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**THE EVOLUTION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY**

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INTRODUCTION

Relevance. The choice of this topic is due to the acute problem of misunderstanding by a variety of countries of the world of foreign policy concepts and the long-term strategy of the People's Republic of China (PRC). In our opinion, the following factors call for a comprehensive study of the ideological foundations of modern China's foreign policy.

Firstly, the evolution of the ideological foundations of China's foreign policy has not been sufficiently studied, given that they have historically been formed in a single cultural and value space. They go back to the ideas of Confucianism, realism, Marxism and some Western theories that influence the formation of foreign policy views, ideas and concepts of the last five generations of Chinese leaders. It is important to understand how the traditional imperial view of China gradually developed an original vision of the world order in which China and its neighbors coexist in "a new era".

Secondly, it is necessary to study how the evolution of Chinese foreign policy concepts was influenced by the national trauma, or the "century of humiliation" (1839-1949), which helped to unite the country's population and build a concept of a common destiny with developing countries, many of which themselves are former colonies. This will make it possible to understand how China's foreign policy is attractive to developing countries, and what they see as the differences between the Western and Chinese models of international cooperation.

Thirdly, it is necessary to identify those conceptual foundations of China's foreign policy that ensure constant activity and strengthening of regional influence. They, in turn, increase the fears of other countries, especially Southeast Asia, about China's attempts to extend its political influence beyond national borders. In this regard, it is necessary to explore the strategic principle put forward by the modern Chinese leadership about the unprecedented changes that the world is facing. This thesis seems to be aimed at strengthening China's role in shaping a multipolar world; economic globalization; rebuilding relations with the United States and the Russian Federation; and the configuration of China's power in foreign policy. This principle also causes concern and misunderstanding in the Western world, including.

Fourthly, it is necessary to study how a country with a strong influence of Marxist-Leninist ideals managed to compete technologically with the developed countries of the West. And although the Chinese political leadership seeks to “amend” the international system that emerged after the Cold War, with its concentration around the United States and liberal Western values, it does not plan to completely overthrow the entire system. Studying the evolution of the conceptual foundations of China’s foreign policy, which have been implemented in political practice, will help to understand how this state managed to accumulate industrial potential, capital, resources and competencies and became a new beneficiary of globalization; turn into the second economic power in the world after the United States and the largest exporter and holder of gold and foreign exchange reserves; not lose the pace of economic development after the world Financial crisis (2008–2013).

Fifth, the study of the evolution of the conceptual foundations of foreign policy and the practice of their implementation on the example of five generations of Chinese leaders will reveal the place of the PRC in the context of the aggravation of the political and economic crisis in Europe; the rapid deterioration of relations between Russia and the West; the reversal of the US strategy to the east; the escalation of territorial disputes in the South China and East China Seas. Thus, the study of this topic will allow us to assess the role of the PRC in the emerging new world order.

The object of the study is Chinese foreign policy thought at the cultural, ideological and scientific levels of its existence and development.

The subject of the study is the conceptual foundations of the foreign policy of five generations of the political elite of the People’s Republic of China in the period 1949–2023.

The chronological framework of the study is limited to the period from 1949 to 2023. The lower boundary of the chronological framework of the study (1949–the end of the 1970s) marks the moment when the first generation of Chinese leaders led by Mao Zedong, having founded a New China, proposes the theory of the theory of “two camps” and “intermediate zones”, then “three worlds”, focused on the formation of Beijing’s own center of power. The upper chronological frame is predetermined by the period from 2013 to the present, when the coming to power of the fifth generation

leader Xi Jinping marks a new foreign policy and resolute targeted diplomacy. Under Xi Jinping, the concept of a “community of common destiny for mankind” and other large-scale foreign policy strategies and theories are being implemented. Our research is intended as the beginning of a project involving a historically linear and integral consideration of the ideological foundations of foreign policy thought, theories and strategies with a common logic of development among the leaders of the People’s Republic of China of five generations: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, with an emphasis on identifying foreign policy continuity.

The purpose is to identify the conditionality of the evolution of the conceptual foundations of the PRC foreign policy by three main components of the modern foreign policy thought of this country – the traditional political culture of China, Marxism and Western theories of international relations.

Setting this goal makes it necessary to solve the following *research objectives*:

- 1) to analyze the traditional ideas of Chinese thinkers on the nature of foreign policy;
- 2) to determine the influence of Marxism on the foreign policy ideas and concepts of the People’s Republic of China;
- 3) to reveal the role of Western theories and concepts of international relations and their influence on the development of Chinese foreign policy thought;
- 4) to characterize the process of evolution of the PRC foreign policy ideas in the early years of people’s power (1949 – the end of the 1950s): from the principle of a “lean to one side” to the theory of “three worlds”;
- 5) to study the dynamics of radicalization of China’s foreign policy during the “Cultural Revolution” (1966–1976);
- 6) to identify the main stages of the emergence and development of Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy strategy for peace and development, the basis for the successful implementation of which was laid in the 1990s.;
- 7) to analyze the new model of China’s relations with the outside world, which leads to the normalization of Beijing's relations with a great number of countries of the world, primarily the United States;

- 8) to explore Jiang Zemin's theoretical approaches to multipolarity in establishing a multipolar and just world order in international relations;
- 9) to identify the features of the development of the foreign policy concept of the new world order in Beijing;
- 10) to characterize the concept of Hu Jintao's "peaceful rise" as Beijing's foreign policy course to ensure regional and international stability;
- 11) to trace the formation of a "harmonious world" in the foreign policy strategy of the People's Republic of China at the beginning of the XXI century.;
- 12) Rethink the essence of Xi Jinping's foreign policy course to creatively substantiate the establishment of a just world order in the 21st century;
- 13) to analyze the concept of "community of common destiny for mankind" as a key link in the ideological basis of China's foreign policy strategy for "a new era".

The scientific novelty consists in an attempt to comprehensively and generalize the ideological foundations of China's foreign policy from 1949 to 2023. The new results obtained by the author of the dissertation research include the following:

- 1) description of the complex composition and structure of modern Chinese foreign policy thought as a synthetic phenomenon combining elements of traditional Chinese political culture, philosophy and ideology of Sinicized Marxism and adapted Western theories of international relations;
- 2) reconstruction of the evolution of the ideological foundations of the PRC's foreign policy from 1949 to 2023 as a continuous process of conceptual search associated with the change of five generations of the political elite of this country;
- 3) clarifying the content of the foreign policy views of the leaders of China (Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping) based on the analysis of a wider range of Chinese primary sources;
- 4) analysis of key concepts and categories of the political language of the PRC leadership as the semantic basis of its foreign policy discourse;
- 5) rethinking of the deep cultural and historical conditionality of the ideological content of the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind", which acts as the conceptual core of China's foreign policy at its current stage.

The sources of the research – documents and materials of various types of research, which can be divided into several groups.

1. *The first group of sources is represented by written monuments of Ancient China.* The information basis for the reconstruction of traditional ideas of Chinese thinkers on foreign policy is based on ancient Chinese monuments : 1. The oldest written and poetic Confucian canons “Shu Jing” (“Shang Shu”, at the turn of the II-I centuries BC) and “Shi Jing” (“Classic of Poetry”) are monuments of an ideological nature about the use of rituals in ceremonial practice, with the ideas of the political philosophy of the Chinese Empire embedded in them; a treatise The “Doctrine of the Middle Way” (“Zhong Yong”) ¹ defines human nature, concretizes the Confucian category of spiritual qualities of man, developing the genesis of world philosophy from myth to logos².

The work of Confucius “The Analects” in English and Chinese”, published in 2010 in translation by Song Daly. In traditional Asian cultures, such as Japanese, South and North Korean, Vietnamese, et al. “The Analects” is one of the Chinese classical works intended for a wide range of readers. It is a classic of world importance, embodying the ideological nature of Eastern Confucian culture. The treatise proposes an ideal model of government with an almost perfect bureaucracy and opens up access to official posts for everyone. He gives the Sky a special role. Both the emperor and the official should strive for moral perfection, carrying out immaculate public administration on the basis of the Rules of *li* (禮)³. The authentic text and interpretations of the “The Analects” a state of harmony but not uniformity, in the electronic version are an excerpt on “unity without differences” from Confucius’s “The Analects”⁴.

¹ The text of the treatise was written between the end of the Period of the Contending Kingdoms and the Western Han Dynasty, circa 221–206 BC. Traditionally, the outstanding historian Sima Qian considers the author of “Zhong Yong” to be the grandson of Confucius Kung Ji – *author's note*.

² The book “Shang Shu”. Full text and comments of the original text of the “Yao Canon” // Information portal ‘Culture’. URL http://www.360doc.com/content/21/1006/19/259476_998519500.shtml (accessed: 23.07.2023). (In Chinese); “Book of Changes” and the unity of man and nature. URL: <https://www.ruiwen.com/wenxue/yijing/311002.html> (accessed: 07.23.2023). In Chinese; We are talking about the unity of man and nature // Information portal “Xuan Guang”. 2020. January 07. URL: <https://www.jianshu.com/p/2ecc68d5855f> (accessed: 07.23.2023). In Chinese; Feng Yulan. A brief history of Chinese philosophy / ed. Su Yun. Ed. 1st. Beijing, 1985. In Chinese.

³ “The Analects” in Chinese and English / trans. Sun Daly. Beijing, 2010. 338 p. In Chinese.

⁴ Authentic text and interpretations of “The Analects” “Harmony of the diverse and differences” // Characters. 2021. March 29. URL: <http://www.vrrw.net/wx/27684.html> (accessed: 07.16.2023). In Chinese.

Sun Wu, or Sun Tzu, in his treatise “The Art of War”, talking about the art of war, reveals its practical, ideological and philosophical significance. The fundamental treatise of Taoist teaching, The Tao Te Ching, is attributed to Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu (VI–V centuries BC). In it, Lao Tzu gives mystery to the dual of Dao–De, which follows from the inaccessibility of the all-encompassing principle to human sensations, words and thoughts⁵. We use these sources to solve the problems of Chapter 1.

2. *Regulatory legal acts*⁶.

- The laws of the Great Ming Dynasty with a summary commentary and an appendix of regulations: Da Ming lu ji jie Fu li. In 4 parts, Part 1. it is the final, fourth part of the translation into Russian of the “Laws of the Great Ming Dynasty”, the first three parts of which were published in 1997, 2002 and 2012. In the published collection of Ming legal regulations, the section “Laws on the Department of Punishments” is the largest (11 chapters out of 30 and 171 legislative articles out of 460). The material contained in this section is an important source for understanding and researching such important problems of the Ming era as methods of governing the country, the judicial system, family and clan relations, et al.;

- “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on deepening Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation entering a New Era” (March 21, 2023) (electronic source). The joint statement was signed during the state visit of President of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping to the Russian Federation at the invitation of President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, held on March 20–22, 2023. The full text of the Joint Statement: <http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5920>⁷;

- Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People's Republic of China on the

⁵ Sun Tzu. The art of war. Chapter 3: Planning an attack // Xuan Yu Reading Information Portal. URL: <https://www.xyyuedu.com/zhuzibaijia/szbfyd/35933.html> (accessed: 07.23.2023). In Chinese; A treatise on the military art of Sun Bin / ed. Guo Huajao. Beijing, 1957. 113 p. In Chinese; Interpretation of Lao Tzu / ed. Yang Liuqiao. Shanghai, 1958, February. Issue 2, chapter 76. 84 p. In Chinese.

⁶ The laws of the Great Ming Dynasty with a summary commentary and an appendix of regulations (Da Ming lu ji jie Fu li). Vol. 1 / [ed. by S. Kucher]; trans. from Chinese, research, note. and adj. N.P. Svistunova. Moscow, 1997. 573 p.

⁷ A joint statement by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on deepening comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation entering a new era. March 21, 2023 // Administration of the President of Russia. 2023. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5920> (accessed: 08.10.2023).

Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in the Border Area (Moscow, April 24, 1997) (electronic source)⁸;

- Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on December 4, 1982). The full text of the Constitution., at the Fifth Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on December 4, 1982. Declared and put into effect by the National People's Congress on December 4, 1982⁹.

3. *The works of the founders of scientific socialism.* A) In The “Works” of K. Marx and F. Engels fully discovered the objective laws of historical movement. They consider and analyze the process of formation of scientific communism, its connection with the international labor movement for the socialist transformation of society. In the “Manifesto of the Communist Party”, a historical document written by K. Marx and F. Engels, on behalf of the Second Congress of the Union of Communists, speaks of the inevitable impending demise of bourgeois society based on the domination of private property¹⁰.

B) Volume 21 of “The Complete Works” of V.I. Lenin contains works written in December 1911 – July 1912, during the period of further rise of the revolutionary movement. The central place in the volume is occupied by works that reflect Lenin's struggle for the reconstruction and strengthening of the revolutionary Marxist party, a new type of party, the struggle against the Menshevik liquidators and Trotskyists, the development of tactics of the Bolshevik Party in the conditions of the revolutionary upsurge. Volume 23 contains works written in 1913 in the context of the growing new revolutionary crisis. In these writings, Lenin sets out the principles of the struggle against the war for peace and defends the idea that war contradicts war to the very essence of socialism. In the 27th and 28th volumes of “The Complete Works” of V.I. Lenin's works include those written in the period from 1915–1920, in which Lenin

⁸ Agreement between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People's Republic of China on the mutual reduction of armed forces in the border area // Electronic Fund of Legal and regulatory documents. URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901779315> (accessed: 09.09.2023).

⁹ The Constitution of the People's Republic of China (adopted and promulgated on December 4, 1982 at the 5th session of the National People's Congress of the 5th convocation. URL: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2018-03/22/content_2052621.htm (accessed: 07.12.2023). In Chinese.

¹⁰ Marx K., Engels F. Works. Vol. 20. Ed. 2nd. Moscow, 1961. 827 p.; Their own. The Manifesto of the Communist Party. 63 p.; Their own. Works. Vol. 42. Ed. 2nd. Moscow, 1974. 535 p.

characterizes the phenomena inherent in imperialism and develops the most important theoretical propositions of Marxism about the transition period from capitalism to socialism. In the 36th, 40th, and 43rd volumes, written from 1918 to 1921, Lenin summarizes ideas about the scientific plan of socialist construction¹¹.

4. *Memoirs and reminiscences of state leaders*. In the work “On China” by G. Kissinger fully covers the key points of Chinese foreign policy from ancient times to the present day, and also writes about the memories of his experiences with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping¹².

5. *Theoretical works of state leaders and figures of the People’s Republic of China*: a) “Selected Works” of Mao Zedong in four volumes, “Selected Works” of Zhou Enlai in two volumes, which reflect the mechanisms of governance of the Chinese state. Volumes I and II of Mao describe the periods of the First and Second Civil Revolutionary Wars (1926–1937). These works are not a complete collection, due to the fact that not all of Mao Zedong’s works have been found, and the Kuomintang has summarized the documents of the Chinese revolution. Zhou Enlai’s “Selected Works” in two volumes in Chinese contain 116 major works by Zhou Enlai from 1926 to 1975. The second volume includes 56 works written after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, including important works from the period of restoration of the national economy, the beginning of complex construction and the period of the “Cultural revolution”. Among them, the works are devoted to economic construction: “The relationship between the current financial and economic situation and the new Chinese economy”, “The transformation of the PRC into a powerful socialist modern industrial country”, et al., and with regard to diplomatic work – “Our diplomatic policy and objectives”, “Five Principles of peaceful coexistence”, “Friendly exchanges have finally opened between China and the United States of America”, et al¹³.

¹¹ Lenin V.I. The complete works. Vol. 21. December 1911 – July 1912. 5th ed. Moscow, 1961. 671 p.; His own. The complete works. Vol. 23. March – September 1913. 5th ed. Moscow, 1980. 595 p.; His own. The complete works. Vol. 27. 5th ed. Moscow, 1962. 643 p.; His own. The complete works. Vol. 28. Notebooks on imperialism. 5th ed. Moscow, 1962. 838 p.; His own. The complete works. Vol. 40. December 1919 – April 1920. 5th ed. Moscow, 1963. 506 p.

¹² Kissinger G. About China. Moscow, 2013. 635 p.

¹³ Mao Tse-tung. Selected works: trans. from Chinese. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1952. 534 p.; His own. Selected works: trans. from Chinese. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1953. 474 p.; His own. Selected works. Vol. 2 // Information portal “Qiushivan”. 2019. July 31. URL: http://www.qstheory.cn/books/2019-07/31/c_1119478087_23.htm (accessed: 08.01.2022). In Chinese; Zhou Enlai. Selected works. Vol. 2. Beijing, September 1984. 535 p. In Chinese.

b) The book “The Main Issues of Modern China” includes speeches and conversations related to the period from September 1982 to June 1987, included in the collection of the same name, published in 1987. The second edition of the “Elected” Chinese party and statesman Deng Xiaoping includes 14 documents, most of which were published for the first time. In total, the volume contains 60 articles and speeches that most fully reflect some of the most important views regarding the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, expressed by the author in the mid-1980s.¹⁴

c) In the books of Jiang Zemin, “Jiang Zemin. On Socialism with Chinese characteristics” presents new theoretical transformations in the practice of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and the basic principles of Marxism. The author shows the external and internal political changes in the People’s Republic of China, systematically summarizes the experience of reforms, openness and socialist modernization, and also answers questions related to the practice of building socialism with Chinese specifics¹⁵.

d) The collection of texts of Xi Jinping’s speeches in his fundamental expanded work “Xi Jinping. On governance. The Second Edition” The published texts in the Second Edition date back to the beginning of his rule, as the First Edition was published as early as 2014. The Third English Edition of the book, unlike the First and Second Editions, publishes Xi Jinping’s speeches and statements since the 19th CPC Congress, when he put forward a series of innovative ideas for “a new era”, charting a course appropriate to the times and enriching the theoretical basis of the Communist Party¹⁶. These sources are extremely useful for solving problems in chapters 2 through 6.

6. *Materials of the Congresses of the Communist Party of China, official documents of the government and the CPC of China.*

- Materials of the congresses of the CPC and the Government of China, covering the reports of the General Secretaries of the CPC Central Committee, leaders of five

¹⁴ Deng Xiaoping. The main issues of modern China. Moscow, 1988. 256 p.; Deng Xiaoping. Selected works. Vol. II (1975–1982). Beijing, 1995. 555 p.

¹⁵ Jiang Zemin. On socialism with Chinese specificity. Moscow, 2002. Vol. I. 397 p. His own. On socialism with Chinese specificity. Moscow, 2004. Vol. II-III. 811 p.; His own. On socialism with Chinese characteristics (Excerpts from special topics). Beijing, 2002. 768 p. In Chinese.

¹⁶ Xi Jinping. The governance of China. II. Beijing, 2018. 802 p.; His own. The governance of China. III. Beijing, 2020. 650 p.

generations. Documents of the VIII–XX Congresses of the CPC (held in 1956, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012, 2017 and 2022) provide an opportunity to reveal both the ideological and conceptual foundations of the foreign policy course, to reveal the Chinese leadership’s ideas about the existing and future principles of Beijing’s international strategy and diplomacy in the coming decades¹⁷. We use the Materials of the CPC and Chinese government congresses to solve the problems in chapters 2 to 6.

7. Important sources of information on foreign policy issues are also regular annual reports on the work of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, which identify key foreign policy instruments, declare the long-term program of the CPC’s activities and contain strategic directions and policy objectives in key areas of China’s foreign policy. The reports were presented by the top leaders of the People's Republic of China: Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao, Li Keqiang in the period from the 1980s to 2022¹⁸.

8. *White papers “National Defense of China”*. The white papers cover the military-political situation in the world and the Asia-Pacific region, and give an idea of

¹⁷ From September 15 to 27, 1956, the VIII National Chinese Congress of the Communist Party of China was solemnly held in the hall of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing // Network of the People's Political Consultative Council of China. URL: <http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/2021/12/29/ARTI1640745056154256.shtml> (accessed: 08.06.2023). In Chinese; Zhou En-lai’s political report at the second plenum of the National Committee of the People’s Political Consultative Council of China on January 30, 1956. Moscow, 1960, 78 p.; Zhou Enlai’s report at the X National Congress of the Communist Party of China (report dated August 24, 1973, adopted on August 28). URL: <https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/25/ARTI1348556780608187.shtml> (fctssed: 03.08.2022). In Chinese; 3rd Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation. The XII Congress of the CPC. In Chinese; XIV Congress of the CPC // Information portal “Network of members of the Communist Party”. 2012. June 12. URL: <https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/06/05/ARTI1338865692254329.shtml?from=singlemessage> (accessed: 05.21.2022). In Chinese; Jiang Zemin's report at the XIV Congress of the CPC // Portal of the Central Government of the People's Republic of China. 04.07.2008. URL: http://www.gov.cn/govweb/test/2008-07/04/content_1035850_4.htm (accessed: 08.10.2022). In Chinese; Jiang Zemin’s report at the XVI CPC Congress (November 8, 2002). Chapter 9: International situation and foreign work // Xuanjianjia News Agency. 2018. January 31. URL: http://www.71.cn/2018/0131/1049937_9.shtml (accessed: 08.09.2023). In Chinese; At the opening ceremony of the XVII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Hu Jintao delivers a report (full text). Chapter 9: Create a new situation for the modernization of national defense and the army // Chinese Internet News Center. 2007. November 14th. URL: http://www.china.com.cn/fangtan/zhuanti/djt/2007-11/14/content_9228561_9.htm (accessed: 08.01.2023). In Chinese; Report to the XX National Congress of the Communist Party of China “Carrying high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics, to fight together for the comprehensive construction of a modernized socialist state” (October 16, 2022) // News Agency “CPC News”. 2022. October 26. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2022/1026/c64094-32551700.html> (accessed: 10.27.2022). In Chinese.

¹⁸ Annual report on the main events in the history of the Communist Party of China. Beijing, 1987. 460 p. In Chinese; Report on the work of the Government, read by Zhu Rongji on March 5, 2003 at the 1st session of the National People's Congress of the 10th convocation // The Chinese government network. Bulletin of the State Council. 2003. No. 11. In Chinese; Wen Jiabao's report on the work of the Government at the 2nd session of the National People's Congress of the 10th convocation (full text) // Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Khabarovsk. 17.03.2004. URL: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgkhh/chn/xwdt/04news1/t115719.htm>. (accessed: 08.06.2023). In Chinese; Report on the work of the Government of Premier Li Keqiang (text summary) // Government of the People's Republic of China. URL: http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-03/05/content_5677248.htm (accessed: 08.06.2023). In Chinese.

the problems that need to be confronted when faced with the growing political and ideological pressure of the West. Thus, the full text of the White Paper “China’s Peaceful Development” consists of five sections, which correspondingly set out the process of opening the path of China’s peaceful development, the common goals of China’s peaceful development, the external political attitudes of China’s peaceful development, the historical inevitability of China's peaceful development and the global significance of China's peaceful development¹⁹. The full text of the White Paper “One Country – Two Systems in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region” (consists of five sections) analyzes the implementation of the national policy proposed by the Chinese Government and aimed at achieving peaceful reunification of China. It was noted that in accordance with the principle of “one country, two systems”, the Chinese leadership successfully resolved the problem of Hong Kong remaining from history through diplomatic negotiations with the British government²⁰. The White Paper on China’s Arctic Policy consists of four parts, which include: the situation and changes in the Arctic, the relationship between China and the Arctic, China’s political goals and basic principles within the framework of Arctic policy, and China's main political position on participation in Arctic affairs²¹.

9. *Materials of the Soviet and Chinese press*. “The Pravda”²², “The Red Flag” of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China²³.

The degree of knowledge of the problem. The evolution of the conceptual foundations of China’s foreign policy is a multifaceted, complex and concurrently insufficiently developed problem in domestic and foreign political science. Conventionally, researchers who have studied this issue can be divided into three main groups.

¹⁹ The White Paper of China. The path of peaceful development of China. Part 1: Peaceful development is the only way to modernize China // The Government of the People's Republic of China. Beijing, 12.22.2005. URL: http://www.gov.cn/xwfb/2005-12/22/content_133974.htm (accessed: 07.25.2023). In Chinese.

²⁰ Practice in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in accordance with the principle of "one country, two systems". The full text of the White Paper // Information Bureau of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. 2014. June 10. URL: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/dtzt/2014/31039/31042/Document/1372893/1372893.htm> (accessed: 08.07.2023). In Chinese.

²¹ China has published a White Paper on the country's Arctic policy: in more detail // Russian.News.Cn. 2018. January 26. URL: http://russian.news.cn/2018-01/26/c_136926688.htm (accessed: 08.21.2023).

²² Pravda. 1964. September 2, no. 246 (16832).

²³ The Red Flag. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 1960. Iss. 6. In Chinese; The Red Flag. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 1960. Iss. 9. In Chinese; The Red Flag. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 1963. Iss. 3-4. In Chinese.

Soviet and Russian scientists. The appearance of publications on the subject in the Russian scientific literature begins in the USSR in the late 1960s and 70s. 20-th century. Such Soviet authors as L.M. Gudoshnikov, E.A. Sergeeva, M.I. Sladkovsky and others²⁴ in their writings emphasize the radicalization and adventurism of the ideological attitudes of Chinese diplomacy of that period. In the 1960s and 1970s, the works of Soviet Orientalists based on the slogans and appeals of Mao Zedong were characterized by a class-based one-sided approach. They are dominated by ideological cliches and dogmatized arguments. Meanwhile the authors take into account the historical conditions of the time, which left their mark on the content of the theoretical foreign policy interpretations of the PRC. In the domestic works of the Soviet period, there is no analysis of the theoretical and methodological provisions of Western political science, their influence on the development of the ideological foundations of China's foreign policy. Among the publications there are no monographs specifically devoted to in-depth and generalizing consideration of the problem, there are only individual articles covering particular issues. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the thread of critical analysis of China's foreign policy decisions has been interrupted in the USSR. Against the background of a large body of one-sided works with a critical class approach, generalizing studies on China's domestic and foreign policy are qualitatively different. The monograph of M.S. Kapitsa is devoted to the interaction of China with the countries of Europe, the USSR, the USA, and Asia²⁵. We are critical to the monographs of G.V. Astafiev and A.M. Dubinsky, F.M. Burlatsky, L.P. Delyusin, P.P. Markov, which present interesting interpretations of certain aspects of China's relations with Japan, Vietnam, India and other Asian and European countries after World War II, during the "Cultural revolution"²⁶. They make a significant contribution to the

²⁴ Sergeeva E.A. Foreign policy and foreign policy propaganda of the CPC leadership. Moscow, 1978. 190 p.; China after the "cultural revolution" (political system, internal political situation) / [L.M. Gudoshnikov, B.P. Barakhta, V.G. Karymov et al.]. Moscow, 1979. 360 p. and others.

²⁵ Kapitsa M.S. Soviet-Chinese relations. Moscow, 1958. 424 p.; PRC: three decades – three policies. Moscow, 1979. 576 p.

²⁶ Foreign Policy and International Relations of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1963 Vol. 1 / ed. by G.V. Astafieva, A.M. Dubinsky. Moscow, 1974. 359 p.; Foreign Policy and International Relations of the People's Republic of China, 1963–1973. Vol. 2 / under the general ed. V. Astafieva, A.M. Dubinsky. Moscow, 1974. 308 p.; Burlatsky F.M. Mao Tse-tung "Our signature number is war, dictatorship". Moscow, 1976. 392 p.; Delyusin L.P. Deng Xiaoping and the reformation of Chinese socialism. Moscow, 2003. 207 p.; Markov A.P. Japan's post-war policy in Asia and China, 1945–1977. Moscow, 1979. 277 p.

pragmatic educational course of foreign policy research from an eastern perspective. In general, in the domestic political science of this period, the opinion was established that the dangerous foreign, including the adventurist policy of the People's Republic of China in the 1950s – late 1970s, departs from the principles of socialist democracy and is based on the cynical ideas of Mao Zedong²⁷. It leads to the international isolation of the PRC.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Chinese studies, including studies of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China, in the USSR/Russia received a powerful impetus to development, which is primarily due to the restoration of interrupted trade, economic, and humanitarian ties between the two countries. Russian political science explores the materials of the XIV–XVI congresses of the CPC, foreign policy attitudes and the theory of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin.

An important milestone in the study of theoretical works on the history of philosophy and the content of Chinese culture of the Middle Kingdom in Russian literature was the political and moral problems of Confucianism. Researchers of the ancient canons of Chinese philosophy contrast the ancient Chinese “correlative thinking” or the principle of “absence-non-existence” to the ancient Greek Platonic idea. Russian researcher A.I. Kobzev defines the place of logic in China, studies numerology, numerical complexes and geometric structures, linking them with the rich tradition of classical Chinese philosophical thought²⁸.

The post-Soviet stage of the development and development of foreign policy strategies and concepts of the People's Republic of China in domestic political science is marked by the appearance of works seeking to critically master the achievements of Western and Chinese TMO. Turning to the literature on the foreign policy course of Mao Zedong, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, it is necessary first of all to mention a group of fundamental domestic works on Chinese studies, which influenced the formation of the dissertation's conceptual ideas about the specifics of the PRC's foreign policy and

²⁷ China after the “cultural revolution” (political system, internal political situation). P. 9; Borisov O.B. China's domestic and foreign policy in the 70s: a political essay. Moscow, 1982. 384 p.; Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong and his heirs. Moscow, 1979. 400 p.

²⁸ Kobzev A.I. The doctrine of symbols and numbers in Chinese Classical philosophy. Moscow, 1994. 432 p.; Society and the state in China: abstracts of the XIX Scientific conference. Part 1. Moscow, 1988. 223 p.

Chinese political culture to the greatest extent. In this regard, it should be noted the works of Sinologists A.V. Vinogradov²⁹, Yu.M. Galenovich³⁰, V.A. Korsun³¹, V.Ya. Portyakova³², A.A. Sveshnikova³³, V.N. Usova³⁴, devoted to the peculiarities of the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China, problems in Sino-American trade and political relations in the 21st century, the strengthening of China's interest in deepening and intensifying ties with Russia.

A unique layer is represented by domestic scientific publications published in the late 1980s and early 2000s. 20-th century.³⁵ Gradually moving away from the class approach, these works serve as a positive intellectual background for research on the theoretical problems of the PRC's foreign policy in the form they existed in the USSR during this period. The authors try to present the tradition of scientific knowledge of Soviet Sinology about foreign policy³⁶. These works largely continue the tradition of the Celestial Empire. The Russian Far Eastern School of Oriental Studies makes a significant contribution to the analysis of traditional political ideas, concepts of the Celestial Empire and the philosophical theory of Chinese political life³⁷. With the

²⁹ Vinogradov A.V. The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in 1949–1976 // *Prospects*. 2016. 15 Aug. URL: http://www.perspektivy.info/oykumena/azia/vneshnaja_politika_kitajskoj_narodnoj_respubliki_v_1949_1976_gg_2016-08-15.htm (accessed: 11.30.2021); His own. Deng Xiaoping's inspection trip to the South and the development of a policy of openness to the outside world // *The history of China from ancient times to the beginning of the XXI century: in 10 volumes. Vol. I: Reforms and Modernization (1976–2009)*. Moscow, 2016. P. 312.

³⁰ Galenovich Y.M. Jiang Zemin's instructions: Principles of foreign and defense policy of modern China. Moscow, 2003. 335 p.; His own. Hu Jintao's motto: Social harmony in China. Moscow, 2006. 392 p.; His own. The new Face of China book 1. The position in the party. Moscow, 2008. 375 p.; His own. The new Face of China book 3. The XVII Congress of the CPC: Hu Jintao's program. Moscow, 2008. 306 p.

³¹ Korsun V.A. China's foreign policy on the threshold of the 21st century. Moscow, 2002. 197 p.

³² Portyakov V.Ya. Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Precepts and their modern interpretation // *Problems of the Far East*. 2012. No. 5. P. 14–27; His own. The vision of multipolarity in Russia and China and international challenges // *Comparative Politics*. 2013. No. 1 (11). P. 86–97.

³³ Sveshnikov A.A. Foreign policy concepts of the People's Republic of China and conceptual representations of Chinese international experts. Moscow, 1999. 180 p.

³⁴ *The history of China from ancient times to the beginning of the XXI century: in 10 volumes. Vol. VIII: The People's Republic of China (1949–1976)* / ed. by Yu.M. Galenovich; chief ed. S.L. Tikhvinsky. Moscow, 2017. 840 p.; Usov V.N. PRC: from the “cultural revolution” to reforms and openness (1976–1984). Moscow, 2003. 190 p.

³⁵ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong and his heirs; His own. Mao Zedong, Jiang Qing and Advisor Deng. Moscow, 2002. 384 p.; Barach D. Deng Xiaoping. Moscow, 1989. 264 p.; Maomao. My father is Deng Xiaoping. The Cultural Revolution: years of trials. Moscow, 2001. 496 p.; Pantsov A. Mao Zedong. Moscow, 2007. 867 p.; His own. Deng Xiaoping. Moscow, 2013. 558 p.; Vladimirov O., Ryazantsev V. Pages of Mao Tse-tung's political biography. Moscow, 1969. 80 p.; Zhang Yu, Holliday J. Unknown Mao. Moscow, 2007. 845 p.; Terrill R. Mao: A Biography. Stanford, 1999. 573 p.

³⁶ Borisov O.B. *Op. cit.*; *International relations in the Asia-Pacific region* / ed. by D.V. Petrov. Moscow, 1979. 278 p.

³⁷ Balchindorzhieva O.B. Social harmony in Chinese philosophy // *Bulletin of Tomsk State University*. 2015. No. 391. P. 58–63; Kuchinskaya T.N. Philosophical and cultural understanding of the socio-cultural space in the context of transnational intercultural interaction // *Bulletin of the Trans-Baikal State University*. 2013. No. 6 (97). P. 122–128; Keidun I.B. Actual problems of studying Confucian classics (the experience of philosophical and religious studies analysis of the canonical text “Li ji”) // *Problems of literature of the Far East: selected materials of the IX international scientific conference* / ed. by A.A. Rodionov. St. Petersburg, 2021. P. 214–225 and others.

variety of methods used, the common thing within these approaches is a structural understanding of this phenomenon.

At the turn of the XX–XXI centuries. The first works are published in the Russian Federation, which explore the theoretical and methodological foundations of the study of foreign policy theories of the People's Republic of China. The problems devoted to methodological approaches directly or indirectly related to the theory of international relations have been developed in monographs and articles by Russian researchers A.D. Bogaturov³⁸, E.N. Grachikova³⁹, M.M. Lebedeva, P.A. Tsygankova⁴⁰. The authors evaluate individual schools and directions, including Chinese ones, critically analyze the proposed provisions related to the problem of development and implementation of foreign policy concepts.

The term “foreign policy concept” has been justified in recent studies by Russian political scientists. Various definitions and categories are embedded in its content. Despite significant progress in the study of numerous phenomena of this phenomenon, the problems of foreign policy theories continue to be relevant.

The specifics of the formation of the concept of the “shared future for mankind” are in the focus of consideration by such Russian scientists as I.E. Denisov, A.V. Semenov, A.V. Tsyvk et al.⁴¹ We agree with the opinion of Russian Sinologists that the concept of a “common future of mankind” raises concerns about China's

³⁸ Bogaturov A.D. *The Great Powers in the Pacific Ocean. The history and theory of international relations in East Asia after World War II (1945–1995)*. Moscow, 1997. 351 p.; Bogaturov A.D., Kosolapov N.A., Khrustalev M.A. *Essays on the theory and methodology of political analysis of international relations*. Moscow, 2002. 384 p.

³⁹ Grachikov E.N. *The formation of the Chinese school of International Relations: analytical approaches and research methods* // *Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Series: International Relations*. 2019. Vol. 19, no. 2. P. 187–200; His own. *The Chinese School of International Relations: Towards Big Theories*. Moscow, 2021. 304 p.

⁴⁰ See, for example: Lebedeva M.M., Harkevich M.V. *Theory of international relations in the mirror of modern Russian studies* // *Bulletin of MGIMO University*. 2016. No. 5 (50). P. 7–19; Lebedeva M.M. *Non-Western theories of international relations: myth or reality?* // *Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series: International Relations*. 2017. Vol. 17, No. 2. P. 246–256; Tsygankov A.P., Tsygankov P.A. *Sociology of International Relations: an analysis of Russian and Western Theories*. Moscow, 2006. 238 p.; *International relations: sociological approaches* / ed. by P.A. Tsygankova. Moscow, 1998. P. 17–47.

⁴¹ Semenov A.V., Tsyvk A.V. *The concept of the “shared future for mankind” in China's foreign policy strategy* // *World Economy and International Relations*. 2019. Vol. 63. No. 8. P. 72–81; Their own. “The common future for mankind” in the diplomatic discourse of China // *Problems of the Far East*. 2019. No. 6. P. 109–124 and others; Denisov I.E., Adamova D.L. *The formulas of Xi Jinping's foreign policy: the main features and problems of interpretation* // *China in World and regional politics. history and modernity*. 2017. Vol. 22 (22). P. 76–90.

superiority, and this theory has not been sufficiently developed to analyze international processes⁴².

Contemporary Western foreign policy concepts, such as, for example, Washington's strategy for the Indo-Pacific region, and their impact on China through the formation of new pro-Western alliances are considered by Professor V.E. Petrovsky⁴³. Certain aspects of the views, ideas, concepts, et al. of Chinese leaders Mao Zedong, Hu Jintao, Jiang Zemin are also presented in dissertations of recent years⁴⁴.

Chinese researchers. Chinese authors have been starting a detailed and in-depth study of conceptual approaches to China's foreign policy since the early 2000s. Since 2005, Chinese political scientists Sun Xuefeng, Qin Yaqing, Zhao Tingyang, Yan Xuetong and others are intensifying research on the Chinese specifics of international relations⁴⁵. The most significant contribution to the enrichment of the theoretical arsenal of the discipline of international relations in China is made by Yan Xuetong, Qin Yaqing and Zhao Tingyang. They construct author's theories that reflect the views of realism, constructivism, liberalism based on Confucian moral qualities, characterize the experience, problems and contradictions in China's relations with the major powers of the world.

In 2009, 2017, 2018, general works on diplomacy by Professor Yang Chuang appeared, which also touched on the theoretical foundations of the PRC's foreign policy course⁴⁶. For the first time, a structural approach and a civilizational method are used, the ideas of theoretical attitudes of China's foreign policy are analyzed, which is

⁴² Russian-Chinese Relations: Between Europe and Indo-Pacific (Part II). Materials of situational analysis // Comparative politics. 2018. No. 4 (9). P. 83–102.

⁴³ Petrovsky V.E. Concepts and Realities of the Indo-Pacific Partnership: Views from China // China in World and Regional Politics. History and modernity. 2022. Vol. 27, no. 27. P. 112–123.

⁴⁴ Abramova N.A. China's political culture, traditions and modernity: dis. ... Dr. Philos. Sci. Ulan-Ude, 2002. 333 p.; Zhdanov V.L. The concept of Mao Zedong's "three worlds" in the context of China's traditional political doctrines: dis. ... cand. polit. sci. Synopsis. Yekaterinburg, 2005. 20 p.; Podolko E.O. Evolution of foreign policy concepts of the People's Republic of China: dis. ... cand. polit. sci. Synopsis. Moscow, 2006. 24 p.; Lexyutina Ya.V. American-Chinese relations in the conditions of the transforming international system at the beginning of the XXI century: dis. ... cand. polit. sci. Synopsis. St. Petersburg, 2012. 46 p.; Mikhalev A.V. Mongolia in the new big game: the role of informal institutions of soft power: dis. ... Dr. polit. sci. Synopsis. Ulan-Ude, 2013. 47 p.; Pak Sang-woo. Theory of international relations and political processes in the territory of the former USSR: dis. ... cand. polit. sci. Synopsis. St. Petersburg, 2002. 16 p.; Sushchenko M.A. The role of traditions in the transformation of the political system of modern China: dis. ... cand. polit. sci. Synopsis. Kazan, 2019. 24 p.

⁴⁵ A practical method of international research. Favorites / ed. Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. Beijing, 2010. 280 p. In Chinese; Qin Yaqing. A relational theory of world politics // International Studies Review. 2016. Vol. 18, no. 1. Pp. 33-474; Yan Xuetong, Ying He. Op. cit. et al.

⁴⁶ Diplomacy / ed. Yang Chuan. Beijing, 2009. 734 p. In Chinese; Yang Chuan. The Path of China's Peaceful development: The Historical Choice and Direction of the Era. Beijing, 2017. 313 p. In Chinese; Diplomacy: theory and practice. T. II / ed. Yang Chuang et al. Beijing, 2018. 730 p.

reflected in works on the history of Chinese diplomacy – in the series of books “One Hundred Years of Diplomatic Relations between China and Foreign Countries” edited by Yang Chuang⁴⁷, which greatly enrich the Chinese historiography of the theory of China's foreign policy, describe in detail the theory and the practice of China's diplomatic cooperation with the leading world powers Great Britain, Germany, India, Russia, the USA, France and Japan. The time period of this collective research covers the XIX, XX and XXI centuries.

The foreign historiography of the PRC's foreign policy and its international relations has been extensive and dynamically developing in Western science since its formation⁴⁸. The works of Professor Xu Zhongyue (I.C.Y. Hsü, 徐中中), which represent the quintessence of the “new synthesis” of the history of modern China. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of their novelty is the analysis of Chinese, Japanese, and Western sources, including Marxist studies⁴⁹.

Of the Chinese authors, we highlight the collective monograph by Yang Bin, Yang Bei, and others. Scientists, without analyzing the foreign policy aspect of the PRC, focus on the evolution of Deng Xiaoping's theory of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, its development and innovation within the framework of the ideology of the “three representative offices” under the leadership of Jiang Zemin⁵⁰.

Professor Zhang Denghua explores the ambiguous role, place, significance, and process of implementing the CES in the diplomatic discourse of the People's Republic of China⁵¹. Professor Zhao Tingyang deeply explores the philosophy of the Tianxia system as a whole world based on global unity and a unified political philosophy⁵².

⁴⁷ See: Xiong Zhiyong. A century of Sino-American relations. Beijing, 2006. 467 p. In Chinese; Zhou Weiping. A century of Sino-Indian relations. Beijing, 2006. 487 p. In Chinese; Yang Chuang, Gaofei, Feng Yujun. A century of Sino-Russian relations. Beijing, 2006. 512 p. In Chinese and other.

⁴⁸ Kissinger G. On China. M., 2013. 635 p.

⁴⁹ Hsü I.S.Y. The Rise of Modern China. 6th ed. New York; Oxford, 2000. XXIX, 1052 p.

⁵⁰ The essence of the spirit of the time: Understanding the Ideology of the Three Missions / Yang Bin, Yang Bei, Sun Yujuan, Wang Junjie. Changchun, 2002. 409 p. In Chinese.

⁵¹ Zhang Denghua. The concept of «community of common destiny» in China's diplomacy: meaning, motives and implications // *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*. 2018. Vol. 5, iss. 2. P. 196–207; His own. Finding the «community of common destiny» // *Asia and the Pacific society*. 2018, 20 April. URL: <https://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/news-events/all-stories/finding-community-common-destiny> (accessed: 30.07.2023).

⁵² Zhao Tingyang. A political world philosophy in terms of all-under-heaven // *Diogenes*. 2009. Vol. 56, iss. 1. P. 5-18; His own. Rethinking empire from a Chinese Concept «All-under-Heaven» (Tian-xia 天下) // *Social Identities*. 2006. Vol. 12, no. 1. P. 29–41; Chen Zhaohe. The Chinese cultural root of the community of common destiny for all mankind.

Chen Zhaohe focuses on the origins and dynamics of the foreign policy tradition of this concept⁵³.

Western researchers. A significant contribution to the development of this topic is made by Western scientists who study the general problems of the development of China's foreign policy, its theoretical and practical arsenal since the first half of the 1970s. The twentieth century, when China takes a course towards rapprochement with the West in the context of a policy of “reform and openness”. We emphasize the works of G. O’Leary, D. Shambaugh, who analyze the dramatic turn of the PRC towards the West: from the hostility of the 1950s and 1960s to the cautious alliance in the first half of the 1970s.⁵⁴

In a number of works by Western scientists, Mao Zedong's foreign policy views and ideas are comprehended, and works devoted to the theory of the “three worlds” are analyzed. We highlight the articles by Professors Herbret Yi (Tokyo), Jiang An⁵⁵ and Han Yin⁵⁶. A notable place in a number of foreign publications is occupied by works devoted to the analysis of the theoretical prerequisites for the study of the “two intermediate zones” and the theory of the “three worlds” by S. Gillespie, S.S. Kim, M.B. Yaguda⁵⁷.

