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**The Anthropological Principle in Russian Philosophy
in the second half of the nineteenth century**

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INTRODUCTION

Relevance of the research

Within the framework of the present research, the same attitudes are pursued, which are referred to in paragraphs 5, 10, 11 and 14 of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 809 of 09 November 2022 "On Approval of the Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values". The study of the history of Russian philosophy in general and the anthropological principle of Russian thought in particular contributes to the development, preservation and strengthening of the traditional values of the Russian people (paragraphs 5 and 10), the development of the spiritual potential of the people of Russia (paragraph 11), as opposed to the "planting of a system of ideas and values foreign to the Russian people and destructive to Russian society" contributes to the preservation of original Russian ideas and values (paragraph 14).

On the example of the discussion about the anthropological principle, it is shown that the polemic of Russian philosophy leads to the development of a number of topical topics, including the anthropomorphization of reality, the problem of the ideal, the ideal potentials of material substance, dialogism, and much more. Thus, it is shown that polemics are not a flaw in Russian philosophy, but – as a stage in the development of dialogicity – its advantage, thanks to which Russian thought of the XIX century helps to solve modern theoretical problems and practical issues.

A current view of Russian philosophy in general, and of the anthropological principle in Russian philosophy in particular, is to develop the history of philosophy not by negating past interpretations in a negative way, but rather by creating new interpretations that take fuller account of research and sources, as well as different points of view. The present study presents a new interpretation of the debate on the anthropological principle, according to which it was not so much a *dispute* between two philosophical "parties" as a dialog in which the one-

sidedness of some evaluations and views was revealed and ideas for synthesizing the two opposites were substantiated. In addition, this paper analyzes the works of Russian philosophers of the 19th century, whose heritage was ideologized during the Soviet period, forgotten in the late 20th century. - In addition, this paper analyzes the works of Russian philosophers of the 19th century, whose legacy was ideologized during the Soviet period, forgotten at the end of the 20th century, and in the last decade began to be recalled in the framework of individual studies, but again in an ideologized and mythologized form.

Today, representatives of countries unfriendly to the Russian Federation would like to leave Russian philosophy on the margins, but they will not be able to do so. Today, for a full comprehension of anthropological problems, a researcher cannot do without Russian philosophy, in which anthropology is the cornerstone. Accordingly, Russian philosophy is necessary for an adequate cognition of reality.

Russian philosophers stood at the origins of anthropology, which we see in the philosophy of the 20th century and which retains its relevance in the 21st century.

Object and subject of the work

The object of this research is the anthropological problems in Russian philosophy of the second half of the XIX century.

The subject of this research is the discussion of Russian philosophers about the "anthropological principle" in 1858–1863.

Goals and objectives of the study

The goal is to meaningfully reconstruct the anthropological principle presented in the works of Russian philosophers of the second half of the 19th century in the context of the discussion of 1858–1863.

Objectives:

1. To clarify the content of Russian anthropological materialism of the XIX century, which had developed by the beginning of the 1860s.

2. To identify the philosophical basis of the dispute between the supporters of N.G. Chernyshevsky and P.D. Yurkevich in the course of the discussion on the anthropological principle.

3. To demonstrate the importance of I.M. Sechenov's natural science ideas within the framework of the anthropological principle and discussion of 1858–1863.

4. To establish that the discussion about the anthropological principle continues in the context of the interpretations of V.S. Solovyov, G.G. Shpet, V.K. Kantor.

5. To identify the specifics and significance of the Soviet interpretation of the philosophy of N.G. Chernyshevsky and his followers.

6. Demonstrate and prove the heuristic significance of the principle of partisanship of philosophy and the appropriateness of its application in research on the history of Russian philosophy.

The degree of elaboration of the topic

A large number of fundamental works by such researchers as I.I. Evlampiev¹, I.D. Osipov², A.V. Malinov³, V.V. Zenkovsky⁴, N.O. Lossky⁵, A.F.

¹ Evlampiev I.I. *Istoriya russkoi metafiziki v XIX–XX vekakh* [History of Russian metaphysics in the XIX–XX centuries]. Russian philosophy in search of the absolute. Part II. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2000. 413 p.; Evlampiev I.I. *Istoriya russkoi metafiziki v XIX–XX vekakh* [History of Russian metaphysics in the XIX–XX centuries]. Russian philosophy in search of the absolute. Part I. St. Petersburg: Aletheia, 2000. 415 p.; Evlampiev I.I. *Istoriya russkoi metafiziki v XIX–XX vekakh* [History of Russian metaphysics in the XIX–XX centuries]. Russian Philosophy in Search of the Absolute. 2nd ed., revised and supplemented. St. Petersburg: RHGA, 2020. 920 p.; Evlampiev I.I. *Istoriya russkoi filosofii: Uchebnoe posobie* [History of Russian philosophy: Textbook]. Moscow: Vysshaya shkola Publ., 2002.

² Kamnev V.M., Osipov I.D. *Political Philosophy of Russian Conservatism*. 2nd ed., corr. St. Petersburg, Vladimir Dal Publ., 2018. 255 p.; Zamaleev A.F., Osipov I.D. *Russian Political Science: Review of the Main Directions: Textbook*. St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg State University Publ., 1994. 208 p.; Osipov I.D. *Philosophy of Russian liberalism (XIX – early XX centuries)*. St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg State University Publ., 1996. 192 p. (In Russian)

Zamaleev⁶, A.A. Galaktionov, P.F. Nikandrov are devoted to the history of Russian philosophy⁷

Anthropological problems are studied in the works of such scientists as B.V. Markov⁸, B.I. Lipsky⁹, B.V. Emelyanov¹⁰, S.N. Korobkova,¹¹ A.N. Kuznetsov¹², N.F. Utkina¹³ and others.

³ Malinov A.V. Research and Articles on Russian Philosophy. St. Petersburg, RHGA, 2020. 608 p. (In Russian)

⁴ Zenkovsky V.V. History of Russian Philosophy. Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt Publ., Raritet Publ., 2001. 880 p. (In Russian)

⁵ Lossky N.O. History of Russian Philosophy. St. Petersburg, Azbuka, Azbuka-Attikus Publ., 2018. 608 p. (In Russian)

⁶ Zamaleev A.F. Synopsis of Russian Philosophy (with the Appendix of a Chronological Table and a Brief Bibliography). St. Petersburg, Petropolis Publ., 2018. 104 p.; Zamaleev A.F. Mites: Studies on Russian Philosophy. Collection. St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg State University Publ., 1996. 320 p.; Zamaleev A.F. Self-Consciousness of Russia: Studies in Russian Philosophy, Political Science and Culture. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2010.; Zamaleev A.F. Textbook of Russian Political Science. St. Petersburg, Letniy sad Publ., 2002. 352 p.; Zamaleev A.F., Zamaleev F.A. Nachalnyi kurs russkoi filosofii: Istoricheskie vvedenie [Initial course of Russian philosophy: Historical introduction]. 2nd ed., corr. St. Petersburg, Petropolis Publ., 2016. 288 p.; Zamaleev A.F., Osipov I.D. Russian Political Science: Review of the Main Directions: Textbook. St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg State University Publ., 1994. 208 p. (In Russian)

⁷ Galaktionov A.A., Nikandrov P.F. Russkaya filosofiya IX—XIX vv. Leningrad: Izdatelstvo LGU. 1989. 744 p.; Galaktionov A.A., Nikandrov P.F. Russkaya filosofiya XI—XIX vekov [Russian philosophy of the XI—XIX centuries]. Leningrad, Nauka Publ., 1970. 652 p. (In Russian)

⁸ Markov B.V. Anthropological imperatives of intercultural communication // Anthropological and argumentative foundations of intercultural communication: Collection of articles of grant research and materials of the round table with international participation, conducted within the framework of the "Days of Philosophy in St. Petersburg - 2019", St. Petersburg, November 22, 2019. – St. Petersburg: Knizhny Dom Limited Liability Company, 2020. Pp. 11–27.; Markov B.V. Anthropological risks of biosocial technologies. Series 7: Philosophy. 2023. Vol. 47, No 2. Pp. 88–105.; Markov B.V. Anthropology and Semiotics of Culture (Based on the Pages of E.A. Orlova's Books) // Personality. Culture. Society. 2020. Vol. 22, No 1–2(105–106). Pp. 181–195.;

Among the studies of the anthropological principle in the works of N.G. Chernyshevsky and his associates are observed: the reduction of the anthropological principle to Feuerbachianism¹⁴; strict subordination of philosophy to the political economy and historical sciences¹⁵; integral consideration of the

Markov B.V. Gosudarstvo i chelovek: antropologiya otvetstvennosti [State and man: anthropology of responsibility]. St. Petersburg, SPbGU Publ., 2012. Pp. 123–149.; Markov B.V. People and Signs. Anthropology of Interpersonal Communication. St. Petersburg, Nauka Publ., 2011. 667 p.; Markov B.V. Filosofskaya antropologiya i problemy kompleksnogo issledovaniya cheloveka [Philosophical anthropology and problems of complex human research]. Philosophy. Humanism. Vol. 9. St. Petersburg, 1998.; Markov B.V. Filosofskaya antropologiya: uchebnoe posobie [Philosophical anthropology: a textbook]. 2nd ed. St. Petersburg, Piter Publ., 2008. 349 p.; Markov B.V., Sokolov B.G., Kolesnikov A.S., etc. History of Philosophy. In 2 vol. Vol. 1. Textbook. 2nd ed., transl. and add. Moscow: Yurayt, 2020.; Markov B.V., Sokolov B.G., Kolesnikov A.S. etc. History of Philosophy. In 2 vol. Vol. 2. Textbook. 2nd ed., transl. and add. Moscow: Yurayt, 2020.

⁹ *Lipsky B.I., Markov B.V.* Philosophical anthropology. Social philosophy: textbook for universities. Moscow: Yurait, 2024. 169 p. (In Russian)

¹⁰ Emelyanov B.V. From the History of the Ideological Struggle Around the "Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" by N. G. Chernyshevsky. Sverdlovsk, 1976. 32 p. (In Russian)

¹¹ Korobkova S.N. Realism and Anthropological Principle in Russian Philosophy // Scientific Journal of the Kuban State Agrarian University, No115(01), 2016. Pp. 391–404.

¹² Kuznetsov A.N. Anthropological principle in the philosophy of N.G. Chernyshevsky // Vestnik MSTU, vol. 5, No3, 2002. Pp. 367–372.

¹³ Utkina N.F. Positivism, Anthropological Materialism and Science in Russia. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1975. 320 p. (In Russian)

¹⁴ Plekhanov G.V. Works about N.G. Chernyshevsky // Plekhanov G.V. Selected Philosophical Works. In 5 vols. Vol. 4. Moscow: Publishing House of Socio-Economic Literature, 1958. Pp. 47–414.

¹⁵ Volk S.S., Nikonenko V.S. Materializm N.G. Chernyshevskogo. Leningrad: Izdatelstvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1979. 152 p.; Pokusaev E.I. N.G. Chernyshevskiy. Essay on life and creativity. Manual for teachers. Ed. 5, corr. And add. Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1976. 223 p.; Rozental M.M. Philosophical views of N.G. Chernyshevsky. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1948. 312 p. (In Russian)

philosophical system with philosophy in a position subordinate to the social sciences¹⁶; studies in which the thinker is considered not as a whole, but himself as part of a certain whole¹⁷; alternative interpretations presenting N.G. Chernyshevsky as an idealist¹⁸.

G.V. Plekhanov touched upon the anthropological principle of N.G. Chernyshevsky when considering his views, but on many questions he made incomplete conclusions that were not quite adequate to the basic principles of N.G. Chernyshevsky himself. V.S. Nikonenko, S.S. Volk, M.M. Rozental also extensively studied the "anthropological principle" in the creative heritage of N.G. Chernyshevsky and his supporters and pointed out the incompleteness of G.V. Plekhanov's view. N.F. Utkina, E.I. Pokusaev and others also studied this topic. The disadvantages include the tendency to reduce the thought of N.G. Chernyshevsky and his associates to the social and political economy theme. G.G. Shpet, V.K. Kantor and others explored the topic from an alternative point of view, interpreting many aspects religiously. There is a tendency of Marxist researchers to reduce philosophy to socio-political problems, while alternative researchers draw opposite conclusions about the hidden religiosity of this or that thinker. Both points of view do not quite correctly reflect the content of the ideas of the philosophers under study.

¹⁶ Nikonenko V.S. *Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky*, N.A. Dobrolyubov, D.I. Pisarev. Leningrad, Leningrad University Publ., 1983. 151 p. (In Russian)

¹⁷ Utkina N.F. *Positivism, anthropological materialism and science in Russia*. Moscow: Nauka, 1975. 320 p. (In Russian); Galaktionov A.A., Nikandrov P.F. *Russian philosophy of the XI–XIX centuries*. Leningrad: Nauka, 1970. 652 p.

¹⁸ Shpet G.G. *Istochniki dissertatsii Chernyshevskogo* [Sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation]. II. Materials. Reconstruction by T.G. Shchedrina. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia, 2009. Pp. 362–416; Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. 528 p. (In Russian)

As V.S. Nikonenko notes, despite the abundance of works about N.G. Chernyshevsky and his associates¹⁹, the topic cannot be considered fully and deeply studied²⁰. As we see it, this remark is still relevant today. Because of the emphasis placed by the researchers of the anthropological approach of N.G. Chernyshevsky and his associates, the philosophical problematics proper is poorly elaborated in historical-philosophical works. Emphasizing socio-historical and political-economic issues²¹. In an attempt to interpret philosophical thought in a religious way, researchers do not sufficiently approach the very subject of research, that is, the philosophy of the thinker under study and, accordingly, the key theme of N.G. Chernyshevsky's philosophy – the anthropological principle. As far as we can see, the subject of historical and philosophical research is often either replaced

¹⁹ Kuznetsov A.N. Anthropological principle in the philosophy of N.G. Chernyshevsky // *Vestnik MSTU*, vol. 5, No3, 2002. Pp. 367–372; Lanshchikov A.P. N.G. Chernyshevsky. Moscow, Sovremennik Publ., 1982. 399 p.; N.G. Chernyshevsky. History. Philosophy. Literature. Saratov: Saratov University Press, 1982. 255 p.; N.G. Chernyshevsky. Articles, Studies and Materials: Collection of Scientific Works. Ed. by A.A. Demchenko. Saratov: ARMK Soffit LLC, 2012. Vol. 18. 240 p.; N.G. Chernyshevsky. Articles, Studies and Materials: Collection of Scientific Works. Ed. by A.A. Demchenko. Saratov: Techno-Decor Publ., 2015. Vol. 20. 220 p.; Solovyov G.A. Chernyshevsky's Aesthetic Views. Ed. 2, add. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1978. 424 p.; Chernyshevskaya N.M. Chronicle of the Life and Activities of N.G. Chernyshevsky. Moscow: State Publishing House of Fiction Literature, 1953. 680 p.; Emelyanov B.V. *Russkii pozitivizm XIX v.* [Russian positivism of the XIX century]. Ser. 3: Social Sciences. 2010. No 2 (77). Pp. 163–177; Demchenko A.A. N.G. Chernyshevsky. Scientific biography (1859–1889). Moscow; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2018. 687 p. (In Russian)

²⁰ Nikonenko V.S. Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, D.I. Pisarev. Leningrad, Leningrad University Publ., 1983. 151 p. (In Russian)

²¹ Volk S.S., Nikonenko V.S. Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky. Leningrad, Leningrad University Publ., 1979. 152 p.; Rozental M.M. *Filosofskie vzglyady N.G. Chernyshevskogo* [Philosophical views of N.G. Chernyshevsky]. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1948. 312 p.; Pokusaev E.I. N.G. Chernyshevsky. Essay on life and work. Manual for teachers. Ed. 5, corr. Moscow, Prosveshchenie Publ., 1976. 223 p. (In Russian)

by the first approach sometimes gives a tendentious reading of a philosophical text^{22,23}. The second approach helps to determine the place of the philosophical system in the historical-philosophical process by formal – and therefore rather strict – features. Thanks to this, we know the place and significance of N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, P.L. Lavrov, P.D. Yurkevich, D.I. Pisarev and I.M. Sechenov and others in the history of philosophy. And we also mean non-standard readings and interpretations. This allows us to approach the philosophy of the thinker precisely as *his philosophy*, and not as an episode or a text accessible for interpretation.

Methodological base

Historical and philosophical reconstruction. Reconstruction of the views of thinkers makes it possible to present the ideas of each of them as a system, even if there is no formal systematicity in the texts of thinkers. It was used in the consideration of the texts of N.A. Dobrolyubov, P.L. Lavrov and N.G. Chernyshevsky in order to present their philosophical views as stages in the formation of Russian anthropological materialism. Also, with the help of historical and philosophical reconstruction, the works of D.I. Pisarev and I.M. Sechenov are interpreted as a further development of the same ideas that were presented in the works of N.A. Dobrolyubov, P.L. Lavrov and N.G. Chernyshevsky. On the basis of texts written by opponents of anthropological materialism, the position of P.D. Yurkevich and his followers is reconstructed as a dualistic doctrine of man.

Comparative analysis. For a correct comprehension of anthropological materialism in Russia in the 19th century, the texts of this trend are compared and contrasted, and both the works of one thinker and the works of various

²² Shpet G.G. Istochniki dissertatsii Chernyshevskogo [Sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation]. II. Materials. Reconstruction by T.G. Shchedrina. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia, 2009. Pp. 362–416; Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. 528 p. (In Russian)

²³ Nikonenko V.S. Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, D.I. Pisarev. Leningrad, Leningrad University Publ., 1983. 151 p. (In Russian)

philosophers are compared with each other. Also, in order to consider anthropological materialism as a historical and philosophical concept, a comparison is made of various philosophical and research texts, which present different assessments and interpretations.

Hermeneutic analysis. The study of the discussion around the anthropological principle and the principle of the partisan nature of philosophy is carried out with the help of "immanent criticism", which assumes that truth in one form or another is already contained in the text and that its comprehension requires "entering" this text, studying it from the inside. The value of this method is that it is not possible to study the text from some alien position (as researchers often did in pre-revolutionary and Soviet times and continue to do today). but based on the content of the analyzed text itself. Accordingly, Chernyshevsky's texts are analyzed through the prism of materialism and the principle of party spirit, which he defended; the texts of P.D. Yurkevich are considered through the religious views of the author himself, and so on.

Source base of the study

We relied on the works of Russian thinkers of the 19th century, who took part in the discussion on the anthropological principle, as well as Russian philosophers, who in other forms substantively continued the dispute of 1858–1863, namely: N.G. Chernyshevsky²⁴, N.A. Dobrolyubov²⁵, D.I. Pisarev²⁶, P.L. Lavrov²⁷, I.M. Sechenov²⁸, P.D. Yurkevich²⁹, V.S. Solovyov³⁰, M.N. Katkov³¹.

²⁴ Chernyshevsky N.G. Autoreview // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986. Pp. 174–204.; Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. Pp. 146–229.; Chernyshevsky N.G. From the correspondence of 1876–1878 // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. Pp. 369–474.; Chernyshevsky N.G. Kritika filosofskikh presudzheniya protiv obshchestvennogo vladeniya [Criticism of philosophical prejudices against communal ownership]. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986. Pp. 603–643.; Chernyshevsky N.G. Polemical beauty // Chernyshevsky N.G. Complete works. In 15 vol. Vol. 7. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1950. Pp. 707–774.; Chernyshevsky N.G. Polemic Beauty. Collection Two // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols.

Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. Pp. 313–331.; Chernyshevsky N.G. Complete Works. In 15 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Goslitizdat Publ., 1939; Chernyshevsky N.G. Preface to the Third Edition // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986. Pp. 205–213.; Chernyshevsky N.G. Prologue: Collection / compilation. G.P. Murenina., comment. A.A. Demchenko and G.P. Murenina. Lobovoy–Irkutsk: East Siberian Book Publishing House, 1984. 480 p.; Chernyshevsky N.G. What is to be done? Moscow, AST Publ., 2017. 480 p.; Chernyshevsky N.G. Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986. Pp. 71–173.

²⁵ Dobrolyubov N.A. On the Truth of Concepts or the Reliability of Human Knowledge // Dobrolyubov N.A. Selected Philosophical Works. In 2. vol. T. 1. Leningrad: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. Pp. 272–276.; Dobrolyubov N.A. Organic development of a person in connection with his mental and moral activity // Dobrolyubov N.A. Selected philosophical works. In 2. vol. T. 1. Leningrad: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. Pp. 228–262.; Dobrolyubov N.A. Osnovaniya opytной psikhologii [Foundations of Experimental Psychology]. In 3. vol. Vol. 2. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1952. Pp. 494–498.; Dobrolyubov N.A. Physiological and psychological comparative view of the beginning and end of life // Dobrolyubov N.A. Collected works. In 3. vol. Vol. 1. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1950. Pp. 479–486.

²⁶ Pisarev D.I. Istoricheskie idei Augusta Konta [Historical ideas of Auguste Comte]. Selected articles. Moscow, Pravda Publ., 1989. Pp. 340–504.; Pisarev D.I. Moscow Thinkers // Pisarev D.I. Works. In 4 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1955. Pp. 274–319.; Pisarev D.I. Scholasticism of the XIX century // Pisarev D.I. Works. In 4 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1955. Pp. 97–159.

²⁷ Lavrov P.L. My Critics // Russian Word. 1861. June. Department II. Russian Literature. Pp. 48–69.; Lavrov P.L. Otvet g. Strakhovu [Answer to G. Strakhov] // Lavrov P.L. Filosofiya i sotsiologiya [Philosophy and sociology]. Selected works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. Pp. 493–507.; Lavrov P.L. Essays on Issues of Practical Philosophy // Lavrov P.L. Philosophy and Sociology. Selected works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. Pp. 339–461.

²⁸ Sechenov I.M. To whom and how to develop psychology? Sechenov I.M. Selected Works. Vol. 1. Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences Publ., 1952. Pp. 172–267.; Sechenov I.M. Reflexes of the Brain // Sechenov I.M. Reflexes of the Brain. Moscow, LENAND Publ., 2022. Pp. 25–124.; Sechenov I.M. Doctrine of non-freedom of will from the practical side // Sechenov I.M. Selected works. Vol. 1. Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences Publ., 1952. Pp. 427–447.

In addition, within the framework of the study, we relied on the works of such philosophers and researchers as R. Descartes³², B. Spinoza³³, G.W.F. Hegel³⁴, K. Marx³⁵, F. Engels³⁶, A.I. Herzen³⁷, V.I. Lenin³⁸, E.V. Ilyenkov³⁹, M.A.

²⁹ Yurkevich P.D. *Iz nauki o chelovecheskom dukhe* [From the science of the human spirit: Essays on philosophy and theology]. Ed. Stereotype. Moscow: Book House "LIBROKOM", 2015. Pp. 3–91.

³⁰ Solovyov V.S. *Idea of a superman* // Solovyov V.S. *Collected works*. In 10 vols. Vol. 9. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1913. Pp. 265–274.; Solovyov V.S. *Ideya chelovechestva u avgusta Konta* [The idea of mankind in August Comte]. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1988. Pp. 562–581.; Solovyov V.S. *Beauty in Nature* // Solovyov V.S. *Collected Works*. In 10 vols. Vol. 6. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1911–1914. Pp. 33–74.; Solovyov V.S. *General Meaning of Art* // Solovyov V.S. *Collected Works*. In 10 vols. Vol. 6. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1911–1914. Pp. 75–90.; Solovyov V.S. *The First Step to Positive Aesthetics* // Solovyov V.S. *Collected Works*. In 10 vols. Vol. 7. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1911–1914. Pp. 69–77.; Solovyov V.S. *Literature or Truth? Nietzsche: Pro et contra*. Anthology. St. Petersburg: Publishing House of the Russian Christian Humanitarian Institute, 2001. Pp. 293–296.

³¹ Katkov M.N. *On the Occasion of "Polemical Beauties" in the "Sovremennik"* // *Russkii Vestnik*. Department: Literary Review and Notes. 1861. T. 33. May–June. Pp. 138–158.; Katkov M.N. *Starye bogi i novye bogi* [Old Gods and New Gods]. Department: Literary Review and Notes. 1861. Vol. 31. January-February. Pp. 891–904.

³² *Descartes R. Reasoning about the method*. St. Petersburg: Azbuka-Attikus, 2020. 320 p.

³³ *Spinoza B. Ethics*. /Lane. V.I. Modestov. Minsk: Harvest, Moscow: AST, 2001. 336 p. (In Russian)

³⁴ *Hegel G.W.F. Science of Logic: In 3 books. Book 3: Subjective logic, or the Doctrine of the concept* / Transl. by B.G. Stolpner. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt, 2021. 303 p. (In Russian); *Hegel G.W.F. Science of Logic: In 3 books. Objective logic. Book 1: The Doctrine of Being* / Transl. by B.G. Stolpner. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt, 2021. 347 p. (In Russian); *Hegel G.W.F. Science of Logic: In 3 books. Objective logic. Book 2: The Doctrine of Essence* / Transl. by B.G. Stolpner. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt, 2021. 188 p. (In Russian)

³⁵ *Marx K. Capital. Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1*. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1952.

³⁶ *Engels F. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* // *Marx K., Engels F. Selected Works*. In 3 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1979. Pp. 373–415.

Lifshitz⁴⁰, V.V. Rozanov⁴¹, T.I. Oyzerman⁴², V.G. Arslanov⁴³, I.I. Evlampiev⁴⁴, I.D. Osipov⁴⁵, V.M. Kamnev⁴⁶, V.K. Kantor⁴⁷, S.N. Korobkova⁴⁸ etc.

³⁷ Herzen A.I. Dilettantism in science // Herzen A.I. Sochineniya. In 9 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1955. Pp. 7–90.; Herzen A.I. Letters on the study of nature // Herzen A.I. Works. In 9 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1955. Pp. 93–327.

³⁸ Lenin V.I. G.V. Plekhanov. "N.G. Chernyshevsky" // Lenin V.I. Complete collection of essays. In 55 vol. Vol. 29. pp. 534–571. (In Russian); Lenin V.I. Children's Disease of "Leftism" in Communism // Lenin V.I. Complete collection of essays. Ed. 5. In 55 vol. Vol. 41. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1981. Pp. 1–104. (In Russian); Lenin V.I. Materialism and empirio-criticism // Lenin V.I. Complete collection of essays. In 55 vol. Vol. 18. Moscow: Politizdat Publ., 1968. pp. 7–384. (In Russian); Lenin V.I. Yu.M. Steklov. "N.G. Chernyshevsky, His Life and Activity (1828-1889)" // Lenin V.I. Complete collection of essays. In 55 vols. Vol. 29. Pp. 572–620. (In Russian)

³⁹ Ilyenkov E.V. Dialectics of the abstract and concrete in scientific and theoretical thinking // Ilyenkov E.V. Collected works. Vol. 1. Moscow: Kanon+, 2019. pp. 23–353. (In Russian); Ilyenkov E.V. Dialectics of the ideal // Ilyenkov E.V. Collected works. Vol. 5. Moscow: Kanon +, 2021. pp. 16–85. (In Russian); Ilyenkov E.V. Dialectical logic // Ilyenkov E.V. Collected works. Vol. 4. Moscow: Kanon +, 2020. pp. 222–449. (In Russian); Ilyenkov E.V. Idealnyy // Ilyenkov E.V. Collected works. Vol. 6. Moscow: Kanon+, 2022. pp. 68–93. (In Russian); Ilyenkov E.V. Cosmology of Spirit // Ilyenkov E.V. Philosophy and culture. Moscow: Politizdat, 1991. pp. 415–437. (In Russian); Ilyenkov E.V. What is a personality? // Collected works. Vol. 5. Moscow: Kanon+, 2021. pp. 385–426. (In Russian)

⁴⁰ Lifshitz M.A. Dialogue with Evald Ilyenkov. (The Problem of the Ideal). Moscow, Progress-Traditsiya Publ., 2003. 368 p.; Lifshitz M.A. Essays on Russian Culture. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt; Kultura, 2015. 751 p.; Lifshitz M.A. Philosophical views of Chernyshevsky // Lifshitz M.A. Collected works. In 3 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow: Izobraz. Iskusstvo, 1986. Pp. 163–179.

⁴¹ Rozanov V.V. Collected Works. Fleeting. Moscow, Respublika Publ., 1994. 541 p.; Rozanov V.V. Uedinennoe [Solitude]. Vol. 2. Moscow, Pravda Publ., 1990. 712 p. (In Russian)

⁴² Oyzerman T.I. Glavnye filosofskie napravleniya (Teoreticheskii analiz istoriko-filosofskogo protsessa) [Main philosophical trends (Theoretical analysis of the historical and philosophical process)]. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1971. 383 p.; Oyzerman T.I. Marxism and Utopism. Moscow,

They also relied on the works of foreign authors, such as B. Bowring⁴⁹, D. Buckhurst⁵⁰, A. Winckelmann⁵¹, M.N. Epstein⁵².

Progress-Traditsiya Publ., 2003. 568 p.; Oyzerman T.I. Problems of Historical and Philosophical Science. 2nd ed. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1982. 301 p. (In Russian)

⁴³ *Arslanov V.G.* Russian art history. Noble culture. The idea of mimesis. 1792–1925: in 2 volumes. Vol. 1. Rejected beginning. Philosophical foundations of Russian art history of the 19th century (1820–1860) / ed. preparation With the participation of A.P. Botvin. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2024. 651 p. (In Russian)

⁴⁴ Evlampiev I.I. Historical significance of Russian philosophy // *Veche. Journal of Russian Philosophy and Culture*. Vol. 27. Part I. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Publishing House. 2015. pp. 131–143. (In Russian); Evlampiev I.I. History of Russian metaphysics in the 19th–20th centuries. Russian philosophy in search of the absolute. Part II. St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 2000. 413 p. (In Russian); Evlampiev I.I. History of Russian metaphysics in the 19th–20th centuries. Russian philosophy in search of the absolute. Part I. St. Petersburg: Aletheya, 2000. 415 p. (In Russian); Evlampiev I.I. History of Russian metaphysics in the 19th–20th centuries. Russian philosophy in search of the Absolute. 2nd ed., revised. and additional. St. Petersburg: RHGA, 2020. 920 p. (In Russian); Evlampiev I.I. History of Russian Philosophy: Textbook. Moscow: Vysshaya shkola, 2002. (In Russian)

⁴⁵ Osipov I.D. Axiology of the Humanities in Russian Conservatism. 2021. T. 16, No 4. Pp. 99–108.; Osipov I.D. Historiology of Russian Positivism // *Bulletin of St. Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflictology*. 2018. T. 34, No 3. Pp. 454–457.; Osipov I.D. Philosophy of Russian liberalism (XIX – early XX centuries). St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg State University Publ., 1996. 192 p. (In Russian)

⁴⁶ Kamnev V.M., Osipov I.D. Political Philosophy of Russian Conservatism. 2nd ed., corr. St. Petersburg, Vladimir Dal Publ., 2018. 255 p. (In Russian)

⁴⁷ Kantor V.K. "The Brothers Karamazov" by F. Dostoevsky. Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya literatura Publ., 1983.

⁴⁸ Korobkova S.N. Realism in the system "Materialism - idealism": historical and philosophical aspect // *Scientific Journal of the KubSAU*, No113(09), 2015. Pp. 1410–1425.; Korobkova S.N. Realism and Anthropological Principle in Russian Philosophy // *Scientific Journal of the Kuban State Agrarian University*, No115(01), 2016. Pp. 391–404.

⁴⁹ Bowring, B. Spinoza, Marx, and Ilyenkov (who did not know Marx's transcription of Spinoza) / B. Bowring // *Studies in East European Thought*. – 2022.

Also, the study was based on such scientific publications as the journal "Philosophical Polylogue: Journal of the International Center for the Study of Russian Philosophy", the journal "Veche. Yearbook of Russian Philosophy and Culture", the journal "Solovyov Studies", the collection "N.G. Chernyshevsky. Articles, Researches and Materials: A Collection of Scientific Papers", English-language journal *Studies in East European Thought*.

Novelty of the research

1. The hermeneutic analysis of the philosophical texts of the participants of the discussion on the anthropological principle was conducted.

2. The philosophical views of N.A. Dobrolyubov and N.G. Chernyshevsky, the "realism" of D.I. Pisarev, the "anthropology" of P.L. Lavrov and the psychophysiology of I.M. Sechenov are presented as aspects of a single philosophical doctrine.

3. The ideas of N.G. Chernyshevsky and his supporters are interpreted in such a way that with their help it becomes possible to translate the monologic strategy of interaction of philosophical schools and trends with each other into a dialogical form of communication.

4. It has been established that the "mythology" about N.G. Chernyshevsky produces new myths that are based on ideology: today's attempts by researchers to revise the Soviet image of Russian thinkers often lead to the formation of new myths.

5. It is demonstrated that the principle of partisanship of philosophy is applicable in analyzing the history of Russian thought and, moreover, partisanship is observed in modern studies on the history of philosophy.

⁵⁰ Bakhurst, David (2023). *The heart of the matter: Ilyenkov, Vygotsky and the courage of thought*. Boston: Brill.

⁵¹ Vinkelman, A. *Solovyov and Schelling: two voices of culture* / A. Vinkelman // *Studies in East European Thought*. – 2022.

⁵² Epstein, M.N. *The Phoenix of Philosophy: Russian Thought of the Late Soviet Period (1953-1991)*. New York and London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019, 312 pp.

Provisions to be defended

1. The views of N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, P.L. Lavrov, D.I. Pisarev and I.M. Sechenov represent a single philosophical doctrine based on the anthropological principle.
2. The philosophical system of N.G. Chernyshevsky is primarily based on materialistic philosophical anthropology and materialist ontology.
3. The principle of the partisanship of philosophy, if it is interpreted as the dependence of political "partisanship" on the ontological trend in philosophy (and not vice versa), remains relevant in historical and philosophical research.
4. The problem of the ideal, which began to be developed in Russian philosophy in the XX century and is presented in the works of Soviet thinkers E.V. Ilyenkov, M.A. Lifshitz and others, is implicit to the way of thinking of Russian thinkers of the XIX century..
5. In the works of Soviet philosophers, the thought models presented in the works of N.G. Chernyshevsky are repeated and developed, including the idea of the anthropomorphization of objective reality.
6. It is incorrect to reduce the ethical aspect of the philosophy of N.G. Chernyshevsky and his supporters, predetermined by the anthropological principle, to either utilitarianism or religiosity.

Main scientific results

1. It is proved that partisanship of philosophy as a strategem helps the historian of philosophy to build a classification and investigate philosophical teachings, while not simplifying them or reducing them to individual sciences or sections of philosophy⁵³.

⁵³ Chernykh A.A. Dialogue of Philosophical Schools on the "Anthropological Principle" in the Articles of N.G. Chernyshevsky and M.N. Katkov // Bulletin of Perm University. Philosophy. Psychology. Sociology. 2024. Iss. 1, pp. 5–15. <https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2024-1-5-15.>; Chernykh A.A. N.G. Chernyshevsky and L. Feuerbach: Anthropological Materialism or Religious Philosophy? Veche. Yearbook of Russian Philosophy and Culture. 2022. № 34. Pp. 68–85.; Chernykh A.A. Psychophysiology of I. M. Sechenov as a Criticism of P. D. Yurkevich's

2. It has been established that the aesthetic, ethical, epistemological, and political economic views of N.G. Chernyshevsky are based on materialistic philosophical anthropology and ontology⁵⁴.

3. It has been proved that the interpretation of N.G. Chernyshevsky as a religious thinker is untenable⁵⁵.

4. It is revealed that N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, P.L. Lavrov, D.I. Pisarev and I.M. Sechenov continued the development of such a philosophical trend as anthropological materialism⁵⁶, and that therefore their views can be considered as aspects of a single philosophical doctrine.

Views on the Anthropological Principle // Bulletin of the Moscow State Pedagogical University. Series: Philosophical Sciences. 2024. № 1(49). Pp. 57–73.; Chernykh A.A. Is the "similarity" of the views of V.S. Solovyov and N.G. Chernyshevsky accidental? Bulletin of Tver State University. Series "PHILOSOPHY". 2023. № 4 (66). Pp. 84–93.

⁵⁴ Chernykh A.A. N.G. Chernyshevsky and L. Feuerbach: Anthropological Materialism or Religious Philosophy? *Veche. Yearbook of Russian Philosophy and Culture*. 2022. № 34. Pp. 68–85.; Chernykh A.A. Is the "similarity" of the views of V.S. Solovyov and N.G. Chernyshevsky accidental? Bulletin of Tver State University. Series "PHILOSOPHY". 2023. № 4 (66). Pp. 84–93. DOI: 10.26456/vtphilos/2023.4.084.; Chernykh A.A. *Filosofiya N.G. Chernyshevskogo v peripetiyakh istoriografii* [Philosophy of N.G. Chernyshevsky in the peripeteia of historiography]. *Communication. Society: Electronic Scientific Journal*. 2023 № 2 (2). Pp. 101–114.

⁵⁵ Chernykh A.A. N.G. Chernyshevsky and L. Feuerbach: Anthropological Materialism or Religious Philosophy? *Veche. Yearbook of Russian Philosophy and Culture*. 2022. № 34. Pp. 68–85.; Chernykh A.A. Is the "similarity" of the views of V.S. Solovyov and N.G. Chernyshevsky accidental? Bulletin of Tver State University. Series "PHILOSOPHY". 2023. № 4 (66). Pp. 84–93. DOI: 10.26456/vtphilos/2023.4.084.; Chernykh A.A. *Filosofiya N.G. Chernyshevskogo v peripetiyakh istoriografii* [Philosophy of N.G. Chernyshevsky in the peripeteia of historiography]. *Communication. Society: Electronic Scientific Journal*. 2023 № 2 (2). Pp. 101–114.

⁵⁶ Chernykh A.A. *Problemy mozga i vospitaniya v monisticheskom materializme N.A. Dobrolyubova* [Problems of brain and education in the monistic materialism of N.A. Dobrolyubov]. *Yearbook of Russian Philosophy and Culture*. 2021. № 33. Pp. 244–260.; Chernykh A.A. *Psychophysiology of I. M. Sechenov as a Criticism of P. D. Yurkevich's Views*

5. It is demonstrated that the "problem of the ideal", presented in Soviet philosophy in the second half of the 20th century, has already been implicitly considered in Russian philosophy of the 19th century.⁵⁷

6. It is found that the original polemicism of Russian philosophy is one of the determinatives of Russian thought⁵⁸.

7. It is proved that the partisanship of philosophy as a thinker's belonging to the ideological discursive doctrine is an actual research strategy⁵⁹.

Theoretical and practical significance of the work

Theoretical significance of the work. The paper presents a new historical and philosophical reconstruction of the views of thinkers who participated in the discussion of the "anthropological principle", free from old ideologies and "mythologies". The presented historical and philosophical reconstruction can be used by researchers in the further development of the topic of the anthropological principle in Russian philosophy and in general in the study of the history of Russian philosophy.

on the Anthropological Principle // Bulletin of the Moscow State Pedagogical University. Series: Philosophical Sciences. 2024. № 1(49). Pp. 57–73.; Chernykh A.A. Is the "similarity" of the views of V.S. Solovyov and N.G. Chernyshevsky accidental? Bulletin of Tver State University. Series "PHILOSOPHY". 2023. № 4 (66). Pp. 84–93.

⁵⁷ Chernykh A.A. Dialogue of Philosophical Schools on the "Anthropological Principle" in the Articles of N.G. Chernyshevsky and M.N. Katkov // Bulletin of Perm University. Philosophy. Psychology. Sociology. 2024. Iss. 1, pp. 5–15. <https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2024-1-5-15>.

⁵⁸ Chernykh A.A. Dialogue of Philosophical Schools on the "Anthropological Principle" in the Articles of N.G. Chernyshevsky and M.N. Katkov // Bulletin of Perm University. Philosophy. Psychology. Sociology. 2024. Iss. 1, pp. 5–15. <https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2024-1-5-15>.

⁵⁹ Chernykh A.A. Dialogue of Philosophical Schools on the "Anthropological Principle" in the Articles of N.G. Chernyshevsky and M.N. Katkov // Bulletin of Perm University. Philosophy. Psychology. Sociology. 2024. Iss. 1, pp. 5–15.; Chernykh A.A. N.G. Chernyshevsky and L. Feuerbach: Anthropological Materialism or Religious Philosophy? Veche. Yearbook of Russian Philosophy and Culture. 2022. № 34. Pp. 68–85.

The importance of anthropological problems in the history of Russian thought is also established. It can be used in the study of the specifics of Russian philosophical thought of the XIX century and the subsequent development of Russian philosophy in the XX–XXI centuries.

The principle of partisanship of philosophy is rethought in such a way that it can be applied in historical and philosophical research, free of ideologization. Thanks to this, researchers have the opportunity to analyze the history of Russian philosophy with the aid of the de-ideologized principle of partisanship.

The conclusions obtained as a result of the study can be applied in further studies of both the history of Russian philosophy of the 19th century and the history of Russian thought of other historical periods.

Practical significance of the work. The results of the study can be used in writing educational and methodological literature for higher educational institutions in philosophical and other social and humanitarian disciplines. The results of the study can also be used in lectures and seminars.

Within the framework of the general education cycle in universities in the disciplines "Philosophy" and "Introduction to Philosophy", the results of the study can be used for a general description of Russian philosophy, its specifics and advantages. Within the framework of the course "Fundamentals of Russian Statehood", the principle of dialogicity, which is important for Russian thought, can be rethought and re-actualized, taking into account the discussion of the anthropological principle.

Within the framework of academic disciplines in the philosophical specialties of bachelor's and master's degrees in universities, the results of the study can be used by the faculty to more fully cover the topic of Russian philosophy of the 1850s–1860s; and students – in order to clarify for themselves the specifics, value and significance of Russian philosophy of the XIX century, and through this to form a more complete understanding of the development of philosophical trends in Russian philosophy of the XX century.

For example, in the educational process in universities, it is possible to reinterpret N.G. Chernyshevsky and his supporters: to interpret them not as "nihilists", "utilitarians" and "revolutionaries", but as deep thinkers whose ideas anticipated many topics of both world and Russian philosophy of the 20th and 21st centuries. and in social and humanitarian knowledge.

Approbation

The results of the study were used in the preparation of the following scientific publications:

1. *Chernykh A.A.* Dialogue of Philosophical Schools on the "Anthropological Principle" in the Articles of N.G. Chernyshevsky and M.N. Katkov // Bulletin of Perm University. 2024. Iss. 1, pp. 5–15. <https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2024-1-5-15>.
2. *Chernykh A.A.* Psychophysiology of I. M. Sechenov as a Criticism of P. D. Yurkevich's Views on the Anthropological Principle // Bulletin of the Moscow State Pedagogical University. Series: Philosophical Sciences. 2024. № 1(49). Pp. 57–73. DOI 10.25688/2078-9238.2024.49.1.5.
3. *Chernykh A.A.* Is the "similarity" of the views of V.S. Solovyov and N.G. Chernyshevsky accidental? // Vestnik Tver State University. Series "PHILOSOPHY". 2023. № 4 (66). Pp. 84–93. DOI: 10.26456/vtphilos/2023.4.084.
4. *Chernykh A.A.* N.G. Chernyshevsky and L. Feuerbach: Anthropological Materialism or Religious Philosophy? // Veche. Yearbook of Russian Philosophy and Culture. 2022. No 34. Pp. 68–85.
5. *Chernykh A.A.* Vitaly Sergeevich Nikonenko. To the 80th Anniversary of the Birth // Philosophical Polylogue: Journal of the International Center for the Study of Russian Philosophy. 2022. № 1(11). Pp. 148–162. DOI 10.31119/phlog.2022.1.170.
6. *Chernykh A.A.* Problems of the brain and education in the monistic materialism of N.A. Dobrolyubov // Veche. Yearbook of Russian Philosophy and Culture. 2021. No 33. Pp. 244–260.

7. *Chernykh A.A.* Philosophy of N. G. Chernyshevsky in the vicissitudes of historiography // Language. Communication. Society: Electronic Scientific Journal. 2023 No 2 (2). P. 101–114.

8. *Chernykh A.A.* Teoriya razumnogo egoizma v rabotakh N.G. Chernyshevskogo i P.L. Lavrova // Modernity: chelovek i kul'tura: Sbornik materialov XXIV mezhvuzovskoy nauchnoy konferentsii, St. Petersburg, 23–25 dekabrya 2021 goda. SPb.: RHGA, 2022. P. 9–14.

9. *Chernykh A.A.* N.G. Chernyshevsky and P.Y. Chaadaev: apologists of madness // XXVI Tsarskoselskie chteniya: Materialy mezhdunarodnoy nauchnoy konferentsii, St. Petersburg, 19–20 aprelya 2022 goda. Tom I. SPb.: LGU, 2022. P. 123–127.

10. *Chernykh A.A.* Metodologicheskaya problema issledovaniya istorii russkoi filosofii (na primere knigi V.K. Kantor o N.G. Chernyshevsky) // XVI annual scientific session of postgraduate students and young scientists: materials of the All-Russian scientific conference, Vologda, November 29, 2022. Volume 2. Vologda: Vologda State University, 2023. P. 317–321.

11. *Chernykh A.A.* I.M. Sechenov's Ethical Doctrine of Non-Freedom of Will // XIV International Conference "Theoretical and Applied Ethics: Traditions and Prospects – 2022. To the 100th Anniversary of the "Philosophical Steamship": Conference Materials, St. Petersburg, November 17–19, 2022. St. Petersburg: OOO "Sborka", 2022. Pp. 116–117.

12. *Chernykh A.A.* Ethical philosophy of P.L. Lavrov and N.G. Chernyshevsky // Theoretical and applied ethics: Traditions and prospects – 2021. Ethics as science and profession: Materials of the conference, St. Petersburg, November 18–20, 2021. St. Petersburg: OOO "Sborka", 2021. P. 235.

Also, the results of the study conducted in the framework of this work were used when participating in scientific conferences: the XVI Annual Theoretical Seminar "The Search for Truth and the Truth of Life in the Space of Modern Culture" at St. Petersburg State University of Economics on November 14–15, 2023, the X International Readings on the History of Russian Philosophy at the

Siberian Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a branch of FCTAS RAS on September 21–23, 2023, the IX International Scientific Conference "Creativity as a National Element: The Problem of Good and Evil" at St. Petersburg State University of Economics on June 29 – July 1, 2023, the XVI Annual Scientific Session of PhD Students and Young Scientists at VoSU on November 29, 2022, the XIV International Conference "Theoretical and Applied Ethics: Traditions and Prospects – 2022. To the 100th anniversary of the "Philosophical Steamship" at St. Petersburg State University on November 17–19, 2022, the XXVI Tsarskoye Selo Readings at the Pushkin Leningrad State University on April 19–20, 2022, the 24th Interuniversity Student Scientific Conference "Student – Researcher – Teacher" at the Herzen State Pedagogical University on April 4–15, 2022, the XXIV Scientific and Practical Conference of Young Scientists "Modernity: Man and Culture" at the Russian Chemical State Administration on December 23–25, 2021, the conference "Theoretical and Applied Ethics: Traditions and Prospects – 2021" at St. Petersburg State University on November 18–20, 2021, the VIII International Readings on the History of Russian Philosophy "Russian Philosophy in the Homeland and in Exile" at the Sociological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a branch of FCTAS RAS on September 23–24, 2021.

In addition, the results of the dissertation research were used in the educational process as part of teaching the disciplines "Philosophy", "History of Russia", "Fundamentals of Russian Statehood" at the Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution of Higher Professional Education "St. Petersburg State University of Economics" in the 2023–2024 academic year.

The dissertation corresponds to the following points of the scientific specialty 5.7.2. History of philosophy:

5.7.2.11. Philosophy of the XIX century

5.7.2.20. Russian philosophy and philosophy of the peoples of Russia.

5.7.2.23. The Main Ideological Currents in Russian Philosophy of the XIX Century

CHAPTER 1. ANTHROPOLOGICAL MATERIALISM IN RUSSIAN PHILOSOPHY

1.1 N.A. Dobrolyubov⁶⁰

This chapter examines the anthropological works of N.A. Dobrolyubov, P.L. Lavrov, and N.G. Chernyshevsky, as their ideas about the anthropological principle served as the subject of discussion in 1860-1863.

Dobrolyubov's philosophical views on the human being are materialistic. In the articles “The Organic Development of Man in Connection with His Mental and Moral Activity” and “Foundations of Experimental Psychology” the critic considered private questions concerning the structure of the human organism and spirit, as well as their interrelationship. Special attention in the named works Dobrolyubov pays to the brain. In other works there is a criticism of the idealistic view of psychologists contemporary to him.

We pay attention to Dobrolyubov's anthropology for the reason that it forms one whole with Chernyshevsky's anthropology. V.S. Nikonenko writes that “the works of Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky, substantiating the material unity of human nature, were written according to a single plan and mutually complement each other”⁶¹. It is worth considering Dobrolyubov's related works in order to fully understand Chernyshevsky's views on human nature.

Dobrolyubov's two most important anthropological articles, named above, he wrote in 1858 and 1859. Chernyshevsky wrote his “Anthropological Principle in Philosophy” a little later - in 1860. As V.S. Nikonenko notes, Chernyshevsky in his article does not touch in detail on the subject of the human brain, as it had been thoroughly dealt with in Dobrolyubov's works by the time of writing the

⁶⁰ Chernykh A.A. Problemy mozga i vospitaniya v monisticheskom materializme N.A. Dobrolyubova [Problems of brain and education in the monistic materialism of N.A. Dobrolyubov]. Yearbook of Russian Philosophy and Culture. 2021. № 33. Pp. 244–260.

⁶¹ Nikonenko V.S. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Dobrolyubov. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1985. P. 87.

“Anthropological Principle”. “Chernyshevsky does not speak about the psychophysical problem, about the brain as a material carrier of consciousness, believing the issue exhausted already in the works of Dobrolyubov”⁶².

In addition, we can observe a striking similarity of argumentation between Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky.

As we know, the thinkers worked together in *Sovremennik* and both were seriously influenced by Feuerbach. From all this it is logical to conclude that they held the same viewpoint in anthropology. For a full study of their common view we shall examine Dobrolyubov's anthropological works in chronological order.

In the article “Physiological-psychological... view...” the critic ironically criticizes the idealist professor Bervey, reproaches him for backwardness from science. Dobrolyubov writes: “By mixing natural and moral sciences, Mr. Bervey imposes such an obligation on naturalists that no one, except medieval alchemists, ever thought of”⁶³. Dobrolyubov reproaches Bervey for rejecting the achievements of the science of man contemporary to him. According to Bervey, “psychology should seek to determine the difference between the vital beginning and the soul in man”⁶⁴. In other words, Bervey urges psychologists to hold a dualistic view in anthropology, even though this is at odds with advances in physiology. Dobrolyubov, on the other hand, defends the integrity of human nature, but so far he does so between the lines: monism is directly opposed to Bervey's position in psychology.

In addition, we see in Dobrolyubov's words a defense of the authority of positive science, in which Bervey does not see the truth: “natural sciences are now

⁶² Ibidem. P. 88.

⁶³ Dobrolyubov N.A. Physiological and psychological comparative view of the beginning and end of life // Dobrolyubov N.A. Collected works. In 3. vol. T. 1. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1950. P. 482.

⁶⁴ Ibidem. P. 481.

doing the wrong thing”⁶⁵. Dobrolyubov's view of natural science is clearly congenial to the views of Herzen⁶⁶ and Chernyshevsky.

In the article “On the Truthfulness of Concepts,” Dobrolyubov explicitly ironizes the idealist philosopher Kusakov for his thoughts on human cognition. Kusakov builds speculative constructs that, according to Dobrolyubov, turn out to be tied to mathematical concepts. Thus, Dobrolyubov quotes from Kusakov's work on the possibility of truth “in determining the highest axioms and building on them all possible knowledge”⁶⁷. From the article we see that Kusakov presents his epistemological conception, but does so inconsistently.

And Dobrolyubov does not pay due attention to a coherent presentation of the philosopher's ideas and criticism of these elements. The essence of the article is rather reduced to a caustic irony over idealism. This irony traces a firm materialist position and adherence to the achievements of natural sciences. Thus, Dobrolyubov writes: “We are conscious of the existence of objects only because they act on us, and that, therefore, it is impossible to imagine an object without action”⁶⁸. In these words one recognizes the argument of Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky against the existence of the soul, understood dualistically. Thus, the criticism is reduced to an affirmation of his position; Kusakov's views here are nothing more than a presupposition for talking about the materialist point of view.

In conclusion, Dobrolyubov emphasizes that the philosophical views of the criticized author are inconsistent: “Philosophy must have gone badly for Mr.

⁶⁵ Ibidem. P. 481.

⁶⁶ Herzen A.I. Dilettantism in science // Herzen A.I. Sochineniya. In 9 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1955. Pp. 7–90.; Herzen A.I. Letters on the study of nature // Herzen A.I. Works. In 9 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1955. Pp. 93–327.

⁶⁷ Dobrolyubov N.A. On the Truth of Concepts or the Reliability of Human Knowledge // Dobrolyubov N.A. Selected Philosophical Works. In 2. vol. Vol. 1. Leningrad: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. P. 274.

⁶⁸ Ibidem. P. 274.

Kusakov: he volunteered to lead us somewhere and led us into a labyrinth from which, it seems, he himself cannot get out”⁶⁹.

In the article "The Organic Development of Man", written in 1858, Dobrolyubov set forth his understanding of materialist anthropology in connection with the issues of human education.

In characterizing the philosophical views of Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky, it would be incorrect to confine oneself to the term "materialism." This term alone has not yet said anything, it can be understood as completely different philosophical views. Thus, Dobrolyubov writes: "We find ridiculous and pitiful the ignorant pretensions of crude materialism, which degrades the high importance of the spiritual side of man, trying to prove that the soul of man consists of some subtle matter"⁷⁰. If there is coarse materialism, then there must also be a "non-coarse", simple materialism. The critic says that such a view, according to which the soul is the finest form of matter, is contrary to the natural sciences. The soul (if we retain the idealistic terminology) should not be understood as some quality at all. The soul is neither an object nor a substance; the soul is the sum total, the interaction, the integrity of certain processes.

Dobrolyubov, like Feuerbach, opposes the term "materialism", seeing in it a one-sided view of being in general and of man in particular. However, man is too complex to look at him from the position of crude materialism and not to disagree with the truth.

The critic speaks of human nature in the context of education. It is not limited only to the imposition of correct concepts on certain issues on the pupil. Dobrolyubov understands the process of upbringing more deeply. The essence of this process should be sought in the structure of man, his organism and his intellectual nature.

⁶⁹ Ibidem. P. 276.

⁷⁰ Dobrolyubov N.A. Organic development of a person in connection with his mental and moral activity // Dobrolyubov N.A. Selected philosophical works. In 2. vol. Vol. 1. Leningrad: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. Pp. 230–231.

The critic writes that both for the bodily and moral activity of man the health of his organism is of great importance. It is to health that education is reduced. Education, which is not directed to the healthy development of the organism, turns out to be harmful and ineffective. “For the proper manifestation of mental activity we must have properly developed, healthy organs”⁷¹. This view derives from the anthropological understanding of man as a single, integral being.

