism of the CPM was due to the significant influence of anarcho-syndicalism on the Mexican labour movement and its leaders²⁸². The ideological attitudes of the CPM are eloquently demonstrated by the fact that the party's representative Manabendra Roy at the Second Congress of the Comintern opposed Lenin's thesis that communist parties should ally with the bourgeois-democratic liberation movement²⁸³. In 1925, CPM leader Woolf reported progress in matters of organisation and discipline. Emphasis was

²⁷⁶ Spenser D. *Stumbling Its Way Through Mexico: The Early Years of the Communist International*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2011. P. 55.

²⁷⁷ Buchenau J. *The Last Caudillo: Alvaro Obregón and the Mexican Revolution*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2011. P. 121 – 122.

²⁷⁸ Heifetz V.L. *Comintern and the Evolution of the Left Movement in Mexico*. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2006. P. 64– 65. [In Russian].

²⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.* P. 115.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.* P. 118.

²⁸² Schmitt K. M. *Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration*. Austin: Austin University of Texas Press, 1965. P. 3-4.

²⁸³ Iyer A. *The Indian Radical Who Helped Found the Mexican Communist Party*// Jacobin. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2021/08/mn-roy-anti-colonialist-indian-independence-mexican-communist-party-comintern-lenin-colonial-policy> (accessed: 13.05.2024).

also placed on the activities of the newly formed Anti-Imperialist League and plans to infiltrate mass organisations²⁸⁴.

In 1924, the CPM leadership was almost completely replaced, and the Soviet embassy, which had opened shortly before, began to influence the processes in the party²⁸⁵. Jay Lovestone, general secretary of the Communist Party of the United States, attended CPM meetings during the period of change and insisted on strengthening discipline and overcoming anarchist tendencies in the Mexican Communist Party²⁸⁶.

One of the most important events that influenced the further evolution of the CPM was the VI Comintern Congress, which paid special attention to the processes taking place in Latin America. Russian researcher Viktor Heifetz wrote on this subject: "The Sixth World Congress of the Comintern (1928) was the 'star hour' for the communist parties of Latin America; the discussion of their problems for the first time in almost a decade of the existence of the world Communist Party came to the centre of attention"²⁸⁷. The congress put forward the thesis of "social fascism" and a "class against class" strategy, effectively forcing the CPM to abandon national specificity and co-operation with allies on the anti-imperialist front²⁸⁸. As a result, the CPM was forced to recognise the existence of a right-wing bias in the party, the lack of internationalism and obliged the Central Committee to take appropriate measures²⁸⁹. In 1929, the reorientation of the CPM to the theory of "social fascism" leads to the party's break with the peasant movement, however, after the VII Comintern Congress, the Mexican leftists were presented with the slogan "Unity at any cost"²⁹⁰. Mexican Communist Party researcher Daniela Spencer, characterising the impact of the united fronts policy

²⁸⁴ Schmitt K. M. *Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration*. Austin: Austin University of Texas Press, 1965. P. 11.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁷ Heifetz V. L. "Left turn" of the Communist Party of Mexico in the late 1920s // *Latin America*. 2017. № 6. P. 63. [In Russian].

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.* P. 65.

²⁹⁰ Heifetz V.L. *Comintern and the Evolution of the Left Movement in Mexico*. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2006. P. 5. [In Russian].

on the CPM's political line, writes: "The Comintern criticised the National Peasant League for spreading 'opportunist' slogans calling for the 'smashing of the landlords' haciendas', deeming 'vague the demand to turn the government into a semblance of a workers' and peasants' government based on something like the Soviets' and the demand to 'temporarily stop paying off the foreign debt'"²⁹¹.

In the same year, an army uprising began in Mexico, which turned into a full-scale revolution. The CPM interpreted these events as the final phase of the internal struggles and contradictions of the Mexican bourgeoisie, and saw the events as a chance for the Communists to take power²⁹². The CPM issues a statement saying, "If the significance of the present situation in Mexico is not understood, and worse, if the necessary assistance is not provided so that the Mexican party can successfully emerge from this struggle, the consequences will be disastrous for the party and our movement, not only in Mexico but also abroad; it should not be forgotten that there are between three and four million Mexicans living in the United States and that the Mexican proletariat has played an important role as an outpost in the struggle against imperialism in the eyes of other Latin Americans"²⁹³.

The uprising was followed by a crackdown on the communist movement: the CPM and all its affiliated organisations were defeated and their leaders imprisoned²⁹⁴. It was not until the mid-1930s that President Lázaro Cárdenas gave the CPM the opportunity to reorganise, using the Communists as support for his radical labour and agrarian reforms²⁹⁵. L. Cárdenas took advantage of the organisation of the Communist leaders to implement his programme, and allowed them to gain seats in a powerless

²⁹¹ Spenser D. *Stumbling Its Way Through Mexico: The Early Years of the Communist International*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2011. P. 165.

²⁹² Schmitt K. M. *Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration*. Austin: Austin University of Texas Press, 1965. P. 15.

²⁹³ Spenser D. *Stumbling Its Way Through Mexico: The Early Years of the Communist International*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2011. P. 166.

²⁹⁴ Schmitt K. M. *Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration*. Austin: Austin University of Texas Press, 1965. P. 15.

²⁹⁵ Schmitt K.M. *Communism in Mexico Today*// *The Western Political Quarterly*. 1962. Vol. 15. № 1. P. 112.

Congress, but did not allow them to participate in shaping the policies of his administration²⁹⁶. Nevertheless, the CPM used legalisation to infiltrate the ranks of railway workers, oil workers, petroleum workers and public school teachers, they also gained a foothold in student and professional circles²⁹⁷.

In the 1940s, the CPM was led by Dionisio Encina, a phase marked by an organisational and ideological crisis of the Mexican Communist Party. Researcher Javier Mac Gregor Campuzano writes: "This state of real 'ideological crisis' plunged the party into a lethargy from which it only began to emerge in the 1960s"²⁹⁸. Party membership fell from 20. 000 in the late thirties to about 5. 000 by the late forties ²⁹⁹. This period was also characterised by the rise of anti-communism at the state level and repression of the CPM³⁰⁰. The most important event affecting the ideology of the CPM at that time was the VII Congress, held in 1940, which revealed a number of issues concerning the relations of Mexican communists with the international communist movement: the reluctance of the CPM to assist Soviet plans to eliminate Leon Trotsky and the Comintern's concern about the CPM's erratic, uncritical and increasingly ineffective relations with the government of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940)³⁰¹.

After the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, the CPM held a series of governing body meetings in 1957 at which Mexican communists tried to find a way out of the crisis and declared that the most important internal task of the party was to deepen self-criticism, recognising mistakes and shortcomings³⁰².

²⁹⁶ Ibid.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Campuzano J. M. G. Browderismo, unidad nacional y crisis ideológica: el Partido Comunista Mexicano en la encrucijada (1940-1950) //Iztapalapa: Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades. 1995. №. 36. P. 168.

²⁹⁹ Schmitt K.M. Communism in Mexico Today// The Western Political Quarterly. 1962. Vol. 15. № 1.

³⁰⁰ Carr B. Mexican Communism 1968–1981: Eurocommunism in the Americas? //Journal of Latin American Studies. 1985. Vol. 17. №. 1. P. 206.

³⁰¹ Carr B. Crisis in Mexican Communism: The Extraordinary Congress of the Mexican Communist Party// Science & Society. 1986. Vol. 50. № 4. P. 391.

³⁰² González M. G. M. El Partido Comunista Mexicano: actor sociopolítico de la izquierda institucional mexicana del siglo XX// Vínculos. Sociología, análisis y opinión. 2013. №. 4. P.

In 1961, the CPM, together with two other communist organisations, founded the 'National Liberation Front', its creation a response to the call of Soviet communists to unite to overcome colonial domination³⁰³. Its programme included: advocacy for closer ties between Mexico and socialist Cuba, opposition to US imperialism, the release of political prisoners, the redistribution of national wealth and the socialisation of land³⁰⁴. The creation of a united 'front' also initiated discussions on the creation of a united left party that could break the power monopoly of the corporatist Institutional Revolutionary Party (IRP) and democratise the political system³⁰⁵.

In the early 1970s, the CPM began to move towards a position close to Eurocommunist. The XVI Congress of the CPM in 1973 described the political regime then existing in Mexico as "despotic presidentialism" and adopted a new programme under the heading "For Democratic and Social Power", the provision of a two-stage path to socialism through democratic and socialist revolutions was discarded and replaced by the provision of a "democratic and socialist front"³⁰⁶. The CPM also recognised that the Mexican Revolution had exhausted its progressive potential and abandoned attempts to steer the leftward course of the ruling IRP³⁰⁷. CPM researchers Massio Madonesi and Jamie Ortega Reyna describe the "Eurocommunisation" of the Mexican Communist Party as follows: "Beyond the search for national paths to socialism and freedom from Soviet control, it was the question of democracy and the recognition of pluralist dynamics in both the leftist movement and society that brought the CPM closer to what would later be called the Eurocommunist position. The new leaders of the CPM focused much of their capacity and political initiative on demanding the "opening of democracy" in Mexico and the creation of political

³⁰³ Schmitt K. M. *Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration*. Austin: Austin University of Texas Press, 1965. P. 123.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid.* P. 122 – 123.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.* P. 238.

³⁰⁶ Carr B. *Mexican Communism 1968–1981: Eurocommunism in the Americas?* // *Journal of Latin American Studies*. 1985. Vol. 17. №. 1. P. 211.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

electoral alternatives, arguing for the need to enforce the 1917 Constitution (which they believed had been violated by those who exercised power in its name)"³⁰⁸.

Like other Eurocommunist parties, the CPM believed that Mexico had developed a "state-monopoly" to which a "democratic alternative" must be offered. "A programme of profound democratic transformation," the CPM declared, "must contain a progressive solution to the problems of all sectors affected by the growing domination of monopolies in the economy, social life, culture and politics. It must contain all necessary measures to combat the crisis and its consequences for the working masses. It must outline concrete democratic alternatives to the development of the productive forces along the monopolistic path, and propose ways out of the crisis for the working masses"³⁰⁹. The result of the Eurocommunist transformation for the CPM was its self-dissolution and merger with other left-wing parties to form the United Socialist Party of Mexico ³¹⁰. "It was the 'democratic openness' and proximity to the Eurocommunist project of the Italian Communist Party and the French Communist Party," writes Mexican researcher Mario Arellano, "that led to the dissolution of the CPM in 1982 and allowed the formation of the United Socialist Party of Mexico"³¹¹.

Thus, we can identify the following factors that influenced the CPM's transition to Eurocommunist positions:

1) Interaction with the "non-proletarian" strata of the population within the broad anti-imperialist and peasant movements, as well as the activities of communists within mass organisations.