⁵³ Chen Zhaohe. The Chinese cultural root of the community of common destiny for all mankind // 4th International Conference on Education, Language, Art and Inter-cultural Communication (ICELAIC 2017), Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research. 2017. Vol. 142. P. 718–722.

⁵⁴ O’Leary G. The shaping of Chinese foreign policy. Canberra, 1980. 302 p.; Shambaugh D. Deng Xiaoping: The Politician // The China Quarterly. 1993. Sept., no. 135. Special Issue: Deng Xiaoping: An Assessment. P. 457–490.

⁵⁵ Yee H.S. The Three world theory and post-Mao China’s global strategy // International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–). 1983. Vol. 59, no. 2 (Spring, 1983). P. 239–249; Jiang An. The theory of the "separation of the three worlds" is still not outdated // KPK News News Agency. 07.07.2014. URL: <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0707/c136457-25246307.html> (accessed: 30.07.2023). In Chinese.

⁵⁶ Han Yin. On the philosophical perspective of Mao Zedong’s International strategic theory // Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research. 2018. Vol. 151. P. 202–205; Cheng J., Y.-S., Zhang Y.-C., Wankun F. Chinese foreign relation strategies under Mao and Deng: a systematic and comparative analysis // Philippine Journal of Third World Studies. 1999. Vol. 14, no. 3. P. 91–114.

⁵⁷ Kim S.S. Mao Zedong and China’s changing world view // China in the global community / ed. by C. Hsiung, S.S. Kim. New York, 1980. P. 30–31; China and the world: Chinese foreign policy in the Post Mao Era / ed. by S.S. Kim, S. Chan. Boulder, 1984. 356 p.; Kim S.S. China and the Third World in the Changing World Order // China and the World: Chinese foreign relations in the Post-Cold War Era / ed. by S.S. Kim. Boulder, 1994. P. 127–170; Yaguda M.B. China’s foreign policy comes of age // The International Spectator. 2007. Vol 42, iss. 3. P. 337–350; Gillespie S. Diplomacy on a South-South dimension: the legacy of Mao’s Three-worlds theory and the evolution of Sino-African relations // Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy / ed. by H. Slavik. Geneva, 2004. P. 109–130; The Chinese view of the world / ed. by Yufan Hao, Guocang Huan. New York, 1989. P. 225–259.

Among the Russian, Chinese and Western works devoted to the topic of foreign policy concepts of the People's Republic of China, in our opinion, research deserves special attention, in which the following aspects of this topic were considered:

a) confirmation of the foreign policy course of “lean to one side”, the strategy of “intermediate zones”, the theory of “three worlds”, the concept of “five principles of peaceful coexistence”, foreign policy of the period of the “Cultural revolution” (Ya.M. Akhmadeeva, A.O. Vinogradov, A.A. Sveshnikov, A.V. Tsvyk, Zhang Mianli, Jiang An, Yang Chuang, Yan Ruibin, et al.)⁵⁸; construction of the “third line”, radicalization of foreign policy during the “Cultural revolution” (Guo Dong, Huang Hua, Chun Kuyin, Chen Donglin, V.V. Velichko, L.M. Luti, B.J. Naughton, R.E. Scalapino)⁵⁹; the strategic principle of “hiding our capacities and keeping a low profile” (L.P. Delyusin, D.A. Smirnov, V.N. Usov, Di Dongsheng, Deng Xiaoping, Cheng Yushe, Zhang Wankun, et al.)⁶⁰;

⁵⁸ Akhmadeeva Ya.M. The development of foreign policy concepts of the People's Republic of China from 1949 to the beginning of the XXI century // Scientific and Technical Bulletin of SPbGPU. Humanities and social sciences. 2018. Vol. 9, No. 1. P. 33 –44; Vinogradov A.O. Foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in 1949-1976. Sveshnikov A.A. Foreign policy concepts of the People's Republic of China and conceptual representations of Chinese international experts; Tsvyk A.V. The evolution of the Foreign policy doctrines of the People's Republic of China (1950–1990) // Bulletin of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series: International Relations. 2015. No. 1. P. 53–59; Jiang An. Op. cit. In Chinese; Diplomacy / ed. Yang Chuan. In Chinese; Yan Ruibin. "One-way declination" and the split of the Soviet-Chinese Union // Journal of the University of Workers' Enterprises of Tianshan City 2007. Iss. 14, no. 1. P. 9–10. In Chinese.

⁵⁹ Velichko V. The interior of China in the context of its regional strategy // World and National Economy" (World and National Economy). 2010. No. 3 (14). URL: <https://mirec.mgimo.ru/2010/2010-03/vnutrennie-rajony-kitaya-v-kontekste-ego-regionalnoj-strategii> (accessed: 30.07.2023); Wang Jianzhu. Mao Zedong and the construction of the "third Line" // KPK News News Agency. 06.2015. URL: <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2015/0615/c85037-27156999.html> (accessed: 07.05.2023). In Chinese; Huang Hua. Analysis of the reasons for the construction of the "third line" // Kylie University Journal. 2007. No. 2. P. 24–26. In Chinese; Chen Donglin. The construction of the "third line": the development of the Western region in the period of preparation for the war. Beijing, 2003. 488 p. In Chinese; His own. Preparing for war: the secret of building the "third line" // Wenshi bolan. 2009. No. 6. P. 4–7. In Chinese; His own. From the "Food and clothing plan" to the "War Preparation Plan" – the process of transition of the guiding ideology of the "third Five-year plan" // Research on the modern history of China. 1997. No. 2. P. 65–75. In Chinese; Cheung Kui-yin, Lin Ping. Spillover effects of FDI on innovation in China: Evidence from the provincial data // China Economic Review. 2004. Vol. 15, iss. 1. P. 25–44; Guo Dong. Organizational evolution of China's Third-front enterprises: cases study on Aosheng Group. Lisbon, 2013. 149 p.; Lüthi L.M. Mao's secret factories in Cold war China // Texas National Security Review. Aug. 4, 2021. URL: <https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/maos-secret-factories-in-cold-war-china/> (accessed: 07.28.2023); Naughton B. The Third Front: Defence industrialization in the Chinese Interior // The China Quarterly. 1988. No. 115. P. 351–386; Scalapino R.A. The Cultural Revolution and Chinese foreign policy. [S. l.]: University of Michigan, Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies, 1968. 125 p.

⁶⁰ Delyusin L.P. Op. cit.; Deng Xiaoping. Favourites. Vol. II (1975–1982). Beijing, 1995. 555 p.; His own. The main issues of modern China. Moscow, 1988. 256 p.; Smirnov D.A. Ideological and political aspects of China's modernization: from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping. Moscow, 2005. 324 p.; Usov V.N. PRC: from the "cultural revolution" to reforms and openness (1976-1984); Di Dongsheng. Continuity and changes: a comparative study on China's new grand strategy // Historia Actual Online. 2007. No. 12. P. 7–18; Cheng J., Zang Y.-S., Wankun F. Op. cit.

b) the implementation of the peaceful and defensive foreign policy of the People's Republic of China under Jiang Zemin with an emphasis on strengthening the complex power of the Chinese state in the context of the multipolar architectonics of international relations (Y.M. Galenovich, V.A. Korsun, Li Anzeng, D. Lampton, M. Marinelli, A.A. Sveshnikov, D. Shambo, et al.)⁶¹;

c) the development of the concept of “peaceful rise”, “peaceful development”, the theory of “common interests” and China's grand strategy on the path of China's becoming a great world power (Dong Manyuan⁶², Ye Zicheng⁶³, Men Honghua, Men Jing⁶⁴, Zheng Bijian⁶⁵, Yan Xuetong⁶⁶, et al.);

d) analysis of the implementation of the concept of a “harmonious world” and “soft power” by Hu Jintao, the concept of a “community of common destiny for

⁶¹ Galenovich Y.M. Moscow – Beijing, Moscow – Taipei. Moscow, 2002. 656 p.; His own. Jiang Zemin's instructions: Principles of Foreign and defense policy of modern China; Kashin V. B. On the way to a global military Power: the evolution of China's military policy in 1949–2014 // Bulletin of the Moscow University. Ser. 25, International relations and world politics. 2013. No. 4. P. 106–129; Li Anzeng. Analysis of Jiang Zemin's thoughts on the stability of state power // Research and teaching of the history of the Party. 2010. No. 6. P. 6–12. In Chinese; Miller L.H., Liu Xiaohong. The foreign policy outlook of China's third generation Elite // The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978–2000 / ed. by D. M. Lampton. Stanford, 2001. P. 123–150; Marinelli M. Jiang Zemin's Discourse on Intellectuals: The Political Use of Formalised Language and the Conundrum of Stability // Journal of Current Chinese Affairs. 2013. Vol. 42, no 2. P. 111–140; Sveshnikov A.A. Foreign policy concepts of the People's Republic of China and conceptual representations of Chinese international experts; Korsun V.A. Op. cit.; Chinese foreign policy: theory and practice (Studies on Contemporary China) / ed. by Th.W. Robinson, D. Shambaugh. Oxford, 1994. 644 p.

⁶² Dong Manyuan. The common interests of humanity and the peaceful development of China // Research on international issues. 2005. No. 5. P. 15–21. In Chinese.

⁶³ Ye Zicheng. It is extremely important for China to implement the strategy of diplomacy of a major power. Some thoughts on China's diplomatic strategy // World Economy and Politics. 2000. No.1. P. 5–10. In Chinese; His own. China's Grand Strategy: The main challenges to China's emergence as a great world power and strategic choice. Beijing, 2003. 442 p. In Chinese; His own. Inside China's grand strategy: the perspective from the People's Republic / ed. by S. I. Levine, Guoli Liu. Lexington, Kentucky, 2011. 277 p.; His own. The Rise of China: The 500-year history of the Huaxia system. Beijing, 2013. 464 p. In Chinese.

⁶⁴ Meng Honghua. The Rise of China and its Strategic Response // International Observer. 2004. No. 3. P. 9–16. In Chinese; His own. Evolution of China's national identity through the prism of domestic and foreign policy (1982–2012) // Social Sciences of the People's Republic of China. 2013. No. 9. P. 54–66. In Chinese; Men Jing. China's peaceful rise? // Studia Diplomatica. 2003. Vol. 56, no. 6: China: which perspectives for an awakening giant? P. 3–21.

⁶⁵ China's peaceful rise: speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997–2005. Washington, D.C., 2005. 40 p.; Zheng Bijian. China's "Peaceful Rise" to great-power status // Foreign Affairs. 2005. Vol. 84, no. 5. P. 18–24; His own. China's road of peaceful development and the building of communities of interests // China.org.cn. 2013. March 24. URL: http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-03/24/content_28341203.htm (accessed: 30.07.2023); His name is [Zheng Bijian]. Some thoughts on a comprehensive international "convergence of interests" and building a "community of interests" // Phoenix New Media Information Portal. 2011. June 30th. URL: <https://news.ifeng.com/c/7fZvGaP2sO0> (accessed: 30.07.2023). In Chinese.

⁶⁶ Yan Xuetong. Discussion 1. Strategic prerequisites for the "peaceful rise of China". Understanding the "peaceful rise" // Teaching and scientific research. 2004. No. 4. C. 5–20. In Chinese; His own. The international stop and the international strategy for the peaceful rise of China // Teaching and Scientific Research. 2004. No. 4. P. 5–6. In Chinese; His own [Yan Xuetong]. The rise of China and its power status // The Chinese Journal of International Politics. Summer 2006. Vol. 1, no. 1. P. 5–33; Yan Xuetong, Sun Xuefeng. The rise of China and its strategy. Beijing, 2005. 249 p. In Chinese.

mankind” and other new Chinese concepts (A.V. Lomanov, Ya.V. Leksyutina, Wang Huning, Li Changchun, Huang Yanzhong, et al.)⁶⁷.

The analysis of the above-mentioned works by Russian, Chinese, and Western authors indicates that the consideration of theoretical and practical aspects of the problem we are interested in in most of these works is rather superficial and one-sided. There is a need for a more comprehensive and comprehensive expansion, rethinking and systematization of this topic. It is obvious that in the research of the types and spheres of Chinese foreign policy strategies and initiatives at the present stage, many insufficiently studied aspects remain in need of further in-depth development. Taking into account these shortcomings, in previous studies of the problem, the tasks were formulated and the structure of our dissertation work was determined.

The theoretical and practical significance of the dissertation lies in the holistic view of the content and evolution of contemporary ideological foundations of foreign policy from 1949 to the present. The results obtained in the course of the study can be used for further in-depth study of the evolution of the foreign policy line of the contemporary leadership of the People's Republic of China. The conceptual scheme substantiated by the author opens up the opportunity for comprehensive political studies of the processes of foreign policy evolution of the concepts of the People's Republic of China, for understanding, developing, and predicting the effect of foreign policy decisions of the leadership of the People's Republic of China. The results of the study can also serve as a theoretical basis for the development of foreign policy decisions by Russian state authorities in the Russian and Chinese directions. The conducted research significantly enriches knowledge in the field of studying the theoretical and

⁶⁷ Lomanov A., Borokh O. The strategy of creating a "powerful cultural state" (On the decisions of the 6th Plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 17th convocation) // *Problems of the Far East*. 2012. No. 1. P. 4-16; Lomanov A.V. Problems of "cultural security" in modern Chinese politics // *Actual problems of regional security in modern Asia and Africa*. St. Petersburg, 2013. P. 128-142; His own. New concepts of Chinese foreign policy // *Asia and Africa today*. 2017. No. 12 (725). P. 8-18; Radikov I.V., Leksyutina Ya.V. "Soft power" as a modern attribute of a great power // *World economy and International Relations*. 2012. No. 2. P. 19-26; Li Changchun. Clarification of the "Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on some important issues regarding the deepening of the reform of the cultural system, the promotion of the development and prosperity of socialist culture" // Information portal "Chinese Civilization". 2011. October 27th. URL: http://www.wenming.cn/syjj/ldhd/lzc/201110/t20111027_366431.shtml (accessed: 05.01.2023). In Chinese; Wang Huning. Culture as a national force: "soft power" // *Fudan Xuebao*. Ser.: Sociological Sciences. 1993. No. 3. P. 93-97. In Chinese; His own. Cultural expansion and cultural sovereignty: the tasks of the concept of sovereignty // *Fudan Xuebao*. Ser. Sociological sciences. 1994. No. 3. P. 9-10. In Chinese; Huang Yanzhong, Bates G. Sources and limits of Chinese "Soft Power" // *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*. Summer 2006. Vol. 48, no. 2. P. 18.

methodological foundations of the People's Republic of China as one of the approaches to the analysis of China's foreign policy and ideological discourse, which have a scientific basis. In addition, the scientific and theoretical significance of the research results lies in the fact that they can be used by public authorities in predicting the further development of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.

The theoretical and methodological basis is *(a) the scientific and philosophical part is based on a set of ideas; (b) theoretical and empirical methods used in political science and other branches of modern social science.*

Theories of international relations – Marxism, realism, liberalism and constructivism allow us to explain the features of the years; identify the main stages of the emergence and evolution of Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy strategy; explore Jiang Zemin's theoretical approaches to multipolarity in establishing a multipolar and just world order in international relations; characterize Hu Jintao's concepts as a transitional course to ensure regional and international stability; make some clarity in the development of Xi Jinping's foreign policy on the creative justification for the establishment of a just world order of the 21st century within the framework of China's foreign policy strategy "in a new era".

The dissertation is based on the following concepts from the theories of international relations: Zhao Tingyan's theory of "Celestial Empire for all"; Yan Xuetong's "moral realism"; Qin Yaqing's "theory of relations", the theoretical construction of "constructivism of the process"; Deng Xiaoping's "keeping low profile and keep in the shadows"; the concept of "peaceful elevation", "peaceful development", Hu Jintao's "harmonious world"; the concept of "community of common destiny for mankind" (CCDM).

(b) theoretical and empirical methods used in political science and other branches of modern social science. The disclosure of the content of Chinese foreign policy thought, the identification of the conceptual foundations of the foreign policy course of the People's Republic of China since 1949 involves the use of a number of theoretical and empirical methods included in the arsenal of both political science and other related socio-humanitarian disciplines.

A comparative historical approach based on the principle of historicism is used in the study of the main elements of the political system of the People's Republic of China, five generations of the elite of this state, China's domestic and foreign policy, as well as the role of external factors in the implementation of Chinese foreign policy. *The principle of historicism* is necessary to explain the logic of the evolution of the conceptual foundations of the PRC's policy as a long-term, multi-stage process conditioned by many social factors. It is associated with the comparative historical method, as a requirement to consider and explain any phenomenon (concept) in the historical context (period) of its existence.

The comparative historical approach is the main theoretical method of our research. It allowed us to build and justify the periodization of the evolution of the conceptual foundations of China's foreign policy. With its help, in particular, the tasks of identifying common and special features in the traditional ideas of Chinese thinkers about the nature of foreign policy; Marxism and Western theories of international relations (Chapter 1); the process of evolution of China's foreign policy ideas from the early years of people's power to the period of Deng Xiaoping (Chapter 2), the effectiveness or unsuccessful attempts to implement certain other concepts or initiatives of Xi Jinping: “a new type of relations between great powers”, “community of common destiny for mankind”, the concept of "ecological civilization" (Chapter 6). This method allows us to compare the opinions of domestic, Western and Chinese scientists regarding the evolution and implementation of Chinese diplomacy⁶⁸. We apply it to the object of studying Chinese foreign policy thought at the cultural, ideological and scientific levels of its existence and development.

The civilizational approach made it possible to identify the fundamental features of the material and spiritual culture of China, as the most important source of sustainable originality of the foreign policy thought of this country. Chinese civilization as an integral social system consisting of values and religion, culture, economic, political and social organization, et al, which are coordinated with each other and

⁶⁸ Popravko E.A., Dudarenok S.M. Methods of culture research. Vladivostok, 2008. 288 p.; Introduction to Oriental studies. General course / ed. by E.I. Zeleneva, V.B. Kasevich. St. Petersburg, 2013. 584 p.

closely interrelated. We use the approach to solve problems mainly in Chapter 1: analyzing traditional ideas of Chinese thinkers about the nature of foreign policy, revealing the role of Western theories and concepts of international relations and their influence on the development of Chinese foreign policy thought, researching Jiang Zemin's theoretical approaches to multipolarity in establishing a multipolar and just world order in international relations, tracing the formation of a "harmonious world" in the foreign policy strategy of the People's Republic of China at the beginning of the 21st century, this method was applied on a large scale in Chapter 6, due to the fact that Xi Jinping's concepts and geopolitical initiative are considered in the context of the national territory of the People's Republic of China, ethnic history related to the history of traditional political culture.

The main means of organizing the empirical material of our research is *semantic analysis* as one of the varieties of political discourse analysis. We use this method to identify the meaning of concepts and categories of Chinese foreign policy thought, reflected in the fundamental concepts of power and governance in their historical evolution (in Chapters 1, 5, 6). In the most ancient written culture – “Shu jing”, “Shi jing”, The Four Books “The Doctrine of the Mean”, “Guan Zi Shi”, “Tao Te Ching: The Book of the Way”, “The Analects” and other important written monuments of Chinese civilization, we reconstruct the dictionary, the lexicon that underlies the concepts of external the policies of the People's Republic of China, the culturally specific language in which they are written, and the knowledge of which allows them to be correctly interpreted, including in the modern world. When solving the tasks in the Fifth and Sixth chapters, namely: to trace the formation of a “harmonious world” in the foreign policy strategy of the People's Republic of China at the beginning of the XXI century, to rethink the essence of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy course on the creative justification for the establishment of a just world order of the XXI century, to analyze the concept of the “community of common destiny for mankind” as a key link in the ideological basis.

The method of discourse analysis is useful for considering the ideas of a “harmonious world”, the concept of “soft power”, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, the concept of a “community of common destiny for mankind”, the concept of an

“ecological civilization” and a number of others as defining and justifying the foreign policy vector of the leadership The People’s Republic of China of the fourth and fifth generations. We apply a semantic kind of discourse analysis to the object of studying Chinese foreign policy thought at the cultural and ideological levels of its development.

Hieroglyphic writing in Ancient Egypt, China, and Sumer has contributed to the achievements of these civilizations and cultural influence on the surrounding peoples since primitive times. In the future, the peoples of Europe borrowed the culture of the book from them⁶⁹. Hieroglyphic writing is figuratively spatial and different from European linear writing and logical thought. It captures the historical memory of the people in a broad sense, namely: space, time, movement, feelings, thoughts. A characteristic feature of the Chinese foreign policy and socio-political text is cliched, emotionality, colorfulness and expressiveness. After 1949, changes in the life of the New China are reflected in the Chinese language by the appearance of neologisms with negative connotations, which are included in the vocabulary of the period of the “Cultural revolution”. Since the period of Deng Xiaoping's leadership, there have been changes in political discourse, which is becoming more solemn and grandiloquent: it is expressed in elements of the preclassical and classical literary language, or *Wenyan*. Especially widely used by the leaders of the People's Republic of China are some quotations from ancient monuments, formulas that have passed into modern language from the classical literary language⁷⁰. At the present stage, the fifth leader of the People's Republic of China persistently and explicitly includes the country in a globalizing world in this way.

The author deliberately introduces a hieroglyphic text and does not deprive it and quotes from Chinese leaders and leaders of the expressiveness of the statement.

Features of the conceptual apparatus. The topic under study involves understanding the basic concepts and concepts in the study of the phenomenon of foreign policy concepts of the People’s Republic of China. The concept of “concept” (from Latin. *conception*) is defined by the Philosophical Dictionary as reflecting the

⁶⁹ Borukhovich V.G. In the world of ancient scrolls. Saratov, 1976. P. 67.

⁷⁰ Maslovets O.A., Senina E.V. A diachronic approach in teaching socio-political translation from Chinese // Problems of modern pedagogical education. 2022. No. 75 (3). P. 270–272.

leading idea of the system of understanding values and political consequences; the system of interpretation of the phenomenon; the sudden birth of an *idea*; solutions to certain political problems and the implementation of ideological constructions⁷¹. The term “concept” in its broad and interdisciplinary interpretation was proposed by American researchers of the school of political realism, which dominated in the 1940s and 1970s. They consider this issue through the prism of the classical approach to the content of the security of the state and its national interests⁷². In a concentrated form, G. Morgenthau forms the most important ideas of this school.

Features of the Chinese conceptual apparatus. In the Chinese understanding, the term *foreign policy concept* or *diplomatic concept* (外交政策概念) is interpreted in an original way. In the phrase “外交政策 概念”, the word “概念” indicates a *concept*, a *concept* closely related to foreign policy strategy. Yang Chuang, a professor at the Chinese Diplomatic Academy, defines *foreign policy*, which means the basic principles and course of the state in international affairs governing the relations of one state with others⁷³.

The Chinese definition of *theory* (“理论”) in the Dictionary of Modern Chinese is quite consistent with the Western one and is applied to the results of the practice of discussing the laws of the objective world and society, to intellectual achievements (in various fields) formed by the group over a long period, in the short term – if there is certain professional knowledge in various aspects of scientific research⁷⁴.

Thus, the core of the conceptual apparatus of our research, which is most closely related to its subject, are the concepts of *idea*, *theory*, *concept* and *strategy*.

Approbation of the results of the dissertation research.

The main ideas and results of the dissertation research are reflected in the author’s publications with a total volume of about 107 printer’s sheets. Besides, key provisions and conclusions were tested during the applicant’s participation in round tables, scientific

⁷¹ The Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary. Moscow, 2006. P. 222; Philosophical dictionary / author-comp. S.Ya. Podoprigora, A.S. Podoprigora. Rostov N.D., 2010. 176 p.

⁷² Khudaikulova A.V., Neklyudov N.Ya. The concept of ontological security in international political discourse // Bulletin of MGIMO University. 2019. No. 12 (6). P. 134.

⁷³ Diplomacy / ed. Yang Chuan. P. 260. In Chinese.

⁷⁴ Dictionary of the modern Chinese language. Beijing, 1978. P. 686. In Chinese.

seminars and symposiums, international, All-Russian and regional conferences: in Moscow (December 2019, November 2020, October 2022); St. Petersburg (March 2023, February 2024); Yekaterinburg (October 2017); Khabarovsk (October 2019); Irkutsk (September 2019, December 2020, October 2021, December 2022); Ufa (2020), Blagoveshchensk (May 2016-2023); Chita (March 2021-2023); Vladivostok (October 2019); at international conferences in Yanbian, China (November 2016, July 2017); at regional and university conferences. The key provisions and conclusions of the study were published by the applicant in more than 20 scientific articles (from the List of peer-reviewed publications of the Higher Attestation Commission) and 5 monographs: “Soft Power” in the Asia-Pacific regional context. Theoretical adaptation and national practices” (2016), “The Soft Tread of the Yellow Dragon” (2017), “Xi Jinping's Concept of the “community of common destiny for mankind: from idea to practical implementation” (2020), “Ideas of European scientists and politicians about the “common destiny” of peoples: past and present” (2021), “Foreign Policy concepts of the People’s Republic of China: theoretical conception and practical implementation” (The best scientific publication of FEFU 2023). The materials of the dissertation served as the basis for the course “Fundamentals of political regionalism”, read for students of the specialty “Political Science” of the Far Eastern Federal University.

The structure and main content of the work. The dissertation consists of an introduction, six chapters, a conclusion, a list of references (716 positions, inside the sections the descriptions are arranged in the alphabet of the authors and titles in the order: in Russian, in Romano-Germanic languages, in Chinese in the alphabet of the Russian translation). The work is illustrated by three drawings and two appendices.

The propositions for the defense:

1. The foreign policy concepts of the People's Republic of China are embedded in China's traditional views on the nature of foreign policy, which underlie the cultural code of the Celestial Empire, which defines a multi-thousand-year-old national tradition as one of the highest values. The foreign policy of the Middle Kingdom and modern China is stable due to “correlative thinking”. The value-ideological categories of “harmony”, “tianxia”, “tongbian”, “gongsheng”, “shi” and

others are permeated with a cultural dimension and have a serious impact on the contemporary foreign policy of the People's Republic of China.

2. Marxist teachings continue to have a significant impact on the foreign policy concepts of the People's Republic of China, despite the fact that China as a state has moved away from the global communist regime. The PRC no longer seeks to impose its own development model on other states.

3. An analysis of the influence of Western theories of international relations on the foreign policy ideas of the People's Republic of China in the second half of the twentieth and first quarter of the twenty-first centuries shows that they played a role in correcting the foreign policy concepts of contemporary China.

4. The conceptualization of Beijing's foreign policy course is deepening and expanding in the content of the foreign policy concepts of the leaders of the last three generations. The main principles of their definition are related to the implementation of active diplomacy at the highest level. Within the framework of global and regional approaches, Chinese leaders of five generations attach great importance to relations with the Russian Federation as a large and friendly neighbor and partner.

5. Since 2013 China is trying to introduce new standards of international relations, and this indicates that Xi Jinping is implementing his ideas with rather difficult problems to solve. By putting forward large-scale, multidimensional and long-term concepts, China plans to take the place of a leader in the new emerging multipolar world. Xi Jinping's central concept is the "community of common destiny for mankind". It has become the scientific basis of China's contemporary foreign policy strategy. The leader of the People's Republic of China shows the inextricable connection between the fundamental provisions of Chinese traditional culture and the contemporary political course of Beijing.

6. Xi Jinping's concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" is inextricably linked historically with the fundamental provisions of Chinese traditional culture and the modern political course of the People's Republic of China. The concept of CCD complements and enriches the theory of Marxism of the XXI century. Based on the postulates of ancient thinkers and scientists – "harmony is the highest value",

“people between the four seas are brothers”, et al., modern Chinese Marxists analyze this concept from the point of view of the relationship between parts and the whole.

Key scientific results.

In the course of the work done, a number of scientifically significant theoretical results were obtained:

1) The authors of the study confirm that the concept of “community of common destiny for mankind” is based on the philosophical category of Chinese culture – “peace as a single community, great harmony in this world”, containing the concept of “peace”. It represents the living social space and thoughts of people as the core and endless continuation of life. The geopolitical idea of a just international order and peace can be traced in Confucian writings⁷⁵.

2) The authors of the study believe that Chinese diplomats and the government support an effective dialogue on the goals of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and consider it an effective way to resolve the nuclear issue, despite a series of nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches in recent years⁷⁶.

3) Using a system-functional approach, the author identified the transformation of the phenomenon of “soft power” in foreign policy strategies, “soft power” in 2016–2017 lost its relevance. Criteria have been identified that prevent the transfer of “soft power” to the outside world⁷⁷.

4) The author shows that the modern concept of a “community with a common destiny for humanity” is enriched with views and provisions about the “common destiny” of peoples. However, there are certain differences between the Russian and Chinese

⁷⁵ Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F., Mefodieva S.A. Traditional culture of China in the context of the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" // Bulletin of Transbaikal State University. 2018. No 8 (24). P. 56–64: 449.

⁷⁶ Chinese and Korean researchers on diplomatic mediation of China in the North Korea nuclear issue / K.F. Lykov, A.V. Boyarkina, E.V. Kovylyina, S.A. Mefodieva, O.V. Kuzmina // Indian Journal of Science and Technology. 2016. Vol. 9. (20): 532; Boyarkina A.V. Development of the situation around the conflict on the Korean Peninsula in 2017: forecasts of Russian experts // Discourse-Pi. 2017. No. 1 (26). P. 119–128: 445; Boyarkina A.V., Mefodieva S.A., Kuzmina O.V. Strategy for the use of "soft power" of the PRC in relation to the foreign policy of the DPRK // International relations. 2017. No. 1. P. 79–89: 447.

⁷⁷ Pecheritsa V. F., Boyarkina A.V. China's soft power: changing priorities // Espacios. 2017. Vol. 38 (47). P. 1–14: 565; Boyarkina A.V. The rise of China's "hard power": a strategic breakthrough in the "new era" // Questions of Political Science. 2018. Vol. 11, no. 39 (8). P. 1025–1047: 432.

concepts of “common destiny”; they have many similarities. These two concepts call on countries and peoples to integrate, build an all-Russian and global home⁷⁸.

5) It has been proven that the practical implementation of the environmental agenda is characteristic of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy strategy. An important role for the concepts of “ecological civilization” and “two mountains”⁷⁹.

6) Revealed certain signs of the negative impact of COVID-19 on relations between China and other countries⁸⁰.

7) The author confirms that the “One Belt – One Road” initiative is intended for practical implementation and is of significant interest for Russia within the framework of competent cooperation with the EEC (Eurasian Economic Community)⁸¹.

8) It has been determined that the works of Chinese political scientists devoted to the common destiny of peoples explore a pressing issue related to the philosophical and cultural justification of Xi Jinping’s concept of the “community of common destiny for mankind.” Chinese scientists creatively develop and complement the content of the concept⁸².

9) It was revealed that the prospects for cooperation between Russia and China in the oil and gas sector stimulate the economies of the two countries, which leads to the

⁷⁸ Pecheritsa V.F., Boyarkina A.V. Xi Jinping’s concept of the “community of the common destiny of mankind” and the idea of "common destiny" in the works of Russian scientists and politicians // *Discourse-Pi*. 2020. No. 4 (41). P. 112–132: 441; Their own. Ideas of European scientists and politicians about the "single destiny" of peoples: in the past and present: monograph. Vladivostok, 2021. 157 p.: 316; Ruban L.S., Boyarkina A.V. The significance of Xi Jinping’s concept of “the community of a common destiny for mankind” in state regulation and international policy of China // *Issues of national and federal relations*. 2021. Vol. 11. No. 4 (73) P. 1209–1218: 504.

⁷⁹ Boyarkina A.V. Xi Jinping’s global strategy for building an "ecological civilization" in a new era // *Ethnosociety and interethnic culture*. 2020. No. 10 (148). P. 113–122: 433; Her own. Environmental direction in the foreign policy strategy of the PRC // *Bulletin of the Russian Peoples' Friendship University. Series: International relations*. 2021. Vol. 21, no. 2. P. 325–337: 451.

⁸⁰ Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. Chinese experience in combating COVID-19 in conditions of limited mobility of the population of Boyarkin // *News of Irkutsk State University*. 2021. Vol. 36. P. 57–66: 439.

⁸¹ Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. The Belt and Road Initiative – new opportunities for the development of the Russian Far East: experience and problems // *Bulletin of the Transbaikal State University*. 2019. Vol. 25, no. 3. (22). P. 48–57: 435; Boyarkina A.V. Chinese Belt and Road Initiative in the context of Xi Jinping’s concept of "Community of a Common Destiny for Humanity" // *Theories and problems of political research*. 2020. Vol. 9, No. 1A. P. 120–140: 437.

⁸² Boyarkina A.V. Chinese researchers on the philosophical and cultural justification of Xi Jinping’s concept of "a community of a common destiny for humanity" // *Oikumena. Regional studies*. 2020. No. 3. P. 128–140: 438; Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. Xi Jinping’s concept of "Community of a common destiny for mankind" – a contribution to the creative development of Marxism in the 21st century // *Oikumena. Regional studies*. 2020. No. 4 (55). P. 104–112: 440.

protection of the economic and geopolitical interests of Russia, which, however, is not China's main trading partner⁸³.

10) New large-scale concepts and Xi Jinping's strategies are aimed at realizing the national idea of the "Chinese Dream" of the great revival of the Chinese nation. The teachings of K. Marx are the most important source of these diplomatic theories, especially the idea of the "sinicization" of Marx, based on historical and dialectical materialism⁸⁴.

⁸³ Ruban L.S., Pecheritsa V.F., Boyarkina A.V. Russia in the new geopolitical and geo-economic reality between Washington and Beijing // *Issues of national and Federal relations*. 2021. Vol. 11, no. 8 (77). P. 2290–2299: 505.

⁸⁴ Pecheritsa V.F. Xi Jinping's concept of a "community with a common destiny for humanity": from idea to practical implementation: monograph / V.F. Pecheritsa, A.V. Boyarkina. Vladivostok: Publishing house Dalnevost. federal Univ., 2020. 224 p.: 315; Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F., Vasileva T.A., Nechai E.E. Xi Jinping's new diplomacy with Chinese characteristics // *Laplace em Revista (International)*. 2021. Vol. 7, no. Extra E, Aug. P. 82–90: 574; Boyarkina A.V. Understanding "great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics": general and special // *Bulletin of the Russian State University for the Humanities. Ser.: Political science. History. International relationships*. 2021. No. 3. P. 79–97: 443; Boyarkina A.V. The role of the concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" in the realization of China's global dream // *Issues of national and federal relations*. 2018. Vol. 11, no. 6 (45). P. 838–846: 446.

CHAPTER 1. CULTURAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS OF CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPTS: MAIN DIRECTIONS

1.1. Analysis of traditional ideas of Chinese thinkers about the nature of foreign policy

China's foreign policy views have deep anthropological and historical and cultural roots. For centuries, they have been formed within the original and unique civilizational culture of the Middle Kingdom, having a minimum of contacts with other spiritual traditions⁸⁵. An important argument in favor of the uniqueness of Chinese civilization is the assimilation of foreign conquerors by Chinese culture.

The traditional approach to foreign policy has its roots in the era of the Chunqiu period (the Spring and Autumn Annals) and the Warring States period. It was then that the formation of traditional Chinese foreign policy schools took place, which were later developed in Confucian and other traditional schools⁸⁶.

Individual foreign policy ideas and views are gradually forming the basis of traditional Chinese foreign policy philosophy. They are contained in the monuments of the most ancient written culture – "Shu jing" ("Canon of [documentary] writings")⁸⁷, "Shi jing" ("Canon of Poetry")⁸⁸, "Zhou yi" ("Zhou changes", or "Canon of Changes")⁸⁹. These works were formed in the first half of the first millennium BC. Due to its high social position, this philosophy was and still is of outstanding importance in the life of the Chinese state and society⁹⁰.

Gradually, from a variety of ideas, positions and views, this foreign policy philosophy forms the concept of "correlative" or "associative thinking."⁹¹ It is a special "intuitive associative system" with its own logic, as it systematizes the world according

⁸⁵ Kobzev A.I. Op. cit. Pp. 8-9.

⁸⁶ Grachikov E.N. The formation of the Chinese School of International Relations: analytical approaches and research methods. P. 187–188.

⁸⁷ Trad. Chinese. "書經".

⁸⁸ Trad. Chinese. "詩經", XI–VI centuries BC.

⁸⁹ "周" – "Zhou yi", or "易经" – "Yi jing".

⁹⁰ Kobzev A.I. Op. cit. Pp. 20-23.

⁹¹ J. Needham is an English sinologist from the University of Cambridge.

to a pattern or structure and determines the interaction of its parts. This system is based on the concepts of the macrocosm and microcosm⁹².

Closely related to "correlative thinking", "imagery-number"⁹³, or numerology and numerical mysticism, wraps in a geometric structure and fixes terminological clichés, postulates, principles, etc. in ancient Chinese literary and scientific monuments – from the binary images of "yin and yang", the five elements of "wu xing"⁹⁴ to the modern "four modernization" and "One Belt– one Road". Since numerology is anthropopolitical and sociocentric, according to M. Granet, numbers speak about the form and significance of things, about the composition and power of the group of people with whom things are connected. They express the power of the head of the human and natural association⁹⁵. This origin of "correlative thinking" largely explains the high political status and cultural significance of numerology.

Since Ancient China, this thinking model has been developing smoothly, gaining a foothold over the centuries in the political ideology of the Middle Kingdom⁹⁶. Modern Chinese leaders also rely on it, using the scientific value of traditional "correlative thinking". They try to maintain a stable, continuous and continuous connection with the original Confucian, then neo-Confucian tradition, use and introduce ideas, concepts, formulations of ancient Chinese philosophers into political discourse and implement them in the foreign policy course. We add a serious argument to the uniqueness of the Chinese tradition – this is Chinese writing, which unites epochs and generations.

For centuries, China's foreign policy has largely depended on and been determined by the peculiarities of Chinese traditional political culture. They are defined by the ethical provisions of politics and public service in Ancient and modern China. In this regard, Professor Chen Lixin highlights the following characteristics and features of Chinese traditional culture⁹⁷:

⁹² Society and the state in China. P. 13, 16.

⁹³ 汉代"象数", originates from the Han era, the end of the III century BC.

⁹⁴ 五行, five elements: water, fire, wood, metal, soil/earth.

⁹⁵ Cit. by: Kobzev A.I. Op. cit. P. 34.

⁹⁶ Society and the state in China. P. 14.

⁹⁷ Chen Lixin. Relationship of marxism in China and Chinese traditional culture // Proceedings of 3-rd International Conference on Education, Management, Arts, Economics and Social Science (ICEMAESS 2015). Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research. Vol. 49. Changsha, 2015. P. 1133–1139.

Firstly, it is characterized by stable continuity, expressing the connection of times and generations, and is maintained from generation to generation; in general, in the process of inheritance, it is almost continuous in time and preserves the memory of the past, reflecting reality;

Secondly, culture has ethnic characteristics and represents a national ideological culture. It is multiethnic and mixed, but as a substrate of traditional culture it relies on the huaxia people, who lived in the fertile valleys of the Yellow River and Yangtze River, gradually uniting other ethnic cultures around themselves. Chinese culture reflects national characteristics and national style;

Thirdly, Chinese culture has a long dynastic chronology. Of the four major ancient civilizations in the world, traditional Chinese culture is the single most viable and sustainable cultural system;

Fourth, in the process of historical development, Chinese traditional culture has absorbed the achievements of the culture of different nationalities, preserving its own gene codes. Chinese society develops its own ideas in dialogue with other cultures and creates a unique form of spiritual culture.

The substantial context of the development of the ideological foundations of foreign policy is significantly influenced by the Marxist legacy and classical theories of international relations (TIR). In order to have a more specific and clear understanding of the fundamental ideological foundations of China's foreign policy, let's consider the main ideas/concepts of foreign policy thought present in the discourse of five generations of Chinese leaders, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.

After the Cold War, the political leadership of the People's Republic of China (PRC), led by Chairman Mao Zedong, formed an independent and comprehensive strategic system with its own national characteristics and mechanisms. When developing strategic attitudes, or "tifa" (提法), Mao relied on the political, philosophical and ideological tradition of Confucius. This tradition is called the *straightening of names* and the *ordering of names* (正名 "zhengming")⁹⁸, and it is considered both in the ancient foreign policy concept and

⁹⁸ According to Confucius, "a ruler [should be] a ruler, a dignitary should be a dignitary, a father should be a father, a son a son".

in the modern one as a source of moral authority and political stability, reflection on a specific political and economic situation⁹⁹. It is no coincidence that the famous saying of Confucius is "If the names do not correspond to the essence, then it is not good with the words. If it is not good with words, then things will not go well" ("名不正则言不顺, , 成") is expressed precisely in "zhengming"¹⁰⁰. Russian and Western sinologists refer this statement to a terminological socio-epistemological concept that reconciles human rights and duties with the norms of traditions in order to properly govern the state. To do this, it is necessary to build the concepts correctly¹⁰¹. Thus, after the formation of the New China and up to the present time, the strategic installations of "typhus" become the most appropriate and effective mechanism for the dissemination of state ideology and are permanently fixed in the political language of the People's Republic of China. It is extremely important to understand these attitudes, since they form the conceptual basis of diplomacy not only of Mao Zedong, but also of subsequent generations of Chinese leaders, based on which Chinese leaders since the 50s and 60s. The twentieth century defines and formulates goals and forms a model of China's communication with the outside world. Among the five leaders of the People's Republic of China, such attitudes can be considered comprehensive diplomacy, peace and development, the concept of a "harmonious world", "diplomacy of a great power with Chinese characteristics".

Mao Zedong borrows Confucian ideas from the four books "The Doctrine of the Middle", in particular the postulate "和和" as his foreign policy course. Mao Zedong tries to draw parallels with Confucius and fills this statement with new meaning. In the ideology of the united front and relations between states, Mao Zedong observes harmony and "unity without unification." This also means for Mao that there is a struggle in the unity of differences. Without unity of disagreement and struggle, Mao Zedong believes, there will be no harmonious world order¹⁰².

⁹⁹ Marinelli M. Op. cit. P. 115.

¹⁰⁰ "The Analects" in Chinese and English / trans. Sun Daly. Beijing, 2010. P. 212. In Chinese.

¹⁰¹ Chinese philosophy: an encyclopedic dictionary / ch. ed. M.L. Titarenko. Moscow, 1994. P. 470–471; Marinelli M. Op. cit.

¹⁰² Revealing the secret: Mao Zedong quotes "The Analects" to predict Chiang Kai-shek's resistance (3) // China News Service. 2013. December 23rd. URL: https://www.chinanews.com.cn/mil/2013/12-23/5651009_3.shtml (accessed: 07.29.2023). In Chinese.

The rationale for Hu Jintao's concept of a "harmonious world" is connected not only with the historical traditions of China, but, most importantly, with the urgent need for its development prospects. The connection of times and generations, the inextricable connection with the fate of the world dictates the creative development of its former concept. The perception of the world of China and the Chinese as part of humanity is at the heart of the idea of uniting the interests of all nations on Earth. Reflecting on this, Hu Jintao, like Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, seeks to raise the national consciousness of his people.

In Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy, the "search for truth through facts" is the foundation of the working class and the ideological pillar of Marxism. The phrase "实事求是" was borrowed by him from the ancient Chinese monument "The History of the Han Dynasty"¹⁰³, written by the famous historian of the Eastern Han dynasty¹⁰⁴, Ban Gu, presumably in 155 AD. The "search for truth through facts" attitude originally referred to the search for true knowledge based on empirical evidence. In modern political discourse, this means acting in accordance with the real situation, without exaggerating or hiding it. The expression refers to the study of the actual object, the inner connection of things and the patterns of their development, as well as understanding the nature of things. Deng Xiaoping thus replaces ideology with methodology.

Developing a foreign policy course in the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping evaluates the concept of "strength" ("势") and focuses on the problem of peace as a world of war or a world of development. He understands that peace and development are the two tasks of the era, and external economic development, openness to the outside world, and orientation towards international cooperation, since that period, have been correlated with the idea of "strength" and isolate China from revolution and wars.

In one of the most important treatises of the ancient Chinese philosophical thought of the Chunqiu and Zhanguo Period, "管子" ("Guan Zi"), *force* ("势") is mentioned as the substance that gives birth to all things, and the *tao* – the way – is connected with force.

¹⁰³ 班固《汉书·河间献王刘德传》. Ban Gu. "Han Shu."

¹⁰⁴ 东汉, 25年–220年. The Eastern Han Dynasty, 25-220 AD.