Dobrolyubov argues that in discovering his consciousness, man inevitably begins to notice antagonisms in himself and in the world around him. The essence of consciousness lies precisely in finding differences. In other words, consciousness reaches for dialectical thinking. At first man contrasts himself with other objects and the world. As thinking develops, he turns away from the world and turns toward his subject. As a result of the dialectical nature of thinking, man sees antagonism in his consciousness itself: “Not yet able to rise to the idea of universal unity and harmony, he assumes the existence of different, unpleasant to each other, beginnings in himself as in nature”⁷².

This is the stage in the development of human thought and philosophy at which *the first point*, the simplicity of man, is denied and *the second point*, the dualistic structure of human nature, is postulated. Here the human soul is still regarded as the higher, light beginning, and the body as the lower, dark beginning. The human mind has not yet risen to *synthesis*, to the idea of the unity and indivisibility of the two beginnings.

And although, as Dobrolyubov writes, the Christian (it would be better to say religious) dualistic worldview is losing its power, still “the old concepts were pitifully abandoned by the scholastic sages of the Middle Ages, and they clung to dualism”⁷³. In other words, the dualism of the Middle Ages took on new forms, but retained its former essence.

⁷¹ Ibidem. P. 237.

⁷² Ibidem. P. 234.

⁷³ Ibidem. P. 234.

According to Dobrolyubov, anthropology (here meaning the natural sciences, not philosophy) has already proved that it is not possible to separate spirit from matter; in any case, attempts to do so speculatively are useless, and nothing has been achieved by experience. “All activity discovered by man is only so far as it is discovered by us in bodily, external manifestations, and that, therefore, we can judge of the activity of the soul only by its manifestation in the body”⁷⁴. If we undertake the study of the soul, spirit, consciousness, we must apply empirical methods. However, according to the dualistic view, the soul is irreducible to the body. Descartes, a vivid representative of dualistic philosophy, believed that the human soul and body could not be related to each other in any way other than through divine intervention. Dobrolyubov would observe that Descartes was “sorry to abandon” his dualism, so he acted inconsistently when he allowed god into his philosophy. Following science requires abandoning the notion of the soul as something independent, as something that did not arise from the body. Again - following science - it is possible to assume the existence of just such a soul, independent of the body. But only temporarily, until we test this hypothesis in practice, by empirical means. When it turns out that there are no real grounds for our assumption, we should either abandon it altogether or, at least, abandon it for a while. And let this hypothesis patiently wait for its time, until, if at all, the natural sciences themselves will not bring it back to life.

It will be objected that at the beginning of the article under consideration the critic defended the soul against the attacks of gross materialism, and this is true. We have quoted the corresponding quotation just above. However, Dobrolyubov is a materialist and understands the soul differently from what idealists of this or that opinion do. “The newest science ... has seen in the soul exactly the force that penetrates and animates the entire bodily composition of man. On the basis of this notion, science no longer considers bodily activities separately from spiritual

⁷⁴ Ibidem. P. 236.

ones”⁷⁵. Not only the soul is inconceivable without the body, but also the body is inconceivable without the soul. At least if we are talking about the body of a person whose brain activity is sufficient for any spiritual activity.

The soul and the body are not connected in the same way as two sticks literally bound together by a string, and not in the same way as an axe and a hatchet, where one element is put into the other, and in general not as two elements that are conceivable without each other. A human soul without a human body is as ridiculous an abstraction as a healthy human body without a soul. “The soul is not connected to the body by an external bond ... but merges with it essentially, firmly and indissolubly, penetrates it all and everywhere so that without it, without this animating power, it is impossible to imagine a living human organism [and vice versa]”⁷⁶. And it should not be thought that this “soul” acquires its unity with the body at any particular moment, at any instant. Of course, consciousness develops to a certain quality in a child already born, but it would be wrong to assert that this development takes place overnight.

Having analyzed the question of the relation between soul and body from the point of view of anthropological materialism, Dobrolyubov turns to the subject of education. As we have pointed out above, a person's upbringing is closely connected with the health of his body. If a pupil diligently memorizes everything that his educators and teachers tell him, but as a result of this his brain turns out to be diseased, such upbringing should be considered wrong. Dobrolyubov understands disease as an incorrect relationship between the many elements that make up an organism. “All disease can be defined precisely as a violation of the correct relationship between the particles which make up our organism”⁷⁷. Since nurture is a process that affects the body, it is related to both the illness and the health of that body.

⁷⁵ Ibidem. P. 236.

⁷⁶ Ibidem. P. 237.

⁷⁷ Ibidem. P. 238.

In order to properly educate the soul and body, it is necessary to realize that they exist in interrelation or, better to say, in unity. Thus, one cannot educate the soul in isolation from the body, and vice versa. Putting a *painful effect* on the body, we should understand that we harm the soul as well, and vice versa.

The unity of human nature is realized in the brain. “Vision is realized not in the eye, but in the brain, as well as all our senses; if we cut, for instance, the eye nerve, the objects will be reflected in the eye still, but we will not see them”⁷⁸. Accordingly, the effects that are exerted on the brain are the most significant for education and health. To destroy the brain is the same as to destroy man himself. A man without a hand is a man without a hand, a man without a heart is a man who will die a second later. And a man without a brain is not a man at all, but a corpse. The cerebrum is the organ that not only provides a man with life, but also his very being as a man, i.e. thinking. With the loss of the brain, he loses not only the ability to receive nerve impulses from the eye or any other nerve, but the very ability to be. It is hard to overemphasize the importance of proper exposure to the brain.

But it's not just the matter of the brain. Dobrolyubov writes: “We beat into children's heads a huge mass of heterogeneous abstract concepts, completely alien to them ... and meanwhile do not want to take care of the correct, reasonable education of those organs that are necessary for that mental and moral activity could be done correctly”⁷⁹. The brain links all organs and all parts of the human body into one system, so it makes sense that as the brain affects these organs and parts of the body, so they affect it. A well-read but puny child is quite likely to be shy. As a consequence, he will more often experience stress in the society of other people, and the effect of this will be that this child will not be confident in himself and his abilities, it will be difficult for him to realize his intellectual abilities and knowledge gained from books. For full human being it is necessary to develop and

⁷⁸ Ibidem. P. 240.

⁷⁹ Ibidem. P. 244.

to do it evenly, because “one cannot speak without language, listen without ears, feel and think without brain”⁸⁰. To speak intelligently and beautifully, it is not enough for a child and a human being in general to read; it is necessary to practice speaking as well: to use not only the brain, the eye and the oculomotor nerve, but the articulation apparatus as well.

The depth of Dobrolyubov's anthropological views is not exhausted by this. He further refers to Moleschott, who, according to him, came to the conclusion that “thought has an influence on the material composition of the brain, and vice versa, the composition of the brain on thought”⁸¹. This conclusion follows logically from all the above statements. This may seem obvious, but it is in the “obviousness” that the merit of this philosophy lies. Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky consistently develop their anthropological materialism as a science, instead of engaging in speculative speculation. An example of how conclusions can be deduced, or better said, invented, from correct premises will be discussed below in the context of another article by Dobrolyubov. Formally logical but inherently questionable conclusions can often be observed in idealist philosophy and theology. Such inconsistency comes from the fact that the conclusion is already ready before all logic and facts, and that the latter turn out to be necessary only for argumentation, while there is no actual deduction.

If we proceed from the facts and really deduce the effect from the cause, and not vice versa, then we get that with the unity of the human organism, the inseparability of spirit and body, it is impossible to imagine that the thought in the brain and the matter itself, which constitutes the body of the thinking organ, would not be in interrelation. For, based on the facts, there is no soul that would interact with thought. And all the functions that can be attributed to the soul are performed by the brain. The exceptions are clearly unrealistic ones, such as immortality or intuition.

⁸⁰ Ibidem. P. 244.

⁸¹ Ibidem. P. 246.

It follows that the way a person uses the brain directly affects this very brain. Thus, regular intellectual activity develops it in the same way that regular physical activity develops muscles. “A person's occupation has an impact on the state of the brain. Mental activity increases its volume and strengthens it, just as gymnastics strengthens our muscles”⁸². Proper training is required for proper brain or muscle development. Excessive exercise is harmful not only to the arms and legs, but also to the brain. Consequently, proper training of the brain (or soul, as idealists would say) contributes to the effective development of intellectual abilities.

Dobrolyubov holds to the view that man is superior to animals precisely on account of his developed brain. In many other ways, however, man is inferior to most animals: he is not as fast as a cheetah, not as strong as a bear, not as agile as probably any animal known to science. The critic quotes Dr. Bock as saying, “[Only] the highest and most perfect development of the brain distinguishes man from animals...the human soul is primarily conditioned by a healthy brain”⁸³. From here we can see that materialism and idealism are close to each other in understanding the difference between man and animal. According to both materialism and idealism, man is distinguished from all nature by his intelligence, morality, sense of beauty, and so on. Only in materialism these last refer to the brain, and in idealism to the soul.

But from this seemingly immaterial distinction, which we usually notice only in scholarly disputes, even greater distinctions follow. The soul perceives concepts from God, from the world of ideas, or from somewhere else, but they are given before experience and therefore initially already exist in the soul, in man. The brain, on the other hand, perceives directly, it receives impulses through nerves from the senses. The brain reads reality and perceives it in a certain way, concepts are not given to it from birth, it takes them from reality itself. “Man does not develop concepts from himself, but receives them from the external world”⁸⁴.

⁸² Ibidem. P. 248.

⁸³ Ibidem. P. 249.

⁸⁴ Ibidem. P. 251.

Here lies the difference between cognition by the soul in idealism and cognition by the brain in materialism. Dobrolyubov writes that “often the same impressions act differently on different people”⁸⁵. Not only the totality of perceived facts, impressions and knowledge, in short, not only previous experience and memory can influence subsequent cognition, but also the starting point - the brain itself. Like any other organ, the brain can vary from person to person. If the brain is nurtured in the same way in different people, they may still have differences in cognition and in the shaping of concepts, even if this difference appears imperceptible.

For Dobrolyubov, proper education has a special social significance. A person must have strong and firm convictions. But a person should not be good by habit or by the example of the majority, he should not be inactively good. A properly educated person is one who will speak in the words of the citizen from Nekrasov's poem:

*And do not go into the camp of the harmless,
When you can be useful!*
A son cannot look calmly
At his mother's grief,
No worthy citizen
He shall not be cold to his fatherland,
There's no greater reproach to him.
*Go into the fire for the honor of your fatherland,
For conviction, for love...* (italics mine. - A.Ch.)⁸⁶.

A well-behaved person is active because he cannot do otherwise. As long as something happens in society that is at variance with his beliefs, he cannot be calm. Such a person is a son and a citizen of his homeland. Dobrolyubov writes that “the efforts of many educators to act on the *heart of the child*, without

⁸⁵ Ibidem. P. 251.

⁸⁶ Nekrasov N.A. Poet and Citizen // Nekrasov N.A. Poems. Poems / Compilation, article and notes by N.N. Skatov. St. Petersburg, Lenizdat Publ., 1996. P. 50.

instilling in him sound concepts, are completely in vain. The result of such “action on the heart” is usually good-naturedness out of habit, with a complete vacillation and impotence of convictions”⁸⁷. Powerlessness and shaky convictions are characteristic of the poet in the above poem. He is used to being kind, “but suddenly the chains rattle” - and only fear remains of kindness, he has no strength to fight, because it was not brought up in him.

Unfortunately, we have to recognize that the environment has a significant, decisive impact on man. Being brought up in a certain way, a person cannot become a citizen from a poet. For this transformation, as a consequence, it is necessary for its own causes, a mere effort of will is not enough. The critic argues that “absolute free will does not exist for man, and that he, like all objects of nature, is dependent on its eternal laws”⁸⁸. Every consequence has its own cause - this is a law that man cannot overstep. The will of man is dependent on his upbringing, it is in the course of upbringing that the personality and its ability to resist external circumstances, the ability to think and act against the outside world are formed. “Will, as a separate, native ability, independent of other abilities, is impossible to allow. All its actions are conditioned and even inevitably produced by the store of knowledge that has accumulated in our brains, and by the degree of irritability that our nerves have”⁸⁹. In other words, the freedom of the will, which the idealist tradition has for centuries regarded as proof of the soul, of the divine beginning in man, this freedom can be accepted by anthropological materialism at best as Spinoza's freedom, as a cognized necessity, but no more than that. The will is recognized by Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky, but as a special psychic phenomenon which is closely connected with all other properties of the brain.

⁸⁷ Dobrolyubov N.A. Organic development of a person in connection with his mental and moral activity // Dobrolyubov N.A. Selected philosophical works. In 2. vol. Vol. 1. Leningrad: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. P. 257.

⁸⁸ Ibidem. P. 258.

⁸⁹ Ibidem. P. 258.

Further, the denial of free will and relegation of the will to a property or ability of the brain leads to the fact that the freedom of choice loses its sacral significance. “Freedom of choice in essence means precisely the possibility, existing in our mind, to compare several objects and determine which of them is better”⁹⁰. Thus, the critic argues that most criminals committed theft, murder and so on because of lack of prudence, ignorance and inability to choose from several options favorable.

So, Dobrolyubov sees the very essence of education in the process of competent development of the whole body, including the brain. But to come to such an understanding of education, it is necessary to abandon the ancient and medieval views of the soul. The ancients regarded the soul as a special matter, while the scholastics regarded it as a special immaterial thing that is connected and at the same time unconnected with the body. Both views simplify the actual state of affairs which the science of man has discovered. There is no soul as it is understood in idealism, but there is a brain resulting in human consciousness. Consciousness and the human body constitute a single organism.

In his article “Foundations of Experimental Psychology”, written in 1859, Dobrolyubov analyzes Archimandrite Gabriel's book. The critic speaks favorably of his work, pointing to the abundance of physiological examples, although he laments the “exceptional point of view”.

The author states that “it is not the eye that sees objects, nor the ear that hears sound, but that the impressions received by these organs from external objects are transmitted by means of sensory nerves to the brain. He says the same about perception and the other three sensory nerves”⁹¹. Dobrolyubov fully agrees with these positions, but Archim. Gabriel takes them to an extreme, with which the materialist Dobrolyubov can no longer agree. The author asserts that the brain is

⁹⁰ Ibidem. P. 259.

⁹¹ Dobrolyubov N.A. *Osnovaniya opytnoy psikhologii* [Foundations of Experimental Psychology]. In 3. vol. Vol. 2. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1952. P. 495.

also not a “feeling beginning”. Archim. Gabriel sees the proof of this in the contradiction between the simplicity of sensations and the complexity of the brain's structure. But it is difficult to recognize such a proof as satisfactory.

Dobrolyubov cites the argument, favored by him and Chernyshevsky, that the power present in matter must manifest itself. Thus, the force contained in the human brain manifests itself in all the intellectual processes that we can notice in ourselves and in others. “And in the human brain, whatever its composition, there must be a power of its own. And what wonder if this power manifests itself in sensation...?”⁹² In other words, Dobrolyubov assigns cognitive ability exclusively to the human brain. There is nothing higher and more complex than the brain in man. Other organs associated with the receipt of sensations, play the role of conductors, deliver nerve impulses to the brain.

To prove the brain's complexity, Dobrolyubov points to its original chemical composition, the intricate structure of this organ, as well as the action of electricity in the brain and the entire nervous system, which had not previously been seen in organic bodies.

Dobrolyubov emphasizes that the structures of organic bodies can have different degrees of complexity and, accordingly, these bodies act and perform their acts in different ways. The critic agrees with idealist psychologists that “the human brain... is the subtlest matter”⁹³. He argues that all over the world we observe the same matter, but developed in different degrees. The body of an insect is more complex than a block of granite, and the body of a small rodent more complex than the body of an insect. In this we see no contradictions and strangeness. Consequently, the structure of the human brain is more complex than any other form of matter that we know.

Dobrolyubov concludes that man is “the most perfect of animals”⁹⁴. Accordingly, his brain should be the most perfect in comparison with the brains of

⁹² Ibidem. P. 495.

⁹³ Ibidem. P. 497.

⁹⁴ Ibidem. P. 497.

other animals, and thus capable of higher thinking activity. Thus, Dobrolyubov asserts that “the brain has a close connection with mental activity”⁹⁵. In support of this, the critic refers to physiological experiments, including Frulan's experience of slicing off the layers of the brain of chickens. Although such experiments show the close connection between the brain and the psyche and leave no foundation for the existence of the soul, some idealist psychologists, according to Dobrolyubov, endow not only humans but also animals with souls.

However, as the critic writes, “it is not the facts that need to be adjusted to a pre-conceived law, but the law itself must be deduced from the facts, without arbitrarily forcing them”⁹⁶. Similarly, it is not necessary to attribute to the brain or the whole body of man or animal a soul as some incorporeal body alien to matter. But it is worthwhile to deduce this *soul* (if we retain this term) by means of experiments from matter, from the *brain*. In other words, the soul, or psyche, should be understood as a property of the brain, not as an object alien to it.

In the articles discussed, Dobrolyubov sets forth the views of anthropological materialism. According to Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky, man is a unified being in whose structure there is no room for dualism. The human body and spirit cannot be thought of separately, but the body is primary, it precedes the spirit. As a result of the development of matter, there were living organisms with a highly organized nervous system. The pinnacle of this development was the human brain, in which consciousness arose. This latter cannot detach itself from its material source, it originates and exists only as a function of the brain, and with the death of the latter it also dies. This view is set forth in the works of Dobrolyubov. The same view is further developed by Chernyshevsky. V.S. Nikonenko writes that “in the work ‘Anthropological Principle in Philosophy’ Chernyshevsky solves the question of the nature of man in an extremely broad form, namely as a question of the relationship between matter and consciousness, he specifically traces the

⁹⁵ Ibidem. P. 497.

⁹⁶ Ibidem. P. 494.

development of consciousness, the formation and manifestation of this property of highly organized matter”⁹⁷. Thus, not only do the views of the two thinkers coincide, but one continues the thought of the other, one complements the other.

Materialists are often reproached for simplifying the actual state of affairs. For example, anthropological materialism presents human nature in a simplified form, because it denies its duality. Man is as if dualistic, it contains two beginnings, the possibility of connection of which is understandable only to one god. But Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov, on the contrary, argue that the dualistic view is a simplification. In the views of anthropological materialists, the human body appears so highly organized that the kernel of the nervous system of this body gives rise to consciousness, a phenomenon so complex that man himself cannot quite explain it. And in fear of the unknown, dualists invented the soul, a special beginning by means of which everything that is not yet known in man can be easily explained. Materialistic monism openly admits that much it does not yet know.

The philosophy of Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov is based on anthropology, which is only the first link of their materialism. “Chernyshevsky's materialistic solution of the problem of the unity of human nature formed the basis for the development of sociology, the question of human needs and ways of satisfying them, etc.”⁹⁸ If we deny the premises, we are forced to deny their corollary. Without anthropological materialism at the core there would be no rest of the philosophy of Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov. Chernyshevsky's theory of art, his theory of rational egoism, his socialism and his belief in the future development of his peasant community are all only corollaries of the view that human consciousness is derived from the brain, and that there is no immortal soul and therefore no god.

⁹⁷ Nikonenko V.S. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Dobrolyubov. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1985. P. 88.

⁹⁸ Ibidem. P. 88.

1.2 P.L. Lavrov

We will consider Lavrov's theory of personality as he presents it in his work “Essays on Questions of Practical Philosophy”, which became the reason for writing “Anthropological Principle in Philosophy” by Chernyshevsky. He reviews Lavrov's work as a whole positively, but still finds in it some inconsistency, which does not suit Chernyshevsky, because it prevents him from constructing a holistic philosophical system. I.S. Knizhnik-Vetrov and A.F. Okulov write: “Believing that Lavrov's work ‘should be positively recognized as good’, Chernyshevsky at the same time drew attention to the fact that in it ‘there are thoughts that are hardly together’, and that this ‘gives, if we are not mistaken, the system of Mr. Lavrov the character of eclecticism’”⁹⁹. And further: “While exposing this weakness of Lavrov's position, however, Chernyshevsky emphasized with all certainty that his own ‘notions about the same subjects... are essentially similar to Mr. Lavrov's way of thinking; the difference will be mainly only in the presentation and methods of raising the question’”¹⁰⁰.

The techniques and the posing of the question are the method. The method determines the very character of the philosophical system. The history of philosophy has established the interpretation of Lavrov's views as positivism¹⁰¹. Accordingly, the “Essays” are of historical and philosophical interest not only as an episode of a private dispute between the thinkers and an occasion for writing the “Anthropological Principle”, but also as a way to compare and contrast positivism and materialism in the person of Lavrov and Chernyshevsky respectively. It is the proximity of Lavrov's and Chernyshevsky's views that helps to identify the key differences between the named philosophical trends.

⁹⁹ Knizhnik-Vetrov I.S., Okulov A.F. Veteran revoliutsionnoy teorii [Veteran of the revolutionary theory]. Selected works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. P. 9.

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem. P. 10.

¹⁰¹ Lossky N.O. Russian Positivists // Lossky N.O. History of Russian Philosophy. St. Petersburg, Azbuka-Attikus Publ., 2018. Pp. 91–97.

Lavrov considers it necessary to develop a theory of the individual, as this latter is the basis for understanding society. According to the author's idea, the work under consideration was only the first section, the starting point for the construction of a theory of society. Thus, Lavrov goes not from society to the individual, but from the individual to society. However, he does not take into account that society has its own qualitative definiteness and therefore can hardly be reduced to a set of individuals.

In addition, Lavrov considers partiality in the question of society to be fundamentally flawed, since, according to him, all schools and parties converge in the picture of an ideal society to which mankind must sooner or later come. This is one of the essential divergences between him and Chernyshevsky, since for the latter the principle of partisanship is necessary at least in order for there to be scientificity, i.e. adequate cognition of reality and, accordingly, of society and its ideal. Without partisanship, according to Chernyshevsky, truth cannot be achieved. However, let us return to Lavrov's theory of personality.

“Essays on Questions of Practical Philosophy” was conceived as the first part of a work on society, hence on politics. Political writings often begin with abstract ethical questions; Lavrov's unfinished work was no exception. Practical philosophy before Marx was understood as ethical philosophy; a trace of this tradition is also noticeable in the title of the Essays.

According to Chernyshevsky, in many respects his and Lavrov's views coincide. Developing the theory from the individual to social relations, they both expound the theory of rational egoism. This is not surprising, however, since they both considered Feuerbach their teacher and were indeed influenced by him.

The anthropological seed in their views is laid by the German philosopher, who for censorship reasons could not be named directly. Both of them, however, developed his anthropology. Both Lavrov and Chernyshevsky went beyond the general notion of man as such, man as a species. In “Essays” and “Anthropological Principle” we observe already an individual who exists in the society of other individuals and interacts with them.

Despite the general similarity of the philosophical views of both thinkers, their views still need to be distinguished. Chernyshevsky did not call Lavrov an eclectic, and Lavrov, in turn, with the significant differences in their views, considered these differences insignificant - this is also indicative.

Lavrov sees a need to build a theory of personality, as this, from his point of view, will help to get away from bias in political theory. Lavrov is trying to be above politics, and his positivism, and thus a certain amount of bias, is already evident in this. The fanatical pursuit of objectivity leads the researcher to unconscious subjectivity.

In addition, he reproaches political economists (probably Marx and others) for “sometimes forgetting that economic relations are not the only dispensations in society”¹⁰². Speaking in this vein, Lavrov puts economic relations on an equal footing with other “dispatches”. It should be recognized that this statement should be considered at least controversial for today. However, Lavrov does not dwell on it in detail. He needs this remark only to justify the importance of his theory of personality.

The author of “Essays” writes that “the necessary condition of any phenomenon existing for a person is consciousness”¹⁰³. Here we see phenomenism - one of the three features of positivism (Auguste-Comtism), which N.F. Utkina emphasizes¹⁰⁴. For Chernyshevsky, who recognizes the existence of matter without man, this phenomenism appears to be an understatement. It is true that man cognizes phenomena through consciousness, but this should be marked with a comma, not a dot. The above quotation from the standpoint of materialism will be true only if we assume that we narrow down the concept of “phenomenon”

¹⁰² Lavrov P.L. Essays on Issues of Practical Philosophy // Lavrov P.L. Philosophy and Sociology. Selected works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. P. 344.

¹⁰³ Ibidem. P. 356.

¹⁰⁴ Utkina N.F. Positivism, Anthropological Materialism and Science in Russia. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1975. 320 p. (In Russian)

to the phenomenon that is reflected in consciousness. Phenomena, i.e., manifestations of things, as such exist apart from man.

Further on in the text, Lavrov mentions in passing that human nature is unified. This is an explicitly materialist statement, which is incompatible with another feature of positivism - scientism¹⁰⁵. In essence, scientism is a skeptical view that recognizes the possibility of knowing phenomena but denies the possibility of knowing essence. A consistent scientist cannot pronounce on the unity of man. The question of the unity or dualism of the man, that is, of the non-existence or existence of the soul, is a metaphysical question. By allowing it to be settled, the phenomenalist Lavrov turns out to be half positivist, half materialist; in short, Lavrov turns out to be eclectic.

Lavrov claims that “the spiritual life of man begins with the phenomenon of *consciousness*”¹⁰⁶. He correlates the fact of consciousness of one's own self with the formation of personality, which takes place as early as in a child. In other words, a person becomes a person when he pays attention to himself. Further, various motivations develop in a person. Lavrov makes a reservation that these motivations do not arise, but they are always there, from the very first days of the existence of personality and society. However, the degree of their manifestation changes in the process of development.

“The desire to enjoy and to eliminate suffering is the initial urge”¹⁰⁷. In the beginning, human motivations are purely animal in nature. The activities of all biological beings known to us are directed toward the affirmation of pleasure and the negation of suffering. For example, a cat - like man - acts in a certain way to be fed, it strives not to be hungry; to stay in comfort, not in discomfort. Such are also the *natural* urges of man; asceticism in this instance should be recognized as an aberration.

¹⁰⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁶ Lavrov P.L. *Essays on Issues of Practical Philosophy* // Lavrov P.L. *Philosophy and Sociology. Selected works*. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. P. 358.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem. P. 359.

So, this urge, according to Lavrov, is “the initial psychological phenomenon following self-consciousness, the phenomenon from which a number of personal phenomena of human activity begins. This urge, from which the labor of knowledge and creativity begins, is the development of the human being as a worker”¹⁰⁸. In other words, hedonism is the starting point in the development of man and his personality. Bypassing hedonism, man could not become a person. After all, he experiences pleasure not only from the primitive urges that are available to the animal, but from those that, as we believe, are inherent only to man. Thus, Lavrov calls the aspirations “to usefulness, to justice, to truth, to orderliness, to activity in general”¹⁰⁹. In the context of hedonism it is not only about bodily pleasure and absence of suffering, but also about moral and intellectual pleasure. For example, it is pleasant to read an interesting book, although this kind of pleasure is in no way conditioned by purely positive physical pleasure.

The desire to receive the pleasant and avoid the unpleasant, according to Lavrov, leads to the development of human abilities, which he calls “knowledge” and “creativity.” These are the two original directions of human activity.

Lavrov reduces the essence of knowledge to cognition, “to the assimilation of reality as it is”¹¹⁰. The dialectical relationship between knowledge and creativity is already apparent here: knowledge takes a resource from the outside, while creativity will take it from within. Lavrov argues that knowledge has three sources: consciousness, the external world, and legends. Accordingly, these are knowledge of one's self, of nature, and of ancestral life. Let us note that at the ontological level this division of knowledge sources is redundant. We separate the knowledge of the internal, i.e. our Self, from the knowledge of the external for the reason that in the first case the cognizer and the cognized coincide, and in the second case they do not coincide. Thus, natural and written sources are essentially indistinguishable, if

¹⁰⁸ Ibidem. P. 359.

¹⁰⁹ Ibidem. P. 359.

¹¹⁰ Ibidem. P. 360.

we do not include the significance of the social factor, i.e. the difference of human sources from purely natural sources for the subject.

Having spoken about knowledge, Lavrov moves on to creativity. He sees the essence of creativity as compensation for the lack of knowledge. Thus, what is lacking in reality, a person invents. But it should be noted that the result of the work of creativity can be superstition, myth, religion, in short, any “theory”, but not a scientific theory. According to Lavrov, science belongs precisely to the sphere of knowledge. Whereas knowledge builds theory from facts, creativity works in opposite ways: “it creates theory where there are few facts”¹¹¹.

Lavrov divides creativity into theoretical and practical branches. Theoretical creativity has as its outcome “the creation of mythology and dogmatic systems”¹¹². And practical creativity “embraces all external human activity”¹¹³. Thus, creativity is the creation of what does not yet exist. In one case this activity is limited to the sphere of the spirit, and in the other case it is realized in the external world: “man creates crafts, social forms, pedagogical methods, worship”¹¹⁴. In this way, Lavrov sees the interconnection of practical and theoretical creativity in the fact that man builds society *in reality* and, in parallel, creates theories about how this society *should be*. This dialectic of oughtness in theory and realization in practice extends to the individuals that make up society.

Next, Lavrov again speaks of the unity of the individual. The mention of this unity earlier, as can be seen, was not an accidental slip of the tongue or an unfortunate phrase. Lavrov deliberately defends this position. “Man is an inseparable whole and his life is *united*”¹¹⁵. Here we are talking about the unity of human activity. Thus, theoretical and practical creativity can be separated in words, but in their manifestation they represent a unity. This is clearly seen in the

¹¹¹ Ibidem. P. 360.

¹¹² Ibidem. P. 361.

¹¹³ Ibidem. P. 361.

¹¹⁴ Ibidem. P. 361.

¹¹⁵ Ibidem. P. 361.

example of a wild man, since “he does not realize the difference between the fact of knowledge and the creation of fantasy”¹¹⁶.

Lavrov believed that man from the wild state comes to classify his activity in order to mix everything into one again afterwards, but no longer unconsciously and eclectically, but dialectically. “Coming out of the indifference in which the savage unconsciously mixes all aspects of activity, man decomposes them by thought, grouping them in order to later consciously combine all the forces of his spirit for life, every moment of which must be the highest unity of science, art, and useful activity”¹¹⁷. The general principle of the priority of reasonableness over unreasonableness and the orientation of this reasonableness towards life is quite clear. But scientificity suffers from the vagueness of the formulation. It remains unclear how the three kinds of knowledge and the two kinds of creativity are united in life. If Lavrov had adhered to the monistic principle, this would be self-evident, since in monism everything has one beginning. However, this principle is not observed in Lavrov's philosophy, and therefore “uniting the forces of the spirit to life” turns out to be either an unfortunate formulation, or the author hints in Aesopian language at the need for radical change in society by revolutionary means. In any case, it remains unclear how the dialectical synthesis of the named types of human activity proceeds.

Next, Lavrov writes about fatalism. By it he understands the philosophical doctrine according to which the human will is not free. Moreover, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky can be referred to such fatalists, with whom Lavrov does not agree. Lavrov's criticism is typical of a positivist - he criticizes fatalism for being metaphysical. This verdict follows from the fact that fatalists prove their position about the will by analogy: just as all other phenomena follow the law of causality, so must the will follow it. From this, Lavrov concludes that “fatalism cannot have a claim to an undeniable, scientific truth”¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Ibidem. P. 362.

¹¹⁷ Ibidem. P. 362.

¹¹⁸ Ibidem. P. 364.

For Lavrov it turns out to be unimportant whether there is freedom of will ontologically or not at all. At any rate, in the context of the theory of personality and practical philosophy, he sidesteps the resolution of this question. “We hope to convince the reader that it is possible to construct the laws of practical philosophy quite independently of the resolution of the dispute about the existence of free will in man”¹¹⁹.

Speaking of free will, Lavrov calls it “a fact of human consciousness. If free will does not exist, then, at any rate, Lavrov unreservedly acknowledges it as a fantastic idea, as a phenomenon which, if not connected with reality, is at least an idea worked out by man. “But the question is not whether it is a fact *for us*, but whether it is a fact of nature, a fact existing really, independently of our consciousness?”¹²⁰. In other words, the question boils down to whether free will is objective or subjective. Having decided to give an answer to this question, we will also have to solve the question of the existence of God. Freedom of the will in any case will have a subjective character *for us*, since every human being is involved in it. But at the same time whether it will have an objective character depends on the existence of god. It is god who gives free will an ontological status, since it is god who is its source. Without God, free will will remain a purely subjective-human creation, devoid of an objective-divine core. Lavrov, unlike Chernyshevsky, distances himself from this question, as he does not consider it scientific. In this respect, Lavrov sympathizes with Prudon: “He (Prudon - note A.C.) quite rightly eliminates from science the question of the existence of non-material beings, the essence of the soul, the origin of spiritual phenomena and turns, as he says, to the study of the phenomena themselves”¹²¹.

Next, Lavrov provides a number of extensive quotations from Prudon's writings, in which the French anarchist discusses free will. Lavrov finds an application of Prudon's views on a particular issue to his theory. Chernyshevsky

¹¹⁹ Ibidem. P. 364.

¹²⁰ Ibidem. P. 365.

¹²¹ Ibidem. P. 368.

would characterize this approach as eclectic, but this is what Lavrov sees as scholarly, that he borrows from different schools what he believes to be true, rather than following the thinkers of only one school. Lavrov concludes from Prudon's words that “the main element of free will in this theory... is the power of human creativity”¹²². In other words, Lavrov adapted Prudon to his own conception. Although he may be right in relating his views to those of another thinker, it is logical to question the appropriateness of such correlations.

Ultimately, Lavrov does reduce free will to subjectivity, hesitating to go further in his conclusions. Although, as we noted above, the subjectivity of free will is obvious and cannot be questioned, it is only objectivity that is at issue. Lavrov needs Prudon here to show his detachment from harsh and “metaphysical” conclusions. The Russian positivist writes: “Materialists do not reject creativity, because it is a fact, while Prudon himself says: if man consisted only of matter, he would not be free”¹²³. Indeed, materialists will not deny the Laurentian *creation*, since it is described by the author as a phenomenon of consciousness. And the materialist party will also accept Prudon's assertion: if there is only matter, there is no freedom (in the sense of arbitrariness); if there is a soul in addition to matter, there is freedom. The idealists will also agree with this. Thus, only what Lavrov is willing to allow regarding free will is the only thing that matters for his theory of personality.

Further Lavrov writes: “the actions of man, both for him and for the observer of the life of individuals and nations, are free phenomena, that is, such phenomena in which neither the actor nor the observer can trace the connection with other phenomena occurring around the actor.

The dependence between action and cause is the same everywhere; but the higher we go up the ladder of beings, the more the action differs from the cause, the more the similarity between them disappears, until finally in man there is such

¹²² Ibidem. P. 369.

¹²³ Ibidem. P. 370.

a difference between the cause and its action that to the undeveloped (roh) intellect it already seems that there is no cause at all, that the action of the will does not depend on anything, that it, therefore, has no basis, that it is *free*”¹²⁴.

In other words, man is so complex that without a special close examination of the causes and effects in his life it is impossible to trace these causes and effects clearly. Because of this complexity of his own structure, a man who makes no attempt to study causes and effects, that is, a man in an ordinary environment, is inclined to simplify complexity and diversity to one universal expression - to free will. This reduction of complex diversity to a universal unity is the result of the work of creativity, as Lavrov sets it out in the first pages of the Essays. Remarkably, the consistent application of this principle leads us to see that the very idea of free will is nothing more than the result of ignorance. Where we lack facts, we invent them. The connection of phenomena seemed incomprehensible to us, and we substituted the diversity of causes for free will. It seems obvious that Lavrov, based on his own theory, should have taken a materialist position on this issue, yet he firmly adheres to an agnostic position.

Lavrov writes that “free will and fatalism are two hypotheses which can both be posited (though not with equal probability), but neither can be proved”¹²⁵. In other words, the hypothesis of free will is idealism, and the hypothesis of fatalism, that is, the absence of free will, is materialism. Lavrov is correct in drawing a line between the two in the context of the will and thinks that he himself has remained outside these extremes, that he is in the realm of scientism. However, agnosticism is one of the extremes of cognition, which has been known since antiquity in the person of the skeptics.

“The only source of all moral and mental wealth of man is his consciousness. This is the initial fact of all science, all creativity, all practical activity”¹²⁶. From Lavrov's words it becomes clear that consciousness, whether it is

¹²⁴ Ibidem. P. 372.

¹²⁵ Ibidem. P. 372.

¹²⁶ Ibidem. P. 373.

connected with the soul, which God endowed man, or whether it is connected with the brain, which is the organ of consciousness, turns out to be the only thing that seems certain. We can, according to Lavrov, deduce the certainty of phenomena that consciousness cognizes as facts. This phenomenology is hardly close to Chernyshevsky's philosophy. However, as we shall see later, a consequence will be deduced from this foundation, which is fully consistent with Chernyshevsky's theory of rational egoism.

Lavrov stubbornly emphasizes the difference between his views and "metaphysics." He asserts that a person can positively know only what is in consciousness, and what cannot be in consciousness, a person seeks to know metaphysically. According to Lavrov, the metaphysician speculatively puts himself in the place of another being who can cognize things that are unknowable for man. Describing the matter in this way, Lavrov equates both idealism and materialism with religion, since the "being" is nothing other than God.

Lavrov writes that "*for himself and for society*, man is free in his consciousness, and in the name of this freedom he is responsible *to himself and to society*." ¹²⁷Such freedom, according to Lavrov, apparently exists in a person even within the framework of fatalism. This position is consistent with the fact that earlier freedom was questioned or completely denied. This can be explained by the fact that Lavrov recognizes freedom at one level, and on the other, he denies it; and also seeks to highlight different views on the subject. In addition, Lavrov further writes: "The consciousness of freedom is a fact of science, namely psychology, and does not depend at all on the metaphysical task: is this freedom real, or is it only a phantom?"¹²⁸. Lavrov further proves the insignificance of the topic of free will for ethical science. For example, he points out that if the fatalistic view is true, it will turn out that in the absence of the divine (free will) in man, man is still engaged in the development of ethical doctrines. In other words, even the

¹²⁷ Ibidem. P. 375.

¹²⁸ Ibidem. P. 375.

extreme degree of one pole does not negate the property that we tend to attribute to the other pole. Human beings are moral even without a god, since such a “godless” person invented god in order to be moral.

Lavrov calls the feeling or assumption of human freedom a “fact of consciousness.” Lavrov looks for in this feeling of freedom the basis for man's responsibility for his actions. If man is conscious of himself as free, he recognizes himself as responsible at the same time. Lavrov writes that the denial of the objectivity of free will does not take away its subjective essence, and this is already sufficient for the existence of human responsibility for his thoughts, decisions and actions.

Earlier Lavrov spoke about the first striving - the striving for pleasure; he spoke about knowledge and creativity, which help man to achieve pleasure. As a result of the workings of these phenomena of consciousness, man becomes aware of his Self. Further, Lavrov writes that “fantasy creates before man outside his actual self another, ideal self, which remains *relatively* constant... This ideal self is man's personal *dignity*”¹²⁹.

In this formulation, we are not talking about a deity who is a standard, a model of what is right and proper. Although in a religious worldview, the dignity of a person can be identical with a deity. Lavrov is a positivist, not an idealist, so the phenomenon of the individual's consciousness, understood as something extra-divine, turns out to be a virtue.

Further, Lavrov writes that dignity requires a person to perform activities to achieve this very dignity. As long as dignity remains an ideal, it has the character of an ought, that is, it demands to be what a person is not. Here the moral ideal and morality are born. It should be noted that it is no accident that religious patterns of behavior appear as sources of morality; The difference between these patterns in materialism and idealism lies in the fact that the former, as a rule, recognizes them

¹²⁹ Ibidem. P. 377.

as phenomena of consciousness, while the latter endows them with objective and absolute meaning, placing them outside man.

Lavrov argues that "dignity requires *respect*; ... ¹³⁰. Thus, dignity is social. Respect requires another person. From Lavrov's point of view, the freedom of the individual person is important for the realization of the ideal of one's dignity in words and actions. However, it remains unclear what is meant by freedom. It is probably a question of relative freedom, which is necessary for the pursuit of the ideal of dignity. If we were to speak of freedom as such, it would already be "metaphysics".

Based on the demands of the individual from himself and from others, Lavrov concludes that "respect for oneself and the necessity of self-development are placed at the head of moral teaching"¹³¹. Further, "physical strength, mental strength, strength of character... ¹³² In other words, Lavrov's conclusions are largely materialistic. He associates morality with man himself, and not with God; and everything that in idealism would be recognized as rather transitory and insignificant, Lavrov ascribes to human dignity as the source of morality.

The author writes that "the more developed a person is, the higher the significance of the pleasures of thought are for him."¹³³ At the same time, he recognizes that "neglecting the qualities of the physique is a one-sided, detrimental fascination for man"¹³⁴. These thoughts are similar to the ideas of Dobrolyubov, which he expounds in the article "The Organic Development of Man in Connection with His Mental and Moral Activity."¹³⁵

¹³⁰ Ibidem. P. 378.

¹³¹ Ibidem. P. 378.

¹³² Ibidem. P. 379.

¹³³ Ibidem. P. 384.

¹³⁴ Ibidem. P. 384.

¹³⁵ Dobrolyubov N.A. Organic development of a person in connection with his mental and moral activity // Dobrolyubov N.A. Selected philosophical works. In 2. vol. Vol. 1. Leningrad: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. Pp. 228–262.

But Lavrov goes on to write that the body and mind are only the possibility of pleasure. At the same time, "for real dignity one must *make up one's mind*, and determination does not belong to the body with its motives, nor to the mind with its thinking, but to the will that develops into character."¹³⁶ Significantly, the body and mind are understood by Lavrov not as matter and soul, but precisely as purely anthropological phenomena. In a note to the previous quotation, Lavrov writes: "Materialists will say: mind and character are the body. You promised to eliminate metaphysical questions, and you assume them solved. Not at all. All metaphysicians in the world should agree in the fact of different phenomena in man. The phenomena of feeling are distinct from the phenomena of feeling, the phenomena of thought, the phenomena of will. This in all psychology is indisputable. Whether one or more sources exist for these phenomena is not for us to know. For brevity we call these phenomena simply body, mind, will"¹³⁷. Lavrov asserts that various phenomena take place in man. In these formulations, it is important that "phenomena" are certain manifestations that can be studied by a scientist; the sources of these phenomena remain, according to Lavrov, outside the sphere of interest of science. Accordingly, Lavrov is not interested in the number of such sources. On the one hand, he asserts the unity of human nature, Since a number of phenomena that we notice in a person reduce to a person. On the other hand, Lavrov talks about the possibility of the existence of several sources of these phenomena. But if the source of the will turns out to be God, then this will call into question the unity of man. Such agnosticism leads to the fact that many provisions of the work under consideration are extremely debatable.

Leaving this "metaphysical" question without a consistent solution, Lavrov leads his argument to move from pure anthropology and ethics to sociology. The

¹³⁶ Lavrov P.L. *Essays on Issues of Practical Philosophy* // Lavrov P.L. *Philosophy and Sociology. Selected works*. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. P. 384.

¹³⁷ *Ibidem*. P. 384.

dignity of a person is formed as a result of his interaction "with the outside world and with other persons."¹³⁸

According to Lavrov, in the pursuit of pleasure, a person's personality "expands." It moves from awareness only of oneself to awareness of the surrounding world as one's own, a part of oneself. "The natural expansion of the personality... led her to the desire to subordinate everything around her to her arbitrariness."¹³⁹ In this wish Lavrov sees the beginning of property. "If given the opportunity, the individual would declare the whole world his property and all people his slaves"¹⁴⁰. Thus, the ambitions of the egoistic person do not have any internal limitations at first.

If in relation to himself a person experiences selfishness, sometimes turning into worship of his own dignity, then in relation to external objects he experiences other feelings. Lavrov singles out mercy among them. However, not every object or creature is worthy of a merciful attitude. "Man... makes a choice between the beings around him, and his preference usually falls on those beings whose lives he understands or knows better. A person is completely indifferent to a stone; Accordingly¹⁴¹, a person shows mercy to the creatures closest to him. There are cases when a person treats a domestic animal with warmth, with which he feels a connection and even notices similarities in the perception of the external environment. As a result, he does not accept cruelty to this animal either from others or from himself. However, "the closest to him is still a person, who speaks, feels, and thinks like himself."¹⁴²

Thus a man is inclined to be most merciful to another man, though in some cases, when he does not see in another human person a sufficient resemblance to

¹³⁸ Ibidem. P. 388.

¹³⁹ Ibidem. P. 388.

¹⁴⁰ Ibidem. P. 388.

¹⁴¹ Ibidem. P. 390.

¹⁴² Ibidem. P. 390.

himself, he may even be cruel to it. Such cases are also known, the most indicative today are various episodes of World War II.

If we discard cases of aberration, then we must admit, following Lavrov, that "the nervous state is reflected in the soul by a feeling of disgust at someone else's suffering, and in the best natures by a feeling of regret. These natures bring a feeling of pity for those who suffer into the concept of one's own dignity¹⁴³." In other words, human dignity is associated with the rejection of the sufferings of others. The more developed a person is, the more he is able to mentally transfer another's suffering to his own personality.

It is remarkable that the act of mercy, according to Lavrov, is shown by a person who puts himself higher than the one to whom he is merciful. One cannot be merciful to one's own equal. Thus, mercy humiliates the one to whom it is directed. At the same time, the one to whom we show mercy, if he does not accept it, will be evil in our eyes. Lavrov sees here a contradiction, because the dignity of man consists in the expansion of his own personality, and the acceptance of mercy is not the recognition of the expansion of his personality, but only the endowment of the merciful lord with virtue. By showing mercy, the personality is made better itself, but it does not make other personalities better. "Hence, the purpose of my action is contrary to its beginning."¹⁴⁴

Lavrov is forced to admit that "the theory of mercy, as unconditional, is inapplicable in relation to people."¹⁴⁵ Mercy humiliates the one at whom it is directed, and therefore takes for granted that some people are worse than others. Because of this, the merciful person himself is humiliated, since it is asserted in the opinion that he is better than others. Lavrov defines mercy as "the modification of egoism, which does not allow worthy personalities outside itself."¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ Ibidem. P. 391.

¹⁴⁴ Ibidem. Pp. 392–393.

¹⁴⁵ Ibidem. P. 394.

¹⁴⁶ Ibidem. P. 394.

Lavrov also argues that mercy ceases to be contradictory when it becomes an ethos of religion, since it finds its origin outside the merciful person. However, from a materialist point of view, this doesn't change the essence of the matter. Feuerbach wrote that the essence of religion lies in man¹⁴⁷. Accordingly, if we say that by giving a thing or phenomenon a religious character, we can thereby deprive this thing or this phenomenon of human nature, then we are setting forth a religious position. God, according to Feuerbach, is the image of the ideal man; translating into Lavrov's terminology, God is dignity. Thus, religion cannot rid mercy of evil, it can only distance man from this ideal of dignity.

Here Lavrov asserts that mercy as an ideal of justice also gets rid of its contradictions and, consequently, of evil. But in the same paragraph the author refutes himself: "Whoever is merciful, because he finds mercy in this case the most just motive, bows down before the ideal of justice, and not mercy."¹⁴⁸

Lavrov goes on to talk about fear and selflessness. When a person sees a force in front of him, an "insurmountable obstacle", according to Lavrov, he has two ways: 1) to hope for mercy or to subdue this force in a peculiar way; For example, when making sacrifices to the gods, 2) to look at the situation in such a way that the refusal to fight does not humiliate the dignity of the person. Lavrov argues that the first path does not lead to development, and the second ends either with the death or triumph of the individual.

Further, the author offers definitions of fear and selflessness. "Fear presupposes the impossibility of struggle and is replaced by struggle in the most varied forms, as soon as the mind admits that it is possible."¹⁴⁹ Judging by the presentation of the material, those two ways refer to fear, which turns out to be unproductive for the personality. In contrast, self-denial contributes to the

¹⁴⁷ Feuerbach L. *The Essence of Christianity* // Feuerbach L. *Selected Philosophical Works*. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1955. Pp. 7–405.

¹⁴⁸ Lavrov P.L. *Essays on Issues of Practical Philosophy* // Lavrov P.L. *Philosophy and Sociology. Selected works*. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. P. 394.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibidem*. P. 395.

development of the human personality. Lavrov defines self-denial as “the beginning, submitting it to another, real or imaginary, personality and submitting voluntarily, so that the dignity of the former in its own eyes remains inviolable”¹⁵⁰.

Lavrov asserts that self-denial is almost identical with love. Without going into details, let us agree that love is a feeling, in the highest development of which a person reaches self-denial. The author writes that "everyone loves to the extent that his nature is developed, and as his nature develops and deteriorates, his ability to love develops or deteriorates."¹⁵¹ In other words, by a person's ability to love, we can judge the degree of development of his personality.

Lavrov draws a line between selflessness and sacrificing something that may seem significant from the outside, but is not a dignity for a particular person. When people sacrifice one thing to another and at the same time set themselves the goal of preserving their own dignity, "they act selfishly, everyone sacrifices to their own dignity what is valued below him"¹⁵². What appears to be selflessness is sometimes not. A mother who sleepless nights caring for her sick child may be motivated by selfish motives, if at ordinary times she is like Vera Pavlovna's mother in *What Is to Be Done?* Lavrov writes that “a very fine line separates here the self-absorbed defense of personal pleasure from the suddenly awakened impulse of self-denial”¹⁵³.

True self-denial is similar to forgetting. If in the formation of personality we reveal ourselves (self-consciousness), then in the act of self-denial we seem to forget about it and mentally transfer ourselves to the object or being for the sake of which we reject ourselves. "We make it our highest dignity to realize that our Self *must* forget itself before this higher being. This is self-denial."¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁰ Ibidem. P. 395.

¹⁵¹ Ibidem. P. 396.

¹⁵² Ibidem. P. 397.

¹⁵³ Ibidem. P. 398.

¹⁵⁴ Ibidem. P. 398.

Lavrov writes that "at first, someone else's being is dear to us as a complement to our well-being, our dignity; We are willing to make sacrifices to preserve it because *we* need it. Through the creative process of idealization, we recognize that we need only that which has an intrinsic dignity¹⁵⁵." Initially we care for a being for the reason that we expect it to be of some benefit to us, and later we begin to value that being as such, regardless of ourselves. In other words, self-denial is feasible for the sake of that being which is the goal, not for the sake of that being which appears to be a means to some other end. The more we value a being, the more inclined we are to self-denial for its sake.

Once we begin to value another being above ourselves, creation, according to Lavrov, creates an ideal of self-denial. The act of self-denial does not humiliate us, but rather elevates us. "Self-humiliation, self-denigration becomes a virtue, a duty, a merit"¹⁵⁶.

According to Lavrov, "any strong attachment in the best personalities leads to self-denial."¹⁵⁷ As a consequence, such individuals find their pleasure in sacrificing a portion of their ordinary pleasures for the pleasures of a loved one. Lavrov asserts that this becomes possible as a result of the subordination of one's own self to another self, since in this other self one's own self is still present "with the help of idealization."

Although Lavrov has not yet had time to talk about justice here, he still hastens to note that the rule "do unto others as you want them to do unto you" is by nature self-denial, not justice. In this, he probably sees the weakness of this formulation, since it claims justice as such, but on the way to this universal justice does not take into account the rejection of the individual himself.

The author further notes that selflessness takes place not only in private relations between individuals, but also at the religious level. From his point of view, man is selfless not only in relation to God, but also in relation to man who is

¹⁵⁵ Ibidem. P. 398.

¹⁵⁶ Ibidem. P. 399.

¹⁵⁷ Ibidem. P. 399.

"sanctified by religion." "Holy, divinely inspired people, persons sanctified by a rite that separates them from the masses, become for the believer the *highest, most worthy* personalities, regardless of their human qualities or shortcomings, in the name of their religious sanctification¹⁵⁸." Belief in God causes the believer to place himself below such people, so that self-denial is a natural consequence. The religious pecking order dictates to man whom he should value higher than himself.

Lavrov goes on to reproach his predecessors for the fact that "every writer holds back between the lines something *that is self-evident* to him"¹⁵⁹. Because of this, the word of the ethicist becomes easy to interpret in any way. And further, Lavrov criticizes Proudhon and his ethics for substituting justice for self-sacrifice, and not understanding justice itself. which he himself will speak of below.

In his discussion of Proudhon, Lavrov derives the formula: "One's own dignity *is implied* to be preserved when we defend the dignity of another."¹⁶⁰ Thus, the ideal of self-denial protects the dignity of a self-sacrificing person, because it is in his renunciation of himself for the sake of another that his own dignity consists.

Lavrov believes that self-sacrifice is associated either with the ideal of religiosity or with the ideal of justice. The field of religion does not interest him, unlike the topic of justice. This topic already suggests itself, especially since Lavrov has outlined a clash of two equal personalities, and such a situation can no longer be resolved by mercy, fear, or even selflessness.

Discussing the clash of equal personalities, Lavrov writes that most people think egoistically and, based on the situation, choose a strategy of action: either to establish their tyranny, if they have enough strength to do so, or to grovel in order to get as many benefits as possible, while the strength is not enough to establish their tyranny. These individuals "sacrifice everything that constitutes human

¹⁵⁸ Ibidem. P. 404.

¹⁵⁹ Ibidem. P. 405.

¹⁶⁰ Ibidem. P. 407.

dignity, chasing the dream of an uncertain future, when the day of tyranny over others will come for them."¹⁶¹

Lavrov argues that people rarely act prudently, but very often, under the influence of passion, unreasonably. In this regard, it is not possible to create a society whose order would be based solely on the prudence of its members. The harmony of such a society would be constantly disturbed. Lavrov believes that to curb passion man needs a feeling, which by nature is similar to passion.

Such a feeling arises in man as a result of the work of creativity. The collision of equivalent personalities with each other generates the need for mutual concessions, but this is contrary to the egoistic aspirations of each individual. A contradiction arises, and by the power of creativity man strives to resolve it. This is how justice appears.

If earlier there was a representation of equal individuals, now there is “a representation of *equal* persons. He (man - A.C.'s note) realizes the relations of *justice* between individuals”¹⁶².

At this stage, a person discovers dignity not only in his own personality, but also in another. Thus, a person recognizes another person as equal to himself, because he also respects his dignity, and the fact of this respect is known to him. If someone insults the dignity of someone whom he has recognized as his equal, he finds in this an insult to his own dignity as well. Lavrov expresses this with the formula: "I must be insulted by the insult of the dignity of my equal, just as any person equal to me must be insulted by the insult of my dignity."¹⁶³

As it seems to us, Lavrov presents the possible states of personality in the form of a dialectical triad. If a person recognizes his dignity, but does not recognize someone else's, then he is an egoist. If a person recognizes someone else's, but not his own, then he is selfless. We see two *moments* in this. Justice is

¹⁶¹ Ibidem. P. 409.

¹⁶² Ibidem. P. 414.

¹⁶³ Ibidem. P. 414.

born from their synthesis, because a person is just precisely when he respects his own dignity, and someone else's.

Lavrov argues that when justice is achieved, a person expands the limits of his dignity. In relation to equal persons, a just person demands from himself and from others not mercy, not self-denial, but justice. This is logical, since both mercy and self-denial correspond to those moments that precede justice.