³⁰⁸ Modonesi M. Ortega Reyna J. Gramsci y Berlinguer en México. Vínculos entre comunistas italianos y mexicanos en los años setenta. Mexico: Editorial Terracota, 2023. P. 23.

³⁰⁹ Araujo O.R. Inquietada, democracia y socialismo en México (crítica al eurocomunismo mexicano). *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*. 1981. Vol. 43. № 2. P. 674.

³¹⁰ Carr B. Mexican Communism 1968–1981: Eurocommunism in the Americas? // *Journal of Latin American Studies*. 1985. Vol. 17. №. 1. P. 201.

³¹¹ Arellano M. Democracia y Hegemonía. Gramsci en la sociología histórica de Pablo González Casanova// Gramsci en México / coordinadores Fuentes D., Modonesi M. Mexico: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2020. P. 188.

- 2) The influence of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and attempts to steer the ruling regime in the direction of socialist transformation.
- 3) The Comintern's "united fronts" policy, which extended to the CPM.
- 4) Decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, which condemned Stalin's personality cult and endorsed the search for national paths to socialism.
- 5) Participation in the "National Liberation Front" together with other leftist organisations.

The example of the CPJ and the CPM demonstrates the global character of the Eurocommunist phenomenon. This allows us to conclude that the formation of the ideology of Eurocommunism was influenced not only by the specific conditions that existed in Europe, but also by global trends in the development of politics and economics. The formation of Eurocommunism as a modification of communist ideology was also significantly influenced by the processes in the international communist movement, in particular, the policy of the Comintern and the evolution of the Soviet political regime.

CHAPTER 2. THE CRISIS OF EUROCOMMUNISM AND ITS ELEMENTS IN THE IDEOLOGY OF MODERN LEFT PARTIES

2.1. Crisis of ideology and practice of Eurocommunism

The question of the crisis of Eurocommunism, as well as its emergence, remains debatable. According to the Marxist theorist Tim Potter, the most pronounced symptom of the crisis of Eurocommunism, which manifested itself in 1979, was the loss of strength of the three major Eurocommunist parties (Italian, French and Spanish), the deterioration of their electoral performance and the inter-party conflicts that began after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the ICP's attempts to find new partners at the international level in the form of socialist and social democratic parties³¹². While the CPS and the ICP strongly condemned the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, FCP leader J. Marchais visited Moscow and expressed support for the Soviet leadership, which prompted the ICP to establish contacts with the French Socialist leader F. Mitterrand and the Social Democratic Chancellor of Germany Willy Brandt, known for his anti-communist line, which caused an extremely negative reaction from the FCP³¹³. M. Di Maggio believed that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the events of 1981 in the Polish People's Republic, together with the final distancing from the CPSU, questioned the identity of the Italian Communist Party: "Between the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the declaration of the state of emergency in Poland on December 13, 1981, in order to eliminate the threat of the protest movement led by Solidarity, the ICP was completing its break with the USSR. This turn was marked by Berlinguer's famous statement about the exhaustion of the driving force of the October Revolution"³¹⁴.

³¹² Potter T. The death of Eurocommunism // Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj2/1981/isj2-013/potter.html> (accessed: 17.01.2024).

³¹³ Ibid.

³¹⁴ Di Maggio M. The Rise and Fall of Communist Parties in France and Italy. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020. P. 226.

In addition to the external factors that intensified the crisis processes, the internal contradictions of Eurocommunism played a significant role.

K. Hudson believes that Eurocommunism was a way for European communist parties to distance themselves from the Soviet leadership: “The main aim of the Eurocommunists was to distance their parties from the Soviet leadership and thereby rehabilitate themselves in the Western European political order, which had kept communists out of power throughout the post-war crisis”³¹⁵. If we proceed from the logic of K. Hudson, the first condition for the emergence of Eurocommunism was the very existence of the Soviet Union and state-socialist regimes in the countries of Eastern Europe, and their disappearance meant the deactualization of Eurocommunism. A. Rubbi believed that the apogee of Eurocommunism, marked by the meeting of the European Communist Parties in Madrid in 1977, was also the beginning of its crisis: “Although the Madrid meeting marked the apogee of Eurocommunism, it was also the beginning of its decline. However, this did not manifest itself immediately”³¹⁶. British researcher M. Maccaferri notes that Eurocommunism ceased to be a significant political force by the mid-1980s and was expunged by the Left itself in the 1990s, but the reasons for the crisis of Eurocommunism are much deeper: “Obviously, 1989 and Mikhail Gorbachev's failed attempt to ‘reform’ the Soviet model are to blame. The failure of the Soviet reformers left the impression that communism could not be reformed at all. But not only that. Eurocommunism was also obscured - or was unable to cope - with the resounding arrival of neoliberalism in the 1980s and the reorganization of social relations around the sterile concept of individualism”³¹⁷.

The failure of Gorbachev's reforms and the subsequent disappearance of the USSR from the political map of the world was not the only reason for the crisis of

³¹⁵ Hudson K. *The New European Left: A Socialism for the Twenty-first Century?* London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P. 32

³¹⁶ Rubbi A. *World of Berlinguer*. Moscow: «International relations», 1995. P. 71. [In Russian].

³¹⁷ Maccaferri M. *Why the Eurocommunists Lost* // *Jacobin*. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2023/11/eurocommunism-communist-parties-gramsci-berlinguer-marchais-history> (accessed 29.12.2023).

Eurocommunism. Nevertheless, the exaggerated expectations from attempts to modify the Soviet model of socialism had certain moral consequences for the Eurocommunist parties. The FCP, which initially perceived the Perestroika policy as a “second communist revolution”, later shifted to criticizing Gorbachev's policy and took more conservative positions, fearing the erosion of the foundations of the socialist system in the USSR³¹⁸. Spanish Communists also supported Perestroika, with former CPS general secretary S. Carrillo expressing the hope that as a result of Gorbachev's reforms “bureaucratic dictatorship will be replaced by a pluralist socialist system. Carrillo expressed the hope that as a result of Gorbachev's reforms, “bureaucratic dictatorship will be replaced by a pluralistic socialist system”³¹⁹.

According to historian Walter Ludwig Bernecker, these events did not have a significant impact on the CPS, as the party was by then already “sick” due to its archaic structure and the crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s³²⁰. The Italian communists, like the other two Eurocommunist parties, were sympathetic to the reformist policies of the new Soviet leadership. The last general secretary of the ICP, Achille Occhetto, after meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, declared “coincidence of political lines” and the search for original ways to socialism³²¹. According to researcher Aldo Agosti, the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, which was celebrated against the backdrop of the “perestroika” processes, in many ways prompted the ICP to start rethinking its attitude to the communist tradition³²². Thus, there was a certain mutual influence between the CPSU during Perestroika and Eurocommunist parties: M.S. Gorbachev recognized in his memoirs that Eurocommunism became one of the sources of “new

³¹⁸ Andolfatto D. *The French Communist Party Confronted with a World Falling Apart (1985–1991) // Perestroika and the Party. National and transitional perspectives on European communist parties in the era of Soviet reforms/* New York: Berghahn Books, 2019. P. 203-204.

³¹⁹ Bernecker W.L. *The Spanish Communist Party and Perestroika // Perestroika and the Party. National and transitional perspectives on European communist parties in the era of Soviet reforms/* New York: Berghahn Books, 2019. P. 31.

³²⁰ *Ibid.* P. 312.

³²¹ Agosti A. *The Italian Communist Party and Perestroika // Perestroika and the Party. National and transitional perspectives on European communist parties in the era of Soviet reforms/* New York: Berghahn Books, 2019. P. 193.

³²² *Ibid.* P. 189.

thinking” and revision of views on socialism³²³. The Eurocommunist parties, for whom the USSR, despite their critical attitude towards it, has always remained an important symbol, saw in Perestroika an opportunity to renew the Soviet model of socialism on the principles of democracy, freedom of speech and political pluralism. The CPSU leadership led by M.S. Gorbachev, seeking to reform the political system and creatively rethink socialist ideas while avoiding “adventurism”, drew attention to the Eurocommunist experience in the absence of the conditions that made the formation of Eurocommunism possible.

The coincidence of the positions of the Soviet Communist Party and the Eurocommunists can serve to confirm the ideas of E. Mandel, who considered Eurocommunism to be the result of the transformation of Stalinism. The failure of the “perestroika” reforms and the subsequent collapse of the USSR significantly demoralized the Eurocommunist parties and raised the question not only of the possibility of democratizing bureaucratic variations of socialism, but also the possibility of transition from capitalism to a different system.

When analyzing the reasons that led Eurocommunism to decline, it should be taken into account that the ideology of Eurocommunism was based not only on the rejection of the Soviet project and was not limited to the electoral strategy of European communist parties. As the example of the FCP shows, the Eurocommunist line was relatively successfully combined with a pro-Soviet stance and the rhetoric of so-called “proletarian internationalism.” The reasons for the crisis of Eurocommunism, in our opinion, lie in the increasing complexity of the social stratification of European societies and the growth of the middle class, whose interests the Eurocommunist parties sought to take into account on an equal footing with their traditional social base. Here we can agree with the position of the researcher of international relations L.B. Popov, who saw the reason for the transformation of Eurocommunist parties in their desire to express the interests of as many social groups as possible: “The practical difficulty that the parties belonging to the Eurocommunist trend tried to overcome was that the

³²³ Gorbachev M.S. Life and Reforms. Book 2. Moscow: «Novosti» Publisher, 1995. P. 588. [In Russian].

traditional Communist parties could protect the interests of the small producers, the middle strata, but could not represent them, that is, protect them in the form and sense in which the small producers and the middle strata themselves understood it”³²⁴. The Eurocommunist parties, striving to express the interests of “the whole nation” and “unite all progressive forces” actually tried to occupy the niche of social democracy. T. Potter wrote to this effect: “Roughly speaking, it boiled down to the following: if the Eurocommunist parties proposed a gradual, parliamentary path to socialism, based on cooperation between classes, what, in fact, distinguished them from the Social Democrats? And if the differences were understood only by a dedicated few, why shouldn't voters who are asked to choose between the two versions of social democracy favor the original over the new converts?”³²⁵. The blurring of the social base led to a change in the social composition of the Eurocommunist parties themselves and their governing bodies³²⁶, which contributed to their social democratization.

Having broadened their social base, their views on democracy and socialism, and seeking to express the interests of as many social groups (“the nation” and “all the people”) as possible, the Eurocommunists were forced to make endless compromises, which cost them the abandonment of their own party programs and capitulation to neoliberalism. According to FCP researcher Gino J. Raymond, the participation of the French Communists in a majority Socialist government that was forced to capitulate to market forces by agreeing to monetarist pressures on the French economy, with all the consequent effects on employment and the financing of social reforms, has largely put the party at a disadvantage³²⁷. ICP leader E. Berlinguer believed that austerity could play a progressive role: “Austerity, depending on its content and the forces that govern its application, can be used either as an instrument of economic depression, political

³²⁴ Popov L.B. *Memories of Eurocommunism*. Moscow: International relations, 2008. P. 105. [In Russian].