Guan Zhong¹⁰⁵, the author of the treatise, uses the word "shi", a concept that has no direct Western equivalent. The hieroglyph "势" consists of two key parts "strength" – "力" and "hold in your hands" – "执"¹⁰⁶.

The Xinhua dictionary gives one of the explanations for "势": "the state or tendency of all things and phenomena."¹⁰⁷

«战而惧水，此谓澹灭。小事不从，大事不吉。战而惧险，此谓迷中。分其师众，人既迷茫，必其将亡之道»。...«成功之道，赢缩为宝»¹⁰⁸. These expressions can be interpreted as "constant work on oneself, during which a person gains strength and finds a way to overcome fear in battle. By winning, you gain treasure."

The presence of traditional ideas during the reign of the third leader of the People's Republic of China, Jiang Zemin, is limited by the fundamental category of the ancient culture of "de" ("德"). It implies in a broad sense "virtue" or "grace" embodied in a practical and people-oriented method of work. In the early 2000s. Jiang Zemin proclaims the synthesis of governing the country at home and abroad on the basis of law and "governing the country with virtue", demonstrating respect for the traditional Confucian belief in the importance of moral norms for establishing harmonious relations between rulers and subjects. Jiang Zemin is trying to introduce society and the state to spiritual and ethical values. He is gradually moving away from the culture of material pleasures. At the XV (1997) and XVI (2002) Congresses of the CPC, Jiang Zemin called for the development of a "socialist system of ideology and morality" that would meet the requirements of a market economy and current legislation and inherit "the best ethical traditions of the Chinese nation".¹⁰⁹

The dictionary of modern Chinese interprets the concept of "和" as "peace; the end of the war".¹¹⁰ From this category is formed "harmony", "harmonious", in Chinese

¹⁰⁵ Years of life and death 719-645 BC.

¹⁰⁶ Chinese-Russian dictionary: more than 70,000 words and expressions. Vol. 4 / ed/ by I.M. Oshanin. Moscow, 1984. P. 471–472.

¹⁰⁷ Xinhua Dictionary of Modern Chinese. Beijing, 1987. P. 770. In Chinese.

¹⁰⁸ Guan-tzu. Evaluation and translation of authentic text // Characters. URL: <https://www.vrrw.net/wx/54979.html> (accessed: 07.21.2023). In Chinese.

¹⁰⁹ Jiang Zemin on socialism with Chinese specifics. A collection of statements on topics. Beijing, 2002. P. 337. In Chinese.

¹¹⁰ Dictionary of the modern Chinese language. Beijing, 1978. P. 446. In Chinese.

"hexie" “和谐”, which is interpreted as "coordination, coordination appropriately and proportionally"¹¹¹.

The combination of the idea of "和" ("he") with the expression "中" ("zhong"), that is, "centrality and peace, justice" – "中和" – means *fair, moderate, the golden mean and harmony*¹¹². In the explanatory dictionary of the Chinese language "Xin Qihai", "中" means "correct", "heart"¹¹³.

In addition, "Y" is mentioned in the "Doctrine of the Middle". The treatise is written: "喜怒哀乐之未发，谓之中；发而皆中节，谓之和；中也者，天下之大本也；和也者，天下之达道也。致中和，天地位焉，万物育焉". This phrase focuses on how to approach harmony from centrality or mediocrity. Sorrows and joys do not manifest in the heart, this is centering, justice; first, the middle is achieved, then you can move towards peace and harmony, and restraint is achieved.

We find an explanation for one of the first meanings of the formula "喜怒哀乐之未发，谓之中；发而皆中节，谓之和" in the Spring and Autumn Period's Chunqiu "Zouzhuan", the most important source of Ancient China's historical prose of historical prose¹¹⁴.

If the idea is 和 ("he") to explain in its political meaning, it is primarily an important strategic component of the Chinese state, and scientific research does not provide a unified understanding of this category. This is perhaps appropriate for a concept that is considered the "main cultural value of Chinese society"; the meaning of "harmony" has always been flexible.

Adhering to the Confucian thought "everything is harmonious, but not identical" or "harmony without homogeneity", and adopting the strategy of "seeking mutual understanding while preserving differences", the foreign policy course of Hu Jintao and

¹¹¹ Dictionary of the modern Chinese language. Beijing, 1978. P. 446. In Chinese. P. 447.

¹¹² Chinese-Russian dictionary: more than 70,000 words and expressions / ed. M. Oshanin. 3rd ed. Moscow, 1959. P. 270.

¹¹³ The New Qihai Chinese Dictionary. P. 30. In Chinese.

¹¹⁴ Formerly known as "Mr Zuo's Spring and Autumn", the abbreviated name is "Zozhuan" ("左传").

his followers reflects the establishment of prosperous and friendly relations between nations, interaction, which leads to the achievement of "social harmony"¹¹⁵.

It is no coincidence that Hu Jintao put forward a new concept of a "harmonious world", it is a tradition of Chinese leaders. China has been offering harmony to the world for five thousand years and establishing an inextricable link between China's traditional position and modern initiatives. More than two millennia ago, Confucius and his disciples glorified the idea of "great harmony" ("大和") and denoted the "great unity" ("大同"), which in modern conditions means the limits of the communist idea. In Confucian culture, a harmonious society of the future is a society of Great Unity. This is the basic principle of communication, the basic norm of regulating relations between people, between a person and society, between states¹¹⁶.

A follower of the philosophical school Yi Xue (易学) that researches the laws of action of all things and their relationships, philosopher Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒)¹¹⁷ era of the Western Han dynasty (汉朝) develops the idea of the unity of man and nature, goes back to the thoughts of Confucius, Meng zi of the interconnection, interdependence and puts forward the thesis "天人之际，合而为一", which means "man and nature are connected and become one" ("天人之际合而为一、以类合之，天人一也")¹¹⁸.

China has limited territorial capabilities and at the same time the necessary resources for prosperity and development. Chinese scholar Yang Liansheng writes that the Qin dynasty bribed barbarians in an attempt to Sinisize them¹¹⁹. The writer Yu Yingshi mentions the "five temptations", which during the Han Dynasty eliminated the threat of invasion and conquest of the empire by the xiongnu tribes on the northeastern border¹²⁰.

¹¹⁵ The beauty of harmony in the "Shanghai Spirit" // People's Daily. Issue 4. 06.10.2018. URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1602855127920027870&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed: 07.22.2023). In Chinese.

¹¹⁶ Balchindorzhieva O.B. Social harmony in Chinese philosophy. P. 58.

¹¹⁷ Years of life ca. 179 – ca. 104 BC.

¹¹⁸ We are talking about the unity of man and nature // Information portal "Xuan Guang". 2020. January 07. URL: <https://www.jianshu.com/p/2ecc68d5855f> (accessed: 07.23.2023). In Chinese; "The Book of Changes" and the unity of man and nature. URL: <https://www.ruiwen.com/wenxue/yijing/311002.html> (accessed: 07.23.2023). In Chinese; Feng Yulan. Op. cit. P. 227–229. In Chinese.

¹¹⁹ Kissinger H. On China. New York, 2012. P. 21.

¹²⁰ Loewe M. Trade and Expansion in Han China by Yü Ying-shih. Second Series. 1968. Vol. 54, Livr. 4/5. P. 313–318 [Cit. by: Kissinger H. Op. cit. P. 22].

Based on the teachings of Lao Tzu ¹²¹ "The Tao Te Ching", Hu Jintao and subsequent leaders emphasize the special essence of "soft power": "The soft and weak prevail over the hard and strong"). Lao Tzu explains this principle by the weakness of "grass and trees" at birth, and "strength lies in keeping soft":

«人之生也柔弱，

其死也坚强。

万物草木之生也柔脆，

其死也枯槁。

故坚强者死之徒，

柔弱者生之徒。

是以

兵强则灭，

木强则折。

强大处下，

柔弱处上»¹²².

Translated into Russian, this can mean: "Human life is also fragile, death is strong. The life of all things and phenomena is soft and fragile, but in death everything withers. Therefore, those who are strong are approaching death, and those who are weak are approaching life. Therefore, if the army is strong, it will be destroyed, and if the forest is strong, it will be cut down. The strong go down, the weak go up¹²³."

Lao Tzu praises water more than anything else in nature and believes that the power of water is close to Tao ("道") – the supreme good, which is like water, and water overcomes everything without a struggle. Tao is the progenitor of all phenomena and things in nature and in the Celestial Empire.

«上善若水，

水善利万物而不争。

¹²¹ The years of his life are approximately 571-471 BC.

¹²² Interpretation of Lao Tzu / ed. Yang Liuqiao. Shanghai, 1958, February. Issue 2, chapter 76. P. 64–65. In Chinese.

¹²³ The author's translation.

处众人之所恶，
 故几于道。
 居善地，
 心善渊，
 与善仁，
 言善信，
 正善治，
 事善能，
 动善时。
 夫唯不争，
 故无尤»¹²⁴。

Translated into Russian, this may sound like: "The highest good is like water, it is suitable for everything without a struggle. It is located where you don't want to be. In this it is close to the Tao (path). To live in a good place with a kind heart, to be conscientious, to rule well, to show abilities at the right time. A noble gentleman and a good ruler are characterized by modesty."

The greatest military thinker of Ancient China, Sun Wu (Sun-tzu)¹²⁵ in the IV century BC, in his treatise "孙子兵法" ("The Art of War") notes that it is best to "conquer the enemy army is not fighting" ("是故百戰百勝，非善之善也；不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也")¹²⁶. He considers the concept of "war" ("战争") through the prism of "state policy, relations between people, life and death, the existence of the state." He compares the laws of warfare with the strength and flexibility of the flow of water on the ground ("战争的规则有一点点像水")¹²⁷.

¹²⁴ Interpretation of Lao-tzu. P. 6–7. In Chinese.

¹²⁵ The years of life and death are approximately 545-470 BC.

¹²⁶ Su-tzu. The art of war. Chapter 3: Planning an attack // Xuan Yu Reading Information Portal. URL: <https://www.xyuedu.com/zhuzibaijia/szbfyd/35933.html> (accessed: 07.23.2023). In Chinese.

¹²⁷ A treatise on the military art of Sun Bin / ed. Guo Huajo. Beijing, 1957. P. 15–16, 53. In Chinese.

The stratagem "soft and weak prevails over hard and strong" has been used for thousands of years to implement a geopolitical strategy in the Middle State¹²⁸. This rule is followed by Sun Tzu and Mo Tzu.

The consequences of the war, writes Sun Tzu, are extremely serious, in this regard, prudence becomes the most valuable quality. "Wars and battles are great affairs of state, life and death... You need to understand it" ("兵者，国之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也"). Sun Tzu sees deception in the war, he believes that the one who knows how to wage war with "soft power", without using weapons and without fighting, will win¹²⁹. Consequently, the strategy and art of government consists in "making the enemy weak by various maneuvers, and building a strategic position yourself, thinking everything over and creating a *"shi"* "势"¹³⁰.

The treatise "Mo Tzu"¹³¹ notes that solving political disputes between states by military means is "like persuading people to drink one medicine to cure different diseases, ... only four, five people will be able to recover".¹³² This statement, in our opinion, can be interpreted as an incomplete opportunity to influence the minds and thoughts of other peoples by force alone and conquer them. This means that not all problems are solved by force.

An important element of traditional Chinese culture, which is the basis of the modern foreign policy strategy of the People's Republic of China, is the idea: "politeness (politeness) is not flattery and not worship." It defines two opposites of the Middle. It is based on the principle "a noble man (husband) is courteous, but not flattering, and the middle is obsequiousness or praise, this is not courtesy." "Different things can be in harmony with each other to generate all living things, if everything is

¹²⁸ Sun Tzu. The art of war. Chapter 5: The Fifth Force of the Army // Xuan Yu Reading Information Portal. URL: <https://guoxue.httpcn.com/html/book/MEILXVXV/CQMEILRNKOIL.shtml> (accessed: 07.23.2023). In Chinese.

¹²⁹ Sun Tzu. The art of war. Chapter 1: Strategic planning // Gushiwenwan. URL: http://www.gushiwen.org/GuShiWen_f1b46150a3.aspx (accessed: 07.23.2023). In Chinese.

¹³⁰ Lai D., Hamby W. G. East meets West: an ancient game sheds new light on U.S. – Asian strategic relations // Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. 2002. Vol. XIV, no. 1, Spring. P. 275.

¹³¹ Mo Tzu, years of life and death ca. 476 or 480 BC – 390 or 420 BC.

¹³² Mo Tzu. Vol. 5. Chapter 19: Non-aggression. Part three // Information portal "Public education". URL: <http://www.guoxue.com/book/mozi/0005.htm> (accessed: 07.23.2023). In Chinese.

coordinated, then the world will stop developing.¹³³ Achieving harmony and unity is the basis for mutual recognition of differences. "Unity/stability/sustainability/" defines the co-participation and favorable interaction of things.

Traditional Chinese culture has developed a national peculiarity that presupposes virtue and the ability to forgive people, as well as attaches great importance to peaceful coexistence and friendly exchanges between countries. "If the peoples living outside the Celestial Empire are not submissive, they will be attracted by culture and virtue; and after that they should be satisfied and calm"¹³⁴. In other words, the traditional culture of China interprets "harmony" as the coordination and unity of improving the diversity of things, preserving the principle of heritage and the connection of various things.

Traditional ideological values influence the political life of modern China, adapting to the changes of the era, ensure stability and consolidate society. A new incarnation is the tendency to expand the presence of ancient ideas among modern Chinese political concepts. Some of them are based on the guidelines and decisions of the twentieth Congress of the CPC in October 2022. In contemporary Chinese political discourse, the traditional idea of "The Middle Kingdom belongs to all" ("天下为公"¹³⁵) finds a connection with the future-oriented program of building a "community of the destiny of mankind"¹³⁶. The most filled with ancient Chinese ideas is the concept of the fifth generation leader Xi Jinping, the "community of common destiny for mankind." It has deep roots in the past, and the ideological and philosophical platform of this concept is based on the ancient Chinese systems of "tianxia" (天下) and "gongsheng" (共生)¹³⁷.

This can be seen, for example, in the studies of the Shanghai School of International Relations "gongsheng" (共生)¹³⁸. The scientists of this school, Zhao

¹³³ Chen Zhaohe. The Chinese cultural root of the community of common destiny for all mankind // 4th International Conference on Education, Language, Art and Inter-cultural Communication (ICELAIC 2017), Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research. Vol. 142. 2017. P. 720.

¹³⁴ Chen Zhaohe. Op. cit.

¹³⁵ Note that the idea itself is contained in the monument "Notes on the ritual" (《礼记·礼运》) or "Li ji", compiled in the IV-I centuries BC.

¹³⁶ Lomanov A.V. The traditional idea of the Celestial Empire in the politics of Xi Jinping // New Era: China after the XIX Congress of the CPC: materials of the annual scientific conference of the Center for Political Research and Forecasts of the IDV RAS. Moscow, 2018. P. 30.

¹³⁷ For more information, see: Pecheritsa V.F., Boyarkina A.V. Xi Jinping's concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind": from idea to practical implementation. Vladivostok, 2020. 224 p.

¹³⁸ Gongsheng: The Rise of the Shanghai School / ed. Xiao Ren. In Chinese.

Tingyang, Yan Xuotong, Qin Yaqing, Ren Xiao and others make a great contribution to the development of the theory of international relations¹³⁹. Hu Shoujun, a sociologist from Fudan University, introduced the updated concept of "gongsheng" into social sciences in 2006¹⁴⁰, and it is widely used by international relations theorists who consider its applicability to an international system with many different types of political systems, cultures and levels of development¹⁴¹.

The concept of "gongsheng", or symbiosis, is a phenomenon originally found in evolutionary biology. It refers to the long-term interaction of different organisms in the same environment. Gongsheng School scientists rethink the theory of the East Asian tributary system like the "gongsheng" world order. In East Asia, the traditions of the interstate order are a "tribute system" developed by J. To. Fairbank in his famous work "The United States of America and China". The tributary or tributary system became one of the most important elements of the Confucian doctrine of the rulers and during ceremonies or court rites served as a connecting tool between foreign policy and the economy of the mid–late 19th century in China¹⁴².

"Gongsheng" is based primarily on the difference between things, not on their identity. It consists of four provisions: 1) the world has a pluralistic nature; 2) all things differ from each other; 3) different beings can peacefully and even amicably coexist and interact with each other, maintaining equality; 4) constructive interaction stimulates joint development¹⁴³.

President Xi Jinping is making special efforts to deepen interconnectedness and rapprochement with his people. His political course in the "new era" of global relations is based on the ancient Chinese concept of "Tianxia" or "everything under heaven" of

¹³⁹ Zhao Tingyang. A political world philosophy in terms of all-under-heaven; Also. Rethinking empire from a Chinese Concept «All-under-Heaven» (Tian-xia 天下); Yan Xuotong. Ancient Chinese thought, modern Chinese power. In Chinese; Qin Yaqing. A relational theory of world politics.

¹⁴⁰ Constructing a Chinese school of international relations. P. 49.

¹⁴¹ Su Changhe. The possibility of the international Gongsheng system: how to build a new type of great power relations in a multipolar world. In Chinese; Ren Xiao. On the principles of the "Gongsheng system" in East Asia: one of the studies of thinking and the system of international relations. In Chinese.

¹⁴² Fairbank J.K. The United States and China. 5th ed. Cambridge, London, 1983. P. 158–171.

¹⁴³ Grydehøj A., Ping Su. China and the pursuit of harmony in world politics: understanding Chinese International Relations theory. Abingdon, New York, 2022. P. 37.

the Zhou Dynasty (III century BC). The idea of this strategy is the harmonious coexistence of "datong" (大同) and the "common destiny" of the peoples¹⁴⁴.

Speaking about the ideological foundations in Xi Jinping's concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind", we note the multidimensionality and complexity of the term itself (in Chinese – 人类命运共同体)¹⁴⁵. It consists of three words: renlei – "humanity", mingyun – "destiny" and gongtong – "community". The concept of "humanity" in Chinese is expressed in two hieroglyphs: *ren* – "man" and *lei* – "genus", that is, translated means "human race". "Common" or "shared/common future" is conveyed by the combination of "命运共同体"¹⁴⁶. According to scientists, in the "community of common destiny for mankind" such a characteristic as transcendence stands out, id est going beyond certain boundaries, overcoming national identification¹⁴⁷.

We find the first mention of the "common destiny" of peoples already in the writings of ancient Chinese thinkers. Since the time of Lao Tzu, they have adhered to the ideas of unity and opposites of *yin* and *yang*, separation of extremes, tolerance, respect for the diversity of cultures and development models as the basis for ensuring harmonious international relations, adhering to moral aspirations, popularization of different cultures, equal dialogue of social systems, mutually beneficial cooperation, complementarity and mutual borrowing cultures of the world¹⁴⁸. They talk about the harmonious relations of the Celestial Empire with other countries, ensuring peace, development, security and stability of states, regions and the world as a whole¹⁴⁹. By the 3rd century BC (1046-256 BC), the "tianxia" system (天下) was being formed in the

¹⁴⁴ Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. Creative development of the concept of the "community of the common destiny of mankind" in the works of modern political scientists // Social and Humanitarian sciences in the Far East. 2019. Vol. XVI, issue 2. P. 29.

¹⁴⁵ This concept has no generally accepted translation into Russian. In the Chinese language, the only option is fixed – "人类命运共同体". CCDM – is an abbreviated spelling in the Russian scientific literature. Engl. "Community of common destiny" (CCD).

¹⁴⁶ Semenov A.V., Tsvyk A.V. On the question of the concept and interpretation of the concept of a "community of the common destiny of mankind". P. 548; Theirs own. The "Common Future of Humanity" in China's diplomatic discourse. P. 548.

¹⁴⁷ Semenov A. V., Tsvyk A. V. The "Shared Future of mankind" in China's diplomatic discourse. P. 111.

¹⁴⁸ Management and strategy / [trans. and a comment. V.V. Malyavin]. Ivanovo, 2018. 519 p.; Pecheritsa V.F., Boyarkina A.V. Xi Jinping's concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind": from idea to practical implementation. P. 8.

¹⁴⁹ Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. The traditional ideas of the Celestial Empire in conjunction with Xi Jinping's concept of a "community of the common destiny for mankind" // Cross-border economics: an electronic scientific polys. alm. 2019. No. 2. 10 p. URL: http://cross-bordereconomy.ru/2019_2/2019_2_4.pdf (accessed: 04.12.2022).

Middle Kingdom – a kind of ancient model of international relations. It lays the ideological foundation of the "common destiny" of the peoples. The system of "tianxia" gets its development during the Zhou dynasty, as the Zhousians united various territories that became part of the new state in the 11th century, and in this connection they undertook the ideological justification of their conquests and acquisitions. They "endeavour to unite the whole world under one roof"¹⁵⁰.

The "community of common destiny for mankind" (CCDM) is based on an important philosophical category of Chinese culture – "the world as a single community, great harmony in this world", containing the concept of "peace". It represents a living social space and people's thoughts as the core and endless continuation of life. The geopolitical idea of a just international order and peace can be traced in the writings of Meng Tzu. He argued that "there is a way to know the world; by knowing people, you know the world. There is a way to get to know people through their thoughts, and they will open up to you." In other words, when governing a state, a ruler should be guided by virtue"¹⁵¹.

The "unity between heaven and man" requires that people consciously follow the law of the development and functioning of the universe, respect natural development and balance. Humanity must develop its original nature, return to its origins. Communities should be polite in their treatment, open and friendly. The government of the country should be oriented towards the population, graciously, competently manage in accordance with the principles of harmony. The State must preserve its sovereignty, respect the principle of non-aggression and peaceful coexistence. In other words, heaven, earth and man must coexist with each other and jointly maintain harmony and unity of the universe as a whole¹⁵².

¹⁵⁰ For more information about traditional foreign policy strategies, see the articles: Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. From the idea of Confucius "between the four seas, all people are brothers" to Xi Jinping's "community of common destiny for mankind" // III Gottlib Readings: Oriental Studies and Regional Studies of the Asia-Pacific region in the focus of modernity. Irkutsk, 2019. P. 66–75; Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F., Methodieva S.A. Traditional culture of China in the context of the concept of a "community of a single destiny for humanity" // Bulletin of Zabaikalsk State University. 2018. No. 8 (24). P. 56–64.

¹⁵¹ Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F., Methodieva S.A. Op. cit. P. 59.

¹⁵² Chen Zhaohe. Op. cit. P. 719.

Reflecting on the large-scale problem of the future fate of mankind, the leader of modern China demonstrates the long-term vision of the Chinese leadership for the future of the world. He stands for a rational consensus and competently justifies and understands the trends of global development. It is China's contribution to global governance that embodies Chinese wisdom and the rich culture of the Chinese nation. In the foundation of the CCDM, the cornerstone is the idea of "Tian". She started as the idea of peace, glorifying the "peace of mind" and "social harmony" ("以和为贵", "协和万邦")¹⁵³ ethical tenets of Confucius and Lao Tzu "do not do to others what you yourself do not desire" ("己所不欲, 勿施于人") and "men between the four seas are brothers" ("四海之内皆兄弟").

Xi Jinping, referring to the sayings of ancient philosophers, analyzes modern foreign policy events and shows the path of China's strategic development. He believes that it is necessary to study the historical experience of High Antiquity, since historical dynasties strategically correctly established relations with their neighbors and ruled the state.

Xi Jinping deeply and creatively interprets the meaning of the words "interest/benefit/position" "利" and "name/glory", puts deep meaning into the concepts of "Tianxia" "天下" and "forever of time" "万世", reflecting the glory and wealth of Confucianism¹⁵⁴.

Adherence to the "correct concept of justice and interests/benefits" is the basis of the Chinese leader's foreign policy thinking. This idea of equal interests is based not on the interests of individual countries, but on the interests of the whole world. According to this concept, peoples and Governments need to solve problems and politically defend justice, moral priority and economically adhere to mutual benefit and common development, find common ground of interests, respect the principles of equality and provide the maximum possible assistance to developing countries.

¹⁵³ The beauty of harmony in the "Shanghai spirit". In Chinese; Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. The creative development of the concept of the "community of the common destiny of mankind" in the works of modern political scientists. P. 32.

¹⁵⁴ Sayings of Xi Jinping // Information portal "Red Banner". 2018. December 05. URL: <http://www.qizhiwang.org.cn/n1/2020/0628/c433094-31761509.html> (accessed: 07.22.2023). In Chinese.

Following the thought of Professor Chen Zhaohe, the creation of a "community of the common destiny of mankind" is not to eliminate differences between countries, impose a single model of values and development, but to make full use of the current peaceful conditions and development opportunities with recognition of differences, guarantee peace and stability of the international situation.

Chinese scientist Mu Zhongjian has researched the historical experience of China's religious culture, contributing to the construction of a "community of the common destiny of mankind." He identified three aspects: the first is the universal feeling of "unity of Heaven and humanity"; the second is the human feeling of "everything under heaven is one family"; the third is harmonious wisdom/knowledge, "ways of the mean". Religious movements have absorbed these three elements and practice them in the process of building a "community of common destiny for mankind."

Let's analyze them in detail. The first, universal feeling of "the unity of heaven and man" was formed on the basis of the Confucian concept "people perceive the universe as a whole. In other words, people should have ecological awareness and be responsible for the preservation of the planet, which is the common home of all mankind and all living beings. Chinese Buddhism emphasizes unity, chanting that all living beings have an inseparable and immortal spiritual state. The subject and the object have interdependence, that is, "unity". The survival of one living being depends on other living beings. In Taoism, "heaven, earth and I exist together, all things and I are one." The human body is a small universe, and the natural world is a big one. Man and nature are one. Taoism supports four concepts: "Tao follows nature"; "imitation of nature"; "interaction between heaven and man" and "unity of Heaven and humanity". This religious doctrine emphasizes the conformity of people to the laws of nature, observance of the laws of nature, protection of the natural environment, conservation of natural resources and encouragement of "restoration of the original simplicity and return to nature", as well as "frugality".

The second element is a holistic and connected worldview of Chinese religious movements. The human feeling of "everything under the sky is one family" goes

beyond race or nationality, embracing all of humanity. Historically, the spread of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism in East Asia was peaceful, and religious wars were not waged. Christianity has a dogma that all people are created by one God, so people are brothers and sisters who should love each other. The most important Commandment of the Gospel says: "Love your neighbor as yourself." This is the second of the greatest Commandments, which emphasizes the love between Christians and non-Christians, and it requires strict observance.

Mu Zhongjian refers to the harmonious wisdom of the "path of averaging" as Confucian averaging or "equilibrium", which means "harmony in diversity". It includes several philosophical elements of equality between man and nature. *Firstly*, the recognition of equality between the peoples of the whole world, that is, "all living beings will grow together without harming each other"; *secondly*, the recognition of different civilizations: "Tao exists in parallel with all living things and does not contradict others"; *thirdly*, mutual respect and tolerance, "harmony" embodies the "golden mean" of "中庸之道", that is, the principle of "do not do to others what you do not wish for yourself"; *fourthly*, the expansion of consciousness, i.e., "the conflict must be resolved peacefully."¹⁵⁵

It is believed that the founder of Taoism, the legendary Lao Tzu, proceeded from the principle: "The path does nothing – and everything is done in the world." The symbolic reality presented in this way in Chinese allows, *firstly*, to perceive the world at the moment of its birth and anticipate all phenomena. It is understandable for what reason the Taoist philosopher Chuang Tzu writes about all things that "fit into each other," "all things are like an outstretched net, and there is no beginning in it".¹⁵⁶ The transition of forms and things into an unlimited state ensures the connection of the universe with internal connections, which is understood as the absence of subject-objective boundaries between things. The world here boils down to the pure communication of the *tong* "同".

¹⁵⁵ Zhang Nu. Chinese Religions and the Construction of a Community of Common Destiny for All Mankind: Ideas and Practice. July 06, 2017. URL: http://www.chinahumanrights.org/html/2017/MAGAZINES_0706/8543.html (accessed: 17.11.2019).

¹⁵⁶ Malyavin V.V. The Secret Canon of China. Gui Gu-tzu. 36 stratagems. 100 chapters of the military canon. Moscow, 2015. P. 48.

Thus, the traditional ideas of Chinese thinkers about the nature of foreign policy are expressed in the traditional culture, which is characterized by the continuity of its development. It is incorporated into the modern policy of the People's Republic of China by representatives of various Chinese schools, tolerant of other cultures, multifaceted and open. Based on the ideas of "harmony in diversity", "communicability", et al., traditional foreign policy views and whole concepts have absorbed the rich millennial cultural tradition of the great Chinese people.

1.2. The influence of Marxism on the PRC's foreign policy ideas and concepts

Unlike in Europe, the ideas of socialism penetrated into China later; then Marxism became part of the political consciousness and political culture of Chinese society. After the Opium Wars, China critically rethought the Western experience and turned to national modernization. Chinese society transforms the ideas of Marxism taking into account national characteristics, enriching it with Chinese specifics and turning them into an organic part of this culture¹⁵⁷.

K. Marx believes that a single community is the main way of human existence. It is a prerequisite for the survival and development of personality as a set of social relations. In this regard, it is necessary to build an ideal and harmonious community in order to achieve individual freedom and comprehensive development¹⁵⁸. Such a society, according to the classics of Marxism, should be socialism.

Western experts call the emergence of Marx ideology as a "paradox of modern Chinese history". Marx in a country engulfed by the Cultural revolution in the 1960s and 1970s. However, today Chinese leaders support above all a Marxist vision that reflects the progressive future of the country. Professor Brown explains the success and stability of China's political system by applying Marxist theory¹⁵⁹.

¹⁵⁷ Chen Lixin. Op. cit.; Tian Chenshan. Mao Zedong. Sinicization of Marxism, and traditional Chinese thought culture // Asian studies (Quezon City, Philippines). 2019. Vol. 7, iss. 1. P. 13–36; Song Lei. The "Chinese Way" is the path of socialism with Chinese specifics // Power. 2017. No. 11. P. 152–157.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.; Chen Lixin. Op. cit.

¹⁵⁹ Boyarkina A.V. Interrelation of Marxism and traditional culture of China // IV Gottlib readings: Oriental Studies and Regional Studies of the Asia-Pacific region in the context of transdisciplinary knowledge. Irkutsk, 2020. P. 112.

On July 1, 1921, the Communist Party of China was formed in the country. For more than 100 years, the CPC has not only led the Chinese people in the national liberation struggle, led the creation of the PRC, however also led the Chinese nation to modern progress. Being adherents and consistent supporters of Marxism, for many decades the ideologists of the CPC have continued to creatively develop this system of views. One of their greatest achievements is the creation of a theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics, which enriches Marxism with new ideas¹⁶⁰.

In the Marxist tradition, this concept presents reflections not only on the construction of socialism in China, but also on the key problems of the modern world. It emphasizes that in modern conditions, humanity must resolve conflicts and contradictions based on a holistic understanding of the world, and, as a result, develop civilization on the basis of harmony and prosperity of all peoples and the entire international community. This concept embodies the Marxist understanding of the laws of social development, emphasizes the importance of theory for practical application¹⁶¹. This makes it related to the Confucian idea of "unity in difference" and the theory of "tianxia"¹⁶².

Yang Bin, a professor at the Institute of Marxism at Heilongjiang University, analyzing the process of development of orthodox and heterodox Marxism in the Chinese tradition, notes the formation of a unified theoretical system of Marxism and socialism with Chinese characteristics based on these two forms in the PRC. Yang Bin argues that in fact, revolutionary in spirit, Maoist ideas, Deng Xiaoping's diplomacy, his postulates of peace and development laid the foundation for innovative Sinicized Marxism during the reign of Xi Jinping¹⁶³.

¹⁶⁰ Song Lei. Op. cit.

¹⁶¹ Xi Jinping. The governance of China. II. Beijing: Publishing House lit. in foreign language, 2018. P. 41–43; Liu S.R. The philosophic interpretation of a community of shared future for mankind from the perspective of the Marxist philosophy // Open Access Library Journal. 2019. Vol. 6. P. 2; Liu Jianfei. Building a community of the common destiny for mankind is the mission of the Communist Party of China // Information portal "Xuanjiang jiaawang". 2017. December 13. URL: <http://www.71.cn/2017/1213/978002.shtml> (accessed: 08.19.2022). In Chinese.

¹⁶² Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. Xi Jinping's concept of "Community of the common destiny for mankind" – a contribution to the creative development of Marxism in the XXI century // Oikumena. Regional Studies. No. 4 (55). 2020. P. 104.

¹⁶³ Yang Binh. A study of two forms of Marxism development: on the historical significance and value of heterodox Marxism. Beijing, 2015. P. 58–61. In Chinese.

According to Chinese Marxist scholars, the concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" is closely related to concepts such as "harmony is the highest value" ("和为贵"), "world identity" ("世界大同") and "harmony between heaven and man" ("天人合一"). It is characteristic that K. Marx and F. Engels, in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, also discusses harmony in a communist society¹⁶⁴.

Chinese Marxism is endowed with distinctive features, ethnic and chronological features. According to some Chinese scholars, Marxist philosophy differs from traditional Chinese, and their integration is difficult.

Chinese researchers understand Marxist theory in Chinese as a process of integrating the views of classical Marxism and traditional Chinese culture. Chinese traditional culture borrows Marxist teachings, while Marxism modernizes Chinese traditional culture. The interaction of Marxism with Chinese traditional culture is expressed in the following six aspects.

The first aspect is that the unique traditional culture contributes to the popularization of Marxism in China. The Sinification of Marxism (马克思主义中国化) was put forward under Mao Zedong. It is based on the experience of revolutionary practice based on socialism with Chinese characteristics. One of the most important features of Marxism in China is that it has absorbed the features of traditional Chinese culture. Chinese traditional cultural values strengthen a multiethnic society and are the core of national unity. The traditional concept of the "social ideal" reinforces the essence of "communism". The traditional idea of "management" promotes the "search for truth from facts." The traditional "national spirit" reflects human nature and acts as a fulcrum of Chinese society. It guarantees the practical application of Marxist theory.

The second aspect is that Marxism creates a new model of Chinese culture. She embodies the spirit of the era of the highly developed socialist culture of the new China. Its foundation is the classical views of Marxism combined with national characteristics, traditional and modern, Chinese and foreign cultural elements, as well as the political decision of the Chinese leadership based on the need to build socialism with Chinese

¹⁶⁴ Marx K., Engels F. The Manifesto of the Communist Party.

characteristics. The new model of Chinese culture lays the creative foundation for the development of socialist culture. Chinese scientists believe that in order to accelerate the formation of a new model of Chinese culture, it is necessary to enrich and develop their own Marxist theory of culture by analyzing the Western approach to culture.

The third aspect considers Marxism as a factor in the development of Chinese traditional culture. The system of political theories of socialism with Chinese specifics is the latest theoretical achievements in adapting Marxism to implement theoretical and practical innovations. The construction of "two civilizations" – highly material and socialist spiritual – transforms traditional Chinese culture and raises the scientific and cultural level of the entire nation. The concept of "three representative offices", put forward by Jiang Zemin at the XVI CPC Congress (November 2002), is a set of guiding ideas that the party should be guided by for a long time. It is a basic requirement of modern Chinese cultural construction and one of the important guiding principles of strengthening party building and socialist spiritual civilization. The development of socialist culture with Chinese characteristics is based on the basic socialist values of "world harmony" and "unity in difference", as well as on the scientific concept of development, offering the development of innovative technologies.

The fourth factor is based on the unique Chinese culture of Marxism. It represents one of the state tasks for the Sinification of Marxist teaching in order to comprehensively integrate traditional Chinese culture into the theory of Marxism. This will lead to the emergence of a new democratic and socialist culture with Chinese characteristics. It combines ethnic, scientific and folk cultures and is based on the culture of the broad masses. Such a new democratic cultural platform embodies the guiding principles of the Chinese Communist Party at the stage of the new democratic revolution. The cultural construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics, focusing on Marxist theory, contributes to the education of the ideal, morality and discipline among citizens. The construction of a new democratic and socialist culture is based on Chinese reality. A democratic culture with Chinese characteristics inherits historical and cultural traditions, absorbs a different culture and shares the values of a socialist spiritual civilization.

The fifth factor presents Marxism in China as a requirement for the modernization of traditional culture. Chinese leaders use a Marxist approach to integrate Chinese national culture into the global space. The key condition for building Chinese culture is to preserve the vitality of Marxist teaching, it must remain the guiding ideology. The improvement of Marxist theory through new practices supports this strength and energy. The transformation of Chinese culture, as well as a complete return to traditional culture, cannot be a pure borrowing of Western culture. To form a new culture, the leadership applies Marxist theory, cultural achievements of all countries based on the rich practical experience of China.

Finally, the sixth aspect is the harmonious development of Chinese traditional culture and the Marxist approach. Culture is a solid combination of human labor and wisdom, representing a phenomenon that is the opposite of what generates contradictions and conflicts between two cultures. Marxism and Chinese traditional culture, according to the country's leadership, are the foundation on which the Chinese Communist Party stands. It is also an ideological tool in the Chinese revolution and state-building and reform. In the implementation of public administration, Chinese leaders rely on the unity of man and nature and the national spirit of Chinese traditional culture. In fact, Marxist theory, the theory of revolution and Chinese traditional culture contribute to the study of social problems and the identification of shortcomings and contradictions in Chinese society. The process of creative development of Marxist teaching in China is crucial for the traditional culture of China and modernization in general.

Marx's theory, as Xi Jinping emphasizes, "illuminates the path of humanity's exploration of the law of history and humanity's search for its own liberation." The Chinese leader critically rethought Marxist theory, presented a new view of history, laying it at the basis of such fundamental concepts as the "community of common destiny for mankind" and the "Chinese dream". An example is the period of the II–III centuries, described in the literary novel "Three Kingdoms", in which the united Han Empire breaks up into kingdoms, but then returns to unity¹⁶⁵.

¹⁶⁵ Boyarkina A.V. The relationship between Marxism and traditional Chinese culture. P. 116.

The Chinese leader notes that the task of the PRC is to update traditional ideas and moral and ethical norms inherited from the time of the great Confucius, which must be respected in our time. Xi Jinping emphasizes that traditional Chinese culture is integrated into modern innovative culture and develops the spirit of the times, contributing to the strengthening of the Chinese state¹⁶⁶.

In the traditional culture of China, perfection is morality, which is the basis of "The Doctrine of the Mean". This principle emphasizes justice, peacefulness and impartiality, "allowing us to achieve (a state of) middle and harmony, and then a prosperous order and universal prosperity will reign on earth and in heaven".¹⁶⁷ Such a society is explored by the classics of Marxism¹⁶⁸. Only cooperation and harmony can solve the acute problems facing society, as well as humanity, and open the way for the prosperity of peoples, Marxists argue. In the new era, this fundamental principle of the existence of peoples is creatively developed in the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind." This theory does not negate the differences between civilizations and religions, but connects the interests of each person with the prospects for the development of the country. If the right path is followed, the joint development of the countries will be able to solve the national problems not only of China, but also of other countries. This will form an attractive image of China as a responsible power, and demonstrate the value of "Great Harmony," which is an ideal society, or communism¹⁶⁹.

The essence of China's "Great Harmony" is traditionally associated with the "good" of the people, their "enrichment" and "reassurance" in the boundless pursuit of a bright future for all mankind. The "Ideal society of Great Harmony" is considered as an organism contributing to the elimination of Evil and negative elements, which makes it related to Xi Jinping's concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" as a new stage in the development of Marxist theory.

¹⁶⁶ Boyarkina A.V. The relationship between Marxism and traditional Chinese culture. P. 116.

¹⁶⁷ Chen Zhaohe. Op. cit. P. 721.

¹⁶⁸ Marx K., Engels F. The Manifesto of the Communist Party. P. 20, 22.

¹⁶⁹ Chen Zhaohe. Op. cit. P. 719; Liu S.R. Op. cit. P. 5.

The reason why Marxist ideas are popular in modern China today is because of the common genes of socialism and Chinese culture. It is no coincidence that many Chinese Marxist scholars introduce the concept of "Sinification of Marxism" into political discourse, that is, it is a combination of Marxism and Chinese culture. Arguing on it, Professor Liu Dezhong gives a classic example of the absorption of foreign culture in Chinese history – this is Zen Buddhism. The "Sinicization of Marxism", he discusses, is likely to be the next such example¹⁷⁰. The idea of "The Celestial Empire belongs to everyone" is in tune with the communist call for the creation of a new person and the formation of a new world order.

Examining the historical fact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of socialist regimes in Eastern European countries, Professor Liu Dezhong emphasizes the need to introduce a new global coordinate system. In his opinion, the CPC is the mainstay of the international communist movement. Overcoming the difficulties of its split and weakening, she assumes responsibility for the voice and leadership of the international communist movement, and this should become a new area of research for Chinese Marxist theorists, Liu Dezhong believes¹⁷¹. He emphasizes the viability of Marxism on Chinese soil. It consists in "keeping up with the times, sharing the common destiny of mankind." Practice is a solid foundation of theory. This Leninist position is fundamental in the policy of the CPC. Armed with Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese leadership continues to creatively enrich and integrate its own experience and that of other socialist countries in their past and present. This is the secret of the vitality of Chinese political culture. The strengthening of China, says Professor Liu Dezhong, "is an immutable historical trend in the development of Marxism. In the history of the development of this revolutionary theory, it is time for the Chinese to introduce their own doctrine," states the scientist¹⁷². Such ideas as "The Celestial Empire belongs to all", "the people are the foundation", the idea of "great unity in the Celestial Empire" are an

¹⁷⁰ Liu Dezhong. "The Celestial Empire belongs to everyone": the socialist gene in Chinese ideology and culture // Information portal "Red Culture". 2019. October 6th. URL: <https://www.hsw.org.cn/wzzx/llyd/wh/2019-06-09/57025.html> (accessed: 01.26.2023). In Chinese.

¹⁷¹ Liu Dezhong. To carry the great banner of Marxism in the XXI century // Information portal "Zhongowang". 2018. May 3. URL: http://opinion.zjol.com.cn/mrwp/201805/t20180503_7169541.shtml (accessed: 01.26.2023). In Chinese.

¹⁷² Ibid.

important contribution to scientific socialism in China and in general to Marxist-Leninist theory¹⁷³.

The modern development of Marxism and its connection with the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" is now being deeply studied at the Academy of Social Sciences of the People's Republic of China, the Diplomatic Academy and other research institutes of the People's Republic of China. The works of scientists from these higher educational institutions and institutes of academic science raise not only complex theoretical issues, but also offer recommendations for improving the foreign policy strategy of the People's Republic of China, the formation of a new model of the world order as a guiding ideology for the development of the world economy, finance and trade. Further successful teaching and popularization of the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" requires high theoretical knowledge, including Marxism, improvement of forms and methods, in-depth scientific research, strengthening the connection between theory and practice.

Professor Liu Shizhen defines Marxist theory as the basis of the national ideology of the People's Republic of China along with traditional political culture. He calls Marxist theory not directly a state ideology, but "a philosophy with traditional Chinese values in a complex and changing global environment in the 21st century"¹⁷⁴. Liu Shizhen believes that the Chinese Communist Party should develop theoretical innovations more widely and analyze specific problems more often on a case-by-case basis. CCDM combines the general theory of Marxism with the reality of China, with its foreign policy strategies and promotes theoretical innovations in the practice of international relations. This is precisely the source of the viability of the theory of Marxism. According to Liu Shizhen, some philosophical and cultural ideas of Marxism are closely related and originate from cultural concepts of Ancient China, primarily from Confucianism¹⁷⁵.

¹⁷³ Teng Wensheng. "The Celestial Empire belongs to everyone": the global contribution of Chinese civilization // Information Portal of the People's Political Consultative Council. 2017. December 4th. URL: <http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1204/c40531-29685308.html> (accessed: 07.19.2023). In Chinese.

¹⁷⁴ Cit. by: Teng Wensheng. Op. cit. In Chinese.

¹⁷⁵ Liu S.R. Op. cit. P. 2.

Xi Jinping's concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind", according to Liu Shizhen and other academics, is based on four theoretical positions that are close to Marxism in spirit. **First**, she stands for the equality of countries in the fight against hegemony. All States, big or small, must respect each other. A great Power cannot interfere in the internal affairs of another country. **Secondly**, CCDM emphasizes the interconnection of people from different countries, faiths, and civilizations. The progress and development of humanity as a whole depends on respect and respect for mutual interests and strengthening international cooperation. **Thirdly**, all countries need to reduce consumption and adhere to sustainable development. The Earth is the only home of humanity and it must be protected. **Fourthly**, countries should cooperate with each other in order to gain management experience and establish harmonious international relations¹⁷⁶.