Lavrov writes that the ideal of personality now includes not only a developed body, thought and character, but also justice. A person can and should be just in the name of his own dignity. But, as the author writes, a person cannot be only partially just. A person is either just or not just at all. Justice cannot have degrees.

Lavrov emphasizes that "justice is the most natural fruit of egoism, put in conflict with other egoisms and reconciled to its position by the power of its creativity."¹⁶⁴ In other words, justice is not the antipode of egoism. On the contrary, justice is a developed form of egoism. After all, equal persons become equal by the power of creation, not by divine providentiality or man's inner goodness, but by necessity. Man strives to make the world the most suitable for himself, hence he also strives to perfect social relations. Equality is replaced by equity for the reason that it is the most practical and *reasonable*. Equity is a reasonable form of egoism, that is, reasonable egoism.

Lavrov further notes that the beginning of justice "is inseparable from human nature, although it is constantly violated in practice"¹⁶⁵. In other words, there is a certain gap between theory and practice. In theory, a person knows justice, but this does not guarantee that he will be able to apply this principle in practice. Putting ideas into practice is often problematic.

Lavrov argues that all people carry the concept of justice, but most of them have not developed an understanding of how to apply it in practice, in specific

¹⁶⁴ Ibidem. P. 418.

¹⁶⁵ Ibidem. P. 418.

situations. Thus, he gives an example in which an undeveloped person sees theft as an injustice only when it harms this person, but if theft enriches this person materially, then theft is recognized as justice. For a more developed personality, stealing under any conditions will be unfair, since such a person will be able to present himself both as a thief and as the one from whom the theft is stolen. However, it is worth asking whether "stealing" from a thief will be truly fair.

Speaking about the psychological process of justice, Lavrov singles out four points of its development: "1) the consciousness that the other person is equal to us; 2) an analysis in our soul of what constitutes its dignity; 3) simultaneous recognition of the right of our own person and someone else's to our respect; 4) the determination to demand from oneself and from other people actions consistent with this mutual respect."¹⁶⁶ Moreover, he defines the third point as the most essential, since, according to Lavrov, it expresses the very essence of justice. Violation of this point is tantamount to injustice. The first point depends on our development and environment, the second on the ability to analyze, and the fourth on willpower. Personality development and analysis precede the emergence of justice, and the volitional effort to observe justice turns out to be a subsequent process.

However, the very concept of justice is immanent in man. "*Everyone is equally aware that everyone should be treated according to his dignity.*"¹⁶⁷ Justice consists precisely in this correlation of dignity and deeds with the dignity of the person in question.

Lavrov further argues that justice, originally inherent in man, is subject to all sorts of distortions. Here it is appropriate to recall a person who sees stealing as good or evil depending on whether he himself is a thief or is stolen from. This is a typical example of distortion of justice, because this person perceives dignity in himself, but does not notice it in another; such a person lacks character. "The

¹⁶⁶ Ibidem. P. 419.

¹⁶⁷ Ibidem. P. 420.

beginning of justice *reward each one according to his dignity*...is perverted in its application by a lack of character. Man is always just”¹⁶⁸.

With the development of the egoistic personality, justice becomes more and more clear and understandable when applied to practice, although initially, as we understand, justice merged with the tyrannical urge of the individual to subjugate the whole world. As the character improves, "justice passes more and more from consciousness to action."¹⁶⁹ Lavrov further writes that the development of egoistic qualities, and he includes intelligence and character among them, forms the very possibility of justice. When the egoistic person realizes that the struggle with equal personalities is harmful to him, he comes to the conclusion that compromise is beneficial. In this way, the equal power becomes equal, and the desire for tyranny is transformed into the realization of justice. However, the desire for justice in a tyrannical tendency is also possible if the person has a sufficiently developed mind and character. If the latter are not sufficiently developed in the personality, then he may not distinguish between the just and the unjust in an action or situation.

In the mind and character, Lavrov sees great importance for the formation of a developed egoistic personality. The author equates the development of mind and character with the education of "a person to the correct performance of the process of just thought and just action."¹⁷⁰ Strengthening character in the educational context refers us to Dobrolyubov's anthropology and his article "The Organic Development of Man in Relation to His Mental and Moral Activity"¹⁷¹. For the performance of just actions, even in spite of certain circumstances, not only the mind is important, but also the character.

¹⁶⁸ Ibidem. Pp. 421–422.

¹⁶⁹ Ibidem. P. 422.

¹⁷⁰ Ibidem. P. 422.

¹⁷¹ Dobrolyubov N.A. Organic development of a person in connection with his mental and moral activity // Dobrolyubov N.A. Selected philosophical works. In 2. vol. Vol. 1. Leningrad: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. Pp. 228–262.

At this stage, law turns out to be synonymous with necessity. In the unwritten sequel to the Essays, Lavrov wanted to show how a person already in society reduces law to some form of social permission and restriction, be it law, custom, or even public opinion.¹⁷²

The author gradually transfers abstract ethical questions into the sphere of social problems. Historical prejudices, Lavrov writes, still exist in modern times. It should be noted that this statement remains relevant even more than a century and a half after the writing of the "Essays". Prejudices "still inseparably link the dignity of man with an innumerable number of accidents"¹⁷³. Thus, we can recall patriarchal prejudices, which, within the framework of the current ideology and socio-economic formation, not only do not outlive themselves, but even become increasingly entrenched in society.

In addition to the previously mentioned conditions of justice, Lavrov also names consciousness and will. Note that it is strange to talk about consciousness here, since it is self-evident in man. As for the will, we can relate it to character, because Lavrov himself said earlier that the will, developing, is transformed into character. Probably, the author meant that consciousness and will are the first causes of justice, because it is from them that mind and character develop.

Lavrov writes that "all public virtues are based on justice, just as all personal virtues are based on self-respect". The virtues named, as well as justice and self-respect, are founded on dignity, that is, on a properly understood respect for one's dignity. Lavrov puts the personal before the social. If to present the described triad schematically, it will turn out approximately as follows:

- 1) initially there is dignity, from which self-respect follows;
- 2) from self-respect follows justice and personal virtues;
- 3) from justice follows social virtue.

¹⁷² Lavrov P.L. Essays on Issues of Practical Philosophy // Lavrov P.L. Philosophy and Sociology. Selected works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. P. 423.

¹⁷³ Ibidem. P. 423.

In other words, *from dignity* as an egoistic concept, *public virtue* gradually *develops* as a concept that is obviously social.

Because of this social character, justice from a separate group of equals extended also to the unequals, to the weaker. Thus mercy was transformed into justice. Although in practice even now justice towards the “weak” is distorted and therefore has the features of mercy.

On the basis of his statement about the transition of mercy into justice, Lavrov derives the rule: “Inferior personalities, but available for development, should be brought to the highest possible development of their dignity”¹⁷⁴. Thus, children and disabled people should receive help from society in development, treatment, etc., not because they are worse than equal personalities who strive to be merciful, but because dignity is recognized for every member of society. If a representative of society cannot do this or does not possess what corresponds to him by virtue of his dignity, then society should help such a person. This will be the realization of justice as a social virtue. “In the name of justice, the child receives education, the insane receives benefits.”¹⁷⁵

Lavrov sees the next step in extending the principle of justice to other creatures. But, as he observes, man cannot in his imagination take the place of a being who is not a man, and this is one of the conditions of justice. And the restrictions that society has put forward regarding the interaction of humans with animals are only the fruit of mercy.

Then Lavrov proceeds to discuss the opposition of man and animal in the spirit of dialectical triads. According to the author, man was once in an animal state, and the undeveloped egoistic personality did not see an essential difference between any animal and another person. This is the thesis. Further, man has set himself against the whole world. This is the antithesis. But the synthesis did not

¹⁷⁴ Ibidem. P. 424.

¹⁷⁵ Ibidem. P. 425.

happen. And what it could lead to, Lavrov does not dare to say, although he suggests that it could deprive a person of his newfound dignity.

But here it should be said that modern man, thanks to the popularization of natural sciences, is already thinking about his insignificance in the face of the Universe, and consequently about the removal of the distinction between man and animal. However, such a view does not negate the fact that man is man. The thought of the unity of man with the whole world does not deprive man of his essence, man remains man, and consequently preserves his dignity. And within the framework of dialectics, this is true, because the removal should not nullify the second moment, the antithesis.

Lavrov writes that "materialists have expressed the hypothesis of the indifference of man and animal in essence."¹⁷⁶ However, the essence of man, as a more developed being, cannot be identical to the essence of an animal. This is proved at least by the facts of the existence of society, the formation of states, the evolution of science, and even by the fact that the author of this work writes these lines instead of foraging for food for sustenance somewhere in the wilderness.

Lavrov himself remains again away from the solution of this "metaphysical" question and turns to the problem of the correlation between justice and property. He claims that "in the complete absence of one of the four conditions of justice, a person cannot even think of solving the question of property on the basis of the beginning of justice"¹⁷⁷.

And since these conditions are not enough in this context, the principle of justice, from Lavrov's point of view, is not applicable to property. In this case, it would be logical to conclude that since property cannot exist within the framework of justice, it must be destroyed.

¹⁷⁶ Ibidem. P. 427.

¹⁷⁷ Ibidem. P. 428.

Lavrov writes that in the event of a conflict between two people, the issue must be resolved in accordance with justice. But if we are talking about a claim to a thing, then justice is powerless.¹⁷⁸

It is noteworthy that the right of the strong is an individual way of decision, and coercion and decision are social. But if society is composed of individuals, and this society decides on questions of property, then all possible solutions to this question are reduced to force, even if they appear in a different form. The only difference is whether we are talking about a lone wolf or a coalition of the strong.

In the course of his criticism of Jules Simon and his Liberty, Lavrov points to the "metaphysical" nature of his reasoning about property. Metaphysicality lies in the dualism of soul and body, which creeps into the discourse on property, and the soul is considered by Simon as the lord of the body. For Simon, the body and the person itself are also the property of a person. Lavrov does not share this view.

"Seizure, the first manifestation of property, is an egoistic action, and the concept of justice, of law, does not enter into it at all."¹⁷⁹ In other words, two branches develop from egoism: one is justice, the other is property. The only thing they have in common is the starting point. Having one nature, one substance, they turn out to be essentially dissimilar. Neither questions of property can be solved by justice, nor *questions of justice can be solved by property*.

"In all cases of property is the mere development of an egoistic personality, which outside itself recognizes no dignity in anything that it can subordinate to itself"¹⁸⁰. Consequently, the essence of property and the essence of tyranny coincide. The tyrant seeks to subjugate the whole world to the limits for which he has enough strength. The egoistic person, claiming possession of things, makes them his property until the moment when he runs out of strength. In both cases, the personality in its egoistic impulse rests only on possibility; Dignity and justice do not play a role here.

¹⁷⁸ Ibidem. P. 430.

¹⁷⁹ Ibidem. P. 433.

¹⁸⁰ Ibidem. P. 434.

From Lavrov's point of view, the body is not property, since there is no question of owning it. But a person is not able to get away from the body. And here Lavrov again reproaches dualism for metaphysics, citing the philosophy of Hegel as an example.

Further, Lavrov emphasizes that egoistic assimilation, that is, the appropriation of things as property, is a necessity for man. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine the development of mankind without property. After all, the latter is the starting point for the formation of the state. And even today the whole foundation of human society consists of the property of certain classes.

In a number of his arguments about the individual, Lavrov reveals himself as an agnostic, sometimes sympathetic to the materialist view. In his conversation about society and especially about property, he is more and more inclined towards materialism. Although the author adheres to a positivist canvas on the whole, his philosophy still has traces of materialism. Thus, Lavrov writes the following lines about Proudhon: "Not belonging to any banner, he sees all the shortcomings of the combatants and strikes them mercilessly."¹⁸¹

From Lavrov's point of view, it turns out that, firstly, Proudhon is above what he writes about, and secondly, this gives him an advantage over all those who consider themselves to belong to any party. Further, Lavrov sees his merit in the fact that he was able to find confirmation of his position in the writings of representatives of various parties: "For us, what we have found in three writers is enough, belonging to completely different schools, confirm our idea and therefore consider it proven..."¹⁸²

Further, Lavrov alludes to the primacy of the ethical and the derivativeness of the political: "Everywhere evil has arisen from the inability to limit the development of the egoistic beginning to justice in a field where, in fact, one could not speak of justice at all"¹⁸³. Again and again, Lavrov emphasizes the

¹⁸¹ Ibidem. P. 441.

¹⁸² Ibidem. P. 445.

¹⁸³ Ibidem. P. 446.

incomparability of property and justice, although it is obvious that for ethics justice is higher than property. When choosing between the two, it is necessary to choose justice, and to renounce property. At the end of the chapter, the author says that property rights are the main controversial issue.

Lavrov episodically turns out to be a dialectician. Seeing a contradiction in the striving of an egoistic person for tyranny and justice, he refers to the power of creativity and removes this contradiction. Probably, E.V. Ilyenkov would have noted that formal logic would force the researcher to go back a few steps in search of error¹⁸⁴. But Lavrov stepped forward – from formal logic to dialectical logic, thanks to which, instead of searching for errors, he saw the removal that takes place in the moral sphere. Lavrov's vacillation between positivism and materialism reveals the difference between these two schools.

"The concept that allowed a person to subordinate others to himself, remaining fair both to himself and to others, ... consists in the sense of *honor*"¹⁸⁵. Lavrov distinguishes two stages of the sense of honor: 1) the desire to distinguish oneself from others and 2) the desire to be valued at face value. The first stage is closely connected with the emergence of self-consciousness. The individual begins to realize that she is herself, and the rest of the world, accordingly, is something different from her. The second stage consists in this distinction between the self and the external world, since it is this distinction that makes honor possible. Lavrov observes that "people of weak character and therefore incapable of finding in themselves a solid basis for the evaluation of their dignity"¹⁸⁶ may be ready to sacrifice for the sake of obtaining the desired assessment from others. Therefore, people of strong character find such a foundation in themselves, and therefore will not make sacrifices for the sake of recognition.

¹⁸⁴ Ilyenkov E.V. *Dialectical Logic* // Ilyenkov E.V. *Collected Works*. Vol. 4. Moscow, Kanon+ Publ., 2020. Pp. 222–449.

¹⁸⁵ Lavrov P.L. *Essays on Issues of Practical Philosophy* // Lavrov P.L. *Philosophy and Sociology*. Selected works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. P. 447.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibidem*. P. 448.

One way or another, if a highly moral person sees the salvation of his dignity in risking or sacrificing his life, then he will go for it. Lavrov sees some imperfection in this. Thus, he notes that the concept of human dignity can change, as a result of which it is possible to improve both the individual and the whole society.

Lavrov believes that a person who has become an object of vilification or a victim of violence retains his dignity. At the same time, the detractor or rapist equates his dignity with the dignity of an animal. Although this view often does not correspond to the opinion of modern society, it should be recognized as correct. It is difficult to imagine that most of today's society will accept such an idea; This is the view of the future society.

But, as Lavrov notes, if a person "values the opinion of an undeveloped society", ¹⁸⁷ then he replaces the concept of honor, and no longer wants to deserve it. Such a person "strives not for *honor*, but for *honor*."¹⁸⁸ It is noteworthy that intellectual development plays an important role in the formation of an adequate understanding of honor from the author's point of view. Accordingly, true honor is the destiny of an intelligent person, while the shallow will be satisfied with honors. The path of honor leads to the lowering of dignity and even the man himself to the level of things. Lavrov equated this path with vanity.

Among the manifestations of vanity he sees belonging to certain groups and associations. And the level of vanity can vary from an acceptable degree (e.g., patriotism) to associations that are clearly devoid of honor. Thus, if a person does not see dignity in himself, he tries to gain honor by belonging to an association or to a master.

However, content with the person who sees dignity in himself, he becomes morally independent. A truly just person does not need to be honored; by the

¹⁸⁷ Ibidem. P. 450.

¹⁸⁸ Ibidem. P. 451.

power of his mind he himself proves to be a sufficient basis (not in the logical sense) for a sense of honor.

Lavrov further writes that “the true dignity of our self lies not in itself, but in the trace that our self leaves behind it in life”¹⁸⁹. Thus, we can say that the dignity of Dobrolyubov, Lavrov and Chernyshevsky has been quite strongly engraved in life, since a century and a half later we study their works, their trace.

Lavrov notes that a developed egoistic personality puts an anonymous significant trace much higher than fame and an insignificant trace. In the name of egoism, it is better to be an unknown inventor of something known than to be remembered under a specific name, but with works that have not survived. "The elevation of someone else's dignity by the usefulness or beauty of our work is incomparably greater than the expansion of our dignity by the fact that we will be respected personally."¹⁹⁰ Deeds speak louder than names.

The contradictions that naturally arise in the former categories are removed *by creativity*. Thus, from the perspective of the endless struggle between personalities arose the ideal of justice, from the craving of the individual to subordinate others arose the ideal of honor. However, all contradictions were resolved, except for the problem of property. All animal principles were removed by the power of creativity, and from them was formed human morality. Everything except appropriation, which was a purely egoistic desire, and has remained so. In this, Lavrov manifests himself as a dialectician and thinker of the socialist trend.

Lavrov notes that "there is neither good nor justice outside the person."¹⁹¹ Thus, the sphere of the ethical does not exist as such, it is not substantive. This position can be attributed to materialism, although achieved with the help of positivist methodology. It follows logically from the fact that Lavrov, recognizing the merits of both materialism and positivism, and inspired by the works of Feuerbach, attempted to create a new, anthropological philosophy. However, the

¹⁸⁹ Ibidem. P. 453.

¹⁹⁰ Ibidem. P. 454.

¹⁹¹ Ibidem. P. 459.

materialist side of Lavrov's doctrine suffers from eclecticism in the first place; for the positivist component, eclecticism is acceptable: "everything will do". But if we proceed from the basic question of philosophy, we should say that there are only two schools of philosophy: materialism and idealism. Nevertheless, it seems hard to attribute positivism to one of them, since a number of reservations must be made. As Lenin showed in "Materialism and Empirio-criticism" using the example of Machismo, positivism is, after all, idealism¹⁹². But a special form of Russian positivism in the person of Lavrov, as can be seen from the analysis of the Essays, leans precisely towards materialism. This bias is also seen in the practical conclusion with which Lavrov concludes his theory of personality: "*Do not neglect the body; develop your thought; strengthen your character; respect the person in yourself and in others.*"¹⁹³

In response to Chernyshevsky's Anthropological Principle, which is formally a review of Lavrov's Essays, the latter responds to three remarks made by the reviewer¹⁹⁴. The first remark concerning the quotation of Mill by Lavrov is not relevant to the essence of the case, we will leave it without comment. The second remark about quotations belonging to "dubious" philosophers shows that Lavrov has a low estimation of the principle of partisanship in philosophy, and this already means his disconnection from the materialist tradition. Among philosophical parties, it is materialism that consistently holds to partisanship. Positivists and idealists either do not recognize the partisanship of philosophy at all, or consider the classification of philosophical trends so conventional that they see no point in

¹⁹² Lenin V.I. Materialism and empirio-criticism // Lenin V.I. Complete collection of essays. In 55 vol. Vol. 18. Moscow: Politizdat Publ., 1968. pp. 7–384. (In Russian)

¹⁹³ Lavrov P.L. Essays on Issues of Practical Philosophy // Lavrov P.L. Philosophy and Sociology. Selected works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. P. 461.

¹⁹⁴ Lavrov P.L. Otvet g. Strakhovu [Answer to Mr. Strakhov] // Lavrov P.L. Filosofiya i sotsiologiya [Philosophy and sociology]. Selected works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. Pp. 496–497.

it. The third remark is the accusation of eclecticism. Above we found confirmation of this directly in the text of the Essays.

We examined Lavrov's anthropology on the example of his Essays on Questions of Practical Philosophy. A detailed analysis has shown that Lavrov is, strictly speaking, eclectic both in method and in the content of his philosophy. Developing a theory of personality, he combines the Hegelian dialectical approach with agnosticism and phenomenism. And although his conclusions are generally consistent with materialist philosophy, still a number of provisions on some issues remain in the vein of positivism. This eclecticism gives us reason to characterize Lavrov's philosophy as rather positivist.

1.3 N.G. Chernyshevsky

Dobrolyubov and Lavrov influenced Chernyshevsky's central philosophical work in their own way. If for the latter Dobrolyubov was a like-minded person, then Lavrov, due to his specific views, cannot be unequivocally called either an ally or an opponent of the author of "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy".

In 1858–1859, Dobrolyubov wrote a series of anthropological articles, in which he covered the topic of the brain as an organ of consciousness, the psychophysical problem of the connection between spirit and matter, consciousness and body. At the same time, it is important to remember that Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov were followers of Feuerbach's anthropological materialism. "If we do not take this fact into account, it will not be clear why Chernyshevsky passed over in silence the questions that were of paramount importance within the framework of anthropological materialism of the nineteenth century¹⁹⁵." Dobrolyubov focused on the materialist theory of knowledge, and Chernyshevsky on the materialist ontology.

¹⁹⁵ Nikonenko V.S. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Dobrolyubov. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1985. P. 88.

In his "Essays on Questions of Practical Philosophy" Lavrov expounded his theory of personality. Unlike Dobrolyubov, Lavrov addresses first of all the theme of ethics and, through it, to the nature of man. Lavrov in his "Essays" did not specifically touch upon the topic of the brain, he avoided the psychophysical problem, since he did not refer "metaphysical" questions to the sphere of science. "Lavrov often abandoned the norms he had established for himself and turned to the substantive side of the matter, and then his reasoning, as a rule, passed into the mainstream of the materialist tradition¹⁹⁶." Chernyshevsky in *The Anthropological Principle* says bluntly: "Without entering into a criticism of Mr. Lavrov's views, we shall try to expound our conceptions of the same subjects; it seems to us that they are essentially similar to Mr. Lavrov's way of thinking; the difference will be almost only in the presentation and in the methods of posing the question."¹⁹⁷ If Chernyshevsky's aim was to write an article on the same subject, but to do it in a slightly different and more consistent way, then it seems logical to avoid the psychophysical issue, which Lavrov did not discuss.

From Chernyshevsky's point of view, Dobrolyubov was a consistent materialist, and therefore it would be unnecessary to repeat himself. In contrast, Chernyshevsky described Lavrov as an eclectic, and therefore, from the point of view of the principle of partisanship, the decision to restate what Lavrov had previously written about is quite justified and understandable.

Chernyshevsky developed a system of views that touched on aesthetics, political economy, anthropology, ethics, ontology, and the theory of cognition. However, the philosophical basis of his views is anthropology, which he drew from Feuerbach. Thus, about "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" Nikonenko writes: "The article serves as a kind of 'methodological key' to all of

¹⁹⁶ Utkina N.F. *Positivism, Anthropological Materialism and Science in Russia*. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1975. Pp. 112–113.

¹⁹⁷ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Anthropological Principle in Philosophy* // Chernyshevsky N.G. *Works*. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 166.

Chernyshevsky's previous works, it closes them, turning them into a unified whole”¹⁹⁸.

Soviet scholars (e.g., Rosenthal, Volk, Nikonenko) drew attention to the originality of Chernyshevsky's thought, who did not stop at Feuerbach's contemplative philosophy, but developed the anthropological materialism of his teacher. Thus, Rosenthal points out that Chernyshevsky, unlike Feuerbach, used dialectics and did not shun political questions¹⁹⁹. Moreover, the difference in the views of Chernyshevsky and Feuerbach is noticeable even in a predominantly philosophical work on anthropology.

The structure of the "Anthropological Principle" at first glance looks somewhat strange. In the course of the article, the topic of anthropology is touched upon as if in passing, accidentally. Chernyshevsky even sneers at the manner of his presentation. Moving from the topic of chemistry and geology to political economy, which at first glance are not connected with anthropology and philosophy, Chernyshevsky writes: "What is to be done, reader: the richer you are, the happier you are;²⁰⁰. A deeper analysis of the article reveals that the author presents his thought according to the idea: the unity of human nature is deduced from the material unity of nature. The abundance of references to natural sciences and political economy is due to Chernyshevsky's point of view that philosophy should generalize the achievements of sciences.

“The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy” by Chernyshevsky is a response to Lavrov's “Essays on Questions of Practical Philosophy”. Chernyshevsky evaluates his work positively, but nevertheless finds it necessary to set forth his own point of view on those questions addressed by Lavrov. It is

¹⁹⁸ Nikonenko V.S. Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, D.I. Pisarev. Leningrad, Leningrad University Publ., 1983. P. 27.

¹⁹⁹ Rozental M.M. Filosofskie vzglyady N.G. Chernyshevskogo [Philosophical views of N.G. Chernyshevsky]. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1948. Pp. 37–38.

²⁰⁰ Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 180.

noteworthy that Chernyshevsky begins his article by talking about the principle of philosophy's partisanship (this partisanship does not reside *in* philosophy, philosophy itself is partisan). Partisanship, according to Chernyshevsky's conviction, is an inherent characteristic of any philosophical doctrine. Obviously, according to this view, Lavrov and Chernyshevsky also gravitate to some "party". Chernyshevsky writes that "philosophical systems are imbued with the spirit of those political parties to which the authors of the systems belonged"²⁰¹. Moreover, the party spirit is inherent not only in political theories, but in any philosophical views in general.

By writing *The Anthropological Principle*, Chernyshevsky showed that he was dissatisfied with Lavrov's work. At the same time, the "reviewer of the *Sovremennik*" praises his opponent for "noticing many of the mistakes of those mediocre philosophers whom he has studied, that he was able to understand many things much better than they did, in a word, that the shortcomings of his pamphlet arose from other books, such as those of Jules Simon and Fichte fils, and that the pamphlet owes its merits to a very large extent to the author himself."²⁰² Chernyshevsky not only expresses sympathy for Lavrov, but also gently hints at his adherence to the party of the materialists, while he dismisses Jules Simon and Fichte-fils as philosophical idealists. References to the latter constitute a defect in Lavrov's pamphlet. It turns out that it is superfluous for a materialist to refer to the works of idealists. Attempts to be above parties lead to eclecticism. Thus, Chernyshevsky simultaneously praises and blames Lavrov, saying that "the combination of one's own merits with the shortcomings of others, if we are not mistaken, gives Mr. Lavrov's system the character of eclecticism. In Mr. Lavrov's pamphlet there are thoughts which are hardly compatible with each other."²⁰³ Chernyshevsky also remains dissatisfied with the fact that Lavrov refers to the texts of P.-J. Prudon. The author of "Essays" sees the merit of the French anarchist

²⁰¹ Ibidem. P. 148.

²⁰² Ibidem. P. 150.

²⁰³ Ibidem. P. 151.

in the fact that he remains above the parties. Chernyshevsky, on the other hand, assesses Prudon as an eclectic who, due to circumstances, was forced to learn from outdated books. In the context of this, Chernyshevsky refers to J.S. Mill, who, in his estimation, was a representative and, consequently, an exponent of the ideas of the privileged class. In addition, Chernyshevsky alludes to the similarity of Lavrov's and Feuerbach's views. This alone would be enough to speak of Chernyshevsky's appreciation of Lavrov as a thinking man. But at the same time there is a parallel with Prudon, for he too was forced to search independently for answers that had already been found by contemporary authors.

Chernyshevsky begins his presentation of the anthropological principle with a number of theses: 1) natural science is the basis of both anthropology and philosophy of nature; 2) natural science proves that the human organism is not dualistic, but monistic; 3) philosophy generalizes the achievements of sciences and states that there is only one nature in man, as other natures do not manifest themselves in any way.

The argument against the existence of the soul, which is also seen in Dobrolyubov's works, is repeated several more times by Chernyshevsky. Using Aesopian language due to censorship restrictions, the author writes: "A circumstance is given in which the existence of a known element in a known object would necessarily have a known result; there is no such result, therefore there is no such element"²⁰⁴. And then he repeats that "reason"²⁰⁵ obliges us to say directly: we know that this element does not exist; if it existed, then what would happen would not be what is happening."²⁰⁶

²⁰⁴ Ibidem. P. 167.

²⁰⁵ It could be objected that Chernyshevsky, being familiar with the texts of the German classics, must understand or at least represent the difference between reason and reason, and therefore the argument from reason sounds unconvincing or even not quite sincere. However, it should be noted that in the context of the article it becomes clear that we are not talking about Kant's reason, but rather about reason.

²⁰⁶ Ibidem. P. 168.

At first glance, monism in anthropology contradicts the fact that both material and moral phenomena take place in man. That is, the soul-body dualism seems obvious. But Chernyshevsky objects that “the union of completely dissimilar qualities in one subject is the general law of things”²⁰⁷. In other words, the problem of dualism and monism is reduced to the differences between the systems of Descartes²⁰⁸ and Spinoza²⁰⁹.

The connection of heterogeneous phenomena, according to Chernyshevsky, is revealed by the mode of origin. Thus, body and consciousness are revealed in the human organism, which has a single nature. Chernyshevsky gives as an example water as a quality that, when its quantitative characteristic (temperature) changes, can take the form of one of three qualities: solid, liquid, or gaseous. Here we observe the Hegelian nodal line of relations of measure²¹⁰. Proceeding from the clarification that different objects can have common qualities in different quantities, we can conclude that Chernyshevsky correctly understood the Hegelian dialectic of quality and quantity.

Chernyshevsky reduces the nature of qualitative-quantitative changes to a chemical process that takes place in objects and bodies continuously. Chemical elements form organic and inorganic combinations and exist according to the same laws. Chernyshevsky notes that both fundamentally consist of inorganic substances. As an example, Chernyshevsky speaks of the difference between acid and wood: he considers acid as a simple combination of elements, And wood is like a complex combination. "It is as if there is a difference between 2 and 200 – a

²⁰⁷ Ibidem. P. 169.

²⁰⁸ Descartes R. Reasoning about the Method. St. Petersburg, Azbuka-Attikus Publ., 2020. 320 p. (In Russian)

²⁰⁹ Spinoza B. Ethics. /Lane. V.I. Modestov. Minsk: Harvest, Moscow: AST, 2001. 336 p. (In Russian)

²¹⁰ Hegel G.W.F. Science of Logic: In 3 books. Objective logic. Book 1: The Doctrine of Being / Transl. by B.G. Stolpner. Moscow: Akademicheskii proekt, 2021. Pp. 326–330. (In Russian)

quantitative difference, no more." ²¹¹Rosenthal saw in this a misunderstanding of the dialectic of quality and quantity²¹². Nikonenko, however, remarked that Chernyshevsky emphasizes precisely the numerical difference only to emphasize the truth of materialist monism²¹³. Speaking of chemical processes, Chernyshevsky asserted that certain qualities were revealed as a result of "motion." that this is a "movement", a chemical process that takes place constantly. In other words, quantitative changes always occur, but only a sufficient quantity leads to a new quality.

The author leads the reader from nature to man, since this is required by the anthropological principle itself, on which the entire philosophy of Chernyshevsky is built. At the same time, the author is ironic about the fact that the "reader" – the very perceptive reader who will later appear in the novel *What Is To Be Done?* – thinks that all these preliminary conversations about nature and the natural sciences do not relate to the topic of man. The question of whether such remarks are due to circumvention of censorship or to Chernyshevsky's love of irony remains secondary.

From the propositions about quality and quantity, the idea of the common principle of all objects – of matter – is derived. Thus, a stone and a plant – an inorganic object and an organic body, with all their differences, "consist of identical parts, united according to the same laws, only united in different proportions."²¹⁴ than in stone. In addition, in an organic body these processes are more complex than those that take place in an inorganic object. The organic is

²¹¹ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Anthropological Principle in Philosophy* // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 172.

²¹² Rozental M.M. *Filosofskie vzglyady N.G. Chernyshevskogo* [Philosophical views of N.G. Chernyshevsky]. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1948. P. 47.

²¹³ Volk S.S., Nikonenko V.S. *Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky*. Leningrad, Leningrad University Publ., 1979. P. 59.

²¹⁴ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Anthropological Principle in Philosophy* // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 174.

more complex and changeable than the inorganic. But organic objects are heterogeneous, and therefore some of them are more complex and changeable than others. For example, Chernyshevsky compares a "huge tree" and a "small grass". It is implied that it is appropriate to compare man with this huge tree, which, against the background of a rational man, the bearer of consciousness, itself turns out to be only a small grass, something insignificant.

Speaking of the unity of the laws of nature, Chernyshevsky notes that this thesis was understood by brilliant thinkers long ago, but it turned out to be proved by science only in the nineteenth century. from my first youth I was a firm adherent of that strictly scientific trend, the first representatives of which were Leucippus, Democritus, etc., up to Lucretius Carus, and which is now beginning to be fashionable among scientists."²¹⁵

Chernyshevsky writes that modern science cannot, on the basis of the investigated part of the subject, give positive knowledge about that which has not yet been investigated. For example, looking at the fracture of the forearm bones of the right hand, we cannot conclude that there is a similar fracture in the left hand. Positive knowledge provides a basis for conjecture, which can be disputed and refuted, but not for assertion. Such knowledge, however, provides a basis for negative conclusions. "We cannot say what exactly the unknown will turn out to be; but we already know what it does not turn out to be"²¹⁶.

At the end of the first part of the article, Chernyshevsky devotes some attention to political themes, closely intertwining them with the partisan nature of philosophy: "... when the representatives of the elements now striving to recreate Western European life are already *unshakable in their philosophical views* (italics mine. – A.Ch.), this will be a sign of the triumph of new beginnings..."²¹⁷ Further,

²¹⁵ Chernyshevsky N.G. From the correspondence of 1876–1878 // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 369.

²¹⁶ Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 179.

²¹⁷ Ibidem. P. 182.

in the fragment removed by the censors, it speaks of the revolution of 1848, after which there followed "the numbness of thought from reaction." However, Chernyshevsky expresses the belief that "if not in ours, then in the next generation will come *the result which lies in the nature of things*"²¹⁸ [emphasis mine] has become unavoidable; and if our generation has not yet succeeded in accomplishing it, at any rate it is doing much to facilitate a useful work for its children"²¹⁹. This "nature of things" is closely connected with the nature of man himself and with the anthropological principle, which, as we see, is of exceptional importance for Chernyshevsky's philosophical and political views.

Further, Chernyshevsky writes, not without feigned irony, that "this article, for all its incoherence, can serve as a preface to the exposition of the concepts of the present science of man as an individual personality."²²⁰ If Lavrov began the theory of personality with the personality itself, then for Chernyshevsky it is important to devote the first half of his "Anthropological Principle" precisely to the partisanship of philosophy and the natural sciences, which at first glance have no obvious connection with man.

Chernyshevsky begins the second part of *The Anthropological Principle* by distinguishing between science, the exact sciences, and those sciences which do not belong to the English concept of science. Neither history, nor psychology, nor moral philosophy, nor metaphysics are included in the exact sciences. Chernyshevsky asserts that there is indeed a basis for such a distinction, since in the exact sciences many questions are already considered to have been solved once and for all. If someone decides to start an argument about whether an apple lying in the palm of his hand will fall if a person stops holding it, then such an arguer will be considered either a joker or a mentally ill person. Moreover, you do not need to be a specialist to know and accept the law of universal gravitation. Physics

²¹⁸ Here we can draw a parallel with the understanding of the ideal and the ideal by M.A. Lifshitz.

²¹⁹ *Ibidem*. P. 183.

²²⁰ *Ibidem*. P. 183.

as a science has developed and, more importantly, popularized so much that the operation of the law of gravity seems obvious to any adult. However, in questions of ethics, for example, many things do not seem obvious, and disagreeing with a truth that one person considers obvious does not mean that the dissenter will necessarily be a joker or mentally ill. And if in the exact sciences the principle of party spirit has exhausted itself, since it seems that there are no alternative parties left, then in philosophy this principle remains relevant and necessary.

Chernyshevsky asserts that the moral sciences are less developed than the natural sciences because of their later appearance. Physics arose as a science and began to develop before psychology, respectively, physics has reached the level that psychology still has to come.

It is assumed that the question of the existence of free will is important for the moral sciences. Their construction as sciences is possible only if a person does not have free will as an objective fact, and not as a "fact of human consciousness" in Lavrov's understanding²²¹. Otherwise, science is left with the fundamentally insoluble problem of free will, which manifests itself apart from and even in spite of causality. Chernyshevsky argues that what is often called the will "is a link in a series of phenomena and facts connected by causality"²²². That which is often taken for an act of will is only an act evoked by a thought, or the thought itself, the cause of which is another thought. requires the dualism of human nature, against which Chernyshevsky's anthropological principle is directed. Giving an argument for the causality of phenomena and against the arbitrariness of free will, Lopukhov in the novel *What Is To Be Done?* objects to Verochka, who suggested that arbitrariness does take place:

"No, Vera Pavlovna; if you turn over without thinking anything about which hand to turn over, you turn over with the hand that is more convenient, there is no

²²¹ Lavrov P.L. *Essays on Issues of Practical Philosophy* // Lavrov P.L. *Philosophy and Sociology. Selected works*. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. Pp. 364–365.

²²² Chernyshevsky N.G. *Anthropological Principle in Philosophy* // Chernyshevsky N.G. *Works*. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 190.

arbitrariness; If you think: "Let me turn it over with your right hand," you will turn it over under the influence of this thought, but this thought did not come from your own will; it was necessarily born from others..."²²³

Further, Chernyshevsky speaks of a psychological fact that has serious social and political significance: "... with weak mental development, a person is unable to understand a life different from his own life; The more his mind develops, the easier it is for him to imagine a life that is not like his own."²²⁴ In other words, a representative of one class or estate, not having sufficient intellectual development, will not be able to understand a representative of another class or estate. Thus, Chernyshevsky ironizes the conservatives and liberals who, being the representatives of the privileged classes, could not understand the hard life of the "Russian muzhik". Chernyshevsky's anthropological principle, if consistently applied to the social sciences, leads to socialist ideas.

Another of the questions of the moral sciences comes down to the moral essence of man. Chernyshevsky writes that in attempts to define man as a naturally good or evil being, most stop at one of the opposite options, but there are also "skeptics" who consider this question insoluble. However, these disagreements have no place within the framework of science, for "on the first application of scientific analysis the whole thing appears to be simple to the extreme. Man loves the pleasant and dislikes the unpleasant"²²⁵. Accordingly, a person is good if he does pleasant things to other people, and evil if he does unpleasant things. That is, a person turns out to be good or evil not by nature, but only depending on circumstances. Man is egoistic, so he strives to do what is pleasant for himself, in other words, he strives to be good for himself. In the following words, Chernyshevsky expressed the main essence of the theory of rational egoism: «... a person is good when, in order to receive what is pleasing to himself, he must do

²²³ Chernyshevsky N.G. What is to be done? Moscow, AST Publ., 2017. Pp. 93–94.

²²⁴ Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 191.

²²⁵ Ibidem. P. 193.

what is pleasing to others; he is evil when he is forced to derive pleasure for himself from causing trouble to others."²²⁶ Plekhanov reproached Chernyshevsky for distinguishing between *egoism* and *rational egoism*, and for rejecting altruism, although, according to Plekhanov, rational egoism is altruism.²²⁷

There is probably no inherent moral essence in the nature of man as such. One person can be good and another evil depending on the circumstances. Moreover, a person turns out to be both good and evil at the same time, but in relation to different people. And at the same time a habit is developed in a person, some constancy in behavior, so one person will be more often good, another - more often evil.

The circumstances in which Chernyshevsky sees the cause of good and evil are illustrated in more detail in his novel "What is to be done?" on the example of Verochka's mother in the fragment entitled "A word of praise to Marya Aleksevna"²²⁸, as well as in *The Second Dream of Vera Pavlovna*²²⁹.

The problem of many sciences, and among them the moral sciences, is that a theoretical solution to this or that problem has already been found, but it is not possible to solve this problem in practice due to circumstances. And if in the natural sciences everything is reduced only to external nature, then in the moral sciences both material means and human impressions are needed to solve problems. a sense of the need for change, intention. It should be noted that feelings and intentions may not be enough for change if they are not widespread enough in society. Moreover, as Chernyshevsky writes, "the most abundant source

²²⁶ Ibidem. P. 194.

²²⁷ Plekhanov G.V. Works about N.G. Chernyshevsky // Plekhanov G.V. Selected Philosophical Works. In 5 vols. Vol. 4. Moscow: Publishing House of Socio-Economic Literature, 1958. P. 261.

²²⁸ Chernyshevsky N.G. What is to be done? Moscow, AST Publ., 2017. Pp. 150–153.

²²⁹ Ibidem. Pp. 164–173.

of manifestation of evil qualities is the insufficiency of means to satisfy needs."²³⁰ The sense of necessity for the transformation of the whole society can be clouded by the immediate problems of the individual, which make the person evil and therefore incapable of improving society. In other words, a person who is angry because of unsatisfied needs is an egoist, not a rational egoist. To put it in Lavrov's terminology, we can say that such a person is an egoistic rather than a just individual.

Chernyshevsky draws our attention to the fact that moral sciences, along with metaphysics, are scientific fields, i.e. exact sciences. Moreover, it was the development of earlier sciences that helped these fields of knowledge to become sciences too. But this does not mean that all or at least the most important questions have been answered in the sphere of morality. The search for many of them is still ahead of us. And finding an answer in theory is not yet followed and may not be followed for a very long time by application in practice. Thus, Chernyshevsky gives the example of agriculture, in which the full theoretical potential of natural sciences is not used.

Further Chernyshevsky writes: "The closest subject of our articles is now man as an individual"²³¹. All the preceding exposition, to which the first part of *The Anthropological Principle* was spent, as well as the beginning of the second, is a methodological and philosophical preface. Without such a preface, which speaks of the partisan nature of philosophy, the importance of the natural sciences, and the necessity of a monistic view, it is impossible, according to Chernyshevsky, to build the edifice of the moral sciences. Ironically, the author further writes: "We are putting aside for a while the psychological and moral-philosophical questions about man, we will deal with physiological, medical, and whatever else you like, and we will not at all touch upon man as a moral being."²³² At first glance, it seems

²³⁰ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Anthropological Principle in Philosophy* // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 195.

²³¹ *Ibidem*. P. 198.

²³² *Ibidem*. P. 198.

that Chernyshevsky is trying to say a little about everything, but he is not going to get to the essence of the matter. That is why Chernyshevsky speaks so disparagingly of the topic which he declared as the main theme of the article. but which "we shall deal with later, if time permits."²³³ Here it would be correct to mention the psychophysical problem, the brain as the source and carrier of consciousness, but Chernyshevsky does not speak about this issue, probably because Dobrolyubov had already written about it in 1858-1859.

Earlier, Chernyshevsky had compared a "huge tree" and a "small weed," pointing out that the former is more complex in its structure than the latter. This was mainly a chemical difference. Now - already in the context of physiology and medicine - Chernyshevsky returns to chemistry: "...the human organism is a very complex chemical combination in a very complex chemical process called life"²³⁴. Life is understood not as the existence of the soul and its presence in the human body, but as a chemical, that is, purely material process. but only denies. Chernyshevsky writes the following about this: "... Negative conclusions are of great importance in all sciences. But they are especially important in the moral sciences and in metaphysics." ²³⁵This special importance becomes evident when certain propositions lead to subsequent propositions justifying the exploitation of some people by others. Chernyshevsky proposes to make a hypothesis – "idleness is pleasant, and work is unpleasant."²³⁶ The author argues that people, following this hypothesis, will tend to use other people's labor and avoid labor themselves. It is logical that those who will labor for themselves and for their exploiter will suffer from excessive work. The exploiters, on the other hand, will suffer from boredom and idleness, like Ilya Ilyich Oblomov. Accordingly, the hypothesis is incorrect. Moreover, as Chernyshevsky writes, it has indeed become the prevailing opinion.

²³³ Ibidem. P. 198.

²³⁴ Ibidem. P. 198.

²³⁵ Ibidem. P. 201.

²³⁶ Ibidem. P. 201.

Chernyshevsky reduces pleasure to a sensation in one form or another. Moreover, the activity of the human organism is necessary to obtain sensation. The author argues that pleasure stems from human activity over external objects. This leads to the negative conclusion that inactive Oblomovs cannot experience really pleasant sensations.

Since the moral sciences are undeveloped, they need more developed sciences in the same way that, for example, physics needed and continues to need mathematics. In order to examine a phenomenon, it is necessary to see what other sciences have to say about it. Based on this it is possible to draw positive and negative conclusions even about those aspects of the phenomenon, which could not be approached without the help of other sciences. Chernyshevsky considers the life process as an example of such a phenomenon.

Thus, initially the topic of soul-body dualism had no approaches for scientific research. People were left to speculate on the basis of other speculations without the possibility of even checking them. But physiology helped to look at the nature of man scientifically. Science could not bring the researcher closer to the soul, but it showed that there was nothing to bring closer to, since there was no scientific basis for the hypothesis of the existence of the soul.

In the context of this theme, Chernyshevsky draws attention to the fact that human physiology is only one of the sections of physiology. Despite the fact that man possesses outstanding intellectual gifts and abilities, he still does not rise above other animal organisms. Accordingly, along with the physiology of man there are physiologies of other organisms. Chernyshevsky does not say it directly, he expresses his thought - as in many other places of the "Anthropological Principle" - in Aesopian language: "...*the difference is enormous, obvious to everyone* (italics mine. - A.Ch.), but agree that scientific people do rightly assert that there are no elements in Tokay grapes that would not be found in Berlin grapes"²³⁷. Chernyshevsky asserts that man does not differ much from the animal

²³⁷ Ibidem. P. 205.

in chemical composition, but in the fragment in italics he notes that there is still a qualitative difference between man and animal. on which his article is built: "We need to survey the entire region of nature in order to reach man."²³⁸²³⁹

Considering animals in the context of anthropology, Chernyshevsky refutes the opinion that animals do not learn and do not develop intellectually. As an example, the author talks about a thoroughbred horse, which has a more receptive optic nerve than a normal horse. From this Chernyshevsky deduces that the nervous system has undergone a change in the course of domestication. In addition, horses learn to walk in harnesses, and domesticated individuals cope with this faster than wild ones. Consequently, a domesticated horse has a more developed intelligence. Such facts erase the impassable boundary between man and animal.

Approaching the theme of man, Chernyshevsky gives a definition of thinking: "Thinking consists in selecting from the various combinations of sensations and ideas produced by the imagination with the help of memory, those that correspond to the needs of the thinking organism at a given moment, in the choice of means for action, in the choice of ideas by means of which it would be possible to arrive at a certain result."²⁴⁰. In other words, the author reduces thinking to the following process: retrieving sensations and ideas from memory in order to use them for practical purposes. Moreover, the products of memory are creatively "made by imagination". Thinking in Chernyshevsky's understanding has something

²³⁸ Ibidem. P. 205.

²³⁹ One could criticize Chernyshevsky for "empiricism," but in view of the fact that in ontology he adheres to materialism, and in epistemology he clearly gravitates towards the method of Hegel, it is fair to say that Chernyshevsky is much closer to Marxism in the ontological and epistemological respect than to empiricism. And the latter, of course, must be distinguished from each other. Individual expressions of Chernyshevsky, on the other hand, by which one could judge of his "empiricism", seem rather not quite successful expressions, through which his deeper position nevertheless shines through.

²⁴⁰ Ibidem. P. 209.

in common with thinking as it is presented in Ilyenkov: "... A thinking body actively builds (constructs) the form (trajectory) of its motion in space in accordance with the form (configuration and position) *of another body*, coordinating the form of its motion (its action) with the form of this other body, and *any other* body. Consequently, the proper, specific form of action of the thinking body consists in *universality*.²⁴¹

Chernyshevsky draws attention to the fact that the nature and essence of thought processes in man and animals are similar, but differ in strength and intensity. The author argues that, contrary to popular belief, animals have the ability to reason. Chernyshevsky says the same about the consciousness of sensations, thoughts, and conclusions. Thus, the phenomenon of sensation requires an external object that produces a sensation and a being that experiences this sensation. By feeling, the creature also feels its state. But to feel the state of a thing is the same as to feel the thing itself. Thus, having a sensation and being aware of a sensation are one and the same thing.

Here Chernyshevsky disputes the opinion that animals do not have sublime feelings. For example, the author claims that the hen takes care of other people's chickens as well as her own, since she has invested her care in them, therefore, the attitude of the hen to the chickens turns out to be moral. But as we see, Chernyshevsky, in trying to emphasize the similar essence of man and animal, sometimes makes rash assumptions.

Having said enough about the material unity of the world, the necessity of natural science for the development of the moral sciences, and the groundlessness of the hypothesis about the soul, Chernyshevsky sets about expounding the theory of rational egoism.

On the one hand, everyday *practice* shows that people's actions are dictated by egoism. But it also shows the opposite: people often turn out to be altruistic and

²⁴¹ Ilyenkov E.V. *Dialectical Logic* // Ilyenkov E.V. *Collected Works*. Vol. 4. Moscow, Kanon+ Publ., 2020. P. 247.

ready to sacrifice themselves for the good of other people²⁴². Here it is appropriate to recall the point of view of Plekhanov, who demanded to recognize altruism as fundamentally different from egoism, but thus deprived the ethical theory of integrity, which was necessary for Chernyshevsky to fight dualism.

Thus, Chernyshevsky wrote: “In the motives of man, as in all aspects of his life, there are not two different natures, two basic laws, different or opposite to each other, and all the variety of phenomena in the sphere of human motives to act, as in all human life, comes from one and the same nature, according to one and the same law”²⁴³. Through ethics, Chernyshevsky carries out the anthropological principle, which is only a special case of materialist monism. In the above quotation, the author speaks simultaneously about ethics, anthropology, and ontology. Strictly speaking, *in ethics there is no egoism and altruism – there is only egoism. In anthropology there is no body and soul – there is only the body. In ontology there is no matter and spirit – there is only matter*. But this consistent monism is not a simplification. On the contrary: monism, in comparison with dualism, complicates the picture of the world, since it requires the philosopher and scientist to look for connections and patterns in everything. without resorting to divine help. It is also worth noting that altruism, understood as rational egoism, does exist; the soul, understood as consciousness and the psyche, derived from the body, also have a place in science and in being; spirit, also understood as something derived from matter, but having no independent existence, is. But it is important to understand these clarifications strictly monistically.

Thus, in order to notice egoism in any human actions, it is necessary to take a closer look at the motives by which people are guided. Their motives are reduced to calculation, to personal *benefit*. But at the same time Chernyshevsky hints at the difference between human actions, saying: "About *the greater* (italics mine. – A.Ch.) Some cases of so-called self-sacrifice should not be spoken of as self-

²⁴² Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 215.

²⁴³ Ibidem. P. 215.

sacrifice: this name is unseemly for them."²⁴⁴ The author also draws attention to the fact that calculation does not deprive a heroic deed of nobility. Proceeding from the dualistic attitude, we could say that intelligence and prudence leave no room for nobility in actions, since the latter are dictated by a cold mind, and not by a fiery heart. We can say that intelligence and prudence endow an action with even greater nobility, because such an act is not performed by chance, but with an awareness of the essence of the matter.

The following quote helps to better understand Chernyshevsky's ethics: "... for a person who is accustomed to respecting himself, death is much easier than humiliation."²⁴⁵ All the acts a person performs - from calculating the benefits of a particular purchase to deciding to sacrifice his life - "in theoretical formula, they all fit under one law: the strongest passion takes over the urges of the less powerful and sacrifices them to itself"²⁴⁶. All human actions, regardless of the degree of their significance and moral coloring, are dictated by the same law, which in another formulation sounds as follows: "... a person acts in a way that is more pleasant for him to act."²⁴⁷ This thought is the leitmotif of "What is to be done?" However, it cannot be said that the heroes of the novel only do what they like. This statement is true, but not quite complete.

The term "egoism" is derived from the Latin word *ego*, "I". Egoism is an ethical attitude, following which a person concentrates on his Self as the highest value. A rational egoist continues to perceive the Self as the highest good, but unlike an ordinary egoist, he does not dwell exclusively on his own Self, but pays attention to the Self of others. *also in other people, he becomes a rational egoist.*

In ethics, one of the most important concepts is good. Chernyshevsky distinguishes three types of good: 1) benefit for an individual; 2) benefit for the whole society or most of it; 3) benefit for man in general, that is, for all people. In

²⁴⁴ Ibidem. P. 216.

²⁴⁵ Ibidem. P. 217.

²⁴⁶ Ibidem. P. 218.

²⁴⁷ Ibidem. P. 218.

each variation, good is defined as benefit. But what is useful for some can be harmful for others. In this connection, Chernyshevsky says that in social questions the geometrical axioms must be applied: "The whole is greater than its part," "the greater quantity is greater than the smaller quantity."²⁴⁸ Accordingly, if the class of ancestral landowners benefits itself by harming the peasantry or the class of the bourgeoisie benefits itself by hurting the proletariat, such ruling classes benefit themselves only at first sight. In fact, these classes harm both humanity as a whole, since they are not the majority of society, and themselves, since they make the society in which they live worse.

Chernyshevsky emphasizes that defining the good as usefulness strengthens the very notion of the good. A concrete understanding of the phenomenon makes it unshakeable. However, there is still a qualitative boundary between good and usefulness. Unlike usefulness, "the concept of goodness very strongly exhibits the trait of permanence"²⁴⁹. If good is higher than good, then below benefit is pleasure, which is the goal of all human strivings. Chernyshevsky distinguishes two sources of pleasure: 1) fleeting and 2) permanent. Permanent, or lasting, sources are divided into two, in fact, into good and good. Here we see that Chernyshevsky is somewhat confused in the exposition of the gradation of pleasure-benefit-good. A couple of lines above, the author defined pleasure as something inferior, but then he brings benefit and goodness under it. Thus it must be understood that pleasure is fleeting, utility is permanent, and good is doubly the constant source of all good. "Good is as if it were a superlative degree of utility, it is as if it were a very useful benefit."²⁵⁰

Probably, a little confusion arose not in the theory itself, but precisely in the process of its exposition, since further Chernyshevsky gives another definition of

²⁴⁸ Ibidem. P. 219.

²⁴⁹ Ibidem. P. 222.

²⁵⁰ Ibidem. P. 223.

good, which can be considered satisfactory for this theory: "... Good is the name given to very strong sources of long-lasting, constant, very numerous pleasures."²⁵¹

Chernyshevsky explains his slightly utilitarian approach to morality by the fact that the natural-scientific manner of studying ethical problems allows him to get rid of "pompousness" and "gives moral concepts the most unshakable foundation"²⁵². The author brings the idea of the immutability of morality, if it is based on calculation, to its logical consequence: "Only good deeds are calculating; Only the one who is good is reasonable, and only as much as he is good."²⁵³ Whoever is good out of habit or by chance is not good at all²⁵⁴.

At the same time, Chernyshevsky observes that the good whose source is things in a person's possessions turns out to be less significant than the good that comes from the qualities of the person himself. For example, a poor man who has no property to share with others may be kinder than a wealthy benefactor who distributes money on a whim. Today the benefactor gives financial aid to the needy, and tomorrow he will sponsor a military campaign. The poor man, on the other hands, will remain kind and benefit others to the best of his ability. In other words, the nature of goodness is not utilitarian; it has a purely anthropological character. The real springs of goodness are feeling and will. And "the ways to fulfill the feelings of the heart are given to the will by the representations of the mind"²⁵⁵. That is, it is the mind that turns out to be what is necessary for the embodiment of good.

²⁵¹ Ibidem. P. 224.