³²⁵ Potter T. *The death of Eurocommunism* // Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj2/1981/isj2-013/potter.html> (accessed: 17.01.2024).

³²⁶ Katorzhevskij P.N. *Formation of the ideological discourse of Eurocommunism. On the example of the Italian Communist Party* // *Free Thought*. 2022. №. 3 (1693). P. 85. [In Russian].

³²⁷ Raymond G. G. *The French Communist Party During the Fifth Republic*. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. P. 172.

repression and the perpetuation of social injustice, or as an opportunity for new economic and social development, a severe downsizing of the state, a profound transformation of the foundations of society, and the protection and expansion of society”³²⁸. Political scientist Carl Boggs quite accurately described E. Berlinguer's position as “a policy of austerity with a socialist face, requiring workers to limit their demands in order to destabilize the Italian economy”³²⁹. In a “historic compromise,” the ICP, in coalition with the Christian Democrats, said it was “necessary to save the national economy” and curb inflation, which led to wage restraint³³⁰. Both the forced capitulation of the Eurocommunists (FCP) to market forces and the recognition of austerity as a progressive measure (ICP) were little in line not only with “overcoming capitalism” but also with the expectations of voters and a number of party activists. This inability to defend the last “line of defense” of their political positions contributed to the fact that instead of influencing other democratic political forces, Eurocommunists became a “left” appendage in broad coalitions composed of forces ideologically alien to the Communists. Eurocommunist formula, that the communist party aims to become “the party of struggle and the party of government”³³¹ at the same time, was not realized: the Eurocommunists failed to become effective spokesmen for the interests of wage earners and other “excluded” groups, nor did they succeed in introducing social reforms through participation in elected bodies. The coalition politics of the Eurocommunists and their desire to remain in representative bodies at all costs provoked criticism and opposition from supporters and members of Eurocommunist parties. Within the ICP, a staunch opposition to the policy of “historical compromise” developed, believing that unity with the Christian Democrats

³²⁸ Birchall I. The death of compromiser // Marxist Internet archive. URL: www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/birchall/1984/07/berlinguer.htm (accessed: 20.01.2024).

³²⁹ Boggs C. Eurocommunism, the state, and the crisis of legitimation // *Berkeley Journal of Sociology*. 1978. Vol. 23. P. 57.

³³⁰ Goulet T. What is Eurocommunism? // Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://socialistworker.org/2015/11/11/what-is-eurocommunism> (accessed: 20.01.2024).

³³¹ Adereth M. *The French Communist party: a critical history (1920-1984), from Comintern to "the colours of France"*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. P. 283.

prevented left unity³³². “Historical Compromise” drew criticism of the ICP from Italian socialists as well, who claimed that by doing so the communists were refusing to seek allies in the leftist community³³³. Marzio Barbaggi and Corbetta Piergiorgio, in their paper on the attitudes of different groups of ICP members and supporters towards the policy of “historical compromise”, conclude: “The party members never looked favorably on the line of historical compromise. A part of them throughout this period never ceased to express their doubts and their dissent at section meetings...By virtue of their place in the organization, militants and especially section secretaries adhered to the official line of the leadership much more than the members, but they also abandoned it gradually, pushed by the members, without considering what was happening in the country”³³⁴.

In our opinion, the attitude of the party mass in the ICP to the “general line” of the party was an expression of the sentiments of the bulk of the communist electorate. The activists were much more involved in the intra-party discussion and decision-making process and occupied an intermediate position between functionaries and rank-and-file members, which made them more susceptible to ambiguous decisions of the party leadership. This situation meant the formation of two political lines within one organizational structure, where on the one hand there were supporters of the socialist perspective, in the minds of whom, in the words of E. Mandel³³⁵, traditional ties to the Russian Revolution and the Soviet Union continued to live on; on the other hand, functionaries performing the functions of administrators within the established “bourgeois” political system. “Communists, like socialists,” writes socialist theorist Sam Marcy, “even in the highest cabinet positions, merely served as administrators of the bourgeois state. This is not a historical compromise with the bourgeoisie. It is not

³³² Balampanidis I. *Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left*. London: Routledge, 2019. P. 66.

³³³ *Ibid.*

³³⁴ Barbagli M., Piergiorgio C. *After the Historic Compromise: A Turning Point for the PCI* // *European Journal of Political Research* 1982. Vol. 10. № 3. P. 234.

³³⁵ Mandel E. *A Critique of Eurocommunism* // Ernest Mandel Internet Archive. URL: https://www.ernestmandel.org/en/works/txt/1979/a_critique_of_eurocommunism.htm (accessed:17.11.2023).

a sharing of power, it is just getting some crumbs and privileges for the bureaucracy of the party and some of its allies. It does nothing to improve the rapidly deteriorating living conditions of the broad masses of people”³³⁶.

In 1991, the leader of the ICP, Akile Okketto, declared the need to change the name of the ICP and create a “new political formation”³³⁷. The topic of changing the name of the party and its communist identity had previously remained taboo, although it was periodically raised in connection with the need to finally eliminate associations with the USSR and the CPSU³³⁸. “Indeed,” writes American researcher David Kertzer, “what came to be known as the ‘K factor’ in Italian politics - the shadow cast over the ICP by its affiliation with the international communist movement - political observers continued to cite as the basis for the ICP's continued exclusion from participation in coalition governments. The “K” factor persisted even as the ICP gradually moved away from its pro-Soviet stance and much of what had traditionally defined the party's communist ideology over the decades”³³⁹. The 20th Congress of the ICP simultaneously became the first congress of a new organization called the Party of Democratic Left Forces (PDLF). Those who disagreed with the rejection of communist ideology and identity founded the Party of Communist Revival (PCR)³⁴⁰. Subsequent attempts to reformat the PDLF and to unite it with other left-wing political forces by the mid-2000s led to its transformation into a de-ideologized “Democratic Party” (DP), originally conceived as a center-left party³⁴¹. Secretary of the DP Piero Fassino, characterizing the ideology of the new party, stated: “The old tripolar framework with left, right and centrists trying to destroy each other no longer works”³⁴².

³³⁶ Marcy S. Eurocommunism: New type of reformism? // Workers World. URL: <https://www.workers.org/marcy/cd/sameuro/euro/euro02.htm> (accessed: 23.01.2024).

³³⁷ Kertzer D. I. Politics and symbols: The Italian Communist Party and the fall of communism. London, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996. P. 10.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Ibid. P. 11.

³⁴⁰ Hellman S. The Difficult Birth of the Democratic Party of the Left // Italian Politics. 1992. Vol 7. P. 68.

³⁴¹ Lazar M. The Birth of the Democratic Party // Italian Politics. 2007. Vol. 23. P. 51.

³⁴² Ibid. P. 52.

One of the first external manifestations of the crisis in the French Communist Party was the results of the leftist forces in the general elections of 1978, which, as J. Ross believed, should have been the culmination of the Eurocommunization of the French communist movement³⁴³. The election results displeased some FCP members, who began to demand that the discussion be organized in the party press, not only in the party organizations³⁴⁴. This proposal was rejected by management citing statutory provisions³⁴⁵. The general atmosphere of crisis, electoral failures and the biggest debates in the party since the 1920s forced the top leadership to change its approach to communicating with members. At the XXIII (1979) congress of the FCP, J. Marchais tried to change the discursive strategy towards personalist populism, deviating from the traditional doctrinal control of party discourse, but the myth of a party with “Marchais as its helmsman” did not have a mobilizing effect, unlike the myth of a “savior class”³⁴⁶. What could not be done by persuading the party members was accomplished by excluding “factionalists” and intellectuals from the party. Gino J. Raymond mentions this episode in his research of the history of the FCP: “The sense of despair caused by the irony that the party's ‘tribune’ was locked in a reactionary cult of silence was reinforced when the party expelled Henri Fishbin and François Hinker, founders of the FCP's dissident forum ‘Rencontres communistes’, and it is noteworthy that in the same year, 1981, Ellenstein and Etienne Balibar were expelled from the party”³⁴⁷. The contradictions between the party leadership, rank-and-file members and communist intellectuals were the result of a deep internal crisis and at the same time the cause of the new structural problems of the FCP. The processes of democratization within the party proceeded slowly and only to the extent that the leadership was willing

³⁴³ Ross G. Crisis in Eurocommunism: The French Case // Socialist Register. 1978. Vol. 15. P. 172.

³⁴⁴ Adereth M. The French Communist party: a critical history (1920-1984), from Comintern to "the colours of France". Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. P. 219

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Raymond G. G. The French Communist Party During the Fifth Republic. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. P. 127.

³⁴⁷ Ibid. P. 159.

to do so³⁴⁸. Under M. Torez, all internal contradictions were resolved by excluding dissenters from the party or through the voluntary withdrawal of those who disagreed with the party's policy³⁴⁹. Despite some relaxations in intra-party life, a similar political culture and leadership style was maintained under J. March. Marsh. Characterizing the political culture of the FCP, J. Ross writes: “As the crisis developed, the [party] leadership had the upper hand, which is to be expected of a party in which the leadership always has the upper hand”³⁵⁰. British researcher David Bell also notes that the FCP had the largest staff of apparatchiks compared to any of the French political parties³⁵¹, which could lead to different interpretations of the party's program guidelines by different categories of its members and as a consequence caused both intra-party conflicts and the inability to effectively aggregate the interests of the left electorate and adequately analyze the current political situation. In his book “What is to be done” L. Althusser, critically analyzing the process of formation of the political line of the French Communists, in particular, noted: “Thus, the FCP for many years ‘decided’ from above what should be the concrete reality, without conducting a serious, deep analysis of concrete reality”³⁵². The rigid hierarchical structure, together with the lack of intra-party democracy, the bureaucratization of the party apparatus, and the purges of intra-party opposition, contradicted the “democratic” rhetoric of the FCP, which naturally led to disillusionment with the Communist Party among its supporters, the creation of alternative leftist organizations, and the growing popularity of the Socialists, whose votes were legitimized in the eyes of the Communist electorate by their coalitions with the FCP.

M. Aderet sees the causes of the crisis in the inertia of the events of 1968: after the bankruptcy of “gauchisme”, qualified cadres, intellectuals and, to a lesser extent, farmers, supported not the FCP but the Socialist Party, which had a more positive

³⁴⁸ Ross G. Crisis in Eurocommunism: The French Case // Socialist Register. 1978. Vol. 15. P. 185.

³⁴⁹ Ibid. P. 187.

³⁵⁰ Ibid. P. 189.