A great numbers of ideas of Marx theory are taken as the basis for China's economic development in the 21st century.¹⁷⁷ According to this theory, people live in a world where everything is interconnected and nothing is isolated. Scientific and technological progress connects the world's population. This leads to changes in nature, while the destruction of nature as a result of human activity is becoming more serious, and as a result, the process of globalization is accelerating. The development of information technology reduces the cost of telecommunications services and increases their efficiency, turning the world into a "global village".

Discussing the idea of unity of interests of peoples and the nature of class (primarily bourgeois) differences in Marxism, Liu Jianjun and Xia Men from Fudan University consider the significance of the "community of class interests" ("阶级利益联合体") for the "community of the common destiny of mankind." The transfer of private property to the public ownership of free people is assessed by scientists as an individual form of community/association of free people (自由人的联合体). Capitalism generates bourgeois interests (资产阶级利益联合), characterized by superiority and

¹⁷⁶ Liu S.R. Op. cit. P. 2.

¹⁷⁷ The relevance of the teachings of Marxism in the modern world. to the 200th anniversary of K. Dedicated to Marx / E. But. Kremleva, D. S. Benz, N. O. Mamaeva [et al.] // Bulletin of the Chelyabinsk State University. Economic sciences. 2018. Issue 61, No. 7 (417). P. 189.

inferiority, exclusivity and hierarchy. With the development of globalization, Internet networks and informatization, human society has become interdependent. Consequently, the civilizational view of exclusivity, hierarchy, and superiority are becoming incompatible with the new era, the scientists write¹⁷⁸. Marx and Engels reveal the nature of bourgeois interests and put forward the idea of the unity of the interests of the proletariat, and then the idea of uniting free people. The association or union of free people must transcend the capitalist nature of "things that control people" (资本主义“物统治人”) and realize the comprehensive development of humanity¹⁷⁹.

According to Chinese researchers, Engels justifies the mechanism of the bourgeois revolution by carrying out political reform, which promotes the unification of mankind based on common interests. There is no need to use coercion or political means. In the 21st century, forms of ownership depend on "network technologies that are naturally linked to politics, society and culture"¹⁸⁰. In China, private property is guaranteed not only by society, but also by the state. Xi Jinping's concept of a "common destiny" is based on the paramount importance of the State and the priority of national development over individual and social values such as human rights. It was during this historical period that Xi Jinping proposed the idea of the "community of common destiny for mankind."

Chinese scientists define Marxism as a system of views on society that considers transhistorical human relations. This system extends to pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial stages of development. Post-industrial society, they believe, overcomes imperialism as the dominant system of its life. However, the main ideological systems lag behind this process, and therefore the question of whether Marxism will become a leader in rethinking the role of capitalism and its future remains open¹⁸¹.

All of humanity is united in a global community where everything is interconnected. All countries must cooperate in order to survive economic crises and maintain sustainable socio-economic development of the world. This is exactly what the

¹⁷⁸ Liu Jianjun, Xia Meng. "Community of class interests" and "community of common destiny for mankind" // Monthly Academic Journal. 2018. No. 5 (9). P. 81. In Chinese.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. P. 81.

¹⁸⁰ Liu Jianjun, Xia Meng. Op. cit. P. 83. In Chinese.

¹⁸¹ The relevance of the teachings of Marxism in the modern world. P. 189.

Chinese One Belt, One Road initiative is aimed at, which stimulates the development of many developing countries, as well as some developed countries, primarily Asia and Europe. They get the opportunity to build or improve infrastructure on a large scale. A great number of countries are strengthening ties with China within the framework of the idea of "cooperation and exchange, mutual benefit", which, in turn, stimulates the growth of world trade.

The "community of common destiny for mankind" is a complex concept in which three elements of the relationship between the whole and parts of the real world are scientifically substantiated. These are the relations of the world and humanity, the relations between the countries of the whole world and the relations of the government and the population of the Earth. CCDM is an integrity; a person, as part of the whole, exists in this system. All countries are interconnected and form a unity, or "community of common destiny for mankind."

The human environment is that part of the spiritual and material space in which spiritual and material relations develop. This is a "home" for all people; humanity must be responsible not only for itself, but also for the next generation. People cannot damage the environment for the sake of their own interests¹⁸². These arguments of Xi Jinping are in some ways in tune with the thoughts of K. Marx's idea of the unity of opposites and peaceful coexistence with nature. The theory of Marxism considers the world from the point of view of dialectics and believes that the development of the world is ultimately conditioned by contradictions that contain two aspects: opposites and unity. Unity and conflict of contradictions, as well as opposites and unity of both sides contribute to the development of all mankind. The modern world is a unity of contradictions. In it, the countries are both opposite and dependent on each other. They compete in cooperation and interact in competition. The concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" just emphasizes competition in the context of a dialogue of civilizations, which reflects the unity of opposites.

Like the classics of Marxism, modern ideologists and leaders of the CPC consider the construction of socialism to be the transition of mankind from "prehistory" to "real

¹⁸² Xi Jinping. On governance. II. P. 442–445.

history", in which a person actually becomes the creator of history, calling for unification and joint coexistence. This position is of particular importance in the logic of the development of human civilization¹⁸³. In today's complex and contradictory world, there is a need to resolve these contradictions and conflicts through inter-civilizational dialogue. These thoughts are in. And. Lenin was developed by Chinese Marxists at the beginning of the XXI century¹⁸⁴. Professor Liu Shizhen believes that the historical cultural, philosophical, and ethical heritage of China complement modern Chinese political culture and make it related to Marxism. It is the Marxist theory that underlies the modern official ideology of the PRC of socialism with Chinese characteristics and is organically interconnected with the concept of a "community of the common destiny of mankind"¹⁸⁵.

Professor Tian Chengshan discovers the connection between the communist idea of Marxism and the deep philosophical idea of "change" of "tongbian" (通变), which is mentioned in "Yi jing". "Tongbian" contains an understanding of the continuity of generations and the unity of peoples. Tian Chengshan believes that the "tongbian" philosophy plays an important role in the discourse on dialectical materialism. It is "tongbian" that defines the correlative way of thinking of the Chinese, their explanation of the order of things in the world¹⁸⁶. This idea explains the chain of China's foreign policy transformations: from the revolutionary state of Mao, then to its economic growth caused by changes during the period of "reform and openness", then to an active position in international relations and a power gaining global influence under Xi Jinping. It is also related to the practice of interaction in the international community – China is changing behavior and identity, interconnected and strategically evolving.

The theory of relativism is closest to the idea of "tongbian". It defends many points of view, views, hypotheses and theories about the same object, but still there is

¹⁸³ Lenin and socialist humanism // Peoples of the world about Lenin. Moscow, 1970. P. 76–78.

¹⁸⁴ Zhao Xiaochun. In pursuit of a community of shared future // World Century Publishing Corporation and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies. 2018. Vol. 4, no. 1. P. 23–37; Liu S.R. Op. cit.

¹⁸⁵ Liu S.R. Op. cit. P. 4.

¹⁸⁶ Tian Chenshan. Op. cit. P. 15–35.

no one true one that can be considered adequate to the real state of affairs in the world¹⁸⁷. In this regard, it should be noted that in Marxist teaching, the question of the objectivity of knowledge, its completeness as a final or absolute phenomenon is impossible. Our knowledge is always relative, and the cognizable reality is in constant change, they are true only at the moment.

However, Professor Tian Chengshan finds certain contradictions in some provisions of Chinese Marxism. He believes that since the process of economic reforms in China has led to the implementation of the doctrines of neoliberalism and is based on the principles of the market, a new broad discourse has emerged about the future of Chinese socialism in a modified interpretation of the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, which the leadership has adhered to since the 1920s¹⁸⁸.

According to Professor Liu Shizhen, the modern world community is a diverse unity with a rich history and culture, different national characters, which at the same time fill the world with contradictions and conflicts. Here there is a need to resolve all kinds of conflicts and tensions through an intercivilizational cultural dialogue¹⁸⁹.

Like Marxism, the concept of the "community of the common destiny of mankind" orients the peoples of the world to fight global challenges, to respect and respect the right of countries to independently apply their social system and development paths, to promote mutual exchange and cooperation between countries. It points to ways of cooperation that correspond to sustainable development and mutual benefit for all mankind. It is aimed at improving the system of global governance, building and developing new communications, and deepening relations between China and the world¹⁹⁰.

The Chinese concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" shows the interconnection and interdependence in the effective development of all countries,

¹⁸⁷ Mamchur E.A. *The Objectivity of Science and relativism: (Towards discussions in modern epistemology)*. Moscow, 2004. P. 14.

¹⁸⁸ Tian Chenshan. *Op. cit.* P. 30.

¹⁸⁹ Liu S. R. *Op. cit.*

¹⁹⁰ Yang Jiechi. Working for a community with a shared future for mankind by promoting international cooperation and multilateralism. At the 55th Munich Security Conference, Munich, 16 February 2019 // Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. 17 February 2019. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3265_665445/3296_664550/3298_664554/201902/t20190217_576157.html (accessed: 08.19.2022).

large and small, developed and developing. It opens up ways for the peoples and Governments of various States to resolve conflicts peacefully, and leads humanity to universal prosperity. The concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" as a component of the Marxist theory of the XXI century is aimed at improving the management of relations between the whole and part, the material and spiritual standard of living of the population not only of individual states, but also of the whole world.

The principles of Chinese traditional culture are in tune with the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin on the equality of people of different nationalities and religions. Chinese researchers summarize the ideas of Marxism, enriched by the national political culture. In the 21st century, Marxism-Leninism became an organic part of this culture.

Therefore, the analysis of the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" in the context of the creative development of Marxism in the 21st century in China shows the close relationship of these theories. CCDM complements and enriches the theory of Marxism of the XXI century. Based on the postulates of ancient thinkers and scientists – "harmony is the highest value", "within the four seas, all men are brothers", "great unity" and "harmony between heaven and man", modern Chinese Marxists analyze this concept from the point of view of the relationship between parts and the whole, suggesting the construction of a harmonious and unified world and path solutions to the global problems facing humanity. They consider the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" as the embodiment of the Marxist understanding of the laws of social development, as a good example of applying theory to practice. This brings the concept in common with the Confucian idea of "unity in difference" and the theory of "tianxia". Modern scientists of the People's Republic of China analyze the factors that determine its further development, predict the prospect of the formation of an international order in the context of Marxist doctrine in a new era. They link the implementation of the concept of the European Union with the fight against global challenges and threats, respect and observance of the rights of countries and peoples to independent and sovereign development, and the promotion of mutual exchange and cooperation between countries.

The timely proposal to the world of the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" in a complex and rapidly changing international situation corresponds to the general trend of world development, the desire of China and other peoples for "peaceful coexistence". This theory also traces the connection of the communist idea of Marxism with the philosophical concept of "tongbian", which contains a dialectical understanding of the continuity of time and the continuity of generations. Discussing the current socio-economic state of China and using Marx's dialectical method of "incorporating capitalism into socialism", modern Chinese Marxists believe that it explains and contributes to resolving the contradictions of two social systems within one state.

Assessing Xi Jinping's Marxist-Leninist "struggle" and his efforts to resolve "contradictions" in the international community, Russian orientalist Professor L.V. Zabrovskaya notes the weakening of the Komsomol members' position within Chinese society, and President Xi's ideas have become "the Marxism of the XXI century" and "the quintessence of Chinese culture and the Chinese spirit." It finds a difference in the style of Hu Jintao's rule as a supporter of a peaceful course towards Taiwan and intending to normalize relations with the United States from the style of Xi Jinping, who applies the methodology of "Marxism-Leninism and historical materialism" to understand the "great challenges of the time"¹⁹¹.

At the same time, some contradictory provisions in the Chinese version of modern Marxism require a deeper scientific analysis, justification and explanation of these contradictions and, possibly, correction of this doctrine, which in many ways should explain and integrate the concept of "state" into the existing complex reality of the modern world and complex international relations. Chinese Marxist scientists invite the scientific community to a broad discussion on the problems of the development of Marxism in the 21st century.

In our opinion, the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" put forward by Xi Jinping gives a new impetus to the creative development of Marxist

¹⁹¹ Cit. by: Zabrovskaya L.V. China in the era of Xi Jinping: a return to the principles of Marxism // Asia-Pacific region: economics, politics, law. 2023. Vol. 25, no. 1. P. 115–117.

theory. This causes to believe that Marxist views are most clearly present in the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind"¹⁹².

The political leadership of the People's Republic of China attempts to creatively use Marxism as one of the effective methods to solve political, social, and cultural problems in the new historical conditions. Chinese Marxism is endowed with distinctive features, ethnic and chronological features. Along with history and traditional culture, Marxism enriches modern diplomatic and foreign policy concepts of the People's Republic of China. Consequently, the stability of China's political system and a socially oriented approach to society are largely guaranteed by the application of Marxist theory in addition to elements of Chinese traditional culture.

1.3. Western concepts and theories of international relations and their impact on the development of Chinese foreign policy thought

After the "Cultural revolution" at the turn of the 1970s and 1980s. XX Chinese theory of international relations (IR) acquires a new qualitative content, fundamentally different from Mao Zedong's foreign policy views and theories. These changes are related to the name of Chinese reform architect Deng Xiaoping. He pursues a construction course for socialism with Chinese specifics, including the one that opened China's new foreign policy to the world. Within the framework of this course, a new foreign policy theory began to be formed, the content of which Western concepts of constructivism and some ideas of liberalism were introduced. All this is reflected and enshrined in the documents of the CPC and is creatively developed in the works of Chinese political scientists.

Chinese professor of political science Yan Xuotong and Qin Yaqing define three historical periods and two approaches to the development of the theory of international relations in China¹⁹³.

Since the early 80s. 20-th century. Chinese political scientists are beginning to imitate or imitate foreign research on international relations. In 1981 there is a work

¹⁹² Boyarkina A.V. Chinese researchers on the philosophical and cultural justification of Xi Jinping's concept of the "Community of common destiny for mankind" // *Oikumena. Regional studies*. 2020. No. 3. P. 128–140.

¹⁹³ Yan Xuotong, He Ying. Op. cit. P. 16. In Chinese.

titled "Acquaintance with modern Western theories of International Relations" published in China. In 1987, Professor Zhang Lilyan publishes the first work on the concepts of international relations in China¹⁹⁴. Chinese scientific circles implements Western theories **in the second period from 1991 to 2000** (理论学习阶段初始期). **From 2001 to 2007 – the third stage** – China is in-depth study of Western theories (理论学习阶段深化期)¹⁹⁵.

On Pre-theoretical Stage (1949–1978) term *theory* refers to strategic thinking and is filled with Marxist views. During this period, a knowledge-oriented theory has not yet been developed, in this regard, the results of research, assessment and generalizations are not yet sufficient. In 1964 there appeared the first ones on training and research structures for the study of international politics in the country. However, in 1966 the "Great Cultural revolution" stops the work of the newly emerging research centers. Yan Xuetong writes of the period from 1949 to the end of the "Cultural revolution" in 1976 as having "halted the development of education and research"¹⁹⁶.

In Chinese scientific publications the concept "理" ("theory") appears. With the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping, the influence of Marxism and interest in it are decreasing and, accordingly, foreign theories are introduced, and the results of research on international relations in the field of liberalism and constructivism A. Wendt, R. Gilpin, O. R. Keohane, J. Nay et al. At the turn of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the Chinese academic community became more familiar with theoretical works on international relations. The level of knowledge not only about neorealism and neoliberalism, Marxism, but also about constructivism is increasing in the country, which became the main feature of this period¹⁹⁷.

At the same time, after the 2010s, the tendency of borrowing political ideas of ancient China has been increasing. For many Chinese political scientists, the ideology of the Celestial Empire's governance and interstate relations of the pre-Qin period

¹⁹⁴ Yan Xuetong, He Ying. Op. cit. P. 16. In Chinese.

¹⁹⁵ Qin Yaqing. Successes and Research Problems of the Chinese Theory of International Relations // World Economy and Politics. 2008. No. 11. P. 13–16. In Chinese.

¹⁹⁶ Yan Xuetong, He Ying. Op. cit. P. 16. In Chinese.

¹⁹⁷ Qin Yaqing. Op. cit. P. 15–17. In Chinese.

serves as an example. The Chinese scientific community begins to form qualitatively new knowledge, synthesising the traditional ideological foundations of the Celestial Empire and East Asia. At that time, China was undergoing complex processes of the birth of a new statehood; as a consequence, Chinese thinkers of that time are engaged in the search for new theoretical ideas that could form the basis of a foreign policy course and a stable state. This leads to the phenomenon of the "Chinese debate" ("中国学派»的争论).

Chinese scientists, through Confucian harmony in the military strategic thought of the Celestial Empire, offer a solution to modern issues of war and peace, they enrich the idea of strategic culture, filling it with Chinese specifics.

Discussing the methods of scientific research, the Professor Yan Xuetong highlights realism, liberalism and constructivism in the theory of international relations. The method of research in international relations is not a theory of the formation of international relations.¹⁹⁸ At the same time, realism and liberalism reflect the material power and interests of states. Professor Yan considers these currents to be sufficiently established and progressive.

In his approach to ways of thinking and philosophical concepts, only Han Feizi was a follower of the materialist doctrine of determinism (in philosophy, the primacy of matter). In this interpretation, Han Feizi's¹⁹⁹ views are close to Marxist or modern realist views (Morgenthau, for instance). Most philosophers reflected both around state governance (as the power of the state is crucial) and the role of the individual in the state. This means that the materialist approach acts as a standard in analyzing the ideology of state governance in these thinkers of the Middle Kingdom. Nevertheless, all of them reasoned about the state. This formed the basis of Yan Xuetong's political theory.

Most notable and important for the theorisation of international relations in the PRC are Yan Xuetong's discourses on the foundations of ruler power, its components,

¹⁹⁸ Practical method of international research / edited by Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. P. 3. In Chinese.

¹⁹⁹ 韩非（约前 280 年-前 233 年）. Han Fei. Years of life and death around 280 BC – 233 BC.

the role of leadership in the failure and prosperity (development) of countries, and the essence of the ruler and the hegemon.

To the elements of the power of government in the pre-Qin period in the Celestial Empire Yan Xuetong includes: the strengthening of power, the welfare of the people, the strength of morality (morality), the spread of justice and humanity, the observance of morality, the education of morality (morality), the decline of morality as a path to the decay of the state. Most philosophers agree that interstate order depends on the nature of interstate leadership. Due to the fact that the two concepts, the whole world or "Celestial World" ("天下") and "ruler" ("王", wang) are often found together "王天下" in Pre-Qin philosophical treatises, they are in relationship, indicating an understanding of the geographical globe as square and flat; philosophers were unaware of the existence of continents (unconnected) and other civilizations. In such a case, the Pre-Qin concept of "天下"²⁰⁰ ("Tianxia") and modern "世界"²⁰¹ ("World, "Shijie") enjoy two similar meanings. **First.** Geographical concept of the sky and the surface of the earth. **Second.** The content is limited to the social relations of mankind. The use of the term "王天下" can also be partly interpreted as "world domination."

Professor Yan identifies two factors of success or failure in the foreign policy development of any states. First, the power basis of interstate transfer of dominance (国家间领导权的实力基础). Second, the transfer of leadership between states (国家间领导权力转移). All thinkers express their views on this issue in different ways. Lao Zi, Confucius, Meng Zi, Xun Zi, Guan Zi and Mo Zi believed that the ruler's power is based on a moral category. Han Feizi insists as the only reason for the fall or flourishing of the state on the legal system. He thinks differently from other philosophers²⁰². Despite the heterogeneity of these trends, in the main six philosophers Guan Tzu, Lao Tzu, Confucius, Meng Tzu, Xun Tzu and Mo Tzu agree on the close relationship between the state of the international system and the degree of morality.

²⁰⁰ Above all, "天下" means China, the Celestial Empire; domination (see: Dictionary of Modern Chinese. Beijing, 1978. P. 1124. In Chinese).

²⁰¹ The totality of the existence of all things and phenomena of nature and human society. (See: Dictionary of Modern Chinese. Beijing, 1978. P. 1040–1041. In Chinese).

²⁰² Practical method of international research / ed. by Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. P. 53–55. In Chinese.

Yan Xuetong's conclusions, based on his analysis of the ideology of state governance of the seven Pre-Qin philosophers, are as follows. He identifies the unifying principle of all philosophers of the Celestial Empire. It is that the construction of ideas or theories begins with the moral qualities of rulers, then extends to society. The system cannot determine the rise and fall of a major power, but the political institution of leadership can, the scholar is certain. Reflecting on these issues, Yan analyses the nature of political power in what can be seen as a major contribution to his theory of international relations - the theory of "moral realism". This new theoretical current is also called moral realism (道义现实主义).

The meaning of "道德" ("daode") is interpreted in the Xiandai Hanyu Qidian Dictionary of Modern Chinese as a form of social ideology (consciousness) that expresses the principles and norms of behaviour accepted in society, while "道义" ("daoyi") is morality and justice²⁰³.

Only *political leadership* based on *morals* is the key to strengthening national strength. For instance, between China and the US, leadership is also key to national development. Morality and national interests are interrelated in the context of the influence of social values and ideas on them, which partly brings this concept closer to constructivism. In order to study the mechanisms of its acquisition, preservation and loss, Yan Xuetong examines the axiological values of the Chinese foreign policy tradition in interaction with national power. Confucian morality is at the center of the political system, says Professor Yan. The key point of this theory is the argument in favor of morality as the most solid foundation for political leadership.

The perception of morality in theory goes beyond classical realism to a certain extent. According to the logic of moral realism, morality leads to an increase in the total national strength and ensures compliance with its norms as ensuring the legitimacy of state actions in the international arena. This approach contributes to the effective implementation and development of the strategy of China's rise within the framework of the Chinese school of realism, which, as a result, will lead to an increase in the level of

²⁰³ Dictionary of Modern Chinese. Beijing, 1978. P. 217, 218. In Chinese.

confidence in this state. China, as a leading country, is trying to change the world order. In this regard, Yan Xuetong supports the rejection of the PRC's policy of non-entry into alliances, calls on the leadership to take on more allied obligations and firmly fulfill them.

We agree with the opinion of the orientalist E. N. Grachikov that the theory of Yan Xuetong cannot be fully implemented due to the fact that now there may be a conflict with some Asian countries neighboring China (in North-East and South-East Asia, for example)²⁰⁴. In addition, NATO countries are beginning to openly and jointly oppose the growing influence and military power of the PRC. Allies are concerned about the fact that China refuses to condemn Russia's special military operation against Ukraine (February 2022), threatens Taiwan, conducts an unprecedented pace and scale of modernization of its nuclear arsenal, and so on.

Within the framework of the analysis of the state management methodology developed by the Pre-Qin philosophers, Yan Xuetong summarizes his conclusions in five theories:

1) realism and liberalism are fairly established and progressive trends that contribute to the flourishing of constructivism and political psychology (not yet sufficiently developed trends in IR). These areas are enriched with Confucian materialistic ideas and conceptual approaches in a comprehensive analysis of the ideology of state governance and form the basis *of the theory of diplomacy of a harmonious world*;

2) Despite differing approaches to the causes of war and understanding of ways to resolve conflicts peacefully, *the theory of security cooperation* promotes relatively peaceful conflict resolution, both in the Warring States period and in the modern world. This theory becomes especially important when non-traditional security threats arise: terrorism, financial crises, energy crises, environmental pollution, and climate change. Reducing air pollution has become one of the most important moral issues of the 21st century. Here, according to Yan Xuetong, the theory of security cooperation may be

²⁰⁴ Grachikov E.N. Chinese School of International Relations. P. 213.

able to morally analyze and explain changes in the role of states in ensuring national security in the face of non-traditional security threats.

3) *elevation and hegemonic stability theory*. It is impossible to maintain world domination by "hard power" alone. This was understood by most philosophers of the Middle Kingdom, and they saw the basis of the power of government in the morality and justice of the ruler. In modern conditions, the theory of stability of domination has already neglected the relationship between the nature of stability of domination and the stability of the world order. Since the end of the Cold War, proponents of the new North American conservatism have argued that the United States is committed to the idea of a "humane/humane hegemon," but this theory only embellishes the propaganda. Professor Yan notes here that S. Huntington and R. Kagan refer to the United States as a "benevolent hegemon" who does not show "arrogance" towards the rest of the world²⁰⁵. How then does hegemonism favor the sustainability of the world order? Pre-Qin thinkers not only put forward a concept of ruler power similar to hegemonic power, but also identified key differences that affect the low or high level of ruling morality and the long-term sustainability and stability of the international system. Thus, President B. Clinton attached great importance to the realization of multipolar policy, while G. Bush violated international norms, realizing the "concept of unipolar world", American military superiority. The stability of the international order under B. Clinton was higher than its stability under J. Bush Jr. Thus, the theory of the rise and stability of hegemonism indicates the high or low degree of influence of the morality of a political leader in a particular region on the stability of that region and the duration of regional cooperation;

4) the theory of international transfer/transit of power. At the end of the twentieth century the rule of Presidents R. Reagan; then J. Bush. Reagan; then J. Bush Jr. in the USA lead the country and the people to decline. And when Presidents J. Kennedy in the 1960s and B. Clinton in the 1990s, there is an increase in the power of political leadership. In fact, new rising powers under different leaders can also increase in power

²⁰⁵ Cit. by: Kagan R. The Benevolent Empire // Foreign Policy. Summer, 1998. No. 111. P. 26.

or decline. During the time of Stalin and Khrushchev, the power of the Soviet Union grew, but the country lost its power under Y.V. Andropov and M.S. Gorbachev;

5) the theory of building international relations. Ancient philosophers agree on the main reason of political leadership in the process of stable functioning of the political system. These are conceptual approaches to its study. The construction of the theory of international relations is carried out, probably, on the transfer of conceptual foundations of strong states to weak ones. In modern conditions, from the position of constructivists, the concepts of international relations are formed in the process of interaction between states, even with the use of imitation or copying approaches, but constructivism does not explain which approaches. International interaction has the same flaw as earlier theories, even if one does not consider the inequality of states in international relations. Professor Yan critically concludes that since the Cold War, democratization of the political regime and marketization have been the two major political and economic currents that classically demonstrate how developed countries shape international relations theory in developing countries²⁰⁶.

Faced Western countries' misunderstanding of China's traditional strategic culture and the motives behind its behavior, Chinese scholars are thinking about a clearer and more explicit expression of China's concepts to the international community and active participation in building a regional order. Scholars analyze the existing problems and prospects for building an East Asian regional order. For example, Xu Tianbo and Li Xiaoyan, as well as Yan Xuetong of the realism school, rely on the works of Confucians and Ming philosophers who explain the formation of states based on the logic of checks and balances of the international system of the Spring and Autumn Annals and the Struggling Kingdoms. Xu Tianbo, a professor of political science, compares the two international systems of the New Age Europe period²⁰⁷ and the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods and finds commonalities and peculiarities in them. The scholar proves that in Ancient China and in New Age Europe there were actually similar processes in interstate and state-society relations. In this she partly develops the ideas of

²⁰⁶ Practical method of international research / ed. by Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. P. 56–58. In Chinese.

²⁰⁷ Periodization within the framework of the formation theory is usually associated with the XV century and up to the beginning of the epoch of revolutions of the XIX century (1495–1815).

Qin Yaqing. Xu Tianbo notes similarities in 1) the frequent feudal wars of the two systems; 2) international anarchy; 3) the emergence of territorial sovereignty; 4) the formation of the balance of power; 5) the debate between state and society and other factors. It is flexible enough to ignore spatial and temporal, ideological factors, and cultural differences between Europe and the Middle Kingdom. That is, China could continue to pursue a balance of power policy after the Warring States period, and Europe could well have imperial regimes. These two periods prefigured something important that made China and Europe what they later became.

Xu Tianbo develops a theory of state formation. It combines the traditional Chinese idea of "rich state, powerful army" and the "self-strengthening movement". This movement targets the "pursuit of enrichment" that was carried out by the Westernization school from the 1860s to the 1890s to introduce Western military equipment, machine production, science and technology to maintain feudal rule. Xu Tianbo is close to the resource mobilization theories of S. Tarrow and C. Tilly on effective mobilization for social change and C. Waltz on the phenomenon of "self-reliance" or "self-help" ("自助"). She believes that strong social bonds are formed among the discontented population, which lead them to join together in social resistance movements such as: demonstrations, through which it is possible to meet the demands of ordinary people or to involve them in public policies. In this regard, Prof. Xu borrows from Waltz's idea of states seeking to maintain the status quo internationally and help themselves. She interprets the term "movement" as a strengthening of economic and military power that contributes to the realization of "even wiser policies"²⁰⁸.

Professor Xu's theory of state formation is based on the thesis that states seek security (and always deter and counterbalance attempts to balance the dominant power) and mobilize human and material resources. War and strategy compel rulers to utilize the necessary resources. They contribute to the transformation and development of the central power system. In other words, the Middle Kingdom cared about preserving sovereignty, endured conflicts, invasions and spent most of its budget on paying tribute

²⁰⁸ Practical method of international research / edited by Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. P. 113. In Chinese.

to warlike tribes (Mongols and others). In the process of formation and strengthening of statehood, instruments of violence such as nationalization and state regulation of the economy and bureaucratization of the administrative system are acceptable. Thus, by strengthening military power the armed forces are formed, the economy is strengthened by rationalization and nationalization of tax revenues, the appointment of personnel to administrative positions on the basis of personal qualities determines quite reasonable tactics. In this way the state promotes self-reinforcement. In this regard, the formation of states and the balance of branches of government (checks and balances) are carried out through "self-reinforcing reforms".

Based on her analysis, Xu Tianbo concludes that frequent interstate wars push rulers or monarchs to adopt "self-reinforcing reforms" ("自强型改革") that form interlocking structures with the state. Her understanding of "self-reinforcement reforms" is to mobilize resources by strengthening administrative functions. Prof. Xu disagrees with the thesis that the ruler supports the increase of state budget expenditure. She identifies two types of logic of state formation: the first is the logic of checks and balances ("制衡逻辑"), in which state power should be harmonized with the principles of warfare, a balance of power is established; the second ("支配逻辑"), is the logic of state dominance. In conclusion, Xu Tianbo argues that in the process of state formation, the logic of domination, in which the state completely dominates society, takes precedence over the logic of checks and balances. The state reinforces coercive mechanisms while forcing the "old structures" of society into partial destruction or "social fragmentation," which is a barrier to establishing the social control necessary to build social order²⁰⁹. We suggest that the order in Chinese society, where foreign and domestic policies are determined by the actions of the emperor/ruler/chairman, is governed by the behavior of the society. Here, the scholar, reasoning about restoring balance in the governance of the country and behavior in the international arena, in this regard, identifies the role of leadership in the process of Chinese state formation as a central issue.

²⁰⁹ Practical method of international research / ed. by Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. P. 114–115. In Chinese.

Professor Li Xiaoyan, reflecting on the core of China's strategic culture, the foreign policy strategy of Confucius, Meng Zi, and Xun Zi, draws a parallel with the strategic culture of the Ming era (1368–1644). Li Xiaoyan believes that Confucian culture is central and dominant as its ideological foundations are enshrined in subsequent eras, it explains the opposition to military action. China's traditional strategic culture is peace-loving in nature. It is a strategic culture of security rather than aggression, and force plays only a secondary role in international relations, which is not primary. Concepts such as "justice" ("humanity"), "harmony," "morality," and "trust" underpin the Middle Kingdom's state security and its domestic and foreign policy stability. They have a moral influence on its people and lead to peaceful interaction with other nations, including eastern but non-Chinese nations. The use of force in foreign policy settlement was considered categorically unacceptable.

Li Xiaoyan finds in Confucius and Meng Tzu the direct dependence of the implementation of diplomatic strategy and foreign policy on the preservation of peace with other states and the security of the Middle Kingdom. Thus, the Confucian culture, based on virtuous and humane governance (王道, 仁政), promotes, **firstly**, the maintenance of lasting peace in the state; **secondly**, in matters of state security, it is negative about the use of force and military clashes; **and thirdly**, in matters of war, security or cooperation with other peoples it relies on peaceful coexistence with them.

Professor Lee explores Alastair Johnston's theory of the influence of *strategic parabellum culture* on maintaining security along the northern borders from Mongol invasions during the Ming Dynasty. Strategic culture under Ming goes through three stages of development: *recognition (consent) – acceptance – execution*. First, the Ming Dynasty recognizes the effectiveness and usefulness of Confucian culture, then accepts and consciously adapts with the addition of its own cultural elements to its style of government, its ideological foundations, and, finally, the style of behavior is consciously implemented in practice. Professor Li notes that the Ming emperors have a high level of internationalization of Confucian culture, that is, a significant borrowing of approaches to solving strategic problems of the state including the field of security.

It seems that the "core" of Chinese strategic thinking differs little from the views of Western realpolitik: conflict is seen as inevitable and a zero-sum game, violence is considered effective and preferable over nonviolent approaches, and offensive strategies are ahead of defensive ones. However, Professor Lee delicately avoids pointing out the advantages of the forceful nature of the strategy.

It is necessary to emphasize during the reign of the Ming the development of the economy, the encouragement of handicrafts, in particular manufacturing, the rapid development of trade with other countries, et al. In 1387, the unification of China under the leadership of Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang²¹⁰ was completed. The collapse of the national economy due to more than a decade of war and Mongol rule, as well as the decline of the population, remnants of slavery of the Yuan dynasty lead to an urgent need for social policy, some changes in the system of the central administrative and government apparatus, strengthening legislation, etc. The cornerstone is the introduction of the Ming Code in the years of Zhu Yuanzhang²¹¹ – "the highest stage in the development of Chinese lawmaking of the Pre-Republican period"²¹².

This monument of Chinese culture and law proves that the goal of the first Ming emperor was a humane, caring attitude towards the peasantry, and there were calls for officials to support the population, manage the economy, and do no harm. Under Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang, some of the regular troops-up to 70 % – were allocated for agricultural work²¹³.

Zhu Yuanzhang's descendants pursue traditional policies, strengthening the borders of the state, and trying to establish friendly relations with the Mongols. They pay special attention to the issues of securing the highest imperial power in the country for their descendants. This has become one of the main motives for maintaining a long-term peace on the borders and within the state. Despite the threat of the restoration of

²¹⁰ In Soviet literature, the accepted spelling is Zhu Yuan-zhang. Years of life 1328–1398. 明太祖朱元璋 (1328年10月21日–1398年6月24日).

²¹¹ 大明律集解附例, 《大明律》.

²¹² The laws of the Great Ming Dynasty with a summary commentary and an appendix of regulations (Da Ming lu ji jie Fu li). Vol. 1. P. 35.

²¹³ Ibid. P. 92.

Mongol rule, the overthrow of the Ming Dynasty by Japan, and then a war with Japan in support of Korea, the Ming attempt to avoid war and conflict.

Mainly the Ming emperors of the mid-sixteenth century (Emperor Zhu Houcong) relied on the Confucian concept of "仁义" ("humanity and justice") as an invincible possession of justice, they emphasize its necessity for achieving peace. The use of unjustified military power was considered unnatural. Even the naval campaigns of the legendary warlord and diplomat Zheng He were aimed at establishing trade ties with Western countries.

The Ming Dynasty was extremely cautious and negative about the use of military tactics and military force. The treatise of 1574 year "The Testament of Emperor Mu Zong of the Ming Dynasty" ("明穆宗宝训") and the treatise of 1577 year "The Testament of Emperor Shi Zong of the Ming Dynasty" ("明世宗宝训") noted the sacred and exclusive nature of the emperor's power to ensure lasting peace and strengthen the borders of the state. This dynasty as a whole borrows from two traditional models, "以防范为主" and "以和为贵" ("caution" and "harmony is the highest value"). "Only the emperor, owning the Middle Kingdom, considers it a single family and strives for all things to have their place" ("朕惟天地以好生为德，自古圣帝明王代天理物，莫不上体天心，下从民欲，包含遍复，视华夷为一家，恒欲其共生并存于宇内也")²¹⁴.

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that the basic principle – maintaining state security, opposing military doctrine – in the treatises "The Analects", "Meng Tzu", "Xun Tzu" is expressed as non-conflict political decisions that lead to the defeat of enemies and their surrender. The Confucian culture of virtuous and humane government opposes force and highly values the non-violent maintenance of State security.

One of the oldest Western schools in the theory of international relations of the 20th century had a certain influence on the development of China's foreign policy thought in the 1980s-90s. – **The theoretical school of liberalism.** In the twentieth century, three trends or currents took shape in it. The first trend of liberalism regulates international relations in the legal field. The second trend includes the creation of the

²¹⁴ Practical method of international research / edited by Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. P. 184–186. In Chinese.

League of Nations and the realisation of the idea of collective security. This trend regulates anarchy through international organisations. Finally, the third current of liberalism analyses the problem of disarmament.

Professor M.M. Lebedeva recognizes the outdated logic of alliances and alliances and believes that non-state actors play an increasing role and influence states, including great powers, within the framework of general world trends. A.I. Neklessa, M.A. Cheshkov, V.A. Kremenyuk, and V.G. Khoros also belong to the pleiad of modern domestic liberals. Less well known are the idealistic-moralist and idealistic-utopian versions of Russian neoliberalism. Among the concepts being developed are the theories of global governance and sustainable development.

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The dialectical method of "integrating capitalism into socialism" is the subject of Professor Liu Rong's research. He sees Deng Xiaoping's reforms as the implementation of the Tongbian philosophy in modern China. Tongbian combines two economic systems – socialist and capitalist. They are effectively developing within the same state. These systems are **"contradictory but complementary"** ("相反相成"). The peculiarity of Deng Xiaoping's views is that he uses the method of unity of opposites (对立统一) and considers both contradictory relations and identical elements of the evolution of these systems (共同点). They are unity, identity, sharing, and consent; they depend on and permeate each other. Under certain conditions, they complement each other and are aimed at the development of the country and society²¹⁶.

²¹⁵ Drobot G.A. Liberalism in the theory of international relations: history, foreign and domestic schools // Socio-humanitarian knowledge. 2014. No. 5. P. 29.

²¹⁶ Liu Rong. Study of the philosophical thoughts of two great generations. Guangzhou, 1998. P. 405–406. In Chinese.

We can agree with Professor Liu Rong in his understanding of capitalism as a realization of neoliberalism in Chinese. Moreover, the scientist does not believe that such neoliberal capitalism contradicts socialism, but rather serves as a means to achieve economic goals. In addition, Liu Rong emphasizes the lack of a Western-style understanding of dualism in the Chinese tradition.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the dreams of Chinese scientists and politicians about an ideal world are becoming more and more intense. A strong and united China is seen as having cosmopolitan values and spreading the Confucian ideal of "tianxia"²¹⁷. Since 2003, there has been a discussion in scientific circles around the published theories of the famous philosopher and political scientist from the Academy of Social Sciences of the People's Republic of China Zhao Tingyang "all-under-heaven". Feeling somewhat dissatisfied with the world, Professor Zhao develops his theory and even system and begins with the thesis that "the supposed/imagined world is a non-world." Rethinking the ancient Chinese practice, it offers an updated system of "tianxia"²¹⁸. The scientist sees the goal of forming this system, firstly, in an attempt to replace the modern international system, which is interstate in nature and by definition cannot be called a global system. There are not enough ideas of *worldness*, in this sense the world is not a world, except in the geographical dimension. Secondly, a world devoid of unity excludes the possibility of the Tianxia system for the development of a genuine global system, and remains a Hobbesian chaos, since there is no truly integral world society governed by a universally recognized political institution.

The sense of community in a huge country is developing slowly and inconsistently. "The idea of people's unity," writes Professor D. Bell, "has gradually faded away in China. However, the Tianxia system has made way for cultural diversity"²¹⁹.

The international spread of Kang Yuwei's "Great Unity" and Zhao Tingyang's "all-under-heaven" ideals seems even more implausible. "All your own" makes no more

²¹⁷ Bell D.A. War, peace, and China's soft power: a Confucian approach // Diogenes. 2009. Vol. 56, iss. 1. P. 29–30.

²¹⁸ Zhao Tingyang. A political world philosophy in terms of all-under-heaven. P. 220.

²¹⁹ Bell D.A. Op. cit. P. 29–30.

sense in international affairs than "to each his own"²²⁰. In this regard, in our opinion, Zhao Tingyang's "all-under-heaven" theory can be attributed to a somewhat utopian idea. Qin Yaqing does not share the author's position. Moreover, unlike Yan Xuetong, he considers the Chinese school of international relations necessary, since, according to Zhao Tingyang's logic, the traditional holistic system of the Middle Kingdom reflects a more correct worldview than the Westphalian one. The Chinese School of IR produces knowledge and offers a creative synthesis of cultures and civilizations, whose resources can enrich theories, taking into account the complex modern world realities. Their goal is to find ways and means to develop and streamline the modern world.

An American professor from Columbia University, G. French, based on the ideas of Professor Zhao Tingyang, explains China's foreign policy through the prism of the tributary system. The ideological reasons that prompted China to include the countries of the near seas and their peoples in its sphere of influence are precisely related to the concept of "tianxia". Calling it the "predestination" doctrine, French writes about the inevitable dominance of China over a vast area of Asia, as it once was in the country's semi-idealized, semi-mythologized past. French claims: what appears to be a new and assertive shift in Chinese foreign policy is consistent with the historical understanding of a hierarchy based on China's tributary system. In other words, in the language of modern international relations, it corresponds to "public goods"²²¹.

Of particular interest to Chinese constructive sociology is the concept of Marxist functionalism, proposed by the American professor of neo-Marxism A. Stinchcombe ("Constructing Social Theories"). The concept of structural functionalism serves as an example of a consistent and holistic analysis of social phenomena in all their ambiguity, inconsistency, and conflict. Stinchcombe understands the functional direction of social structure as the organized context of social relations in which members of a society or group are involved²²². This theory seems to us to be a convenient tool for exploring the

²²⁰ Bell D.A. Op. cit. P. 29–30.

²²¹ Boyarkina A.V. To the question of great power diplomacy with Chinese specificity in the "new era" // *Crede Experto: transport, society, education, language*. 2022. No.1. P. 129–140.

²²² Stinchcombe A. *Constructing Social Theories*. New York, 1968. 303 p.

methodological path from simple empirical generalizations to a higher level of generalizations and theory.

At the same time, some Western scholars doubt the long-term dominance of the liberal approach and support many traditional social democratic approaches. American political scientist F. Fukuyama writes about the Cold War period and the liberalism that will always prevail in the world. However, the world history of recent decades proves the opposite. In contrast to Fukuyama's view of the influence of ideology, the theory of moral realism asserts that no ideology can forever prevail, since subsequent generations will have different ideologies than previous generations. The progress of digital technologies will increase the impact of culture. Thus, the ideological gap in liberal societies and between generations will grow in a shorter time frame and will become wider than before; various new forms of marginalization have already emerged, as liberalism creates too much inequality²²³.

It is recognized that since the 1990s, the global expansion of international monopolistic capitalism has increased the influence of neoliberalism. It is noted that in the last few years neoliberalism is beginning to spread in China as well, despite the fact that this trend follows the capitalist path, while the official position of the country's leaders expresses the desire to improve the socialist system.

At the beginning of the 21st century in China, the constructivist approach is beginning to occupy more and more space in foreign policy discourse. The focus of his attention is ideological, discursive, normative, transformational, institutional and other non-material forms of power influence of political reality. In the Chinese school of international relations, the discussion is increasingly taking on a socio-cultural tone. It is the constructivist approach that ensures the dynamics of international processes. In China, one of the first researchers to discover that the three main Western schools of international relations theory – structural realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and structural constructivism – had neglected to study the complex process of international

²²³ Yan Xuetong. IR Moral Realism's Epistemology // *India Quarterly*. 2020. Vol. 76, no. 2. P. 341.

relations and the international system was Qin Yaqing²²⁴. The reasoning of Western thinkers leads Professor Qin Yaqing to the idea of formulating his own original theory, which is based on the basic ideas of constructivism. Drawing on Western social theories, in which "rationality" is at the core, he attempts to formulate a general "theory of relations", the origins of which lie in traditional Chinese works and the classical monument "Yi jing" (Book of Changes), which Confucius considered the fundamental concept of management.