²⁵² Ibidem. P. 224.

²⁵³ Ibidem. P. 224.

²⁵⁴ Compare: Dobrolyubov N.A. Organic development of a person in connection with his mental and moral activity // Dobrolyubov N.A. Selected philosophical works. In 2. vol. Vol. 1. Leningrad: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. P. 257.

²⁵⁵ Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 226.

Further, Chernyshevsky writes in Aesopian language about the anthropological principle: "... This principle consists in the fact that man must be regarded as one being having only one nature, so as not to cut human life into different halves belonging to different natures, *in order to regard each aspect of man's activity as the activity of his whole organism, from head to foot inclusive, or if it happens to be a special function of some special organ in the human organism. then consider this organ in its natural connection with the whole organism* (italics mine. – A.Ch.)"²⁵⁶It is impossible to fully understand the idea in italics without Dobrolyubov's articles on the brain and education²⁵⁷.

Chernyshevsky closes his article with a definition of anthropology in which, unlike Lavrov, the author provides answers to “metaphysical” questions: “Anthropology is such a science, which, whatever part of the vital human process it speaks about, always remembers that this whole process and every part of it takes place in the human organism, that this body serves as a material producing the phenomena it considers, that the qualities of phenomena are conditioned by the properties of the material, and the laws by which phenomena arise are only special particular cases of the laws of nature”²⁵⁸. It is noteworthy that Lavrov recognized the fact of the "unity of man," but he did not express this thesis clearly and did not give a consistent materialist explanation of this unity²⁵⁹.

In this way, Chernyshevsky supplemented Dobrolyubov's works on the psychophysical problem and education, and also corrected the mistakes that, as he

²⁵⁶ Ibidem. pp. 226–227

²⁵⁷ Dobrolyubov N.A. Organic development of a person in connection with his mental and moral activity // Dobrolyubov N.A. Selected philosophical works. In 2. vol. Vol. 1. Leningrad: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. Pp. 228–262.; Dobrolyubov N.A. Osnovaniya opytnoy psikhologii [Foundations of Experimental Psychology]. In 3. vol. Vol. 2. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1952. Pp. 494–498.

²⁵⁸ Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 228.

²⁵⁹ Lavrov P.L. Essays on Issues of Practical Philosophy // Lavrov P.L. Philosophy and Sociology. Selected works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1965. Pp. 357, 361.

believed, Lavrov had made in expounding the theory of personality. Also, on the basis of all of the above, it can be considered proven that the article "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" occupies a central, system-forming role in Chernyshevsky's views.

CHAPTER 2. THE DEBATE ON THE "ANTHROPOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE" IN 1860-1863

2.1 P.D. Yurkevich's Polemic with the Anthropological Theory of N.G. Chernyshevsky

The religious philosopher P.D. Yurkevich sharply disagreed with Chernyshevsky's views. In 1860, his critical article entitled "From the Science of the Human Spirit" was published in the Transactions of the Kiev Theological Academy. Yurkevich's review was written from the standpoint of religious idealism. His work is interesting not only because it is a critical response to the "Anthropological Principle" and thus marks the beginning of a debate, but also because Yurkiewicz's views belong to the philosophical party, which is the opposite of materialism. In the context of the materialism of Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov, as well as the philosophy of Lavrov, the consideration of Yurkevich's views contributes to the understanding of the general picture of philosophy in the Russian Empire in the 60s of the XIX century.

Since these philosophers are involved in a discussion about fundamental philosophical issues, their ideas, set forth in their respective works, represent a cross-section from which it is possible to form an idea of the philosophical views of the era. To complete the picture, it is necessary to turn to the analysis of Yurkevich's work.

According to Yurkevich, the subject of psychological science can be investigated only by the method of introspection, in contrast to those sciences that study the sphere of the physical. Since the activity of the soul is hidden and does not manifest itself in the external world, then, as Yurkevich writes, "we cannot have a definite range of phenomena that would be caused by a certain number of

causes."²⁶⁰. In other words, in order to study something, it is necessary for this something to be represented in reality in the form of a phenomenon, a phenomenon, so the soul, according to Yurkevich, cannot be cognized in the same way as physical phenomena. Therefore, Yurkevich does not conclude that it is impossible to study the soul, but only indicates that such a study is particularly difficult.

Moreover, according to Yurkevich, soul phenomena manifest themselves in an original way in each individual, so that the unscientific “research” methods followed by poets are the most effective. At the same time, philosophers who strive to systematize and find general laws of the soul's activity, “often built only hypotheses that are not grounded in themselves and are not consistent with reality”²⁶¹. Based on this position, one could conclude that Yurkevich sympathized with irrationalism, but in the following exposition the author will show himself rather as a Kantian.

From Yurkevich's point of view, there are two directions in the study of the soul: 1) the one that relies only on empirical methods, and 2) the one that considers introspection as an effective method. It is noteworthy that Yurkevich does not directly call the first trend either realism, materialism, positivism, or empiricism. It is worth noting that Yurkevich does not strictly distinguish between these names in his work.

Arguing the validity of idealism in understanding the nature of the soul, Yurkevich writes that "it (idealism – approx. A.Ch.) accepted feelings, strivings, and thoughts as they were,"²⁶² while its opposite treated psychic phenomena as the motions of atoms. This conception of materialism must be regarded as vulgar;

²⁶⁰ Yurkevich P.D. *Iz nauki o chelovecheskom dukhe* [From the science of the human spirit: Essays on philosophy and theology]. Ed. Stereotype. Moscow: Book House "LIBROKOM", 2015. P. 4.

²⁶¹ *Ibidem*. P. 5.

²⁶² *Ibidem*. P. 5.

neither Chernyshevsky nor Dobrolyubov counted themselves among the ancient atomists or mechanistic materialists²⁶³.

Here Yurkevich argues, in essence, that idealism does not tend to produce a complete and internally consistent system²⁶⁴: "... within the metaphysics of idealism, psychology could take on the development of..."^{265 266} The author probably sees here the advantage that the idealistic understanding of the soul does not tie the researcher's hands with findings in other fields of science. But Yurkevich ignores the risk that the achievements of psychology will not be reconciled with the achievements of chemistry, physiology, and other areas of natural science. In this, as far as we can see, lies eclecticism and, consequently, inconsistency.

At the same time, Yurkevich does not seek to separate psychology (the science of the "soul") from metaphysics (philosophy): "...we do not hope psychology...can completely renounce metaphysical assumptions about the essence of the world, as natural science has renounced"²⁶⁷. That is, psychology should not be checked against philosophy, but, as we shall see later, it is entirely based on theology, which itself arose from philosophy.

Yurkevich notes that the first task in the development of psychology is to study the empirically given activity of the soul: "First of all, it is necessary to study

²⁶³ Dobrolyubov N.A. Organic development of a person in connection with his mental and moral activity // Dobrolyubov N.A. Selected philosophical works. In 2. vol. Vol. 1. Leningrad: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1948. Pp. 230–231.

²⁶⁴ One could argue with this statement, citing as examples the philosophy of J.G. Fichte, F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel.

²⁶⁵ Yurkevich P.D. Iz nauki o chelovecheskom dukhe [From the science of the human spirit: Essays on philosophy and theology]. Ed. Stereotype. Moscow: Book House "LIBROKOM", 2015. P. 5.

²⁶⁶ Such idealism, while recognizing monism in ontology, recognizes the dualism of soul and body in anthropology. In the eyes of the materialist, who extends the principle of monism to everything, such idealism appears inconsistent.

²⁶⁷ Ibidem. P. 6.

phenomenal laws."²⁶⁸ But idealism, as the author asserts, did not contribute to the development of the empirical side of psychology (that is, it was generally against psychology as a science), since this philosophical party always pursued only "higher tasks."²⁶⁹

Further, Yurkevich points out the occasion for writing the article. "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" consisted of two parts, about which the author writes the following: "We will use these articles *as a reason* (italics mine. - A.Ch.) for the research"²⁷⁰. That is, Yurkevich polemicizes not so much with Chernyshevsky as with the philosophical party represented by the editor of the *Sovremennik*.

Yurkevich rhetorically asks whether the theory that reduces mental phenomena to organic life will be scientific. For a religious thinker, this is more of a rhetorical question than a real problem. Science strives for truth, and the reduction of the divine principle in man (soul) to the carnal principle (body) in theology or religious philosophy cannot be recognized as truth. After all, the word Truth itself is often understood in Christianity as one of the predicates of the divine essence. Chernyshevsky's theory, on the other hand, is clearly atheistic. Thus, even before reading *The Anthropological Principle*, Yurkevich knew how he would have objected to Chernyshevsky or any other atheist on the topics of anthropology and ethics. The answer to the question posed by Yurkevich at the beginning of the article is decided for the author in advance, and before reasoning and formulating arguments. Anything that contradicts religious truth is a mistake by definition. Accordingly, Yurkevich's article is not so much a polemical work as a propaganda of a religious worldview under the pretext of philosophical polemics.

It is noteworthy that Yurkevich refers to Chernyshevsky's work as a philosophy of "realism". Further in the text it is clear that by realism the author understands positivism rather than materialism. Moreover, Yurkevich uses the

²⁶⁸ Ibidem. P. 6.

²⁶⁹ Ibidem. P. 6.

²⁷⁰ Ibidem. P. 8.

term "materialism", so it is hardly possible to explain Chernyshevsky's attribution to realists by the fact that the author avoids a specific term. As we noted above, in this work the author does not draw a clear line between the parties of realism and materialism, or positivism and materialism. Presumably, this can be explained by the fact that the idealist is inclined to note in all non-idealist philosophers precisely those features that make them opponents of idealism. In other words, Yurkevich divides thinkers into friends and foes, the differentiation of "strangers" among themselves seems to be insignificant for him.

Criticizing Chernyshevsky's position, according to which moral questions are solved thanks to the discoveries of the natural sciences, Yurkevich asserts that "psychology cannot receive its material from anywhere except internal experience."²⁷¹ However, it is difficult to imagine what psychology could achieve if it neglected external experience and experimentation. Probably, such a "psychology" would be limited to the experience of divine revelation, but such a framework does not correspond to the goals of science.

However, Yurkevich insists that physiology, on which Chernyshevsky pins great hopes, and psychology, the sources of "material" lie in areas that are accessible only to them. But it is not quite clear how this agrees with the fact that the author considers it necessary for psychology to begin research with the collection of empirical data.

Yurkevich reproaches Chernyshevsky for wanting to replace psychology with physiology. If psychology is understood as a sphere of knowledge that is characterized by irrational cognition, in which poets are most successful and philosophers cannot achieve intelligible results, then the desire to put physiology instead of psychology becomes understandable. Psychology, as Yurkevich describes it, can hardly be called a science. It is understandable why the author sympathizes with such a field of knowledge and believes that it cannot be replaced

²⁷¹ Ibidem. P. 9.

by natural science. But why such a special field of knowledge should be elevated to the rank of a science remains a mystery to us.

Chernyshevsky's view of the "moral sciences" as being subordinate to the natural sciences seems to Yurkevich to be incorrect. Chernyshevsky's point of view follows logically from his criticism of dualism. The author's view is based on the dualism of soul and body, and therefore the reduction of the sphere of spirit to the material sphere seems incorrect for him.

Further, Yurkevich criticizes Chernyshevsky for having "placed sensation, and consequently the representation and systems of human thought, and with them all the series of sensations and strivings, in the circle of physiological objects given for external experience."²⁷² It is worth clarifying that it is unfair to minimize sensation to higher intellectual activity, i.e. thinking and representation. For example, a person feels cold air with his skin, but he does not feel the process of solving an equation, unless it is a matter of feeling the way the written object is in his hand at that moment.

Here Yurkevich also criticizes Chernyshevsky for stating positions that often seem obvious not only to the scientist, but also to the average person. For example, the position on the priority of satisfaction of needs: the first physiological need is respiration, followed by other needs. The author seems to separate those provisions that are obvious to the average person and those that only a scientist knows. It is logical to ask whether a scientific discovery becomes non-scientific from the fact that it became widely known in the course of popularization of scientific achievements. For Chernyshevsky, it is obvious that such a discovery remains scientific regardless of its popularity. Moreover, the editor of *Sovremennik* is not in a hurry to deny any thesis scientificity, even if this thesis seems simple and obvious. Yurkevich, on the other hand, is probably inclined to recognize as scientific knowledge only that which is not known to many people and by its content represents an extremely difficult subject for understanding.

²⁷² Ibidem. P. 12.

Defending his views, Yurkevich criticizes the dualistic philosophy of Plato, who in “metaphysical” issues clearly distinguished between matter and spirit. Christianity, according to the author, “has removed this metaphysical dualism: it recognizes matter as a product of spirit”²⁷³. However, it is worth noting that such an understanding does not “remove” dualism, but only explains its origin. In any case, in the question of psychology, philosophical anthropology turns out to be much more important than ontology.

Yurkevich draws a distinction between metaphysical and epistemological dualism. And if the former is “detached” with the help of religious truth, the latter, according to Yurkevich, “remains.” The author writes: “No matter how much we talk about the unity of the human organism, we will always cognize a human being in two ways: with the external senses – the body and its organs, and with the internal sense – mental phenomena.”²⁷⁴

But, from the point of view of materialism, it would be more consistent to deduce from the rejection of “metaphysical” dualism the rejection of epistemological dualism as well. If we imagine matter as something derived from spirit, then it seems that matter should be explained only from spirit. Thus, all the secrets of the human body must be hidden in the human soul. And from the knowledge of the essence of man it is a stone's throw to the God-man Jesus Christ, and from there to the triune God, who is identical with all that exists. In other words, the consistent development of these propositions would lead us to the recognition of religious truth as the only true and redundant for the purposes of any knowledge. But Yurkevich, being a theologian, for some reason sees the need for concessions to science and the secular form of knowledge.

Following the principle of epistemological dualism, Yurkevich sometimes deviates far from the main theme of the “Anthropological Principle”. Thus, the author writes that “thought has no spatial extension”.²⁷⁵ Hence it is deduced that

²⁷³ Ibidem. P. 13.

²⁷⁴ Ibidem. P. 13.

²⁷⁵ Ibidem. P. 14.

the physiologist cannot explain all the processes occurring in connection with the human organism, since thought cannot be seen, touched, and so on. But Chernyshevsky does not deny the necessity of specific cognition of thinking, he only defends atheistic and monistic principles in the construction of philosophy and science. It turns out that Yurkevich does not so much criticize Chernyshevsky's theory as his interpretation of this theory.

Following this method of polemics, the author brings to absurdity the position about the connection of the nervous system with the process of intellectual activity. The brain is an organ of consciousness and at the same time is the center of the nervous system. It would be incorrect to reduce desire to the spatial movement of the nerve, but it is quite adequate to point out the dependency of one process on the other. It should also be noted that apparently the movement of a nerve is a quantitatively simpler phenomenon than thought or desire. If a materialist like Chernyshevsky makes seemingly reckless pronouncements, it is worth paying attention to their orientation: whether the materialist is claiming scientific or philosophical truth. Chernyshevsky was not a natural scientist.

Criticizing Chernyshevsky for one extreme (identifying nerve movement with an intellectual act), Yurkevich falls into the other (human bodily and mental activity are a mere coincidence)²⁷⁶. To solve such a problem, there is nothing left but a Cartesian God who would unite the incompatible extension and thought. On what grounds one should neglect practice and common sense, which speak of the interconnection of phenomena, is not entirely clear.

Further, the author asserts that Chernyshevsky is confused about questions, some of which relate to philosophy, and others to science. Yurkevich writes: "Our author also does not distinguish between metaphysical questions and questions the solution of which belongs to the exact or experimental sciences."²⁷⁷ For the author, as we have seen, it is essential to draw a line between *one* and *the other*, while for

²⁷⁶ Such skepticism is close to the views of David Hume. But consistent adherence to skepticism could lead Yurkevich to undesirable conclusions.

²⁷⁷ Ibidem. P. 16.

the editor of the *Sovremennik* it is important to find that common ground that unites *the one* and *the other*. In other words, Chernyshevsky distinguishes between these questions and does not get confused about them, but unlike the dualist Yurkevich, he always follows the principle of monism. and not the "writer". For example, the editor of *Sovremennik* does not criticize individual dualists, reproaching each of them for not knowing anything about science, philosophy, or any other field of knowledge. Chernyshevsky, considering the principle of the party nature of philosophy to be important, criticizes the trend, the school, the party, and not the individual representative.

Defending dualism, Yurkevich writes that "the word *unity* has a charming charm for metaphysics and has almost no meaning for the natural scientist."²⁷⁸ But a theologian would hardly claim that the processes of the human body do not affect each other. A blood infection received through a vein in the arm will lead to a blood infection in the whole body, and this will probably be followed by the death of the person, the whole person, not just the limb. Excessive yellowing of the whites of the eyes may indicate serious liver disease. The pain of a heart attack may spread, for example, to the lower jaw. From these medical examples, we can conclude that the different parts of the body are related to each other and have an influence on each other, and often this correlation may not seem obvious. If we reason abstractly, it is hardly possible to see a connection between the eyes and the liver or between the heart and the jaw. But distracted reasoning in such matters cannot be satisfactory. And as can be seen from the examples in the fields of physiology, medicine, biology, and philosophical anthropology, the "proverbial" unity has a natural-scientific meaning.

Yurkevich makes a remark about the analytical character of the sciences, but he does not use it to describe the scientific method. The author thus disputes the "unity" that Chernyshevsky advocates. In the context of this same "unity", Yurkevich mentions that some physiologists have tried to develop the concept of a

²⁷⁸ Ibidem. P. 16.

“vital force” that permeates the organism and accounts for its “metaphysical unity”. But such an understanding, as Yurkevich himself sees, is not quite scientific. Moreover, such a “unity” has a clearly simplified form in comparison with what Chernyshevsky advocates in his “Anthropological Principle”. The author probably does not notice the difference between the vulgar unity, which is achieved by means of some abstract force, some fantastic common substance, and the concrete connection of the diversity of elements in one organism.

The sciences “decompose this unity into a multitude of material parts”²⁷⁹ and “the unity of the human organism is for them a phenomenon, something that appears, something that seems.”²⁸⁰ From the fact that analysis is the main method of physiological and chemical research, Yurkevich concludes that it is impossible to think of the achievements of physiology and chemistry as *one*, and not *many*. But it should be noted that even “metaphysics” (philosophy) is inclined to such an analysis, because philosophy as such arose in parallel with the emergence of categories, each of which must be considered separately from the others. Even within the framework of mythical and religious worldviews, which tend to synthesis, it is often necessary to analyze, delineate, and distinguish. After all, a religious thinker will not draw a conclusion from the thesis of the triune nature of God about the illusory nature of His unity. It should be noted that in Hegel's philosophy, with which Yurkevich was familiar, there is a thesis about the unity of analysis and synthesis as implying each other.

But Yurkevich, as can be seen from the work, has much more respect for Kant's philosophy. The author writes that the “apparent” unity of the human organism “comes from the properties of the soul, which translates each phenomenon into its own language and imposes synthetic forms on it.”²⁸¹ Thus, if Chernyshevsky's philosophy can be labeled by the terms materialism and monism,

²⁷⁹ Ibidem. P. 17.

²⁸⁰ Ibidem. P. 17.

²⁸¹ Ibidem. P. 17.

Yurkevich's views could be characterized as Kantianism and dualism. One has the impression that the author remains a theologian as if by habit, but not by views.

Yurkevich distinguishes between materialism and natural science: "...between modern natural science and materialism there is this profound difference, that natural science explains the human organism from material bases, and materialism from these bases explains the whole being of man, the whole man"²⁸². Earlier, Yurkevich asked a rhetorical question about the difference between "philosophy" (i.e., Chernyshevsky's views) and the natural sciences, implying that such a non-independent philosophy has no meaning. that materialism only generalizes the discoveries made by natural scientists. In fact, it often happens that science explains reality on the basis of empirical data, while materialism generalizes the conclusions of natural science. However, materialism does not always play such a modest role. And Chernyshevsky, who highly valued the natural sciences and also considered materialist philosophy to be scientific, did not place philosophy in a subordinate position to the sciences, but considered it to be science itself. Otherwise, it is impossible to explain why Chernyshevsky became a follower of Feuerbach and Hegel, and not of the positivists.

Further, Yurkevich quotes from *The Anthropological Principle*, in which Chernyshevsky proves that the soul does not exist. The author writes: "The power of this proof is based on a logical principle: if there is no effect, then there is no cause."²⁸³ However, according to Yurkevich, such "consequences" are still present in the inner life of a person. The fact that Chernyshevsky did not find them is attributed by the author to faith: "... we can say nothing against him: one can believe in everything."²⁸⁴ For the "essayist", as Yurkevich states, it has the character of an "axiom". It is noteworthy that for the reviewer himself the opposite position has the nature of a dogma.

²⁸² Ibidem. P. 18.

²⁸³ Ibidem. P. 19.

²⁸⁴ Ibidem. P. 19.

In the same place, Yurkevich writes that “the essayist does not understand the advanced people he wants to follow”²⁸⁵. The author probably means the “realists” (positivists), but Chernyshevsky never tried to follow them, considering them not the most profound thinkers. In one way or another, the “advanced people” in Yurkevich's exposition turn out to be eclectics who “do not reject the facts given in inner experience,”²⁸⁶ but at the same time “prove that these psychic facts are only *in the phenomenon* ...”²⁸⁷ In other words, these mental-psychic somethingnesses exist and do not exist at the same time. The inner experience is recognized as valid, but only in the phenomenon of the inner experiences themselves (i.e., in an illusory form). It turns out that Yurkevich's “advanced people” seek to please both materialists and idealists, with the result that they become confused in their own words and become skeptics who refuse to know things-in-themselves. Chernyshevsky's views can hardly be equated with the philosophy of such “advanced people.”

Criticizing the argument against the existence of the soul, Yurkevich interprets Chernyshevsky's philosophy in a positivist way. Thus, he argues that for the “essayist” the main criterion in the search for the soul is the external perception of the subject from the outside. That is, if one sees the subject, the subject exists, if one doesn't see it, it doesn't exist. The author asks: “If phenomena are possible only for another viewer, where is this other viewer in the realm of self-observation and self-viewing?”²⁸⁸. Since such a spectator cannot see the soul of another person, it follows that there is no soul. In any case, this is how Chernyshevsky's theory of knowledge appears in Yurkevich's eyes.

It should be noted that such an interpretation does not agree with one of the key tenets of materialism: objective reality exists independently of the subject. The view of the latter is only a way of studying reality, but not a way of creating the

²⁸⁵ Ibidem. P. 19.

²⁸⁶ Ibidem. P. 19.

²⁸⁷ Ibidem. P. 19.

²⁸⁸ Ibidem. P. 20.

world. Yurkevich seems to ignore this important circumstance. As a result, Chernyshevsky's anthropological materialism becomes more like Machism, but such an interpretation cannot be considered adequate.

The author sees Chernyshevsky's inconsistency in the fact that a new quality is deduced from quantitative changes. In quantity as such, the quality that should become a consequence is not yet observed. In Yurkevich's understanding, the dialectics of quantity and quality does not agree with the views of the "writer". For Yurkevich, the birth of quality from quantity is a "miracle". Accordingly, following the Cartesians, he has to introduce the concept of God. For the author, the transition of quantity into quality is creation ex nihilo, and therefore requires "a miracle that must be explained from the unceasing creativity of God."²⁸⁹ But it would be more honest if Yurkevich began his review with the fact that the "author" is an atheist, and this would be the basis for the analysis of the text. Not quite right. It would be better to start with the fundamental principles, not with the conclusions from them.

Thus, Yurkevich appeals to the authority of David Hume in order to refute causality and determinism. From the author's point of view, such a reference is appropriate, since he refers Chernyshevsky to the followers of such thinkers as Hume. But the fundamentals of the philosophy of Chernyshevsky and Hume are already different.

Further, the reviewer speaks about what, from his point of view, is the lack of experiential knowledge. Citing such phenomena as heat and flame as examples, Yurkevich notes that experience testifies to the inseparability of these phenomena, but he asserts that there are no grounds for assuming the necessary unity of phenomena. Seeing in this the basis of skepticism inherent in the sciences, Yurkevich misses the fact that excessive skepticism is harmful to science. If, as a result of numerous experiments, we have learned that the flame is warm or hot, then there is no reason, other things being equal, to touch the flames in the hope of

²⁸⁹ Ibidem. P. 25.

feeling cold. Excessive agnosticism in cognition does not lead to a scientific worldview, but to skepticism in relation to all scientific achievements and, consequently, to the scientific picture of the world.

Returning to the topic of quantity and quality, Yurkevich asserts that materialism as a system of views is not perfect, since it does not explain the transition from quantity to quality. The author thinks of such a leap religiously and therefore demands that the transition be made by some "doer". Moreover, the latter, according to Yurkevich, "is extremely destructive for materialism, which is especially in need of this miracle"²⁹⁰. Hence we can conclude that the reviewer mystifies the materialist worldview. One of the foundations of materialism is the denial of the existence of any supra-worldly figure, creator, demiurge. It seems that Yurkevich deliberately ignores this fact either for the purpose of propaganda of religious ideas, or because of the unclear distinction between the systems of experientialism, realism, positivism and materialism.

Continuing his criticism of the dialectics of quantity and quality, Yurkevich suggests the need for a "sentient being" in which a qualitative leap could take place. Without a beholding subject, the author cannot imagine how the wave-like motion of air can turn into sound, and the vibration of ether into light. We will not comment on those examples from the point of view of the history of physical science. Let us only note that the author does not give any arguments, nevertheless he is convinced that the "transformation" of some phenomena into others can be done either by the will of God or by the laws of Kantian philosophy. Apparently, in the field of the theory of cognition the authority of the Holy Scripture and Kant are unquestionable. Moreover, it is not quite clear which of the two authorities has more weight for Yurkevich. But we can assume that the reviewer is more sympathetic to philosophy, because he writes that "quantitative difference turns

²⁹⁰ Ibidem. P. 27.

into qualitative difference not in the object itself as a thing in itself, but in the relationship of the object to the sensing subject”²⁹¹.

But then Yurkevich writes that "we see a leap, a gap, because the event that makes up the transition from one of these qualities to another does not impress us."²⁹² It is not quite clear why earlier in the reviewer's conception the subject created and perceived a leap with his perceptive power, and now the subject nevertheless notices the *fact* of making a leap as such, but cannot notice *the leap itself*. for it is not a theory in the strict sense, but only an attempt to expound fragments of Kant's epistemology.

Further, Yurkevich again endows the materialist theory with religious motives, saying that "the material creator of the world has no *memory* of what he created before" ²⁹³. Such a fundamental disregard for the foundations of materialism leads to a distortion of the content of this philosophy. Thus, the reviewer brings to absurdity the position on the origin of animate and inanimate nature from the chemical process, presenting the matter as if, as a result of the chemical process, things and beings can arise randomly, without conforming to any laws. But the materialist understands this to mean that there is no “material creator of the world” (like any other demiurge), and that all chemical processes occur according to natural *laws*. Probably such a theory seems so unacceptable to Yurkevich that he sees the need to distort it in every possible way.

Earlier the reviewer presented his view of the distinction between natural science and materialism. But in the process of criticism, the boundary between one and the other started to blur. Moreover, Yurkevich offers Chernyshevsky to show how mental phenomena arise from chemical elements, clearly implying that this is impossible. It is true that Chernyshevsky would have agreed, for his understanding of thinking was far above vulgar-materialist ideas.

²⁹¹ Ibidem. P. 28.

²⁹² Ibidem. P. 29.

²⁹³ Ibidem. P. 33.

Yurkevich finds the understanding of good and evil as relative and circumstance-driven human qualities unsatisfactory. Instead, the reviewer introduces the category of “duty”: “...a man does evil when he violates *duty*”²⁹⁴. In other words, the author offers a teleological interpretation of good and evil, and explains the nature of evil in an Augustinian way – as the absence (negation) of good (duty).

Further, Yurkevich criticizes Chernyshevsky for ascribing to animals the capacity for higher intellectual activity. We shall not discuss the validity of this view of the intellect of animals, since it is not the subject of philosophy. But it should be noted that Chernyshevsky defended the principles of materialism and may have been able to present some of the propositions in a simplified form, and therefore inaccuracies may be found in his texts. But here it is not so much physiological details that are important, but philosophical principles. Neither Chernyshevsky nor Yurkevich specialized in the natural sciences.

But if Chernyshevsky harmonizes his philosophy with the achievements of the natural sciences, then Yurkevich clearly neglects this. Thus, the author asserts that animals in their way of acting are guided by a generic idea or goal, although the achievements of science do not lead to a conclusion about teleology in the behavior of animals. the souls of animals originated by God's command from material nature." ²⁹⁵From this the reviewer concludes that animals are not moral, and therefore their instincts are irresistible. But even a simple example of how a trained dog, at the command of its owner, is able not to eat a treat lying on its nose immediately, but to wait for a command, testifies to the successful struggle against instincts.

However, Yurkevich is convinced of the weak-willedness and determinism of animal behavior. From the author's point of view, man differs from animals,

²⁹⁴ Ibidem. P. 37.

²⁹⁵ Ibidem. P. 39.

since "the human spirit is not generic, but personal."²⁹⁶ But the simple desire of man to continue the race testifies rather to the contrary.

Polemizing with the assertion that animals have memories, Yurkevich refers to the authority of Aristotle, who "denied them the ability to remember"²⁹⁷. Unfortunately, the author did not prove that the earth is the center of the universe, around which the sun and stars revolve, and the air is higher than the earth for the reason that it stretches upwards in the purpose of its movement, while the earth in its essence tends downwards. Probably, the author of the treatise "On Memory and Recollection" seems to be an authority for Yurkevich only in some cases.

Disputing the ability of animals to remember (recall), the reviewer asserts that human memory requires "harmonious, systematic, thinking memory."²⁹⁸ In other words, animals have the capacity for memory, but they cannot remember (recall). According to Yurkevich, in animals "the present perception refreshes the trace of the previous perception"²⁹⁹ and this limits their memory. If Yurkevich is right in this particular question (which we will not judge, since this is not a philosophical question), it does not follow that human nature is dualistic, as the author tries to prove. but on this question Yurkevich only retold some of the tenets of Kant's philosophy and the Christian religion. The reviewer should have paid more attention to the main thesis that Chernyshevsky proves.

Further, Yurkevich adduces various arguments in favor of the fact that man is superior to other animals in his intellectual abilities. However, the "author" never disputed this general proposition. Chernyshevsky's and Yurkevich's views on particular questions differ, but these differences are of interest at best for the history of science, although we doubt it. To remember or recall is of interest only in the context of philosophy that this activity is similar to human activity. The real disagreement between Chernyshevsky and Yurkevich lies not in whether there is a

²⁹⁶ Ibidem. P. 39.

²⁹⁷ Ibidem. P. 40.

²⁹⁸ Ibidem. P. 41.

²⁹⁹ Ibidem. P. 41.

qualitative difference between the intellect of man and other animals, but in what constitutes *the nature of this qualitative difference*. Chernyshevsky sees *the reason for the superiority of man over animals in the more perfect structure of the matter of the human brain*. Yurkevich believes that this difference lies in the origin: "And God created great fishes, and every living creature of creeping things, which the waters brought forth, after their kind, and every bird of a feather after its kind"³⁰⁰; "And God said, Let us make man in our image and after our likeness"³⁰¹; "And the Lord God created man from the dust of the ground, and blew into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul"³⁰² According to Christian teaching, animals are created "after the kind" of the animals themselves, and man is created "in the likeness" of God.

As can be seen, the difference in views on human nature lies not in how well Chernyshevsky or Yurkevich are read in the field of studying the intelligence of animals, but in the fundamental principles on which thinkers build their philosophical systems.

Yurkevich speaks of the consciousness of a wild and educated person as qualitatively indistinguishable, since regardless of the degree of development, human consciousness "equally pushes the world of direct views into the background, turns it into a phenomenon..."³⁰³ In other words, the reviewer believes that every person perceives reality as phenomena, and not things-in-themselves. In addition to the problem of agnosticism, Chernyshevsky would also note here that the minds of wild and educated people, in spite of their great closeness, still have an essential difference: at least in the fact that a savage man cannot think in such

³⁰⁰ The Book of Genesis. 1:21.

³⁰¹ The Book of Genesis. 1:26.

³⁰² The Book of Genesis. 2:7.

³⁰³ Yurkevich P.D. *Iz nauki o chelovecheskom dukhe* [From the science of the human spirit: Essays on philosophy and theology]. Ed. Stereotype. Moscow: Book House "LIBROKOM", 2015. P. 51.

concepts and categories. to which the thinking of the brain formed in the course of training has risen.

But the author has identified the consciousness of savage and educated people, probably in order to emphasize the rashness of Chernyshevsky's idea of an exclusively quantitative difference in the thinking of Newton and the chicken. Indeed, it is hardly possible to say that the thinking of the chicken and Newton (and in general: animal and man) are almost one and the same. But, as far as we can see, Chernyshevsky focuses on the material basis of the thinking of any being. In both the chicken and Newton, the process of thinking depends on a node of the nervous system, that is, on the brain. In both cases, thought is derived from matter. And there is no special force (soul) that would determine the qualitative difference between two material bodies.

At the same time, it is worth noting that Yurkevich underestimates the significance of the quantitative difference. For example, a kilogram of steel and a ton of the same material are not qualitatively different, but a kilogram of metal can be lifted by a person without much difficulty, and even Archimedes could not move a ton.

Yurkevich equates Chernyshevsky's understanding of thinking with madness, backing it up with a good example, and also discusses whether animals perceive dancing as art, and so on. In other words, Yurkevich delves into particulars, which constitute the subjects of special sciences, and not philosophy.

Satisfied with the reasoning about the intelligence of animals, Yurkevich moves on to the main topic of the work he is reviewing: "... a section on the moral activity of man."³⁰⁴ The author expresses disagreement with the fact that Chernyshevsky attaches decisive significance to circumstances in the formation of human morality: "...only circumstances - like creative forces - make something out of this moral *nothingness*"³⁰⁵. It should be noted that Yurkevich is not ready to

³⁰⁴ Ibidem. P. 61.

³⁰⁵ Ibidem. P. 61.

accept significant events in human life as objective, and therefore introduces into Chernyshevsky's theory a subjective principle, "creative forces", which are not initially observed in the ethics of the "author". degree is formed during life, and not during the sacrament of baptism.

Again, the disagreement is not about the conclusions, but about the starting point. It seems that if Yurkevich had taken the trouble to consistently apply materialist principles in philosophy, he would have received conclusions close to Chernyshevsky's. But the author clearly does not pay attention to this problem.

Chernyshevsky opposes calling a person evil or good, since morality is formed by circumstances and has a relative character: one and the same event will be good for one person, and evil for another. Yurkevich says that the very beginning of humanity is to impute to a person his actions. But such an understanding of humanity is thoroughly religious, which Yurkevich does not directly say.

The reviewer also asserts that the "author" "gives us a completely general rule by which it is necessary to determine when every person is good or evil."³⁰⁶ "A person is good," he says, "when in order to get something pleasing to himself, he has to do something pleasing to others, he is evil when he is forced to derive pleasure for himself from causing trouble to others."³⁰⁷ But Yurkevich does not take into account that an act, pleasant for its perpetrator and for some other man, may turn out to be unpleasant for a third person. An example is a situation in which two people mutually love each other, but the feelings of a third person turn out to be undivided. Even in this not infrequent case, the "general rule" is no longer general.

It is not quite correct to judge circumstances as evil or good (as Yurkevich suggests for greater "consistency"). If a person who suffers from allergies accidentally encounters the causative agent of his ailment, we cannot say that the

³⁰⁶ Ibidem. P. 61.

³⁰⁷ Ibidem. P. 62.

very circumstance that caused the two objects to collide is evil. We would not seriously argue, for instance, that having a cat and a person allergic to cat hair in the same room is evil. But let us give another example: if a judge sentences a criminal, he performs an act that is unpleasant to the convicted person, but we can hardly call the judicial process evil on this basis. Chernyshevsky's theory suggests that there is no such thing as objective evil, just as there is no such thing as objective good. Good and evil, according to Chernyshevsky, are rather relative.

Yurkevich takes Chernyshevsky's ethics to an extreme, saying that within the framework of the "essayist's" views "every person should be understood as something morally characterless"³⁰⁸. As before, the author does not agree with the premise, but criticizes the investigation.

Yurkevich, dissatisfied with the fact that in Chernyshevsky's philosophy there is no place for God and, consequently, for rational design, concludes from this that the soul, from the point of view of the "author", arises by chance. However, the interconnection of phenomena in the world plays such an important role in Chernyshevsky's system that such criticism only testifies to the fact that Yurkevich does not notice the rationality in the materialist picture of the world itself. For Chernyshevsky, the rational structure of the world and the absence of God are in agreement, while Yurkevich sees in this an insoluble contradiction. In addition, as was said earlier, Chernyshevsky does not recognize the existence of the soul, while Yurkevich tries to find the subjective principle (God, the creator, the soul) where the "author" did not imply it.

Thus, the author writes: "This is again mythology, which admits many really creating gods, calling them circumstances."³⁰⁹ As far as we can see, Yurkevich is not trying to make fun of the "writer", but quite seriously speaks of any act of creation (creation, creation) as subjective in nature.

³⁰⁸ Ibidem. P. 63.

³⁰⁹ Ibidem. P. 63.

Yurkevich's statement on the following question looks curious: "There are cases when an animal "in order to get something pleasing to itself" must "do something pleasant" to another animal. Such are the games of young animals, such are the relations of the sexes."³¹⁰ We cannot go into purely physiological and psychological details, but since this topic is related to ethical and anthropological issues, it should be pointed out that Yurkevich does not have a good idea of "gender relations. The author clearly simplifies the essence of this problem, probably imitating Kant, who argued that spouses mutually use each other's bodies. Both of these thinkers were solely theoreticians and, probably because of this, allowed simplistic speculative constructions in questions about the "relation of the sexes".

Further, discussing the ways of achieving pleasantness in the public sphere, Yurkevich tells us that man has not only the desire for pleasantness, but also "*the desire of desire*, that is, he not only desires pleasant and useful things, like other animals, but also desires that this very desire should reach its goal by *means that are generally suitable*"³¹¹. In other words, having a desire to satisfy hunger, a person prefers not to steal food, but to buy it. This should be agreed, but in the context of this issue it would be reckless to underestimate the process of education, in the course of which a person learns to act in one way and not to act in another. The notions that stealing or killing are not innate, otherwise God would not have had to give Moses the tablets of commandments.

Yurkevich writes that man "distinguishes *between good and evil* deeds in his own and someone else's activity, just as he distinguishes between truth and falsehood in knowledge."³¹² But Chernyshevsky does not deny that in everyday life people judge good and evil, applying these concepts to specific events or actions. The "writer" asserts only that it is illegitimate to treat these concepts in this way in the context of science.

³¹⁰ Ibidem. P. 63.

³¹¹ Ibidem. P. 65.

³¹² Ibidem. P. 66.

The following remark of the reviewer about the exposition of the essence of human moral activity in the "Anthropological Principle" is noteworthy: "... we only show how close the writer stood to a correct understanding of this activity."³¹³ Based on that, one can judge how distant Chernyshevsky and Yurkevich are from each other in their understanding of ethics, if the author writes about the closeness of their views in spite of the fundamental differences in their theories.

Further, Yurkevich tries to introduce into Chernyshevsky's theory a technique used by "English moral philosophers." Those involved in the event have a preconceived perception of actions, so the commentator suggests looking at "what impression they make on an outsider impartial spectator"³¹⁴. However, it is worth noting that even with the maximum degree of objectivity of this "spectator", he is still interested in living in a society that is in accordance with his understanding of the good. In addition, we do not know anything about this viewer, except for his non-involvement in the specific situation that he must evaluate. In other words, the remarks of such a spectator have little or no significance for ethical theory.

The reviewer also argues that the "system of moral utilitarianism" lacks the concept of the dignity of the human person. However, Lavrov's work, in response to which the "Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" was written, in many respects reveals the concept of the dignity of the person. It is noteworthy that Chernyshevsky agreed with almost all the provisions of Lavrov's theory of personality: this can be traced in the latter's work.

Not noticing the concept of dignity in the ethics of the "writer", Yurkevich sees in the "censure of the mot" for imprudent embezzlement only a reproach for the inefficient use of funds. But much deeper is the condemnation for not conforming to a human being, as it can be. Unfortunately, the reviewer does not notice this, and therefore is satisfied with this criticism.

³¹³ Ibidem. P. 66.

³¹⁴ Ibidem. P. 67.

Ignoring the depth of the theory, the author further writes that an outside viewer would notice "in the one who enjoys the death of the enemy – an immoral and vile person."³¹⁵ But an outside viewer does not know about the causes of enmity, as a result of which he can only give a superficial judgment about morality.

In an attempt to understand Chernyshevsky, Yurkevich writes: "If our author says that 'good is utility,' then it seems that he is directing his theory of morality against the morality of *rigorism*, which wants us to fulfill the laws of duty in the same way as a stone fulfills the laws of gravity."³¹⁶ But the theory of reasonable selfishness does not reduce the ethical sphere to simple laws of human behavior, nor to the ought to be moral beings. In Chernyshevsky's theory we should distinguish between *egoists* and *reasonable egoists*. The behavior of both represents something regular, deterministic. Although the reasonable egoist is clearly morally superior to the egoist, there is no room for oughtness here. The theory of rational egoism does not so much impute to a person to act in one way or another as it does to explain why a person acted in one way or another. In their content the concepts of the egoist and reasonable egoist correspond to the terms egoistic personality and just personality in Lavrov's theory. They are only different stages in the development of human morality. As far as one can see from Yurkiewicz's reasoning, he did not notice this.

The reviewer further summarizes his understanding of ethics quite succinctly: "...man, like the animal, begins his existence in the pathological world of immediate desires for the pleasant as such; ... But from this pathological world of direct desires man, as we have seen, emerges into the real world and enters the realm of the *truly existent*... Therefore, he transfers his pleasures and his satisfaction to this world of truth and goodness; for him, pleasure ... is the triumph of the goal and the idea"³¹⁷. That is, according to Yurkevich, man has an animal, a

³¹⁵ Ibidem. P. 70.

³¹⁶ Ibidem. P. 70.

³¹⁷ Ibidem. P. 73.

material nature, which determines desires, but thanks to God, man can rise above matter in spirit, thereby transforming and elevating desires that were originally material; this transformation proceeds teleologically, the soul of man strives from matter to spirit.

There is no religiosity in Chernyshevsky's philosophy, and therefore Yurkevich did not notice the depth of his theory, since he is probably inclined to identify depth with religiosity (idealism), and superficiality with materialism.

In the context of the exposition of ethical theory, Chernyshevsky touched upon political and economic issues. His argument that the whole is greater than its part means a greater social significance for the good of the majority than for the minority. Yurkevich understands these words of the "author" quite adequately: "He says that universal human interests are higher than national, national interests are higher than estates. What does this mean *above*? Is it that the estate has the right to sacrifice the interests of private individuals to its interests, the nation to the interests of the estates?"³¹⁸ But the reviewer further concludes that such a principle would lead to an "Eastern" view of the relationship between society and individuals. Chernyshevsky would not be able to agree with this, if only because "Eastern" society would not sacrifice one private person of the emperor to the peasantry, rather the opposite. But it does not take into account that a private person can be a slave, a peasant or a worker, or he can be a representative of the noble class or even a member of the imperial family. Such individuals are not equal to each other, but that is the point of Chernyshevsky's argument in order to equate individuals with each other: if the interests of hundreds of peasants conflict with the interests of one landlord, the landlord must yield.

Without specifying, Yurkevich says that the pursuit of private interests in accordance with the principle of "justice" should be respected by society. What this justice is and how to implement it is not entirely clear. Lavrov in his "Essays on Questions of Practical Philosophy" touched upon the problem of the relationship

³¹⁸ Ibidem. P. 74.

between justice and property and showed that it is impossible to solve the problem of property with the help of justice.

Yurkevich argues that estates can be "dishonest", and therefore their interests cannot always be placed above the interests of individuals. But the meaning of this term is not explained in the text. It remains to be assumed that the dishonesty of the estate is determined by its claims to rights and privileges that it did not have before.

Yurkevich asks: "... how, for example, should a small company of merchants set about its business in such a way that its interests do not contradict the interests of the whole merchant class... Why and how will she know that she will not enter into this fatal contradiction?"³¹⁹ If we give a direct answer, we must say that in order to avoid the "fatal contradiction" we should refer to the achievements of political economy; this question lies beyond the scope of ethics. But more interestingly, Yurkevich did not discuss the case of a majority claiming ownership of a smaller part of society. Instead, the reviewer gave an example in which a minority acts. It is worth stressing that one cannot make a step in these questions solely by the forces of philosophy and ethics.

Following Chernyshevsky's thought, Yurkevich returns from the political economy sphere back to the ethical issues. "The Composer" described the image of a man who is pleased to give pleasure to others, but to cause trouble is unpleasant for him and himself. In this the reviewer saw an "absolute point," an "unconditional good." Yurkevich misses that such conditionally independent of circumstances good was itself formed as a result of circumstances. Unfortunately, this is not emphasized by the author.

Nevertheless, Yurkevich notes that the ethics of reasonable egoism has much to do with love for humanity: "...love, and, in the sense of the article, love for humanity, and also probably selfless love"³²⁰. But the author did not see religiosity

³¹⁹ Ibidem. P. 74.

³²⁰ Ibidem. P. 76.

in this theory, and therefore came to the conclusion that these ideas were not developed by Chernyshevsky quite correctly.

Yurkevich writes that Chernyshevsky, speaking of egoism, does not describe egoism at all, but rather a certain moral height. He interprets Chernyshevsky's theory itself in such a way that he brings it to the point of absurdity: "... every person... treats the other as a thing."³²¹ It is quite logical that as a result of such an interpretation, the reviewer discovers contradictions in the thoughts of the "author": "Everything that reminds you of the sufferings of living beings evokes sadness in you – sadness not for yourself, but for a life that is completely alien to you."³²² But it would be incorrect to contrast this sadness with the egoistic beginning of human morality, as Yurkevich does.

Here the author also writes about the idea of public good, which meant a lot to Chernyshevsky and which is logically derived from the concept of rational egoism. Yurkevich considers the relationship between egoism and the pursuit of the public good ridiculous. Thus, the reviewer writes that "a man in spite of his egoism recognizes the right of living beings as such, therefore, their right to life, to the joys and benefits of life and why he is interested in their fates, why their sufferings and joys are reflected in his heart and cause in him sympathy, participation and love".³²³ But, as we noted earlier, the search for simple and clear explanations of moral phenomena leads to the fact that egoism is viewed exclusively in a negative way. Philosophical egoism is, first of all, the awareness of oneself as oneself and the difference between one's Self and others. And in the course of development, this desire turns into a desire for the development and perfection of mankind and, accordingly, into love for other people.

Yurkevich interprets Chernyshevsky's theory in this way, which concludes that a person demands that he renounce his own Self. However, in Chernyshevsky's work, it is the understanding of the Self as a value that becomes

³²¹ Ibidem. P. 78.

³²² Ibidem. P. 80.

³²³ Ibidem. P. 81.

the basis of morality, which he calls the theory of rational egoism, and which G.V. Plekhanov preferred to call altruism.

Yurkevich accuses Chernyshevsky of ideas from which the "writer" is extremely far from it: "You would like to kill in a person all attraction, all vitality and warmth."³²⁴ Such a conclusion is quite natural for a religious thinker as soon as he hears about the rejection of the concept of the soul, its immortality and free will. For the reviewer, the human body is probably an exclusively negative, evil moment, while the soul is a positive, good moment. It is logical that without a soul, such an evil material body will be devoid of a good principle. But here, too, there is criticism of the effect and ignorance of the cause. For Chernyshevsky, a viable human body in which there is no soul does not become something inhuman.

A few pages later, criticizing Chernyshevsky for a certain lack of spirituality, Yurkevich explains the reason for his attitude to the theory of the "writer":³²⁵ In other words, Yurkevich had literally invented some ideas and attributed them to Chernyshevsky. The author criticized this fantastic "compiler" in his article.

Continuing his criticism, the reviewer reproaches this "essayist" that he did not notice the difference between human and animal pleasures. Yurkevich writes about man that "his pleasures depend on the idea he has formed about the dignity of objects or the goals of his activity".³²⁶ In other words, man derives pleasure not so much from the direct satisfaction of physical desires as from the mediation of the *idea* between desire and reality. If a man sets himself the goal of becoming an ascetic, he will derive pleasure from his hunger, although this is contrary to his animal nature.

Summing up his article, Yurkevich defines Chernyshevsky's philosophy as "realism." This is all the more strange since the term "materialism" was encountered in the text of the article. At the same time, the author gives such

³²⁴ Ibidem. P. 87.

³²⁵ Ibidem. P. 88.

³²⁶ Ibidem. P. 89.

characteristics of the philosophy of the "writer" that one gets the impression of vulgar materialism. It is well known that Chernyshevsky was not a supporter of this type of materialism, but developed Feuerbach's anthropological materialism, supplementing it with Hegel's dialectics and his own political economy. In other words, Yurkevich did not criticize Chernyshevsky, but the way he himself read the article "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy."

Yurkevich reproaches Chernyshevsky for the "naïve belief" that chemistry studies things-in-themselves, and not phenomena. But the belief in the dualism of things in themselves and phenomena seems no less naïve. Chernyshevsky's monism and Yurkevich's dualism are based on different philosophical principles: Chernyshevsky is guided by *practice*, while Yurkevich is guided by religion.

Let us cite N.F. Utkina's judgment on the nature of Yurkevich's views on the philosophy of materialism and positivism: "But not all theologians confused materialism with positivism. P.D. Yurkevich appreciated positivism's interpretation of the subject of the natural sciences and noted with satisfaction that, from the point of view of positivism, the sciences are separated from metaphysics and deal with phenomena without touching their essence. Not only did he not identify positivist concepts with materialism, but he opposed them to materialism."³²⁷ We do not, however, see in "From the Science of the Human Spirit" a clear realization that materialism and positivism are irreducible to each other.

³²⁷ Utkina N.F. *Positivism, Anthropological Materialism and Science in Russia*. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1975. Pp. 56–57.

2.2 Dialogue on the "Anthropological Principle" in Articles by N.G. Chernyshevsky and M.N. Katkov³²⁸

In the article "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" (1860), N.G. Chernyshevsky set forth such an understanding of human nature, which caused a stormy polemic on the pages of the journals "Russian Herald", "Sovremennik", "Otechestvennye zapiski", "Russkoe slovo". Often this polemic took the form of an altercation rather than a scholarly dispute. But, despite the non-philosophical form of the dispute, it was philosophical in content, if only because the starting point for each of the two positions was the philosophical works of N.G. Chernyshevsky and P.D. Yurkevich.

Many journalists of that time (M.N. Katkov, D.I. Pisarev, S.S. Dudyshkin and others) took part in the polemics, who substantively adhered to one of two poles: to the point of view of N.G. Chernyshevsky or P.D. Yurkevich.

On this basis, the conclusion suggests itself that the views of the "school" of Chernyshevsky and the "school" of Yurkevich on the anthropological principle are reduced to materialism and idealism, respectively. But if we limit ourselves to this, then many of the arguments and counterarguments of the participants in the dispute will remain incomprehensible.

In accordance with this approach, it is easy to identify N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov and D.I. Pisarev as materialists, P.D. Yurkevich and M.N. Katkov as idealists, and P.L. Lavrov as eclecticists³²⁹³³⁰³³¹. And what is more

³²⁸ Chernykh A.A. Dialogue of Philosophical Schools on the "Anthropological Principle" in the Articles of N.G. Chernyshevsky and M.N. Katkov // Bulletin of Perm University. Philosophy. Psychology. Sociology. 2024. Iss. 1, pp. 5–15. <https://doi.org/10.17072/2078-7898/2024-1-5-15>.

³²⁹ Evlampiev I.I. Historical Significance of Russian Philosophy. Journal of Russian Philosophy and Culture. Vol. 27. Part I. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Publishing House. 2015. pp. 131–143.

³³⁰ Korobkova S.N. Realism in the system "Materialism - idealism": historical and philosophical aspect // Scientific Journal of the KubSAU, No113(09), 2015. Pp. 1410–1425.

important is that such a division into "philosophical parties" does not always reflect the essence of the positions of certain thinkers. This is already evident from F. Engels' remarks³³² on the philosophical views of L. Feuerbach, who in some questions turned out to be an idealist, in others – a materialist, in others – not quite a consistent materialist, etc. To understand the views of philosophers in a meaningful way, it is not enough to simply categorize them according to the basic question of philosophy or any other criterion. It is necessary to trace how and why certain thinkers put forward these or those arguments in favor of the position dictated by their school or direction.

For example, Katkov, to whom Yurkevich owes his popularity, solidarized with the author of the article "From the Science of the Human Spirit." But it is hardly on this basis that he can be equaled to Yurkevich. Katkov's argumentation in a certain sense seems original, also against the background of Yurkevich's critical remarks against Chernyshevsky.

The discussion between Chernyshevsky and Katkov within the framework of the more global polemic about the anthropological principle of 1860-1863 is interesting because this discussion - to put it in the language of logic - represents the *particular* through which the universal is clarified; that is, the particular that is *concretely universal*³³³. In other words, having analyzed the discussion between Chernyshevsky and Katkov, we will meaningfully express the philosophical essence of the polemics of 1860-1863 on the anthropological principle.

³³¹ Korobkova S.N. Realism and Anthropological Principle in Russian Philosophy // Scientific Journal of the Kuban State Agrarian University, No115(01), 2016. Pp. 391–404.

³³² Engels F. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy // Marx K., Engels F. Selected Works. In 3 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1979. Pp. 373–415.

³³³ Ilyenkov E.V. Dialectics of the abstract and concrete in scientific and theoretical thinking. Vol. 1. Moscow, Kanon+ Publ., 2019. Pp. 23–353.

In his article "Old Gods and New Gods," the publicist M. N. Katkov³³⁴ spoke ironically about the journalists of the *Sovremennik* for their views on philosophy and science: "Whoever pretends to be a thinker must not take on faith, without his own thought, anything from Mr. Askochensky, or from Mr. Buchner, or from Ivan Yakovlevich, or from Feuerbach."³³⁵ The mention of Feuerbach hints transparently at the anthropological materialism advocated by the representatives of Chernyshevsky's school. Katkov explicitly points out that Chernyshevsky and his supporters are inconsistent as thinkers because they "take Feuerbach's views on faith". From Katkov's point of view, "nihilists" like Chernyshevsky should have been more critical of their "authorities." One can assume that such a "critical" attitude - as Katkov would have wanted it to be - would naturally lead not only to a proper criticism of Feuerbach's ideas, but also to a complete or almost total rejection of them.

It seems, however, that the point is not so much that the Chernyshevsky school accepts Feuerbach's ideas without "its own thought," but rather that this own thought is not seen as valuable by Katkov. One might just as well criticize Feuerbach for "taking on faith" the ideas of P.A. Holbach and other French materialists. But it is obvious that such criticism is wrong, because Feuerbach, Chernyshevsky, and other philosophers brought their thoughts into the system of materialism. And Katkov surely understood this, but he perceived the philosophical approaches of any materialists as dogmatism in itself, because the original, from his point of view, ideas of I. Kant or Yurkevich do not even receive a proper dialog on the part of Chernyshevsky's school. Chernyshevsky and his school perceived their position as a strict adherence to scientific principles, on the basis of which other schools, following other principles, in their eyes looked like a retreat not from the "materialist dogma", but from the rigor of thinking and the achievements of science.