³⁵¹ Bell D.S. French Communism: An Exceptional Orthodoxy // The French Exception/ New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2004. P. 48.

³⁵² Althusser L. What is to be Done? Cambridge: Polity Press, 2020. P. 20.

impact on the electorate thanks to its combination of moderate and ultra-leftist phraseology³⁵³. The FCP initially condemned the demonstrations against De Gaulle and actually opposed the protesters, gaining the image of the party that “stopped the revolution”³⁵⁴, which led to the growth of alternative leftist groups. D. Bell, characterizing the coexistence of the FCP with other leftist organizations, concludes that the events of 1968 were a turning point for the Communist Party: “Until then, the Communists had not recognized competition and in May 1968 they did not know that there were different groups. They were forced to take notice and react by fighting (sometimes violently) against the new groups that were rising, because its [the FCP] 'halo of proletarian sanctity' had been lost and its legitimacy questioned”³⁵⁵. On the one hand, the FCP's position seemed consistent, as French communists had been advocating the possibility of a democratic path to socialism for more than two decades, arguing that objective circumstances and the “concrete-historical situation” made it possible. On the other hand, when objective circumstances led to a social explosion, the party actually adopted a wait-and-see attitude and lost the sympathy of its supporters among the left, ostracizing the protesters ideologically and declaring them “self-righteous neophytes of the revolution”³⁵⁶.

Symptoms of the FCP crisis were the party's electoral performance in the presidential (1981) and European (1984) elections, which were significantly worse than the previous ones³⁵⁷. G. Marchais, speaking before the Party Central Committee, sought to justify the failures and to convince party members that the union of the left had no meaning without a strong Communist Party: “We still think first of all: union,

³⁵³ Adereth M. *The French Communist party: a critical history (1920-1984), from Comintern to "the colours of France"*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984. P. 222.

³⁵⁴ Mendel A.P. *Why the French Communists Stopped the Revolution // The Review of Politics*. 1969. Vol. 31. №1. P. 3.

³⁵⁵ Bell D. S. *The French Communist Party within the Left and alternative movements // Modern & Contemporary France*. 2004. Vol. 12. №1. P. 24.

³⁵⁶ Duclos J. *Who are they, the Communists?* Moscow: Politizdat, 1973. P. 93. [In Russian].

³⁵⁷ Martelli R., Vigreux J., Wolikow S. *One Hundred Years of History of the French Communist Party: The Red Party*. Berlin, London, New York: Springer Nature, 2022. P. 213-214

union of the left; and only then do we think of the Party”³⁵⁸. By the mid-1980s, the FCP's electoral performance had declined to 7-11 percent depending on the type of election (down from 21-22 percent in the first two decades of the Fifth Republic), the electorate had aged, its influence on labor unions had diminished, and its control over municipal governments, long a key source of resources, had fallen dramatically³⁵⁹. By the early 1990s, the FCP received very little public attention and had the image of a “run-down” and marginalized organization ³⁶⁰, which was in stark contrast to its old image as the “party of struggle” and the “party of resistance heroes”. Marino De Luca and Marco Domiani, analyzing the transformation of the FCP in the 1980s and early 1990s, conclude: “After a quarter of a century of Marché's leadership, the fate of the French Communist Party was strongly conditioned not only by the political lines imposed by its leader, but also by exogenous factors linked to the collapse of the socialist regimes”³⁶¹.

Thus, the following reasons for the crisis and subsequent marginalization of the FCP can be identified: inconsistent coalition policy and, as a consequence, the outflow of the electorate to the socialists; excessive bureaucratization and separation of the governing bodies from the rank-and-file members and voters; undemocratic internal structure and repressive measures against the party opposition; the party's desire to maintain a pro-Soviet line and avoid conflict with the CPSU³⁶², even to the detriment of its image inside the country. It was not until 1976 that J. Marchais began to distance himself more decisively from the Soviet model and unequivocally condemned the policy of Stalinism, while Robert Yu (1994-2003), general secretary of the FCPF, stated that this delay had caused the French Communist Party considerable image

³⁵⁸ Ibid. P. 215.

³⁵⁹ Ross G. Party Decline and Changing Party Systems: France and the French Communist Party // Comparative Politics. 1992. Vol 25. № 1. P. 44

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Damiani M. De Luca M. From the Communist Party to the Front de gauche. The French radical left from 1989 to 2014 // Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 2016. Vol. 49. № 4. P. 2.

³⁶² Raymond G. G. The French Communist Party During the Fifth Republic. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. P.88.

damage: “The FCP waited too long. It has cost us dearly. It is now twenty years too late”³⁶³. Attempts to extend their influence to new social groups backfired and led the communist electorate to support the Socialists. The decline in the popularity of the French Communists was influenced, among other things, by their failure to capitalize on the momentum of the 1968 protests and the subsequent loss of the FCP's “monopoly” on the communist idea.

After its legalization, the CPS expected to repeat the success of the ICP and proclaimed itself “the main party of the working class and working people”³⁶⁴. However, the real electoral indicators were far from expectations and in the first democratic elections after the death of Franco, the Communists received only 9.24%, while 29.2% of voters cast their votes for the Socialists³⁶⁵. Manuel Azcarat Diz, one of the leaders of the CPS, wrote in his memoirs that Carrillo saw a way out of the situation by moving to a more right-wing position: “An even more serious consequence of the electoral defeat for the CPS was another: in order to increase our electoral influence, we had to move to the right. Whereas we had already made moves to the right before, flirting with Suárez to achieve legalization, the conclusion Carrillo drew from the election was that we needed to emphasize this orientation. It was a very serious mistake, because we were moving away from certain signs of identity that constituted the *raison d'être* of our existence”³⁶⁶.

In the 1979 general elections, the CPS did not significantly improve its results; together with its allies from the Catalan left-socialist party PSUC, the communists

³⁶³ Aeschmann E. Virot P. Jospin défenseur du communisme français. Le Premier ministre a défendu hier le PCF, que la droite mettait en cause après la sortie du «Livre noir du communisme» // Liberation. URL: https://www.liberation.fr/france/1997/11/13/jospin-defenseur-du-communisme-francais-le-premier-ministre-a-defendu-hier-le-pcf-que-la-droite-mett_222223/ (accessed: 06.02.2024).

³⁶⁴ Donofrio A. The end of Eurocommunism and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) // *Studia Historica. Historia Contemporánea*. 2013. Vol. 31. P. 171.

³⁶⁵ Ibid.

³⁶⁶ Ibid. P. 171.

received only 10.79% of the vote³⁶⁷. After another electoral setback, the CPS attempted to replicate the Italian strategy of “historical compromise”: the Communists explicitly and implicitly promoted the position of the dominant party, the Union of the Democratic Center (UDC). Fernando Claudin, a former CPS functionary and one of S. Carrillo's deputies, wrote: “It [the CPS] has gone so far in its politics that it favors postponing the general elections and concluding a pact of two or three years that would guarantee the leading role of the UDC and the transformation of the SSWP into a right-wing controlled appendage. Since elections represented the only immediate opportunity to achieve a change of political direction to the left, though unfortunately this has not happened”³⁶⁸. At the same time, the historical compromise in the Spanish Communist Party's interpretation was much more to the right than the Italian one: while the Italian Christian Democrats had experience of participating in the anti-fascist resistance, many members of the Spanish UDC were former functionaries of the Francoist period³⁶⁹, which caused dissent on the part of many CPS members, especially those who remained in Spain and were repressed for their political activities during Franco's rule.

Of all the Eurocommunist parties, the CPS was the most critical of the Soviet project. While the ICP and FCP, having shifted to Eurocommunist positions, remained relatively loyal to the USSR and the CPSU, criticizing certain aspects of Soviet reality and referring to the specific national conditions in which the Soviet state was formed, the CPS became, in the words of political scientist Gary Prevost, “extremely critical”³⁷⁰ to the USSR because of the repression of the dissident movement, and its revision of orthodox Marxism went much further than tactical considerations³⁷¹. S. Carrillo in his analysis goes much further than the Italian or French communists, believing that the

³⁶⁷ Elecciones Generales 1 de marzo de 1979 // Junta electoral central. URL https://www.juntaelectoralcentral.es/cs/jec/documentos/GENERALES_1979_ResultadosCongreso.pdf (accessed: 08.02.2024).

³⁶⁸ Claudin F. The Recent Evolution of Eurocommunism // Contemporary Marxism. 1980. №. 2. P. 19 – 20.

³⁶⁹ Ibid. P. 20.

³⁷⁰ Prevost G. Eurocommunism and the Spanish communists // West European Politics. 1981. Vol. 4. №. 1. P. 75.

³⁷¹ Ibid. P. 76.

predominance of the state sector of the economy and the hegemony of the “forces of labor and culture” are sufficient to achieve socialism³⁷², and the ruling classes will naturally integrate into the socialist system: “To repeat - some of these dominant classes will become more permeable and will be able to cooperate in one way or another with the new social system, reducing the scope and possibilities of violent resistance...”³⁷³. Such theoretical conclusions, coupled with electoral defeats, naturally led to the development of centrifugal tendencies within the party and caused discontent among pro-Soviet communists and the left wing of the party.

In 1981, T. Potter wrote of the divisions within the Spanish Communist Party: “At the moment, the CPS seems to be torn by radically different currents that disagree over structure, tradition, and strategy”³⁷⁴. Intra-party conflicts were exacerbated by the CPS's compromising attitude toward the institution of monarchy. C. Carrillo argued in his speeches that the dichotomy between monarchy and republic had lost its relevance and that the monarchy was the guarantor of preserving democracy: “The CPS wants a democratic system for Spain, and the monarchy will be welcomed if it is able to guarantee it, because what is important now is the choice not between ‘monarchy and republic’, but between ‘dictatorship and democracy’³⁷⁵. Thus, the ideology of the CPS, after its legalization, can be attributed to the right-wing current in Eurocommunism, which envisioned the path to socialism “through a ‘long march’, slow and steady, through political and civil society institutions”³⁷⁶. Growing dissatisfaction with the Eurocommunist line led to the formation in 1982 of a new communist organization, the Partido Comunista de Catalunya (PCC), with more orthodox positions than the CPS³⁷⁷.

³⁷² Carrillo S. «Eurocomunismo» y Estado. Barcelona: Grupo Editorial Grijalbo, 1977. P. 94.

³⁷³ Ibid. P. 98

³⁷⁴ Potter T. The death of Eurocommunism // Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/newspape/isj2/1981/isj2-013/potter.html> (accessed: 17.01.2024).

Pinilla G. A. La legalización del PCE. Intrahistoria del consenso // Norba Revista de Historia. 2019. Vol. 32. P. 67.

³⁷⁶ Jessop B. Nicos Poulantzas Marxist Theory and Political Strategy. London: Macmillan, 1985. P. 297.