Based on generalizations of the works of primarily A. Wendt, M. Finnemore, K. Sikkink, A. Acharya and J. Checkel and other Western theorists, he analyzes the dynamics of modern international relations to resolve complex relationships and identify the role of the PRC as a balance of power in the international community²²⁵. For the development of theory of IR in China, Professor Qin considers the main method of scientific and humanitarian knowledge. It is on the basis of the human spirit, the combination of scientific and humanitarian knowledge that research in the field of IR methodology should be carried out. Despite the rapid development of Chinese international relations research after the period of "reform and opening up," Qin Yaqing notes the lack of "self-awareness" in ontology, epistemology and methodology, the lack of attention to international relations research in China²²⁶. Qin Yaqing identifies three methods:

- 1) ontological and epistemological origins of methodological disagreements;
- 2) debate methodology: positivism and hermeneutics;
- 3) the difference and problems of natural science and humanities knowledge.

The crisis of the humanities and the problem of their renewal leads the scientist to the idea that the final approach, which is applied by R. Jackson, B. Buzan, M. Finnemore and others, will be able to create and support new forms of thinking in the practice of future-oriented humanities in the future. This is the approach that scholars favour in the development of their innovative theories.

²²⁴ Member of the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Vice-Rector of the China Institute of International Relations, representative of the constructive current.

²²⁵ Practical method of international research / ed. by Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. P. 16–21. In Chinese.

²²⁶ Ibid. P. 22.

The significant influence of Qin Yaqing's theories on contemporary Chinese political thought is reflected in his attempt to introduce two concepts important to Chinese social culture, "关系" ("relationship", *relationalism*) and "过程" ("process"), into the theory of international relations. Qin Yaqing proposes a complex theoretical construct called "constructivism of the process" – "过程建构主义".

In fact, the term “relations”/“connections”, namely “guanxi” (关系), which not only build a solid foundation for state power, but are also the key to the life of the entire Chinese society. At the heart of relationship management theory is the spiritual expression of the negotiation process. This is what determines such an order, when the behavior of society is characterized by mutual cooperation and trust of citizens, a common understanding of social and moral norms and values, establishing relationships in society to maintain order in which participants behave in a spirit of mutual cooperation and mutual trust.

Qin Yaqing integrates the concept of relationism extremely flexibly into the moral component of his theory, noting its moral content of justice, which is key to understanding the foreign policy ideological foundations of modern China, including.

Proposing the author's "theory of relationships", or "relational management" (关系理论), it makes innovative contributions to the Chinese school of international relations and uses Western conceptual system to interpret Chinese conceptual system such as Confucian relationism²²⁷. "Relational management" differs from Western-style management, which is based on established norms.

According to Qin Yaqing's views, "constructivism of the process" is *first and foremost* a system-level theory that examines how system-level factors influence the behavior of organizations in the international system, and believes that these system factors cannot be considered at the organizational level. *Second*, “process constructivism” advocates a social ontology, focuses on intangible social factors, and emphasizes the interaction and interdependence of actors. Social ontology and social evolution constitute the main theoretical basis of "constructivism of the process".

²²⁷ Qin Yaqing. Culture and global thought: Chinese international theory in the making // Revista CIDOB d'Afers Internacionals. 2012. Vol. 100. P. 70.

Based on his personal understanding of constructivism, he finds from the famous representatives of the American school of constructivism M. Finnemore, A. Acharya and J. Checkel several innovations they developed on the problem dissemination of international norms within the framework of democratization and market economies of the European Union countries (J. Checkel) or regionalization of the Asia-Pacific region (A. Acharya), et al. and develops its own breakthrough theoretical innovations in relation to Chinese foreign policy behavior. This theory of Qin Yaqing reflects the Chinese perspective ("中国视角"). He shows increased analytical interest in these phenomena, since they represent a new Western direction for the theoretical enrichment of Chinese studies. His attention is focused not so much on the development and dissemination of international norms, but directly on the processes and mechanisms of socialization, strategies and tactics of "sending countries" or "disseminators" of norms.

Qin Yaqing is trying to prove that logic and science exist in China, constantly adding to the "theory of relationism." Having reconsidered the phenomenon of "international norm" from the perspective of the formation of Chinese foreign policy and the role of cultural and civilizational identity in it, he turns to research into the empirical field of international relations. Professor Qin Yaqing clearly understands the acute problem of maintaining the viability and security of state borders in the PRC, provided that modern China has an effective state system, despite uprisings and upheavals, introduces his theories on the problems of the failure of the formation of buffer states in China. It focuses on M. Finnemore's theory²²⁸, which draws on the rationalist way of studying the world, as it plays a significant role in almost all studies of norms, and focuses on the influence of international community norms on state identity, interests and learning norms.

Developing the theory of learning as a leading one in the field of socialization, Finnemore "turns" the "learning/learning" model into a "teaching" model. Qin Yaqing's Finnemore learning theory is interested in international and regional norms that set standards for the appropriate behavior of states. Thus, Finnemore analyzes international

²²⁸ Representative of the American school of constructivism in international relations theory. Professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

organizations as the most important elements of social structure. Using the example of the activities of three international institutions, she examines UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) initiatives aimed at developing science, education, cultural and creative industries in developing countries.

Qin Yaqing raises the question of the formation of the theoretical and conceptual foundations of modern regionalism, which has not yet been completed. He is interested in finding new methods and approaches to the study of modern regional processes that are multidimensional and eclectic. In this regard, he studies the works of someone who has been working since the 90s. XX century in the USA and Canada by the Indian researcher A. Acharya.

Focusing on the structure of regional norms, the scholar identifies two paths of norm diffusion. ASEAN adopts two proposals to revise the agenda and change the institutional arrangement. The first proposal, which emerged in the early 1990s, is to establish a multilateral security institution for the Asia-Pacific region based on the norm of "collective security." After the establishment of the structure of ASEAN countries and China, Japan, Republic of Korea ("ASEAN + 3"), this norm is adopted rather quickly. The second proposal, made in the late 1990s, seeks to develop ASEAN's role in addressing transnational issues that would require it to go beyond its traditional commitment to norms of non-interference in the internal affairs of its members. Here, Qin Yaqing faces the dilemma of humanitarian intervention, a sensitive issue that has no easy answer and raises political complexities²²⁹. This concern has its normative roots in post-Cold War notions of human intervention and democratic support, albeit labelled in a regional context as "constructive intervention" and "flexible engagement". At the same time, the norm of humanitarian intervention remains a concern in ASEAN. This is because all its member countries are endowed with respect for and high awareness of sovereignty. On the contrary, the attempt to introduce the norm of non-interference based on the idea of "flexible engagement" has failed. There is no unanimity among ASEAN member countries on the issue. Attempts to revisit the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN member countries have recently gained

²²⁹ Practical method of international research / ed. by Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. P. 31. In Chinese.

momentum with the military coup in Myanmar in 2021. Thus, based on the principle of non-interference, Brunei, Cambodia and Thailand are not prepared to take collective action against the Myanmar government, whose actions are condemned by the global community.

Professor Qin also notes Acharya's most notable contribution to the dialogue on non-Western variants of international relations theory. At the same time, this author is somewhat critical of the idea of creating separate national schools in the PRC, as they may prove to be even more limited than current Western theories.

Professor Qin also notes Acharya's most notable contribution to the development of dialogue on non-Western variants of international relations theory. At the same time, this author is somewhat critical of the idea of creating separate national schools in the PRC, since they may turn out to be even more limited than Western theories existing today.

The third scientist whose works Qin Yaqing turns to is the American representative of the school of constructivism, J. Checkel, who studies the process of assimilation of the norms and rules of a certain community by candidate countries for joining the European Union. Qin Yaqing enriches his theory by emphasizing J. Checkel's constructivist approach to analyzing the dynamics of diffusion, socialization and internalization of international norms (democratization, market economy and other European norms). Internalization involves the assimilation of association norms as adherence to the rules of role behavior dictated by the community and their moral values.

Ignoring the need and effectiveness of using traditional instruments of force in Checkel's theory, it is no coincidence that Qin Yaqing focuses on extramaterial types of force. In his opinion, science pays little attention to socialization in the system of international relations. Thus, he, likewise M. Finnemore, is interested in the mechanisms of "teaching". However, Finnemore's mechanism is a "black box", while Checkel "opens" it; in this regard, Checkel's innovation and central idea is to clarify and reveal the success of the normative mechanism. Thus, the expected damage from social or material sanctions exceeds the desire and need to comply with the norms. Here Qin

Yaqing relies on K. Marx's ideas about social relations based on the criticism of ideology; "socially oriented action" by M. Weber; communicative-rational theory of J. Habermas. In general, this means rethinking the significance and functions of public spaces capable of providing free mutual understanding between social structures or recipient countries in an attempt to find the foundations of social integration. Moreover, this, according to Qin Yaqing, is completely independent of the specific structure of material incentives or sanctions. "Recipient countries" and "sender countries" form a unique emotional field that contributes to the creation in society of an environment of tolerance towards other people's opinions and carries out the so-called "infection" of dialogue partners with certain arguments that incline them to accept the norm.

Qin Yaqing notes that Chekel narrowly and regionally demonstrates, using the example of European integration, the acceptance of rules by actors. Qin Yaqing considers innovative developments in the model of internalization of norms to be the assimilation of norms depending on the role rules that determine the behavior of the "recipient countries" and the assimilation of association norms for reasons of their moral value.

Therefore, three innovations in the field of norm dissemination that Professor Qin identifies from the three researchers described above: 1) Finnemore's is the "teaching/learning" model of international organizations; 2) for Acharya, this is the level of correspondence between the structure of regional norms and international ones; 3) and finally, Checkel explains the mechanisms of norm diffusion. Qin Yaqing writes that these three phenomena enrich research, despite the fact that their analysis has not reached a large theoretical scale, the study of norms is an important part of innovation and deserves close attention as a tool to overcome "false universalism", explaining regionalism through the prism of the European Union countries²³⁰.

Qin Yaqing concludes that the implementation of foreign policy automatically leads to a change in norms. And the cultural and historical context, as a source of norms and ideas, is not static, but a constantly evolving environment. It hinders or promotes the successful assimilation of international norms.

²³⁰ Practical method of international research / ed. by Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. P. 32–33. In Chinese.

Leaving the conceptualization of power to realists, Qin Yaqing does not consider this phenomenon innovative in the study of foreign policy of states. The scientist interprets the "soft power" factor as a unifying approach of the PRC in the European Union. It seems that the practical actions of some European players may correspond to the traditional utilitarian understanding of force, which provides the state with the opportunity to realize its own interests.

Discussing upon the national school of international relations as an idea, Professor Qin pragmatically notes that in modern conditions no one can use only the resources of their own tradition. Qin Yaqing does not agree with either Zhao Tingyang or Yan Xuetong because he does not think that international relations theory is always qualitatively universal or should rely solely on Chinese traditions. It must achieve some degree of universality, but locality and local practices are important. Qin Yaqing continues his idea of a global vision – even when creating a Chinese school of IR, one cannot help but use many Western conceptualizations, approaches and ideas, but at the same time, a modern rethinking of the traditional Chinese line is necessary. Qin Yaqing suggests adding value to Western thought, but keeping the content national. For example, Deng Xiaoping absorbs Western ideas for implementing reforms, as well as the policies of Lee Kuan Yew, the Prime Minister of Singapore. He tries to practice Western ideas, however at the same time adheres to East Asian values.

Summarizing the large conceptual body of Qin Yaqing's ideas, we note that he emphasizes the importance of theoretical generalizations based on an analysis of the changing nature of international and regional relations; features of the processes of regionalism and regionalization throughout the vast diversity of the Asian world. The scientist especially emphasizes the importance of the issue of developing, on this basis, an updated epistemology and research methodology. His latest research is devoted to new approaches to the study of regional, interregional, transregional, etc. connections.

Another representative of constructivism, Professor Shi Yinhong (Director of the Center for American Studies at the People's University), defines the study of history as a classical method for theoretical understanding of international relations; it is of paramount importance in the theorizing of international relations, without which there

will be no real understanding of world or regional political history, political economic history, or the history of world development. Sharing the views of the classics of Western history writing L. von Ranke, P. Schroeder and others, Shi Yinhong based the development of his theory includes the non-forceful formation of the behavior of states, ideas of collective mentality and worldviews with prevailing norms, values and historical experience. In the classical historical approach to the history of international relations, the scientist sees the main value of studying archival materials, a true and truthful presentation of historical events in international politics²³¹.

Globalization theory. The globalization of society is today one of the most important trends in the development of civilization, which in the next decade will have a decisive impact on almost all spheres of society: economics, politics, science, education and culture in the connection that until recently the liberal approaches to the present and the past of humanity and led to increased attention to global concepts. However, in recent years, this theory has been criticized in both the Russian and Western scientific communities, since it idealistically represents a capitalist system that has no shortcomings, and describes the state of world political and social science as a crisis.

Due to the diversity and multidirectionality of globalization theories, globalization remains an ambiguous phenomenon that determines the main world processes. In the theory of globalization, we can highlight such areas of study as the financial market, economics, international relations, management of transnational corporations, culture, migration processes, and ecology.

Globalization is seen as the expansion, intensification and deepening of world interdependence and interconnectedness, manifested in all aspects of modern life. Despite this general understanding of globalization, there are a significant number of different approaches to globalization, but also, as a consequence, differences in the conceptualization of this phenomenon in understanding the causes, structure, consequences and logic of its development²³². One of these visions is the world-system approach, which began to be developed as early as French enlighteners of the 18th–

²³¹ Practical method of international research / ed. by Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. P. 9–11. In Chinese.

²³² Kiryanova L.G., Mazurina O.A. Theories of globalization in the context of the postclassical paradigm // News of Tomsk Polytechnic University. 2007. Vol. 311, no. 7. P. 116.

19th centuries. Thus, H. Saint-Simon, A. Comte, G. Hegel, K. Marx consider the unity of humanity as the unity of the race. Their main principle is “people should behave like brothers”²³³. Over the centuries, the idea of a “common destiny”, unity and brotherhood has been developed in various political and economic conditions, first of the Russian (Russian, Moscow) kingdom, the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, then modern Russia. It clearly relies on spiritual and moral purity, love, humility²³⁴. D.I. Mendeleev and V.S. Soloviev and other great Russian thinkers discovered a system of community life and interconnectedness of peoples. Saint-Simon's idea of brotherhood is consonant with the Confucian idea "people between the four seas are brothers" and the modern concept of Xi Jinping²³⁵.

The systemic crisis of the modern world order defines the theory of globalization as a key concept in scientific discourse, the subject of which it became in the mid-1990s. This system emerged and was formed in the late 1960s. Western scientists G. Arrighi, I. Wallerstein, G. Modelski, R. Robertson and other ideologists stand at the origins of the development of globalization processes that perceive the world as a system. They view humanity as a single and holistic entity, and not as a collection of separately existing civilizations.

In our opinion, significant influence on the nature of China's foreign policy is influenced by the ideology of the world-system approach of F. Braudel and I. Wallerstein²³⁶. Wallerstein led the world-system school, which describes the spread of the European world system through successive crises and hegemonic shifts. The world-system scientific direction became the Golden Age of a grandiose historical vision of historical research conducted over the course of a century. Wallerstein and Marx believe that Marxism provided the movement towards revolution. Reflecting on the conceptual design of large regional structures, Wallerstein, Braudel and Marx describe static macro-

²³³ Pecheritsa V.F., Boyarkina A.V. Ideas of European scientists and politicians about the "common destiny" of peoples: in the past and present. Vladivostok, 2021. P. 54.

²³⁴ Boyarkina A.V. Xi Jinping's concept of a "community of a common destiny for humanity" and ideas about a “common destiny” in the works of Russian scientists and politicians // Discourse-Pi. 2020. No. 4 (41). P. 125.

²³⁵ Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. European scientists and politicians about the "common destiny" of peoples: towards the formulation of the problem // Bulletin of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Russia and the World. 2020. No. 3 (25). P. 90.

²³⁶ See, for example: Wallerstein I. Analysis of world systems and the situation in the modern world. St. Petersburg, 2001. 416 p. et al.

regional structures that are incapable of independent economic growth. However, unlike Marx, Wallerstein allows for the possibility (without rejecting the capitalist system) of its reorganization several decades in the future. We admit that Wallerstein's world-system is utopian, unclear and uncertain, since future world-systems are multi-element and difficult to predict. In addition, humanity can develop in different directions. The teachings of Marx and Wallerstein objectively do not coincide, although Wallerstein himself may consider himself a successor of Marx.

A follower of world-system analysis in China is Professor Li Mingqi. In his work "The Rise of China and the Decline of the Capitalist World Economy", analyzing world historical processes, factors and reasons for China's economic power, he poses the problem of environmental sustainability in the development of future economic systems as a necessity in the distribution of population resources. He asks the question of the unity of the world economy as a global system. The post-capitalist world-system must be based on political and social principles that can contribute to the collapse of the existing world-system and lead to the deterioration of the world ecosystem.

In addition, Wallerstein's world-system paradigm most substantively examines modern economic global processes. Beijing is actively offering the world its new initiatives, one of which is "One Belt, One Road". In our opinion, this strategy is a true example of global design to promote economic development and exchanges between China and more than 60 countries. Acting in line with the model of a world empire and a world economy, the Chinese state has been since the 1980s. begins to actively invest in second and third world countries, creating its own system of dependent countries. Thus, they fall not only into a technological, but also a financial trap. But this is not a problem of China, but of those countries that have not conducted a financial examination of their capital and investments. China intends to deprive the United States of its leadership status in the near future, but does not seize foreign enterprises or territories by force or by building large numbers of military bases (as some European states or the United States in general do, aggressively and using force). By developing the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, the Chinese government hopes to produce and freely distribute its goods and technologies not only in European countries, but also to

pave the way further to Africa and even to the United States, if this were possible. China is building infrastructure facilities, building railway networks, enterprises and power plants, et al. It ensures the growth of its economy and, in part, the European one. At the same time, since the mid-2010s. The EU's attitude towards China has changed significantly. European politicians, fearing the economic "predatory" aggression of the PRC in their own markets for high-tech products, are strengthening and will strengthen the functioning of the EU Investment Screening Mechanism, introduced in October 2020.

We believe that the trade conflict with the US, then after 2020. The COVID-19 pandemic and falling hydrocarbon prices are testing China's production and technological base and strengthening its domestic market amid the weakening of the United States and European countries. This leads to the fact that deglobalization has an impact on the partner countries of the PRC and its Asian neighbors within the framework of the "One Belt, One Road" initiative.

It seems that globalization will entail the most radical changes in the sphere of culture, where we can expect a new humanitarian revolution, unprecedented in the history of mankind²³⁷. In the study of global theories, the Chinese scientific community also relies on the Marxist teaching of economics and culture and is gradually expanding the theoretical and methodological foundations of its analysis. In many works, the use of a constructive (socio-cultural) approach, based on comparative historical and historical genetic methods, is easily revealed. At the same time, these concepts are subject to serious analysis and criticism.²³⁸ Professor Wang Shuzu analyzes the relationship between economy and culture, which reveals the economy as a source of social and cultural development. We share the opinion of Chinese researchers about the identity of culture and economy as a structure due to the fact that globalization is a consequence of rapid economic development, which should not be worshiped and followed in its mainstream, otherwise there is a danger of losing national identity²³⁹.

²³⁷ Colin K.K. Globalization and culture // Strategic priorities. 2014. No. 4. P. 80.

²³⁸ Artashkina T.A. The formation of the science of culture in modern China // Professional education in the modern world. 2017. Vol. 7, no. 3. P. 1153.

²³⁹ Wang Shuzu. Economic and cultural globalization. Beijing, 2006. 176 p. In Chinese.

Despite the fact that the Chinese scientific community has not yet formed a clear understanding of the nature of the content of globalisation processes, the number of references to the theoretical concepts of Western, primarily American authors is increasing. The ideas of R. Robertson, E. Giddens, I. Wallerstein are reinterpreted by Chinese scientists through the prism of Marxist views. A large number of Wallerstein's works have been translated into Chinese. Professor Chen Lei²⁴⁰ agrees with the opinion of Western authors who defend the multicultural nature of globalization processes. Chinese researchers have no doubt that it is in the cultural sphere that threats will be eliminated and the main problems of the future of humanity will be solved, and not in the economic or political spheres.

The above allows us to draw a number of conclusions and generalizations about the features of the theoretical and methodological basis for studying the foreign policy concepts of the PRC. They are as follows. **Firstly**, the traditional ideas of Chinese thinkers about the nature of foreign policy underlie the cultural code of the Celestial Empire, which defines one of the highest values of the millennia-old national tradition. The philosophy of the Celestial Empire, history, and foreign policy are stable thanks to the conceptual basis of traditional Chinese philosophical thought – "correlative" or "associative thinking". Value-ideological categories of "harmony", "change" ("通便"), "gongsheng" ("共生"), "strength" ("势") are imbued with a cultural dimension and have a serious and significant influence on the foreign policy of the PRC today.

One of the components of the great revival of the Chinese nation is culture and traditions –precisely those vital elements of the national mentality necessary when resolving issues of war and peace, understanding the Confucian principle in Chinese foreign policy and military strategy. The behavior of the PRC in the international arena stems from an understanding of Chinese "harmony," "great unity," "community," and other ideas, and in turn leads to an understanding of "strategic culture." It, in our opinion, will help eliminate the US isolationist course and pave the way for her leadership, strengthening China's global governance.

²⁴⁰ Chen Lei. Cultural globalization. Cultural security and cultural identity // National Studies in Guangxi. 2010. No. 2. P. 37–40. In Chinese; Cui Hui, Dai Xiaojie. Study of strategic problems of the development of Chinese culture in the context of globalization // Bulletin of the Weinan Pedagogical Institute. 2011. Vol. 26, no. 5. P. 38–41. In Chinese.

Secondly, an analysis of the influence of Marxist teaching on the foreign policy concepts of the PRC shows, in general, China as a state that has moved away from the global communist regime. The PRC no longer seeks to impose its own development model on other states.

Marxism is interconnected with traditional culture of China. This shows, firstly, that the Chinese approach to Marxism proves effective in the practical implementation of state power and the management of socio-economic and cultural processes. In addition, an important task for the modernization and popularization of Marxism in China is to fix this teaching in scientific research. Secondly, the components of traditional culture complement and enrich modern Marxism in China. Thirdly, the political leadership of China intends to develop new ideas of Marxism and conduct in-depth study of it in order to solve important practical problems, implement reforms and development. This gives the distinctive characteristics of Marxism in modern China. Fourth, Chinese national culture and Marxism are developed under the leadership of Marxism combined with elements of traditional culture.

Today's China has moved much further away from Marxism in foreign policy than in the 50s and 60s. of the 20-th century. However, even today it would be too simplistic to explain his foreign policy course solely by the revival of traditional theories and practices. This allows us to go back and look back at the events of October 1, 1949, when the birth of the People's Republic of China occurs and Mao Zedong utters a phrase that remains key for the entire Chinese people: "From now on, the Chinese people have straightened their shoulders and risen from their knees." It is with the figure of Mao Zedong that the end of the era of national humiliation is associated, when the Western powers turned China into a semi-colony. And the fifth leader of the leaders of the PRC is making every effort to achieve a united and great national revival by the people and the state. Since 2017, President Xi Jinping has been pursuing a course on the revival of the Chinese nation, which means a synthesis of the traditional political culture of Confucianism and Sinicized Marxism. His concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" is most filled not only with traditional ideas, but also with Marxist content. In our opinion, this is an attempt not only to preserve, but also to strengthen the

specific Chinese culture. Not economically – China's economy is the second largest, its financial condition has strengthened overall.

Third, an analysis of the influence of Western theories of international relations: realism, liberalism, constructivism and the theory of globalization on the foreign policy ideas of modern China shows that the theoretical research of Chinese political scientists is strengthened and enriched by the traditional cultural ideological foundations and values of the Celestial Empire. In relation to foreign policy, Chinese scholars have noted a normative discrepancy between "Chinese" and "Western" views of world order. Given these gaps in understanding, the literature suggests that states do not act equally in similar situations. Leading experts have commented on the importance and necessity of developing and implementing their own so-called "non-Western" or national versions of the theory of international relations. Scholars have conducted research ranging from relations between major powers to the entire structures of the international system, from economic interdependence to regional integration and from international institutions to global governance. Their use of theories has also reached a wide scale: not only realism, liberalism, social constructivism, but also the English school, Marxism, feminism, etc. Given that leading scholars and think tank researchers serve as advisers to the Chinese government on international policy issues, there is a direct relationship between academic debate and the discourse of official political strategy.

Yan Xuetong, Qin Yaqing, Zhao Tingyang, Shi Yinhong, Li Xiaoyan and other political scientists are strengthening the Chinese theoretical complex of foreign policy ideological foundations. They add innovation, putting forward their own innovative approaches, filled with ancient ideas of the Middle Kingdom, in order to eliminate the imperfections of English, American or French theories of international relations. These scientists are strategists, engaging in open discussion among themselves, critically evaluating their work. Their theories are intended to reveal the general nature of strategy, as well as to explain the elements that shape and determine specific historical strategies. As an example, they cite the vast corpus of philosophy of the Celestial Empire, thereby proposing the development of modern methods of scientific knowledge based on classical works of a philosophical and religious nature, among others. Arguing on the

results and prospects for the development of Chinese theories of international relations, scientists strive for innovation in their research and put emphasis on the combination of opposites in managing relations between states and in the world as a whole.

We cannot but agree with the position of Yan Xuetong, who represents the world of traditional Chinese concepts of world order as more useful than Western approaches. This means a synthesis of Chinese constructive dialogue, based, among other things, on traditional thinking, with Western concepts of international relations. Political leadership, Professor Yan is convinced, is a decisive factor in the outcome of rivalry between countries. His "moral realism" states that strategic trust is the core morality of a country's government, and the type of leadership determines the rise and fall of a country. In addition, material interest and material power are the main resources of the realist school and the liberal school. It is no coincidence that Yan Xuetong highly appreciates the role of the heritage of the philosophers of the Celestial Empire as a significant contribution to the development of these directions. Professor Yan thus enriches the theory of international relations.

Xu Tianbo and Li Xiaoyan advocate culturally oriented behavior of the state and society. They defend the positions of the Confucian tradition in conjunction with the implementation of diplomatic strategy and foreign policy in order to maintain peace with other states and the security of the modern PRC. We believe that order in Chinese society, where foreign and domestic policies are determined by the actions of the emperor/ruler/chairman, is regulated by the behavior of society. Here, scholars, reflecting on restoring the balance in governing the country and behavior in the international arena, identify the role of leadership in the process of formation of the Chinese state as a central problem.

In studying the features of the theoretical and methodological basis of the PRC, we will highlight the theory of moral realism of Yan Xuetong, which determines the forecast for the development of foreign policy relations of the PRC in the future, emphasizing that this system is only beginning to form the Chinese idea of building a world order and China's place in it. This position is fully consistent with the modern state of the theory of international relations. But the question of what theories should be

and how to form them remains largely open. We emphasize the positive aspect expressed in fixing the starting points for subsequent research.

Fourthly. We highlight separately breakthrough innovations, which, according to Qin Yaqing, represent the quintessence of regional cultural and value ideas, as well as the main goal of doctoral research in the PRC. Professor Qin Yaqing updates the study of problems of regional integration, mutual "learning" of international structures and even civilizations from each other. His "relational theory" and "constructivism of process", as systems-level theories, became an umbrella approach that unites different theoretical schools and comparative methodology. In our opinion, its ideology is full of peace-loving characteristics, which, of course, plays an important role in building a traditional regional order in Northeast and East Asia as well. The world order in this region is influenced by Confucian culture, which is based on the philosophy of harmony with the mechanisms of relational governance of Qin Yaqing.

Speaking on the foreign policy thought in the tradition (Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism), we note in their evolution in the consciousness of society and the elite both convergence and synthesis, and mutual criticism and competition. The scope of our study does not include an analysis of the religious component of the ideological foundations of foreign policy and the views of the Chinese leadership on religion. However, in order to avoid the false impression of a certain internal harmony and unity inherent in Chinese foreign policy thought, we note that the legalists advocated the control of political and public opinion by law and spoke about regulating the economic sphere while maintaining state monopolies, the need to create a strong centralized state, reliance on a strong army and the need for external expansion. Declaratively, implicitly, legalism is also present in the modern foreign policy actions of Chinese leaders. Currently, the fifth generation Chinese leader and society need a strong army as an image component (it is not prestigious to build modern international relations exclusively with a trading country).

It is impossible to say with complete confidence that today is only the dominant trend of traditional Chinese political culture. Taoist views are generally characteristic of third, fourth and fifth generation leaders. A number of soft non-force ideas of Taoism are developed in the concepts of Jiang Zemin, especially Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping.

Analyzing the role of Confucianism in the development of foreign policy principles, we note the special religious climate that has developed in China, which is secondary to the primary sacred role of the state. A pyramidal religious structure did not arise, and there were no religious contradictions or wars throughout history, since the state is above religious tradition. Confucians advocated the need to follow high antiquity in order to ensure the stability of the civilizational core and culture, they talked about the importance of morally following the path of Fuxi, Shennong, Yao, Yu, et al.

In the early period of development of the Celestial Empire and now, Confucianism stabilizes the state order, foreign policy and spiritual life. And it is no coincidence that the idea of collectivism peacefully coexists alongside Confucian traditions. Practice, according to Deng Xiaoping, is the foundation of Marxist philosophy, the essence of Marxist teaching. It contributes to the understanding of his entire ideological system.

The elements of foreign policy thought as humanism, materialism of the historical worldview and the ideal of commonwealth are similar to Marxist philosophy and Confucianism. They complement each other, for instance, Confucianism can borrow scientificity and modernity from Marxism, and Marxism, in turn, can be close to the traditions of Chinese society.

We emphasize the distinctive features of European and Chinese Marxism. Chinese Marxism is historically defined by an ideology that includes Marx's class analysis; Lenin's understanding of imperialism; and the ideas of Mao Zedong (in particular, the theory of contradictions). In practice, these elements are inseparable: international class struggle gives rise to imperialism, and imperialism becomes the dominant international contradiction.

K. Marx and F. Engels as ideologists of the working class who participated in the European revolutionary movement, channeled European Marxism into urban militaries. While in New China, Mao, with the support of the alliance of the working class, peasantry, intelligentsia and national bourgeoisie, defeated the Kuomintang, conquered and strengthened power in the country. Since the mid-1930s, following the election of a

new party leadership led by Mao Zedong, Sinicized Marxism developed. It was Mao who organized his armed forces and revolutionized the countryside.

In our opinion, of the above Western theories of international relations, which are partly used by the modern leadership of the PRC, the theories of globalism and constructivism are most traceable in the evolution of foreign policy thought. In the new conditions of the theory of globalism, the Chinese expert community considers as a potential engine for the further development of the PRC, but from an economic point of view, a positive attitude towards globalization, of which the PRC is a consistent defender, emphasizing the objective nature and inevitability of this process. This position is associated with the great benefits that China received from active participation in the international division of labor and interstate cooperation. China opposes this position with its concept of a new type of multilateralism, based on the idea of the "community of common destiny for mankind." At the same time, globalization threatens to lose Chinese national identity. The PRC leadership is clearly aware that globalization is a natural process and, in the opinion of many, irreversible. In our opinion, cultural globalization should be intensified in order to eliminate religious and national boundaries, strengthen language skills, and promote the exchange of knowledge and scientific technologies.

CHAPTER 2. THE GOALS AND PRIORITIES OF THE FOREIGN POLICY COURSE OF THE FIRST GENERATION OF CHINESE LEADERS

2.1. The foreign policy ideas of the People's Republic of China in the early years of people's power (1949–the end of the 1950s): from the principle of a "lean to one side" to the theory of "three worlds"

Having won the civil war against the Kuomintang (国民党), the Chinese Communist leadership, led by Mao Zedong (毛泽东), proclaimed the formation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) (中华人民共和国) on October 1, 1949. The new government has set a course for building socialism. The foreign policy of the Chinese state had to correspond to this main goal. It is formed taking into account the difficult international situation, in the conditions of the cold war and the acute confrontation between the two political forces, which were led by the USSR and the United States. This approach of the Chinese leadership proceeded from the confrontation of the theories of two main camps: the imperialist-anti-democratic, led by the United States, and the anti-imperialist-democratic, grouped around the USSR²⁴¹.

The priority and main direction of Beijing's foreign policy is strengthening cooperation with the USSR, which helped the Chinese people in defeating the Japanese invaders. The Soviet Union was the first to recognize the people's power and provided tremendous assistance in domestic and foreign policy. In a short period, the USSR became the main military and political ally of the People's Republic of China, which was enshrined in the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China on February 14, 1950. (for a period of thirty years) during the stay in Moscow of the Chinese party and government delegation headed by Mao Zedong²⁴².

²⁴¹ Zhao Hongwei. Chinese diplomacy in the context of the processes of mutual influence and rivalry in East Asia // Analytical notes of the MGIMO Scientific Coordinating Council for International Studies (U) of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2007. Iss. 1 (21). P. 14.

²⁴² Kapitsa M.S. Soviet-Chinese relations. p. 353; Ryabchenko N.P. Treaty of historical significance: to the 60th anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance // Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region. 2010. No. 2. P. 127.

During the years of the PRC's rule by Mao Zedong, several priority foreign policy strategies of China can be identified: This is the theoretical position about the "middle" or "intermediate zone", which developed into the theory of the "intermediate zone"; the strategy of the "two middle zones", which transformed into the theory of the "two intermediate zones", and the concept of the "three worlds"²⁴³.

These doctrines are based on the philosophical principles of the materialist dialectics of K. Marx and F. Engels in relation to the transformation of modern international society. Based on the statement about the study of nature, history and human spiritual activity, K. Marx emphasizes the endless picture of all kinds of interlacements and interactions²⁴⁴. Guided by the ideas of Marxism (马克思主义理论), Mao proceeds from the opposition and unity of contradictions, analyzes the relations of interests between the political entities of the international community and puts forward the thesis "who is our enemy, who is our friend" in the first place in the implementation of diplomatic strategy, considers a theoretical model for a systematic analysis of the international political situation.

In the early years of the government, the theoretical foreign policy framework of the Maoist leadership mainly consisted of individual appeals, slogans and statements by the Beijing leaders and did not yet represent integral systemic views, foreign policy doctrines and even deeper concepts. All of them were aimed at substantiating the new diplomatic course of the PRC²⁴⁵. Its main content was reduced to the commitment of the Chinese people to the socialist vector of development and the fight against world imperialism, to active rapprochement with the USSR (苏维埃社会主义共和国联盟) and the countries of the socialist camp²⁴⁶. International isolation from Western countries and the difficult socio-economic situation of the People's China dictated the need for the country to join the camp of socialism led by the USSR. Mao justifies this necessity in the article "On People's Democracy". At the same time, he draws on the views of Sun

²⁴³ Han Yan. Op. cit. P. 202–205.

²⁴⁴ K. Marx. F. Engels. Works. Ed. 2-e. Moscow, 1961. Vol. 20. XXII, 827 P.

²⁴⁵ The "one-way bias" course, or the period of "one-side decision-making", is called "一边倒"决策" in China.

²⁴⁶ Yan Yubin. Op. cit. P. 9–10. In Chinese.

Yat-sen and takes into account the 28-year experience of the development of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (中国共产党).²⁴⁷

A new foreign policy strategy aimed at implementing the "three great principles" ("另起炉灶", "打扫干净屋子再请客", «一边倒»的原则.): "start all over again"; "clean up the house, and then invite guests"; "stick to one side")²⁴⁸ demands: "to form an alliance with the USSR"; "not to recognize the diplomatic relations established by the government of Chiang Kai-shek²⁴⁹, but to start all over again." Its author calls for "the elimination of all manifestations of imperialist influence in China (to close foreign military bases, banks, settlements, schools, publishing houses, hospitals, etc.)."²⁵⁰

The above provisions were included in the "General Program of the NPCC" of 1949²⁵¹ ("共同纲领"), which contains the principles of the PRC's foreign policy, among others. According to these principles, diplomacy should adhere to the principles of independence, autonomy and territorial sovereignty, defend lasting international peace and friendly cooperation between the peoples of all countries, and resist the imperialist policy of aggression and war²⁵².

The fundamental content of the new Chinese policy is the confrontation with the United States and the exposure of Washington's aggressive imperialist policy. And it was justified. The Truman administration not only did not recognize the PRC and called on other countries to do so, but also continued to support Chinese nationalists in Taiwan.

In numerous speeches and statements of the early 50s of the XX century. Mao Zedong argues that world imperialism is the main threat to China. "Now is the period of

²⁴⁷ Yan Yubin. Op. cit; Vinogradov A.O. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 1949–1976.

²⁴⁸ Diplomacy / ed. Yang Chuan. P. 460. In Chinese; Zhang Xian li. Mao Zedong's assessment of the situation in three important diplomatic decisions in 1949 // Institute of History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee. 01.22.2018. URL: <https://www.dswxyjy.org.cn/n1/2019/0228/c423725-30948695.html> (accessed: 08.04.2022). In Chinese.

²⁴⁹ 蒋介石. Military and political figure of China, who led the Kuomintang Party in 1925 after the death of Sun Yat-sen; President of the Republic of China.

²⁵⁰ Sveshnikov A.A. Concepts of the People's Republic of China in the field of foreign policy and national security // China in world politics. Moscow, 2001. P. 93–94; Grachikov E.N. Features of China's foreign policy: stages of changing strategies // Observer. 2015. No. 3 (302). P. 36.

²⁵¹ The general program of the NPCC. Adopted at the 1st plenary meeting of the People's Political Consultative Council of China (CPPCC) on September 29, 1949.

²⁵² Diplomacy / ed. Yang Chuang. P. 460–461. In Chinese.

the last struggle against imperialism, ... imperialism in this world is our enemy. Now is the time of the last struggle of imperialism, it is dying, "imperialism is dying capitalism." In the international community, China belongs to the anti-imperialist front led by the Soviet Union... The Chinese people must lean towards either imperialism or socialism... there is no third way. ...China's main ally and pillar in the fight against imperialism is the USSR ."²⁵³

The decision to ally with the USSR was made in March 1949 at the 2nd plenum of the CPC Central Committee. The 1950 Treaty finally consolidated the military-political agreement, which obliged the two sides to come to each other's aid in the event of an attack by Japan or the United States of America. The relationship between the two leaders, Mao Zedong and Stalin, has also moved into a stage of close trust. The main content of the PRC's course is the principle, the name of which is fixed in the domestic Chinese literature as "keeping one side".²⁵⁴ It was the period of the "ten years of honeymoon", the heyday of Soviet-Chinese relations in the military, diplomatic, economic and other spheres.

It was the heyday of truly close and fraternal relations between the two states. It was not only the comprehensive assistance of the USSR in building a new Chinese state, the army, training specialists, creating entire branches of the national economy with thousands of factories, but also the full support of the PRC in its foreign policy²⁵⁵. During the period of interaction between the USSR–China alliance from 1949 to the 1960s, the economic and military-technical assistance of the Soviet Union to China alone is estimated at 1.5 billion US dollars²⁵⁶.

The leadership of the People's Republic of China considered the USSR to be the most ideologically close to its new system. In all lines and directions, the PRC has become closely close not only to the Soviet Union, but also to the countries of the eastern communist bloc. In the conceptual sphere, in the first years after coming to

²⁵³ Mao Zedong. Selected works. Vol. 2 // Information portal "Qiushivan". 2019. July 31st. URL: http://www.qstheory.cn/books/2019-07/31/c_1119478087_23.htm (accessed: 01.08.2022). In Chinese.

²⁵⁴ Or let's say the translation is "the course / principle of "one-way declination"."

²⁵⁵ Jiang Yumeng, Bychkovskaya O.M. Features of the PRC's policy towards the USSR in 1949–1979 // Belarus in the modern world. Minsk, 2019. P. 113.

²⁵⁶ Terri I R. Decree. Op. P. 229

power, the Chinese Communists perceived the theory of the "two camps" ("两大阵营" 理论") in its Soviet interpretation, which reflected the coincidence of geopolitical (strategic) and ideological aspects of Chinese politics.²⁵⁷

During the People's Liberation War²⁵⁸, Mao Zedong, along with the theory of "two camps", also developed the theory of "intermediate zones", which provided for the existence of an intermediate force relatively independent of the two camps – the United States and the Soviet Union.

The close rapprochement of the PRC and the USSR in the early 1950s on the basis of ideological and political cooperation is also emphasized by Western researchers. Harvard University professors talk about the presence of "Soviet DNA in Chinese political culture" and the great contribution of the Soviet Union and Stalin personally to the formation and development of the Chinese Communist Party. Professor K. Kirby writes: "Without the Communist Party of China, there would be no New China, ... and without the Soviet Union, there would be no Communist Party of China and ... there would be no People's Republic of China. ...No foreign state, whether mentor or rival, revolutionary or revisionist, has had more weight in modern China than the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."²⁵⁹

The Korean War in 1950-1953 made a significant adjustment to the development of the Chinese foreign policy course of "sticking to one side". It has further strained Sino-American relations. China and the United States became embroiled in a three-year war on the Korean Peninsula from June 1950 to July 1953. The entry of the PRC into this war in October 1950 was perceived in the United States as a serious threat to the security of their country and Japan.

During the Korean War, Soviet-Chinese cooperation developed quite effectively. The Soviet Union provided air support to the People's Liberation Army of China, provided a large number of military supplies and economic assistance. During these

²⁵⁷ Sveshnikov A.A. Concepts of the PRC in the field of foreign policy and national security. p. 93; Ren Donglai. From the theory of the "two camps" to the "five principles of peaceful coexistence": the evolution of China's views and policies towards Nation-States // Pacific Bulletin. 2000. No. 4. P. 87–94. In Chinese.

²⁵⁸ The Chinese Civil War, June 1946–September 1949

²⁵⁹ China learns from the Soviet Union, 1949–Present / ed. by Li Hua Yu, Th.P. Bernstein, T.M. Chen. [S. l.], 2010. 562 p.

years, China finally adopted the Soviet model of its development²⁶⁰. All this testified to the friendly and warm relations between the two countries in the first half of the 1950s and the priority diplomatic course of the PRC towards the USSR. During these years, there were frequent contacts between the governments of the two countries.

In 1951, at a meeting in the Crimea, Zhou Enlai and I. Stalin agreed on the issue of Soviet Union assistance – to send Soviet military pilots to the border with Korea in order to cover the operations of the Chinese army from the air. As a result of a counteroffensive by Chinese and North Korean troops, Pyongyang was liberated in December, and Seoul was retaken in January 1952. However, the situation later stabilized, and as a result of negotiations in July 1953, it was possible to reach an armistice between the North and the South, again dividing the warring parties along the 38th parallel.

Given the increasing role of the PRC in Asia, the Washington administration has tried to develop China's relations with the United States tensely. She has taken a tough stance towards China. Washington "fanned" the cold War in the region by tightening the economic embargo against Beijing in the fall of 1950, increased support for the nationalist government in Taiwan, blocking the PRC's membership in the UN and trying to isolate the PRC in the international arena.²⁶¹

At the same time, in January 1950, the President of the United States G. Truman, realizing that China avoids military and political responsibility in the Korean crisis, made a statement about the absence of US intentions to interfere in the Taiwan problem in any way, and unveiled the geographical boundary of Washington's defense strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. It gets the name "Acheson line". According to this strategy, neither the Korean Peninsula nor Taiwan entered the limits of the zone limited by this line, and China's status as a great power in East Asia was confirmed (previously recognized by the United States in the Cairo Declaration).²⁶²

²⁶⁰ Grachikov E.N. Features of China's foreign policy: stages of changing strategies. P. 34–46.

²⁶¹ Xia Aifeng. The cold war and Chinese foreign policy // E-International Relations. 2008. July. 16. P. 1. URL: <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/518> (accessed: 21.11.2021).

²⁶² Zhao Hongwei. Op. cit. P. 15.

In March 1951, an information report by the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States was published entitled "Plans of the Chinese Communists regarding the Korean War and World War III." It analyzed possible actions that the PRC could take in the event of an escalation of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula before the Third World War. The plan mentions a secret Soviet-Chinese agreement concluded in October 1950, to which China would appeal if UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. This agreement obliged the USSR to provide direct support to the PRC. A U.S. intelligence report reported that if world War broke out, the Chinese Communists did not plan to leave the coast without a fight. It was mentioned that additional troops were being sent to Eastern China at that time, and it was also reported that 300 aircraft had arrived in Qingdao. In the comments to the report, it was suggested that the ongoing accumulation of military forces in Eastern China could serve as a cover for the upcoming attack on Taiwan. In general, this information report serves as an additional confirmation that the United States was actively monitoring not only its main political opponent, the USSR, but also China.

Hoping to prevent economic cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of China by expanding military operations, imposing an economic blockade and an embargo on the supply of strategic goods to China and North Korea, the US government, however, failed and decided to cease hostilities in October 1952²⁶³.