³³⁴ Katkov M.N. *Starye bogi i novye bogi* [Old Gods and New Gods]. Department: Literary Review and Notes. 1861. Vol. 31. January-February. Pp. 891–904.

³³⁵ *Ibidem*. P. 893.

Katkov writes that “senseless repetition of other people's thoughts, obscurantism in the name of knowledge, servility in the name of freedom, fanatical worship of idols created by our own ignorance in the name of enlightenment, desecration of thought at its source - this is what is repugnant, this is what is outrageous, this is what ... should excite indignation”³³⁶. In other words, following the ideas of Hegel and Feuerbach in the way that the school of Chernyshevsky does amounts to repeating the ideas of the German philosophers.

But the most curious thing here is that the two disputing schools reproach each other for the same thing: dogmatism, obscurantism, fanaticism, ignorance. Each of the two schools has its own authorities, the adherence to the principles of which turns out to be *dogmatism in the eyes of their opponents*. Chernyshevsky recognizes himself as a follower of Feuerbach, so he is dogmatic with regard to Feuerbach's ideas. Yurkevich is a Christian, therefore he is a dogmatist with regard to the truth of Revelation. on which their opponents rely turns out to be *obscurantism*, for it is obvious to some that Feuerbach is the foremost thinker of his time, and to others it is equally obvious that the Holy Scriptures are divinely inspired. Strict adherence to the fundamental principles of one's school takes the form of such stubbornness that it turns out to be *fanaticism*, because he does not take seriously the achievements of his opponents, and if he makes an attempt to get closer, he cannot understand the thoughts of his opponent.

It is obvious that the situation described is a problem. Starting from different starting points, each school turns out to be *right in its own way*. And it is quite possible that with different starting points it cannot be otherwise. In order to really speak the same language, that is, to call, for example, dogmatism, not mutually exclusive things, but one and the same thing, philosophers need to begin their philosophical search from one starting point. from one point of view. However, it is far from obvious that such unification is possible, and it is also not obvious that this unification would help philosophy to develop.

³³⁶ Ibidem. P. 894.

In the article "Old Gods and New Gods" Katkov criticizes the materialism of the Chernyshevsky school on the example of Antonovich's views. However, in form, this criticism is more like an altercation. As is often the case in Russian philosophy of the nineteenth century, the content has to be searched between the lines.

Thus, Katkov allegedly justifies the "doctrine of the materialists" and tries to present Antonovich as an opponent of materialism. However, it is obvious that both have rather the opposite meaning. Justifying materialism as a philosophical system, Katkov says that in the history of the development of philosophy, periods of materialism are natural and useful, but not in themselves, but only as a transient moment. That is, Katkov does not find his own meaning in this philosophy, but only a service one. Devaluing materialism as a philosophical school, Katkov views nineteenth-century German materialism as a painful reaction to "absolute" and "non-absolute" idealism. The editor of the Russian Herald treats materialism in Germany not as a valuable trend in itself, but as a stage that was necessary to overcome the crisis.

Calling Antonovich an opponent of materialism and even persuading him not to criticize materialism, Katkov is clearly ironic. In an effort to expose criticism of materialism, Antonovich, according to Katkov, becomes too demanding of his opponents, who, according to Antonovich, should themselves express active criticism, but for some reason do not do so or do not do it enough.

Katkov claims that Antonovich does not think independently, but only retells the ideas of his authorities. This could be seen as nothing more than irony, but it seems that Katkov seriously criticizes Antonovich for his lack of originality and lack of his own thought. Therefore, Katkov writes that when Antonovich begins to think independently, the author of the *Sovremennik* will change his attitude to materialism and idealism. that a philosopher who stands on the position of materialism, as it were, does not notice everything, misses something important that cannot be noticed if one stubbornly follows "oracles" like Feuerbach. It is well known that Chernyshevsky's school did not recognize the ontological status of the

spirit (in the words of E.V. Ilyenkov, the ideal) *as an immortal soul* . Recognition of the spirit as a product of thought, of psychic activity, is not enough for a thinker like Katkov. For him, it is essential that the soul is not just in human perception, but objectively exists: it exists in approximately the same way as material objects exist in the world. (ideal) for Katkov seems to be a lack of understanding of the very essence of philosophy, ontology, and the universe. And in order to understand (accept) that spirit or the ideal exists as an independent being, independent of matter, a philosopher like Antonovich must first abandon the attitude according to which the independence of the being of spirit is denied, and then reflect on the question of the nature of spirit or the ideal independently. With a consistent comprehension of this question, according to Katkov, the philosopher will come to the position that he and Yurkevich hold.

Disputing the point of view according to which "nihilism" in relation to beliefs and prejudices is the prerogative of materialism, Katkov writes: "There are idealist systems that lead thought to such nihilism as the most desperate of materialists cannot imagine."³³⁷ Here Katkov clearly speaks in plain text, without trying to hurt his opponent. Speaking of the possibility of idealist "nihilism," Katkov argues that the difference between the two philosophical schools is not that one denies beliefs and the other defends them. This does not apply at all to the division of philosophers into idealists and materialists. In other words, not only materialists, according to Katkov, deny obsolete prejudices, but also idealists, and in their nihilism they may be even more radical than the school of Chernyshevsky.

Continuing this theme, Katkov writes: "On the other hand, materialist schools are not at all so hostile to all kinds of beliefs. Holding a porter with a stern face on the front porch, materialistic schools cordially receive a multitude of beliefs from another entrance. Does Mr. Antonovich know that materialism has its own mythology, which is much more enslaving to minds than that which is naively

³³⁷ Ibidem. P. 896.

born from the bosom of Mother Earth?"³³⁸ One might think that mythology is understood as a kind of fantastic narrative, but it is clearly not about taking certain plots and stories on faith, but rather about believing certain philosophical and worldview attitudes. Accordingly, the “mythology” of materialism about the non-self-existence of the spirit comes to the fore. This “myth” is followed by others, some of which were often criticized by materialists themselves in the XIX-XX centuries. For example, the “myth” about the nature of thinking as a movement of substance in the brain really follows from the denial of the independence of the being of spirit. But even Chernyshevsky did not accept such extremes of vulgar materialism, partly because such vulgar “myths” do not follow from the first “myth” with necessity, but are merely deducible: vulgar conclusions are not natural, but merely epistemologically possible.

This begs the question of whether philosophy without “mythology” is possible at all, that is, without “mythology” *at all*. If we put the question in this way, we can say that Katkov criticizes the Chernyshevsky school for the “mythology” of science, while the Chernyshevsky school understands this “mythology” as more perfect than the “mythology” of religion. Katkov believes that the Chernyshevsky school misinterprets the very concept of science, and the Chernyshevsky school believes that Katkov and Yurkevich overemphasize the importance of religion in philosophical and scientific pursuits.

For the Chernyshevsky school, the understanding of the derivation of spirit from matter is sufficient to explain the universe, while for Katkov and Yurkevich such an understanding of spirit is incomplete, truncated, and therefore gives a distorted picture of the world, in which one of the most important aspects of being (spirit) is simply not fully explained.

Katkov levels the “partisanship of philosophy” by reducing any philosophy to philosophy as such. Idealism and materialism in this case, from his point of view, turn out to be types of philosophy that are in the same field, but as if on

³³⁸ Ibidem. P. 896.

different hierarchical levels. According to Katkov, Yurkevich's idealism is better than the materialism of the Chernyshevsky school, not because they look at the same thing differently, but because the Chernyshevsky school simply sees less than Yurkevich. Yurkevich sees the spirit, while Chernyshevsky's school ignores it, taking it to be just one of the movements of matter.

Chernyshevsky, on the other hand, upholds the *principle of partisanship*, thus divorcing materialism and idealism not merely as different levels of the hierarchy of philosophizing, but as fundamentally different positions, one of which is scientific, progressive, and true, and the other anti-scientific, regressive, and false. Such a sharp attitude to the opponent's philosophical party in Chernyshevsky is explained precisely by the fact that, according to the principle of partisanship, philosophers of different parties (schools, trends) *look at the same thing differently*.

But Chernyshevsky's principle of partisanship of philosophy is not reduced to exalting one philosophical tradition and devaluing another. The principle of partisanship consists first of all in the fact that the difference between materialism and idealism is thought of as a difference in the very first step that a philosopher takes on the path of his philosophizing. In answering the basic question of philosophy, the thinker defines himself into one of the two parties. The further questions that the thinker faces and the answers he gives to them are not unimportant, but the main meaning of the principle of partisanship lies precisely in the basic question and not in all philosophical questions in general.

Idealism and materialism begin their philosophical search from different starting points, so they come to different conclusions. This leads to the fact that the materialist in the eyes of the idealist simplifies the picture of being, and the idealist in the eyes of the materialist - invent non-existent aspects of being. It is not at all accidental that in the materialist tradition there are tendencies towards utilitarianism, and in the idealist tradition towards creativity (in the sense of art).

In the context of the principle of partisanship of philosophy and the basic question of philosophy, it is important to note that they do not always coincide. Thus, when analyzing the views of Katkov and Chernyshevsky, it is easy to see

that Katkov sympathizes with Kant's agnosticism, i.e. cognitive pessimism, while Chernyshevsky stands on the position of Hegelian dialectics, i.e. cognitive optimism. That said, it is obvious that both Kant and Hegel were idealists (if one defines their "party" by the basic question). However, the classification into Hegelians and Kantians in the context of Chernyshevsky and Katkov turns out to be no less important than the classification into materialists and idealists.

Responding to Katkov's criticism, Chernyshevsky writes the article "Polemical Beauties. Collection One"³³⁹. In the context of the polemics, many issues are touched upon (including non-philosophical ones), but we will pay attention to those that relate to the discussion of the anthropological principle.

Objecting to the thesis that Chernyshevsky and his school do not have a "thought of their own" but only repeat what Feuerbach said, Chernyshevsky jokingly agrees with this: "With such a vacillation of mind, as I have just read, I agree with it. And above all other defects of mind and character, I am also gifted with talkativeness: I absolutely cannot remain silent about anything."³⁴⁰ In a sarcastic manner, Chernyshevsky recounts Katkov's criticism: "unsteadiness of mind" forces Chernyshevsky to agree with Feuerbach's views, without forming his own opinion, but on the other hand, by virtue of his "talkativeness", he constantly retells what he has read from the German philosopher. to tell his opponent that in reality the situation is quite different. Chernyshevsky says that the works of Feuerbach which he read were received critically (as Katkov wanted), but this criticism did not lead Chernyshevsky to renounce Feuerbach's ideas, but only to assimilate and rework them. That is, in Katkov's eyes, it turns out that Chernyshevsky was not able to approach Feuerbach's ideas to the proper degree. Chernyshevsky, on the other hand, says that it was precisely for this reason that he accepted these ideas, that he approached them properly and critically.

³³⁹ Chernyshevsky N.G. Polemical beauties // Chernyshevsky N.G. Complete works: In 15 vol. Vol. 7. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo khudozhestvennoy literatury, 1950. pp. 707–732.

³⁴⁰ Ibidem. P. 708.

In the context of "idols", "old and new gods", Chernyshevsky moves from clearly sarcastic irony to a more serious tone: "... That part of the public who disagree with us, seeing in us many shortcomings, did not think in any way that we erected idols. That is why the article in the *Russky Vestnik* comes out no more than amusing to that part of the public who sympathize with us – the point of the accusation is poorly chosen. We erect idols! "Do me a favor, blame us for this more often and more."³⁴¹ Chernyshevsky finds this point of Katkov's criticism far-fetched. If Katkov seriously sees Feuerbach as an idol of Chernyshevsky's school, Chernyshevsky himself sees him as nothing more than an advanced philosopher *of his time*. Chernyshevsky does not view Feuerbach's philosophy outside of time and history. In other words, if Chernyshevsky were to respond to this thesis seriously, he might say that just as he "worships" Feuerbach, in the same way that Katkov venerates, for example, Kant or Yurkevich. Each of the two schools "worships" those thinkers who are at the moment cutting edge, but only for the moment. That is, if the Chernyshevsky school is guilty of idolatry, then all the other "schools" do not differ from it on this point. To this Katkov would object that he perceives the philosophy of Kant and Yurkevich critically, while Chernyshevsky treats the works of Feuerbach uncritically. A truly critical attitude, according to Katkov, must inevitably lead to Katkov's point of view. But the same can be stated with regard to Chernyshevsky. In both cases, however, the point is not the uncritical view that proclaims itself to be critical, but the starting point, from which one cannot come to conclusions other than those to which Chernyshevsky and Katkov arrive. The point is that Chernyshevsky and Katkov - in the language of hermeneutics - by the time of their "critical" analysis of this or that text (be it a work by Kant, Yurkevich, or Feuerbach), they already have a certain *preunderstanding*, have already formed *prejudices* about the question, phenomenon, or subject being analyzed.

³⁴¹ Ibidem. P. 715.

With regard to Yurkevich's article, fragments of which were reprinted in *Russky Vestnik* with comments by Katkov, Chernyshevsky expressed himself as follows: "The excerpt is preceded by a preface from the *Russky Vestnik* itself: I read this preface and was content with it."³⁴² Behind the form of the polemics there is again concealed the substantive side of the disagreements between Katkov and Yurkevich and the school of Chernyshevsky. There is no doubt that Chernyshevsky must have read his critic's article in its entirety. But Chernyshevsky saw no point in arguing about details when the problem lies at the foundation, in the system-forming principle. probably impossible for censorship reasons. But it cannot be said that the dispute did not take place. The demonstrative refusal to discuss is precisely the essence of the debate. It can be said that "dissecting" the philosophical system of one's opponent is not in the spirit of that time, so in the event that it would be necessary to get to the very foundations of Yurkevich's philosophical system, Chernyshevsky said that he would not even read the work of his critic.

Yurkevich presented a point of view according to which the physiological activity of a person should be studied empirically, and psychological activity by the method of introspection (self-observation). Moreover, it is inadmissible to mix the methods of research of physiology and psychology, according to Yurkevich, since the subjects of study in each of the fields simply do not lend themselves to an adequate explanation of an inappropriate method. Chernyshevsky, on the other hand, insists, as can be seen from *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy*, on the necessity of a combination of methods of investigation.

In the epistemological respect, the contradiction is clearly visible here not so much between idealism and materialism as between dualism and monism. The demand to divide being into two principles and in no case to confuse them goes back to Descartes's understanding of substances. The demand to consider being as a single substance with two attributes goes back to Spinoza's monism.

³⁴² Ibidem. P. 725.

Allegorically expressing the essence of the epistemological disagreements between Yurkevich and Katkov with the school of Chernyshevsky, we can say that Yurkevich is Descartes, and Chernyshevsky is Spinoza.

Chernyshevsky recalls his seminary past, justifying his knowledge of the philosophy of the direction that Yurkevich adheres to: "I myself am a seminarian. I know from experience the position of people who are brought up as Mr. Yurkevich was brought up."³⁴³ Developing the theme of seminary influence on the way of thinking, Chernyshevsky writes: "All of us seminarians wrote exactly the same as Mr. Yurkevich wrote. If you like, I can deliver to the editors of *Russky Vestnik* the so-called seminary "problems," that is, essays, small dissertations, which I wrote when I was in the philosophical class of the Saratov seminary."³⁴⁴ An example of such problems can be seen in the work of V.K. Kantor³⁴⁵. If earlier Katkov had reproached Chernyshevsky and his school for the lack of "their own thought," now Chernyshevsky expressed the same reproach. but in relation to Yurkevich.

Katkov refused Chernyshevsky's offer to deliver the seminary "tasks." It seems that this was an opportunity for Katkov to prove on factual material that Chernyshevsky was mistaken in his following words: "We know how these things are written, what is written in these things, that is, we seminarians know this."³⁴⁶ But the rejection of *Russkoye Vestnik* testifies to the fact that either this proposal was perceived as a meaningless mockery, or that Katkov is convinced that Yurkevich had "his own thought" in addition to his seminary education, or that Chernyshevsky was right in his assessment of Yurkevich as a thinker who was exceptionally faithful to the seminarian traditions of the time.

³⁴³ Ibidem. P. 725.

³⁴⁴ Ibidem. P. 726.

³⁴⁵ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The Fate of Nikolay Chernyshevsky*. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 52–56.

³⁴⁶ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Polemical beauties // Chernyshevsky N.G. Complete works: In 15 vol. Vol. 7*. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo khudozhestvennoy literatury, 1950. P. 726.

Clearly comparing Yurkevich with himself, Chernyshevsky writes: "If Mr. Yurkevich's position changes, he will very soon become unpleasant to recall his article."³⁴⁷ Apparently, Chernyshevsky draws a parallel between Yurkevich's work and his own seminary "tasks", in which there really could be no original thought. Thus, Chernyshevsky saw the point of contact between the two schools not in the original ontological and gnoseological points (because here the difference is obvious), but in the possibility of dialog through acquaintance with each other's "authorities": "I do not know how old Mr. Yurkevich is; if he is no longer a young man, it is too late to care about him. But if he is still a young man, I will gladly offer him the small stock of books I have at my disposal"³⁴⁸. It is unlikely that the books from Chernyshevsky's personal library would have contributed to the 35-year-old Yurkevich's becoming a materialist. Nevertheless, this gesture should be viewed not as part of a polemic, but as a disposition towards a potential like-minded person and an attempt to enter into dialogue, not a conflict.

In the June issue of the "Russian Herald" there was an article by Katkov "On the "Polemical Beauties" in the "Sovremennik"³⁴⁹". The author, following Chernyshevsky, touched upon many questions, but we will dwell on those that are related to the polemics about the anthropological principle and Yurkevich's article.

Katkov pays great attention to Chernyshevsky's words that he has not read the article "From the Science of the Human Spirit": "Why is he so eager to assure the public that he has not read and will not read the articles of his critic? After all, it's worse that he hasn't read and doesn't want to read."³⁵⁰ But Katkov provides evidence from which it can be deduced that Chernyshevsky did read Yurkevich's article. And here he also writes: "They point out to him, for example, a book or a writer on the subject about which he is talking - not some silly and unknown book,

³⁴⁷ Ibidem. P. 726.

³⁴⁸ Ibidem. P. 725.

³⁴⁹ Katkov M.N. On the Occasion of "Polemical Beauties" in the "Sovremennik" // *Russkii Vestnik*. Department: Literary Review and Notes. 1861. T. 33. May–June. Pp. 138–158.

³⁵⁰ Ibidem. P. 141.

not some unknown writer, who cannot but take note of, at least to refute (*italics mine*. - A.Ch.) - Mr. Chernyshevsky replies: "I haven't read any of this and I don't want to read it; I know in advance that it is nonsense"³⁵¹. Katkov also insists on the need for dialogue, but, like Chernyshevsky, proposes it on his own terms. Chernyshevsky suggests that Yurkevich read books from his home library, and Katkov that he familiarize himself with his seminary "tasks." Katkov suggests that Chernyshevsky read Yurkevich's article, admit that he has read it, and either agree with what he has written, or enter into a scholarly dispute. and Katkov will write his seminary "tasks," and Chernyshevsky will not write a refutation of Yurkevich. The question arises: can we consider that the dialogue as such did not take place at all, or whether the considered polemics represent the maximum that was possible for these two schools? The caustic ironic polemics between Katkov and Chernyshevsky's school cannot formally be considered either a discussion, much less a dialogue: it seems that each of them is conducting a monologue, trying to interrupt the opponent. But in terms of its content, the discussion did take place, although it could not become a full-fledged dialogue.

In proof of this thesis, two episodes from Katkov's June article can be cited as an example. Katkov tries to level out the methodological difference between the philosophical views of Chernyshevsky and Yurkevich: "In fact, Mr. Yurkevich does not deny what Messrs. Chernyshevsky and Antonovich believe in this way; But in addition to this, he admits something else that these gentlemen do not allow, do not admit precisely because of the feeling of a blind cult that forbids the use of one's own thought."³⁵² This aspect of the problem was considered above in connection with Katkov's February article, but here we will only note that the attempt to exclude the partisan nature of philosophy from analysis is one of the ways in which Katkov tried to enter into a dialogue. cult", which should be abandoned. In other words, materialism, according to Katkov, looks at being too

³⁵¹ Ibidem. P. 142.

³⁵² Ibidem. P. 144.

narrowly. According to the principle of the party principle, materialism does not look narrowly, but simply differently from idealism. Probably, Katkov should not devalue this approach, but accept it as a full-fledged one, so that dialogue becomes possible.

Instead, Katkov takes certain propositions from the philosophy of Chernyshevsky's school and reduces them to the point of absurdity: "In those articles of Mr. Chernyshevsky which Mr. Yurkevich analyses, it has been proved very convincingly that the character of sensations depends on the nature of food. perhaps also the nature of opinions?.." ³⁵³ Of course, Katkov became ironic not because he does not understand, but because he does not accept Chernyshevsky's ideas about the derivation of spirit from matter.

Chernyshevsky, having the experience of studying in the Saratov seminary and also the experience of believing in God (he became an atheist not earlier than the age of 20), could not but understand Yurkevich's and Katkov's point of view. Chernyshevsky's defiant remarks about Yurkevich's work do not represent a disregard for the personality of his critic or a poor acquaintance with philosophical idealism, but a form of discussion against the worldview with which he fundamentally diverged in its very foundations and from which he had once abandoned in favor of another worldview, in favor of anthropological materialism, which goes back to Feuerbach.

Katkov, while not accepting this new world-view as a complete world-view (for materialism does not take into account the spirit in its independent sense), insisted on a revision of that "defect" which, from his point of view, there is in materialism. It may be stated that in the nineteenth century materialist philosophy had not yet been as thoroughly developed as idealist philosophy (there was no alternative to German classical philosophy yet). However, in the 20th century, this very "deficiency" was sought to be filled by analyzing the problem of the ideal. In

³⁵³ Ibidem. Pp. 155–156.

the works of E.V. Ilyenkov³⁵⁴ and M.A. Lifshitz³⁵⁵, this really non-far-fetched problem was developed in detail.

2.3 D.I. Pisarev against the "scholasticism" of P.D. Yurkevich and Russian journals of the 60s of the XIX century

Pisarev's article "Scholasticism of the Nineteenth Century," published in 1861 in the journal *Russkoye Slovo*, is a significant episode in the discussion of the anthropological principle and the partisan nature of philosophy. For an adequate understanding of this work, it is necessary to pay attention to how researchers evaluate Pisarev's philosophical views. This is all the more necessary, since the article under consideration was the thinker's transition from Enlightenment ideas to revolutionary-democratic ones.

A.N. Maslin writes that Pisarev was influenced by the ideas of positivism, but remained a materialist: "Emphasizing the worldview significance of natural science sometimes means in a certain sense materialistically interpreted positivist trends."³⁵⁶ A.A. Galaktionov and P.F. Nikandrov evaluate Pisarev's philosophy as a previous stage in the formation of Marxist ontology: "Pisarev was essentially a materialist metaphysician; dialectics appears in him only spontaneously, and that mainly in the field of natural sciences, when he considers the development in the plant and animal world"³⁵⁷. V.S. Nikonenko, considering Pisarev's "realism" as a

³⁵⁴ Ilyenkov E.V. *Dialectics of the ideal* // Ilyenkov E.V. *Collected works*. Vol. 5. Moscow: Kanon +, 2021. pp. 16–85.; Ilyenkov E.V. *Ideal* // Ilyenkov E.V. *Collected works*. Vol. 6. Moscow: Kanon+, 2022. pp. 68–93. (In Russian)

³⁵⁵ Lifshitz M.A. *Dialogue with Evald Ilyenkov. (The Problem of the Ideal)*. Moscow, Progress-Traditsiya Publ., 2003. 368 p. (In Russian)

³⁵⁶ Maslin A.N. *Pisarev D.I. // History of philosophy in the USSR*. In 5 vol. Vol. 3. / ed. by Evgrafov V.E. Moscow: Nauka, 1968. P. 140.

³⁵⁷ Galaktionov A.A., Nikandrov P.F. *Russkaya filosofiya XI–XIX vekov* [Russian philosophy of the XI–XIX centuries]. Leningrad, Nauka Publ., 1970. P. 419.

continuation of the philosophy of Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov, emphasizes the importance of careful study: "Contradictory assessments of Pisarev's philosophical views become possible if individual articles of the thinker fall into the field of view of the researcher. even if they are the most important, and also if we do not take into account the peculiarities of the expression of his philosophical views."³⁵⁸

In the context of the polemics around the "Anthropological Principle in Philosophy", it is especially important to bear in mind the following remark by Nikonenko, in which the researcher opposes the devaluation of the philosophy of "realism": "Pisarev's 'anti-theoretical' statements are directed against scholasticism, the theoretical stupidity of the Dudyshkins and N. Ko, against reactionary concepts."³⁵⁹

Pisarev's polemical work "Scholasticism of the Nineteenth Century" is divided into two articles, each of which appeared in 1861 in the journal *Russkoye Slovo*. Chapters I-X are dated May 12, and chapters XI-XVII are dated September 3.

In the first part Pisarev expressed his attitude to the journal "criticism" contemporary with him, expressing at the same time his views on the problem of the partisanship of philosophy and outlining some remarks on Lavrov's views and Antonovich's methods of criticism. It was in this connection that Lavrov penned his article "To My Critics."

In the second part, the author speaks more definitely about the journalists of *Otechestvennye Zapiski* who criticized Chernyshevsky and, accordingly, also materialism, "realism" and "nihilism". Among such authors Pisarev names Albertini, Bestuzhev-Ryumin, and Dudyshkin. In addition, Pisarev mentions *Russky Vestnik* and, in some individual chapters, Yurkevich.

³⁵⁸ Nikonenko V.S. *Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, D.I. Pisarev*. Leningrad, Leningrad University Publ., 1983. P. 83.

³⁵⁹ *Ibidem*. P. 88.

In other words, Pisarev speaks out against the “scholasticism” of the journals *Russky Vestnik* and *Otechestvennye Zapiski*, as well as such thinkers as Yurkevich and Lavrov. The reporter of “*Russkiy Slovo*” agrees with the worldview of Chernyshevsky and Antonovich. It is necessary to consider the described essay in detail.

Criticizing “scholasticism”, Pisarev touches upon the problem of the effectiveness of journalism today: “People who write forget that they write not for themselves, but for society”³⁶⁰. As a result, the reading public follows not the struggle of ideas that have been developed by thinkers, but the “scandalous side” of journalistic polemics. Further, Pisarev opposes illusions about the influence of Russian magazines on the consciousness of the people. The sixties man emphasizes that “about the influence on the common people... It's ridiculous to say. Our people, of course, do not know what is written and discussed about them, and probably will not know about it for another thirty years.”³⁶¹ Pisarev expresses doubt as to whether journalism has been able to solve at least one practical problem relating to the life of the people.

Theoretical activity cannot change the life of the “people”, whose representatives not only could not understand the articles published in the magazines of the 60s of the XIX century due to lack of education, but also almost never knew elementary grammar, that is, they could not read. Accordingly, Pisarev's statement that “citizens are educated by life, not by books”³⁶² is true. Journalism in general cannot bring the theorist closer to the “people”; for this it is necessary to live among them and have common interests with them.

In a fragment of text cut out by the censorship, Pisarev evaluated the Russian peasant as such a representative of society who “is not yet able to rise to the concept of his own personality, to rise to rational egoism and to respect for his

³⁶⁰ Pisarev D.I. Scholasticism of the XIX century // Pisarev D.I. Works. In 4 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1955. P. 98.

³⁶¹ *Ibidem*. P. 99.

³⁶² *Ibidem*. P. 100.

*own self*³⁶³. In these words one can recognize reflections of the ethical theory that Chernyshevsky and Lavrov were developing in parallel.

In the same fragment, Pisarev proposes a strategy for educating the people, that is, for the propaganda of rational egoism. After the deleted part of the text, the words follow: "This middle class, humanized by universal ideas, can become an intermediary between the leading figures of Russian thought and our younger brothers, the peasants."³⁶⁴

At the beginning of Chapter IV, Pisarev formulates the goal of Russian journalism and its target audience. The purpose of journalism, according to Pisarev, is to shatter the prejudices of its audience and "to help it develop a rational worldview."³⁶⁵ But it is not conceivable for magazines to influence the way of thinking of mature people, and therefore the target audience should consist of "people who are young and fresh, people capable of embracing the truth and renouncing paternal delusions"³⁶⁶. Although there is a sound kernel in these arguments, it should be noted that it has a clearly populist and enlightenment character, that is, partly utopian.

These arguments about the tasks of journalism and the strategy of enlightenment may seem far from questions of philosophy proper, from the problems of the partisan nature of philosophy and the anthropological principle. But it is with this that Pisarev begins the exposition of his materialist view of the world, man, and society. If Chernyshevsky in "The Anthropological Principle" approached the question from afar, speaking first about the connection between political and philosophical views, about the material unity of the world, then Pisarev defends materialism and criticizes "scholasticism" (idealism), beginning with an exposition of the strategy for conducting journalistic activity. As far as we

³⁶³ Ibidem. P. 101.

³⁶⁴ Ibidem. P. 101.

³⁶⁵ Ibidem. P. 102.

³⁶⁶ Ibidem. P. 102.

can see, it is necessary to pay attention to these accents in order to better understand the views of Chernyshevsky and Pisarev.

Developing the idea of the partisan nature of philosophy, Pisarev criticizes "reasonable people" who are trying to find the golden mean. However, "the neutrality that reasonable people try to maintain is in essence an optical illusion."³⁶⁷ Such optical self-deception can be found in the work of Lavrov, who tried to stay outside of materialism and idealism, explaining this desire by the fact that both parties are "metaphysical" and therefore unscientific.

Touching upon the theme of literature, Pisarev expresses a judgment about the middle class as the main actor of social transformations. "The struggle of ideas, not personalities, the clash of concepts and views are possible only in this class"³⁶⁸. On the one hand, this is what explains the predominance of middle-class people as heroes in literature. On the other hand, the author emphasizes the significance of this class in the ideological and, consequently, political struggle. Pisarev also writes about the psychological significance of this selection of heroes: "Being predominantly concerned with the middle class, our fine literature turns its attention not so much to society as to the human personality"³⁶⁹. In this way, literature reflects "the phenomena of Russian life."

Further, the author emphasizes that "criticism" should not invent new phenomena that do not exist in life, but only follow literature, which, in Pisarev's opinion, copes with its task. Thus, he writes that "criticism can only discuss existing phenomena, express the needs prevailing in society, and not generate new phenomena."³⁷⁰ It is important to understand that the author is not trying to belittle the importance of "criticism", but only indicates its role. Moreover, Pisarev speaks disparagingly of those "miserable people" who prefer "strict systematicity" and the construction of theories to feeling and life. But in such words the author criticizes

³⁶⁷ Ibidem. P. 104.

³⁶⁸ Ibidem. P. 107.

³⁶⁹ Ibidem. P. 107.

³⁷⁰ Ibidem. P. 108.

not the system and theory in general, but idealism, which places systems and theories above the reality in which man exists, that is, in material substance, in nature broadly understood.

In accordance with the understanding that in the formation of a worldview reality is more important *than theoretical constructions*, Pisarev speaks about the nature of the Patriotic War of 1812 and the actions of the people in a materialistic and even somewhat utilitarian way: "These millions rise not in order, it seems to me, to defend some general idea, but in order to protect their personal interests."³⁷¹

In the context of the difference between living feeling and idealistic theories, Pisarev puts the problem of his contemporary journalism as follows: "We have been bored by phrases, we have embarked on dialectics, we have revived scholasticism"³⁷². That is, instead of the "real deed", "words and abstractions" are discussed: in a spirit close to the Middle Ages.

Speaking out against the "theory", Pisarev draws attention to the fact that hardly anyone would dispute the following proposition: "Respect the human personality in yourself and in others"³⁷³. But it turns out to be difficult to apply such a truth, obvious in theory, in practice: "... look around you – you will encounter contradictions to this simple rule of practical morality at every step; look into the history of mankind, and you will be convinced that it has not even theoretically grasped this idea"³⁷⁴. From this circumstance Pisarev derives the rule that "*the application of a principal to a case is much more important than the principle itself* (italics mine. - A.Ch.)"³⁷⁵. It could be argued that in order to apply the principle, it is necessary to grasp the principle on a theoretical level. But here, as in the case of Chernyshevsky's texts, the author focuses on what is most important to him, even if this emphasis seems to lead to a transition from one

³⁷¹ Ibidem. P. 110.

³⁷² Ibidem. P. 111.

³⁷³ Ibidem. P. 112.

³⁷⁴ Ibidem. P. 112.

³⁷⁵ Ibidem. P. 112.

extreme to another, no less dubious, extreme. but only in shape: in order to straighten a bent stick, you first have to bend it in the opposite direction.

It is the implementation of principles in practice that Pisarev considers the most important problem, since, in his opinion, disagreements rarely arise about these principles. Whoever does not agree with us on the basis of it, we consider any dispute to be completely useless." ³⁷⁶That is why Pisarev sees no need for serious polemics either with *Russky Vestnik*, or with *Otechestvennye Zapiski*, or with Yurkevich.

Emphasizing the usefulness and vitality of the materialist view, as well as the abstractness and fantasy of the idealist view, Pisarev offers a relativistic view of beauty. For example, he asserts that "there is no absolute beauty"³⁷⁷ and that "the concept of beauty lies in the personality of the appreciator, not in the object itself."³⁷⁸ Pisarev further expresses this thought with the formula: "Beauty is felt, not measured by an arshin"³⁷⁹. And although such a view cannot be considered necessary for materialism, it can nevertheless be deduced from the materialist understanding of the world and man. Pisarev is aware of the dependence of the aesthetic feeling on the activity of the brain, so he asserts that the "syllogisms", from which it follows that a work is artistic, do not matter if it "did not affect my nervous system".³⁸⁰

Related to this position on the perception of artworks by individuals is the claim that "a strictly held theory necessarily leads to the constraint of the individual"³⁸¹. According to Pisarev, if we put theory above personality, this leads to the fact that the personality tortures itself for the sake of an idea, theory, prejudices. In accordance with this understanding, the provision on the

³⁷⁶ Ibidem. P. 112.

³⁷⁷ Ibidem. P. 115.

³⁷⁸ Ibidem. P. 115.

³⁷⁹ Ibidem. P. 115.

³⁸⁰ Ibidem. P. 115.

³⁸¹ Ibidem. P. 116.

inadmissibility of directing the artist's work is also in accord. Pisarev asserts that a man of art can neither be "pushed" nor "dragged away". In accordance with these words, the author reproaches "Mr. Bova" (Dobrolyubov) for trying to "harness poetry to a cart"³⁸². But it seems that in this matter the truth lies somewhere in the middle.

Further, Pisarev writes: "Our time is decidedly not favorable for the development of theories. The people have become more cunning, as our peasants say, and they do not fall for anything."³⁸³ Pisarev understands by the word theory not any theoretical construction, but namely idealistic concepts, such as Hegel's philosophical system. Pisarev contrasts such theory with "modern, healthy and fresh materialism"³⁸⁴, which to a greater extent corresponds to the spirit of the Russian peasant and the whole people. that "we have little understanding of the enthusiasm and mysticism of the passionate adept"³⁸⁵.

In the ethical sphere, the rejection of the idealist theory and the adoption of a materialist view of the world leads to rational egoism. It is worth saying that the distinction between rational egoism and egoism in the ordinary sense are different phenomena that differ in the degree of their development not only in the philosophy of Chernyshevsky, but also in the views of Pisarev. A journalist for *Russkoye Slovo* writes: "If everyone in the strict sense were egoists in their convictions, ... Without creating for yourself artificial concepts of ideal and duty, and without interfering in other people's affairs, then, indeed, then it would be freer to live in the world than now, when hundreds of people have been taking care of you almost from the cradle of a hundred people..."³⁸⁶. In other terms, the consistent implementation of the theory of reasonable egoism in practice contributes to a more favorable existence and productive development of society, without

³⁸² Ibidem. P. 118.

³⁸³ Ibidem. P. 118.

³⁸⁴ Ibidem. P. 118.

³⁸⁵ Ibidem. P. 118.

³⁸⁶ Ibidem. P. 119.

sacrificing the individual and his freedom. Of course, it was impossible to realize such a thing in Russia in the 19th century, but Chernyshevsky and Pisarev were confident that society could develop to an appropriate level in the future.

In the sphere of science, according to Pisarev, idealism leads to the fact that “the element of fantasy” is “played out in someone else's field.” In other words, idealistic constructions represent the antipode of scientificity. But if fantasy remains in its own status, that is, understood as artistic fiction, it does not and cannot do humanity and science any harm.

Solving the question of the purpose (meaning) of life, Pisarev gives a different answer than Chernyshevsky and Lavrov. While the latter two thinkers believed that life acquires a high meaning when an individual brings benefit to mankind, Pisarev's view is much simpler: “...do not ask about the purpose; the purpose itself will be found, and life will solve the questions before you propose them”³⁸⁷. Pisarev's view should be recognized as quite sensible, but it seems rash to put an end to it; it would be necessary to supplement it with statements from the philosophy of Chernyshevsky and Lavrov, which we have mentioned. In other words, life itself (reality) is ahead of man in the attainment of truth, the truth is already in life, and man only follows this real truth. Accordingly, he always seems to be late. This is Pisarev's rightness. But at the same time, humanity is a part of "life," and therefore there can be nothing more significant in the life of the individual than to bring reality to its own truth. This is the rightness of Chernyshevsky and Lavrov.

Further, Pisarev raises the problem of the correlation between egoism and goodness in man: "... How can these egoistic principles be reconciled with love for humanity? There's nothing to worry about. Man is by nature a very good creature.”³⁸⁸ Thus, if we do not put before the individual various requirements that we observe throughout almost the entire history of mankind, then man will be

³⁸⁷ Ibidem. P. 120.

³⁸⁸ Ibidem. P. 120.

good. Such an understanding of human nature resembles Rousseau's concept of the natural state, and Pisarev draws attention to this. But Pisarev goes further than the French thinker, as he notes "that savages live under such conditions, which interfere with the free development of character."³⁸⁹ Among such conditions, the journalist of the "Russian Word" singles out a) the threat from nature, to which the savage has not yet fully adapted, b) superstitions and prejudices, c) the desire for the ideal. In other words, Pisarev presents the development of society in three stages: 1) a savage state in which man is at the mercy of nature and *theories*, 2) a civilized man who has been able to conquer nature so much that he is not afraid of it, but has not freed himself from his *theories*, 3) a man who will develop to such an extent that he will be able to reject *theories*. Thus, Pisarev writes that "the emancipation of the individual and respect for his independence is the last product of later civilization."³⁹⁰

As far as we can see, nature is not such a significant obstacle to the development of mankind as the product of people themselves – theories, that is, prejudices and ideals. "Theoreticians do not care about what is available; They say: this is how it should be."³⁹¹ Pisarev reproaches the idealists for not conforming their concepts to reality, but on the contrary: they want to "remake" reality into their own concepts. *The idealist imagines the world to be different, and the materialist realizes the world in its existence and makes it different in practice.*

Thus, the adversary of materialism turns out to be an idealistic theory. Pisarev wrote that "in practical life we are all materialists and all go at odds with our theories"³⁹². Therefore, the materialist does not enter into contradiction when he is engaged in philosophy or science, since his practice corresponds to the materialist theory. The idealist, on the other hand, cannot connect practice and theory, which is why for him "the ideal serves as an eternal reproach and a constant

³⁸⁹ Ibidem. P. 121.

³⁹⁰ Ibidem. P. 121.

³⁹¹ Ibidem. P. 121.

³⁹² Ibidem. P. 122.

nightmare."³⁹³ According to Pisarev, the materialist accepts *evidence* as the criterion of truth, while the idealist tries to the best of his ability to fight the evidence in order to defend his theoretical constructions.

Pisarev also reproaches "philosophers of all times" for wasting their work on "fruitless efforts to understand the non-existent." Instead, attention should be paid to what appears before the direct gaze of man. On the basis of these propositions, a formula is derived that resembles the argument of Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky against the soul in the method of proof: "*The impossibility of an obvious manifestation excludes the reality of existence.*"³⁹⁴

Asserting that science is supplanting speculative philosophy, Pisarev puts forward a demand that can be extended to the entire philosophical party of materialism: "... we want to know what is, not to guess what might be."³⁹⁵

Chapter X is devoted to the analysis of a number of Lavrov's articles. Pisarev criticizes his philosophy for its "indeterminacy" and "dialectics". Pisarev argues that Lavrov's weakness, which the "criticism" (i.e. other journalists) fails to recognize, lies "in the absence of subjectivity, in the absence of definite and integral philosophical convictions"³⁹⁶. In other words, Lavrov does not consider himself either a materialist or an idealist, he tries to be not in philosophy, but above philosophy. In the *excessive desire* for objectivity, Pisarev sees a drawback.

Pisarev writes about Lavrov's public lectures published in the January issue of *Otechestvennye Zapiski*. The journalist of *Russkoye Slovo* expected to see in these lectures Lavrov's view of modern philosophy, that is, he wanted to reveal the same partisanship and subjectivity. But "Lavrov with special care hid his personality so that you will definitely not get to it."³⁹⁷

³⁹³ Ibidem. P. 122.

³⁹⁴ Ibidem. P. 123.

³⁹⁵ Ibidem. P. 123.

³⁹⁶ Ibidem. P. 125.

³⁹⁷ Ibidem. P. 126.

According to Pisarev, Lavrov does not express any specific judgments, and his thought is limited to general places. Pisarev sees the need for the application of philosophical achievements in practice, that is, it must be useful, and "what Mr. Lavrov calls philosophy is detached from the soil, devoid of flesh and blood, brought to a play on words – this is scholasticism, an idle game of the mind."³⁹⁸ For example, Lavrov raises the question of "what am I", ³⁹⁹but as a result of reasoning he does not give an answer. Moreover, Lavrov assigns this question a place outside the boundaries of science, that is, he considers it fundamentally unsolvable.

Pisarev asserts that Lavrov's lectures are "useless" in terms of their content, and therefore they should not be analyzed in detail and criticized in detail. In this regard, the journalist of *Russkoye Slovo* criticizes Antonovich for his review of Lavrov's first two lectures, which was published in *Sovremennik* in April 1861.⁴⁰⁰

Pisarev offers his own approach to criticizing Lavrov's lectures: one should ask whether the talk about speculative philosophy is relevant and whether Lavrov has managed to say anything worthy of attention on this topic. As Pisarev writes, Antonovich delves into the assessment of the second question, which concerns Lavrov, but Antonovich leaves the first question about the viability of speculative philosophy unaddressed.

It is important to note here that Pisarev cites Antonovich's consideration that Lavrov is eclectic, but does not state his judgment. Lavrov, on the other hand, argued in "To My Critics" that Pisarev agreed with Antonovich, although we observe neither agreement nor challenge.

Pisarev believes that Antonovich should have taken apart the third lecture as well, since in it "Mr. Lavrov's philosophical convictions are finally expressed in a more definite form and lead to real conclusions in the sphere of practical life"⁴⁰¹.

³⁹⁸ Ibidem. P. 126.

³⁹⁹ Ibidem. P. 126.

⁴⁰⁰ Ibidem. P. 128.

⁴⁰¹ Ibidem. P. 129.

Having analyzed Lavrov's work, Pisarev concludes: "In the field of moral philosophy, our views are almost diametrically opposed."⁴⁰² For Pisarev, the direct perception of reality as it is, that is, the perception of evidence, is important; and the moral ideal, asceticism and striving for the goal do not make any sense for him. Lavrov, according to Pisarev, subordinates the obviousness and immediacy to systematicity and formal logic, divides reality into things-in-themselves and phenomena, thereby expelling the evidence from the sphere of knowledge, and also reduces the moral formation of the individual to the striving for the ideal and "moral spices and ingredients." In other words, the materialist Pisarev sees in Lavrov a speculative philosopher, an idealist. However, the characterization given to Lavrov by Chernyshevsky and Antonovich should have somewhat justified Lavrov in the eyes of Pisarev, if he had agreed that the author of the lectures was not an idealist, but an eclectic. As we have seen, the eclecticism of Lavrov's views lies in the fact that he turns out to be half positivist, half materialist. Moreover, expounding his ethical teaching, he gave a categorical justification of rational egoism.

At the end of the first part of "Scholasticism of the XIX century", Pisarev writes that other philosophers, except Lavrov, are not worthy of such attention, so he confines himself to a couple of words about them. For example, he speaks of Strakhov in a caustic ironic tone: "Strakhov considers it necessary to prove that there is a great difference between a man and a stone."⁴⁰³ The journalist of the "Russian Word" will say about Yurkevich later in connection with the "Russian Herald" and "Otechestvennye Zapiski".

The second part begins with words about conservative-liberal journalists who speak negatively about revolutionary-democratic criticism. Pisarev justifies the "whistlers" by saying that criticism and irony cannot do harm: "A living idea, like a fresh flower from the rain, grows stronger and grows, withstanding the test

⁴⁰² Ibidem. P. 129.

⁴⁰³ Ibidem. P. 131.

of skepticism."⁴⁰⁴ Moreover, healthy skepticism is necessary, since with the change of generation, beliefs and ideas change, and "what seemed irrefutable yesterday is falling down today."⁴⁰⁵ Accordingly, to refuse to write and wait until the worldview is finally formed, as recommended by opponents of "whistleblowers", Pisarev considers wrong. And the point is not only that human views are always in the process of formation, but also that "the passionate delirium or ardent dialectics of a young man is always deeper in the soul of the listener and move it more vividly than the wise advice of an old man"⁴⁰⁶. This is all the more true because, according to Pisarev, authorities can be false and can then be shattered by doubt, and if the authority turns out not to be false, then doubt recognizes it.

Pisarev looks at many things as relative: not only aesthetics, but also cognition has a relativistic character. Thus, he asserts that views can be neither true nor false, since there are many of them and they are equal. It should be said that this position does not fully correlate with the materialist worldview and looks more like an element of polemics than a serious statement.

Further, Pisarev puts forward the famous ultimatum of his philosophical party, to which Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov and, with some reservations, Lavrov should also be attributed: "... what can be broken must be broken; what will withstand a blow will do, what will shatter to pieces, then trash; in any case, strike right and left, there will be no harm from this and cannot be."⁴⁰⁷

Chernyshevsky's "polemical beauties," as Pisarev writes, "stirred up the journalistic world."⁴⁰⁸ Many journalists are more attracted to controversy and controversy than to scientific discoveries. Pisarev asserts that the "Russian Herald" and "Otechestvennye Zapiski" pay extremely much attention to Chernyshevsky.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibidem. P. 133.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibidem. P. 134.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibidem. P. 135.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibidem. P. 135.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibidem. P. 136.

For example, it is noted that the "Russian Herald" published a response to the June article of the "Sovremennik" in the issue of its magazine for the same month.

As is known, Otechestvennye Zapiski reproached Chernyshevsky for ignoring Yurkevich: "... But⁴⁰⁹, as the editor of the Sovremennik wrote in Polemic Beauties, it makes no sense for him to argue with Yurkevich. Chernyshevsky explained this by the fact that his opponent was conducting a discussion not against him, but against materialists in general, and also by the fact that Chernyshevsky placed Yurkevich much lower than himself as a thinker⁴¹⁰. In other words, Pisarev evaluates the views of the idealists as outdated. In addition, he claims that polemics with them is meaningless because it is also unnecessary for enlightenment and propaganda of ideas: "To convince the public? They are on our side as it is"⁴¹¹.

Nor does Pisarev see anything interesting for readers in a serious polemic against idealists: "If we were to refute you point by point, our articles would come out as boring and puzzling as your critical studies."⁴¹² Accordingly, the journalist of Russkoye Slovo considers the polemics of materialists against idealists superfluous, with the exception that the dispute is conducted with the help of irony and "whistling."

Pisarev also gives a similar recommendation to Otechestvennye Zapiski, which positions themselves as "serious" as opposed to the "boys" and "whistlers" from Sovremennik and Russkoye Slovo. "You must pretend to feel the most complete, cold, indifferent contempt for us, as if *you are ignoring us*."⁴¹³ However, the conservative-liberal press cannot stand the "whistling" and "ridicule", and therefore devotes articles to Chernyshevsky, the authors of which seek to expose him.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibidem. P. 138.

⁴¹⁰ Ibidem. P. 138.

⁴¹¹ Ibidem. P. 138.

⁴¹² Ibidem. P. 138.

⁴¹³ Ibidem. P. 139.

In response to Chernyshevsky's remark that *Otechestvennyye Zapiski* did not have a unity of direction, Dudyshkin reacted with moderate agreement, believing that this was a positive side. Pisarev disputes both points of view, since, despite the lack of unity that Chernyshevsky implied, he saw something else, namely: "...inaccessibility to living interests, ...*ignoring the* living and sick places of our private and public life."⁴¹⁴ But such "unity" can hardly be credited to the editors of the magazine.

Outlining the problem of polemics between representatives of various philosophical parties, Pisarev raises the topic of authorities. For example, he notes that it is "pleasant" to argue with a representative of one's own camp, since there is an opportunity to refer to authority, as, for example, medieval scholastics in the course of a dispute could cite a quote from the works of the Church Fathers or the treatises of the Philosopher. In such a dispute, the reference to authority is in itself a full-fledged argument. Polemics with a representative of another party do not leave such an opportunity. For example, Yurkevich's references to Kant in a critical analysis of Chernyshevsky's article are meaningless, since the authority of the Königsberg thinker could hardly convince a follower of Feuerbach.

In the next chapter, Pisarev analyzes Albertini's objections to Chernyshevsky, but they mainly concern socio-political questions. We will note a purely philosophical point. From Albertini's article, Pisarev draws the following conclusion about the nature of his views: "1) one should praise one's adepts, even if they talk nonsense and do nasty things; 2) one must scold one's opponents on the spot, denigrate them by hook or by crook, and rejoice if someone else denigrates them."⁴¹⁵ In these two paragraphs we see the principle of partisanship, but carried to the point of absurdity. According to the first clause, materialists should always praise each other, and idealists should do the same in relation to their like-minded friends. It follows from the second clause, however, that the materialist is in any

⁴¹⁴ Ibidem. P. 140.

⁴¹⁵ Ibidem. P. 146.

case obliged to censure the idealist, and the idealist to censure the materialist. In other words, it follows from these points that only the very basics, the philosophical foundation, which does not extend beyond the basic question of philosophy, matter. Obviously, such a view simplifies the matter greatly. Pisarev was probably able to derive such clauses from Albertini's words because this latter was trying to build up a denunciation of Chernyshevsky.

Pisarev's remark, which he makes already to Bestuzhev-Ryumin, follows logically from this. Thus, the journalist of "Russky Slovo" insists that when conducting polemics should be based only on the ideas of his opponent as the subject of criticism. Personal attitudes towards the opponent will only harm the process of discussion, as they can lead away from the essence of the disagreement.

In the context of the reasons for the fall of Rome, Pisarev writes that "Bestuzhev-Ryumin, as an idealist, cannot reconcile himself with the sober outlook of Mr. Chernyshevsky. Chernyshevsky"⁴¹⁶. From the latter's point of view, Rome fell *not out of necessity*, but *because of an* attack by barbarians. Pisarev defends Chernyshevsky's view that the "decline of morals" cannot cause the destruction of a state or civilization. Bestuzhev-Ryumin reproaches Chernyshevsky for wishing to "promote the development" of the people when it is not possible. Pisarev, on the other hand, argues that for this it is enough "not to interfere", that is, to remove purely material obstacles on the way of the people to Education. Having stopped starving and having found time for leisure, the people would have become, according to Pisarev, not only to read, but even to write books. We should agree with this, because in the same way educated people appeared among the privileged classes in Antiquity.

Further, Pisarev expresses the contradictory idea that the propaganda of materialism in Russia of the 19th century is impossible due to the socio-economic backwardness of the country, since "slavery" in the form of serfdom is still preserved in it. The journalist of the "Russian Word" claims that this order is

⁴¹⁶ Ibidem. P. 151.

supported by an idealistic view of reality. However, Belinsky, Herzen, Chernyshevsky and Pisarev himself propagandized materialism, although this was difficult in the Russian Empire.

Developing the idea of the spread of materialism, Pisarev writes that individuals can come to such a worldview in two ways: 1) experiencing failures, losses and losses, 2) thinking, purely theoretically. The journalist considers the first path difficult, and the second is rather simple. Moreover, the formation of a person as a materialist is conditioned by circumstances, and therefore is applicable not only to individuals, but also to society.

Further, the journalist of *Russkoye Slovo* talks about Dudyshkin, but to a greater extent he is ironic. For example, Pisarev evaluates the editor of *Otechestvennye Zapiski* as an insignificant thinker: "You praise what you can do, but you can praise what seems to be miserable utopians, i.e., people who look further, feel more deeply and speak more boldly."⁴¹⁷ Pisarev, on the other hand, places the utopians, among whom is Chernyshevsky, much higher.

At the end of the article, Pisarev writes about Dudyshkin as an unscrupulous journalist who attributes words to his opponent that he did not write. But what is more important, the journalist of the "Russian Word" in the context of "Otechestvennye Zapiski" mentions Yurkevich, who, following Katkov, was highly appreciated by Dudyshkin. According to Pisarev, the reason for this solidarity lies in three reasons: 1) Yurkevich opposed Chernyshevsky, 2) he supports "routine", i.e., obsolete views, (3) "his arguments are extremely vague, as are the arguments of idealists in general, who try to support their constructions by means of dialectics."⁴¹⁸

Later, in the article "Moscow Thinkers" published in the journal *Russkoye Slovo* (Russian Word) in 1862, Pisarev, in the context of his polemics with Katkov and *Russky Vestnik*, again mentions Yurkevich and his article "From the Science

⁴¹⁷ Ibidem. P. 156.

⁴¹⁸ Ibidem. P. 157.

of the Human Spirit," directed against Chernyshevsky's Anthropological Principle in Philosophy.

In Chapter VII, Pisarev writes about Yurkevich's work that "it would be more thorough to pass this article in silence,"⁴¹⁹ although the journalist of *Russkoye Slovo* still sees in the polemics against this article arguments both for and against. The reason why Pisarev again only mentions and defiantly ignores the work "From the Science of the Human Spirit" is that Yurkevich belongs to the camp of idealists: "I venture not to speak of this article precisely because I do not see the slightest point of contact between Mr. Yurkevich's thoughts and my own ideas."⁴²⁰ Pisarev does not see in these opinions the vitality to which he himself aspires, so he speaks of his article as outdated and filled with "dialectical subtleties".

But this attitude should not be taken as a refusal of polemics, but as a kind of way of arguing. By declaring his unwillingness to pen objections to Yurkevich, Pisarev gives him a very low evaluation as a philosopher.

Pisarev often speaks disparagingly of "dialectics" as the art of arguing, in which medieval theologians practiced, but here he notes that he is ready to "use philosophical dialectics as an instrument of struggle"⁴²¹. In other words, the method itself is quite acceptable to him, but the significance of this method is determined by the goal that the "dialectician" sets for himself. However, Pisarev does not consider it necessary for himself to seriously use the means of dialectics for an argument with the "scholastic", who uses it as if for the exercise of thought.