³⁷⁷ Astakhov E. «Eurocommunism» and the split of the Communist movement in Spain // Cuadernos Iberoamericanos. – 2017. Vol 18. №. 4. P. 11.

In 1984, the founding congress of the Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain (CPNI) was held under the slogan “Eurocommunism has divided us, Marxism-Leninism will unite us”³⁷⁸. Historian Paul Heywood suggests that the preconditions for the crisis in the CPS were forming long before Franco's death and the legalization of the Communist Party: “Because the CPs was, of course, illegal, its leadership was forced into exile after the Spanish Civil War and eventually settled in Paris. One important consequence of this was that a division emerged between the underground CPS in Spain and the party leadership in France”³⁷⁹. At the same time, the principle of democratic centralism obliged the activists who remained in Spain to obey all the decisions of the émigré leadership without question, in conditions where the possibility of expressing dissent was practically excluded. The dissatisfaction of the underground part of the CPS manifested itself in the conflict between S. Carrillo and his assistants, Jorge Semprun and F. Claudin, who believed that the leadership of the party had become disconnected from the situation in the country and made an openly critical report on this subject, after which he was expelled from the party³⁸⁰. Despite the Eurocommunist line and democratic rhetoric, authoritarian methods of party leadership, which included the exclusion of dissenters, persisted in the CPS even after the party's condemnation of Stalinist practices. “However,” writes P. Heywood, “for all Carrillo's expressed commitment to Eurocommunism, he was not prepared to allow any flexibility in the leadership structure. The exclusion of Claudin and Semprun, and later Lister, was because they represented a threat to sacrosanct democratic centralism. For Carrillo, this was not just important: it was unequivocal. The problem was that for other members of the CPS it was not.”³⁸¹.

Carrillo's authoritarian style of party leadership continued throughout his tenure as secretary general of the CPS. In 1982, when the Spanish Communists received the worst result in their history in the parliamentary elections, Carrillo was forced to resign,

³⁷⁸ Ibid. P. 12.

³⁷⁹ Heywood P. Spanish communists in crisis // Journal of Communist Studies. 1985. Vol 1. №. 3-4. P. 167 – 168.

³⁸⁰ Ibid. P. 168-169.

³⁸¹ Ibid. P. 169.

but planned to retain control over decision-making by appointing a loyal functionary as party head³⁸². Not only the electoral results of the party deteriorated, but the party's membership rapidly declined - from 132,069 members in 1981 to 84,652 in 1983³⁸³. As a result, S. Carrillo himself was expelled from the CPS in 1985 and founded a new communist party, the Workers' Party of Spain - Communist Unity, which failed to attract a significant number of supporters and, after failing in the parliamentary elections in 1986 and 1989, became part of the ISWP³⁸⁴. The CPS itself joined the Izquierda Unida (United Left) coalition in 1985, continuing its gradual abandonment of class rhetoric³⁸⁵. After the coalition was transformed into an independent political force, the CPS refused to be part of it and retained its organizational independence³⁸⁶. Between 1986 and 1994, the CPS slightly improved its electoral performance, but after that the party again entered a period of stagnation³⁸⁷.

The crisis of the CPS, which appeared after the legalization of the party in 1977, was partly prepared by the previous stage of its activity during the dictatorship of F. Franco. The CPS leadership, which was in exile, was, for objective reasons, detached from the activists in the country, which prevented the development of a political line that corresponded to the existing conditions. The contradictions between the emigrant part of the CPS and its rank-and-file members were aggravated by the authoritarian manner of leadership, which remained even after the democratization of the political system in Spain. At the same time, the CPS, while taking a democratic stand, was unable to democratize its structure, and ideological monolithicism was achieved by excluding intra-party opposition. In addition to organizational-party aspects and problems of intra-party democracy, the party's crisis was precipitated by the abrupt

³⁸² Preston P. *The last Stalinist: the life of Santiago Carrillo*. London: William Collins, 2014. P. 329.

³⁸³ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁴ *Ibid.* P. 329-330.

³⁸⁵ Van Biezen I. *Building party organisations and the relevance of past models: The communist and socialist parties in Spain and Portugal // West European Politics*. 1998. Vol. 21. №. 2. P. 56.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁷ Chari R. S. *Why did the Spanish communist strategy fail? // Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*. 2005. Vol. 21. №. 2. P. 297.

reversal of its political course, which implied alliances with the former Frankist bureaucracy, the rejection of even nominal demands for a transition to a republic and public expressions of loyalty to the institution of the monarchy, as well as the denial of social antagonisms at the theoretical level, which effectively duplicated the social democratic agenda and deprived the Spanish Communist Party of its own identity.

The crisis of Eurocommunism in each of the West European Communist Parties had its own specifics, influenced by national conditions, the peculiarities of the political system, and the previous political tactics and strategies of the Communist Parties themselves. At the same time, the crisis phenomena in different parties had similar causes and symptomatology.

The main reasons for the crisis of Eurocommunism as an ideology and political practice include:

1. The overemphasis on parliamentary activities had far-reaching ideological consequences for Eurocommunist parties, which no longer positioned themselves as working class organizations and instruments for overcoming capitalism, but claimed to be “effective administrators” of the existing system, thus duplicating social democracy.

2. The coalition policy of the Eurocommunist parties, which was rejected by the communist electorate, actually turned the Communist parties into unchanging “junior coalition partners” and did not bring the expected political dividends.

3. The desire to reach as many social groups as possible with their agitation forced Eurocommunist parties to put forward contradictory demands, which ultimately led to a dilution and shrinking of the social base.

4. Archaic internal structure, limited theoretical discussions within the party, repression of party opposition, and hypertrophied “democratic centralism” that led to a disconnection of the leadership from the party masses and, as a consequence, from the social groups whose interests the Communist Party sought to express.

5. Failure to develop common principles at the international level; the gradual disintegration of Eurocommunist parties within the European and international communist movement. This point should include the Eurocommunists' extremely polar assessments of the USSR, its foreign policy and their attitude to the Soviet model - from complimentary (FCP), to “extremely critical” (CPS).

In all the above cases, Eurocommunism, in its various interpretations, did not contribute to the popularity of the Communist Parties and led them to marginalization, which was expressed in a shrinking membership base, lower electoral results, and a break from their social base and trade unions (FCP, ICP). For the ICP, the result of the Eurocommunist line was social democratization and subsequent de-ideologization. The failure of Eurocommunism as a political strategy and the inability of the “orthodox” Communist parties, formed as a result of the split of the Eurocommunist Communist parties, to take their place on the left-radical political flank, led to the crisis of the 1990s, aggravated by the collapse of the “socialist commonwealth” and forced the search for new forms of organization and the desire to “reinvent” communist ideas taking into account the changed political-ideological space.

2.2. Elements of Eurocommunism in the ideology of the modern European “radical left”

In the contemporary discourse of communist and radical leftist parties, the term “Eurocommunism” is practically not used. A number of researchers and leftist theorists consider Eurocommunism exclusively as a political line of some European communist parties in the 1970s-1980s or as one of the stages of development of the radical leftist movement. M. Maccaferi argues that by the early 1990s Eurocommunism had disappeared from the communists' ideological toolkit: “By the mid-1980s, Eurocommunism had ceased to be a significant political force that attempted to shake up the Western Left. By the time of the sudden death of ICP leader Berlinguer in 1984, the term itself had completely fallen by the wayside. And, eventually, Eurocommunism was dropped from the counter-reactions of the left in the 1990s”³⁸⁸. In the words of K. Hudson, radical left parties (RLPs) “chose to redefine and restructure anti-capitalist politics in the post-Soviet era”³⁸⁹.

In an attempt to overcome the consequences of the crisis, the communist and lvo-socialist parties chose different options of transformation. The orthodox Communist parties took the “conservative” path and retained the “class-oriented” Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and communist attributes, while continuing to reproduce the narratives of Stalinism and its “anti-revisionist” modifications³⁹⁰. Some communist and workers' parties switched to center-left and social-democratic positions, changing their names and reorienting themselves toward participation in public politics. The third way of transformation implied the preservation of “anti-capitalist” attitudes, the use of populist rhetoric, the recognition of democratic rights and freedoms, the desire to critically rethink communism and socialism, and, in some cases, the removal of the

³⁸⁸ Maccaferri M. Why the Eurocommunists Lost // Jacobin. URL: <https://jacobin.com/2023/11/eurocommunism-communist-parties-gramsci-berlinguer-marchais-history> (accessed 29.12.2023).

³⁸⁹ Hudson K. The New European Left: A Socialism for the Twenty-first Century? London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. P. 33.

³⁹⁰ Katorzhevskij P.N. The influence of Eurocommunism on the ideology and political practice of the contemporary “radical left”// Political expertise: POLITEX. 2023. Vol. 19. №. 1. P. 37. [In Russian].

word “communist” from the name of the party.³⁹¹ The parties that followed this path of transformation are mostly members of the pan-European Party of the European Left, and can be labeled by the general term “radical left”. The parties of this spectrum are united by their aspiration to overcome capitalism and their categorical rejection of Stalinism³⁹² and the desire to disassociate itself from contemporary social democracy, which is no longer perceived by many as a left ideology³⁹³. Most RLPs refer directly or indirectly to Marxism and the communist tradition, as expressed in the PEL manifesto, which enshrines its core values : “We refer to the values and traditions of socialism, communism, the labor movement, feminism, the feminist movement and gender equality, the environmental movement and sustainable development, peace and international solidarity, human rights, humanism and anti-fascism, progressive and liberal thinking, both nationally and internationally”³⁹⁴.

The RLP is far from being ideologically monolithic and has its own ideological peculiarities due to its history and political practice: it represents both formations of the Eurocommunist tradition and those who share more of a left-socialist or eco-socialist ideology³⁹⁵. In their research of the formation of the PEL, R. Dunphy and L. March write: “After the tumultuous events of 1989-1991, it was far from obvious that the weakened forces of the radical left could re-unite to restore even the minimal level of cohesion and cooperation they had enjoyed before 1989. Electoral ratings went into free fall; many merged or transformed, in some cases into non-radical center-left parties...The disorder was so great that for some analysts the Communist parties were no longer even thought of as a cohesive party family”³⁹⁶.

³⁹¹ Ibid.

³⁹² Dunphy R., March L. *The European Left Party*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019. P. 87.

³⁹³ Gray J. *After social democracy: politics, capitalism and the common life*. London: Demos, 1996. P. 9.

³⁹⁴ European Left Manifesto // European Left. URL: https://www.european-left.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Manifesto-European-Left_ENG.pdf (accessed: 07.02.2024).

³⁹⁵ Kostiuk R.V. *Left alternatives in the campaign for the 2019 European Parliament elections // Modern Europe*. 2019. №5. P. 63. [In Russian].