The Korean war led to serious international isolation of the People's Republic of China, primarily from Western countries. Despite all the efforts of the new leadership, the PRC was recognized only by the countries of the socialist camp and some developing countries. Most countries of the world continued to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan.

This war had a serious impact on China's foreign policy, consolidating the course of "one-way bias." In addition, Chinese leaders were finally convinced of the long and impetuous return of Taiwan, which had turned into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of the United States, to the bosom of the mainland²⁶⁴. In 1954, the PRC fired artillery at

²⁶³ Foreign Policy and International Relations of the People's Republic of China, 1949–1963. Vol. 1. P. 79–81.

²⁶⁴ Vinogradov A.O. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 1949–1976.

Kinmen Island (Kemoy) in the western part of the Taiwan Strait in order to disrupt the security treaty between the United States and Taiwan.

Learning from the consequences of the war on the Korean Peninsula in 1953, Beijing is making diplomatic efforts to break out of international isolation, which is reflected in the new foreign policy doctrine of the People's Republic of China, first formulated by Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Zhou Enlai (周恩来) in 1954. It is called the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" («和平共处五项原则»). The Chinese leadership announced that it "stands for a foreign policy of preserving world peace and peaceful coexistence of countries with different systems." By offering the world a multi-vector foreign policy, Beijing tried to create a more attractive image of a communist country and raise its authority.

The five principles include:

- mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty (互相尊重领土主权 (在亚非会议上改为互相尊重主权和领土完整));
- mutual non-aggression (互不侵犯);
- mutual non-interference in the internal Affairs of each other (互不干涉内政);
- equality and mutual benefit (平等互惠);
- peaceful coexistence (平等互利和和平共处).

In fact, four of the five principles prescribe a policy of non-interference with other sovereign States. And the pursuit of equality and mutual benefit is both a political and an economic guideline. Thus, the five principles can be reduced to two: justice and non-interference. Despite some ambiguity, vagueness and triviality, these principles, according to many politicians and analysts of the world, still regulate the international behavior of most countries on the planet²⁶⁵.

These five principles were proposed by the PRC to the participants of the Bandung Conference (万隆亚非会议) in 1955. Beijing called on the participants of this

²⁶⁵ Gillespie S. Op. cit. P. 112

conference to recognize the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" as the basis for building diplomatic relations in the Afro-Asian world. Such a broad coalition of states was supposed to bring China out of isolation and ensure its legitimate position in the world. To this end, Mao Zedong mitigated ideological differences and proposed reconciliation initiatives as a means of rapprochement with many third world countries.²⁶⁶ At the Conference, the expression "mutual respect for territorial sovereignty" was replaced by "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity" (1955年4月, 万隆亚非会议召开, 周恩来在全体会议和政治委员会会议两次发言中, 将«互相尊重领土主权»改为«互相尊重主权和领土完整»加以表述).²⁶⁷

Zhou Enlai, the first head of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, made a huge contribution to the implementation of a softer and compromise policy of the People's Republic of China in these years. As a man seeking to resolve unresolved differences and gain a reputation as a reasonable person, he, who oversees the country's foreign policy, sought to avoid international conflicts, to reconcile and tried to identify China's course with the common cause of peace. It is on his initiative that the political leadership of the People's Republic of China develops and puts into practice two additional principles of peaceful coexistence of states to the original five:

1. Respect for the freedom of choice of the political and economic system.
2. Mutually beneficial relations between peoples²⁶⁸.

The decisions of the Bandung Conference, where Zhou Enlai made a large and informative report, become landmark installations for the Chinese foreign policy line²⁶⁹, which continues at the present time. Indeed, in different periods it differs in strategies, tactics, tools, forms and goals, but the basis remains the same, the basic principles of China's foreign policy remain unchanged. In recent decades, they have been included in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China in 1982, as well as in the defensive

²⁶⁶ The Chinese view of the world. P. 230

²⁶⁷ [Party History Calendar]. "Five principles of peaceful coexistence" by Zhou Enlai // Central Radio Network. 2021. December 31. URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1720615878437184120&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed: 01.08.2022). In Chinese.

²⁶⁸ Cooley J. K. East wind over Africa: Red China's African Offensive. New York, 1965. P. 11.

²⁶⁹ Tolmachev Yu. O. Sino-Indian relations in the late 40s – early 60s of the XX century: abstract ... dissertation of the Candidate of Historical Sciences. Tambov, 2016. P. 18.

strategy of the country's foreign policy²⁷⁰. They are also confirmed in the decisions of the XIX Congress of the CPC, which clearly stated that China continues to pursue a peaceful and independent foreign policy («中国坚定奉行独立自主的和平外交政策。»)»²⁷¹.

Zhou Enlai's "secret key" at the Bandung Conference was his offer to negotiate with the United States, China's main rival, on the Taiwan issue. He made this offer at just the right moment to achieve the desired effect. It was a success of Chinese diplomacy, and during this period Beijing gained a reputation as a compliant partner, ready to resolve differences through negotiations. Zhou emphasized two vectors that China shares with all other countries: the history of colonial rule and the need for further independence based on economic recovery. It is noteworthy that none of these vectors related to the Soviet Union. In the 1950s and 1960s, the "five Principles of peaceful coexistence" were considered an effective tool for overcoming differences between the countries of the "third world" and resisting pressure from the West²⁷².

After the Bandung Conference, moderation and neutrality have become positive factors in China's foreign policy²⁷³. Under these conditions, the Chinese leadership attached increasing importance to the Afro-Asian region as the main center of the anti-imperialist struggle, and Afro-Asian solidarity embodied in the "spirit of Bandung" became a prominent theme of Chinese foreign policy statements²⁷⁴.

In 1955, the Chinese leadership consolidated the principles of peaceful coexistence as the official state policy of the People's Republic of China in relation to all countries of the "third world". Mao Zedong found the international situation "extremely favorable", despite the widespread controversy surrounding a possible armed conflict between the USSR and the US²⁷⁵. On this basis, the theory of "two

²⁷⁰ Liu Lirong. The Evolution of China's EU policy: from Mao's intermediate zone to a strategic partnership based on non-shared values // JEIH Journal of European Integration History. 2012. Vol. 18, iss. 1. P. 11.

²⁷¹ Xi Jinping. The text of the report at the XIX Congress of the CPC "To achieve a decisive victory in the complete construction of a medium-income society, to win the great victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era" (18.10.2017). Chapter 12: Adhere to the peaceful path of development and promote the building of a community of a single destiny of mankind. 27.10.2017. URL: http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/27/content_5234876.htm (accessed: 01.08.2022). In Chinese.

²⁷² Yahuda M. B. Towards the end of isolationism: China's foreign policy after Mao. London, 1983. P. 340.

²⁷³ Kim S.S. Mao Zedong and China's changing world view. P. 30–31.

²⁷⁴ Gillespie S. Op. cit. P. 114.

²⁷⁵ The Chinese view of the world. P. 225–259.

worlds" is formed, which Mao later modified and transformed into the idea of "intermediate zones".

The "five principles of peaceful coexistence" proposed by Beijing at the Bandung Conference aroused broad support from the leaders and peoples of the "third world" countries, and its decisions provoked heated discussion and resonance throughout the world community. Bandung, the researchers note, initiated the sound of the voice of the "third world", which was subsequently to be heard on the world stage.²⁷⁶

At the same time, despite the triumph of the "Bandung spirit" of peaceful coexistence, Taiwan remained the "bone of contention" between the United States of America and China. In 1954–1955, both Washington and Beijing continued to maintain contact; trade was developing between them, and other interested countries were involved. However, China continued to state that the Taiwan issue was its purely domestic priority and could not be discussed internationally.

Sino-American negotiations to resolve this problem began in August 1955. They continued throughout the entire period of the U.S. leadership. By Eisenhower. These talks dealt with issues such as non-use of force, the US embargo against China and cultural exchanges.

In 1954–1955, the concept of China's foreign policy was implemented in the general direction of the entire "socialist commonwealth" without an open intention to pursue its own course²⁷⁷. Under these conditions, the political leadership of the People's Republic of China is trying for the first time to take advantage of the support of foreign Chinese, or huaqiao (华侨). This was dictated by the difficult international situation and China's continued isolation in the international arena. The surge of anti-Chinese sentiment in Southeast Asian countries after their independence in the 1950s, as well as the lack of economic resources in China after the victory in the civil war, forced the leader of the Chinese Communists Mao Zedong to pay attention to Huaqiao. He viewed the Chinese diaspora abroad as helping to win over to his side, as an ally in the struggle

²⁷⁶ Gillespie S. Op. cit. P. 114.

²⁷⁷ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong, Jiang Qing and Advisor Deng. P. 197–198.

for strengthening power in the New China, in the formation of the PRC in the foreign policy arena and in the internal socio-economic recovery.

To this end, the Chinese state justifies the line of conduct towards Chinese emigrants abroad, the policy towards relatives of emigrants, re-emigrants, as well as investments and donations from Huaqiao in the PRC²⁷⁸.

Until 1950, all foreign Chinese, regardless of citizenship, were considered as subjects of the People's Republic of China and even counted them in the total population of the country, considering the "right of blood" a key principle in determining citizenship. The concept of Huaqiao as Chinese citizens living abroad and the refusal to consider Chinese with foreign citizenship as Huaqiao was first documented in the "Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Working with Emigrants abroad – 1952".²⁷⁹

Since the mid-50s of the XX century, calls for Huaqiao to return to their homeland for permanent residence with a guarantee of comprehensive support have been increasingly heard from Beijing. At the same time, the Chinese authorities encouraged emigrants to stay abroad. Those who did not want to return to their homeland had to fit into the host society, become a part of it, without losing their Chinese identity. In the mid-1950s. The PRC was able to actively work with Huaqiao abroad through its diplomatic missions, which, as the country's recognition in the world grew, began to displace the Kuomintang representative offices. In China, great importance was attached to the inclusion of foreign Chinese in the information space of the country, the formation of "correct" ideas about the realities of the New China among the diaspora²⁸⁰.

The measures taken by the Chinese leadership against Huaqiao have somewhat defused the situation with foreign Chinese, their relatives and emigrants to China. This made it possible to correct the consequences of the general erroneous decisions of the country's leadership in the first years after the formation of the PRC. In the second half

²⁷⁸ Afonasyeva A.V. The formation of the PRC's policy towards the Chinese Diaspora before the period of reforms and openness (1949–1976) // *Problems of the Far East*. 2020. No. 6. P. 26.

²⁷⁹ Afanasyeva A.V. *Op. cit.* P. 27.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid.* P. 25–40.

of the 50s and 60s of the XX century, the formation of methods and approaches to working with the Chinese diaspora began; rather trusting financial conditions were emerging for working with Huaqiao in the upcoming period of reforms and openness, which began in 1978²⁸¹.

Beijing's new multi-vector foreign policy in the second half of the 1950s manifested itself in relations with Japan. During these years, the number of meetings between the Chinese leadership and the Japanese has increased dramatically. Looking at relations with this country in a new way, Mao hoped for the victory of the Japanese "left" forces²⁸². In mid-1956, he proposed to Japan to conclude a Pacific Treaty that would link China, Japan and the United States. The conclusion of the treaty was postponed several times, and it was only in the 1970s that it was recorded in a "spiritual" rather than official form, when Mao normalized relations with the United States and Japan against the USSR²⁸³.

The period of development of the People's Republic of China in 1956-1966 was marked by the adoption by Beijing of a new foreign policy concept called "two-fisted strike" ("两个拳头打人"). It is considered in Chinese historiography to be the decade of the "ordering of foreign policy", or "调整" ("tiaozheng", ordering).²⁸⁴ Back in 1935, Mao explained in terms of the traditional Chinese philosophy of "Yin and Yang" "the relationship between defense and offensive, between slowness and speed of decision-making, as well as between internal and external lines."²⁸⁵ This, in our opinion, indirectly indicates Mao Zedong's call for the use of a "two-fisted strike" strategy, i.e. striking simultaneously in two directions. At the same time, Mao considered it

²⁸¹ Afanasyeva A.V. Op. cit. P. 29, 38.

²⁸² Terri I R. Op. cit. P. 266.

²⁸³ Ibid. P. 266.

²⁸⁴ So Liqin. [One hundred years of the party's history. One hundred days of reading]. In 1960, an eight-figure policy of "streamlining, consolidation, enrichment and improvement" was first proposed, and Soviet-Chinese relations deteriorated // Information Portal "Zybao". 2021. April 07. URL: <http://www.zbbx.org/article-2-6091.aspx> (accessed: 02.12.2021). In Chinese.

²⁸⁵ Boyarkina A.V. Great Strategies of China's foreign policy: from Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping. // Russian-Chinese studies. 2023. Vol. 7, No. 1. p. 72.

necessary to oppose the principle of maintaining one large rear zone and adhere to the principle of small rear zones²⁸⁶.

The first mention of Mao Zedong's expression "a blow with two fists" is found in the work "Strategic Issues of the Revolutionary War in China" in 1936 («中国革命战争的战略问题»), devoted to the peculiarities of the concentration of forces of the Chinese Red Army. Mao criticizes the concept of an even distribution of forces and for the first time talks about the so-called method of "beating the enemy with two fists."²⁸⁷ This is an attempt to achieve victory over the enemy at the same time on two strategic directions is divided into two parts by the red army («。。。有所谓‘两个拳头打人的说法，把红军主力分割为二，企图在两个战略方向同时求胜。那时的结果是一个拳头置于无用，一个拳头打得很疲劳，而且没有当时可能取得的最大胜利»). According to Mao, there should be "only one main direction and the strategy should be to fight one against ten."²⁸⁸

In the period from 1956 to 1966, having changed the line of the Chinese foreign policy of "leaning to one side", Beijing moved to spread socialist ideas in Asia, Africa and Latin America as opposed to the policy of containing international imperialism led by the United States. In the long term, Mao Zedong saw a military-political bloc with common goals, objectives and a foreign policy course. The basis of such cooperation was the achievements of the socialist proletarian revolution. The imperialist countries led by the United States and the revisionist ones led by the Soviet Union created the phenomenon of "two enemies" for the PRC. This phenomenon, as the domestic sinologist E.N. Grachikov writes, led the New China to streamline, "straighten out" towards independence and independence²⁸⁹.

²⁸⁶ Shi Shantao. The origin and application of the expression "blow with two fists" // Educational portal "Dada Wendanwan". 2020. May 18. URL: <https://www.zqwdw.com/shenghuoxiuxian/2020/0518/232603.html> (accessed: 05.12.2021). In Chinese.

²⁸⁷ Mao Zedong. Selected works: trans. from kit. [in 4 volumes]. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1952. P. 398.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. P. 398–399.

²⁸⁹ Vinogradov A.O. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 1949–1976.

If Britain and France do not follow the path of a peaceful settlement, but intervene by force, Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇²⁹⁰) argues, they will be heroically resisted not only by the Egyptian, but also by the Arab peoples. This will lead to decisive opposition from the entire socialist camp, the peoples of Asia and Africa, Latin America and Western countries (for example, England and France). Following the US policy of expanding weapons and preparing for war can entail significant military expenditures, increasingly hindering the development of their national economy. This will increase the discontent and resistance of the main allies of the United States and deepen the contradictions between Britain and America²⁹¹.

During these years, Mao Zedong tried to take China out of the custody of the Soviet Union and lead the country to full independence. De-Stalinization, Soviet proposals to build a joint long-wave radio station and a nuclear submarine fleet in China, as well as various interpretations of Marxism-Leninism were negatively perceived by Beijing, and the "Khrushchev thaw" and Moscow's attempts to defuse relations with the West were not welcomed²⁹².

Criticism of the Maoist regime against socialist countries close to the USSR and the world communist movement has also intensified. Under the slogan of fighting revisionism in the CPSU and throughout the international communist movement, Maoist propaganda tried to form a bloc of heterogeneous political elements hostile to the USSR and the CPSU²⁹³. To this end, the Maoist group tried to evoke outright anti-Sovietism, chauvinism and fanaticism. Mao's articles and speeches of the late 60s of the twentieth century were filled with calls for "the restoration of historical justice and the creation of a great China." In practice, this resulted in increased provocations on the Soviet-Chinese border and Beijing's claims to vast territories of the Far East and Siberia, to present a "bill to the Soviet Union."²⁹⁴

²⁹⁰ Liu Shaoqi (1898–1969) was a Chinese revolutionary, statesman and politician. One of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.

²⁹¹ Documents of the VIII National Congress of the Communist Party of China / ed. The Main Directorate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1957. Iss. 1. P. 58. In Chinese.

²⁹² Boyarkina A.V. China's foreign policy ideas during the reign of Mao Zedong // Russia and China: history and prospects of cooperation. Iss.12. Blagoveshchensk, 2022. P. 449–458.

²⁹³ Vladimirov O., Ryazantsev V. Op. cit. p. 7.

²⁹⁴ Ibid.

Despite the differences in general, the people and the leadership of the People's Republic of China expressed sympathy and respect for I.V. Stalin as the leader of a great country, senior leader and comrade. In traditional Chinese culture, reverence and respect for elders is a significant principle. It is no coincidence that the procedure of condemning the "cult of personality" of the leader of the peoples at the twentieth Congress of the CPSU and the removal of his body from the Mausoleum did not cause a feeling of delight among the Chinese population, especially among the Chinese leadership, which already in the 1950s actively began to use the cult of its own leader Mao Zedong.

The speeches and statements of Mao Zedong and his entourage increasingly raised the issue of the unequal nature of the 1950 Treaty. According to Chinese leaders, he was imposed by the "elder brother" of the USSR on weak China at that time. Beijing also believed that the secret agreement that Northeast China and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region were becoming a zone of influence of the USSR was not equal, since the strategically important Chinese-Eastern Railway (CER) operated here, including military supplies to Port Arthur and maintaining the combat readiness of the Soviet troops on the Liaodong Peninsula.

Strengthened politically and economically, Beijing demanded from the USSR a revision of the unequal Aigun Treaty (1858) and the Beijing Treaty (1860), imposed by the tsarist government on weak China. Also in the 1960s, books and brochures with maps were published in large quantities in China, on which Vietnam, Kampuchea, Mongolia, Tibet, parts of India, Kazakhstan, and the Soviet Union were designated as Chinese territories.

In the articles and speeches of the leader of the Chinese people, there were calls for the independence and independence of China and the need to distance oneself from the experience of the Soviet Union, not to follow its "crooked path". In the same years, the Chinese leadership began to revise the experience of the USSR for China²⁹⁵.

The events in Poland and Hungary, which led these countries to greater independence and independence, were assessed in China as a weakening of the USSR's

²⁹⁵ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong and his heirs. P. 99, 101.

leading role in the socialist camp. Chinese leaders Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping took part in the settlement of relations between the Hungarian and Polish leadership with Moscow.

A continuation of Beijing's line to split the world system of socialism and the international communist movement was Mao Zedong's speech at international meetings of representatives of communist and workers' parties (国际共产党和工人党会议) in Moscow in 1957²⁹⁶, where he acted as a theoretical teacher. In his report, the CPC leader focused on the contradictions in socialist society²⁹⁷.

In the second half of the 1950s, the political leadership of the People's Republic of China, taking into account the significant changes in the international situation in Asia and in the whole world, tried to adjust its foreign policy doctrine and fill it with new provisions. The country's leader Mao put forward the theory of "intermediate zones". The prerequisites for its emergence were:

1) the change of the center of world power as a result of the Second World War – Western Europe – to a bipolar system of international relations (Yalta-Potsdam) led by the USSR and the USA;

2) the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community on the basis of Franco-German negotiations, which opened the way to European integration. ²⁹⁸In addition, in the context of the Cold War in the late 1940s, the United States turned Japan into its main ally in the Far East.

The reason for the rethinking of the foreign policy concept was the appeal to the analysis of the lessons of the Korean War of 1950-1953. Based on this analysis, Mao Zedong emphasized the growing influence of the PRC in contrast to the great powers of the USSR and the United States. The results and consequences of this war changed the post-war map of the world and convinced Mao Zedong that many key international issues were being resolved without China's participation. This means that Beijing needs to strengthen its diplomatic activities and raise China's role in world politics. These

²⁹⁶ International meetings of representatives of Communist and workers' parties in Moscow (November 1957). Moscow, 2013. 624 p.

²⁹⁷ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong and his heirs. P. 100.

²⁹⁸ Declaration of 9-th May 1950 delivered by Robert Schumann // European Issue. 10th May, 2011. No. 204. URL: <https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/questions-d-europe/qe-204-en.pdf> (accessed: 19.12.2021).

problems became key issues in the work of the VIII Congress of the CPC in September 1956²⁹⁹.³⁰⁰ Defining the foreign policy line, the congress pointed out that the CPC "stands for a foreign policy of preserving world peace and peaceful coexistence of countries with different systems, ... makes efforts to develop and strengthen friendship with the countries of the peace camp, democracy, socialism ...".³⁰¹ The congress stressed the need for China to adhere to an independent and independent policy and said that the "principles of peaceful coexistence" put forward by it are universal and should be extended to relations between socialist countries (in contrast to the position of the USSR, which proceeded from the fact that relations between socialist countries are not only friendly, but also "fraternal") («一）继续巩固和加强同伟大的苏联和各人民民主国家的永恒的、牢不可破的兄弟友谊；（二）同赞成«五项原则»的亚洲、非洲国家和其他国家建立和发展友好关系；（三）同一切愿意同我国建立外交关系和经济文化关系的国家建立和发展正常的外交关系和经济文化关系»）。³⁰²

In their reports to the congress, Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi noted the need to build normal relations with Western European countries, the commitment of the Chinese leadership to the USSR and other peoples, and that the PRC's policy based on the "principles of peaceful coexistence"³⁰³ does not exclude any country.

At the congress, Liu Shaoqi, analyzing the favorable international situation for China in building socialism, stressed the importance of the concept of the "intermediate zone" as an engine for mobilizing forces within China and activating forces for the world struggle. "The CPC firmly opposes the policy of the Kuomintang in the mid-30s of the twentieth century, expressed in the formula of "anti-communism" and

²⁹⁹ Materials of the VIII Congress of the CPC. On the whole. yaz; Annual report on the main events in the history of the Communist Party of China. 1987. p. 277. From September 15 to 27, 1956, the VIII National Chinese Congress of the Communist Party of China was solemnly held in the hall of the National Chinese Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing. In Chinese.

³⁰⁰ Materials of the VIII Congress of the CPC. P. 11. In Chinese.

³⁰¹ Borisov O.B. Op. cit. P. 10.

³⁰² Resolution on the political report of the VIII Congress of the CPC (adopted by the VIII Congress of the CPC on September 27, 1956) // Network of Members of the Communist Party of China. URL: <https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/24/ART11348471241458943.shtml> (accessed: 01.05.2022). In Chinese.

³⁰³ Documents of the VIII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. p. 61. In Chinese; Zhou Enlai. The second five-year plan of the VIII National Congress of the Communist Party of China for the Development of the National Economy (1958–1962). Beijing, 1956. In Chinese.

"prevention of the spread of communism" (《防共》和《反共》的口号)³⁰⁴. The main function of American imperialism is to conduct "anti-Communist activities" aimed at the suppression of the people of his country and the extensive intervention in the "intermediate zone" between the socialist countries and the United States of America" (《。。。美帝国主义目前的主要活动，实际上是假借《反共》之名，以便压制本国的人民，尽可能地控制和干涉处于社会主义国家和美国之间的广大中间地带》)³⁰⁵. At the same time, Liu Shaoqi also spoke in his report about the need for peaceful coexistence with the United States of America. However, their hostility to the PRC, the invasion of Taiwan, the activities of secret agents to carry out subversive activities against the Chinese state, attempts to exclude the PRC from solving international issues, deprivation of legal status in the UN, etc. excluded the settlement of disputes with America through peaceful negotiations³⁰⁶.

Putting forward the concept of "intermediate zones", Mao³⁰⁷ emphasized that the United States of America and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone that includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa.

It is characteristic that in the Chinese language the combination of "intermediate zone" and the plural "intermediate zones" is transmitted only as 《中间地带》, "middle" and "intermediate" are synonymous in this case³⁰⁸. It is noteworthy that in some English-language publications by Chinese authors we find translations of this phrase as "middle zones and "intermediate zones"³⁰⁹. In Chinese discourse extremely flexible terminology: found as "theory" and "concept", the "transitional zone" (《中间地带》概念, 《中间地带》理论). In 1963, according to Chinese political scientists, Mao defined the

³⁰⁴ Peng Hou wen. How was the slogan "Down with Chiang Kai-shek and liberate all of China" put forward? URL: <https://www.hsw.org.cn/m/show.php?classid=36&id=75302> (accessed: 12.05.2022). In Chinese.

³⁰⁵ Documents of the VIII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. P. 55–58. In Chinese.

³⁰⁶ Ibid. P. 61.

³⁰⁷ Terrill R. Op. cit. P. 259; Nobuo Takahashi. The Chinese communist and the theory of intermediate zone during the 1950s. P. 9. URL: https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/kokusaiseiji1957/1990/95/1990_95_63/_pdf/-char/en (accessed: 10.04.2022).

³⁰⁸ The Great Chinese-Russian Dictionary / ed. Ma Yunxiang, Liu E. Changchun: Jilin People. p. 3026. In Chinese.

³⁰⁹ Han Yan. Op. cit. P. 202–205; Yee H.S. Op. cit. P 240–241; He Zhipeng, Sun Lu. A Chinese theory of international law. [S. l.], 2020. P. 187.

geography of the concept of "two intermediate zones"³¹⁰: "There are two intermediate lands: one is Asia, Africa and Latin America, the second includes Europe, the countries of North America, Oceania, and Japan. The countries of the "second intermediate zone", although dependent on the United States of America, are obliged to throw off the weight of American imperialism."³¹¹ According to the Maoist concept of "intermediate zones", the vast intermediate zone between the United States and the socialist countries included the entire capitalist world, with the exception of the United States³¹².

In the Pacific, the United States controlled territories larger than all former British spheres of influence, as well as Japan and territories under the control of the Kuomintang, South Korea, Central and South America. Mao Zedong pointed out that the United States was also trying to control the entire British Empire and Western Europe and was setting up military bases in many countries in order to attack the Soviet Union. Mao believed that it was not really the Soviet Union, but the countries in which these military bases are located, that were the first to suffer from US aggression. He allowed for the possibility of uniting the American and the peoples of all countries to jointly fight the American reactionaries and their "dogs". In this, Mao saw the only possible option to avoid a third world war. Mao did not believe that atomic bombs could resolve the outcome of wars³¹³.

An important element underlying the idea of "intermediate zones" was Mao's idea of a "permanent revolution", which was composed of the provisions of the World War and the tactics of the international revolutionary movement. In the teachings of Lenin, Marx and Engels, Mao attached special importance to the thesis of violence as a form of restructuring society and creating a new social system³¹⁴.

In the early 1960s, Mao Zedong's concept of "intermediate zones" was filled with new content. He suggested abandoning the course of "one-way bias", "throwing off the shackles and pinning hopes" on a large number of developing countries and focusing on

³¹⁰ A Practical guide to International Relations / ed. Huang Zhihan, Yao Fei. Tianjin, 2013. P. 169. In Chinese.

³¹¹ Luo Yanming. Mao Zedong and the Great Cause of Unification of China // KPK News News Agency. 2013. November 4. URL: <http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2013/1104/c85037-23425576-3.html> (accessed: 18.02.2022). In Chinese.

³¹² Zhang Xiang li. Op. cit. In Chinese.

³¹³ Terrill R. Op. cit. P. 259.

³¹⁴ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Tse-tung. "Our crowning number is war, dictatorship." Moscow, 1976. P. 302–305.

the theory of "intermediate zones"³¹⁵. The "intermediate zone" was already a more extensive territory between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which contained a large number of capitalist countries, colonial and semi-colonial states of Europe, Asia and Africa.

This site is one part belonged to the economically underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the other part – to imperialist countries of Europe and the developed capitalist powers³¹⁶ («中间地带两部分：一部分是指亚洲、非洲和拉丁美洲的广大经济落后的国家，一部分是指以欧洲为代表的帝国主义国家和发达的资本主义国家。这两部分都反对美国的控制。在东欧各国则发生反对苏联控制的问题») ³¹⁷.

Speaking to Chinese students at Moscow State University on November 27, 1957, Mao emphasized the importance of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America as countries located between socialist and capitalist states. "There is an "intermediate zone" between the two camps ...According to UN estimates, the world's population is 2.7 billion people, including the population of socialist countries – about 1 billion, and the population of the imperialist camp is 400 million. The remaining 1,300 million people mainly live on three continents – Asia, Africa and Latin America. The population of countries such as Indonesia, Egypt, Sudan, Ghana, etc. includes 700 million who have already achieved national independence. This does not include 600 million people living in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Turkey. Countries in the imperialist camp such as Germany, Japan, and Italy are not ready to fight. There is no cooperation between England and the USA. Both camps are fighting for the 1.3 billion people living in the "twilight zone" ("中间地带这 13 亿人口，两个阵营都在争取») ³¹⁸.

³¹⁵ Luo Yanming. Op. cit. In Chinese.

³¹⁶ Zhang Xiang li. Op. cit. In Chinese; Excerpts from the book "Ninety years of the Chinese Communist Party: Commitment to Independence and Opposition to Hegemony" / ed. Wang Zhiyan // Xinhua News Agency. 2016. July 27th. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-07/27/c_129162167.htm (accessed: 08.04.2022). In Chinese.

³¹⁷ Do you see how Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping lifted the siege of the Soviet Union? // PDA exhibition. The history of the party. 11.18.2010. URL: <https://politics.gmw.cn/2010-11/18/content13974674.htm> (accessed: 01.03.2022). In Chinese.

³¹⁸ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Tse-tung. "Our signature number is war, dictatorship." P. 308; Luo Yanming. Op. cit. In Chinese.

The United States, Mao believed, covers the entire western Pacific and Southeast Asia. The US Seventh Fleet stationed in the area was the largest – it included six aircraft carriers of the American Navy out of the available twelve. The United States controlled not only Europe, Canada, Latin America (with the exception of Cuba), but also Africa (Congo).

Mao Zedong stressed that many countries, while criticizing US foreign policy, at the same time disapprove of the international activities of the USSR. "The powerful capitalist countries of the pan-European market ... and Japan do not want to obey either the United States or the Soviet Union." Mao also noted that not all Eastern European countries are satisfied with the policy of the Soviet Union³¹⁹.

In his assessments of the idea of "intermediate zones", the Chinese leader argued that it was not the conflict between East and West, but the conflict between American imperialism and the oppressed peoples of the world that constituted the main contradiction of the era. This idea is closely related to the concept of international security. In his opinion, it is the struggle against imperialism that will contribute to the preservation of "peace" between the great powers. This view was in stark contrast to the Soviet position, according to which the "Great Union" was necessary to ensure world peace³²⁰. According to Mao, the United States of America is spreading American imperialism to the countries of Europe, Canada, all of Latin America, with the exception of Cuba, and all the way to Africa. At that time, Mao was in dire need of allies in the international arena and understood that cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States would negatively affect the development of the PRC³²¹. He asks rhetorically whether this is the reason why Asia, Africa, Latin America, Europe and Canada, as well as other countries, oppose American imperialism. Isn't this the reason for Charles de Gaulle's anti-American policy?³²².

Mao Zedong tried to implement his concept of "intermediate zones" in European politics. In this area, Mao believed, China should focus not on geopolitics, but on

³¹⁹ Mao Zedong. «There are two intermediate zones». September, 1963 // Wilson Center Digital Archive International History Declassified. URL: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121207> (accessed: 19.12.2021)

³²⁰ NobuoTakahashi. Op. cit.

³²¹ Mao Zedong. Op. cit.

³²² Mao's Theory of intermediate zones // Communist Affairs. July-August 1964. Vol. 2, no. 4. P. 3–7.

economics, culture and technology. According to Mao, many Atlantic countries also do not support the United States. Thus, Charles De Gaulle denied the fact that France would be a satellite country of the United States. Tensions between the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe increased.³²³ It is also possible to form an "intermediate zone" between them.

Beijing tried to draw into its orbit of interests the countries of the "third world" that suffered from American imperialism. Thus, the authors of the magazine "Red Banner" noted that the movement for national democracy of the peoples of Latin America is gradually rising. The people of Cuba call on the rest of the peoples of Latin America to rise up in the revolutionary struggle against American imperialism and not lose faith in victory. This path is complicated and contradictory. Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Panama, being in the power of a dictatorship, support the armed struggle and demand independence³²⁴. We believe that the idea of "intermediate zones" acts as an instrument of the armed struggle for the independence of the oppressed peoples of the "third world".

The concept of "intermediate zones", according to modern Chinese researchers, reflects the Maoist worldviews of the philosophy of struggle and contradictions in world politics. "Whatever the movement is, it assumes two states: relative immobility and noticeable change, – Mao writes³²⁵. - "The movement of two states is caused by the struggle of two contradictions." Calling on the Chinese people to revolutionize, Mao Zedong understood that the more serious the situation developed, the more resolute the fighting spirit of the Chinese became. He was convinced that "the reactionaries will one day be defeated, one day we will win."³²⁶

Mao believed that only by uniting, supporting and participating in the anti-colonial and anti-hegemonic struggle of the countries of the "middle zone" could China build a peaceful and stable new state and strengthen its international position.

³²³ Mao Zedong. Decree. Soc.

³²⁴ Zhang Zhiqiang. The rise of national democratic movements in Latin America // Red Banner. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 1960. Iss. 9. P. 32–37. In Chinese.

³²⁵ Han Yan. Op. cit. P. 202.

³²⁶ Ibid.

It is noteworthy that with the strengthening of the socialist camp led by the USSR, the term "intermediate zone" gradually disappeared from Chinese official documents in the 1950s. However, in a number of aspects and directions of foreign policy, the logic of this theory continued to influence the perception of Chinese leaders of the international situation.

So, in the mid-50s of the twentieth century, noticeable changes took place within the framework of Chinese foreign policy doctrine. **First**, the concept of "peaceful coexistence" was introduced into Chinese political documents. **Secondly**, the demarcation of the socialist camp was revised. These changes completely modified the previous concept of international security, which underlies the idea of an "intermediate zone". Namely, the idea that the "courageous struggle of people" against imperialism in the "intermediate zone" would reduce the likelihood of world war was replaced by the idea that consultations between great Powers are necessary to strengthen world peace. With this concept of international security, Chinese foreign policy theory began to be embodied in the diplomacy of peaceful coexistence. **Thirdly**, the death of Soviet leader I.V. Stalin also made adjustments to the theory and practice of China's international policy. After the death of the leader of the peoples, the Chinese leadership began to trust Moscow less. In the relations between Mao and the new leader of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, disagreements began, resulting in contradictions on the principles of socialist internationalism and its compliance with the concept of sovereignty. In relations between the two former allies, Beijing saw limitations on its sovereignty with good reason. The PRC began to express dissatisfaction. This was reflected in the speeches of the leaders of the People's Republic of China – Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1953-1958, and especially in the assessments of the Chinese leadership of the decisions of the XX Congress of the CPSU.

In 1958. Mao revised the content of the idea of an "intermediate zone" as a justification for China's new turn in foreign and domestic policy³²⁷. In 1958, during the Taiwan crisis, the foreign policy vector of the Chinese leader abruptly changed to the polemic of confrontation with the USSR, which adhered to the concept of international

³²⁷ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Tse-tung. "Our signature number is war, dictatorship". P. 309.

detente, which Mao denied. He foresaw a further aggravation of Soviet-American relations. At the expanded meeting of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee in Beidaihe in August 1958. Mao said that China needs to maintain tensions between the United States and the USSR, unlike Western countries, due to the increasing influence of communist parties and the successful development of China. In 1959, the Chinese leader again stressed the inadmissibility of international detente³²⁸.

The revival of the idea of an "intermediate zone" caused a discrepancy in the ideas of peaceful coexistence between the USSR and the PRC. Although this discrepancy was relative, it became deeply embedded in the political world order in the late 1950s.

In the 1960s, according to Mao Zedong, the USSR tried to force China to implement its strategic plans. At this time, Mao Zedong's perception of the struggle in the international arena was again sharpened. He developed the idea of an "intermediate zone" into the theory of "two intermediate zones" and opposed both American imperialism and Soviet revisionism. The Chinese leader did not pay attention to the ideological confrontation during the Cold War; his proposal of the concept of "two intermediate zones" contributed to the control of actions by the Soviet Union, including the withdrawal of specialists, the termination of contracts, and the termination of economic and military assistance to China. China, Mao believed, was resolutely fighting the chauvinistic actions of the Soviet Union³²⁹.

In the context of the development of the theory of "intermediate zones", Mao criticized N.S. Khrushchev, calling him a "revisionist" and accused him of "objectively aiding and abetting the imperialist enemy³³⁰." At the same time, he criticized the position of P.M. Tolyatti³³¹ for supporting the USSR.

It should be noted that in the Beijing magazine "Red Banner" (《红旗杂志》) in 1963, a voluminous article was published analyzing the criticism of the CPC by P.M. Tolyatti at the X Congress of the Communist Party of Italy. It caused an open

³²⁸ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong, Jiang Qing and Advisor Deng. P. 198.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ On the theory of the Intermediate Zone // Japanese journal Sekat Shuho. 1964. 11 August. URL: <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-9/mswv926.htm> (accessed: 16.01.2022).

³³¹ Palmiro Michele Tolyatti (1893-1964), General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party.

discussion in the PRC. Commenting on this article, Chinese scientists and analysts stressed that with their erroneous remarks, the Italian Communists violate the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism on issues of the international communist movement. Their opinions on this issue differed from the position of the CPC³³². Consequently, there were two fundamentally different views on the contradictions of the world³³³.

In the early 1960s, criticism of the Soviet leadership intensified in the Chinese press. At the same time, Mao Zedong's ideas were promoted about the need to "create a broad united front against imperialism" («建立反帝国主义的统一战线») and support the movement for the independence of nations in the "intermediate zone".³³⁴

In 1960-1962, the contradictions between China and India also escalated. Relations between the countries remained quite tense due to the unresolved problem of border surveying. The aggravation of contradictions was the result of the suppression of the uprising in Tibet by Chinese troops and the flight of the spiritual leader of Tibet, the Dalai Lama, to India. Mao believed that the escalation of the conflict in the Himalayan region and the Tibetan issue could lead to a decrease in the influence of the CPC in the countries of the socialist bloc³³⁵.

The two sides' different understanding of historical treaties, the role of religion and traditions led to Mao's refusal to use diplomatic methods and negotiations with India. The Chinese side has moved on to direct threats and insults. China and India fought not only for border territories, but also for the right to become a leader in the Asian region. Their joint attempts to build a new system of international relations did not end in success.³³⁶ The United Kingdom and the United States began supplying weapons to India, and Beijing announced a unilateral cease-fire. The USSR's position during the conflict was also fiercely criticized by the CPC: the leadership led by

³³² Once again, about the differences between Comrade Tolyatti and us. On some important issues of Leninism in modern times // Red Banner. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 1963. No. 3-4. pp. 1-83. In Chinese.

³³³ Ibid. P. 5-7.

³³⁴ Mao Zedong: New Democracy. 1940, January. In Chinese.

³³⁵ Tolmachev Yu.O. Op. cit. P. 19.

³³⁶ Ibid. P. 23.

Khrushchev was again accused of capitulation, betrayal and that the Soviet Union was sacrificing China's interests in an effort to please the United States³³⁷.

Assessing the importance of relations between the People's Republic of China and neighboring countries in the 50s and 60s of the twentieth century, Professor V.S. Kuznetsov points to the positive factor of Buddhism in the realization of the diplomatic goals of the People's Republic of China in relations with countries that have a different socio-political system and state ideology than in China. It is significant that the development of contacts with neighboring Buddhist countries expressed China's tolerance and desire to gain an attractive image in the outside world, despite the communist atheism of the CPC leadership. Such a pragmatic and flexible approach to religion ensured that Mao Zedong protected the interests of the country and strengthened Chinese influence abroad³³⁸.

In October 1962, at the height of the Caribbean crisis, the Chinese Party press accused N.S. Khrushchev of adventurism in connection with the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, then of weakness towards President Kennedy and the agreement on a peaceful resolution of the crisis.

In the early 1960s, not only did the contradictions between the PRC and the USSR and other countries sharply escalate, but an ideological struggle within China also unfolded. The CPC imposed compulsory study of "Mao Zedong's ideas" on the people of China. Beijing has set a course for the formation of a powerful campaign in support of the "great proletarian cultural revolution", the suppression of party members following the capitalist path ("kapputists"), etc. In the field of international relations, a struggle against bureaucracy has simultaneously unfolded; Its source was declared to be "imperialism", which combined with the "revisionism" of the USSR and other socialist countries. The collection "Long live Leninism!" in 1960 sets out the main line of the CPC on issues of modernity³³⁹. Mao Zedong formulated the problems of war and peace, communism, and the revolutionary cause in the spirit of his "ideas". In 1964, another

³³⁷ Vinogradov A.O. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 1949–1976.

³³⁸ Kuznetsov V.S. The Buddhist factor in the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China // China in world and regional politics: (history and modernity). Moscow, 2000. P. 174, 180.

³³⁹ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong and his heirs. P. 123–125.

offensive in the field of ideology took place: Mao Zedong's "quotations" began to be published in large editions.

All these campaigns could not but affect the relations between the PRC and the USSR. This was expressed in Beijing's condemnation of the Soviet Union in connection with the Caribbean crisis and provocations on the border.

In 1962-1963 Mao Zedong created a "fifth column" and put forward, as Wang Ming points out, a "notorious" 25-point program aimed at splitting the socialist commonwealth, the international communist and anti-imperialist national liberation movements³⁴⁰. At the same time, in the fight against "revisionism", he struck at some of the leaders of the CPC, led by Liu Shaoqi³⁴¹.

The confrontation between the two largest Communist parties in the world – the CPSU and the CPC – became especially noticeable in 1962-1963 during the congresses of the parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Italy and Czechoslovakia, during which the CPC delegation was criticized by Moscow and representatives of other parties and accused of trying to drag the whole world into a nuclear war and spread nationalism. The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government tried to relieve tension between the countries. However, the Maoist leadership demanded only concessions from Moscow.

In 1963-1964, a series of Soviet-Chinese negotiations between the parties and government delegations of the two countries ended almost to no avail. Nine articles were published in the Chinese central Party press, including in the People's Daily newspaper («人民日报»), accusing the Soviet leadership of revisionism, split and betrayal of the international communist movement, "fake communism", etc., the leadership of the CPSU was called "the greatest schismatics of our era". The authors accused the USSR of restoring capitalism and called it an enemy of peace, socialism and the peoples of the whole world³⁴².

³⁴⁰ Wang Ming. Half a century of the CPC and the betrayal of Mao Tse-tung. Moscow, 1975. P. 209.

³⁴¹ Chinese revolutionary, statesman and politician. One of the leaders of the Communist Party of China, Chairman of the People's Republic of China (1959–1968).

³⁴² Vinogradov A.O. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 1949–1976.

Fighting simultaneously on two fronts, against the USSR and the United States, Beijing, within the framework of the concept of "two intermediate zones", tried to develop relations with African countries. Back in 1955, at a Conference of 29 Asian and African countries in Bandung (Indonesia), Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai met for the first time with the leaders of Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, Liberia and Ghana. After the Conference in 1956, a joint communique was signed with Egypt on the establishment of diplomatic relations.

In the 1960s, the official periodical (the Red Banner magazine) published articles about the growing colonial policy of American imperialism and, as a result, China's support for African peoples in the fight against imperialism and the protection of the interests of African countries³⁴³.

The influence of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation on international politics in Asia and Africa was constantly increasing. At the same time, the impact on the countries of the "third world" was felt acutely and immediately. The Soviet Union in the "third world" states intensified its efforts to expand its geographical influence. The two states fought for the allegiance of various liberation movements and newly independent "third world" countries³⁴⁴.

Southeast Asia is becoming the main pillar of China's policy towards the countries of the "third world". Beijing took into account historical, demographic and geographical ties with its neighbors. At the same time, the decolonization of Africa was in the interests of China, as it provides it with a rare opportunity to implement its new foreign policy.

American researcher J. T. Yu says that the Chinese leader's interest in the "third world" was not accidental and was not limited solely to declarations. The policy of the "third world" was implemented by China regardless of the ruling regime of the countries and in a positive way. The professor writes that back in the 1950s, the main interest of the PRC in relation to the countries of the "third world" was to develop a

³⁴³ 马华。胜利一定属于伟大的非洲人民//红旗。半月刊中国共产党中央委员会主办。一九六〇年，第六期。42-45页码。Ma Hua. Victory must necessarily belong to the great African people // Red Banner. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 1960. Issue. 6. P. 42-45.