The journalist of *Russkoye Slovo* expresses a judgment similar in meaning to Chernyshevsky's words about Yurkevich's article: "*...those who are unable to survey the whole trend of thought at a glance, object to individual details, argue against partial oversights, and turn a living idea into a dialectical pounding of*

⁴¹⁹ Pisarev D.I. *Moscow Thinkers // Pisarev D.I. Works*. In 4 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1955. P. 301.

⁴²⁰ *Ibidem*. P. 301.

⁴²¹ *Ibidem*. P. 302.

water (italics mine. – A.Ch.)"⁴²² Accordingly, according to Pisarev, following Chernyshevsky, a materialist should only "pass by" such a phenomenon as Yurkevich's work.

This conclusion about Yurkevich and other "scholastics of the nineteenth century" corresponds to the view of Nikonenko, who expressed the methodological significance of Pisarev's "nihilism" in relation to idealist thought in the following words: "There can be only one truth, there can be only one correct, correct worldview – Pisarev clearly realized this, and all his activities were aimed at the development of a scientific worldview."⁴²³

2.4 I.M. Sechenov v. P.D. Yurkevich⁴²⁴

I.M. Sechenov devotes the first chapter of "Reflexes" to involuntary movements, that is, about those in which the will does not take part, and therefore these movements can be considered as the work of a certain mechanism, as if we were talking not about a person, but about the creation of a person. But it is precisely on this machine-like structure of reflected movements that the faculty of thinking is based, which elevates man above the entire material world.

If the reaction to the stimulus is translated through the reflecting center into the movement of the body, then the stimulus itself passes by consciousness, as it were. If the reaction to the stimulus is not translated into the movement of the body, then this something that is reflected in the human psyche remains in consciousness, becoming part of it. Thus, by reflecting material reality in

⁴²² Ibidem. P. 302.

⁴²³ Nikonenko V.S. Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, D.I. Pisarev. Leningrad, Leningrad University Publ., 1983. P. 86.

⁴²⁴ Chernykh A.A. Psychophysiology of I. M. Sechenov as a Criticism of P. D. Yurkevich's Views on the Anthropological Principle // Bulletin of the Moscow State Pedagogical University. Series: Philosophical Sciences. 2024. № 1(49). Pp. 57–73. DOI 10.25688/2078-9238.2024.49.1.5.

consciousness (and not only in the reflective center of the reflex scheme), people become capable of self-consciousness and discover the possibility of thinking. In other words, the reflex schema is the primitive structure that underlies human consciousness. This is the key to understanding how it is possible to solve the psychophysical problem and the problem of dualism in general. This key in the history of Russian thought is discovered by Chernyshevsky and Sechenov.

In the second chapter of "Reflexes" (§§10-14), Sechenov seeks to substantiate that all human mental activity is based on the schema of a simple reflex. In the context of the anthropological principle, this is significant because Sechenov's doctrine is not just an episode in the development of the natural sciences, but also a reinforcement of Chernyshevsky's philosophical views with scientific works and discoveries. about which Chernyshevsky spoke philosophically: morality is possible only when the world and man are organized according to the principles of materialism and monism.

Chernyshevsky's work "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" became an occasion for discussion about the nature of man and morality. The editor of the *Sovremennik* substantiated the philosophical propositions of anthropological materialism, the main of which are the following: 1) man is a single whole, therefore he must be thought monistically, not dualistically; 2) the material world is not one of the worlds, but the only one, moreover, existing according to the laws of natural science. It follows from these theses that being is arranged in accordance with the monistic principle, while dualism necessarily leads to contradictory conclusions.

Many thinkers of the 19th century, including P.D. Yurkevich, did not agree with Chernyshevsky. He wrote an article "From the Science of the Human Spirit", aimed at criticizing anthropological materialism. But Chernyshevsky's theory also had defenders, for example, the founder of psychophysiology, I.M. Sechenov.

It is known that the work of I.M. Sechenov "Reflexes of the Brain" is of great philosophical importance⁴²⁵. It is also well known that his ideas and discoveries have a close connection with the philosophy of Chernyshevsky and his school. Moreover, the famous work "Reflexes of the Brain" was written in support of N.G. Chernyshevsky's point of view in the discussion of the anthropological principle. In this connection it is appropriate to look at Sechenov's work as an answer to Chernyshevsky's main critic - P.D. Yurkevich.

Chernyshevsky's article prompted Sechenov to investigate the psychophysical problem. The work "Reflexes of the Brain" originally had the title "An Attempt to Reduce the Way of Origin of Mental Phenomena on Physiological Basis" and was planned for publication in "Sovremennik" No. 10 for 1863.

Given the reputation of *Sovremennik* and the urgency of philosophical polemics in the early 1860s, the choice of the journal cannot be called an accident. Sechenov clearly solidarized with the views of Chernyshevsky, who at that time was imprisoned in the Alexeevsky Ravelin in the Peter and Paul Fortress. The original title of the work also indicates the scientist's materialist view, since to reduce the psyche to physiology is to deny the foundations of idealism.

Not surprisingly, the censorship did not allow the article to be printed in *Sovremennik* and also forced the author to change the obviously materialistic title to a more neutral one. As a result, "Reflexes of the Brain" was published in the highly specialized newspaper "Medical Bulletin".

⁴²⁵ Budilova E.A. I.M. Sechenov and N.G. Chernyshevsky // N.G. Chernyshevsky and Modernity. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1980. Pp. 236–242.; Kapustina D.M. I.M. Sechenov on the physiological foundations of the origin of mental phenomena: methodological aspect. 2015. № 1(31). Pp. 30–37.; Koshtoyants Kh.S. Sechenov is the founder of the scientific study of mental phenomena // Sechenov I.M. Reflexes of the brain. M.; Leningrad, USSR Academy of Sciences Publ., 1942. Pp. 5–29.; Mironov D.A. Etiko-antropologicheskie vozreniya I.M. Sechenov [Ethical and anthropological views of I.M. Sechenov]. 2008. №49. Pp. 132–136.; Shaternikova M.N. I.M. Sechenov // Sechenov I.M. Reflexy golovnogo mozga [Reflexes of the brain]. Moscow, LENAND Publ., 2022. Pp. 5–24.

In “Reflexes” Sechenov sets himself the task of explaining the activity of a person “with an ideally strong will”⁴²⁶ with the help of the reflex scheme presented in the chapter on involuntary movements. The scientist seeks to prove two main propositions: 1) voluntary movements proceed according to the three-part scheme of the reflex, the middle link of which is a mental act; (2) other things being equal, the same excitation of nerves causes the same effect.

On the eve of a detailed substantiation of his hypothesis, the scientist offers eight theses, which are then subjected to critical analysis. For the voluntary movements of a person with an ideally strong will, the following is assumed: 1) the absence of noticeable sensual excitement; 2) the urge to action lies in sublime (psychic) motives; 3) the ability to control external movements ranging from complete oppression to limited strengthening; 4) the will has the ability to control the time of external movement; 5) the will is also capable of subordinating to itself the duration of external motion; 6) voluntary movements are conditioned only by mental impulses; 7) the will also stands above the grouping of voluntary movements; 8) voluntary movements are conscious.

In other words, these theses express the assumption that the human will is beyond the power of external influences and causes, and all its motives lie exclusively in itself. Such an opinion about the will and actions of man, according to Sechenov, was widespread in society in the second third of the nineteenth century. In *Reflexes*, Sechenov made an attempt to scientifically refute this understanding of will, contrasting it with materialism, which was close to the views of Chernyshevsky's school.

Trying to challenge these views and substantiate a largely opposite worldview, Yurkevich pays great attention to the topic of psychology, which is directly related to the psychophysical problem and the anthropological principle.

⁴²⁶ Sechenov I.M. *Reflexes of the Brain* // Sechenov I.M. *Reflexes of the Brain*. Moscow, LENAND Publ., 2022. P. 64.

Yurkevich believes that psychology as a science of the spirit is fundamentally different from physiology because the spirit as an object of study "is not subject to human observation in such a convenient and accessible form as the objects of the physical world."⁴²⁷ If a scientist studies external phenomena, then, according to Yurkevich, he is satisfied with the perception of the external world presented in the form of phenomena. If a scientist investigates the soul, the spirit, then he faces a more difficult task. In order to study the soul or spirit, it is necessary to turn to one's inner life, since the subject of research "is not presented as a thing to be pointed to, the soul is not revealed... observation in the ready-made and motionless image of the thing."⁴²⁸ The activity of the soul is hidden and does not manifest itself in the external world, and in order to study something it is necessary that something *appears*, and the soul does not *appear*.

Yurkevich designates two trends in the understanding of mental phenomena: 1) the one that neglects internal experience and concentrates only on external empiricism; 2) one that recognizes the scientific significance of inner experience. It should be noted that the first direction, strictly speaking, occurs only in the form of abstraction of some manifestations of the essence from its other manifestations (for example, physiology as an abstract, that is, one-sided view of a complex psychophysiological complex of phenomena). Accordingly, Sechenov does not fall under this point, but he stands even further from the second point. Yurkevich, on the other hand, clearly correlates with the second direction, since he gravitates towards the method of introspection (self-observation, the study of the Self by himself), and physiology completely refuses to understand the nature of mental life. Yurkevich insists that physiology, on which Chernyshevsky pins great hopes, and psychology, the sources of "material" lie in areas that are accessible only to them.

⁴²⁷ Yurkevich P.D. Iz nauki o chelovecheskom dukhe [From the science of the human spirit: Essays on philosophy and theology]. Ed. Stereotype. Moscow: Book House "LIBROKOM", 2015. P. 3.

⁴²⁸ Ibidem. P. 3.

The main question of the article "From the Science of the Human Spirit" Yurkevich formulates as follows: "Can a theory that sees in mental phenomena a simple modification of the phenomena of organic life satisfy scientific requirements?"⁴²⁹ The question is rhetorical, and therefore it already contains an answer.

From what has been said, it is clear that Yurkevich solves the psychophysical problem (or formulates his anthropological principle) with the help of epistemological dualism, distinguishing it from dualism in "metaphysics" (ontology). And although Yurkevich criticizes "metaphysical" dualism, it is no accident that he says that "psychology", unlike the natural sciences, should not abandon "metaphysics". According to Yurkevich, if in the sphere of the study of material life it is possible to abandon metaphysics in favor of empiricism, then in the sphere of the study of the spirit, metaphysics should be preserved.

Chernyshevsky places the "moral sciences" in subordination to the natural sciences, while Yurkevich separates them in principle. Criticizing Chernyshevsky's views, Yurkevich equates him with philosophers like David Hume. On this basis, the whole of Yurkevich's criticism of Chernyshevsky is reduced to an analysis not of anthropological materialism proper, but of the philosophy of extreme empiricism. But Chernyshevsky was not an extreme empiricist in the manner of Hume, nor was he a positivist. That is why he did not seek to remove "metaphysics" from philosophy or even from psychology. In other words, Yurkevich vulgarizes Chernyshevsky's views, raising them to an extreme that simply does not correspond to Chernyshevsky's real views. In the same way, Sechenov's ideas do not correspond to empiricism and positivism.

Taking Chernyshevsky's thought to the extreme (if not to the point of absurdity), Yurkevich himself falls into the opposite extreme. Criticizing Chernyshevsky for identifying the movement of the nerve with the intellectual act, Yurkevich writes that "the movement of the nerve *does not in any way begin* to be

⁴²⁹ Ibidem. P. 8.

a sensation."⁴³⁰ For Yurkevich, "sensation" is not a perception of the external world, but a mental process. Then it turns out that the study of empirical data is completely useless for psychology, and the coincidence of the external and internal life of a person is *purely coincidental*. But at the same time Yurkevich earlier argued that empirical cognition cannot be completely cast aside.

In the course of a conversation about the nature of moral and intellectual phenomena, Yurkevich put forward to Chernyshevsky such a demand, which should have been addressed to natural scientists: "...to show from what chemical salts or acids these phenomena originate or are formed"⁴³¹. There is an obvious simplification of the chemical change of substances. Chernyshevsky constantly talks about the complexity of chemical processes occurring in the human body, and even more so in the brain, and Yurkevich tries to reduce this complexity to the level of a simple chemical formula.

It is also noteworthy that it is precisely the description of thinking in which Chernyshevsky is close to the views of E. V. Ilyenkov that Yurkevich presents as an example of an erroneous statement. In Yurkevich's opinion, Chernyshevsky "does not have any clear and definite concept of thinking. 'Thinking,' he says, "consists in selecting from the various combinations, sensations, and ideas produced by the imagination with the help of memory, those that correspond to the needs of the thinking organism at a given moment..."⁴³² Yurkevich even equates such thinking with madness.

Yurkevich has his own understanding of the theory of rational egoism, which Chernyshevsky expounded in *The Anthropological Principle*. Thus, without distinguishing between different stages of the development of egoism, Yurkevich concludes that the *Anthropological Principle* describes a moral height that egoists cannot reach: "... You cannot climb to this height. The writer proves to you 'that all

⁴³⁰ Ibidem. P. 15.

⁴³¹ Ibidem. P. 34.

⁴³² Ibidem. P. 54.

people are egoists."⁴³³ However, from Chernyshevsky's point of view, *it is precisely for this reason* that a person can reach such a moral height. It is precisely human egoism that is the cause, the consequence of which is what in everyday language is called altruism.

Further, Yurkevich writes that "the writer would like us to exclude from our activity our *self*, ... He would like us to turn off our joys and sufferings from our lives, ... only under these conditions would he be ready to recognize this activity and this life as unselfish. ..."⁴³⁴ Indeed, it is impossible to remove everything human from human activity. But Chernyshevsky does not want this, he does not demand that man cease to be an egoist, but only states that man is an egoist by nature: in this the "author" sees neither good nor evil, only a given. Yurkevich, as a result of his interpretation of the theory of rational egoism, came to the conclusion that "rigoristic morality" demands something from man. This is not observed.

In one of his remarks to Chernyshevsky, Yurkevich adequately and concisely expresses the essence of Chernyshevsky's ontology, although he tried to denounce the "author": "Incidentally, the theory that the writer adheres to must also explain the origin of the world solely from circumstances."⁴³⁵ But then the reviewer goes on to draw a conclusion that Chernyshevsky could scarcely confirm: '...circumstances converge on an empty place and give birth to the so-called soul'⁴³⁶. Yurkevich clearly points to the randomness of such conditions, with which the editor of the *Sovremennik* could not agree, since he defended the principle of determinism. Later, Sechenov would show, using the example of the development of a child, that circumstances are not deities who create *ex nihilo* (as Yurkevich tries to present it), but the result of the interaction of objects and phenomena of the material world.

⁴³³ Ibidem. P. 76.

⁴³⁴ Ibidem. P. 85.

⁴³⁵ Ibidem. P. 63.

⁴³⁶ Ibidem. P. 63.

Having decided to write an essay on the reflexes of the brain, Sechenov intended not only to publish the results of his research work, but also to show that the origin of mental phenomena can be reduced (not in the sense of reduction, but in the sense of explanation) to physiology, namely, to the mechanism of the involuntary reflex. In other words, Sechenov wanted, on the one hand, to substantiate the philosophical propositions of Chernyshevsky's theory with the help of his scientific psychophysiological research, and on the other hand, to refute the view of Yurkevich and their supporters on the nature of man and his psyche.

Sechenov, scientifically substantiating the view of the anthropological principle common to him and Chernyshevsky, traces the development of the child's reflex activity from the moment of birth, as well as the process of the emergence of the first mental acts from this activity. Initially, the newborn does not know how to look, listen, smell and touch.

As a result of repeated exercises, he learns not just to wander in space, but *to look* at concrete objects. On the basis of this, *attention* develops, that is, the ability to perceive selected objects clearly, a clear feeling of things is formed. Moreover, it is emphasized that the development of representation proceeds without the intervention of the will.

Then, with the help of visual skill, the child begins *to associate sensations* through the optic nerve with touch and muscle sense. These latter are not as vividly felt as visual excitation, but the act of looking contributes to their development. In the child's field of vision is his hand, with which he performs some actions (*muscle sense*). He also sees external objects with which he interacts with the help of his hand (*touch*).

In the future, the *visual-auditory association* develops. Auditory attention, i.e. *listening*, is, like the act of looking, a learned involuntary movement. The child strives to imitate external influences, and therefore, as a result of hearing someone else's speech, he also begins to make sounds with the help of the muscles of the tongue, larynx, lips, etc. *pronounce meaningful words*. Sechenov connects this circumstance with the association of impressions from sight and hearing, as a

result of which the visual image of some objects or the movement of the lips is associated in the child's mind with certain sounds.

Sechenov writes that "a memorized successive series of reflexes leads to a very complete representation of the object, *to knowledge in an elementary form.*"⁴³⁷ That is, cognition is reduced to a comparison of impressions received from various sense organs. As a result of the simplest, that is, direct form of cognition, the child already has *a concept of space*. It is noteworthy that in voluntary movements, elementary knowledge about objects corresponds to the central link of the reflective apparatus.

It is important to emphasize that a child at the beginning of his development does not relate to external reality passively, but actively. That is, not only the surrounding world affects the child's sense organs, but the latter also strives for a more accurate and reliable perception of the world. This circumstance is of particular importance if we take into account that constant training of the nerves and muscles is necessary to maintain the performance of the nerves and muscles. Thus, Sechenov rightly refers the craving for active perception to reflexes.

The next stage of development is the ability to *analyze* and *synthesize*. What is seen is perceived both as a whole and as a part of a discrete whole. This possibility lies in the material organization of the eye. On the retina of the eye there are "visual spheres", which are not evenly distributed: the closer to the visual axis, the higher the concentration of these spheres. through which the axle passes. In addition, the visual spheres do not communicate with each other, and therefore a person can see both the whole picture presented in front of his eyes, and separately the details of what he sees. The principle of this analytical-synthetic perception can be noticed by first looking at this paragraph as a whole, and then by shifting attention to a single word or symbol.

⁴³⁷ Sechenov I.M. Reflexes of the Brain // Sechenov I.M. Reflexes of the Brain. Moscow, LENAND Publ., 2022. P. 72.

The analyzing ability of the eye allows a person to perceive external objects as divisible and different in size. Visual analysis also lays the foundation for the idea of movement. But, strictly speaking, it is only in the visual representation that there is not enough perception of time to form the idea of movement.

Like the eye, the tactile surface of the body is also divided into sentient spheres. Their concentration, that is, the distance from each other, determines how detailed the perception will be. It is logical that tactile analysis and synthesis will develop by analogy with visual analysis.

These and many subsequent physiological subtleties show that, on the one hand, human cognition is conditioned by the senses and is therefore limited by them, and on the other hand, cognition, with all its imperfections, is aimed at real things, and not illusions or phenomena. In other words, it should be recognized that the so-called "natural attitude" was scientifically substantiated as early as the nineteenth century, and the fact that the ways of cognition are limited determines only the degree of difficulty in achieving the truth about objective reality.

The ability of hearing to analyze is interesting because it creates the basis for perceiving such a dimension as *time*. Sound is felt as something stretching, due to which "hearing is an analyzer of time."⁴³⁸

The muscular sense contributes to the perception of both time and space. However, Sechenov writes, without sight, hearing and muscle exercise, this would be impossible, since the muscle sense itself is too weak.

The scientist says very little about the perception of taste and smell and does not give them a decisive role in the development of nervous activity, so we do not mention them. In addition, these aspects of psychophysiology have a mediocre relationship to philosophical questions.

In other words, in the development of the psyche, the most important are vision, hearing, muscle sense and touch. If we proceed from the order in which Sechenov presented the history of the development of a child in the first days of

⁴³⁸ Ibidem. P. 78.

life, then we can say that vision and muscle sense are of paramount importance. In making such an assumption, we do not, of course, mean to say that hearing and touch are not important for the development of the psyche and thinking. After all, it is obvious that language, which is closely related to the thought process, develops primarily under the influence of auditory sensations. In addition, the number of mental acts increases due to a greater number of different sensations and, consequently, associations.

Further, Sechenov touches upon the topic *of disassociation* of sensations, that is, he speaks of reflexes in a pure, not complex form. From a practical point of view, their meaning is reduced to the learned predominance of one reflex or sensation over another, and sometimes this is accompanied by an active action to inhibit one of the reflexes of association. he disassociates his sensations for the sake of greater efficiency of touch or hearing. It is also known that in the daytime the visual sense predominates, and in the dark time – the muscle sensations. In other words, the condition of disassociation is the predominance of the strength of one reflex of association over another.

It should be noted that visual sensation is rather objective in nature, since it is directed at the real world, which a person perceives as external, despite the fact that the sensation takes place in the optic nerve, and not in a visible object. At the same time, muscular feeling is essentially subjective, because it is felt and actually takes place in the body of the perceiving subject. It is important to keep this in mind when considering the relationship between the cognizing subject and objective reality.

But the immediate significance of the disassociation of sensations lies in the fact that the subjective is separated from the objective in man. In this way, "man meets himself for the first time,"⁴³⁹ that is, self-sensation *and* self-consciousness *are revealed to him*.

⁴³⁹ Ibidem. P. 82.

It should be noted that analysis also contributes to the formation of concepts: for example, a person acquires a concept of time as a result of the mental separation of auditory and muscular sensations from the viscosity of the corresponding processes.

The multifaceted development of the nervous system through the repeated repetition of reflexes leads to the fact that a person begins to "*think in images, words and other sensations* that have no direct connection with what is acting on his sense organs at that time"⁴⁴⁰. Moreover, such a possibility lies in the presence of previous experience of perception. The ability to mentally repeat impressions is the *ability to reproduce sensations*. The latter is possible due to the fact that after the removal of the stimulus, the sensation doesn't disappear, but is preserved in a hidden, implicit form. This mental phenomenon we call *memory*. It is the ability to memorize, i.e. to link together all experienced sensations and reflexes, that makes man a thinking being. As far as we can see, the process of thinking is a continuing series of "reflexes" (reflections), but taking place mainly in the inner world of man.

The recurrence of a previous sensation awakens an earlier experience of the same reflex. The more often the same sensation is repeated, the more vividly it is imprinted in memory and the more firmly it is retained in it. Accordingly, the most distinct sensation is better remembered, and the clearer it is, the more recent it has been received or resumed. Memory is possible only of actual things and phenomena, and in their corresponding forms. In other words, we apprehend and remember what is, and as it is, because "sensation lingers precisely in the real form"⁴⁴¹

Memorization is possible due to the fact that homogeneous (i.e. similar) sensations are not just repeated over and over again, but are also connected with each other in one *trace*.

⁴⁴⁰ Ibidem. P. 86.

⁴⁴¹ Ibidem. P. 90.

"Visual and purely tactile memory can be called spatial. Auditory and muscular memory is⁴⁴² called the memory of time." Sechenov calls space and time fractional parts of concrete sensations, since they are formed as a result of analysis, that is, abstraction.

It is important that the memory of the association is carried out even with a "hint" of its part. For example, if a person hears the sound of a bell, he will remember a visual-auditory association, that is, a visual image of a bell will appear in his mind with a real sound, although there is no real bell in front of his eyes. In other words, both sensation (reflex) and memory of sensation (psychic formation) set in motion a reflex mechanism, with the difference that recollection often has a weaker effect than direct sensation.

Sechenov emphasizes that the act of reflex is understood in consciousness as something whole, but the ability to analyze sensations leads to the fact that the links of the reflex are also cognized by the subject as separate elements. As a result, movements become dependent not only on external stimuli, but also on ideas – and this brings us to the topic of *thinking*.

Also important is the conclusion that mental acts proceed in accordance with the mechanism of the reflex, and the conscious movements that follow them, although they are called voluntary, are nevertheless reflected. Thus, voluntary movements, in spite of *self-deception*, turn out to be only the consequence of external stimuli.

For example, in associations, one of the sensations may be weak, and therefore implicit to consciousness, but when there is a "hint" of this barely noticeable impression, the entire association is reproduced. In such a situation, it seems to a person that his movement is voluntary.

Sechenov puts forward a hypothesis according to which "the human brain contains mechanisms that delay muscle movements."⁴⁴³ Moreover, the skill of

⁴⁴² Ibidem. P. 92.

⁴⁴³ Ibidem. P. 99.

suppressing or suppressing the reflex by analogy with movements must be learned by repeated repetitions.

The development of this ability is observed already in the development of the child, who at the beginning of life is extremely sensitive to external stimuli and reacts to stimuli with almost the whole body.

In the context of the further development of the retarding mechanism, Sechenov connects the work of the latter with moral education. The opposition of the feeling of fear of punishment to moral behavior leads to the morality of "frightened people". As we can see, this is not effective, since as a result of such education, the moral attitudes of a person will be determined mainly by evasion of punishment. *the morality of the motive*.

The ability to delay movements, that is, reflexes, is also developed by reflex. For example, Sechenov cites the example of peasants and gentlemen: the former have a higher "rudeness" of nerves than the latter. This circumstance is due to the regular practice of each social group: masters do not experience the physical burdens that fall on the shoulders of working people. The same is true of mongrels and domestic dogs, some of which learn to delay the movement that should follow the feeling of pain, while others almost never experience it, and therefore react to it much more vividly.

After the nerves have been excited, the impulse goes to the reflecting center, and from there it must proceed to the motor nerves and cause movement, but this does not occur if the third link of the reflex is delayed. However, the reflex process itself is set in motion, even if it is not completed: the external stimulus has already caused a psychic act . The act of reflection is a bundle of ideas and concepts, which is not expressed by external actions. "*Thought is the first two-thirds of the psychic reflex.*"⁴⁴⁴

Since thinking is often associated with speech, it should be clarified that the act of pronouncing words is a movement, that is, a complete reflex (muscular-

⁴⁴⁴ Ibidem. P. 103.

auditory association). From this, of course, it does not follow that the pronounced thought ceases to be a thought. The speech act is not so much the logical completion of thinking as a way of expressing a thought that has arisen thanks to external stimuli. Sechenov writes that "thought is a reproduction of reality."⁴⁴⁵

Thought is subjective, in spite of its objective origin. It follows that mental images derived from sensations of real objects are inferior to their real equivalents in terms of clarity of representation.

Sechenov writes that one "once after the thought is an act, another time the motion is delayed and the act stops (apparently) on the thought, finally, the third time under the influence of the same thought is an act different from the first"⁴⁴⁶. As a result, thought is separated from action in consciousness. On this basis, *self-consciousness* leads a person to *self-deception*: thought begins to be understood as the primary cause of an action. However, from the consideration of involuntary and voluntary movements, it becomes obvious that the first cause of any action always lies in external excitement.

But the "voice of self-consciousness" goes further. Man not only thinks of thought as a cause, but also believes that, other things being equal, a certain number of possible actions can follow from one stimulus and one mental act, between which a person chooses, as if he had free will.

Psychic reflexes with increased movement are referred to by Sechenov as the sphere *of passions*. Passions develop from elementary sensual pleasures, which acquire an increasingly complex form as the child grows up: one pleasant sensation in perception merges with all the properties of the object. Along with this, *desires* (aspirations for pleasure) are also formed., in which an adult experiences languor, and the child begins to cry and scream.

The more often a passionate reflex is repeated, the greater the number of associations that arise in memory and, consequently, the more stimuli for this

⁴⁴⁵ Ibidem. P. 104.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibidem. P. 105.

reflex become. As a result, the memory of this desire and the need to satisfy it will happen more often.

At the same time, the opposite mechanism also operates: sooner or later, the repeated sensation becomes boring. The impression, being vivid for the first time, becomes paler and paler as the reflex is repeated. In this way, *a negative passion arises*. In addition, as a result of repetition, the impression is fragmented, that is, analyzed. As a result, "the delight of a particular sensation gives way to the clarity of a calm idea"⁴⁴⁷. Along with this, the old source of pleasure can be replaced by a new one. And everything new, according to Sechenov, is unexpected for a person. There is a similarity between fear and surprise, each of which plays the role of an amplifying mechanism: "Surprise is akin to fear"⁴⁴⁸. Among other things, the blunting of the passionate reflex also occurs due to the absence of its own stimulus.

From what has been said, it follows that *desire* in passionate and *thought* in ordinary mental acts are *phenomena of the same order*, that is, "the first two-thirds of the reflex"⁴⁴⁹. In other words, desire is a mental reproduction of a passionate act.

Sechenov distinguishes between passion in a child and in an adult: for the former, the objects of desire are initially embodied in objects and only over time grow into abstract concepts, while for the latter, desires have already acquired a conditionally immaterial form. as valor, courage, and so on. In the future, in the process of analysis, the visual image will lose its attractiveness for him, and ethical attitudes will remain as independent concepts. "Here is the whole moral side of man."⁴⁵⁰

Taking into consideration the history of the publication of *Reflexes*, Sechenov's further words, as far as we can see, have a direct relation to Chernyshevsky both as a person and as a materialistic philosopher, who in his

⁴⁴⁷ Sechenov I.M. *Reflexes of the Brain* // Sechenov I.M. *Reflexes of the Brain*. Moscow, LENAND Publ., 2022. P. 109.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibidem*. P. 109.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibidem*. P. 109.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibidem*. P. 112.

articles justified atheistic morality, i.e. the theory of reasonable egoism. It becomes clear that in the context of the discussion of the anthropological principle, as well as of Chernyshevsky's place and significance in the history of Russian philosophy, these are words of great importance. In this connection we will allow ourselves to quote here a voluminous quotation from Sechenov's work.

"Love of truth, generosity, compassion, unselfishness, as well as hatred of all the opposite, develop, ... frequent repetition of passionate ideas in the mind... Is it surprising, then, that a child at the age of eighteen, with an ardent love of truth, not carried away in the opposite direction by those motives which develop in most people only in their mature years, *is ready to go to torment for the sake of this truth? For he knows that his ideals, his knights, have suffered for it, and he cannot but be a knight, because he was a knight from the age of five to eighteen. Passion, of course, will diminish a great deal, but in its place there will be what is usually called deep conviction. It is these people, under favorable circumstances, who develop into those noble and high types of which we spoke at the beginning of this chapter. and they remain true to their convictions, contrary to the demands of all natural instincts, because this voice pales in the brightness of the pleasures that are given to a knight by truth and love for man.* These people, once they have become like this, cannot, of course, change: their activity is the fatal consequence of their development. And there is an awful lot of consolation in this thought, because without it faith in the strength of virtue is impossible"⁴⁵¹ (italics mine. – A.Ch.).

At the end of the conversation about passions, Sechenov pays special attention to such a phenomenon as the love of a man for a woman. Thus, the instinctive side of this phenomenon in a boy is represented by sexual desire. A certain ideal is formed in consciousness, the features of which are later found in reality. Starting from dark and indefinite sexual aspirations, the young man comes to a clear feeling of love. With the development of the latter, the young man ceases

⁴⁵¹ Ibidem. Pp. 112–113.

to be an egoist (in the ordinary sense): This is expressed in the fact that he loves his pleasures and is ready even for "self-sacrifice" for them. Sechenov emphasizes that passion is supported by the variability of the image, but there is a limit to such changes. As a result, passion passes, but the feeling of love is not destroyed with it, but grows into "love out of habit" or "friendship".⁴⁵²

Passion, being a psychic reflex with an intensified end, includes many phenomena. For example, *fear* (fright), which was discussed in the context of involuntary movements, belongs to the sphere of passions. Such types of passion as *delight* and *ecstasy* may outwardly look like the absence of any movement, but the latter still occurs in the muscles, albeit implicitly.

As Sechenov writes, thought is a "psychic reflex without end."⁴⁵³ It should be noted that it was the incomplete reflex that arose as a result of central inhibition that was one of the factors thanks to which thinking was revealed to man. The human speech apparatus turned out to be well designed to provide the ability to transmit (express) thoughts. And the brain turned out to be organized in a complex enough way for a person to perceive speech as thoughts, and his own and other people's thoughts as the causes of actions (although this circumstance led to self-deception, which was discussed earlier). Thus, *the retardation of reflexes, the ability to speak, and the high organization of the nervous system became the conditions of thinking.*

Speaking of *desire* and *action*, Sechenov writes that desire is revealed at the moment of arrest of the passionate reflex. In addition, it is a passionate aspect of thought. Along with desire, there is volition in the mental life of a person. The latter is an "almost dispassionate psychic reflex"⁴⁵⁴, while desire belongs entirely to the sphere of passions. But will as a motive for an action can be stronger than desire. Based on the statements made earlier, we can conclude that this is

⁴⁵² These thoughts echo what Chernyshevsky expounded in *The Anthropological Principle* and illustrated in the novel *What Is To Be Done?*

⁴⁵³ *Ibidem*. P. 115.

⁴⁵⁴ *Ibidem*. P. 117.

impossible, since the more passionate reflex must always outweigh it. However, Sechenov explains this by the fact that volition is still not completely dispassionate. In other words, the victory of will over desire does not go beyond the framework of the reflex scheme, but is completely consistent with it. The difficulty is only in those cases in which it is impossible to find the reason for the desire. The psychic life of a person is too complex to detect the first impulse for each action without any problems. And when a person tries to prove that he still has free will (that is, the ability to act completely arbitrarily), then in the act of proving freedom is not found, but only a regularity. Nevertheless, the defender of vulgar free will is even more convinced of his rightness, that is, he has been deceived *by self-consciousness*⁴⁵⁵.

Accordingly, other things remaining equal, one thought and one action (or oppression of movement, if this is natural in a particular case) must be produced from one excitant. The individual does not select between the "possible" ends of the reflex, but necessarily commits the one that follows in a required way from its causes. In other words, there is no absolute free will, and "*the first cause of every human action lies outside of it*"⁴⁵⁶.

Sechenov reproaches himself for the "gaps", expressing the following consideration. In "Reflexes" the topic of individual differences in the nervous system of each person was not touched upon, since 1) it was not possible to trace

⁴⁵⁵ Sechenov gives an example in which a conditional "enemy" tries to prove to the scientist that voluntary movements (that is, those that arise from free will alone and are not externally determined in any way) are possible. To prove his point of view, the opponent bends the finger of his hand at the close time he himself named. The disputant sees this as an act of free will. Sechenov explains by external reasons why the disputant chose to move his finger to demonstrate "arbitrariness" and why he named not the next hour, but the next minute for the moment of movement. Thus, the movement of the hand and especially the finger is most characteristic of a person, and the moment is chosen in order to prove his opinion as soon as possible. In other words, everything in this defense of free will is not free, but lawful. Sechenov concludes that his opponent has been deceived by self-consciousness.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibidem. P. 121.

the relationship between individual inclinations and universal human traits, and 2) individual characteristics play an insignificant role against the background of external influences on a person, including *upbringing*. These words sound like a counterargument to Yurkevich's assertion that physiology cannot study mental phenomena on the sole ground that each individual is not like another.

In other words, the sensation of objective reality, represented by objects and phenomena closest to the subject, is a necessary condition for the emergence and maintenance of the existence of reason, consciousness, and psyche. the one who has lost his sensory nerves would continue to sleep dead sleep until death."⁴⁵⁷ Accordingly, mind outside matter is impossible.

Thus, Sechenov scientifically substantiated the key ideas of Chernyshevsky, which lie at the basis of the philosophical system of anthropological materialism. At the same time, Sechenov defended Chernyshevsky's ideas against criticism from Yurkevich, substantiating from the standpoint of contemporary science that psychology and physiology could not only consider the same subject and use similar methods of research, but they must do so in order to develop a scientific understanding of the nature of man and his psyche.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibidem. P. 124.

CHAPTER 3. DISCUSSIONS ON THE "ANTHROPOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE" IN THE WORKS OF V.S. SOLOVYOV, G.G. SPETH, V.K. KANTOR

3.1 V.S. Solovyov about N.G. Chernyshevsky⁴⁵⁸

It must be said that the controversy about the anthropological principle is only a particular case of a larger, longer and more general polemic. It is a discussion between the “schools” of Plato and Democritus, between idealists and materialists. In this connection it is important to show how this larger polemic manifested itself in occasional disputes and discussions in Russian philosophy after 1863.

One of the most influential Russian idealists of the nineteenth century is V.S. Solovyov, who can be considered the progenitor of twentieth-century Russian religious philosophy. Among the Russian pre-Marxian materialists, however, the most powerful is Chernyshevsky. In this regard, it will be interesting to see what Solovyov wrote about Chernyshevsky's philosophy, particularly his materialist aesthetics, which is based on the ontology of anthropological materialism.

This episode from the history of Russian philosophy is indicative, since its analysis will reveal the specificity of the attitude of Russian idealists to the doctrines of materialists in Russian philosophy.

The similarity of the aesthetic outlooks of two Russian philosophers, N.G. Chernyshevsky and V.S. Solovyov, who stood on diametrically opposed positions, which has been repeatedly noted in the historical and philosophical literature, has not yet received a satisfactory explanation. Meanwhile, it is obvious that this similarity cannot be understood as a coincidence of the aesthetic views of both thinkers; most likely, the discourse on beauty and art has in this case a different, not aesthetic status and should be considered in a broader context.

⁴⁵⁸ Chernykh A.A. Is the "similarity" of the views of V.S. Solovyov and N.G. Chernyshevsky accidental? Bulletin of Tver State University. Series "PHILOSOPHY". 2023. № 4 (66). Pp. 84–93. DOI: 10.26456/vtphilos/2023.4.084.

Among the works of modern historians of philosophy devoted to Solovyov's aesthetic theory are the studies of N.A. Kormin⁴⁵⁹, V.V. Bychkov⁴⁶⁰, L.S. Ershova⁴⁶¹, N.P. Krokhina⁴⁶², L.N. Zorina⁴⁶³, M. Matsar⁴⁶⁴, E. Peter⁴⁶⁵ and others.

The scholarly study of Chernyshevsky's aesthetics began to emerge in 1897, when an article by G.V. Plekhanov was published⁴⁶⁶. In Soviet times, many works were written about Chernyshevsky's philosophy, including his aesthetic theory. First of all, the studies of A.A. Bazhenova⁴⁶⁷, G.G. Shpet⁴⁶⁸ and especially G.A. Solovyov should be⁴⁶⁹ highlighted.

⁴⁵⁹ Kormin N.A. *Aesthetic Space of Philosophy of Unity and Phenomenology: Transcendentalism and Creativity*. Moscow: Institute of Physics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2018. 127 p. (In Russian)

⁴⁶⁰ Bychkov V.V. *Aesthetics of Vladimir Solovyov as an Actual Paradigm // History of Philosophy*. № 4. Moscow, Institute of Physics of the Russian Academy of Sciences Publ., 1999. Pp. 3–43.

⁴⁶¹ Ershova L.S. *K voprosu ob estetike prirody V.S. Solovyova* [On the issue of the aesthetics of nature by V.S. Solovyov]. 2006. №1 (12). Pp. 82–89.

⁴⁶² Krokhina N.P. *The Problem of Sophia Art in the Aesthetics of Vl. Solovyov // Solovyov Studies*. 2001. №3 (3). Pp. 152–165.

⁴⁶³ Zorina L.N. *Idea of Unity in Philosophical Aesthetics of Vl. Solovyov // Solovyov Studies*. 2006. №1 (12). Pp. 71–82.

⁴⁶⁴ Matsar M. *Correlation of Aesthetic and Artistic in the Positive Aesthetics of Vladimir Solovyov // Solovyov Studies*. 2006. №1 (12). Pp. 89–100.

⁴⁶⁵ Helen Peter. *Divine Sophia in the Philosophical and Theological Work of V.S. Solovyov "La Russie et l'Église universelle" // Philosophical Polylogue: Journal of the International Center for the Study of Russian Philosophy*. 2019. №2 (6). Pp. 141–166.

⁴⁶⁶ Plekhanov G.V. *Aesthetic Theory of N.G. Chernyshevsky // Plekhanov G.V. Selected Philosophical Works*. In 5 vols. Vol. 5. Moscow: Publishing House of Socio-Economic Literature, 1958. Pp. 238–281.

⁴⁶⁷ Bazhenova A.A. *Chernyshevsky and Russian Aesthetic Thought // N.G. Chernyshevsky and Modernity*. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1980. Pp. 277–288.

⁴⁶⁸ Shpet G.G. *Istochniki dissertatsii Chernyshevskogo* [Sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation]. II. Materials. Reconstruction by T.G. Shchedrina. Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopedia, 2009. Pp. 362–416.

Among the recent works on Chernyshevsky, it is worth noting the monograph by V.K. Kantor⁴⁷⁰, in which, against the background of philosophical and biographical research, his ideas are interpreted in a new way, and also the issues of aesthetic theory are touched upon.

Similarities and differences of aesthetic positions of the two thinkers were studied in the works of E.A. Korotkina, A.I. Mazaev, L.A. Kogan and others.

On the basis of scientific research and primary sources⁴⁷¹, it can be clearly concluded that the positions of Solovyov and Chernyshevsky are formed within the framework of different worldview systems. If Solovyov builds his aesthetics primarily on Christian teaching, then Chernyshevsky relies primarily on the searches of V.G. Belinsky and the materialism of L. Feuerbach. Nevertheless, in his work "The First Step to Positive Aesthetics" Solovyov expresses "a certain intercession for Chernyshevsky", pointing out the similarity of his aesthetic theory with his understanding of beauty and art. From our point of view, this circumstance requires a special historical and philosophical explanation.

The question should be put as follows: is there a real similarity between the aesthetic positions of Solovyov and Chernyshevsky, or is it only an accidental coincidence? Proceeding from the fact that the thinkers held opposite views and

⁴⁶⁹ Solovyov G.A. Chernyshevsky's Aesthetic Views. Ed. 2, add. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1978. 424 p. (In Russian)

⁴⁷⁰ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. 528 p. (In Russian)

⁴⁷¹ Solovyov V.S. Beauty in Nature // Solovyov V.S. Collected Works. In 10 vols. Vol. 6. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1911–1914. Pp. 33–74.; Solovyov V.S. General Meaning of Art // Solovyov V.S. Collected Works. In 10 vols. Vol. 6. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1911–1914. Pp. 75–90.; Chernyshevsky N.G. Autoreview // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986. Pp. 174–204.; Chernyshevsky N.G. Preface to the Third Edition // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986. Pp. 205–213.; Chernyshevsky N.G. Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986. Pp. 71–173.

defended them consistently and decisively, it would be necessary to conclude that the coincidence of their aesthetic theories is purely formal. However, in this case, it is not entirely clear why exactly Solovyov draws attention to this similarity and interprets it as "the first step towards positive aesthetics."

As is known, Russian philosophy in the 19th century developed in the format of polemics between philosophical "parties". Solovyov and Chernyshevsky belonged to opposite "parties", which was reflected in their aesthetic views. Solovyov's "positive" aesthetics stemmed from the philosophy of all-unity developed by him, which was thought to be the result of the evolution of European metaphysics and Christian thought, while Chernyshevsky's aesthetics was a conclusion from the philosophy of materialism in general and the anthropology of L. Feuerbach in particular.

Accordingly, in Solovyov's aesthetics, beauty was recognized as a divine idea that emanates, thereby creating beautiful things and phenomena. At the same time, it was argued that beauty is ontologically higher than beauty. And human creativity, being derived from creation (creature), was understood as being at a lower level in the ontological hierarchy. This circumstance does not change from the fact that Solovyov recognizes the possibility of human creation through art.

In Chernyshevsky's aesthetics there is no absolute. Initially, only the material unity of nature is given, that is, the monistic structure of the world, in which there is only one substance – matter. On the one hand, beauty in Chernyshevsky's aesthetics is objective, since "beauty is life", that is, something that exists in reality. On the other hand, man as a living being is a subject who, in accordance with his understanding of life and utility, cognizes phenomena as beautiful or ugly.

Freedom as an indispensable condition for creativity is interpreted differently by Solovyov and Chernyshevsky. In Solovyov's system, a person is formally free if he is in unity with a community of people, in which all members constitute a unity. Such freedom is realized not only and not so much through man's own individuality, but through the medium of Sophia and God. In

Chernyshevsky's system, the individual is free when he acts not on the basis of a categorical imperative or other external conditions, but on the basis of subjective desires, the realization of which presupposes the cognition and recognition of objective laws. Accordingly, Solovyov understands the freedom of man's creativity as the conscious fulfillment of God's will, while Chernyshevsky insists that truly free creativity should be exclusively the creativity of man himself.

In this context, it is interesting to recall the attitude of Chernyshevsky and D.I. Pisarev to the polemics with P.D. Yurkevich about the anthropological principle⁴⁷², especially since Yurkevich influenced Solovyov's way of thinking. Chernyshevsky asserts that he sees no point in arguing with a seminary graduate, since Yurkevich's arguments are known to him, as a former seminarian, in advance⁴⁷³⁴⁷⁴ that Yurkevich's point of view about his philosophy is of no interest to him.

Pisarev, as a follower of Chernyshevsky, consonantly asserts: "... I do not see the slightest point of contact between Mr. Yurkevich's thoughts and my own ideas."⁴⁷⁵ But unlike Chernyshevsky, who liked to be ironic, Pisarev clearly formulates the reason why the "nihilists" and materialists avoid polemics with the idealist.

Nevertheless, Solovyov points out the similarity of his aesthetic position with the views of Chernyshevsky. According to Solovyov, their aesthetic teachings are based on one and the same idea – the idea of life. Beauty, at least in organic

⁴⁷² Yurkevich P.D. *Iz nauki o chelovecheskom dukhe* [From the science of the human spirit: Essays on philosophy and theology]. Ed. Stereotype. Moscow: Book House "LIBROKOM", 2015. Pp. 3–91.

⁴⁷³ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Polemicheskie krasoty* [Polemical beauty] // Chernyshevsky N.G. *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii: V 15 t. T. 7*. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1950. Pp. 725–726.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibidem*. P. 773.

⁴⁷⁵ Pisarev D.I. *Moscow Thinkers // Pisarev D.I. Works*. In 4 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, State Publishing House of Fiction Literature Publ., 1955. P. 301.

nature, is observed where the fullness of life takes place. It is impossible not to agree that in general form this thesis is found both in Solovyov and in Chernyshevsky. But in order to judge the similarity of their views, it is necessary to understand what content they put into the concept of "life".

Both Chernyshevsky and Solovyov look at life as the main category of aesthetics, through which beauty and beauty are defined. But the divergence begins at the moment when it is necessary to define "life."

According to Solovyov, beauty as light is manifested in inanimate nature directly, and in organic nature light appears in the form of *life*. That is, light as the substance of beauty is embodied in organic nature as life⁴⁷⁶.

Chernyshevsky, on the other hand, connects the concept of life with what in 1860 he defined as an anthropological principle⁴⁷⁷. The meaning of the anthropological principle, according to Chernyshevsky, lies in the application of monism to human nature. That is, both life and beauty (beauty) in his philosophical system are not emanations of the absolute, but independent entities (if we talk about specific manifestations of life and beauty).

In embryo, this idea is already present in "The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality". As the conclusions of the master's thesis, 17 theses are presented, which can be conditionally divided into several thematic groups: beauty and life (1-3), the sublime and tragic (4-8), objective reality and its copying (9-11), the causes of the emergence and essence of art (12-17). The theses included in each of the groups constitute a certain unity among themselves.

Of the 17 theses Solovyov adopts only the following positions: "1) existing art is only a weak surrogate of reality, and 2) beauty in nature has objective reality". With a number of reservations, we might say that the first position

⁴⁷⁶ Solovyov V.S. Beauty in Nature // Solovyov V.S. Collected Works. In 10 vols. Vol. 6. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1911–1914. P. 46.

⁴⁷⁷ Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. Pp. 226–228.

correlates with thesis 9, and the second with theses 2 and 3. But to separate theses 2 and 3 with thesis 1 is to take the thought out of context.

In fact, the first group of theses is an exposition of the monistic principle in the so-called Aesopian language. And without each other, these theses do not refute monism and even more so do not serve as proof of the propositions of Solovyov's aesthetics, but become just an unfinished thought.

The meaning of the first three theses is approximately as follows. Chernyshevsky disputes the view of the beautiful as a reflection of the absolute in the individual phenomenon, as is the case in the aesthetics of Hegel or Solovyov. The concept of "beauty" is associated with life, but is not reduced to the manifestation of the *idea* of beauty, since Chernyshevsky rejects dualism in favor of monism but in the key of anthropological materialism, close to natural-scientific materialism.

With the first proposition, which correlates with the 9th thesis, the situation is somewhat more complicated. Speaking of "existing art", Solovyov implies that in the future art will develop and eventually merge with religion, and man fully realizes himself as a "co-creator" of the world. In Thesis 12, Chernyshevsky directly refutes the connection between the origin of art and the need to "make up for the shortcomings" of objective reality. Also in thesis 10, he writes that the beautiful in nature is "quite beautiful."

Considering these propositions as the "first step" towards "positive" aesthetics, Solovyov breaks them with many elements of Chernyshevsky's aesthetic and philosophical system, including those from which these propositions are logically derived. In other words, Solovyov takes only a part of Chernyshevsky's ideas, and outside the context of materialist aesthetics, and transfers them to his own system of aesthetics.

In particular, Solovyov's attitude to Feuerbach is indicative. Chernyshevsky considered Feuerbach his teacher and credited him with the appearance of the ideas that formed the basis of Aesthetic Relations. In other words, without Feuerbach's anthropological materialism, there would have been no Chernyshevsky's aesthetics,

and hence no "first step." Solovyov, on the other hand, asserts that Chernyshevsky's "philosophical outlook" was "constrained" by the philosophy of the German thinker⁴⁷⁸.

It is known that Chernyshevsky at the age of about 20 turned Feuerbachian, having first become acquainted with the text of *The Essence of Christianity*⁴⁷⁹. In 1855, at the age of 27, he defended his master's thesis. There is no reason to believe that in the period between the first reading of Feuerbach's work and the defense of his dissertation, Chernyshevsky's views changed significantly, especially since this is not recorded in the research literature. Accordingly, the ideas set forth in "Aesthetic Relations..." not only organically agree with Feuerbach's philosophy, but also represent the development of this philosophy. Two circumstances convincingly testify in favor of this statement. In the preface to the third edition of his dissertation, Chernyshevsky admitted that his aesthetic ideas were dictated by the influence of Feuerbach⁴⁸⁰. In addition, a prominent researcher of Chernyshevsky's aesthetics, G.A. Solovyov, noted that the source of Chernyshevsky's ideas about beauty and the source of Feuerbach's ideas about God are one and the same – reality represented by man⁴⁸¹.

In the context of anthropological materialism, even the provisions on art as a surrogate of reality and on the objectivity of beauty appear incompatible with Solovyov's aesthetics. Clearly realizing this, Solovyov extracts the relevant theses from the context of Chernyshevsky's philosophical system, reasoning that Chernyshevsky did not understand the sense of the thought expressed by him:

⁴⁷⁸ Ibidem. P. 77.

⁴⁷⁹ Chernyshevskaya N.M. *Chronicle of the Life and Activities of N.G. Chernyshevsky*. Moscow: State Publishing House of Fiction Literature, 1953. P. 47.

⁴⁸⁰ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Preface to the Third Edition // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works*. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986. Pp. 205–213.

⁴⁸¹ Solovyov G.A. *Chernyshevsky's Aesthetic Views*. Ed. 2, add. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1978. P. 65.

“...the author's own explanation is unsatisfactory”⁴⁸². It would be appropriate to draw an analogy with what Belinsky once told the young Dostoevsky about his talent, drawing attention to the fact that the writer cannot always understand the meaning of his own works of genius⁴⁸³. However, there is no direct correspondence between a literary critic and a writer, on the one hand, and two philosophers of different philosophical "parties", on the other. Often) to the philosophical significance of his works, but the critic has the right to discover this meaning, then the philosopher, on the contrary, cannot but claim the philosophical significance of his works, and therefore the interpretation of his works becomes not so much an interpretation of the original source as an exposition of the views of the interpreter himself.

It can be concluded that Solovyov, in criticizing Chernyshevsky's aesthetic theory, disputes the foundation of this theory, and does so in two ways: on the one hand, he rejects what he considers to be wrong, and on the other hand, he agrees with those ideas whose true content he clarifies on the basis of his position. Thus, the "first step" on the path to "positive aesthetics" is not so much the merit of Chernyshevsky, as many as Solovyov. And if this is so, then the "point of contact" between the aesthetic teachings of Chernyshevsky and Solovyov turns out to be imaginary, if we consider it from the standpoint of Chernyshevsky's anthropological materialism, but from the point of view of Solovyov's philosophy of all-unity, this "point of contact" is real. In other words, the picture fundamentally changes depending on the optics that we choose.

In general, the search for positive content in all, even "negative" phenomena and doctrines (such as, for example, positivism and socialism) is a widely used method of criticism by Solovyov. In this regard, we can recall the evolution of

⁴⁸² Solovyov V.S. *The First Step to Positive Aesthetics* // Solovyov V.S. *Collected Works*. In 10 vols. Vol. 7. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1911–1914. Pp. 76–77.

⁴⁸³ Dostoevsky F.M. *Diary of a writer for 1877 January* // Dostoevsky F.M. *Complete Works*. In 30 vols. Vol. 25. Leningrad, Nauka Publ., 1983. Pp. 30–31.

Solovyov's interpretation of F. Nietzsche's "superman". When the German thinker began to gain popularity in Russia, Solovyov reacted to this by writing an article "Literature or Truth?"⁴⁸⁴ (1897), in which he completely rejected Nietzsche's teaching in any philosophical meaning and ironically called him a "superphilologist", and his idea of the superman – "a chair at the Faculty of Philology". However, after a while, when it became clear that Nietzsche's influence on Russian philosophy would have to be taken seriously, Solovyov wrote another article, differing in general tone and final conclusions – "The Idea of the Superman"⁴⁸⁵ (1899). Continuing to criticize Nietzsche's concept of the "superman," the Russian philosopher at least places it higher than the "economic materialism" of K. Marx and the "abstract moralism" of L. Tolstoy. Analyzing Nietzsche's teaching "from the good side," Solovyov separates the wheat from the chaff and as a result reveals the true content of the idea of the superman, namely, that it is, in fact, the "first step" to the doctrine of God-manhood. In this interpretation, Nietzsche's philosophy turns out to be significant, but only because it leads to the philosophy of Solovyov. Solovyov himself appears as a kind of Russian Hegel, who absorbs into his philosophical system everything true that was understood before him. A similar method is used in the interpretation of the idea of mankind by O. Comte⁴⁸⁶.

One may wonder why Solovyov really considered Chernyshevsky's thesis a significant work in the formation of "positive" aesthetics, or whether clarifying the true content of his opponent's individual ideas is a kind of polemical device by means of which they are transformed into their opposite. Of course, one cannot but assume that Solovyov really did consider Chernyshevsky's aesthetic ideas

⁴⁸⁴ Solovyov V.S. Literature or Truth? Nietzsche: Pro et contra. Anthology. St. Petersburg: Publishing House of the Russian Christian Humanitarian Institute, 2001. Pp. 293–296.

⁴⁸⁵ Solovyov V.S. The idea of a superman // Solovyov V.S. Collected works. In 10 vols. Vol. 9. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1913. Pp. 265–274.