³⁹⁶ Dunphy R., March L. *The European Left Party*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019. P. 64.

Despite the fact that a significant part of the PEL member parties are heirs of the Eurocommunist tradition and in one way or another have passed through this stage in their ideological evolution, they try to weaken the connection with this heritage³⁹⁷, in every possible way, there is no mention of the term “Eurocommunism” in the program and statutory documents of the “Euro-left”. Although the RLP declares a radical rejection of capitalism and neoliberalism, declares an irreconcilable attitude toward ideological opponents, and emphasizes its opposition to the establishment, political conditions and pragmatic considerations have forced it to return to Eurocommunist practices. Despite the desire to conform to general social trends and some experiments with image and rhetoric, the RLP still retained some of the features that were characteristic of its predecessors before 1989³⁹⁸. The example of the Greek coalition of radical leftists SYRIZA, which, having won the parliamentary elections in January 2015, was forced to enter into a coalition with the right-conservative party “Independent Greeks” to form a government is illustrative³⁹⁹. This tactical maneuver was not theoretically justified by the party's ideologists, and Alexis Tsipras, the leader of the Greek “left-radicals” at the time, stated that the party was forced to take such a step and adopt the memorandum, indirectly referring to Lenin's famous “one step forward, two steps back”⁴⁰⁰. This coalition policy reproduces the Eurocommunist idea of “historical compromise”, which implied the possibility of an alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie for the sake of isolating its “most reactionary circles”. SYRIZA found it possible to compromise with the Eurosceptic right in order to isolate the parties representing the “old establishment”⁴⁰¹.

³⁹⁷ Chiocchetti P. *The radical left party family in Western Europe, 1989-2015*. London, New York: Routledge, 2016. P. 74.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁹ Aslanidis P., Rovira Kaltwasser C. *Dealing with populists in government: the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition in Greece* // Research Gate. URL: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/297721292> (accessed: 14.02.2024).

⁴⁰⁰ Katsourides Y. *Radical left parties in government: The cases of SYRIZA and AKEL*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. P. 125.

⁴⁰¹ Katorzhevskij P.N. The influence of Eurocommunism on the ideology and political practice of the contemporary "radical left" // *Political expertise: POLITEX*. 2023. Vol. 19. №. 1. P. 41. [In Russian].

A. Tsipras was one of the few “radical left” party leaders to invoke Eurocommunism: at rallies and in interviews before his election as Greek Prime Minister in 2015, he claimed to be inspired by the intellectual legacy of E. Berlinguer⁴⁰². Regardless of which part of Italian Eurocommunism was the source of inspiration for the leader of the Greek Left, the creation of the SYRIZA bloc with the conservatives bears considerable resemblance to the line of the ICP, which sought to support the “progressive” part of the Christian Democrats, personified by Aldo Moro, who supported the participation of communists and trade unions in the government coalition and advocated a joint overcoming of the economic crisis that engulfed Italy in the second half of the 1970s⁴⁰³.

The policy of “historical compromise” was also reproduced by the German Left of Die Linke and the Cypriot Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL). During the 2021 Bundestag elections, Die Linke effectively abandoned its position of implacable opposition for a possible role as a “junior partner” in a coalition with the Greens and the Social Democratic Party: “During the election campaign, the Left fell for the tricks of its political opponents, above all the alleged ‘social democratization’ of the SPD and the claim that the Union 90/Greens is something more left-wing than the FDP liberals. When the Left no longer reminds the SPD and the Greens of their responsibility for anti-social reforms, no longer considers these parties political opponents, and instead wants to work with them as junior coalition partners, it is essentially self-effacing”⁴⁰⁴. At the XVII party congress in 1990, AKEL stated that it was considering strategic cooperation with the Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK) and the Democratic Party (DIKO) in order to assemble the broadest possible coalition to isolate the right-wing Democratic Assembly Party (DISY)⁴⁰⁵. This strategy

⁴⁰² Broder D. Syriza and the death of Eurocommunism // The New Statesman. Available at: <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/2023/09/syriza-eurocommunism-napolitano> (accessed: 14.02.2024).

⁴⁰³ Balampanidis I. Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left. London: Routledge, 2019. P. 65.

⁴⁰⁴ Reinhardt J. Die Selbstabschaffung der Partei “Die Linke” // Jungle World. URL: <https://jungle.world/artikel/2021/40/mehr-als-verdient> (accessed: 14.02.2024).

⁴⁰⁵ Dunphy R., Bale T. Red Flag Still Flying? Explaining AKEL—Cyprus's Communist Anomaly // Party politics. 2007. Vol. 13. №. 3. P. 295.

failed in the short term, but AKEL's subsequent experience of building coalitions with non-communist forces was much more successful. In the early 2000s, pursuing the goal of broadening its social base and improving its electoral appeal, also had the experience of building a coalition with liberals from the United Democrats party, as I. Katsouridis notes. Katsouridis: “AKEL's history of critical or indirect participation in government coalitions and refusal to take a negative stance towards coalition building, unlike most of its colleagues, was an advantage for the party”⁴⁰⁶. The Italian PCR continued the tradition of “historical compromise” by participating in the centrist government in 2006, led by PD Prime Minister Romano Prodi. The PCR found itself with “one foot in and one foot out of government,” trying to participate in the coalition government while remaining true to its principled positions: “The PCR protests also often looked as if they served a symbolic purpose, necessary to keep core supporters, without putting the government in concrete difficulties”⁴⁰⁷. In essence, for the PCR this meant a return to the old Eurocommunist formula of “party of struggle and party of government”.

The electoral consequences of reproducing the policy of “historical compromise” for the “revived” Italian Communists were unfavorable: in the 2008 parliamentary elections, the PCR did not win a single parliamentary seat and the left-wing coalition Sinistra Arcobaleno, of which the Communists were a part, won less than 3% of the parliamentary seats. The PCR did not win a single parliamentary seat, and the left-wing coalition Sinistra Arcobaleno, in which the Communists went to the polls, won less than 3% of the vote⁴⁰⁸. As a result of the crisis, the PCR had every chance to repeat the fate of the old ICP; a number of party leaders proposed to “dissolve” the party into a broader left-wing movement, but the majority of members

⁴⁰⁶ Katsourides Y. *Radical left parties in government: The cases of SYRIZA and AKEL*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. P. 89.

⁴⁰⁷ Albertazzi D. McDonnell D. Newell J.L. *Di lotta e di governo: The Lega Nord and Rifondazione Comunista in office* // *Party Politics*. 2011. Vol.17. № 4. P. 479.

⁴⁰⁸ Charalambous G. *Realignment and Entrenchment: The Europeanisation of Rifondazione Comunista* // *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*. 2011. Vol. 12. №. 1. P. 41

and the new party leader Paolo Ferrero favored the preservation of the party as an autonomous political entity and the cessation of strategic cooperation with the DP⁴⁰⁹.

The experience of the RLP's participation in coalitions with ideologically alien parties was mainly dictated by the current political situation and was not always an integral part of their political strategy. AKEL's goal was to isolate the right in the 1990s and expand its social base in the 2000s; SYRIZA's leadership argued its alliance with the conservatives on the grounds of the need to resist the demands of the Euro-troika and the impossibility of forming a government alone; PCR not only followed the tradition of its predecessors from the ICP, but also tried to prevent Silvio Berlusconi from coming to power by participating in a centrist coalition. Regardless of the reasons that led the RLP to adopt such a strategy, it had similar goals, objectives and, in some cases, consequences to the Eurocommunist "compromise": a decline in electoral performance, a loss of popularity among its supporters (Die Linke and the PCR) and organizational splits, as happened with SYRIZA, when some of its members left the party and created a more left-wing organization, Popular Unity, which tried to implement its original program. An exception to this is the Cypriot AKEL, which has managed to reap some political dividends after several attempts to participate in broad alliances.

The fundamental theoretical proposition that links the modern RLP with the Eurocommunists is the thesis of coming to power democratically. As Ya. Balampanidis: "The Eurocommunist 'moment' is the historical connector that links the past and present of the European Left. Macroscopically, Eurocommunism was the political project through which left politics in Europe made the final transition from the revolutionary past to a completely different paradigm"⁴¹⁰. In its political manifesto, the PEL does not demand the immediate establishment of socialism through the dictatorship of the proletariat; the modern left speaks of overcoming the omnipotence of corporations, expanding social security, demilitarizing and transforming capitalism

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁴¹⁰ Balampanidis I. Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left. London: Routledge, 2019. P. 231.

and the European integration project as such⁴¹¹. The RLP, like the Eurocommunist parties of the twentieth century, see the already existing democratic institutions as the levers for implementing their program: “We want to act in such a way that the elected institutions, the European Parliament and national parliaments, as well as the representative committees (the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions) have more powers of action and control”⁴¹². The statutes of the PEL state that the party commits itself to “use democratic forms to fight to overcome modern capitalist relations” and to participate in elections and referendums in accordance with the regulations and rulings of the European Union and the Council of Europe⁴¹³. Belgian political philosopher Chantal Mouffe characterizes the combination of anti-capitalist goals with reformist methods of gaining control over political decision-making and implementation as “radical reformism”: “It is not a question of socialist revolution. I believe that an acceptable strategy for the Left today would be radical reformism, carried out through 'positional warfare' (Gramsci), pushing reforms forward as far as possible. Which no doubt implies a figure of rupture, but a more coherent one, taking into account the unpredictability and the fact that everything will be internationally tied”⁴¹⁴. Operating in the liberal-democratic political space and trying to change it through legal mechanisms, the RLPs often fail to articulate their social ideal, speaking not of “socialism” or “communism” but of “another Europe”, copying the Eurocommunists' idea of “progressive democracy”⁴¹⁵. In this regard, the keynote speech of former PEL chairman Gregor Gysi (2018) calling for more social security,

⁴¹¹ Katorzhevskij P.N. Left populism and the political legacy of Eurocommunism// *Via in tempore. History. Political Science*. 2022. Vol. 49. №. 4. P. 902. [In Russian].

⁴¹² European Left Manifesto // European Left. URL: https://www.european-left.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Manifesto-European-Left_ENG.pdf (accessed: 07.02.2024).

⁴¹³ European Left Statute // European Left. URL: <https://www.european-left.org/about-us/statutes/> (accessed: 07.02.2024).

⁴¹⁴ Mouffe C., Confavreux J. A salutary shock? Chantal Mouffe on Brexit and the Spanish elections // Verso Books. URL: <https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2732-a-salutary-shock-chantal-mouffe-on-brexit-and-the-spanish-elections> (accessed: 08.07.2022).