³⁴⁴ Yahuda M. Op. cit. P. 125.

strategy to prevent the American military and political environment. According to Professor Yu, two historically important events contributed to the formation of China's policy towards the "third world".³⁴⁵

Firstly, in the second half of the 1950s, the American presence in Asia did not weaken, and the PRC tried to gain the favor of neighboring countries first of all. But in vain, since China could not persuade Southeast and South Asia to take a firm stand against the United States.

Secondly, in the 1960s there was a Soviet-Chinese conflict and the rise of the national liberation movement in Africa. Soviet socialism was embroiled in the struggle against world imperialism, and the young African states saw China as an ally. Beijing was impressed by the further disintegration of the West and the new determination of the rising peoples of the "third world". The consequences of these and other factors, Yu writes, contributed to the renewal of the Chinese formula of "third world" policy.

In the 1960s, the African national liberation movement reached its apogee, and the Non-Aligned Movement was developing. A number of developing country organizations, or the "Group of 77"³⁴⁶, have been established. Since the early 1960s, the PRC, in accordance with the slogan "The struggle of the peoples of Africa is the struggle of the Chinese people," has provided economic and financial assistance to African States. In particular, in January 1964, the recognition of the PRC by France made it possible to establish relations with a number of French-speaking countries of the continent, primarily with former French colonies. President Sh. de Gaulle set a course for independence and relative independence from the United States and NATO countries and established diplomatic relations with China. This contributed to the further development of China's relations with African countries.³⁴⁷

An important sign in the development of China's relations with African countries was the trip of Premier Zhou Enlai in 1963-1964 to African countries (Egypt, Algeria,

³⁴⁵ Yu G.T. China and the Third World // Asian Survey. 1977. Vol. 17, no. 11. P. 1037.

³⁴⁶ The largest intergovernmental organization of developing countries operating within the framework of the United Nations and its bodies. The grouping was formalized in 1964 at the 1st session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held in Geneva.

³⁴⁷ Degtarev D.A. Chinese expansion into Africa: "a holy place is never empty"? // Asia and Africa today. 2005. No. 2. P. 35; Vinogradov A.O. Foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in 1949–1976.

Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia), where he put forward five principles of China's relations with the countries of the African continent:

1. To support the peoples of all African countries in their struggle against imperialists, colonialists and neo-colonialists in order to gain and preserve national independence.

2. To support the policy of peace, neutrality and non-alignment of African countries.

3. To support the desire of African countries for solidarity and unity by means chosen by the countries of the continent themselves, as well as to support their efforts to resolve differences through peaceful negotiations.

4. To demand that other countries respect the sovereignty of African States.

5. To fight against aggression and other forms of foreign interference.

According to Zhou Enlai, "the Third World represents the main force in the battle against colonialism, imperialism and hegemony. China belongs to the "third world"."³⁴⁸ Since then, Chinese leaders have been analyzing international relations and cooperation between states from a trilateral perspective.

According to American professor Lin Zhimin, Mao, clearly aware of the importance of the third force, planned to expand China's influence in international relations. The PRC not only ideologically supported the Soviet Union, but at the same time developed relations with other countries with common historical experience and international prestige. Theoretically, China defined a territory that did not belong to either the Soviet Union or the United States of America. This "golden mean" protected not only China's national interests, but also the broader interests of the socialist world. Mao's reasoning about the changing world order and the place of China from his thought "about three worlds" later (the second half of the 1970s) developed into the theory of the "separation of three worlds". In fact, for the first time, China's policy of

³⁴⁸ Yu G.T. Op. cit. P. 1036.

peaceful coexistence towards the countries of the "third world" was based on this three-sided perception³⁴⁹.

By 1965, the PRC had established diplomatic relations with 18 African States, such as Egypt, Algeria, Burundi, CAR, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Morocco, Mauritania, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Kenya, Zambia and Sudan.

At the same time, Chinese Premier Zhou in Africa made a number of statements about the presence of various ultra-left groups in African countries, the purpose of which is to carry out a "world revolution". This led in 1965 to serious riots in a number of countries on the African continent³⁵⁰.

By 1963-1964, Chairman Mao's idea of the "intermediate zone" had acquired the contours of the future theory of the "two intermediate zones" («两个中间地带»理论). Realizing the importance and necessity of attracting such imperialist countries as Japan, Canada, etc. to his side, in August 1964, Mao met with representatives of the delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party in Beijing. He admired the national greatness and achievements of the Japanese, their victories over the countries of Southeast Asia. He explained his position on the territorial issue, saying that Japan's demands to return the Kuril Islands in accordance with the Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Declaration are completely justified.

Mao Zedong considered the territories occupied by the Soviet Union too numerous. Under the pretext of ensuring Mongolia's independence and in accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet government actually established its dominance over this country. Part of Romania, part of East Germany, Poland and Finland were transferred to Russia. According to Mao, it is extremely unfair that the leadership of the USSR divides the territories of other countries, while its population is only twice the population of Japan, whose territory is incomparable with the Soviet Union.

Turning to the border issue between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, Mao touched upon Soviet military assistance to India, the issue of the continued stay of Soviet and Chinese specialists there, and other similar problems.

³⁴⁹ Lin Zhimin. China's Third World policy // The Chinese view of the world / ed. by Y. Hao, G. Huan. New York, 1989. P. 243.

³⁵⁰ Vinogradov A.O. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 1949–1976.

Pointing out that relations between the two countries have steadily deteriorated since the XX Congress of the CPSU, Mao Zedong emphasizes: "We were challenged, so we resist... I didn't know what war meant. Three instructors taught me about war: the first was Chiang Kai-shek; the second was Japanese imperialism, and the third was American imperialism."³⁵¹ Mao Zedong spoke pathetically about the war, pointing out that the Chinese people have been waging war for 25 years and have lost several tens of millions of people. No one died from the "war on paper", and, as a result, it can be continued for another 25 years³⁵².

Against the background of the aggravation of the Soviet-Chinese polemic in the early 1960s, the Chinese leadership came to the conclusion that the USSR and the United States could collude against China, that a world war was inevitable, and that nuclear weapons were likely to be used. In the statements of the political leadership of the People's Republic of China, the words "hegemonism", "superpower", "revisionist Soviet Union"³⁵³ began to sound more and more often.

According to Mao, the concept of "intermediate zones" implies the development of relations and support for the countries of this zone in the struggle for independence. Mao Zedong believed that the ultimate goal of the American imperialists was to defeat the "socialist" countries, overthrow the communist regimes in them and establish their own puppet regimes, and that in addition the Americans were planning an "act of aggression and enslavement of the intermediate zone", i.e. all other countries of the world, including America's loyal allies: Great Britain, Germany, Japan, India.

The focus of the "contradictions of the capitalist world," according to Mao, contributes to a change in the US foreign policy course. Mao Zedong named the main factors of this change, namely: 1) the existence of 12 "socialist states" with a "total population of 1 billion", with the exception of Cuba and Yugoslavia; 2) the increased power of influence of the "Soviet Union and the entire socialist world"; 3) the destructive actions of the "imperialists of the United States and its partners" in Asia,

³⁵¹ Mao's Theory of Intermediate Zones. P. 4.

³⁵² On the theory of the Intermediate Zone.

³⁵³ Tsvyk A. V. Evolution of the foreign policy doctrines of the People's Republic of China (1950–1990). P. 53–59; Vinogradov A.O. Foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in 1949–1976; Akhmadeeva Ya. M. Op. cit. P. 36.

Africa and Latin America as a result of "national liberation" and "people's revolutionary" movements. In this context, Cuba was mentioned as having entered the "path to socialism" after the "overthrow of the reactionary rule of the fleeing dogs of US imperialism"; 4) new developments in the struggle of the working class for democratic rights and the development of socialism in the capitalist countries of Europe and America; 5) a more pronounced uneven development of capitalist countries. Examples: the "capitalist forces of France" are more resolute in opposing the United States of America; the "contradictions" between the United States and Great Britain are becoming more and more acute; The countries that were defeated in the World War (Germany, Italy, Japan) "got back on their feet and are striving...to get rid of American imperialism, and the same is true of trade competition between the United States and Japan"; West Germany and Japan "are once again becoming hotbeds of war"; 6) intensifying competition between groups of capitalist countries³⁵⁴.

All these factors, according to Chairman Mao Zedong, encouraged the workers of different countries to "unite", "defeat the American imperialists" and thereby "win freedom for themselves." In addition, this means, Mao argues, "the intensification of contradictions and conflicts between other imperialist countries." This is shown by the strong "unity of the socialist countries, the expansion of the liberation movement of oppressed nations and the energetic struggle of the proletariat, the high probability of containing the imperialists – thus, they will not dare to defy the will of the people and declare a new world war, world peace will be preserved."³⁵⁵

Mao was convinced that peace was possible only under a communist regime, and anyone who defied the will of communist leaders was a warmonger and an enemy of peace. American imperialism "in recent years has become especially active in propaganda against China" in order to "perpetuate" its seizure of Taiwan, maintain control and enslave Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asia. The imperialists are trying by all means to steal from the British Commonwealth the once "brightest pearl" of the British crown, India, turning it into the sphere of influence of the United States. In this

³⁵⁴ Mao's Theory of Intermediate Zones. P. 5.

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

regard, according to the Chinese leader, J. Nehru "provoked the Sino-Indian border conflict," and "the American imperialists boldly invaded India under the pretext of opposing China."

Mao Zedong perceived the problems and contradictions in the international arena that threaten China's development in a complex. He referred to the main hindering factors, **firstly**, the "contradiction" between Great Britain and American imperialism; **secondly**, the conflict between the countries of the European Common Market, the European Free Trade Association and the Atlantic Community in connection with the Suez crisis³⁵⁶. As a result, he believed, this would lead to an acute struggle for markets between the imperialist powers and further aggravation of contradictions.

Mao Zedong called the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America an important and the first "intermediate zone". They are populated "not only by workers, peasants, representatives of the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, but also by the patriotic national bourgeoisie and even aristocrats ... who...they refuse to be slaves" and took up arms against the American imperialists and their "running dogs" throughout the "intermediate zone". "The success of the people's revolution in China³⁵⁷ has shown the oppressed peoples a great example of victory," the Chinese leader said³⁵⁸. In addition, "the revolutionary struggle of the people in vast territories of Asia, Africa and Latin America reached unprecedented proportions" after the "October Revolution in Russia," so that "the imperialists and their henchmen will never be able to resist this force," despite the temporary mistakes of the Communists in this worldwide struggle. In other words, the countries of the "intermediate zones" are China's key allies in the fight against Soviet revisionism³⁵⁹.

³⁵⁶ In 1957, representatives of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed in Rome an agreement establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), known as the "Common Market".

³⁵⁷ Mao Zedong talks about the revolutionary tradition in China, the historical past of revolutions in the complex: the Opium Wars, the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), the Sino-French War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Reformist Movement of 1898, the Yihetuan Uprising, the Revolution of 1911, the May 4 Movement, the Northern Campaign of 1926-1928. (the campaign of the Kuomintang National Revolutionary Army of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek). Check: The historical context: China's Revolutionary tradition. P. 507-510. URL: <http://www.surendranatheveningcollege.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Significance-of-Peoples-Revolution-in-Chinaeng.pdf> (accessed: 12.04.2022).

³⁵⁸ Mao's Theory of Intermediate Zones. P. 6.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

Professors G. Astafyev, A. Dubinsky, M. Makarov believe that the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are the main and decisive force in the anti-colonial struggle. The second "intermediate zone", or industrialized countries of the monopolistic bourgeoisie (except the United States), were supposed to create a political basis for mobilizing anti-American sentiments in the interests of Beijing's great-power policy. This theory was intended to interest the anti-Soviet monopolistic bourgeoisie in the prospect of an alliance with the nationalist regime of Beijing, the authors believe³⁶⁰.

The concept of "two intermediate zones" («两个中间地带»理论) Mao Zedong provoked criticism both in the West and in the USSR due to the fact that in it the head of China declared claims on the territory of the Soviet Union as part of the native Chinese lands³⁶¹.

On September 2, 1964, the newspaper Pravda published the claims of the Communist parties to the "divisive activities of the CPC" and the objection from the Soviet Union to Mao Zedong's position on tsarist and Soviet imperialism and the theory of "intermediate zones"³⁶². At the same time, the political leadership of the USSR admitted that the statement of the Chinese leader was an invention of bourgeois journalists in order to "poison the international atmosphere and sow discord" between the two great socialist countries. Moscow expected Beijing to refute this statement, but Wang Binnan, Deputy Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, confirmed the position of the Chinese president on the territorial issue.

This was no coincidence, since back in 1954 Mao tried to express territorial claims to N.S. Khrushchev and N.A. Bulganin. Officially, Mao claimed all territories for 25 years, and the implementation of the theory of "intermediate zones" for 18 years. In this regard, Mao Zedong asks the question: on what basis is the Pravda newspaper shocked and surprised?³⁶³

³⁶⁰ China's foreign policy. On the essence of the foreign policy course of the modern Chinese leadership / ed. col.: G.V. Astafyev (ed.) [et al.]. Moscow, 1971. P. 35.

³⁶¹ Afonin B.M. Japan and former enemy countries after the end of World War II // Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region. 2015. No. 3 (89). P. 28.

³⁶² The convening of a meeting is necessary // Truth. 1964. September 2, No. 246 (16832). P. 3.

³⁶³ Mao's Theory of Intermediate Zones. P. 6.

During a visit to Beijing in 1954, N.S. Khrushchev refused to "come to an agreement on the issue of Mongolia" due to the fact that the territory of Mongolia is an internal matter of the state, and not Beijing or Moscow.

The Soviet official press criticized Mao Zedong's theory of "two intermediate zones" for its lack of a Marxist-Leninist proletarian approach. Soviet leaders claimed that Mao was "flirting" and entering into a bloc with a "class enemy" such as Japan. Beijing, in turn, accused the USSR of flirting with the aggressors and that it was the Russians who created a precedent for such political "flirtation". According to Mao, the USSR sought to conclude the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 and even earlier the Brest-Litovsk Peace of 1918 in order to save the revolution, i.e. to save the usurpers in power.

In Russia, the Chinese leadership's argument for the right to return territories held by the armed authorities of the old regime a hundred or more years ago was refuted due to the fact that the population of these territories was obliged to pay taxes to the Chinese emperor. Based on such historical precedents, France could claim Great Britain due to the fact that at one time England was ruled by a Norman prince, or Great Britain could own the territory of France, since it waged a Hundred Years' War there. Also, the border with China may run along the Great Wall of China, less than 100 kilometers from Beijing. Thus, the newspaper Pravda reduced Mao's claims to a historical basis to the point of absurdity. In fact, China cannot even rely on this dubious historical precedent, Pravda continued, because since the middle of the XVII century, Chinese rule has spread only to the Khingan Ridge, significantly south of the Amur River, thereby refuting the statement of the journal Historical Research (No. 4, 1964), which stated that Russia has seized vast lands north of the Heilongjiang River³⁶⁴ and east of the river. Ussuri. Russia has at various times annexed vast lands in Xinjiang and the Northeastern region. In addition, the territory north of the Khingan Mountains was inhabited by native tribes (Evenks, Daurians and others), who were periodically raided by the Manchus. It is noteworthy that neither Russians nor Manchus lived in the Amur region. The actual border between Russia and China arose with the "settlement of the northern

³⁶⁴ In Chinese – the Black Dragon River 黑龙江, the name of the Amur River.

half of the Amur Basin by Russians and its southern half by Chinese," Pravda claims. The editors of the newspaper, without disputing the accusations against the foreign policy of tsarist Russia, asked the Chinese leaders to take into account the feelings of Soviet people who for generations had lived and worked in this territory of about one and a half million square kilometers, considered it their home and the land of their ancestors and suddenly found themselves outcasts at home.

Most of all, the Soviet leaders were worried about a potential negative precedent that could lead to a revision of the borders. This would have caused an escalation of international tensions. Beijing's proposal, Moscow believed, was indeed fraught with military conflicts and further serious consequences and, as a result, it was proposed to maintain the status quo indefinitely until the socialist regime was strengthened in all countries, productive technologies reached a sufficiently high level, in order to unite all mankind, gradually eliminating differences in the standard of living of different peoples. Then the territorial borders between the countries will lose their political, economic and cultural significance. In such circumstances, in the uncertain future, there may be a more even redistribution of the population.

So, summarizing the above, we can distinguish three stages in the development of Mao Zedong's foreign policy concepts. **The first period:** 1949 – the first half of the 1950s – the theory of "two camps" (or the theory of "two worlds") and the idea of an "intermediate zone". **Second:** the late 50s – early 60s of the twentieth century. – the concept of "intermediate zones". **Third:** the theory of the "two intermediate zones" of the 1960s³⁶⁵. Implementing these concepts, Mao Zedong tried to create an international community of equal opportunities, with a single social structure. Using Marxist rhetoric as an analytical tool and proceeding from the opposites and unity of contradiction, Mao analyzed the relationship of interests between the political entities of the international community and, first of all, put forward the position – "who is our enemy, who is our friend" in diplomatic strategy.

Beijing has gradually transformed the "two camps" strategy into the idea of an "intermediate zone". The concept of Mao Zedong's "intermediate zone" was based on

³⁶⁵ HanYin Op. cit.

ideological confrontation. The idea was an analysis of the international strategic situation after the Second World War³⁶⁶. This foreign policy strategy of Mao was aimed at openly opposing the aggressive policy of the United States, it prevented interference in China's internal affairs. Being peaceful in nature, this doctrine did not provoke conflicts and sought a peaceful settlement of Sino-American disputes in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence.

It is noteworthy that Mao distinguished the main and secondary sides of the contradictions from the two sides, and in them – positive and negative qualities. Mao Zedong ignored the concept of unity between the transformations of opposites³⁶⁷. "... The main and secondary sides of the contradiction turn into one another, and the nature of the phenomena changes accordingly³⁶⁸." Mao's negative side turns out to be the main one. It determines the nature of things and phenomena. Mao recognized no exceptions: opposites confront each other in all processes, they are like two enemies, irreconcilable and do not merge. In other words, Mao sought to transform China from a semi-colonial dependent on imperialism into an independent new state with the overthrow of imperialism³⁶⁹. In a February 1957 speech "On the question of the correct resolution of contradictions within the people," Mao showed how the negative sides of the Hungarian events of 1956 turned into "good" ones, from which a useful lesson can be learned.

Relying on the dialectic of the constant transformation of things and phenomena into each other, Mao Zedong believed that the international situation was changing and developing. In the early 1950s, the Chinese leader, implementing the strategy of "leaning to one side", concentrated on uniting the countries of the "middle" or "intermediate zone". In this zone, the leader of the People's Republic of China first of all included the countries of the "third world", i.e. the space lying not between two worlds, but rather in a vast zone separating two rivals: a zone including many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries of Europe, Asia and Africa.

³⁶⁶ Zhang Mianli. Op. cit. In Chinese.

³⁶⁷ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong: "Our crowning number is war, dictatorship." P. 295.

³⁶⁸ Mao Zedong. Selected works: trans. from kit. [in 4 vols.]. Vol. 2. P. 444.

³⁶⁹ Ibid. P. 446.

This "intermediate zone" is becoming a new ally of the socialist camp, since, according to Mao himself, it is a protective buffer, "the rear areas of imperialism." Thus, the theory of the "intermediate zone", which serves as a forerunner to the doctrine of the "three worlds", reflected the changing perception of Mao himself of the international environment³⁷⁰.

He believed that there was no absolutely unified international political structure, and even in the conditions of a bipolar system of fierce confrontation between the United States and the USSR, the development of various political forces was not balanced. The balance of power is constantly evolving and changing; the subsequent split of the two camps, the United States and the USSR, confirms this thesis of Mao. The contradictions between Western Europe, Japan and the United States have become especially acute. This further convinced Mao Zedong that "the imperialist camp is not united," and the protection of national interests reveals various contradictions and disagreements³⁷¹. At the same time, Mao justified the need for close cooperation and support with the vast colonies and semi-colonial countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as mutually beneficial ties with Great Britain, France, and other capitalist countries that have contradictions with the United States and the USSR.

The combination of the struggle against American imperialism with the struggle against Soviet revisionism corresponded to the main directions of Beijing's foreign policy doctrine in the 60s of the twentieth century. Moreover, the emphasis of this struggle was shifted towards the USSR. Economic and military-technical cooperation with the Soviet Union began to weaken. Previously concluded trade agreements were canceled, and thousands of specialists were recalled from the PRC. On July 5, 1963, fulfilling Mao Zedong's instructions, a delegation headed by Deng Xiaoping arrived in Moscow to meet with M. Suslov, B. Ponomarev and Yu. Andropov. In fact, the negotiations turned into an ideological debate and ended in vain. Soviet-Chinese

³⁷⁰ Gillespie S. Op. cit. P. 111–112.

³⁷¹ Han Yin. Op. cit. P. 205.

relations have worsened, gradually moving from ideological differences to the rupture of multifaceted ties³⁷².

At the same time, against this background, Mao Zedong, fearing that the United States of America had strengthened its military presence in Vietnam and, due to the high concentration of industry and infrastructure development in the hard-to-defend coastal provinces, insisted on the strategic relocation of industries to the deep rear; factories important for national security were moved to factories remote from the central provinces of China areas, including into the depths of mountain ranges³⁷³. This policy has been called "the construction of the "third line"" («三线建设»).

Despite the internal Chinese content, the Chinese leadership has included the content of its foreign policy concept in the "third line" program, or strategy for domestic economic development. This decision corresponded to the spirit of the tradition of Chinese political culture. Even ancient Chinese thinkers emphasized the inextricable link between the defense and foreign policy of the Chinese state. Later, this connection was analyzed in depth and justified in the "Instructions" of the leader of the third generation of Chinese leaders, Jiang Zemin³⁷⁴.

According to Chinese researchers, Mao Zedong's course was justified. He proposed to increase attention to the internal mechanisms of the implementation of the strategy of the "third front" and considered the enterprises of the "third front" as a strategic reserve, the implementation of which was supposed to have a great effect and cause significant social consequences³⁷⁵. According to Chinese tradition, this program sounds like "the construction of the "third line"" («三线建设»)³⁷⁶.

³⁷² Yin Han. Opening a course for negotiations on normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union // *Bainyanchao*. 2013. No. 11. P. 61–64. In Chinese.

³⁷³ Lüthi L. The Vietnam war and China's Third-Line Defense Planning before the Cultural Revolution, 1964–1966 // *Journal of Cold War Studies*. 2008. Vol. 10, no. 1 (Winter). P. 31–33.

³⁷⁴ See: Galenovich Y. M. Jiang Zemin's instructions.

³⁷⁵ Chen Yunlin. From the "Food and Clothing plan" to the "War Preparation Plan" is the process of transition of the guiding ideology of the "third five-year plan". In Chinese; Cheung Kui-ying, Lin Ping. *Op. cit.* P. 25-44; Huang Hua. *Op. cit.* P. 24–26. In Chinese.

³⁷⁶ Chen Yunlin. The construction of the "third line": the development of the Western region in the period of preparation for the war. On the whale. *yaz.*; His own. Preparing for war: the secret of building the "third line" // *Wenshi bolan*. 2009. No. 6. P. 4–7. In Chinese.

The origin of the term "third line" was borrowed from Lin Biao's speech at the Conference of Seven Thousand Cadres, one of the largest party conferences of the Communist Party of China, which was held in Beijing from January 11 to February 7, 1962. Lin Biao feared an attack by the Kuomintang troops in Taiwan supported by the US Navy, which the coastal forces were not able to withstand cities.

Taking this into account, Mao Zedong for the first time raised the question of the ratio of the development of the inner northwestern regions of the country in conditions of waging a full-scale war. He proposed to develop a "third front" strategy, the large-scale implementation of which begins in the early 1960s. This is a large-scale investment program for the development of remote areas of the northwest and west of the People's Republic of China. Started in 1964, it was closed and secret³⁷⁷. In 1965, Mao Zedong wrote that "China needs to pay attention to building a "third front" and accumulate forces to fight imperialism and revisionism. The strategy of the third "front" includes metal mining, the development of weapons, the development of mechanical engineering, chemical and oil industries, and the construction of railways. Such a powerful potential will ensure victory in a possible war, and China has nothing to fear"³⁷⁸/

The production and resource base in the central provinces of the People's Republic of China was put on alert. The essence of the "third front" strategy consisted in the territorial geographical division of the whole of China into three regions: the northwestern remote areas (on the border with the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province, there are two of them) and the inner one. Many defense-related research and production facilities have been relocated to these regions. Later, these regions became known as the "Great Third Front", and the military institutes and factories located there became enterprises of the "third front" (Figure 1)³⁷⁹.

³⁷⁷ Naughton B. Op. cit. P. 351.

³⁷⁸ Cit. by: NaughtonB. Op. cit. P. 351.

³⁷⁹ Guo Dong. Op. cit. P. 1.




Figure 1 – Territorial boundaries of the "Great Third Front"³⁸⁰

The construction of the "third front" was accompanied by considerable difficulties, lack of financial resources, investments and met resistance not only from middle managers, but also from the highest echelons of the PRC government. Mao Zedong was not satisfied with the dynamics of the implementation of Liu Shaoqi's³⁸¹ economic course and Deng Xiaoping's political course, which hindered the implementation of his plan. According to Mao, the possibility of waging a large-scale war with the United States of America or the Soviet Union also hinders the implementation of this strategy. In these circumstances, Chairman Mao called on the CPC and the Chinese people to unite and accelerate the construction of the "third front". According to Mao's plan, in the event of war, Chinese troops would have to retreat to the interior, like the Kuomintang in 1938 in the face of an offensive by Japan and the Soviet Union in 1941 in the war with Nazi Germany. Chairman Mao called on the country to be ready for this event, unlike Chiang Kai-shek and I.V. Stalin, who, as Mao concluded, did not do it on time at their own risk³⁸².

³⁸⁰ Naughton B. Op. cit. P. 354.

³⁸¹ Liu Shaoqi (刘少奇). Chinese revolutionary, statesman and politician. One of the leaders of the Communist Party of China, Chairman of the People's Republic of China (1959–1968).

³⁸² Lüthi L.M. Mao's secret factories in Cold war China.

Analyzing the program, Chinese researchers consider the construction of Mao Zedong's "third front" not only the most important strategic plan in the history of New China, but also an important breakthrough in the history of the country's economic development.

Professor Huang Hua identifies the reasons for the construction of the "third line", which are complex and diverse.

The first is preparing for war and changing the wrong industrial model in order to promote the long-term economic development of the country – this is the main reason for the development of this program.

The second, ideological reason, lies in the active strengthening of military defense in the interior and bases of the strategic rear during the revolutionary war³⁸³. It is known that the disorganization of the management of the Chinese authorities actually led to the destruction of the basic areas and the manufacturing industry, caused a disruption of economic ties and a reduction in foreign trade turnover³⁸⁴.

At the same time, some Chinese researchers question the vital necessity of building a "third front". Considering the negative aspects of this strategy in the context of a policy of reform and openness, they give it a comprehensive economic assessment. The incomplete viability of this program, in their opinion, lies in the fact that no evidence of a US attack on China has been found; the construction of the "third line" is not justified; the war between China and the United States has not begun, in this regard, the implementation of this project causes many contradictions in the mid-1960s³⁸⁵.

Russian Professor V.N. Usov believes that Mao's fears about the upcoming war, although incorrect and subjective, forced him to violently rebuild civilian industries. It was a major turn in the national economy of the country on the rails of militarization³⁸⁶.

According to B.J. Naughton (University of California), despite the fact that this program, implemented in order to eliminate an external threat, was tightly controlled by the Chinese leadership, it required large financial expenses and negatively affected the

³⁸³ Huang Hua. P. 24–26. Op. cit. In Chinese.

³⁸⁴ Velichko V. Op. cit.

³⁸⁵ Wang Jianzhu. Op. cit. In Chinese.

³⁸⁶ Usov V.N. PRC: from the "great leap" to the "cultural revolution". (1960-1966). Part 2. Moscow, 1998. P. 195.

economic development of the People's Republic of China, even more than the "cultural revolution"³⁸⁷.

The same is stated in the official commentary of the People's Daily newspaper. It notes that the disadvantage in the construction of "third line" enterprises is considered to be numerous financial losses, excessive investment that was used improperly, and, as a result, its low efficiency³⁸⁸. It is characteristic that the discussion regarding the expediency of the "third line", proposals for the relocation of enterprises of the "third line", especially the high-tech cycle, back to the coastal areas, from where they were withdrawn during the second half of the 1960s – the first half of the 1970s, continues today³⁸⁹.

However, most Chinese analysts agree that Mao Zedong thought of defense construction as a phenomenon of maintaining the balance of power in world politics and considered it possible to prevent a new world war in this way. This program was implemented in 13 provinces of the People's Republic of China and was of great importance, especially in the first years after the formation of the People's Republic of China. It was the most important strategic plan in the history of building a New China.

However, its status and importance gradually decreased and disappeared with the development of a market economy. In order to function more effectively in the new economic conditions, the enterprises of the "third front" had to transform. During the years of the implementation of the "third line", 205.2 billion yuan was invested, 1,100 infrastructure facilities were built³⁹⁰.

Due to the fact that the construction sites of these projects are located in the inner Central regions of China, this causes serious financial losses and inconveniences for the subsequent operation of enterprises. Despite these costs, the implementation of the "third line" accelerates industrialization in the central and western regions of the country.

The theory of the "three worlds" became the main link in Mao's foreign policy course (the 1960s - the end of the 1970s). The theoretical basis of the doctrine of the

³⁸⁷ Naughton B. Op. cit. P. 351.

³⁸⁸ Cit. by: Velichko V. Op. cit.

³⁸⁹ Velichko V. Op. cit.

³⁹⁰ Chen Donglin. Preparing for war: the secret of building the "third line". In Chinese.

"three worlds" («三个世界»的概念) by Mao Zedong was inspired by the ethnocentric worldview developed by the Chinese back in the legendary Shang era (商朝, 1600-1046 BC). It was based on the idea of the primacy of Chinese rulers over neighboring tribes and nationalities. It was based on the idea of the divine nature of the power of the rulers of the Celestial Empire. By the Period of Spring and Autumn and the Period of the Warring Kingdoms³⁹¹, this idea was supplemented by the idea of the cultural superiority of the Chinese. At the same time, the sinocentric concept of suzerainty was born, which for many centuries shaped the doctrine of imperial China.

The logical consequence of this idea was the doctrine of China's messianic role, its spiritual duty to educate its neighbors and the impossibility of the reverse process. The great thinker of Ancient China, Confucius (孔子), laid the theoretical foundations of the future concept of Great Han chauvinism, which for many centuries determined the policy of the Chinese bureaucracy³⁹².

Relying on the traditional views of ancient Chinese thinkers on the world order, based on the idea of their state as the center of the world, the "middle state", Chairman Mao Zedong continued to develop the theory of the "three worlds" in new historical conditions. This doctrine is also referred to by many Chinese researchers as the theory of the "separation of the three worlds", or «三个世界划分»理论³⁹³.

There are contradictions between these worlds. The main contradictions in the international community (there are also three of them), Mao believed, are: *the contradiction between imperialist countries; between imperialist and national independent states; between Western countries and the United States of America.*

These three contradictions are not only opposite, but also united, which is a contradiction of the interests of the international community during the Cold War and contains a huge driving force. This affects the evolution of the international community.

³⁹¹ 春秋时期 Chunqiu Period (The Period of Spring and Autumn), 770-476; 战国时期 The Zhanguo Period (Warring States), 475-221 BC.

³⁹² Zhdanov V.L. Op. cit.

³⁹³ Liu Rongwei. The idea of a "community of the common destiny of mankind" is the legacy and development of the theory of the "three worlds" // World Socialist Studies. 2019. No. 4. P. 18–20. In Chinese; Jiang An. Op. cit. In Chinese.

Based on a general analysis of the contradictions mentioned above, Mao emphasized that "contradictions exist between imperialist countries, so we can take advantage of them. They are not so united, the Americans and the British are not so united, the Americans and the West Germans are not as united as Adenauer is against the British. So all the workers of the world, the patriotic people oppressed by the imperialists, are a lot of our allied forces"³⁹⁴.

Chinese scientists continue to develop the doctrine of the three main contradictions in the international community. They are trying to creatively supplement the Maoist concept with new content, taking into account the changing international situation, and substantiate a new Chinese concept, an alternative to the Soviet and American ones.

This concept is based on the exclusivity of the "heavenly origin" of the Chinese "middle" state (中国), which in modern conditions, after many failures and humiliations by foreign invaders, must regain its former greatness, "lost territories", "restore justice", using other countries to achieve its interests. The culprits of the misfortunes that happened to China in this concept are the United Kingdom ("opium" wars), Japan (wars, significant casualties), Russia/USSR (invasion of the northern lands of China and the arrogant attitude of I.V. Stalin), the United States (competition in achieving leading positions in the region and the world)³⁹⁵.

Certain provisions of the theory of the "separation of the three worlds", creatively developed by Chinese scientists, were published in the "Selected Works" of Mao Zedong in the 60-70s of the XX century³⁹⁶. In his writings, Mao characterized each of the "three worlds", showing the growing contradictions between them. Mao referred to the "first world" as the hegemonies of the USSR and the USA competing for world domination. The "second world" is represented by Japan, Europe, Australia, Canada; China belongs to the "third world". («。 。 。 美国、苏联是第一世界。中间派，日本、欧洲、澳大利亚、加拿大，是第二世界。咱们是第三世界») ³⁹⁷.

³⁹⁴ Han Yin. Op. cit. P. 204.

³⁹⁵ Akhmadeeva Ya. M. Op. cit. P. 35.

³⁹⁶ Do you see how Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping lifted the siege of the Soviet Union? In Chinese.

³⁹⁷ Ibid.

This strategy of Chairman Mao Zedong to divide the world into three parts was aimed at the solidarity of the international proletariat, socialist countries and oppressed nations. The "Second World" was considered by Mao as a two-sided one, oriented towards both socialism and capitalism. The countries of the "third world" are able to win or unite in the fight against hegemony.

2.2. Radicalization of foreign policy during the "Cultural Revolution" (1966–1976)

The years of the "Great Cultural Revolution" («文化大革命») in China are evaluated inconsistently and cause a lot of controversy in both Russian and Chinese and Western historical and political science. According to Tang Zou, an American professor of Chinese descent, one of the likely causes of this large-scale historical phenomenon is the crisis, the ideological struggle within the CPC in the early 1960s, which led to the Maoists criticizing the political organization of the separation of elites and masses. Mao wanted to destroy the inefficient old system of government and create a new one based on the involvement of each member in a political organization. However, Mao Zedong failed to achieve this.³⁹⁸ The American historian B. Schwartz is inclined to consider the idea of China's modernization through the process of rationalization of all social spheres as the reason³⁹⁹.

The "cultural revolution" is unequivocally negatively assessed by Soviet and Russian scientists. The assessment of the "cultural revolution" by most Chinese scientists is more restrained. It is only in recent years that more scientific papers have appeared, which more objectively and in detail analyze the content and consequences of the "cultural revolution" of the 60-70s of the twentieth century. An exhaustive description of this event is presented in the writings of Xi Jinping⁴⁰⁰.

It is characteristic that until recently, the attention of Chinese analysts and politicians has been focused on the internal aspects of the "cultural revolution". Little

³⁹⁸ Burlatsky F. M. Mao Zedong, Jiang Qing and Advisor Deng. P. 155–156.

³⁹⁹ Ibid. P. 158–159.

⁴⁰⁰ Xi Jinping. The governance of China. III. Beijing, 2020. 650 p.

attention was paid to the analysis of the PRC's foreign policy course, practical and theoretical research of foreign policy doctrine, including the theory of the "three worlds", which was filled with new content during the "cultural revolution" – the anti-Soviet aspect intensified and more attention was paid to strengthening cooperation with the United States.

The impetus for the formation of this part of the foreign policy concept was the meeting of U.S. Secretary of State G. Kissinger with Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai in November 1973, at which a wide range of issues of cooperation between the two countries, coordination of their policies in the Middle East and Asia were discussed. The political leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States agreed to jointly oppose Soviet hegemony, strengthen cooperation with Europe and Japan, and strengthen the political line linking the United States, Japan, China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Europe. They demonstrated joint actions against Soviet hegemony by developing a "strategy for forming an alliance against the enemy."⁴⁰¹

In the 70s of the twentieth century, noticeable changes took place in the world associated with the rise of developing countries and the expansion of Soviet influence and the entire socialist camp. At the same time, crisis phenomena in the financial, economic and energy spheres were observed in Western countries, including the United States. These changes in international life have not gone unnoticed in Beijing. The Maoist leadership rejected world socialism, declaring the socialist commonwealth "non-existent", accused Marxism-Leninism of the depravity of the achievements of socialist countries, writes L.M. Gudoshnikov⁴⁰². In this regard, the Chinese leadership expanded the content of the previous theory of the "three worlds". Mao Zedong's idea of a global division of humanity into three worlds has received wide resonance⁴⁰³. Its detailed version was first presented by Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, in April 1974 at the VI special session of the UN General Assembly. On the instructions of the President of the People's Republic of China, he identified three political forces in international politics. Developing the idea

⁴⁰¹ Kissinger G. Op. cit. P. 307.

⁴⁰² China after the "Cultural Revolution" (political system, internal political situation). P. 3–4.

⁴⁰³ Pantsov A. Mao Zedong.

of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping stated that two superpowers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, constitute the "*first world*"; The developing countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions together form the "*third world*"; and the developed countries between them make up the "*second world*"⁴⁰⁴. («苏美两个超级大国属于第一世界，苏美以外的西方发达国家和东欧国家属于第二世界，亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲的广大发展中国家属于第三世界») ⁴⁰⁵.

In his speech at the United Nations in 1974 Deng Xiaoping stated that "history develops in struggle, and the world develops amid upheavals. ... Countries want independence, nations want liberation, peoples want revolution – this is the irresistible trend of history ⁴⁰⁶. ... Two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, are madly trying to seize world hegemony. ... They are trying to control the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America."⁴⁰⁷

At the VI special Session of the UN General Assembly (六届联大特别会议) Deng Xiaoping for the first time appealed to the world community to support the countries of the "third world". His speech was supported by many countries, including Latin America, Africa, and Asia⁴⁰⁸.

According to Dan, the ideological orientation of the "three worlds" is to establish the broadest international anti-hegemony, primarily a united front against Soviet hegemony⁴⁰⁹.

China, Deng Xiaoping emphasized, belongs to the "third world." This thesis subsequently entered widely into the discourse of Beijing's foreign policy and is still being repeated by the leaders of the People's Republic of China. According to the authors of this concept, the countries of the "second" and "third" worlds form the center of the struggle of superpowers. However, the Soviet Union has already been branded by Beijing as a "social imperialist" state, which replaced the United States of America as

⁴⁰⁴ Yee H.S. Op. cit. P. 239.

⁴⁰⁵ The strategic idea of dividing the "three worlds" // Municipal People's Government of Ankang. 21.04.2022. URL: <https://www.ankang.gov.cn/Content-2409169.html> (accessed: 03.08.2022). In Chinese.

⁴⁰⁶ Yee H.S. Op. cit. P. 242.

⁴⁰⁷ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong: "Our crowning number is war, dictatorship." P. 310.

⁴⁰⁸ A turning point in history before the Qin Dynasty: Deng Xiaoping in 1975 / ed. Cheng Zhongyuan, Xia Fou Zhen. Beijing, 2003. P. 24–25. In Chinese.

⁴⁰⁹ Do you see how Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping lifted the siege of the Soviet Union? In Chinese.

the main threat to world peace. The essence of the updated theory of the "three worlds" was to unite the "progressive" states of the "third world" and defeat the "second world" by isolating the two "reactionary" superpowers. Mao Zedong conceptualized China as a "third world" country, forming a strategic force of the "global united front". Beijing assigned itself a leading role in the vanguard of "protection" from the expansion of the superpower⁴¹⁰.

The period of the "cultural revolution" has become the most anti-Soviet in the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. During these years, Beijing developed the idea of a "worldwide united front" (or "united front") and a "worldwide united rear" under the general name "one line, one array" («一条线战略»). According to Mao, the "united front" consisted of China, the United States, Japan, and Western Europe. Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and other Muslim states are opposed to the PRC, and the regions to the south are united in a single rear⁴¹¹.

The Maoist theory of the "separation of the three worlds" of the 1960s, enriched in the 1970s, assumed the unification of the countries of the "third world" under the auspices of China and was a continuation of the concept of "intermediate zones"⁴¹². The central place in it was occupied by the strategy of the "world united front", the genesis of which can be traced back to the early years of the existence of the Communist Party of China (1920s). In those years, Mao Zedong advocated an anti-Japanese united front together with the bourgeoisie at the beginning of the war with Japan. The Chinese Communist leader also applied the "united front" strategy during the Civil War. Mao insisted that the Chinese Communists continue to develop a political line aimed at "developing progressive forces, conquering the middle forces and isolating the persistent forces." The united front against Chiang Kai-shek's policies consisted of workers, peasants, the petty and national bourgeoisie. It was these that Mao considered important elements of the coalition front. The basic principle of the United Front strategy was "not to strike in all directions and not to aggravate opposition sentiments."

⁴¹⁰ Yee H.S. Op. cit. P. 241.

⁴¹¹ Galenovich Yu. M. Chinese plots: What China is pleased and dissatisfied with. P. 458–459.

⁴¹² Trushkin A.G. The ideological foundations of the new foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (1978-2001) // Bulletin of the NSU. Ser.: History, philology, Oriental studies. 2019. Vol. 18, No. 4. P. 110; Yee H.S. Decree. Op. P. 241.

⁴¹³ Note that this strategy allowed China to win the war with Chiang Kai-shek, their main enemy. It is symptomatic that Mao's idea of dividing the world space into three parts or categories in his strategy of the "world united front" can also be traced in his conversation with the American correspondent A.L. Strong in 1946⁴¹⁴.

During the period of the "cultural revolution", Mao's idea of a "permanent revolution" became the central idea of the Chinese leadership. It formed the theoretical background of his practical plans in the 1960s and 70s. At the X Congress of the CPC and in the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China in 1982, provisions were laid on the continuation of the revolution during the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was this idea that formed the core, the core of Mao's socio-political views on the problems of the "cultural revolution", the problems of war and peace, and world politics. Mao Zedong's approach to revolutionary activity was formulated as an approach to "deepening continuous Revolution"⁴¹⁵. Mao perceived the revolution as a method of carrying out political campaigns, armed conflicts, demonstrations of verbal radicalism, etc. The split of the communist movement, the struggle against the Soviet Union also represented elements of a "permanent Revolution". Referring to historical experience, Mao considered the new World War useful and linked wars between states with revolutions. Mao sought to turn the revolution in China into a "universal" installation for the entire world communist movement."⁴¹⁶ The Chinese leader and Beijing ideologues strenuously called for the overthrow of the temple of Confucius and the construction of a temple of Mao Zedong's ideas⁴¹⁷. Mao Zedong's "ideas" were declared "sacred and inviolable." The ideological regime established as a result of the "cultural revolution" meant an artificial narrowing of the spiritual culture of the party and the entire Chinese people⁴¹⁸.

The "cultural revolution" in the USSR was assessed in a radically different way: the "decade of troubles" in China (1966-1976) was a tragic stage not only in the field of

⁴¹³ Yee H.S. Op. cit. P. 240.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid.

⁴¹⁵ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong: "Our crowning number is war, dictatorship." P. 287–288.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid. P. 306–307.

⁴¹⁷ China after the "Cultural Revolution" (political system, internal political situation). P. 159.

⁴¹⁸ Burlatsky F.M. Mao Zedong and his heirs. P. 143.

domestic but also foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. Starting in the summer of 1966, Mao Zedong launched a counter-revolutionary coup against the Chinese people and the international communist movement. The Red Guards, on the orders of the Chinese leader, "shouted about their intention to go to war against Moscow." A significant number of them were resettled to the borders of Mongolia and the Soviet Union⁴¹⁹.

In 1966–1968, seeking to strengthen their influence in the countries of the "third world", the Beijing leaders developed the theory of the "three worlds" and tested the atomic bomb. At the same time, they stressed that missile and nuclear weapons in China are "at the initial stage of testing."⁴²⁰ Mao preferred not to openly talk about the power of the PRC's nuclear missile potential, emphasizing the weakness of Chinese weapons in comparison with American or Soviet ones as a disguise. In the autumn of 1966 and the summer of 1967, Beijing conducted tests of the missile program and began preparations for testing the first hydrogen bomb. The tests were unsuccessful and were accompanied by difficult problems. But in 1966, after a successful missile hit, Mao decided to purchase intercontinental missiles in the next 4 years. At the same time, the slogan appears: "An ideological atomic bomb explodes a material atomic bomb."⁴²¹ It is noteworthy that, while implementing the nuclear program, Beijing did not think much about the consequences of nuclear tests: the population of a number of Asian countries experienced problems from radioactive contamination⁴²².