⁴⁸⁶ Solovyov V.S. Ideya chelovechestva u avgusta Konta [The idea of mankind in August Comte]. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1988. Pp. 562–581.

significant - but only as a passing stage in the history of "true aesthetics." If so, then Chernyshevsky's aesthetics, as interpreted by Solovyov, appears to be relevant only within the framework of the philosophy of universalism. It is clear that Chernyshevsky could hardly agree with such an assessment of his aesthetics.

Asserting that Chernyshevsky's dissertation contributed to the development of the doctrine of beauty, Solovyov insisted that the author of "Aesthetic Relations..." could not understand the true content of his work. In other words, Chernyshevsky's merit, according to Solovyov, lies only in the unconscious solution of the basic problems of aesthetics. Obviously, such a conclusion, while formally recognizing the significance of Chernyshevsky's individual ideas, in fact discredits his entire philosophical position as a whole. probably, the point here is not in Solovyov's ironic and frivolous attitude towards Chernyshevsky⁴⁸⁷, but in his fundamental disagreement with his anthropological materialism and materialist aesthetics.

Thus, the coincidence in the aesthetic views of Solovyov and Chernyshevsky is more formal than substantive. The concept of "life," which Solovyov notes in Chernyshevsky, is understood by Chernyshevsky in a completely different way from how it is interpreted within the framework of "positive" aesthetics. Solovyov looks at Chernyshevsky's theory exclusively from his own point of view, being sure that it is true. However, being formal, the coincidence of the aesthetic views of Solovyov and Chernyshevsky is still not accidental. This is the natural result of the corresponding interpretation, the meaning of which, of course, is not to clarify the content of Chernyshevsky's aesthetics, and not even to state the existence of points of intersection between opposing philosophical positions, but to contribute to the substantiation of one's own views.

Both the sphere of aesthetics in general and Chernyshevsky's philosophy in particular turn out to be for Solovyov only a means to substantiate his point of view in the field of ontology. The attempt to make other people's ideas "one's own"

⁴⁸⁷ Brodsky A.I. Vladimir Solovyov. St. Petersburg, Nauka Publ., 2016. P. 26.

is not accidental, but a completely habitual and natural form of philosophizing for Solovyov, which by no means involves the search for possible like-minded people proceeding from other grounds, but, on the contrary, their elimination.

The following episode is a more modern form of the same controversy that was analyzed above.

3.2 N.G. Chernyshevsky in the interpretation of V.K. Kantor

... the usual trick of his opponents is to pervert the meaning of his words.

M.M. Rosenthal

Modern studies of the history of Russian philosophy are still dominated by the trend of interpreting Russian thought in terms of its integrity, which implies the possibility of appealing to its invariant, “essential” characteristics, or “traits”. As a result, the content of Russian philosophy is inevitably reduced and often distorted, depending on which “traits” this or that historian of philosophy considers genuine⁴⁸⁸. Accordingly, the "canon" of great Russian philosophers includes only those whose views do not contradict the idea of the "whole" of Russian philosophy and confirm the correctness of the chosen methodology of historical and philosophical research. Those philosophers whose views do not meet these criteria and, moreover, demand their refutation, turn out to be "outcasts". At best, attempts are made to obscure and diminish their significance for the development of Russian philosophical culture, and to primitize philosophical ideas.

A clear example of this trend is the reception of N.G. Chernyshevsky's philosophy in modern historical and philosophical discourse. It is obvious that Chernyshevsky is a thinker who had a real influence on the progressive minds of

⁴⁸⁸ Rybas A.E. O russkoi filosofii ne v tselom [On Russian philosophy not as a whole]. *Veche. Journal of Russian Philosophy and Culture*. 2015. Vol. 27. Part. I. pp. 143–152.

his time, and he cannot simply be dismissed from the history of Russian philosophy. Chernyshevsky's authority – or, more precisely, the still lingering relevance of his ideas – prevents us from "forgetting" this philosopher, from doing without him when writing a history of Russian thought. It is for this reason that a whole campaign has recently been launched against Chernyshevsky in historical and philosophical literature, the purpose of which is to create a new image of the thinker so that he could organically fit into the now officially recognized version of the history of Russian philosophy.

Among St. Petersburg philosophers, V.S. Nikonenko is rightly considered a specialist in Chernyshevsky's philosophy. Indeed, for a long time he studied the socialist and atheistic philosophical tradition in Russia: his works on materialism by Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov and D.I. Pisarev are known⁴⁸⁹⁴⁹⁰⁴⁹¹. However, after 1991, the sphere of scientific interests of V.S. Nikonenko changed significantly: his attention began to be attracted mainly by religious topics⁴⁹². Of course, V.S. Nikonenko repeatedly stressed that the study of the history of Russian philosophy should be comprehensive, taking into account the "ambiguity, multifacetedness, multidirectionality of the movement of philosophical thought"⁴⁹³, because only in this case will an understanding of the unity of the historical-philosophical process be achieved, which is formed not as a result of the logical dictate of generalizing concepts, but "on the basis of specific characteristics of reality."⁴⁹⁴ "Belinsky, by the way, as well as Herzen, and Dostoevsky, and Chernyshevsky, and Tolstoy, and Solovyov," wrote V.S. Nikonenko, "cannot be

⁴⁸⁹ Volk S.S., Nikonenko V.S. Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky. Leningrad: LGU, 1979.

⁴⁹⁰ Nikonenko V.S. Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, D.I. Pisareva. Leningrad, LGU Publ., 1983.

⁴⁹¹ Nikonenko V.S. Nikolay Aleksandrovich Dobrolyubov. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1985.

⁴⁹² Nikonenko V.S. Works on Russian Philosophy and Literature. St. Petersburg, RHGA Publ., 2014.

⁴⁹³ Ibidem. P. 25.

⁴⁹⁴ Ibidem. P. 26.

squeezed into some linear process of philosophical development, they directly or indirectly determined the intellectual and moral life of their epochs, being at the same time often extremely distant from each other."⁴⁹⁵ From this followed the conclusion that Russian philosophy is an organic combination of various ideological currents, And the task of the historian of philosophy is, first of all, to reveal the "substantial foundations" of these currents, explaining their unity. Unfortunately, V.S. Nikonenko did not have time to write a generalizing work on the history of Russian philosophy, in which the methodological recommendations indicated by him would be implemented. Carried away by religious thinkers, he did not continue his research into Chernyshevsky's philosophy.

The author of one of the first post-Soviet textbooks on the history of Russian philosophy, A.F. Zamaleev, considered Chernyshevsky's views solely in the socio-political context. Such an approach, which, obviously, cannot but be recognized as reductionist, he justified by the fact that Chernyshevsky as if "always turned to philosophy, 'depending on the need': in one way it could be Locke, in another - Feuerbach, in a third - Hobbes or Bentham. Philosophy was for him an instrument of *party* politics"⁴⁹⁶. From this point of view, Chernyshevsky's significance lies only in the fact that, as a representative of the "peasant" party, he tried to establish "communal" socialism "on the basis of Hegelianism," thereby defending "peasant interests."⁴⁹⁷

It is interesting to note that in his work "The Chronicle of Russian Philosophy" A.F. Zamaleev, speaking of 1855, does not mention Chernyshevsky's dissertation "Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality".⁴⁹⁸ And in presenting a discussion of "man in philosophy," he does not reveal the essence of the

⁴⁹⁵ Ibidem. P. 27.

⁴⁹⁶ Zamaleev A.F. Self-Consciousness of Russia: Studies in Russian Philosophy, Political Science and Culture. St. Petersburg, Nauka Publ., 2010. P. 92.

⁴⁹⁷ Ibidem. Pp. 92–94.

⁴⁹⁸ Chronicle of Russian Philosophy. 862–2002. A.F. Zamaleev. St. Petersburg, Letniy sad Publ., 2003.

anthropological principle as Chernyshevsky understood it, but instead focuses on the description of "extensive political science excursions,"⁴⁹⁹ eventually drawing the appropriate conclusion: "Chernyshevsky's anthropology bears the features of both moral utilitarianism and political radicalism."⁵⁰⁰ In more detail and, apparently, with sympathy, A.F. Zamaleev expounds the arguments of "Chernyshevsky's opponent" – P.D. Yurkevich, leading the reader to the idea that they are final. In this regard, the question arises: why then is the polemical answer of D.I. Pisarev to Yurkevich not considered? It is noteworthy that A.F. Zamaleev resorts to sarcasm, apparently considering it to be the last argument: Chernyshevsky, in replying to Yurkevich, really "turned out to be right", but only that "Mr. Yurkevich's position will change" – it has really changed, since "the Kiev theologian was transferred to Moscow to head the department of philosophy at the university"; but Chernyshevsky himself "was arrested and ended up in the Peter and Paul Fortress."⁵⁰¹

It is also worth noting the tendency to bring Chernyshevsky's views closer to or even identify with positivism, which is quite widespread in modern historical and philosophical literature. The meaning of this is to deny Chernyshevsky the right to be called a philosopher in the strict sense of the word (for positivism in this case is by default thought of as "under-philosophy" or "non-philosophy"). For example, S.S. Gusev, describing the "paradox of positivism", noted that Chernyshevsky's views "in general orientation are quite close to the positions of the founder of positive philosophy,"⁵⁰² A.A. Yermichev characterized them as "Marxist positivism,"⁵⁰³ and I.I. Evlampiev as "a combination of natural-scientific

⁴⁹⁹ Ibidem. P. 161.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibidem. P. 163.

⁵⁰¹ Ibidem. P. 165.

⁵⁰² Gusev S.S. Paradox of positivism // Russian positivism: Lesevich, Yushkevich, Bogdanov. S.S. Gusev. St. Petersburg, Nauka Publ., 1995. P. 10.

⁵⁰³ Ermichev A.A. Realism of Marxist Positivism // Philosophy of Realism: From the History of Russian Thought: Collection of Articles. St. Petersburg, SPbGU Publ., 1997. Pp. 61–85.

materialism, militant positivism, social utopianism, and political radicalism,"⁵⁰⁴ and then concluded that "Chernyshevsky can hardly be recognized as a profound and original thinker."⁵⁰⁵

But probably the most harsh "verdict" on Chernyshevsky is V.K. Kantor's monograph "The Tree of Life Cut Down" published in 2016. *The Fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*⁵⁰⁶. Let us consider this work in more detail, since both this work itself and the reaction to it in the professional philosophical community best allow us to understand the current situation in Russian philosophy.

Judging by the reviews of V.K. Kantor's book, some researchers accept his point of view, while others note the problem of combating the "myth" of Chernyshevsky, while recognizing the risk of creating a new myth.

B.V. Emelyanov and O.B. Ionaitis evaluate Kantor's work as an original study and emphasize that it is necessary to study Chernyshevsky's work from a "new" (probably not Soviet) position. Moreover, B.V. Emelyanov and O.B. Ionaitis see the main advantage of the book under review in the originality of V.K. Kantor's approach: "We consider the best pages of the book to be those that tell about the Christian feat of Chernyshevsky as a prisoner"⁵⁰⁷. Further, the reviewers write that the author "carefully selects the facts".⁵⁰⁸ One cannot but agree with this statement, but only adding that V.K. Kantor cites only those facts that confirm the correctness of his point of view. Those facts that are "inconvenient" for him he either omits, or accompanies them with a peculiar interpretation. B.V. Emelyanov and O.B. Ionaitis call Kantor a "historian" who collects facts and builds convincing

⁵⁰⁴ Evlampiev I.I. *Istoriya russkoi filosofii: Uchebnoe posobie* [History of Russian philosophy: Textbook]. Moscow, Vysshaya shkola Publ., 2002. P. 94.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibidem*. P. 96.

⁵⁰⁶ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016.

⁵⁰⁷ Emelyanov B.V., Ionaitis O.B. "Other" Chernyshevsky: V.K. Kantor's version // *Vestnik VyatSU*. 2017. №10. P. 112.

⁵⁰⁸ *Ibidem*. P. 114.

arguments. to be more precise, in the work under consideration V.K. Kantor showed himself not so much as a scientist as as a writer.

T.S. Zlotnikova makes a lot of important remarks and comes to the conclusion that V.K. Kantor, “recoding” the old “myth”, creates a new one. However, she tends to call the new myth an “antimyth” instead of a myth proper. The main idea of the book, according to T.S. Zlotnikova, is the theme of the “Russian European”, which V.K. Kantor drew from V.S. Solovyov. In whole, T.S. Zlotnikova speaks positively about V.K. Kantor's book, calling his work original and worthy of attention.

But at the same time, T.S. Zlotnikova makes critical remarks, for example, she writes the following: "V. Kantor's thought... that Chernyshevsky's enemies... created a myth out of him, which was supposed to destroy piety in relation to the real qualities and preferences of man, is paradoxical not only in essence, but has the quality of a certain overestimation of the mental and organizational capabilities of these very opponents. I believe that only very sophisticated and consistent people could have thought of such an exquisite intrigue, and Chernyshevsky's opponents were unlikely to have both of these qualities at once."⁵⁰⁹ T.S. Zlotnikova also speaks about the uncertainty of the genre of the book⁵¹⁰, about the book's gravitation towards the genre of myth⁵¹¹, about "priorities", for example, about the frequent mention of Chernyshevsky's assessment by V.V. Rozanov, who did not devote a single serious work to the "Vilyui prisoner"⁵¹². Discussing the genre nature of V.K. Kantor's work, T.S. Zlotnikova writes that "the new myth appears in a curious slip of the tongue of the VK, which, in a completely modern spirit, calls the NGCh a 'star of the opposition'." ⁵¹³Further, T.S. Zlotnikova, probably not

⁵⁰⁹ Zlotnikova T.S. Recoding the Myth of N.G. Chernyshevsky // Bulletin of the Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy. 2017. In 18 vol. Vol. 4, p. 158.

⁵¹⁰ Ibidem. P. 158.

⁵¹¹ Ibidem. P. 159.

⁵¹² Ibidem. P. 159.

⁵¹³ Ibidem. P. 160.

without irony, writes: "And – the apotheosis of the myth supported in the VK book by references to N. Berdyaev, G. Lopatin and others: 'a Russian saint, a hermit'."⁵¹⁴ However, these criticisms do not ultimately affect the high assessment of the book about Chernyshevsky.

O.A. Zhukova expresses doubts about V.K. Kantor's thesis about Chernyshevsky's religiosity and the possibility of tearing his ideas out of the context of Russian history. At the beginning of the article, she poses two questions: "... Can Chernyshevsky's legacy be "cleansed" of revolutionary myth and ideological interpretations? And how fair is it to define him as a supporter of gradual reforms and a Christian thinker?"⁵¹⁵. Trying to answer the first question, the reviewer makes it clear that it is impossible to de-ideologize Chernyshevsky's legacy. And in answering the second question, she simply refers to the philosophers of the Russian religious renaissance, considering this to be quite a sufficient argument: "N.A. Berdyaev, V.V. Zenkovsky, N.O. Lossky, P.B. Struve, S.L. Frank, *metaphysically do not recognize him (Chernyshevsky). –Note. A.Ch.)* the bearer of a free and Orthodox spirit."⁵¹⁶

O.A. Zhukova further notes that V.K. Kantor is not quite consistent when he quotes S.N. Bulgakov: "But Bulgakov's main idea is different. The pathos of the article is that the asceticism and devotion of the Russian intelligentsia as external forms, a kind of pseudo-religiosity, are dissociated by the author from true religiosity. In Bulgakov's opinion, Chernyshevsky, as "the leader of the Russian intelligentsia", stands at the start of this process of breaking with Christianity, still retaining the moral features of religious culture"⁵¹⁷. In other words, in Bulgakov's

⁵¹⁴ Ibidem. P. 166.

⁵¹⁵ Zhukova O.A. Novyi chelovek: Nikolay Chernyshevskii v zerkale russkogo evropeizma [A New Man: Nikolay Chernyshevsky in the Mirror of Russian Europeanism]. Sociological Review. 2017. №1. P. 296.

⁵¹⁶ Ibidem. P. 303.

⁵¹⁷ Ibidem. P. 304.

assessment, Chernyshevsky is not a Christian, but an atheist who has only recently parted ways with Christianity.

T.G. Yurchenko briefly summarizes the content of V.K. Kantor's book without expressing critical remarks. It can be assumed that the reviewer agrees with the author of the book. Nevertheless, at the end of the article, T.G. Yurchenko concludes that V.G. Kantor does not so much refute the myth of Chernyshevsky as recode this myth⁵¹⁸.

Thus, V.K. Kantor, according to many reviewers of his work, made an attempt to "demythologize" Chernyshevsky. In Soviet times, according to V.K. Kantor, the image of the "Vilyui prisoner" was used to create a "phantom of a revolutionary." The author of the book disputes Chernyshevsky's revolutionary nature and atheism, basing his arguments on biographical material and the finding of "rhymes" in fate. In other words, V.K. Kantor seeks to refute the understanding of Chernyshevsky's philosophical views, which developed in the Marxist tradition, not by historical and philosophical methods, but rather by artistic and rhetorical methods. Thus, he interprets the views of the editor of the magazine "Sovremennik" as reformist, Christian and positivist. In Kantor's interpretation, Chernyshevsky appears not as a forerunner of Soviet Marxism, as was considered for a long time, but as an ideological opponent of the Bolsheviks and any revolutionary theories in general. But, as we can see and as T.S. Zlotnikova⁵¹⁹ and O.A. Zhukova noted⁵²⁰, V.K. Kantor created a new myth about Chernyshevsky.

⁵¹⁸ Yurchenko T.G., Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. – 528 p. // Social and Humanitarian Sciences. Russian and foreign literature. Ser. 7: Literary Studies. Abstract Journal. 2019. № 1. Pp. 157–162.

⁵¹⁹ Zlotnikova T.S. Recoding the Myth of N.G. Chernyshevsky // Bulletin of the Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy. 2017. In 18 vol. Vol. 4, pp. 157–169.

⁵²⁰ Zhukova O.A. Novyi chelovek: Nikolay Chernyshevskii v zerkale russkogo evropeizma [A New Man: Nikolay Chernyshevsky in the Mirror of Russian Europeanism]. Sociological Review. 2017. №1. Pp. 296–313.

V.K. Kantor begins the construction of his myth with the remarks that Chernyshevsky studied at the seminary⁵²¹. Trying to emphasize that this is not an accidental coincidence, he also points to the genealogy of the hero of the book. Nikolai Chernyshevsky's father, Gavriil Chernyshevsky, was a priest, and not in the first generation⁵²². This is one of Kantor's arguments in favor of the thesis that Chernyshevsky was a Christian throughout his life.

In addition, V.K. Kantor tries to find points of contact between Chernyshevsky and such religious thinkers as F.M. Dostoevsky and V.S. Solovyov. For instance, he mentions Solovyov's article "The First Step to Positive Aesthetics", in which Solovyov approvingly speaks about Chernyshevsky's thesis⁵²³. But V.K. Kantor does not mention that Solovyov mainly criticizes the dissertation, sharing only a few of the 17 theses of the author of "The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality".⁵²⁴ It is obvious that Chernyshevsky and Solovyov, even on the surface, cannot seem close in their views. But V.K. Kantor finds this closeness, and also in purely external signs: both were characterized by piercing laughter and self-irony⁵²⁵.

Interestingly, Dostoevsky is mentioned much more often in the book about Chernyshevsky. You can be convinced of this by looking at the name index⁵²⁶. Kantor often supports his thesis about Chernyshevsky with voluminous quotations from Dostoevsky's novels⁵²⁷. It is not entirely clear how justified this is in the study

⁵²¹ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 27.

⁵²² Ibidem. P. 30.

⁵²³ Ibidem. P. 20.

⁵²⁴ Solovyov V.S. The First Step to Positive Aesthetics // Solovyov V.S. Collected Works. In 10 vols. Vol. 7. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1911–1914. Pp. 69–77.

⁵²⁵ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 28.

⁵²⁶ Ibidem. Pp. 514–526.

⁵²⁷ Ibidem. Pp. 155, 183.

of Chernyshevsky. Moreover, even such people close to Chernyshevsky as N.A. Nekrasov, N.A. Dobrolyubov, Chernyshevsky's wife, and I.I. Panaev are rarely⁵²⁸ mentioned. He himself explains this by the "rhymes" of the fates of the two great thinkers.

In an attempt to substantiate his thesis about Chernyshevsky as a Christian, V.K. Kantor equates the theory of rational egoism with the ethics of Christ: "... The rational egoism of Chernyshevsky's characters essentially repeats the famous formula of Christ, that one must love others as oneself."⁵²⁹ However, the author seriously simplifies the ethics of the characters in *What Is To Be Done?*, trying to present it as love. The meaning of rational egoism is not so much in love as in reasonableness. The difference between Chernyshevsky's ethics and ordinary egoism is that the rational egoist notices the "I" (ego) not only in himself, but also in himself. but also in others. Hence the importance of calculation in the context of morality and the desire of a rational egoist to perform actions that will benefit other people. This concept is expounded in more detail by Chernyshevsky in his work "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy",⁵³⁰ but it is noteworthy that V.K. Kantor, speaking of rational egoism, prefers to analyze not Chernyshevsky's philosophical work, but a work of art.

Thus, based on the interpretations of the theory of rational egoism and some biographical information, V.K. Kantor concludes that Chernyshevsky was a religious thinker. It is known that Chernyshevsky preferred university studies to a career as a priest, which indicates his secularism. But V.K. Kantor explains this by the fact that Chernyshevsky was looking for alternative methods to affect people,

⁵²⁸ Kantor V.K. "The Brothers Karamazov" by F. Dostoevsky. Moscow, Khudozhestvennaya literatura Publ., 1983.

⁵²⁹ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 20.

⁵³⁰ Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. Pp. 146–229.

as he considered the church contemporary to him unsuitable for his purposes⁵³¹. In this regard, V.K. Kantor will further draw a parallel between Chernyshevsky and Alyosha Karamazov, a character in Dostoevsky's novel *The Brothers Karamazov*, whom Elder Zosima told to go into the world, that is, to leave the monks⁵³². It is difficult to doubt Alyosha in his religiosity. And although there are no grounds for drawing such a parallel, this technique helps to create the appearance that Chernyshevsky's views can legitimately be interpreted as religious.

It should be emphasized that until about the age of 20, Chernyshevsky was indeed religious, as evidenced by his diary entries and his writings from the seminary period⁵³³. But V.K. Kantor strives to extend youthful beliefs to the worldview of an adult. He points out that his father was a role model for Chernyshevsky and draws in detail a portrait of Gavriil Ivanovich as a deacon, who even among other clergymen was a particularly zealous righteous man⁵³⁴. An attempt to interpret Chernyshevsky's words and deeds throughout his life as Christian is the leitmotif of the book. Even warm relations with his father are interpreted by V.K. Kantor as religiosity⁵³⁵, while love for parents is the norm of human relations, regardless of the worldviews of the older and younger generations.

In another place, V.K. Kantor, discussing the publicist M.L. Mikhailov, writes the following: "... Mikhailov already in the late 50s became a radical publicist, translator, while implementing the principles of love set forth in the novel *NGCh*, becoming the third in the marriage of the Shelgunovs.⁵³⁶ Such hints do not testify to either Christian ethics or the ethics of rational egoism. Even the

⁵³¹ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 25.

⁵³² *Ibidem*. P. 69.

⁵³³ *Ibidem*. Pp. 52–56.

⁵³⁴ *Ibidem*. P. 47.

⁵³⁵ *Ibidem*. P. 199.

⁵³⁶ *Ibidem*. P. 61.

thought of a marriage in which there are not two, but three people at once is unacceptable for Christianity. but in the possibility of women's emancipation. The above quote from the work of V.K. Kantor testifies to the obvious vulgarization of this morality and, as a consequence, the distortion of the theory of rational egoism.

Further, discussing the discussion between Yurkevich and Chernyshevsky, V.K. Kantor emphasizes the points of principle for himself: "... and the objection to the professor of the theological academy where he wanted to study, and the topic of the professor's article ("From the Science of the Human Spirit"), and the arguments."⁵³⁷ The mention of the desire to study at the academy and the emphasis on the title of Yurkevich's article create an atmosphere favorable to the point of view of V.K. Kantor. He builds not so much an argument as a context, and he does it selectively. But this topic is left aside. Instead, the "arguments" on which Chernyshevsky refuses to continue the discussion with Yurkevich are emphasized. The main of these "arguments", according to V.K. Kantor, is Chernyshevsky's assertion that he himself studied at the seminary in his time and was familiar with the arguments of his opponent in advance. But V.K. Kantor avoids the fact that Chernyshevsky fundamentally puts himself in the position of a philosopher whose views are opposite to those of Yurkevich. Moreover, Chernyshevsky's belonging to the philosophical "party" of Democritus is the reason why he refuses to discuss. In "Polemical Beauties" Chernyshevsky wrote about this: "If you respect, and I do not respect a certain trend, then my attitude towards it will seem to you impermissibly impudent."⁵³⁸ And in another place: "... What need do I have to look seriously at the author of a well-known article, or at the people who praise him, when I see that they are repeating against me personally things that have been repeated from time immemorial about every thinker of the school to which I adhere?"⁵³⁹ Chernyshevsky directly says that he and Yurkevich belong to different

⁵³⁷ Ibidem. P. 51.

⁵³⁸ Chernyshevsky N.G. Polemic Beauty. Collection Two // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 319.

⁵³⁹ Ibidem. P. 326.

philosophical schools, and he calls Yurkevich an idealist, but does not say anything specific about himself. This circumstance is due to the fact that in Russia in the nineteenth century it was not safe to call oneself a materialist in the press, and therefore it was necessary to resort to the help of the "Aesopian" language.

The text of the monograph contains sometimes contradictory theses. For example, speaking about Chernyshevsky's perpetuum mobile, V.K. Kantor first admits that, "most likely, he did not realize about the prohibition of the French Academy to send perpetuum mobile projects to it"⁵⁴⁰. But in the next chapter he writes: "... although it has already been said by the French Academy that it does not accept projects of perpetual motion machines for consideration as contrary to the laws of nature. Of course, such a well-read young man as Chernyshevsky knew about it."⁵⁴¹ Whether Chernyshevsky knew about this ban or did not know, as it seems to us, is not so important. The very fact of the attempt to invent a perpetual motion machine speaks of the great ambitions of the thinker. Both versions (about knowledge and ignorance of the prohibition) are admissible, since there is no reliable evidence in favor of one of them, or to abandon judgments on this issue, appealing to the impossibility of proving or disproving them.

V.K. Kantor regularly compares Chernyshevsky with Dostoevsky. In particular, he draws a parallel between their socio-political views during their studies at the university. Their views are far from being homogeneous, but V.K. Kantor speaks precisely about the points of contact, and "removes" disagreements. Thus, he emphasizes the rejection of the ideas of liberalism by Chernyshevsky and Dostoevsky. Paraphrasing Dostoevsky's thought, V.K. Kantor writes: "Of course," he wrote, "freedom is good, But does your freedom give everyone a million? And if not, then the one who has a million will oppress the one who does not have this million."⁵⁴² Chernyshevsky could not but agree with these words. However,

⁵⁴⁰ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 61.

⁵⁴¹ Ibidem. P. 88.

⁵⁴² Ibidem. P. 63.

Dostoevsky's ideas about Christian humility, which are expounded, for example, in *Crime and Punishment* or *The Brothers Karamazov*, are completely alien to Chernyshevsky, who wrote about the possibility and necessity of a socialist transformation of society⁵⁴³.

Further, V.K. Kantor writes: "Looking ahead, I will note that the main political idea of Chernyshevsky is a constitutional monarchy, and not a rebellion, or rather, even opposition to a rebellion."⁵⁴⁴ But the political system and the method of changing it do not contradict each other in themselves. Hypothetically, it is quite possible to imagine the establishment of a constitutional monarchy as a result of a revolt. The opposition of such concepts is illegitimate. However, V.K. Kantor diligently creates the image of Chernyshevsky as an opponent of the rebellion and, "consequently", a monarchist, without adducing evidence to confirm his monarchist convictions. Using the construction "running ahead", he hopes that the reader will accept the proposed thesis in one way or another. With such techniques, V.K. Kantor very skillfully creates an atmosphere and builds a context.

The consideration of the fragment about Feuerbach⁵⁴⁵ requires a separate analysis. V.K. Kantor presents Feuerbach, who had a significant influence on Chernyshevsky's worldview as a theologian. He tries to refute the atheism of the author of "The Essence of Christianity" with the help of such thinkers as F. Engels. A reference to Engels' words about Feuerbach as a thinker who wants to "dissolve philosophy in religion", that is, as an idealist⁵⁴⁶. On the basis of this quotation, V.K. Kantor considers the view of Feuerbach as an atheist and materialist to be refuted. However, in Engels' work *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical*

⁵⁴³ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Kritika filosofskikh presudzheniya protiv obshchestvennogo vladeniya* [Criticism of philosophical prejudices against communal ownership]. Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986. Pp. 603–643.

⁵⁴⁴ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 74.

⁵⁴⁵ *Ibidem*. Pp. 78–86.

⁵⁴⁶ *Ibidem*. P. 81.

German Philosophy, which is quoted by V.K. Kantor, Feuerbach is repeatedly treated as a materialist and atheist⁵⁴⁷. Feuerbach's "religiosity" is not understood here literally. Engels criticizes Feuerbach not for idealism or theology, but for inconsistency in the application of materialist principles⁵⁴⁸. Outside the context of the article, the meaning of the quotation changes, but this is what V.K. Kantor apparently needed.

In an attempt to refute the fact that Chernyshevsky is a materialist in his philosophical views, V.K. Kantor makes reference to the autobiography of N.I. Kostomarov, who, among other things, writes about Chernyshevsky. V.K. Kantor further quotes from Chernyshevsky's comments on this autobiography: "His stories about me are as fantastic as his account in 'Autobiography'. I believe that neither agreement nor disagreement between the two fantastic sources provides a solid foundation for any conclusions about what the actual truth was"⁵⁴⁹. There is no direct indication of the refutation of the materialistic nature of Chernyshevsky's views, and therefore V.K. Kantor's thesis looks unconvincing. But what is important is that in quoting Chernyshevsky, V.K. Kantor edits his words. "But – and his stories are fantastic to me, like his story in the Autobiography".⁵⁵⁰ This could be ignored if the author defined his work as a work of fiction and renounced scientific accuracy. But his monograph is classified as a historical and philosophical study. Unfortunately, there is no way to check every quotation: there are too many of them in V.K. Kantor's monograph. that there are inaccuracies in other quotes as well.

⁵⁴⁷ Engels F. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy // Marx K., Engels F. Selected Works. In 3 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1979. Pp. 385, 393, 398.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibidem. P. 391.

⁵⁴⁹ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 101.

⁵⁵⁰ Chernyshevsky N.G. Complete Works. In 15 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Goslitizdat Publ., 1939. P. 767.

To confirm his assertion about Chernyshevsky's views, V.K. Kantor writes the following in a footnote: "He hated the fanaticism of the NHC, he wrote a lot about it."⁵⁵¹ Neither a reference to the source, nor a quotation from Chernyshevsky on this subject is given in the text. It turns out that the reader should take V.K. Kantor at his word. And this is despite the fact that his thesis is non-standard, and therefore requires serious argumentation. And if he sometimes allows himself to edit quotes, then why not attribute this or that point of view to someone? The question, alas, is rhetorical.

In another place, discussing Chernyshevsky's attitude to women, V.K. Kantor speaks of the twenty-year-old Nikolai Gavrilovich as a teenager: "But it was difficult for a twenty-year-old Volga resident, despite his bookishness, like for any teenager."⁵⁵² In these words there is either an inaccuracy in determining the period of development of the individual, or an attempt to belittle the young Chernyshevsky. The second option is also supported by the frequent reference to the thinker's "bravado" in relation to God and religion⁵⁵³.

Further, in the context of Kostomarov's retelling of Chernyshevsky's philosophical beliefs, V.K. Kantor "recognizes" the influence of Feuerbach on the future "Vilyui prisoner". Kostomarov regarded Chernyshevsky's views as atheistic. But, as it turns out, in this episode Chernyshevsky ironized with "youthful bravado"⁵⁵⁴. It should be noted that V.K. Kantor often refers to Chernyshevsky's manner of speaking with irony, and he uses this fact to prove religiosity and reformism, on the one hand, and to refute atheism and revolutionism, on the other⁵⁵⁵.

⁵⁵¹ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 102.

⁵⁵² Ibidem. P. 94.

⁵⁵³ Ibid. P. 96, 99, 103, 107, 115, 124.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibidem. P. 103.

⁵⁵⁵ Ibidem. Pp. 190, 228, 238–239, 243, 304, 467.

V.K. Kantor tries to trace a peculiar "rhyme" of the roles in the fate of Chernyshevsky historian N.I. Kostomarov and the novice poet V.D. Kostomarov. He mentions the case of the murder of two Christian boys, in which three Jews were accused. Despite the groundlessness of this accusation, N.I. Kostomarov as an expert supported the condemnation of the Jews to penal servitude. Proceeding from this, V.K. Kantor draws a parallel between the accusation of the Jews of murder and N.I. Kostomarov, on the one hand, and the accusation of Chernyshevsky and the denunciation of him by V.D. Kostomarov, on the other. Despite the fact that these events have no connection with each other, V.K. Kantor insists on their correlation, thereby "rhyming" the life and fate of Chernyshevsky. In other words, V.K. Kantor, using a purely artistic method, tries to prove that V.D. Kostomarov's accusation of Chernyshevsky of atheism is false to the same extent as the accusation of murder against Jews was false⁵⁵⁶. With such a formulation of the question, a parallel between murder and atheism also suggests itself, but this is clearly meaningless.

Further, V.K. Kantor writes that N.I. Kostomarov, evaluating Chernyshevsky's aesthetics, believed that he did not understand the beauty of poetry⁵⁵⁷. This view of the historian is based on Chernyshevsky's jokes, with the help of which he tried to avoid Kostomarov's protracted arguments about the beauty of nature. In this connection, V.K. Kantor cites a voluminous quotation from Chernyshevsky, in which the editor of the *Sovremennik* explained that he did not speak seriously, but jokingly⁵⁵⁸. It should be noted that in order to conclude that Chernyshevsky was receptive to the beauty of nature or poetry, it would be

⁵⁵⁶ Ibidem. Pp. 103–104.

⁵⁵⁷ Chernyshevsky N.G. Complete Works. In 15 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Goslitizdat Publ., 1939. P. 773.

⁵⁵⁸ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 105.

sufficient to refer to his dissertation "The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality",⁵⁵⁹ but V.K. Kantor does not do this and prefers to refer to Chernyshevsky's letters and memoirs to prove his theses.

V.K. Kantor puts Chernyshevsky and Solovyov on a par with "profound metaphysicians" and then asserts that in the understanding of the editor of *Sovremennik* "a woman is always right." On the basis of these two premises, which are not supported by references to sources, V.K. Kantor concludes that Chernyshevsky's philosophy reveals the theme of "eternal femininity", which is characteristic of the thinkers of the religious renaissance of the early 20th century.⁵⁶⁰ Chernyshevsky's confession to his fiancée that he expects the gendarmes to appear "at any moment" is explained by V.K. Kantor as "peacock boasting."⁵⁶¹

In an attempt to refute Chernyshevsky's adherence to revolutionary ideology, V.K. Kantor quotes page 466 of the first volume of the complete works of his works, published in 1939-1953, in a footnote: "There must be some kind of defense against the democratic, against the revolutionary trend, and this defense can be nothing but the thought of his wife."⁵⁶² It is noteworthy that there are no such words on this page of the complete works⁵⁶³.

Further, in constructing his own image of Chernyshevsky, V.K. Kantor likens his aesthetics to the views of Plato and Aristotle⁵⁶⁴ and thus tries to reduce the role of Feuerbach in the formation of Chernyshevsky's views. V.K. Kantor

⁵⁵⁹ Chernyshevskiy N.G. *Esteticheskie otnosheniya iskusstva k dejstvitel'nosti* [Aesthetic relations of art to reality] // Chernyshevskiy N.G. Works. In 2 vol. Vol. 1. Moscow: Mysl, 1986. pp. 71–173.

⁵⁶⁰ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 113.

⁵⁶¹ *Ibidem*. P. 113.

⁵⁶² *Ibidem*. P. 119.

⁵⁶³ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Complete Works*. In 15 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Goslitizdat Publ., 1939. P. 466.

⁵⁶⁴ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The Fate of Nikolay Chernyshevsky*. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 125–136.

emphasizes that Chernyshevsky "fell in love with the ancient philosophers already in the seminary period of his life",⁵⁶⁵ that is, before he first read "The Essence of Christianity".

In contrasting Chernyshevsky's views with anti-capitalist sentiments, Kantor does not take into account the article by the editor of *Sovremennik* on the peasant commune⁵⁶⁶ and the remarks on class interests and their significance for humanity in *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy*⁵⁶⁷. In the context of Chernyshevsky's statements about Nekrasov's ability to make a fortune, Kantor cites a quote in which Chernyshevsky defends Nekrasov, and in this he sees sympathy for the bourgeois-capitalist relations, as well as a tendency to reformism in politics. It is interesting to recall that similar thoughts were expressed by V.I. Lenin, to whom V.K. Kantor expresses an obvious dislike⁵⁶⁸, namely, in "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder" he wrote about the inadmissibility of extremes in questions of politics and economics⁵⁶⁹. In other words, in this matter Chernyshevsky is close to Lenin. Refuting the kinship of their ideas, V.K. Kantor proved just the opposite.

Returning to Chernyshevsky's aesthetics, he writes: "In fact, this was the task of his dissertation, which in Soviet times was considered to be the application of the ideas of Feuerbach's philosophy to aesthetics."⁵⁷⁰ In confirmation of the fact

⁵⁶⁵ Ibidem. P. 136.

⁵⁶⁶ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Kritika filosofskikh presudzheniya protiv obshchestvennogo vladeniya* [Criticism of philosophical prejudices against communal ownership]. Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1986. Pp. 603–643.

⁵⁶⁷ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Anthropological Principle in Philosophy* // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 219.

⁵⁶⁸ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The Fate of Nikolay Chernyshevsky*. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 226, 270, 295, 309, 335, 488–492.

⁵⁶⁹ Lenin V.I. *Children's Disease of "Leftism" in Communism* // Lenin V.I. Complete Works. Ed. 5. T. 41. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1981. P. 14.

⁵⁷⁰ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 150.

that such an opinion took place in Soviet times, V.K. Kantor does not provide any evidence⁵⁷¹, but he died in 1918, that is, before the creation of the Soviet state. The Soviet scholars who wrote about Chernyshevsky⁵⁷² refuted Plekhanov's point of view and asserted that Chernyshevsky merely took Feuerbach's philosophy as a basis and developed it independently.

Speaking about the interpretation of Chernyshevsky's ideas in Soviet times, V.K. Kantor resorts to generalizations: for example, he does not name either the names of Soviet scientists or their works. This leads, on the one hand, to inaccuracies, and on the other hand, to the fact that the "deliverance" of Chernyshevsky's image from the Soviet "myth" is, in fact, achieved through the uncritical use (or conscious modeling?) of the myth of "Sovietness." In other words, "demythologization" as a formulation of the problem turned out to be mythologized itself. Thus, the example of the correlation between Feuerbachianism and Chernyshevsky's aesthetics shows that V.K. Kantor does not take into account the opinions of major Soviet researchers on this issue.

He quotes Chernyshevsky's words from the preface to the third edition of *Aesthetic Relations*: "The conclusions that he (Chernyshevsky writes about himself. –Note. *A.Ch.*) made of Feuerbach's thoughts for the solution of special aesthetic questions that seemed to him correct at that time; but even then he did not consider them particularly important. He was satisfied with his little work only in the sense that he was able to convey in Russian some of Feuerbach's ideas in the forms that were then necessary for such works to conform to the conditions of Russian literature."⁵⁷³ V.K. Kantor focuses on the phrase "seemed right to him at

⁵⁷¹ Plekhanov G.V. *Aesthetic Theory of N.G. Chernyshevsky* // Plekhanov G.V. *Selected Philosophical Works*. In 5 vols. Vol. 5. Moscow, Sotsekgiz Publ., 1958. Pp. 238–281.

⁵⁷² Volk S.S., Nikonenko V.S. *Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky*. Leningrad: LGU, 1979.; Rozental M.M. *Filosofskie vzglyady N.G. Chernyshevskogo* [Philosophical views of N.G. Chernyshevsky]. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1948.

⁵⁷³ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 161.

that time", apparently implying that these words contain Chernyshevsky's rejection of his aesthetic theory. that Chernyshevsky, as already an experienced journalist, was not entirely satisfied with his dissertation, which he had written in his youth. In addition, one could use the technique of V.K. Kantor and say that these remarks are full of self-irony, characteristic of the "Vilyui prisoner".

V.K. Kantor also draws attention to the fact that Chernyshevsky set himself the goal of "harmonizing with the conditions of Russian literature", and in this he sees a refutation of the facts that Chernyshevsky's thesis was seriously influenced by Feuerbach's philosophy. But it is not at all obvious why Russian literature should oppose Feuerbach. And if we take into account that the literary-critical articles of Chernyshevsky and his associates published in "Sovremennik" not only did not reject Feuerbachianism, but also supplemented it, then V.K. Kantor's conclusion cannot but be recognized as doubtful. Especially since, despite his assertions, Engels repeatedly called Feuerbach a materialist⁵⁷⁴.

Here, following G.G. Shpet,⁵⁷⁵ V.K. Kantor quotes Feuerbach: "He who says and knows only that I am an atheist does not say and knows absolutely nothing about me. The question of whether there is a God or not, the opposition between theism and atheism, dates back to the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries, but not to the nineteenth century. It was⁵⁷⁶ in these words that both researchers saw the justification of Feuerbach's religiosity. But if we think about the meaning of the above quotation, we can see that for Feuerbach the division of thinkers into atheists and theists seems banal, outdated, too general, and therefore superficial. According to Feuerbach, the denial of God is the negation of the negation of man, that is, *not-God = not-not-Human*. If we remove the negation from both sides, we get the

⁵⁷⁴ Engels F. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy // Marx K., Engels F. Selected Works. In 3 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1979. Pp. 385, 393, 398.

⁵⁷⁵ Shpet G.G. Istochniki dissertatsii Chernyshevskogo [Sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation]. Moscow, ROSSPEN Publ., 2009. P. 368.

⁵⁷⁶ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 161.

following: *God = not-Human*. This is Feuerbach's thought: for there to be a man, there must be no God. If we assume, following V.K. Kantor, that the Christian Chernyshevsky decided to say that his ideas formed the basis of his dissertation solely out of respect for Feuerbach, then it is not quite clear how a Christian can respect an atheist and his philosophical ideas that Chernyshevsky, like Feuerbach, is still an atheist and a materialist.

It is worth emphasizing that V.K. Kantor treats Chernyshevsky as a Christian who tried to develop religion under the guise of positivism⁵⁷⁷. In this way, he relies on the tradition that has developed in post-Soviet historical and philosophical literature of identifying Chernyshevsky's philosophy with positivism (this was discussed above).

Continuing to develop the theme of Chernyshevsky's latent religiosity, V.K. Kantor asserts that "evangelical paraphrases" are often found in his texts. Unfortunately, he does not cite specific examples, but he sets himself the task of "showing the system of his views in any of his major works."⁵⁷⁸ In other words, the place of facts is again taken by their interpretation. V.K. Kantor interprets "The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality" in a Christian key, asserting that in the dissertation "for the first time sounded... But⁵⁷⁹ in the same way, taking into account the specifics of the Gospel texts, it would be possible to connect many other texts with them, including those that have nothing to do with Christianity. In addition, relying on an arbitrary interpretation and indicating in advance the conclusion to which it should lead, it would be possible to find similarities between the works of Chernyshevsky and the texts of the Jewish Tanakh or the Mohammedan Koran. But, nevertheless, it is quite realizable. True, the result of such work – and V.K. Kantor strives to draw a clear line between Chernyshevsky's views and Soviet Marxism – does not oblige to anything.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibidem. P. 162.

⁵⁷⁸ Ibidem. P. 163.

⁵⁷⁹ Ibidem. P. 163.

In this regard, it is noteworthy to pay attention to Solovyov's article "The First Step to Positive Aesthetics", in which he acknowledges only a few propositions out of 17 theses: "1) existing art is only a weak substitute for reality, and (2) beauty in nature has an objective reality."⁵⁸⁰ It is noteworthy that in the same passage Solovyov, a religious thinker, admits that Chernyshevsky was a Feuerbachian at the time of writing his dissertation⁵⁸¹.

Turning to the interpretation of the novel "What is to be done?", V.K. Kantor points to the Gospel paraphrasis that Chernyshevsky uses in the context of the theme of new people: "the salt of the salt of the earth"⁵⁸². It is not entirely reasonable to see in such references a direct indication of religiosity. Over the long years of its existence, Christianity has become a cultural phenomenon that has not only religious, but also cultural significance. In other words, without additional clarifications from Chernyshevsky, the phrase "salt of the salt of the earth" cannot be unequivocally interpreted as proof of his religiosity.

Apparently, V.K. Kantor himself was well aware that all his arguments in favor of considering Chernyshevsky a religious thinker were far-fetched and did not stand up to criticism. That is why he uses another device – rhetorical, namely, he tries to create a context in which Chernyshevsky would be perceived as a Christian ascetic. In particular, he assures the reader that Chernyshevsky always treated his father, a priest, with respect and highly valued his years of study at the seminary. He also draws parallels between Chernyshevsky's small apartment room and a monastic cell, between daily work on texts and constant prayer, between secular nobility and piety⁵⁸³.

⁵⁸⁰ Solovyov V.S. *The First Step to Positive Aesthetics* // Solovyov V.S. *Collected Works*. In 10 vols. Vol. 7. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1911–1914. P. 77.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibidem*. P. 77.

⁵⁸² Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 173.

⁵⁸³ *Ibidem*. Pp. 182–183.

It is noteworthy that in order to confirm the religious meaning of certain statements of Chernyshevsky, V.K. Kantor often turns not to the works of Chernyshevsky, but to the novels of F.M. Dostoevsky⁵⁸⁴. It is for this reason that Dostoevsky is mentioned in the monograph of V.K. Kantor much more often (this was discussed above). The question of how Dostoevsky's plots can serve as proof of the thesis of Chernyshevsky's religiosity can be left open.

Along with the works of Dostoevsky, the Holy Scriptures play a significant role in the construction of V.K. Kantor's arguments. For example, the assertion that Chernyshevsky's "reference to the authority of Belinsky is purely theological"⁵⁸⁵ is substantiated not by Chernyshevsky's texts, but by the Gospel of John: "And if I judge, then My judgment is true, because I am not alone, but I am also the Father who sent Me."⁵⁸⁶. Does it turn out that V.K. Kantor equates Chernyshevsky with Christ, and Belinsky with Yahweh? Meanwhile, the parallel between Chernyshevsky and Jesus Christ will be drawn by him more than once.

Creating the effect that Chernyshevsky was close in spirit to the philosophers of the religious Renaissance and alien to Soviet Marxism, V.K. Kantor often mentions V.V. Rozanov and his assessment of Chernyshevsky, which is included in the epigraph to the book and partly in the title: "Of course, not to use such ebullient energy as Chernyshevsky for state-building was a crime bordering on atrocity... In this one truly remarkable biography we came to the Tree of Life: but we took it and cut it down. If we⁵⁸⁷ were guided by this quotation, one might think that the "clairvoyant" Rozanov long ago, like V.K. Kantor now, recognized in Chernyshevsky "a true believer", moreover, a martyr and sufferer for the faith. However, it is worth paying attention to other statements by Rozanov, including those related to the above, but for some reason were omitted by V.K. Kantor. how everything immediately falls into place. Rozanov wrote: "I always thought of the

⁵⁸⁴ Ibidem. P. 183.

⁵⁸⁵ Ibidem. P. 185.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibidem. P. 185.

⁵⁸⁷ Ibidem. P. 7.

wrong standards for Chernyshevsky: a thinker, a writer... even politics. Here everywhere he is nothing special, and sometimes he is ridiculous and pretentious."⁵⁸⁸ In "Fleeting" Rozanov also repeatedly mentions Chernyshevsky, the following judgment is especially noteworthy: "... there was no one who would say to him the "all-Russian" FOOL in the loud Lomonosov language."⁵⁸⁹ And further, discussing Pushkin, he writes: "Thus 'fate' brought Pisarev, Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky against him. Three snouts rose to him and grunted."⁵⁹⁰ However, V.K. Kantor believes that Rozanov highly appreciated Chernyshevsky⁵⁹¹. Could it be that Rozanov's position as a whole was unfamiliar to him?

Further, V.K. Kantor mentions that the noble authors of *Sovremennik* had a unfavorable attitude toward those who had come from seminaries and entered journalism⁵⁹². By this, he probably seeks to secure for Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov the status of "seminarians", which, presumably, once and for all determined their views and fate.

In the following exposition, V.K. Kantor emphasizes not so much Chernyshevsky's "religiosity" as "reformism" and rejection of the rebellion. In this regard, he recalls A.I. Herzen and the disagreements between the editors of *Kolokol* and *Sovremennik*. V.K. Kantor writes that "our researchers ignore Herzen's reproach to Dobrolyubov and Chernyshevsky for serving the government"⁵⁹³, but there are certainly no references to the works of "our researchers", just as there is no analysis of the "reproach" that Herzen expresses to the "*Sovremennik*". Meanwhile, it is well known that Plekhanov wrote about the

⁵⁸⁸ Rozanov V.V. *Uedinennoe [Solitude]*. Vol. 2. Moscow, Pravda Publ., 1990. P. 207.

⁵⁸⁹ Rozanov V.V. *Collected Works. Fleeting*. Moscow, Respublika Publ., 1994. P. 41.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibidem*. P. 141.

⁵⁹¹ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 190.

⁵⁹² *Ibidem*. P. 204.

⁵⁹³ *Ibidem*. P. 210.

differences in the political economic views of Chernyshevsky and Herzen⁵⁹⁴. And the Soviet researchers who did not pay attention to Herzen's words about Chernyshevsky were reproached by V.K. Kantor himself for accepting Plekhanov's point of view "without any reflection."⁵⁹⁵ while Plekhanov distinguished them.

It can be assumed that V.K. Kantor was guided by a kind of "mystical" method, similar to the one used by D.L. Andreev in his time. Here, for example, is what he writes about the memoirs of N.A. Tuchkova-Ogareva: "... A woman's penetration into the character of the man she was interested in sounded amazing. And no matter how much Soviet researchers write about the revolutionary pathos that animated the NGCh, these simple words completely outweigh them... "... was wonderful, full of gentle thoughtfulness, in which selflessness and resignation to fate shone"... This, of course, is not the image of a revolutionary, but rather of a Christian ascetic."⁵⁹⁶

Developing the idea of Chernyshevsky's "reformism", V.K. Kantor refers to a letter from B.N. Chicherin and twice quotes the same phrase condemning Herzen for calling for a revolt⁵⁹⁷. In the context of the opposition between the revolutionary Herzen and the "reformist-gradualist" Chernyshevsky, it seems strange that quotations from the works of Chernyshevsky himself are not quoted at all. Probably, there are simply no corresponding statements in Chernyshevsky's works.

Trying to reconcile the themes of the peasant community and ethics in Chernyshevsky's views, V.K. Kantor presents the idea of rational egoism as "an extreme manifestation of the personal principle."⁵⁹⁸ This wording is not entirely

⁵⁹⁴ Plekhanov G.V. *Our Disagreements* // Plekhanov G.V. *Selected Philosophical Works*. In 5 vols. Vol. 1. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1956. P. 174.

⁵⁹⁵ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 85.

⁵⁹⁶ *Ibidem*. Pp. 211–212.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibidem*. Pp. 219, 222.

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibidem*. P. 230.

accurate. Egoism in any manifestation is related to personality, but it is not entirely legitimate to say that it can have some "extreme" form. As mentioned above, rational egoism differs from ordinary egoism in the respectful attitude of the "I" to the other "I". The formation of rational egoism in an individual is impossible outside society. In other words, the complementarity of the communal structure of society and rational egoism in Chernyshevsky's philosophical system is self-evident.

From the position that Chernyshevsky was "saturated with evangelical senses",⁵⁹⁹ V.K. Kantor concludes that "two concepts can be placed side by side: rational egoism and the golden rule of Christian ethics."⁶⁰⁰ However, rational egoism is not at all reduced to love for one's neighbor. Moreover, the pathos of Chernyshevsky's ethical theory does not lie in the obligation to love others and act rationally. From the same motive (egoism) people can do both evil and good deeds. Chernyshevsky expounded these ideas in detail in the second part of *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy*⁶⁰¹.

Trying to distinguish Chernyshevsky from such revolutionaries as Marat and Robespierre, V.K. Kantor also mentions E. Pugachev⁶⁰². That is, he puts the Pugachev uprising of 1773-1775 on a par with the Great French Revolution of 1789-1799.⁶⁰³ ⁶⁰⁴In other words, a revolution, unlike a revolt, implies a qualitative transformation of society.

⁵⁹⁹ Ibidem. P. 234.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibidem. P. 234.

⁶⁰¹ Chernyshevsky N.G. *Anthropological Principle in Philosophy* // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. Pp. 183–229.

⁶⁰² Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 243.

⁶⁰³ *Peasant wars in Russia of the XVII–XVIII centuries*. Ed. by L.V. Cherepnin Moscow: Nauka, 1974. P. 110.

⁶⁰⁴ Bovykin D.Y. *Frantsuzskaya revolyutsiya 18 v.* [The French Revolution of the 18th century]. In 35 vols. Vol. 33. Moscow, Bolshaya Rossiyskaya entsiklopediya Publ., 2017. Pp. 593–596.

According to V.K. Kantor, "as a rule, people confused the desire for freedom with the thirst for revolution, the thirst for rebellion. But Chernyshevsky was well aware of the direct contradiction between freedom and revolt."⁶⁰⁵ With this he connects the fact that Chernyshevsky became, in the understanding of his descendants, a revolutionary. But the essence of the revolution is not in the revolt, but in the qualitative change in society that may follow the "revolt." Chernyshevsky considered the preservation of the commune as one of the ways of such a transformation. Accordingly, Chernyshevsky did not so much "try with all his might to resist the revolt"⁶⁰⁶, as much as he taught young people reading the *Sovremennik* to act not rashly, but prudently.

Vulgarizing the concept of "revolution", V.K. Kantor equates it with the fires of 1862 in St. Petersburg⁶⁰⁷. Since Chernyshevsky was against kindling fires, then, according to V.K. Kantor, he was also against the revolution. However, an artistic comparison of a fire with a revolution is hardly appropriate in historical and philosophical research.

Developing the theme of revolution, V.K. Kantor speaks extremely negatively about the Bolsheviks (V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin, N.I. Yezhov, L.P. Beria, F.E. Dzerzhinsky).⁶⁰⁸ For example, he compares Lenin's "rule" with the despotic power of the Russian Empire, and Chernyshevsky with a philosopher who refused to leave Russia on a "philosophical steamship."⁶⁰⁹ Stalin is directly called a "predator" and a "villain," and is also compared to the head of the Third Department, A.L. Potapov, who talked with Chernyshevsky on the eve of his arrest⁶¹⁰⁶¹¹⁶¹² The problem of perceiving members of the Bolshevik Party without

⁶⁰⁵ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 243.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibidem. P. 261.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibidem. Pp. 263–264.

⁶⁰⁸ Ibidem. Pp. 270–272, 309, 326, 470, 488, 497.