⁴¹⁵ Katorzhevskij P.N. The influence of Eurocommunism on the ideology and political practice of the contemporary "radical left"// *Political expertise: POLITEX*. 2023. Vol. 19. №. 1. P. 42. [In Russian].

stronger protection of labor rights, and more popular democracy is noteworthy⁴¹⁶. Thus, G. Gysi speaks of a radical transformation of the existing European model, which can be implemented by fighting neoliberal reforms, as well as de-bureaucratization and “fielding” of existing institutions. The position of the democratic path to socialism, as in the case of the Eurocommunist parties, is the main contradiction in their ideology. The reproduction of this strategy poses challenges for the left, as contemporary left-populist parties extrapolate the Eurocommunist experience from the national level to the pan-European level under very different conditions⁴¹⁷. If in Italy in the second half of the last century the Communist Party participated in the drafting of the basic law of the country and was one of the most authoritative political forces, today's “left-radicals”, having much less influence, are trying to transform European democracy with the help of those instruments, the principle of organization and functioning of which they themselves criticize⁴¹⁸. The Eurocommunist parties believed that the very fact of the existence of the Soviet Union and the “socialist world” created the necessary conditions for a democratic transition to socialism in European countries⁴¹⁹ and forced the ruling class to make social and political compromises.⁴²⁰ In the modern world there is no example of a successful realization of a left-wing project that would influence to some extent the political process in Europe and fully correspond to the RLP's ideas of a democratic socialist alternative, which distinguishes the current European political space from the conditions of the second half of the twentieth century.

⁴¹⁶ Gysi G. To all Left and Progressive Forces in Europe: Create Unity to Defeat Neoliberal Politics! // Die Linke. URL: <https://en.die-linke.de/news/selected-news/detail/to-all-left-and-progressive-forces-in-europe-create-unity-to-defeat-neoliberal-politics/> (accessed: 07.02.2024).

⁴¹⁷ Katorzhevskij P.N. Left populism and the political legacy of Eurocommunism// Via in tempore. History. Political Science. 2022. Vol. 49. №. 4. P. 902. [In Russian].

⁴¹⁸ Ibid.

⁴¹⁹ Togliatti P. For the democratic renewal of Italian society, for the advance towards socialism. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960. P. 125. [In Russian].

⁴²⁰ Carrilo S. «Eurocomunismo» y Estado. Barcelona: Grupo Editorial Grijalbo, 1977. P. 98.

The RLP sees the key to the peaceful transformation of capitalism in uniting “all progressive forces against neoliberalism”⁴²¹, just as the Eurocommunist parties sought to consolidate various social groups not previously targeted by the Communist Party against the domination of “monopoly capital”. In the same way that the Eurocommunist parties sought to consolidate various social groups not previously targeted by the Communist Party against the domination of “monopoly capital”.. Despite the fact that Marxist rhetoric is still the marker for the RLP that distinguishes them from social democracy ⁴²², their discourse hardly uses “class-oriented” terminology. RLPs prefer to speak not of “the proletariat” but of “the people” or “the people”: “In Europe, in each of our countries, people are suffering from the policies of globalized capitalism, implemented by governments in the interests of big capital and lobbies, which undermine the solidarity and social gains from the great struggles”⁴²³. The aspiration of the RLP to reach out to as many social groups as possible, who for various reasons are dissatisfied with the existing system of economic and social relations (“neoliberalism”), is in many ways similar to the attempts of the Eurocommunist parties of the last century to become spokesmen for the interests of the “whole nation” or the “popular majority”. According to I. Balampanidis, Marxist ideology has strong “antibodies” against populism and forbids portraying “the people” as something monolithic and devoid of contradictions, but there has always been a certain “populist temptation” for Communists⁴²⁴. The broadening of the social base for Eurocommunists and the transition to populist rhetoric were the result of the policy of “popular fronts” and social changes in European countries, manifested in the growth of the middle class. Using Marxist tools, we can conclude that in the case of the RLP,

⁴²¹ Gysi G. To all Left and Progressive Forces in Europe: Create Unity to Defeat Neoliberal Politics! // Die Linke. URL: <https://en.die-linke.de/news/selected-news/detail/to-all-left-and-progressive-forces-in-europe-create-unity-to-defeat-neoliberal-politics/> (accessed: 07.02.2024).

⁴²² Fagerholm A. What is left for the radical left? A comparative examination of the policies of radical left parties in Western Europe before and after 1989 // *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*. 2016. Vol. 25. P. 20.

⁴²³ European Left Manifesto // European Left. URL: https://www.european-left.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Manifesto-European-Left_ENG.pdf (accessed: 07.02.2024).

⁴²⁴ Balampanidis I. *Eurocommunism: From the communist to the radical European Left*. London: Routledge, 2019. P. 66.

what in materialist dialectics is called “spiral upward development”⁴²⁵ has occurred the heterogeneous composition of the RLP's supporters and their appeal to the “popular majority” led to their tendency to form alliances with political forces potentially opposed to the “elites” and the “establishment”.

Since 2017, the RLP has been organizing “European Forums” with left, green and other “progressive” forces in order to build a broad movement against neoliberalism. The declaration adopted at the 2018 forum, held in Bilbao, Spain, refers to the contradictions between neoliberalism and democracy: “A democratic society is one that responds to and defends the needs of its citizens who have the capacity to listen and act for collective benefit. This is why we believe that the main justification for defining the European Union is the weakness of democracy in its functioning. The neoliberal orientation of its treaties is imposed without the consent of the people and sometimes against their will”⁴²⁶. The emphasis on interconnectedness was characteristic of Eurocommunist parties, which believed that the expansion of political, individual and creative freedoms was possible only if state-monopolistic capitalism was overcome and saw socialism as “the result of the continuous democratization of economic, social and political life”⁴²⁷. According to M. Makin-Waite the entire ideological evolution of the European communist movement since the 1930s has led to a strengthening of the democratic impulse within it: “In each decade between 1917 and 1989, some communists have sought to ‘recover’ and reapply the democratic content and impulse underlying politics. Through the Popular Front of the 1930s, the Prague Spring of 1968, and Eurocommunism of the 1970s. democratic values and accountability within radical change have continually emerged and 'come back'. This was not because democracy is something necessarily present that is always there and constantly 'breaking through'. It was because building and sustaining democratic

⁴²⁵ Steigerwald R. Introduction to Marxist Philosophy. Moscow: Politizdat, 1982. P. 68. [In Russian].

⁴²⁶ European Forum Declaration // European Forum. URL: <https://europeanforum.eu/bilbao-2018/declaration-2018/> (accessed: 16.02.2024).

⁴²⁷ Perminova A.I. Pre-Congress discussion in the French Communist Party// Problems of strategy and tactics of the communist movement. Iss. 3. 1979. P. 21.

processes is a necessary condition for the realization of socialist principles”⁴²⁸. In our opinion, the difference between the Eurocommunist parties and the RLP lies in the fact that the Eurocommunists considered democracy as a means to achieve democratic socialism, while for the modern “radical left” the primacy is democratic values, which they seek to achieve through overcoming the neoliberal system and the transformation of “European bureaucratic institutions”, which they regard as a form of authoritarianism. The democratic intentions of the Eurocommunists, which find their expression in the ideology of the modern RLP, are the most complete expression of the thesis from the “Manifesto of the Communist Party” by K. Marx and F. Engels: “In place of the old bourgeois society with its classes and class opposites comes an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all”⁴²⁹.

The main idea adopted by the RLP from the Eurocommunists of the twentieth century is to affirm democratic (including “bourgeois”) freedoms not only as the main goal of socialist transformation, but also as a means of moving towards a non-capitalist system and its obligatory attributes. This approach stands in stark contrast to the position of Bolshevik theorists and other representatives of orthodox Marxism, who believed that the benefits of democracy would become available to the poorest strata only after the elimination of classes through the dictatorship of the proletariat⁴³⁰. This idea is quite precisely formulated by the Marxist philosopher Michael Brie. “There is a dangerous infantile ideological disorder,” writes M. Brie, “inherent in socialism, which recurs in almost every new movement and generation: the longing for a world beyond the contradictions of modernity. This yearning identifies the overcoming of the capitalist, state or fascist form of these contradictions with their elimination as such. This too is a false utopia that leads to catastrophes, whether small or large in scale, and

⁴²⁸ Makin-Waite M. *Communism and Democracy: History, debates and potentials*. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2017. P. 21.

⁴²⁹ Marx K. Engels F. *Manifesto of Communist Party*// Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/russkij/marx/1848/manifesto.htm> (accessed: 12.12.2023).

⁴³⁰ Lenin V.I. *On “democracy” and dictatorship*// Marxist Internet archive. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/russkij/lenin/works/37-2.htm>. (accessed: 12.12.2023). [In Russian].

stands in the way of genuine socialist transformation. One of the tasks of genuine, transformational movements is not to flee from the contradictions of complex societies, but to discover them, face them head-on and rebuild them with passion and vigor. Free communist sociality in the spirit of Karl Marx and collectively responsible liberal freedom in the spirit of John Stuart Mill form the main poles of contradictions in modern societies, the complexity of which is due to their mediation”⁴³¹.

The term “Eurocommunism” was dropped from the political vocabulary by its successors in the early 1990s and has acquired a predominantly negative connotation for the “radical left”. It is often used exclusively in a historical context, associated and associated with the policies that led the strongest communist parties in Europe to the biggest crisis in their history. The RLPs, attempting to “reinvent” radical socialist and communist ideas, sought a new ideological identity distinct from social democracy and “Marxism-Leninism” in its “anti-revisionist” interpretations. At the same time, these parties partly inherited the membership base of the former Eurocommunist parties (PCR), continued to operate within the framework of the former organizational structures (CPS, FCP) and retained their former supporters from among the base electorate, which created the basis for the resuscitation of Eurocommunist politics in the future. The RLP was forced to reproduce Eurocommunist practices due to the need to function within the limits set by European-style liberal democracy. Their anti-capitalist orientation, combined with the use of legal mechanisms to promote and realize their political positions, return the RLP to the Eurocommunist model of “to the right of Bolshevism, to the left of social democracy,” as expressed in the PEL manifesto: “The social democratic concept of the Third Way in Europe failed because it did not resist this [neoliberal] development and had no alternative to it, thus contributing to it. This creates opportunities and places a great responsibility on the left to change the current world. But we cannot follow the same traditional path as in the

⁴³¹ Brie M. *Uniting Communism and Liberalism: An Unsolvable Task or a Most Urgent Necessity? // Rethinking Alternatives with Marx: Economy, Ecology and Migration/ Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021. P. 334.*

20th century, which brought great achievements but also great defeats and tragedies to forces with revolutionary inspiration”⁴³².

⁴³² European Left Manifesto // European Left. URL: https://www.european-left.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Manifesto-European-Left_ENG.pdf (accessed: 07.02.2024).

CONCLUSION

The research examines the process of formation of Eurocommunism, starting from the “fourth period” of the Comintern, which laid the foundation for the policy of “popular fronts” and became the starting point of a long “incubation period” that preceded the theoretical and conceptual formation of Eurocommunism as a modification of communist ideology. For the communist parties, Eurocommunism became a kind of “negation of negation.” Bolshevism, derived from the social-democratic tradition, eventually broke with it on both ideological-theoretical and symbolic levels - from the purely organizational question of party membership to the political (attitude to the liberal bourgeoisie, conditions and ways of socialist revolution). Eurocommunists, while continuing to reproduce some of the narratives of Leninism and maintaining an outward adherence to it, at the same time justified the possibility of achieving “revolutionary” transformations by democratic methods and, using communist phraseology, gradually distanced themselves from Bolshevism in its various interpretations and from the Soviet model of socialism in particular.

The term “Eurocommunism” in the research is understood: in the narrow sense - the political line of the Italian, French, Spanish and other European Communist Parties, in the broad sense - a modification of communist ideology, which implied a democratic transition to a non-capitalist model of development, occupying a position between social democracy and various interpretations of “orthodox” Marxism.

The first problem identified in the research is the origin of Eurocommunism and the preconditions for its formation. As a result of analyzing the history of the three European communist parties (ICP, FCP, CPS) in the national and international context, it was concluded that Eurocommunism began to take shape after the Comintern abandoned the theory of “social fascism” directed against social democracy. The new tactics led to cooperation with non-communist forces and broadened the social base of the Communist Parties. The analysis of this problem concluded that some theoretical positions of Eurocommunism were borrowed from classical Marxism and Leninism.

The paper analyzes the problem of democratic transit to socialism, the social ideal of Eurocommunism and the political strategy corresponding to this ideal. The main contradiction of Eurocommunism as an ideology can be considered the aspiration to carry out fundamental economic and political transformations without social upheaval, on the basis of a broad consensus of ideologically heterogeneous political forces, which led to the inclusion in the Eurocommunist theory of the concept of an additional stage between capitalism and socialism, which should be realized not only by the “revolutionary class”, but also by the “whole nation”.

The second chapter examines the causes of the crisis of Eurocommunism and its subsequent reproduction by the modern “radical left”. The research showed that the reasons for the crisis of Eurocommunism include their inconsistent coalition policy and the desire to occupy a social democratic niche at the tactical level, which caused discontent among supporters and voters; the preservation of the archaic “demcentralist” structure, which actually turned into “bureaucratic collectivism” and its contradiction with democratic rhetoric; conflicting demands arising from attempts to reach supporters of other political forces with their propaganda; the disappearance of the “socialist commonwealth” and the subsequent erosion of the international communist movement; inter-party disagreements within the “Eurocommunist camp” itself.

Contemporary RLPs continue to reproduce Eurocommunist strategy and tactics without referring to their ideological predecessors. Like the Eurocommunist parties of the twentieth century, the RLP seeks to implement its political programs with the help of European-style instruments of liberal democracy, which determines their coalition policy and forces them to compromise with ideologically alien forces.

Eurocommunism became the most expressive manifestation of the democratic impulse in the communist movement, the need for the “return” or “reinvention” of which in one form or another was declared by every generation of communist politicians and theorists. This research confirms the conclusion that Eurocommunism was, on the one hand, a natural result of the evolution of the communist movement in the twentieth century, which characterizes its conditioning by the previous political strategy of the communist movement at the national and international level. On the

other hand, it is a peculiar form of defense of the basic tenets of communist ideology against totalitarian forms like Stalinism. It was also a way of adapting the Communist Parties to social stabilization, which meant participating in the political process within the framework of liberal democracy and changing the interpretation of the term “revolution,” by which the Eurocommunists meant a set of radical reforms leading to an intermediate stage (“progressive democracy”) between capitalism and socialism.

Projecting I. Lakatos' methodology of research of scientific programs onto the research of Eurocommunism as a modification of communist ideology allows us to distinguish its “positive” (protective belt) and “negative” heuristics (hard core). The basic postulates of Marxism, inherited by Eurocommunism, are emphasized in the “hard core”, which include:

- 1) The historical inevitability of capitalism being replaced by socialism.
- 2) The vanguard role of the Communist Party.
- 3) The historical (or “messianic” according to N. Berdyaev⁴³³) mission of the working class and other social groups involved in the production of so-called “surplus value”.

These provisions remain immutable and irrefutable for the Eurocommunist parties, no “modus tollens” is used in relation to them.

“Protective belt” is formed by the democratic component of Eurocommunism⁴³⁴:

- 1) Provision on the democratic path and consideration of national specificity in the advancement towards socialism.
- 2) The thesis of the necessity of an intermediate stage between socialism and capitalism.
- 3) Preservation of political pluralism and diversity of forms of ownership.
- 4) Protection and expansion of individual, political, cultural and other rights and freedoms.

⁴³³ Berdyaev N. The Origin of Russian Communism. Saint Petersburg: Azbuka, Azbuka-Atticus, 2020. P. 113. [In Russian].

⁴³⁴ Eurocommunism as a factor in the ideological evolution of the Communist movement // Political science issues. 2024. № 7. Vol. 14. P. 2269. [In Russian].

- 5) The need to involve the “non-proletarian” strata of the population in communist politics, to distance themselves from the model of “state socialism”.
- 6) The possibility of a strategic alliance not only with other leftists but also with non-communist “progressive” and “anti-fascist forces”.
- 7) Declaring the “national” character of communist parties and their autonomy in strategizing and decision-making.
- 8) Criticism of Stalinism and other undemocratic models of socialism.

Eurocommunists thus sought to refute “anomalies” and “counterexamples”, which could include⁴³⁵:

- 1) The impossibility of revolutionary transformations in the existence of effectively functioning institutions of representative democracy.
- 2) Compulsory super-statehood and centralization of the economy.
- 3) The inevitable monopolization of power by the Communist Party and the resulting one-party rule.
- 4) Ignoring the interests of the “petty-bourgeois” strata of the population.
- 5) The perception of the inevitable tendency of communist parties to authoritarian and totalitarian models of social and state structure and repressive practices like Stalinism.
- 6) Suppression of civil and democratic rights when communists are in power.
- 7) External management of communist parties by the “center of the international communist movement” represented by the USSR and the CPSU.

It is worth noting that the Eurocommunist parties, with the help of “positive heuristics” (a protective belt), considered it possible to transform the objective factors initially unfavorable for the realization of their political principles. “Progressive democracy” was designed to preserve the broad civil rights of freedom guaranteed by bourgeois democracy and to eliminate, by means of profound social reforms, those of

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

its “vices” which prevented their further expansion. As I. Lakatos notes, “...a research program can challenge an impressive body of recognized scientific knowledge: it is like a plant planted on unfavorable soil, which it then gradually transforms and subdues”⁴³⁶. The “positive heuristic” of Eurocommunism assumed the broadest possible interpretation of socialist democracy, justifying the existing deformations by the “concrete-historical situation” and the “correlation of class forces”, which allowed to insist on the progressive and even “democratic” nature of Soviet socialism, but the inapplicability of this model in European countries due to national peculiarities, changes in the social structure of society compared to the first half of the twentieth century, the established democratic political culture among workers. The most illustrative example of the expansion of the “protective belt” was the thesis put forward by E. Berlinguer about the possibility of “historical compromise” and the creation of an ideologically diverse coalition of political forces in connection with the military coup in Chile and the overthrow of the socialist president S. Allende.

In our opinion, the crisis of Eurocommunism as an ideology and its associated set of political practices was related to the inability of Eurocommunist theorists to foresee counterexamples caused by objective reality and to expand the “protective belt” of the theory. The failure of democratic reforms in the Soviet Union, the subsequent restoration of capitalism and the collapse of the “socialist commonwealth” became a challenge for Eurocommunist parties and forced some of them to abandon the “hard core” (the ICP) or ignore what had happened and function in the previous regime (the FCP), which gradually led to marginalization, lower electoral results and image losses. However, the rethinking of their history and ideology by communist and post-communist parties, which retained anti-capitalist attitudes, against the background of the crisis of the 1990s, together with the intensification of European integration processes, led to the formation of a pan-European PEL, many member parties of which reproduce the Eurocommunist strategy in the absence of the conditions that made its

⁴³⁶ Lakatos I. Falsification and methodology of research programs // Humanitarian portal. URL: <https://gtmarket.ru/library/basis/4369/4373> (accessed: 20.02.2024). [In Russian].

very emergence possible. “In sum, it is not surprising,” write R. Dunphy and L. March, “that the European Left Party took fifteen years to emerge after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Perhaps more surprising is that it emerged at all”⁴³⁷.

Guided by the methodology of I. Lakatos, we can conclude that modern RLPs have formed a certain “model” corresponding to the conditions of their “positive heuristics” and constantly changing along with the transformation of ideology. In this regard, I. Lakatos notes: “‘Model’ is a set of boundary conditions (perhaps together with some ‘observational’ theories) about which it is known that they must be replaced in the course of further development of the program. It is more or less known even in what way. This shows again what a minor role the ‘refutations’ of any particular model play in a research program; they are entirely foreseeable, and positive heuristics are a strategy for this anticipation and further ‘digestion’”⁴³⁸. The model formulated by modern radical leftists on the basis of Marxist theory and its Eurocommunist modification can be formulated as follows: “There is a system of exploitation of wage laborers and other oppressed groups, formed on the basis of industrial capitalism, changing with the development of technology and the increasing complexity of social stratification of society, and represented by a set of social groups and institutions. This system prevents the realization of social, democratic, cultural, labor and other rights of the exploited majority of the population and needs to be replaced by a qualitatively new system with the participation of all “progressive forces”. The system opposed by anti-capitalist forces can be labeled as “capitalism,” “imperialism,” “state-monopolistic capitalism,” “neoliberalism.” Its agents can be the “propertied classes”, the “bourgeoisie”, the “bureaucracy” (“Eurobureaucracy”), or “transnational corporations”. The changing social structure of the countries in which the “radical left” operates necessitates a shift from “proletariat” to “working class” or “popular majority,” supplemented by “precarariat” or “cognitariat” where necessary. The social ideal can also range from “communism” or “classless society” to “another Europe”,

⁴³⁷ Dunphy R., March L. *The European Left Party*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019. P. 64.

⁴³⁸ Lakatos I. *Falsification and methodology of research programs* // Humanitarian portal. URL: <https://gtmarket.ru/library/basis/4369/4373> (accessed: 20.02.2024). [In Russian].

“democratic socialism” and “progressive democracy”. Such a model opens the field for interpretations and refinements under changing conditions, which creates the possibility of reactualizing Eurocommunist ideology and strategy in forms different from those of the 1970s and 1980s⁴³⁹.

⁴³⁹ Eurocommunism as a factor in the ideological evolution of the Communist movement // Political science issues. 2024. № 7. Vol. 14. P. 2270. [In Russian].

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