⁶⁰⁹ Ibidem. Pp. 270–271.

⁶¹⁰ Ibidem. P. 271.

reflection is a topic of separate studies, and more historical, than historical and philosophical. the third department and the informant V.D. Kostomarov. In other words, he tries to present Chernyshevsky as the complete opposite of Lenin and the members of his party.

To reinforce this thesis, V.K. Kantor compares Chernyshevsky to Socrates: like Socrates, who said that if he had been asked to stop practicing philosophy, he would not have agreed to do so even for his freedom, Chernyshevsky refused the freedom he was promised for a change in his way of thinking. But after all, Socrates was not actually forced to abandon his beliefs. And Chernyshevsky's principled refusal of petitions for pardon is in no way connected with his wish to retain his former way of thinking. V.K. Kantor writes about Chernyshevsky that “they suggested him to emigrate, to ask for pardon, only if he thought in a different way”⁶¹³. However, neither emigration nor a request for pardon would have had the consequences that V.K. Kantor hypothetically writes about.

He draws attention to the fact that Chernyshevsky, in a letter to Alexander II, speaks negatively about A.I. Herzen and N.P. Ogaryov, and also asks not for forgiveness, but for justice⁶¹⁴. It should be noted that it would be strange to speak differently about such people dangerous to tsarism as the editors of *Kolokol* in a letter to the emperor. As for the demand for justice, Chernyshevsky really believed that there was no evidence against him. However, V.K. Kantor concludes that Chernyshevsky, unlike the revolutionaries Herzen and Ogarev, was a reformist.

Continuing the comparisons, V.K. Kantor puts V.D. Kostomarov and Lenin on a par on the grounds that both of them saw in Chernyshevsky's works published

⁶¹¹ Ibidem. P. 272.

⁶¹² Khaustov V.N. Beria Lavrentiy Pavlovich // *Bolshaya Rossiyskaya entsiklopediya*. URL: https://bigenc.ru/domestic_history/text/5847734.

⁶¹³ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 285.

⁶¹⁴ Ibidem. P. 288.

in *Sovremennik* "materialism and atheism"⁶¹⁵, as well as "socialism and communism".⁶¹⁶ The conclusion that follows from such a comparison, according to V.K. Kantor's logic, is obvious: the intellectual level of Lenin and the informant Kostomarov is one and the same.

Evaluating the novel "What Is To Be Done?" as a reformist and "life-affirming" work, V.K. Kantor sees in it neither a criticism of reality nor a call for societal transformation, but rather a praise of the capitalist way of life and small entrepreneurship⁶¹⁷. At the same time, the fact that the manuscript had to go through the strictest censorship is not taken into account at all, of which Chernyshevsky could not have been unaware. In 1862, the editor of the *Sovremennik* had extensive experience in writing essays in the "Aesopian language", and he used it in the creation of the novel. Of course, it was impossible to expound socialist and atheistic propositions directly, and the censorship would never allow such a novel to be published.

Discussing *What Is To Be Done?*, V.K. Kantor agrees with N.S. Leskov in his assessment of Vera Pavlovna's workshops as a call for bourgeois entrepreneurship⁶¹⁸ and concludes that Chernyshevsky "wanted to introduce bourgeois structures in a serfdom country that would liberate man."⁶¹⁹ But the principles of organizing work in workshops do not correspond to the laws of the capitalist economy, such as the maximization of profit and the concentration of capital⁶²⁰, even the very idea of the accumulation of capital seems absurd to her. Thus, the workshops from the novel cannot be attributed to the institutions of bourgeois society.

⁶¹⁵ Ibidem. P. 308.

⁶¹⁶ Ibidem. P. 308.

⁶¹⁷ Ibidem. P. 325.

⁶¹⁸ Ibidem. P. 326.

⁶¹⁹ Ibidem. P. 330.

⁶²⁰ Marx K. *Capital. Critique of Political Economy*. Vol. 1. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1952.

⁶²¹ Chernyshevsky N.G. *What is to be done?* Moscow, AST Publ., 2017. Pp. 174–181.

Returning again to the theme of rational egoism, V.K. Kantor equates the materialistic ethics of the heroes of *What Is To Be Done?* with nihilism, i.e. the denial of morality. But at the same time he asserts that the heroes of the novel are nihilists only in words, and not in deeds, since in their actions they manifest Christian morality. In other words, V.K. Kantor does not recognize the possibility of atheistic morality, and does not provide arguments in favor of his point of view⁶²². Like Dostoevsky's heroes, he could simply say that there is no virtue if there is no immortality. And if Vera Pavlovna, Lopukhov, Kirsanov and Rakhmetov act morally, then this happens not because they are atheists and reasonable egoists, but exclusively because they are Christians.

V.K. Kantor compares the collective farm to the peasant community and from here he comes to a new comparison/opposition: this time between Chernyshevsky and Stalin. The former was against legislating the status of the community, while the latter created collective farms⁶²³. Obviously, such an opposition is not correct, since the community and the collective farm are completely different things. The organization of a collective farm implies the collective use of land that belongs to the state and is not private property, while in the community each family had its own land plot. The establishment of collective farms was the end of the history of the community in Russia, and not its revival. Both Lenin and Stalin categorically opposed the commune, considering it a relic of the past and an instrument of enslavement of the individual; the same opinion was shared by Chernyshevsky. And if, for example, Chernyshevsky had a chance to see collective farms, then he, who highly valued practical usefulness, would hardly have spoken negatively about them.

In general, V.K. Kantor's work contains a lot of various comparisons and analogies, which in most cases are most likely designed to have an emotional impact on the reader. For example, V.K. Kantor compares Chernyshevsky and A.I.

⁶²² Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 327.

⁶²³ *Ibidem*. P. 329.

Solzhenitsyn, unreasonably putting them on a par⁶²⁴. He pays great attention to the comparison of Chernyshevsky with Lenin – of course, with the aim of contrasting them. V.K. Kantor calls Lenin's ethics immoral⁶²⁵, substantiating his conclusion with the help of the vulgarization of class morality, which Lenin defended⁶²⁶. In this regard, it is worth noting the "parallel" analysis of Chernyshevsky's novel *What Is To Be Done? Painful Issues of Our Movement*". As a result of such "comparative studies", he comes to the conclusion that the principle of democratic centralism, described by Lenin, inevitably leads to totalitarianism, while the workshops of Vera Pavlovna are an example of completely different relations, because there was no centralism there. The fact that Lenin's work deals with the structure of a specific political party, while Chernyshevsky's novel hypothetically models an ideal labor collective, is, of course, completely ignored by V.K. Kantor, because otherwise the effect of such a comparison would be completely different.

V.K. Kantor is not the only contemporary researcher of Chernyshevsky who makes attempts to revise the canon about Chernyshevsky recognized in the history of philosophy. A.V. Vdovin argues that many different myths have been formed around the figure of Chernyshevsky, one of which he undertakes to debunk. A.V. Vdovin, like V.K. Kantor, bases his argumentation on the authority of such tendentious researchers of Russian philosophy as G.G. Shpet and V.V. Zenkovsky. Zenkovsky. It has been shown above that both of these thinkers could not penetrate into the content of both Feuerbach's and Chernyshevsky's philosophy, and therefore judge them not as scholars, but rather as philosophers who interpret the doctrines of other philosophers in the way that suits them. Shpet and Zenkovsky, followed by Kantor and Vdovin, do not investigate, but rather they interpret Chernyshevsky's philosophy. However, as A.V. Vdovin notes, in the research

⁶²⁴ Ibidem. P. 458.

⁶²⁵ Ibidem. P. 488.

⁶²⁶ Ibidem. P. 490.

environment there are still attempts to refute such interpretations, for example, in the work of A.A. Demchenko⁶²⁷.

It is noteworthy that A.V. Vdovin concludes that Chernyshevsky "clearly juggles the facts"⁶²⁸ only on the basis of the arguments of Shpet and Zenkovsky. Asking the question about the true sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation, we set ourselves the task of establishing a certain historical and philosophical truth, in which the emphasis should be placed on the word "historically". However, in the context of the discussion about the sources of the "Aesthetic Relations" itself, there is a more essential question: why do certain researchers seek to refute Chernyshevsky's words about his Feuerbachianism? This historical and philosophical question has an emphasis already on the second part, that is, on the word "philosophical". It seems that the desire to "debunk the myth" is dictated not so much by the researcher's desire to establish historical truth as by his personal interest in what role Chernyshevsky and his image will play in the general galaxy of democratic thinkers. Arguing about who Chernyshevsky really was in terms of his way of thinking, what philosophical ideas he actually adhered to, researchers are fighting for Chernyshevsky. Such episodes in the history of thought are not new. Representatives of different philosophical views are fighting for the heritage of this or that philosopher, interpreting it in such a way as to make this philosopher their own or, at least, not to give this philosopher to their opponents. Therefore, such works on Chernyshevsky's philosophy cannot be considered serious historical and philosophical research.

In general, we can conclude that after getting acquainted with the works of Shpet and Zenkovsky, it will be difficult to find something original in the article by A.V. Vdovin. Accordingly, if there is a discussion, then, of course, with the

⁶²⁷ Demchenko A.A. Nikolay Chernyshevsky in Russian Memory and Criticism // N. G. Chernyshevsky: pro et contra / Compilation, introduction. Article, comment. A. A. Demchenko. St. Petersburg, RHGA Publ., 2008. Pp. 34–35.

⁶²⁸ Vdovin A.V. Chernyshevsky vs. Feuerbach: (pseudo)sources of the dissertation "Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality" // Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie. 2011. Vol. 68, No 1. P. 41.

"classics", and not with their followers. Otherwise, it would be necessary to put forward the same arguments against A.V. Vdovin as against Shpet or Zenkovsky.

A.V. Vdovin tries to present Feuerbach as a subjectivist in aesthetics, and Chernyshevsky as his complete opposite. According to Chernyshevsky, the beautiful is contained in "life", and according to Feuerbach, according to A.V. Vdovin, a person creates beauty from his consciousness. But judging by this interpretation, it seems that A.V. Vdovin does not take into account the theory of reflection and does not consider the idea of the interconnection of being and consciousness, moreover, apparently, he does not consider Feuerbach a materialist, although the rejection of his materialism has yet to be proved.

In addition, researchers, starting with Shpet, who claim to "debunk the myth" about Chernyshevsky, try to analyze in detail certain diary entries of Chernyshevsky. But in the course of their analysis, they turn out to be not very perceptive psychologists, since they do not talk about the real movement of thought, but about the formal use of terms. And this prevents such researchers from adequately interpreting this or that note written by the thinker to the desk. The age of the thinker, the context of the situation and other circumstances are important details that determine the meaning of a particular note. It is much easier to call a philosopher a liar or accuse him of poor memory and misunderstanding of philosophy than to adequately link all the information into one. Thus, if Chernyshevsky says that his dissertation was inspired by Feuerbach's ideas, the researcher has two ways: 1) to say that Chernyshevsky is not telling the truth for one reason or another, or 2) to try to understand what exactly Chernyshevsky meant. The first way, as far as we can see, is tendentious. The second variant seems to us to be the one that a conscientious historian of philosophy should follow.

Distinguishing between Chernyshevsky and Feuerbach, A.V. Vdovin pays more attention not to Feuerbach himself, but to some of his followers in Russia. A.V. Vdovin, finding no similarities between the ideas of Chernyshevsky and the

aesthetics of these followers, infers that Chernyshevsky is not a Feuerbachian. But this looks more like a forgery than a scientific argumentation.

Speaking of the fact that Chernyshevsky was influenced not by Feuerbach but by Rousseau, A.V. Vdovin did not explain why Chernyshevsky needed this. One might suppose that a philosopher, wishing to be famous as an original thinker, might not recognize the influence of other philosophers on his way of thinking. But Chernyshevsky does not do this, on the contrary, he modestly calls himself a follower of another philosopher. And for what purpose Chernyshevsky could distort the truth about who was an authority for him personally is not explained.

In addition, speaking about the similarity of the ideas of Proudhon and Chernyshevsky, A.V. Vdovin does not consider the fact that, in addition to the texts of certain thinkers, Chernyshevsky's way of thinking could also be influenced by the situation, the context of the epoch. Trying to be a consistent scientist, A.V. Vdovin takes an internalist position, ignoring the justice of the externalist approach in the study of the history of philosophy.

In general, the criticism of Chernyshevsky is often reduced to a vulgarization of his ideas. Speaking of a certain objectivism in Chernyshevsky's understanding of the nature of the beautiful, they omit such statements from the dissertation, which could indicate rather a subjectivist view of the beautiful⁶²⁹. But if the researchers following Späth had noticed this, they would have clearly

⁶²⁹ For example, in Chernyshevsky's dissertation we read: "... Beauty is life, and in the closest way life that reminds us of man and human life..." P. 80; «... it can be noted that "the truly sublime is not in nature, but in man himself" P. 87; «... and the sublime, like the beautiful, appears to us as a phenomenon more independent and, however, closer to man than it was imagined." P. 89; «... definitions of the beautiful and the sublime... ... the attitude to man in general and to his concepts of those objects and phenomena that man finds beautiful and sublime is brought to the fore: the beautiful is that in which we see life as we understand and desire it, as it pleases us; the great is that which is much higher than the objects with which we compare it." P. 90; "The beautiful and the sublime are completely different concepts, not subordinate to each other and subordinate only to one general concept... ... "interesting"" P. 90; «... it depends on the person himself to what extent his life is filled with beauty and greatness." P. 111.

criticized Chernyshevsky for his inconsistency. Instead, attention should be paid to the dialectical nature of Chernyshevsky's thinking, by means of which it would be possible to approach the understanding of his ideas. A.V. Vdovin, who asserts that Chernyshevsky proposed simple solutions to "complex aesthetic problems",⁶³⁰ clearly did not notice this. Such conclusions are often reached by researchers who try not so much to understand Chernyshevsky as to put an end to him.

Summing up all of the above, we can conclude that the discussions about Chernyshevsky, which at present not only do not subside, but, on the contrary, are unfolding with renewed vigor, testify both to the significance of Chernyshevsky's ideas for Russian philosophical culture, and to the fact that the task of revising its fundamental characteristics is now on the agenda. The question of Chernyshevsky's place and significance in the history of Russian thought flows into the problem of self-determination of Russian philosophy.

3.3 The Problem of interpreting the "Anthropological Principle" of N.G. Chernyshevsky⁶³¹

In the historiography of Russian philosophy there are different assessments of the philosophy of N.G. Chernyshevsky and L. Feuerbach. On the one hand, it is widely recognized that Feuerbach was a materialist and atheist who had a significant influence on the formation of Chernyshevsky's materialist views⁶³². On

⁶³⁰ Vdovin A.V. Chernyshevsky vs. Feuerbach: (pseudo)sources of the dissertation "Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality" // *Zeitschrift für Slavische Philologie*. 2011. T. 68, No 1. P. 63.

⁶³¹ Chernykh A.A. N.G. Chernyshevsky and L. Feuerbach: Anthropological Materialism or Religious Philosophy? *Veche. Yearbook of Russian Philosophy and Culture*. 2022. № 34. Pp. 68–85.

⁶³² Volk S.S., Nikonenko V.S. *Materialism of N.G. Chernyshevsky*. Leningrad: LGU, 1979.; Lenin V.I. G.V. Plekhanov. "N.G. Chernyshevsky" // *Lenin V.I. Complete Works*. In 55 vols. Vol. 29. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1973. Pp. 534–571.; Lenin V.I. Y.M. Steklov. "N.G. Chernyshevsky, His Life and Activity (1828-1889)" // *Lenin V.I. Complete Works*. In 55 vols. Vol. 29. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1973. Pp. 572–620.; Nikonenko V.S. *Materialism of N.G.*

the other hand, some scholars⁶³³ attempt to present Feuerbach as a religious thinker who is far from materialism, and Chernyshevsky is treated either as a person who did not understand Feuerbach's philosophy, or as a religious thinker like him. The existence of such significant disagreements in historical and philosophical science is interesting, but at the same time somewhat suspicious. We will try to answer the question whether the philosophy of Chernyshevsky and Feuerbach is anthropological materialism, as many historians of Russian philosophy assert, or their views should still be characterized as religious-philosophical, as some researchers propose to do. Let us turn to the monograph by V.K. Kantor "The Felled Tree of Life. The Fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky", published in 2016.

In one of the fragments quoted by Kantor⁶³⁴, the twenty-year-old Chernyshevsky asserts that man is inclined to anthropomorphize everything that he perceives. Moreover, man correlates the cognizable objects not with the idea of man, not with man in general, but with himself, with a concrete personality. And this man perceives God in the same way – through the prism of himself. It follows that faith in God is something personal, Subjective. Chernyshevsky at this time, as we see, had not yet renounced religion, but had already made clear to himself the rudiments of Feuerbach's anthropology. Kantor writes the following in this regard: "He (Chernyshevsky. –Note. A.Ch.) saw the most important thing: Feuerbach,

Chernyshevsky, N.A. Dobrolyubov, D.I. Pisarev. Leningrad, LGU Publ., 1983.; Plekhanov G.V. Works about N.G. Chernyshevsky // Plekhanov G.V. Selected Philosophical Works. In 5 vols. Vol. 4. Moscow: Publishing House of Socio-Economic Literature, 1958. Pp. 47–414.; Rozental M.M. *Filosofskie vzglyady N.G. Chernyshevskogo* [Philosophical views of N.G. Chernyshevsky]. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1948.; Utkina N.F. *Positivism, Anthropological Materialism and Science in Russia*. Moscow, Nauka Publ., 1975.

⁶³³ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016.; Shpet G.G. *Istochniki dissertatsii Chernyshevskogo* [Sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation]. II: Materials / Reconstruction by T.G. Shchedrina. Moscow, ROSSPEN Publ., 2009. Pp. 362–416.

⁶³⁴ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. M.; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 80.

strictly speaking, was talking about the human perception of faith, which is different for everyone."⁶³⁵ Let us clarify a few points: 1) in Feuerbach's work, any perception of faith is human, since non-human faith does not exist, faith in its genesis is a purely human phenomenon; 2) it is somewhat rash to assert that Feuerbach's "most important" thing lies in the personal perception of faith, since Feuerbach's man is an image or kind of man, but not a separate person. Thus, the conclusion that Kantor draws from his analysis of Feuerbach's philosophy and the young Chernyshevsky's opinion of *The Essence of Christianity* is obviously insufficiently substantiated.

It is remarkable that Kantor not only tries to present Chernyshevsky as a religious thinker, but also Feuerbach. To prove the adequacy of such a view, Kantor quotes from S.N. Bulgakov: "All his (Feuerbach's) attention is absorbed by the vital tasks of philosophy, questions about absolute values or about the sense of human life, i.e. religious questions"⁶³⁶. Indeed, absolute values and the meaning of human life are very important for religious thought, but it does not follow that reflection on these topics will always be religious. In general, it must be said that the cornerstone of religion is man. Religion never does without man, as evidenced, in particular, by the teaching of Feuerbach. As is known, Feuerbach called his philosophy anthropology and in this context considered the questions of the meaning of life and absolute values. Consequently, Bulgakov's assertion about the religiosity of Feuerbach's philosophy is not correct.

Kantor goes on to quote the young Chernyshevsky again: "In religion I do not know what to say – I do not know whether I believe in the existence of God, in the immortality of the soul, etc. Theoretically, I am rather inclined not to believe, but in practice I lack the firmness and determination to part with my former thoughts about this."⁶³⁷ In this record, there is a crisis of faith. In 1849 Chernyshevsky began to read *The Essence of Christianity* and adopted an

⁶³⁵ Ibidem. P. 80.

⁶³⁶ Ibidem. P. 80.

⁶³⁷ Ibidem. P. 81.

anthropological interpretation of the perception of religion, and already in 1850 he wrote that he doubted his former religious views. A few years later, Chernyshevsky would defend monism and attack dualism in his works. But Kantor nevertheless asserts that Chernyshevsky never parted with his religious worldview in his entire life. In search of proof of his point of view, the researcher again turns to Bulgakov, who characterizes Feuerbach's philosophy as a "crossroads" from which the paths diverge in opposite directions. Probably, it is implied here that under the influence of Feuerbach one can become not only an atheist, but also a theologian. However, neither Bulgakov nor Kantor adduces arguments in defense of this thesis.

Thus, Kantor made an attempt to use Bulgakov's authority to prove his view of Feuerbach and Chernyshevsky. But if he had limited himself to the opinion of a religious philosopher on such a debatable issue, then the reader would have a feeling of incompleteness or even doubts. Realizing this, Kantor further quotes a thinker whose materialist views cannot be doubted: "... it is worth considering Engels' words about the Bruckberg hermit: "Feuerbach does not at all want to abolish religion; He wants to perfect it. Philosophy itself must be dissolved in religion." So the believing son of an archpriest could hardly have learned materialism and atheism from Feuerbach."⁶³⁸ This quotation is taken from Engels' late work "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy".⁶³⁹

In a different part of this short article Engels writes the following words about Feuerbach: "With irresistible force he finally became conscious of the fact... that the material, sensually perceived world, to which we ourselves belong, is the only real world, and that our consciousness and thinking, no matter how super-sensible they may seem, are the product of a material, bodily organ - the brain.

⁶³⁸ Ibidem. P. 81.

⁶³⁹ Engels F. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy // Marx K., Engels F. Selected Works. In 3 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1979. Pp. 373–415.

Matter is not the product of spirit, and spirit is only the highest product of matter"⁶⁴⁰

Further, Engels, in the context of Starke's book on Feuerbach, writes as follows: "Starke sees Feuerbach's idealism not in what it really consists in."⁶⁴¹ In other words, in Engels' opinion, there is idealism in Feuerbach's views, but it does not constitute his entire philosophy. Starke reduces idealism to the pursuit of ideal goals, such as love, compassion, truth, and so on. Without going into a criticism of Starke's views, we will say that Engels saw Feuerbach's idealism in something else.

It is precisely in the fragment from which Kantor quoted Engels that we are talking about what Feuerbach's idealism consists of. This is literally the preceding sentence, followed by the words about the "perfection of religion": "Feuerbach's real idealism comes to the surface as soon as we approach his philosophy of religion and ethics."⁶⁴² Let us point out two circumstances: 1) Engels speaks of concrete sections of Feuerbach's philosophy, and not of his entire system; 2) If Kantor quoted from the middle of the article "Ludwig...", then he must have read the previous twenty pages of the same work and seen Engels' direct indications that Feuerbach was a materialist. But for some reason, Kantor ignored it.

In addition, Feuerbach, as Engels shows, opposes monotheistic religion in favor of the religion of man and love. This new religion is "tailored for all times and peoples," and therefore proves unsuitable in all circumstances. Feuerbach's idealism consists in the pretension to a new "religion," but in the rejection of Christianity he manifests himself as a materialist: "Feuerbach seriously investigates only one religion – Christianity, this world religion of the West, based on monotheism. He shows that the Christian god is only a fantastic reflection of

⁶⁴⁰ Ibidem. P. 385.

⁶⁴¹ Ibidem. P. 389.

⁶⁴² Ibidem. P. 391.

man (*italics mine. – A.Ch.*)"⁶⁴³ According to Feuerbach, God has no ontological status, God is the alienated essence of man.

Engels' final characterization of Feuerbach reads as follows: "He grasps at nature and man with all his might. But both nature and man remain with him only words. He cannot say anything definite either about real nature or about real man. But in order to pass from Feuerbach's abstract man to real, living people, it was necessary to study these people in their historical actions." ⁶⁴⁴Of course, Engels ascribes the merit in the further development of philosophy to Marx. However, if we look at pre-Marxist socialist thought in Russia, we will notice that Chernyshevsky, Dobrolyubov, and Lavrov had already begun to develop Feuerbach's philosophy from abstract man to concrete man. Historical.

A detailed examination of the article "Ludwig..." reveals that Engels criticizes Feuerbach for inconsistency in his materialist views. The manifestation of this inconsistency turned out to be a retreat to idealism in the construction of a new religion and ethics. Of the many characterizations Engels gives to Feuerbach, Cantor takes the one that best fits the evidence for his own point of view. Out of context, however, the above quote loses its initial meaning. For example, if we were to take the following quote out of context, we would get the impression that Engels himself is in fact an idealist: "...every little-developed man is an idealist by nature, and one thing that remains incomprehensible: how can there be materialists in the world at all?"⁶⁴⁵. In the context of the whole work, it becomes clear that Engels is only ironic about Starke's opinion of Feuerbach.

Such quotation is a rhetorical device. If in support of any thesis quotes from representatives of different views and parties are cited, then the impression is created that there can be no disagreements in the issue under consideration, accordingly, the truth of the thesis cannot be questioned.

⁶⁴³ Ibidem. P. 393.

⁶⁴⁴ Ibidem. P. 398.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibidem. P. 390.

Basing his opinion on the authority of Bulgakov and then Engels, Kantor says of Chernyshevsky as follows: "He was simply looking for support for the establishment of Christianity in the intellectual context of his time."⁶⁴⁶ It turns out that Feuerbach only turned up at Chernyshevsky's hand, since he was popular at the time when the formation of the future Vilyui prisoner as a thinker took place. But as we have seen, Bulgakov and Engels, the idealist and the materialist, evaluate one and the same philosopher in exactly the opposite way. The idealist considers Feuerbach an idealist, while the materialist considers him a materialist. Even if we assume that both views have a basis, it turns out that Feuerbach is a dubious support for the establishment of religion.

Having interpreted Engels in a specific way, Kantor embarks on the same reinterpretation of Feuerbach. He quotes the following quote from *The Essence of Christianity*: "Religion is a view of the essence of the world and of man, identical with the essence of man. But it is not man who rises above his view (*italics mine – A.Ch.*), but it rises above him, spiritualizes and defines him, dominates him."⁶⁴⁷ Kantor interprets this unambiguously as the elevation and spiritualization of man by God. However, it is not by chance that Feuerbach uses the word "view" instead of the word "god." God, according to Feuerbach, is that which man created as a result of the alienation of his essence. This latter began to dominate man. The quote that Kantor quotes from *The Essence of Christianity* is about this.

Further, in one and the same place, Kantor calls Feuerbach both a religious philosopher and a "tempter."⁶⁴⁸ However, such contradictory characterizations can only be explained by the fact that Kantor sees in Feuerbach's works both a criticism of Christianity and "the important things" that Chernyshevsky assimilated. Here he also cites entries from the diary of the young Chernyshevsky, who expresses atheistic ideas. But Kantor is in no hurry to explain them

⁶⁴⁶ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 82.

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibidem*. P. 82.

⁶⁴⁸ *Ibidem*. P. 83.

unequivocally as a negation of religion, since "the context is uncertain," and Chernyshevsky may be "upsetting the mood." In other words, Kantor explains the protest against religion not by the formation of a new worldview, but only by the youth of yesterday's seminarian. Kantor further writes: "Chernyshevsky very often allowed himself such irony that his interlocutors took it for his real thoughts."⁶⁴⁹ Chernyshevsky's youth and his penchant for irony allow Kantor to ignore many of the statements of the already mature Chernyshevsky and to draw a conclusion about him solely on the basis of his own considerations.

Interestingly, Kantor generally denies Feuerbach's "latent atheism": "...I have already cited the considerations of many researchers that Feuerbach had no hostility to religion, that he posed the problem of Christianity as the main problem of philosophical thought"⁶⁵⁰. But if we remember that Engels in his article "Ludwig..." draws attention to the fact that in Germany in Feuerbach's time, religion and politics were mainly important in theoretical life⁶⁵¹, there is nothing surprising in the fact that Feuerbach, who was alien to politics, concentrated his attention on religion. It is also noteworthy that Kantor's main researcher of Feuerbach is apparently Bulgakov, and Soviet scholars, who wrote a lot about Feuerbach, and about Chernyshevsky, he ignores.

At the same time, Kantor continues to conduct arguments based on belittling the importance of Chernyshevsky. Thus, he writes: "It must be remembered that the period of rejection of former shrines in the pubertal period is experienced by all young people."⁶⁵² However, the entries in Kantor's diary date from 1848 to 1851, Chernyshevsky was born in 1828, which means that by 1848 he was already

⁶⁴⁹ Ibidem. P. 84.

⁶⁵⁰ Ibidem. P. 84.

⁶⁵¹ Engels F. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy // Marx K., Engels F. Selected Works. In 3 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1979. Pp. 379–380.

⁶⁵² Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 84.

twenty years old. Puberty, as you know, ends earlier in young people, at the age of 17-18⁶⁵³.

As mentioned above, Kantor neglects Soviet researchers of philosophy. Or, more precisely, he refers to only one of them – G.G. Shpet. For example, he refers to the work "Sources of Chernyshevsky's Dissertation", written in 1929: "... I will quote the opinion of such a powerful analyst and expert on Russian philosophy as Gustav Späth: "Plekhanov trusted this Preface and concluded: 'We have correctly understood Chernyshevsky's attitude to Feuerbach.'"⁶⁵⁴ This refers to the third preface to his dissertation, "The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality," in which Chernyshevsky says bluntly that his master's thesis was based on Feuerbach's anthropology.

Cantor further quotes a few more remarks from Speth's article: "It should not be overlooked that in a large part of it this is a document of senile memory. And what senile memory is - it is well known!"⁶⁵⁵. It is noteworthy that Kantor interprets the young Chernyshevsky in his own way, instead of taking him literally, because the twenty-year-old boy is "late" in puberty. But he continues to interpret the already mature, sixty-year-old Chernyshevsky, neglecting the literal meaning of the philosopher's words: Chernyshevsky was let down by his "senile memory." that at the age of sixty memory can fail a person as much as Cantor convinces us of this, then, of course, it will be impossible to agree with the obvious conclusion that Cantor deliberately distorted Engels' thought about Feuerbach.

Shpet compares Chernyshevsky's "senile memory" with an old painting that has deteriorated and been restored. Kantor comments on this image as follows: "Shpet is ironic, as we see, but he easily overcomes the authority of Plekhanov, who subordinated many Marxist-oriented Russian philosophers to his

⁶⁵³ Dictionary of Medical Terms. URL: <https://classes.ru/all-russian/dictionary-russian-med-term-38911.htm>.

⁶⁵⁴ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 85.

⁶⁵⁵ Ibidem. P. 85.

understanding. And then this point of view was established in Soviet historiography without any reflection." ⁶⁵⁶However, Shpet's colorful metaphor is neither a proof nor an argument. Plekhanov did draw attention to the significant influence that Feuerbach's philosophy had on Chernyshevsky, and even emphasized this fact. But, contrary to Kantor, many Soviet scholars criticized Plekhanov after Shpet's death for being too categorical in his assessment of Chernyshevsky. In 1948, M. M. Rosenthal wrote: "Undoubtedly, a number of features of anthropological materialism, as we shall see, have in common between Chernyshevsky and Feuerbach. But it would be a profound mistake to identify their philosophical views, as, for example, Plekhanov does."⁶⁵⁷ Plekhanov's view was well reflected in Soviet historiography, but for some reason Kantor ignores this circumstance and asserts the exact opposite.

Chernyshevsky quite often expressed the idea that he was a follower of the great philosopher Feuerbach. This can be read in his letters to his sons from Vilyuysk dated April 11, 1877, February 9, 1878 and March 8, 1878. ⁶⁵⁸Shpet and Kantor after him suggest that Chernyshevsky did not understand Feuerbach by referring to his self-review: "Chernyshevsky refers directly to Feuerbach, in the conviction that he is only reproducing the judgments expressed by Feuerbach."⁶⁵⁹ But it is obvious that this is more like modesty towards the teacher than it is evidence of a misunderstanding of his philosophy.

Cantor then cites another extensive quote from Shpet's work: "... if Chernyshevsky's senile Preface is not the product of the author's weakened memory, if it accurately reproduces the attitude towards Feuerbach which inspired

⁶⁵⁶ Ibidem. P. 85.

⁶⁵⁷ Rozentel M.M. *Filosofskie vzglyady N.G. Chernyshevskogo* [Philosophical views of N.G. Chernyshevsky]. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1948. P. 37.

⁶⁵⁸ Chernyshevsky N.G. *From the correspondence of 1876–1878 // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works*. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. Pp. 384, 386, 393, 447.

⁶⁵⁹ Kantor V.K. "The Felled Tree of Life". *The fate of Nikolai Chernyshevsky*. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Center for Humanitarian Initiatives, 2016. P. 85.

Chernyshevsky's youthful dissertation, then the doubt arises whether even then, in the days of his youth, Chernyshevsky knew Feuerbach sufficiently well, whether he had sufficiently assimilated him, whether he understood him, whether he was really imbued with him to such an extent as to have the right to call himself a Feuerbachian. It must be said frankly that I consider this question to be central to the argumentation of this work."⁶⁶⁰ Thus, since Kantor uses the authority of Shpet to confirm his own view, it is worth considering "The Sources of Chernyshevsky's Dissertation" in more detail.

In this work, Speth quotes Feuerbach as saying that he considers the question of the existence or non-existence of God irrelevant to his age. If we assume that Feuerbach is a religious philosopher, then it turns out that he contradicts himself here. For if Feuerbach had been a religious philosopher, he would have needed to actualize the question of the being or non-being of God. But since the question of God is "irrelevant" for him, it is most likely that he stands in the positions of an atheist and materialist, and this question has already been resolved in favor of the existence of God as a subjective idea, but not as an objective reality.

Späth quotes Feuerbach: "I deny God means with me: I deny the negation of man."⁶⁶¹ But he does not conclude about Feuerbach's atheism, but instead tries to present the author of *The Essence of Christianity* as a religious thinker. Späth searches for details, tries to take into account all the details in order to better understand Feuerbach's thought, but overlooks a simple logical inconsistency. The denial of God, according to Feuerbach, means the denial of the negation of man. If we formalize this statement, we get:

- 1) non-God is non-non-man;
- 2) God is non-man;

⁶⁶⁰ Ibidem. P. 86.

⁶⁶¹ Shpet G.G. *Istochniki dissertatsii Chernyshevskogo* [Sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation]. II: Materials / Reconstruction by T.G. Shchedrina. Moscow, ROSSPEN Publ., 2009. P. 368.

3) non-God is man.

This means that there is either God or man. But it is impossible to deny man: we can find an argument in favor of the existence of man in ordinary experience, in the natural sciences, as well as in a number of philosophical teachings: Cartesianism, Marxism, etc.

Thus, we see that Späth, like Cantor, ignores the basic idea of The Essence of Christianity: God is the alienated essence of man. Feuerbach writes: "... The essence of faith, the essence of God... is the essence of man that is posited, imagined outside of man."⁶⁶²

Further, Späth quotes Feuerbach's words that the goal of all his creative activity was always religion⁶⁶³. But above we have cited Engels' consideration, which explains this "fixation" of the German atheist philosopher of the nineteenth century on religion⁶⁶⁴.

Interestingly, in the course of his further discussion of the thesis, Speth wonders who Chernyshevsky had in mind when he speaks of the already dead or silenced people who had understood philosophy. It is known at least that Chernyshevsky considered Belinsky to be an expert in philosophy and said so in his central work: "Belinsky also did not know German, and yet knew German philosophy in such a way that there are not ten people in Germany itself who understand it as deeply and clearly"⁶⁶⁵. We must ask ourselves whether Späth could

⁶⁶² Feuerbach L. The Essence of Christianity // Feuerbach L. Selected Philosophical Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1955. P. 405.

⁶⁶³ Shpet G.G. Istochniki dissertatsii Chernyshevskogo [Sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation]. II: Materials / Reconstruction by T.G. Shchedrina. Moscow, ROSSPEN Publ., 2009. P. 370.

⁶⁶⁴ Engels F. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy // Marx K., Engels F. Selected Works. In 3 vols. Vol. 3. Moscow, Politizdat Publ., 1979. Pp. 379–380.

⁶⁶⁵ Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 163.

not have known this, and if he did not, whether there could be any question of searching for the sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation.

In another place, Shpet asserts that Chernyshevsky claims to "destroy" idealistic-metaphysical aesthetics, but at the same time does not propose a new positive system⁶⁶⁶. It is noteworthy that V.S. Solovyov, one of the most authoritative Russian idealists, recognized Chernyshevsky's positive, not negative, merit in the field of aesthetics, although he did not share his views: "... the author of "Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality" ... He did not say the last, but only the first word of true aesthetics."⁶⁶⁷ We will not discuss with Shpet on aesthetic questions, but we will note that he apparently did not treat Chernyshevsky as a serious thinker.

Thus, touching upon the discussion between Yurkevich and Chernyshevsky, Shpet writes that "in terms of philosophical education, the difference between Chernyshevsky and Yurkevich was precisely the difference between a seminarian and a scientist."⁶⁶⁸ According to Shpet, Chernyshevsky had nothing that was necessary for the study of science: "... In ⁶⁶⁹general, the author tries to show Chernyshevsky as a vain and dreamy dogmatist, incapable of serious scientific work⁶⁷⁰. Shpet pays special attention to the fact that in "Polemical Beauties"

⁶⁶⁶ Shpet G.G. *Istochniki dissertatsii Chernyshevskogo* [Sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation]. II: Materials / Reconstruction by T.G. Shchedrina. Moscow, ROSSPEN Publ., 2009. P. 389.

⁶⁶⁷ Solovyov V.S. *The First Step to Positive Aesthetics* // Solovyov V.S. *Collected Works*. In 10 vols. Vol. 7. Ed. 2. St. Petersburg: Book Publishing Partnership "Prosveshchenie", 1911–1914. Pp. 74–75.

⁶⁶⁸ Shpet G.G. *Istochniki dissertatsii Chernyshevskogo* [Sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation]. II: Materials / Reconstruction by T.G. Shchedrina. Moscow, ROSSPEN Publ., 2009. P. 407.

⁶⁶⁹ *Ibidem*. P. 406.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibidem*. Pp. 396–410.

Chernyshevsky himself characterizes himself not as a specialist scientist, but as an erudite journalist⁶⁷¹.

To summarize, Shpet concludes that there is no indication in university or literary criticism of Feuerbach's radicalism and impact in *The Aesthetic Relations of Art to Reality*. He also considers it significant that Chernyshevsky, during the course of his dissertation and long after his master's degree was approved, did not speak directly about the relationship between his aesthetic views and Feuerbach's philosophy⁶⁷². However, the lack of attention of criticism does not mean or prove the absence of Feuerbach's philosophical ideas in Chernyshevsky's dissertation. In addition, written evidence that such and such a text reflects the influence of such and such a philosophy is not a necessary consequence of the actual presence of certain ideas in a work. The fact that Chernyshevsky, neither during the preparation of his dissertation nor in the years after receiving his degree, wrote anywhere the words "My aesthetics is inspired by Feuerbach" is not a convincing refutation of this influence. Nor should one expect insight and deep analysis from the "critics," which, even if they wanted to, could not name in print the name of the author who wrote "an extensive work on polemics against Catholicism." Moreover, Chernyshevsky nevertheless announced the connection between his aesthetics and Feuerbach's anthropology in 1888 in the preface to the third edition of his dissertation. If, from Späth's point of view, a direct indication is so necessary, then one could be satisfied with this belated testimony.

Shpet is perplexed by the fact that Chernyshevsky did not indicate Feuerbach's concrete ideas either in his dissertation, or even more so in the preface to its third edition⁶⁷³. But it is not quite clear why it is necessary to give such "concreteness" if Chernyshevsky takes from Feuerbach's anthropology not the particulars, but the very core of anthropological materialism.

⁶⁷¹ Ibidem. P. 409.

⁶⁷² Ibidem. P. 411.

⁶⁷³ Ibidem. P. 412.

Based on some of Chernyshevsky's statements, Shpet believes that 1) Chernyshevsky decided to raise aesthetics to the level of science – but then writing a dissertation turns out to be an original creative act, 2) Chernyshevsky's views are constantly expressed in literature and life – but in this case they must be collected and coordinated with the ideas of science⁶⁷⁴. In neither fact does Späth notice the influence of Feuerbach. Perhaps this is why he asks rhetorically: where does Chernyshevsky see the connection between his aesthetics and the philosophy of the author of *The Essence of Christianity*: where he "speaks of the general ideas of modern science, or when he speaks of the constant statements of literature and life?"⁶⁷⁵.

Chernyshevsky's materialistic views are expressed in literature and in life not as scientific definitions or conclusions, but as phenomena that should be studied by scientific methods. With regard to science, it should be remembered that Chernyshevsky wrote in his letters to his sons: Feuerbach for him is the thinker who expressed the latest scientific truths⁶⁷⁶. The general ideas of modern science about the relation of the real world to the imaginary, according to Chernyshevsky, are monistic materialism, which is evident at least from his work "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy." Späth concludes that Feuerbach did not influence Chernyshevsky's dissertation. But his arguments, as we can see, are not convincing. *The Essence of Christianity* fell into Chernyshevsky's hands in 1849, and he read at least an introduction⁶⁷⁷, in which the whole essence and meaning of Feuerbach's anthropology had already been set forth, which he applied in subsequent chapters to particular questions of religion. anthropological materialism was understood and assimilated by him. The quotations which Shpet

⁶⁷⁴ Ibidem. P. 413.

⁶⁷⁵ Ibidem. P. 413.

⁶⁷⁶ Chernyshevsky N.G. From the correspondence of 1876–1878 // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. Pp. 384, 386, 393, 447.

⁶⁷⁷ Chernyshevskaya N.M. Chronicle of the Life and Activities of N.G. Chernyshevsky. Moscow: State Publishing House of Fiction Literature, 1953. P. 47.

cites in proof of his point of view ⁶⁷⁸testify not so much to the fact that Chernyshevsky was not a Feuerbachian, but to the reverence with which he treated his teacher. In fact, while paying homage to Feuerbach, Chernyshevsky continued to independently develop his doctrine of anthropological materialism.

In other words, in the historical-philosophical process, Feuerbach is a predecessor of Chernyshevsky. Thus, Chernyshevsky was able to understand and apply Hegel's dialectics to some degree in his articles "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy", "Critique of Philosophical Prejudices against Communal Ownership", etc., and in the articles "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy", "Critique of Philosophical Prejudices against Communal Ownership", etc. As for Feuerbach, we read from E.V. Ilyenkov that "having not coped with dialectics in its general form, Feuerbach often hesitates, now and then allowing such definitions, which he immediately has to correct, supplement and stipulate, and as a result his presentation becomes a bit vague and ambiguous. The essence, however, remains the same⁶⁷⁹. The peculiar style of Feuerbach's presentation is partly the reason why some scholars rank him among the religious philosophers. But if we pay attention to the content of Feuerbach's works, and not to their style, we can agree with Ilyenkov: "Like any materialist, Feuerbach fights against the dualistic opposition of thought to being as the initial principle of philosophy."⁶⁸⁰

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Feuerbach's concentration on the subject of religion is a certain difficulty for historians of philosophy, especially in the question of the influence of his anthropology on Chernyshevsky. To solve this problem, attention should be paid to Chernyshevsky's letter of April 11, 1877, from Vilyuysk, which he wrote to his sons: "But if you want to have an idea of what is,

⁶⁷⁸ Shpet G.G. *Istochniki dissertatsii Chernyshevskogo* [Sources of Chernyshevsky's dissertation]. II: Materials / Reconstruction by T.G. Shchedrina. Moscow, ROSSPEN Publ., 2009. Pp. 414–415.

⁶⁷⁹ Ilyenkov E.V. *Dialectical Logic* // Ilyenkov E.V. *Collected Works*. Vol. 4. Moscow, Kanon+ Publ., 2020. P. 356.

⁶⁸⁰ *Ibidem*. P. 351.

In my opinion, human nature, learn this from the only thinker of our century who, in my opinion, had perfectly correct ideas about things. This is Ludwig Feuerbach... To the particular question of which I speak, the question of the motives of human action, belongs one of Feuerbach's notes to his "Lectures on Religion," *Vorlesungen über das Wesen der Religion*.⁶⁸¹⁶⁸²

Let us quote a fragment from the text of a note in which Feuerbach, in response to Professor Schaden's criticism of his views, refers him to one of his works in order to clarify the essence of his views to his critic: "... in the article "Against Dualism", where I establish the psychological genesis of the ideas of supersensibility, of the immateriality of the soul, where I explain how it happens that a person cannot coordinate the action of thought with the action of the brain; furthermore, the proof, confirmed by innumerable examples, that a supersensible being is nothing but the non-sensible (abstract or imaginary) sensible; Finally, the theme of all my later writings is man as the subject of thought, whereas previously thought itself was a subject for me and was regarded by me as something self-sufficient."⁶⁸³ From the above quotation it is clear that Feuerbach opposes the dualism of soul and body, points to the psychological conditionality of dualistic ideas, speaks of a supersensible god as an imaginary being, and also points to the main subject of his later writings – man. It is noteworthy that Chernyshevsky, unlike Feuerbach, was not interested in the theme of religion during the period of his work. Chernyshevsky's interest was conditioned by the peculiarities of Russian life: the Commenting on a quote from Schaden's work, in which the latter retells a paraphrase of Fichte's philosophy, Feuerbach writes: "How can the 'conscientious' critic see that this position is a critique of Fichtean idealism, because now the next

⁶⁸¹ Chernyshevsky N.G. From the correspondence of 1876–1878 // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 384.

⁶⁸² Feuerbach L. Applications and Notes. To the Twenty-Seventh Lecture // Feuerbach L. Selected Philosophical Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1955. Pp. 880–894.

⁶⁸³ Ibidem. P. 881.

phrase reads, 'so, in idealism the essence of theology is realized!'"⁶⁸⁴. That is, Feuerbach criticizes Fichte's idealism and expounds his views for the purpose of criticism, but the professor does not notice this and, under the guise of Feuerbach's views, criticizes Fichte's philosophy.

Then Feuerbach moves on to the theme of man: "... individuality embraces the whole man, the essence of man is one, the general essence itself is an individual essence. It is true that man makes distinctions in himself—for he himself is clearly composed of organs and forces that differ from one another and even opposite—but that which he distinguishes in himself belongs to his individuality to the same extent, is to the same extent an integral part of it, as that from which he distinguishes it."⁶⁸⁵ In the above fragment the essence of monism is clearly set forth. Such⁶⁸⁶ a view excludes the possibility of the existence of an immortal soul removed from the material mortal body. Feuerbach emphasizes that the "head" (brain) as the abode of the intellect is essentially different from the "belly" as the abode of natural needs⁶⁸⁷. The human organism combines both intellectual activity and purely material functions. The human "I" reveals itself in all parts of its organism. This circumstance leaves no possibility of treating Feuerbach's philosophy as vulgar materialism. But at the same time, Feuerbach unequivocally speaks out about his materialistic views: "... I put nature in the place of being, and man in the place of thinking."⁶⁸⁸

However, Feuerbach does not dwell on this purely anthropological point of view. Further, he discusses the difference and similarity between the individual and the general. Thus, the German philosopher speaks of human needs, which manifest

⁶⁸⁴ Ibidem. P. 882.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibidem. P. 883.

⁶⁸⁶ Chernyshevsky N.G. Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N.G. Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Mysl Publ., 1987. P. 169.

⁶⁸⁷ Feuerbach L. Applications and Notes. To the Twenty-Seventh Lecture // Feuerbach L. Selected Philosophical Works. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Gospolizdat Publ., 1955. P. 884.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibidem. P. 882.

themselves differently in different social conditions. For example, if a person does not have "space and time" for the realization of his desires and inclinations, then these will be "ephemeral". that "the inference drawn from the denial of these desires and inclinations to a 'self-positing community', to a pure phantom without inclinations, without desires, without individuality, is nothing but the old, only veiled by logical formulas or phrases, dualistic and fantastic leap or inference from the world to a non-mundane being, from matter to the immaterial, from the body to a being devoid of corporeality."⁶⁸⁹. When many individuals suppress their natural needs, elevating this struggle with their inclinations to a social rule, then they – each individually – manifest themselves individually. But at the same time, the social nature of the suppression of desires cannot be denied. In other words, the individual and the social both coincide and do not coincide. This argument of Feuerbach refers us to Ilyenkov's thesis about the universal and the individual, or about the concrete-universal: "... The⁶⁹⁰ human race as the universal is manifested in individuals, so there is no abyss between the universal and the individual, between society and the individual, between God and man, between abstraction-idea and concrete-matter.

Further discussing individual inclinations, Feuerbach speaks of the essence of the categorical imperative as a motive for human activity. He summarizes the essence of the Kantian maxim in the following terms: "...I do not want to die, I want to live, and what I want, you - must, namely, leave me to live"⁶⁹¹. In other words, the universal rule of morality derives from the desire of each individual. The social originates from the individual and exists in it. The boundary between the individual and the general, according to Feuerbach, lies in the prevalence of the

⁶⁸⁹ Ibidem. P. 886.

⁶⁹⁰ Ilyenkov E.V. *Dialectical Logic* // Ilyenkov E.V. *Collected Works*. Vol. 4. Moscow, Kanon+ Publ., 2020. P. 441.

⁶⁹¹ Feuerbach L. *Applications and Notes. To the Twenty-Seventh Lecture* // Feuerbach L. *Selected Philosophical Works*. In 2 vols. Vol. 2. Moscow, Gospolitizdat Publ., 1955. P. 886.

universal among the individual⁶⁹². If one desires one thing and the other wants another, then here we do not observe the universal. If each individual desires the same thing, then the universal is present.

As can be seen from the above, we must admit that Plekhanov and Soviet researchers were right when they characterized the views of Feuerbach and Chernyshevsky as anthropological materialism. It is also true that Chernyshevsky was not merely a popularizer of the views of the German philosopher. The author of *The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy*, taking into account the works of other Russian followers of Feuerbach (N.A. Dobrolyubov, P.L. Lavrov), independently developed the doctrine of anthropological materialism. As for such researchers as Späth and Kantor, they most likely consciously distort the views of Feuerbach and Chernyshevsky. The question of why they do this requires a separate study.

⁶⁹² Ibidem. P. 890.

CONCLUSION

Anthropological materialism is a landmark event in the history of Russian philosophy. The views of the greatest representative of this trend, N.G. Chernyshevsky, have been and remain the subject of discussion. The dispute about the place of the "Vilyui prisoner" in the history of Russian philosophy is at the same time a dispute about the subject and representatives of Russian philosophy, as well as about the significance of anthropological materialism – and materialism in general – for the Russian tradition⁶⁹³.

It was within the Russian anthropological materialism of the XIX century and within the discussion of Russian philosophers of this direction with their opponents about the "anthropological principal" that many themes were articulated, which from the XIX-XX centuries become relevant and retain their importance in the XXI century.

The anthropological principle, understood as a thesis about the cognizability of the world through the subject, that is, through man, is found in Russian philosophy already in A.I. Herzen. The fact that cognition takes place precisely in the forms of specifically human cognition was written by I. Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason. The importance of understanding truth not only as a substance, but also as a subject, was spoken of by G.W.F. Hegel. In the subsequent tradition, both in Europe and in Russia, the emphasis is also placed on the importance of anthropomorphizing reality. Of course, different thinkers saw this in different ways, nevertheless, the need for the subject's involvement in the cognition of the world was recognized by many thinkers of various philosophical schools and trends: Russian religious philosophy, Marxism, existentialism, phenomenology, positivism, etc.

⁶⁹³ Veche. Journal of Russian Philosophy and Culture. №27. Part I. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg State University Publishing House. 2015. 323 p. (In Russian)

The method of anthropomorphizing the world with the help of materialist monism, proposed by the school of N. G. Chernyshevsky, occupies a significant place both in the history of Russian philosophy and in the history of world thought.

Summing up, we can state:

1) N.G. Chernyshevsky, of course, relied on many European thinkers, among whom L. Feuerbach and G.W.F. Hegel occupied the first place for him. But at the same time, one cannot ignore the great importance of the ideas of N.A. Dobrolyubov and P.L. Lavrov, without whose works "The Anthropological Principle in Philosophy" would hardly have been written. Complementing Dobrolyubov and Lavrov, Chernyshevsky clearly formulated the propositions about the material unity of the world, the unity of human nature, and the ethics of rational egoism. D.I. Pisarev and, especially, I.M. Sechenov, whose psychophysiology is imbued with Chernyshevsky's philosophical ideas, proceeded from these propositions.

2) The view of Chernyshevsky as a socio-political thinker certainly has a place in historical and philosophical science. However, it would be wrong to limit ourselves to this, because the basis of certain political, sociological, and economic views is a certain ontology. In Chernyshevsky, ontology takes primarily the form of philosophical anthropology, since questions of being are viewed through the prism of human beings' nature. In Soviet times it was popular to look at thinkers through the prism of socio-political issues. However, it should be recognized that this cannot be limited to this, all the more so in the context of Chernyshevsky, who had a philosophical system of his own. From this system, Chernyshevsky derived his views on politics, society, economics, ethics, aesthetics, and so on.

The recently popular attempts to consider the philosophy of N. G. Chernyshevsky and L. Feuerbach as the fruit of religious thought should be recognized as untenable. The fundamentals of their philosophy are set forth in their own works quite unambiguously, and these fundamentals are clearly materialistic. Materialism and religiosity are fundamentally incompatible (one should be critical of V.V. Zenkovsky's experience of finding "religiosity" in every Russian thinker,

since such an approach leaves room for substitution of concepts: religiosity in a special sense is easy to interpret in a confessional sense). In other words, the desire of the researcher to give an original interpretation should not replace the striving for truth in historical and philosophical science: if Chernyshevsky and Feuerbach were atheists and materialists, this should be unconditionally recognized as a historical-philosophical fact.

3) The principle of partisanship in philosophy, of which Chernyshevsky wrote, is indeed applicable to the classification of philosophy. There are essential, fundamental differences between different philosophical trends, on the basis of which an adequate typology is possible. The philosophical parties of idealism and materialism are irreconcilable in principle, since both are based on the basic question: whether matter or spirit is primary. The philosopher's affiliation to one of the two parties depends on the solution of this question. Of course, both materialism and idealism are divided into many directions: metaphysical materialism, dialectical materialism, aleatory materialism, etc., subjective idealism, objective idealism, solipsism, etc. The boundary of this branching is determined only by the present moment and can therefore expand indefinitely with the passage of time.

4) The problem of the ideal in Russian philosophy of the nineteenth century is already present in the discussion of the anthropological principle. For example, P.D. Yurkevich and M.N. Katkov, arguing with N.G. Chernyshevsky and his associates, consistently defended the thesis that matter does not have ideal potentialities, and from this it was concluded that materialists do not recognize the ideal, the spiritual. The materialists, in the person of N. G. Chernyshevsky and the major representatives of his school, did not deny this very ideal: they only seemed to deny it, since they polemicized with the idealists on the question of the dualism of soul and body. Chernyshevsky and his associates defended monism in philosophical anthropology, and consequently seemed to deny the spiritual principle in man. In fact, they recognized this ideal, but only asserted that it could

not be separated from the material. Thus, the problem of the ideal in an implicit form was already taken into account by Russian thinkers.

5) It is wrong to define the utilitarian or religious viewpoints of N.G. Chernyshevsky and his school as ethical views. The theory of reasonable egoism is a non-metaphysical interpretation of morality, according to which egoism and altruism are not so much opposites as different stages of development of the same qualities in a person. N.G. Chernyshevsky, P.L. Lavrov, I.M. Sechenov and others present ethics as something that is arranged in harmony with the materialistic monist principle.

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