According to Mao's plan, in order to determine foreign policy actions and attitudes, it was necessary to replace revolutionary Marxism-Leninism with "the ideas of Mao Zedong." Mao encouraged the spread of his cult around the world. Popularization of the "ideas of Mao Zedong" and his "Little Red Book" has become the main foreign policy task of Beijing. Chinese leaders have declared that "the world has entered a new era of Mao," and Maoism should be spread around the world⁴²³. The diplomatic course developed towards sympathy for the countries of Southeast Asia and

⁴¹⁹ Wang Ming. *Op. cit.* P. 239.

⁴²⁰ Borisov O.B. *Op. cit.* P. 99–100.

⁴²¹ Zhang Yu, Holliday J. *Unknown Mao*. Moscow, 2007. P. 595.

⁴²² A dangerous course. *About the events in China*. Issue 1. Moscow, 1969. P. 212.

⁴²³ Zhang Yu, Holliday J. *Op. cit.* P. 596–597.

Africa. So, in the middle of 1967 The cult of Mao flourished in Burma, in which Mao intended to provoke a new round of civil war. Secret training camps were established throughout China by Mao's decree to train young people and teach them how to use weapons, including citizens of Western countries⁴²⁴. Similarly, Beijing supported various communist movements and maintained an emphasis on armed and guerrilla warfare in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, etc. The leaders of the People's Republic of China put forward the thesis that it is necessary to focus on a "protracted war" in Cambodia⁴²⁵.

In November 1968, in an interview with the Australian Maoist Hillu, Mao declared world unification, that the world needed unification. "In the past, many, including the Mongols, the Romans, ... Napoleon ... wanted to unite the world. Today, the United States and the Soviet Union are trying to unite the world... but have failed. In my opinion, the world can be united." It spoke of the incredible ambition and courage of this man. It was himself and his country with its huge human resources that he saw as the world ruler and leader of the world revolution. During the interview with E. Snow⁴²⁶ Mao Zedong described himself as "a Buddhist monk under an umbrella. Without hair and without a palate." This is how Mao allegorically explained that he does not obey either earthly or heavenly laws ("*hair*" "发" in Chinese sounds the same as the word "*law*" "法")⁴²⁷.

Mao planned to return Hong Kong before the expiration of the lease agreement in 1997, "bring the British to their knees" and offered unconditional surrender in order to show who the true owner of the colony was⁴²⁸. On Mao's orders, the government led by Zhou Enlai promoted provocative actions, including terrorist campaigns in Hong Kong.

In order to gain the support of some countries of Western Europe and Latin America, in 1968 Mao and his supporters in Beijing held an international seminar of pro-Chinese parties and groups, which was attended by France, Italy, Chile, Indonesia. The PRC has also established closer ties with England and Belgium.

⁴²⁴ Zhang Yu, Holliday J. Op. cit. P. 597.

⁴²⁵ Borisov O.B. Op. cit. P. 75.

⁴²⁶ An American journalist known for his books about China and his friendly attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party.

⁴²⁷ Pantsov A. Mao Zedong. P. 695.

⁴²⁸ Zhang Yu, Holliday J. Op. cit. P. 599.

According to Wang Ming, Mao waged a "frenzied struggle" against the countries of the socialist commonwealth, directing all his forces to split the world system of socialism, planning to end the anti-imperialist national liberation movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America⁴²⁹. Wang Ming explained this by the desire of the Chinese leader to subjugate the countries of imperialism. Mao wove intrigues, provoked the American-Soviet, world military conflict. And after the thermonuclear war, the President of the People's Republic of China intended to reign supreme throughout the world and strengthen his position inside the country. Moreover, the anti-Soviet and anti-communist actions of Mao Zedong were put at the forefront. They were indeed used by the Chinese leader as a means of rapprochement with Western countries.

In the late 1960s, anti-Soviet rhetoric increased dramatically in China. Chairman Mao Zedong announced to the international community that the Soviet Union "plans to violate the state border in Siberia, invade Northeast China and Mongolia." Mao predicted a war and a clash between the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) and the Soviet Army on both sides of the Yangtze River⁴³⁰. The situation worsened as a result of the entry of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968 and armed conflicts in the Far East of the USSR, Damansky Island and the Xinjiang sector in 1969. There were 4,189 clashes on the Soviet-Chinese border from 1964 to 1969⁴³¹. This was followed by difficult negotiations between A.N. Kosygin, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. So, in March 1969, the Beijing leaders called Kosygin a "vile revisionist" and did not answer his phone calls. Comparing these events with the events in Hungary in 1956, Wang Ming recommended that "the Soviet leaders carry out armed intervention in the affairs of the People's Republic of China."⁴³² However, in the autumn of 1969, Zhou Enlai settled the situation at a meeting with Kosygin at the Beijing airport⁴³³. As a result of the negotiations, the border issue has been resolved: fr. Damansky was ceded to China.

According to Chinese researchers, from 1967 to 1970, the number of diplomatic missions in Indonesia, India, Burma, Mongolia, and North Korea decreased in China.

⁴²⁹ Wang Ming. *Op. cit.* P. 178–179.

⁴³⁰ Pantsov A. Mao Zedong. P. 692.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*

⁴³² Wang Ming. *Op. cit.*

⁴³³ Pantsov A. Mao Zedong. P. 693.

Kim Il Sung, trying to reduce the influence of Mao Zedong in North Korea, is seeking the withdrawal of the remaining Chinese troops on the peninsula. The Chairman's negativity spread to the Middle East and the African continent. Mao hopes to wage a people's war and overthrow the ruling regimes there. In Latin America (Cuba) and even in Asia (Vietnam) Mao could not overthrow "rotten regimes."⁴³⁴ It is characteristic that the Communist parties and groups that followed in the wake of the PRC's policy suffered the greatest harm. Communist Party organizations were completely destroyed in Indonesia.

It seems that Beijing's foreign policy in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and some Pacific states was aimed at establishing the dominance of the PRC⁴³⁵.

Maoist propaganda tried to poison and corrupt the consciousness of the Chinese people and the world socialist community, including by inciting outright chauvinism and fanaticism. Mao called for "the restoration of historical justice and the creation of a great China." His claims to the vast territories of the USSR were justified by the decision to "present an account to the Soviet Union."⁴³⁶

At the same time, according to Professor Lin, the revolutionary line in China's foreign policy has failed. It failed for two main reasons: **exaggeration and miscalculation**. **Firstly**, China has set itself the goal of making revolutions in too many regions. The intense ideological component of the revolutionary strategy created difficulties for Beijing, prevented it from setting priorities and developing effective means of their implementation. **Secondly**, based on an ideologically sound strategy, China has seriously miscalculated the complexity and diversity of the "third world" countries. China has alienated many countries by insisting on the united struggle of the "third world" against both revisionism and imperialism. Mao did not take into account that each country has its own concept of national interests and defines its own relations with superpowers⁴³⁷.

⁴³⁴ Zhang Yu, Holliday J. Op. cit. P. 600–609.

⁴³⁵ Kapitsa M.S. China: three decades – three policies. P. 489–490.

⁴³⁶ Vladimirov O., Ryazantsev V. Decree. op. P. 7.

⁴³⁷ Cit. by: Gillespie S. Op. cit. P. 120.

The transition from revolutionary disorder to foreign policy transformations began at the end of 1968 and ended in April 1969 at the First Plenum of the IX Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (中国共产党第九次全国代表大会)⁴³⁸. The new strategy, based on the embodiment of the concept of a united front of China, the United States and sympathetic third world countries against the Soviet Union, opened a new page in China's foreign policy. This was clearly manifested in the relationship between the situation in China within the state and the international situation. The devastating consequences of the "cultural revolution", which plunged China into a state of uncertainty between 1966 and 1968, are gradually being neutralized («敌人一天天烂下去，我们一天天好起来。一方面，全世界无产阶级和各国人民的革命运动蓬勃高涨。越南南方、老挝、泰国、缅甸、马来亚、印度尼西亚、印度、巴勒斯坦和亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲其他国家和地区人民的武装斗争日益壮大»)⁴³⁹.

According to N. Levin, Adviser on China at the Institute of Politics of the Asian Society (New York), the Soviet threat to China's security served as the basis for establishing a temporary strategic alliance with the United States of America, an imperialist superpower, which, although weakened, remained the only force capable of resisting this danger⁴⁴⁰. The Chinese leadership viewed "American imperialism as a paper tiger pierced by the peoples of the world for a long time," and considered "social imperialism" to be the true threat, which is much more dangerous⁴⁴¹. In the opinion of some Western researchers, in this "paper thesis about the tiger" Mao limits the military strength of the United States and the danger of a Soviet-American war.

Mao's failures in Indochina were also a good reason that forced him to gradually move closer to the United States and pay a visit to the American leadership. Beijing, hoping to provoke an aggravation of relations between the two superpowers, brought to

⁴³⁸ Report to the IX Congress of the Communist Party of China (reported on April 1, 1969, adopted on April 14) // Database of national congresses of the Communist Party of China. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64561/4429445.html> (accessed: 03.08.2022). In Chinese.

⁴³⁹ Report to the IX Congress of the Communist Party of China (reported on April 1, 1969, adopted on April 14). In Chinese.

⁴⁴⁰ Levine S.I. Chinese foreign policy in the strategic triangle // Chinese defense and foreign policy / ed. by J. T. Dreyer, I. J. Kim. New York, 1998. P. 63–86.

⁴⁴¹ Tsyvk A.V. Evolution of the foreign policy doctrines of the People's Republic of China (1950–1990). P. 55.

Washington that it was time to change the course of the United States towards China. Since 1969 The United States of America has begun to implement a series of "small steps" to ease and further lift restrictions on trade with China. In a message to Congress, President Nixon declared his readiness to "enter into a dialogue with Beijing," and Mao Zedong was assured that the aggression against Laos and Vietnam was not directed towards China. This was followed by an action from the Chinese side, called "ping-pong diplomacy"⁴⁴². In April 1971, "a new chapter in the relations between the American and Chinese peoples was opened," as the Chinese premier told young American athletes in the building of the National People's Congress (NPC)⁴⁴³. Kissinger believed that Nixon was clearly aware of the importance and necessity of establishing such fragile relations between China and the United States, as well as attention to the fundamental strategic goals of the geopolitical dialogue⁴⁴⁴.

In 1972, Nixon's visit to China signaled for China its revival in the global diplomatic game. The United States has made important historical changes in international affairs, as a result of which Chinese diplomacy has become a mixture of ideology and national interest⁴⁴⁵.

In the final document, called the Shanghai Communique, each of the States formulated its position on the serious obstacle to normalization – the Taiwan issue. The People's Republic of China has confirmed that Taiwan is part of China and opposes all attempts to form two Chinas, one China and one Taiwan, or an independent Taiwan. The United States noted the importance of finding a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem and the intention to withdraw the remaining American troops from Taiwan.

During the visit, Nixon's February 1972 Zhou Enlai stressed that even in 1955, China tried to lead the negotiations on the normalization of bilateral relations, and "now is the time necessary to find a way to stop being enemies" («。。。我们必须做的事情是寻找某种办法使我们可以有分歧而又不成战争中的敌人»)⁴⁴⁶.

⁴⁴² Borisov O.B. Op. cit. P. 80.

⁴⁴³ Kissinger G. Op. cit. P. 256.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid. P. 259.

⁴⁴⁵ Kissinger G. Op. cit. P. 256.

⁴⁴⁶ Zhou Enlai. Selected works. Vol. 2. P. 475. In Chinese.

The Sino-American rapprochement and the new "great alliance" were of great practical importance for China. **Firstly**, it allowed Beijing to establish new contacts with other industrialized countries. In the last years of Mao's rule, political and economic relations with the West expanded and strengthened. In 1973, for example, China purchased \$4.3 billion worth of industrial equipment from the West, the largest step since China accepted Soviet aid to improve its industrial base in the 1950s. **Secondly**, thanks to improved relations, Beijing has established new contacts with pro-American developing countries. Between 1971 and 1972, twenty-four Third World countries established or resumed diplomatic relations with China. In other words, the reorientation of China's foreign policy in the early 1970s put China in a much better position to implement its policy towards the "third world". After initially focusing on the Sino-American rapprochement, Mao turned again to the theoretical basis for this new agreement: the theory of the "three worlds" or "separation of the three worlds"⁴⁴⁷.

In addition to the United States, Japan was also in the focus of normalizing relations. In September 1972, during the visit of the Japanese delegation to China, Zhou Enlai made a speech on the resumption and strengthening of friendly bilateral relations. He emphasized the greatness of the Chinese and Japanese peoples, emphasized that the friendship of the two countries contributes to the warming and defuse the tense situation in Asia and contributes to the maintenance of peace («中日两国人民应该世代友好下去。中日友好。。。将为和暖亚洲紧张局势和维护世界和平作出贡献»)⁴⁴⁸.

According to the American professor J. By the early 1970s, the shortcomings of this policy lead to another reassessment. During the "cultural revolution", the military leadership saw the USSR as the most serious threat, and in this regard, Beijing switched to a less ideologized and more balance-of-power-oriented foreign policy course. China has moved closer to the United States as the lesser of two evils⁴⁴⁹.

The early 1970s were characterized by the revival of economic ties with the countries of Indochina, Africa and the Middle East – Pakistan, Ceylon, Somalia, Cambodia, etc. According to estimates, China's obligations to provide economic and

⁴⁴⁷ Gillespie S. Decree. P. 122.

⁴⁴⁸ Zhou Enlai. Selected works. Vol. 2. P. 477–478. In Chinese.

⁴⁴⁹ Dreyer J. T. Chinese foreign policy // Foreign Policy Research Institute. Foot Notes. 2007. Vol. 12, no. 5. P. 1.

technical assistance amounted to 1.7 billion rubles⁴⁵⁰. This indicated that Beijing was seeking to revitalize diplomatic ties, using more flexible methods, not so persistently imposing Maoist ideas⁴⁵¹.

Inside Communist China, all these international phenomena led to the infamous event – "Project 571". Mao Zedong's closest associates Liu Shaoqi, Chen Boda and Lin Biao, respectively the "herald", "theorist" and "heir", rebelled against the anti-communist, anti-Soviet and anti-people ideas of the Chinese leader and carried out an open counterrevolutionary coup⁴⁵². In December 1970 – March 1971, the plan "Engineering Scheme 571" («“571 工程”纪要»反革命武装政变计划)⁴⁵³ was drawn up. In Chinese, the number "571" sounds like "五七一", "Wu Qi yi", when writing hieroglyphs with identical sounds (but different tones) means "weapon" (武器义). These were the theses of a secret document that revealed the attempt on the life of Chairman Mao Zedong, his former "colleague of the Chairman" Marshal Lin Biao, his son Lin Ligo, wife Ye Qun. Subsequently, this project marked the beginning of the end of the era of the great leader Mao. Lin Biao, declared a "mortal enemy", and his family members died in the deserts of Mongolia⁴⁵⁴.

X Congress of the CPC, which was held from 24 to 28 August 1973 (中国共产党第十次全国代表大会于 1973 年 8 月 24 日至 28 日), became increasingly anti-Soviet and Mao's foreign policy became even more reactionary. The main link in the foreign policy adopted by the Tenth Congress of the CPC was the provocation of the world War and the preparation for war against the USSR⁴⁵⁵. According to Mao, the international situation was characterized by great chaos in the world. A chaos – "a good thing, not bad," he thought («当前国际形势的特点是天下大乱。这种乱，是好事，不是坏事，它正在继续朝着有利于各国人民，而不利于帝国主义、现代修正主义和各国反动

⁴⁵⁰ Borisov O. B. Op. cit. P. 74.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Wang Ming. Op. cit. P. 227.

⁴⁵³ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁴ Pantsov A. Mao Zedong. P. 710.

⁴⁵⁵ Wang Ming. Op. cit. P. 225, 238.

派的方向发展»)⁴⁵⁶. The communique of the congress reported on "vigilance regarding the sudden attack of social imperialism." Wang Ming ⁴⁵⁷wrote about the slogan put forward by Mao, which demonstrates the true and hypocritical attitude of the Chinese president towards the war. "Dig deeper shelters, store more grain, do not claim hegemony." In fact, Mao advocated hegemony. Thus, he openly supported the state coup in Chile (September 11, 1973), established contacts with the military-industrial complex of the United States, NATO, West Germany, England and some other countries, the "Common Market" of Europe, and the militaristic groups of Japan⁴⁵⁸.

Speaking at the X Congress, Zhou Enlai, based on the "ideas of Mao", justified the split of the world into two camps: the "camp of superpowers", which, "conspiring" with each other, simultaneously fights for world hegemony, on the other side – small and large states and peoples. "The third world, the peoples of Europe, North America and Oceania support each other in their struggle against "hegemonism and the politics of superpower power." ...Countries strive for independence, liberation, peoples want revolution, which has become an irresistible historical trend," Zhou argued («亚洲、非洲、拉丁美洲各国人民争取和捍卫民族独立，保卫国家主权和民族资源的斗争，有了更加深入和广泛的发展。第三世界同欧洲、北美、大洋洲人民的正义斗争，互相支持，互相鼓舞。国家要独立，民族要解放，人民要革命，已成为不可抗拒的历史潮流»)⁴⁵⁹.

Since the introduction of the updated theory of the "three worlds", three phases can be distinguished in its development. The first was from 1974 to 1975, when Mao's revolutionary line in foreign policy was approved and all anti-Soviet forces, including the United States, were united. The emphasis is on one's own strength. The second, from the end of 1978 to 1979, was characterized by the expansion of China's trade and economic relations with the outside world (Western European, socialist, developing

⁴⁵⁶ Zhou Enlai's report at the X National Congress of the Communist Party of China (August 24, 1973, adopted on August 28) // Information portal "Network of Communist Party Members". 2012. September 25th. URL: <https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/25/ART11348556780608187.shtml> (accessed: 03.08.2022). In Chinese.

⁴⁵⁷ Wang Ming (王明). The Chinese revolutionary, a party and statesman, actively opposed the strengthening of Mao Zedong's influence.

⁴⁵⁸ Wang Ming. Op. cit. P. 240–241. In Chinese.

⁴⁵⁹ Zhou Enlai's report at the X National Congress of the Communist Party of China (report dated August 24, 1973, adopted on August 28). In Chinese.

countries, Japan). The third phase is formed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Duplication or simultaneous use of foreign policy strategies, many analysts believe, was commonplace at all three stages of development.

Therefore, it can be argued that the theory of the "three worlds" is the most flexible concept that can be modified and adapted to new situations by changing or shifting the composition of political forces in the "three worlds". This complex and contradictory idea has remained the theoretical basis of China's foreign policy for many years and is part and instrument of Beijing's global strategy.

At a meeting with K. Kaunda⁴⁶⁰, Mao stated: "In my opinion, the United States of America and the Soviet Union form the first world. Japan, Europe and Canada, the middle part belong to the "second world". We are the "third world". The "Third World" has a huge population. With the exception of Japan, Asia belongs to the "third world". All of Africa belongs to the third world and Latin America, too" ⁴⁶¹ («美国、苏联是第一世界。中间派，日本、欧洲、澳大利亚、加拿大，是第二世界。亚洲除了日本，都是第三世界。整个非洲都是第三世界，拉丁美洲也是第三世界») ⁴⁶².

The first stage in the implementation of this concept **can be considered the approval of Mao's revolutionary line in foreign policy;** the second is **the unification of all anti-Soviet forces, including the United States;** and the third is **the emphasis on a strategy of self-reliance.**

The unification of Vietnam in 1975 changed the architecture and structure of relations between the great powers in the region. The US withdrawal from Indochina marked the end of the era of direct American involvement and the beginning of a reduction in the American military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Hidden differences and conflicts between the Chinese and Vietnamese have escalated again after the elimination of the common US military threat. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's participation in the Angolan civil war of 1975 meant its strengthening and becoming a world power. In 1978. An agreement on Friendship and Cooperation was

⁴⁶⁰ Kenneth David Kaunda is the first Prime Minister and President of Zambia.

⁴⁶¹ Gillespie S. Op. cit. P. 123.

⁴⁶² Jiang An. Op. cit. In Chinese.

concluded between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The USSR contributed to the fact that Vietnam began to strive to play a dominant role in the Asia-Pacific region⁴⁶³. The conflicts between China and Vietnam escalated into a large-scale border war in February 1979 after Vietnam invaded Cambodia and established a pro-Han regime in Phnom Penh. In 1979, Beijing condemned the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan.

It is symptomatic that the newspaper "people's Daily" on November 1, 1977, published a paper called "Theory of Chairman Mao Zedong on the division into three worlds –a significant contribution to Marxism-Leninism" («毛主席关于三个世界划分的理论是对马克思列宁主义的重大贡献»), in which he promised to defend the revolutionary line of Mao Zedong's foreign policy. The document reaffirmed Mao's "three worlds" theory, first formulated by Deng Xiaoping three years earlier, and emphasized the strategic aspects of this concept⁴⁶⁴. This indicated that in a very favorable international environment, China's belonging to the "third world" and its following the socialist path corresponded to the Marxist and Leninist position – China and other socialist countries stand on a par with the rest of the third world countries, provide mutual support and assistance.

After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, inspired by the arrest of the "Gang of Four" and the rapid restoration of public order, the new Chinese leadership led by Hua Guofeng (华国锋) (who had no support for power either in the military or in the party apparatus) continued to rely on the "teachings of Mao". In this regard, it is not surprising that Mao's revolutionary line was adopted as a guideline for China's foreign policy and the basis of the theory of the "three worlds".

The reasons why Beijing followed such a revolutionary line in foreign policy were China's perception of an external threat and the crisis of domestic policy. In the 1970s, China established diplomatic contacts with many developed and developing countries and normalized relations with the United States. Some progress has been made in negotiations with Japan. However, negotiations with the United States on

⁴⁶³ A short history of Sino-Soviet relations, 1917–1991 / ed. by Zhihua Shen. Singapore, 2016. P. 336.

⁴⁶⁴ Yee H.S. Op. cit. P. 240.

official diplomatic ties have reached an impasse on the Taiwan issue. At the same time, the Maoist leadership witnessed the gradual withdrawal of Vietnam and India towards their rival, the Soviet Union⁴⁶⁵. An unsuccessful attempt was made to convince Hanoi to distance itself from Moscow's help. Mao, having enlisted the short-term support of Prince Sinauk and Pol Pot (Cambodia), intending to use them to his advantage, hoped to take a dominant position in Indochina, but the Vietnamese people did not allow Mao to win⁴⁶⁶.

Assessing the significance of the theory of the "three worlds", Professor S.S. Kim, a researcher from the Institute of East Asia (Columbia University), writes about its "symbolic rather than meaningful" meaning. Kim explains that the "three worlds" theory is a simplified model for identifying and evaluating major contradictions in the international order. This theory functions as a geopolitical compass for China to take its rightful place in the world. One can compare the theory of the "three worlds", Kim emphasizes, with Wallerstein's world system, which divides the global political economy into a core, a semi-periphery and a periphery. It also divides the globe into three parts: the "first world" of two superpowers in predatory rivalry or collusion; the "third world" of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America; the "second world" of developed nordic countries, closed between them⁴⁶⁷.

Kim considers the quintessence of Mao Zedong's theory to be its focus on anti-hegemonism, its desire to strengthen the position of weak and poor (including China) states in order to outpace the strong and rich. It provides for the formation of a "united front" strategy, based on the experience of China, to oppose the countries of the "third world" to the countries of the "first" in the struggle for the transformation of the post-war international system. According to Kim, although the theory calls for a "double enemy" approach directed against two superpowers, in fact it is the Soviet Union that poses a threat to the whole world⁴⁶⁸.

⁴⁶⁵ Yee H.S. Op. cit. P. 244.

⁴⁶⁶ Zhang Yu, Holliday J. Op. cit. P. 605–608.

⁴⁶⁷ Kim S.S. China and the Third World: in search of a neorealist world policy. P. 178–211.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid. P. 184.

The scientist argues that "the split in the South between fast-growing and stagnating, small and large, coastal and landlocked, left and right, democratic and authoritarian states contributes to the fact that any statement about the unification of the third world movement becomes a strange combination of rhetoric and wishful thinking...". Revealing the contradictions of the symbolism of the "third world" as an independent force in world politics can go too far and mislead⁴⁶⁹.

The term "third world" was increasingly challenged by critics who represented this world in terms such as "non-aligned" and "South". They inadvertently legitimized the hierarchy in the global political system. Without completely rejecting this criticism, the "third world" label existed partly in connection with China's political statements, and partly because it symbolized a common identity and common aspirations that still bind the countries and peoples of the poor South. This indicates that the concept of Mao's "three worlds" serves different purposes at different times of the theory.

The threat of war from the USSR and the consequences caused by the "cultural revolution" in China itself contributed to a reassessment of China's foreign policy. The reassessment followed a new analysis that identified four contradictions in the world instead of an idealized one contradiction. Kim explains that Mao Zedong's difficulty in identifying the only fundamental contradiction reveals the meaning of his "painful reassessment" of the international system. According to the American researcher, the structural shift from bipolarity to multipolarity, combined with the deterioration of relations between the USSR and the PRC, contribute to the fact that Mao begins to study various variations of multiple zones.

An interesting interpretation of the doctrine of Mao Zedong's "three worlds" is offered by modern Chinese political scientists. In their opinion, Mao, putting forward the theory of the "three worlds", is the first to transform China into an independent state. This, of course, contributes to the development of comprehensive cooperation between China and the countries of the "third world". It significantly increases the international status of the Chinese state and strengthens the international influence of the PRC,

⁴⁶⁹ Kim S.S. *China and the Third World in the changing world order*. P. 129.

forcing the United States to establish diplomatic relations with China on its own initiative after the end of World War II⁴⁷⁰.

Russian Sinologists, in turn, believe that the division of the world into three territories in the new Chinese doctrine of the "three worlds" is explained by three main changes that have occurred in the world: 1) many states of Asia, Africa and Latin America are gaining independence and stepping up their participation in international affairs; 2) as a result of the emergence of "social imperialism", the "socialist camp" is disintegrating; 3) the uneven development of capitalism entails the activation of the imperialist grouping⁴⁷¹. The anti-Soviet orientation of this theory, according to Professor A.V. Vinogradov, contributes to the support of some developed Western countries in the implementation of reforms within the country. This trend is caused by the concern of the Chinese leadership in connection with the growing power of the USSR and its allies. The anti-Soviet emphasis in Chinese propaganda and statements by Chinese leaders was close to those representatives of the Western bloc who had concerns about further expansion and strengthening. These sentiments allow China, which also considered the USSR to be the main threat to its security, to establish relations not only with the "third world", but also with developed countries, to break through the international isolation in which the PRC found itself as a result of the rupture of relations with the socialist camp and the subsequent "cultural revolution"⁴⁷².

So, summarizing the above, it can be argued that Mao Zedong's theory of the "three worlds" served as the theoretical basis for a radical change in China's foreign policy. This theory justified the need for subsequent close cooperation between China and the United States of America during the "cultural revolution". At the same time, this idea has become a convenient tool for carrying out the anti-Soviet line of the PRC. Finally, the theory of the "three worlds" has significantly influenced the development of

⁴⁷⁰ Zhang Zhancang. Theoretical substantiation of Xi Jinping's ideas about socialism with Chinese specifics of the new era // Research of state development strategies. 2018. No. 2. P. 118.

⁴⁷¹ Vinogradov. A.V. Foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in 1976–1978. // History of China from ancient times to the beginning of the XXI century: in 10 volumes. Vol. IX: reforms and modernization (1976–2009). Moscow, 2016. P. 95; History of China from ancient times to the beginning of the XXI century: in 10 volumes. Vol. VIII: Chinese The People's Republic (1949–1976). P. 587–588.

⁴⁷² Vinogradov A.V. China's foreign policy in 1976–1978. P. 95.

China's multi-vector and largely contradictory policy towards the countries of the "third world".

As one of the landmark theoretical achievements of Chinese diplomatic strategy and theory of international relations, the theory of the "three worlds" had a significant impact on the world order during the Cold War. It is noteworthy that many Chinese researchers emphasize the importance and practical significance of this doctrine for the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in the "new era". Jiang An, a professor at the Institute of Social Sciences at Shenzhen University, finds an inextricable connection between the key principles of the theory of the "three worlds", such as national sovereignty and independence, sovereign diplomacy and national security, and modern international diplomacy. As a strategic example of protecting national security, Mao Zedong's "three worlds" theory offers values and a choice of ways to shape and establish a new world order and provides the basis for China's foreign policy⁴⁷³.

Professor Jiang An points to three aspects of the theory of the "separation of the three worlds", which have made a historical contribution to the foreign policy thought of the People's Republic of China. First, Mao laid the cornerstone of the theoretical values of Chinese diplomacy. In the era of imperialism, hegemonism and colonialism, this theory sought to preserve national sovereignty and prevented the repetition of mistakes by modern diplomacy. Secondly, Mao solved the logical equation of Chinese diplomatic theory. After the formation of the New China, the CPC and the government put forward a number of theories of international relations and diplomatic strategies. Their basic formula is: "peaceful coexistence" → "separation of the three worlds" → "peace and development" → "harmonious world" (Figure 2) and so on.

The theory of the "separation of the three worlds", Mao believed, is based on the principle of ensuring international justice and national security. It not only implements the spirit of the Asia-Africa Conference (Bandung), but also lays the ideological cornerstone of the "peace and development" strategy. Thus, this theory has become a key link in the overall chain of Chinese diplomacy.

⁴⁷³ Jiang An. Op. cit. In Chinese.

“和平共处”→“三个世界划分”
→“和平与发展”→“和谐世界”

Figure 2 – The basic formula of the New China Government's diplomatic strategies*

Thirdly, the theory opened up new studies of diplomatic theory with Chinese specifics. Based on this theory, Mao Zedong has sought to "lift China from its knees" since the Opium Wars in 1840 and break the system of imperialism, colonialism and hegemony⁴⁷⁴.

We believe this theory is bipolar, since it divides the world into imperialist and socialist countries and is aimed more at opposing the USSR than the United States.

The principles set out in the Shanghai Communique in 1972 served as the basis for the establishment of official diplomatic relations between China and the United States. This rapprochement on a global scale changed the context of the Cold War and influenced the movement towards detente between the USSR and the United States. One of the important reasons for the establishment of a temporary strategic alliance between China and the United States was the threat to its security from the USSR. Mao Zedong, hoping to provoke an aggravation of relations between the two superpowers, told Washington that it was time to change the course of the United States. Mao believed that the United States was an imperialist superpower, although weakened, but remained the only state capable of resisting this danger⁴⁷⁵.

In the early 1970s, both China and the United States began to perceive the Soviet Union as a common enemy. The subsequent steps of the American diplomacy of R. Nixon and G. Kissinger allowed China to turn its international strategy from

* Compiled by the author.

⁴⁷⁴ Jiang An. Op. cit. In Chinese.

⁴⁷⁵ Levine S.I. Op. cit. P. 63–86.

confrontation with both superpowers towards confrontation exclusively with the Soviet Union. Then China could accept the United States as an unspoken ally⁴⁷⁶.

After the death of Mao Zedong on September 9, 1976, the leadership of the People's Republic of China came to power, headed by Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Hua Guofeng, who continued Mao Zedong's diplomatic course and supported the implementation of the first stage of the "three worlds" concept. The new Chinese leadership and the press continued to assert that the PRC would consistently adhere to Mao Zedong's revolutionary foreign policy line. Thus, in the speech of Deputy Premier of the State Council Li Xiannian, the attempt to isolate the USSR and commitment to the anti-Soviet course were emphasized⁴⁷⁷. Mao's revolutionary line was adopted as a guideline for China's foreign policy, and his theory of the "three worlds" remained the basis of this policy⁴⁷⁸.

In the initial period of Hua Guofeng's political leadership, the theory of the "three worlds" continued to be the basis for China's foreign policy. Later, she refuted the fears of some "third world" countries about the rapprochement and subsequent close relations between China and the United States of America. She strengthened this influence on the countries of the "third world". This influence manifested itself in two directions:

1) the strategy closely linked the policy of the People's Republic of China with the issue of concerns of the "third world" countries about the development of relations between the two superpowers. In the process of changing China's relations with the two superpowers, its policy towards the "third world" has also changed. As a result, she became less consistent;

2) in accordance with the strategy of the "great union", China perceived the countries of the "third world" according to the degree of strength of their "Soviet ties". The supporters of the Soviet Union were enemies, and those who were not were allies⁴⁷⁹.

⁴⁷⁶ Levine S.I. Op. cit. P. 63–86.

⁴⁷⁷ Borisov O.B. Op. cit. P. 249–250; Yee H.S. Op. cit. P. 244.

⁴⁷⁸ Yee H.S. Op. cit.

⁴⁷⁹ Lin Zhimin. Op. cit. P. 234–235.

After the death of Mao Zedong, despite the continuity of the foreign policy course, there was a noticeable adjustment. At the same time, the problems of the state became a priority. The situation inside the country was complicated and contradictory. The new political leadership abandoned the provocative military policy, fearing a state coup. In conditions of instability in society, harsh anti-Soviet propaganda was weakening.

Over the next few years, three fundamental flaws in the strategy of the "grand alliance" with the United States (the Grand Alliance) emerged.

Firstly, this strategy turned out to be too simplistic. By focusing mainly on a single anti-Soviet factor, this strategy, like Mao's revolutionary approach, underestimated the will of many developing countries to determine the national character of foreign policy.

Secondly, there were analogies between Chinese and American policies on many issues of the development of the "third world", especially those related to regional conflicts. These questions aroused suspicion and indignation among many who viewed these parallels as evidence of a deviation of China's foreign policy course from its proclaimed position of the "third world"⁴⁸⁰.

The third and perhaps most serious drawback of this strategy was the excessive reliance on stable international relations with the United States, which, in the end, leads to dangerous isolation of China. This was recognized not only by Chinese and Soviet analysts, but also by many Western ones⁴⁸¹.

Under these conditions of "fascination" with the United States, China's attitude towards them changed to indifference and gradually deteriorated. For a while, China took a relatively calm and passive position, in which it remained before taking its first steps in the post-Maoist years in foreign policy.

In the early days of the Reagan administration, any illusions of the Sino-American partnership were quickly exposed, as the new American government took an increasingly pro-Taiwan position, which was accompanied by a revival of American-

⁴⁸⁰ Lin Zhimin. Op. cit. P. 234–235.

⁴⁸¹ Gillespie S. Op. cit. P. 125.

Soviet rapprochement. Although this new U.S. position did not escalate into a serious confrontation, it signaled the beginning of China's disillusionment with the grand alliance's approach.

At the same time, the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in the late 70s of the twentieth century was characterized by inconsistency and unpredictability. Thus, in response to the alleged growing Soviet threat and the resurgent trend towards "appeasement" in the West, Beijing reiterated the need to form an international front against hegemony. In the second stage of the development of the theory of the "three worlds", calls for the creation of a united front reappeared in China, including the normalization of relations with the United States of America, the main purpose of which was to undermine the power of the Soviet Union. To this end, Deng Xiaoping made trips to Southeast Asia, Japan, and then to the United States in November 1978-1979.

The period of the "cultural revolution" was characterized both in the Western world as a fusion of foreign policy and revolutionary policy, which made them practically indistinguishable. R. E. Scalapino ⁴⁸²writes about this, emphasizing that the internal party reshuffles and the removal from power of some officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China have seriously reduced the attractiveness and prestige of the People's Republic of China in the non-Western world. As a result, this has affected issues such as China's membership in the United Nations and other international organizations that the country once treasured. At that time, China was not able to provide assistance to other States⁴⁸³. The Chinese leadership's calls for protracted people's wars, harsh attacks on most Asian countries and the constant assertion that Maoism is the global wave of the future were, in the professor's opinion, "crazy and unbalanced" policies. Even Chinese political language "has reached such a level of violence or threat that the connection between statements and practical action has become completely uncertain."⁴⁸⁴

⁴⁸² R.E. Scalapino is an honorary professor at Peking University, the Center for the Study of Northeast Asian Countries in Mongolia and the Institute of Economic Research of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

⁴⁸³ Scalapino R.A. Op. cit. P. 89.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid. P. 84, 89.

Beijing's armed conflicts with Hanoi (1979-1980) contributed to Vietnam's rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Negotiations between the USSR and the United States to limit the nuclear reserves of OSV-II (OSV-2 treaty) have raised China's concern about defusing tensions between the two superpowers, which could allow the Soviet state to strengthen its military position. In an attempt to avoid diplomatic isolation, Beijing has concluded a treaty of peace and friendship with Tokyo. In addition, the previously existing problems were solved by including a paragraph defining the optional nature of the paragraph "against the hegemony" of the "third world" countries. Beijing has also concluded an agreement on the Taiwan issue.

During the Vietnam War, the Chinese political leadership took important steps to improve the living standards of the Chinese people and in relation to China's defense strategy⁴⁸⁵. Marshal Ye Jianying, in a speech on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the PLA, stressed the importance of the people's war in China's defense strategy and pointed out the need to strengthen China's defense, equip its army, navy and aviation with modern means, including missiles and nuclear weapons. Marshal Ye and other representatives of the military elite advocated the modernization of the backward and poorly equipped armed forces of the People's Republic of China in the late 1970s⁴⁸⁶.

Chinese leaders were clearly aware of the need to modernize China's defense capability and disagreed about the period and speed of its process. The military leadership predicted scenarios of a future Sino-Soviet war, including a nuclear one, and calls for increasing China's defense. More moderate supporters of the military strengthening of the state believed that China's defense at that time was powerful enough to deter the Soviet Union and foresaw a large-scale attack using traditional weapons. As a result of the broad debate around the defense and modernization of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China, priority has shifted to the side of "defense built on the foundation of a strong economy; progress comes only when an

⁴⁸⁵ Hsieh A. L. *Communist China's Strategy in the nuclear era*. [S. l.], 2010. 224 p.

⁴⁸⁶ Yee H.S. *Op. cit.* P. 243.

economically powerful state strengthens national defense."⁴⁸⁷ In other words, within the framework of the "three worlds" concept, the importance of people's and guerrilla warfare in the future protracted war against the USSR, according to some Chinese leaders, will increase, not decrease. Mao's conviction of the success of the people's war was clearly reflected in the PRC's global strategy, a revolutionary line that emphasizes support for the "third world" as the strategic base of a unified anti-Soviet front. Mao believed that a revolutionary approach, as well as an approach of peaceful coexistence, would facilitate a movement that would inevitably lead to significant changes that would benefit all countries of the "third world". When this did not happen, the Chinese leadership began to revise its foreign policy strategy.

In an interview with Time magazine in January 1979, before leaving for the United States, Deng Xiaoping stressed that the importance of normalizing relations between China and the United States lies not in the development of bilateral relations, but in global strategic consequences. Deng spoke of China as an underdeveloped, poor country and called for unification with America in order to jointly confront the "polar bear"⁴⁸⁸. Dan noted that the United States had been in strategic retreat since the early 1970s and that the "real hotbed of war" was not America, but the Soviet Union⁴⁸⁹. In his opinion, the best way to confront Soviet expansion, whose characteristic tactics were "intimidating the weak and fearing the strong" and "intervening and seizing at every opportunity", is to create an anti-Soviet united front composed of developing and developed countries, including the United States. Beijing's international strategy at that time unfolded in two directions: first, to enlist Washington's support for China's military campaign against Vietnam, and secondly, to prevent the conclusion of the OSV-II between the two superpowers.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 suddenly opened and a year later completed the second, short stage of the implementation of the theory of the "three worlds" and pushed the process of evolution of the third phase. The Afghan crisis has forced Beijing's leaders to rethink China's global strategy. The situation in

⁴⁸⁷ Yee H.S. Op. cit. P. 244.

⁴⁸⁸ Kissinger G. Op. cit. P. 385.

⁴⁸⁹ Yee H.S. Op. cit. P. 244.

Afghanistan demonstrated to the Chinese that the Soviet Union is capable of launching a rapid offensive and supporting the war against a neighboring country, using a large number of combat units and a huge amount of weapons and equipment delivered by air and by land. Chinese leaders believed that the USSR was prepared and ready to wage various types of wars – nuclear or conventional, world or limited war. Nevertheless, Beijing's immediate reaction to the new Soviet threat was cautious and prudent.⁴⁹⁰

It is important that the inability of the Western allies to develop a coordinated strategy against the Soviet Union called into question China's own "united front" plan, which Mao implemented during the development of the second stage of the "three worlds" strategy. Beijing tirelessly warned Washington and its allies that, despite the presence of the Soviet Union on the eastern borders, the main military objective of the USSR remains in Europe. It will continue to expand and strike if it is not stopped. As a result, all countries and peoples must unite and stand firm against the ruthless "polar bear". Beijing's leaders understood that China must rely on its own efforts to defend against the Soviet threat⁴⁹¹.

So, during the reign of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), the Chinese foreign policy strategy or concept underwent significant changes. In its evolution, several stages can be distinguished, during which foreign policy concepts were formed:

- 1) the idea of "two worlds" in the late 1940s (early 1950s);
- 2) the idea of an "intermediate zone" and the principle of "sticking to one side" (1946 – early 1950s);
- 3) "five principles of peaceful coexistence" (mid-1950s);
- 4) the idea of "two intermediate zones";
- 5) the program of the "third front" and the theory of the "three worlds" (mid-1960s – late 1970s).

In the late 1940s, being in a state of political instability and social decline, China pursued a foreign policy course designed to recognize and support China from the three great powers: the United States, Britain and the USSR, with the condition of non-

⁴⁹⁰ Yee H.S. Op. cit. P. 244.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

interference in the internal affairs of the young country. At this stage, the leader of the People's Republic of China has so far formed only views and thoughts about the "intermediate zone".

Beijing's next foreign policy concept was the idea/thought of "two intermediate zones" aimed at forming a front against American imperialism and some European countries, and later at containing the Soviet Union, which, according to the Chinese party leadership, colluded with the United States to fight for world domination⁴⁹².

According to Mao Zedong, the countries of the "first intermediate zone" were direct allies of China against the Soviet Union and the United States, and the "second intermediate zone" were indirect allies. The first zone included the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the other – the imperialist countries of Europe and other developed capitalist countries. China's diplomatic strategy, according to Mao, was to rely on the countries of the "first middle zone, but to gain the favor of the countries of the "second middle zone" and resist American imperialism and Soviet hegemony."⁴⁹³

The concept of "intermediate zones" was China's foreign policy doctrine, on the basis of which it built interstate relations, trying, among other things, to resolve issues of war and peace. This multi-layered and contradictory concept formed the basis for the subsequent series of Chinese foreign policy concepts⁴⁹⁴. The concept of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence", formulated by the leadership of the People's Republic of China in 1954, stands out against their general background. As many analysts generally admit, the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" compare favorably with other foreign policy concepts of the PRC. These theoretical propositions have successfully passed the test of time and are harmoniously combined with the moral and ethical component of traditional Chinese ideas about the world around them. These five principles have an obvious universal content and are especially appealing to developing countries that have freed themselves from colonial dependence⁴⁹⁵.

⁴⁹² Tsvyk A.V. Evolution of the foreign policy doctrines of the People's Republic of China (1950–1990). P. 54.

⁴⁹³ Do you see how Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping lifted the siege of the Soviet Union? In Chinese.

⁴⁹⁴ Hovhannisyan A.Yu., Nadiryan D.A. The fundamental principles of China's diplomacy on the world stage // Region and the world. 2019. No. 3. P. 8.

⁴⁹⁵ Salitsky A., Semenova N. Chinese ideas about the world order: traditions and modernity // Prospects: electronic journal. 2019. No. 2 (18). P. 54.

The second half of the 1950s was marked by the interaction of Chinese and Soviet leaders and cooperation between the two countries. However, relations between the leaders began to deteriorate rapidly from 1957. Serious disagreements arose between the PRC and the Soviet Union.

In the early 1960s, the Chinese leadership realized the need to create research centers to study current problems of world politics. In the mid-1960s, amid the deterioration of relations with the USSR, drastic changes took place in the foreign policy views of the People's Republic of China.

After Stalin's death, Mao intensified the struggle with Moscow for leadership in the socialist camp. This forced him to invade the Soviet sphere of interests, and since 1958, there has been a cooling in Sino-Soviet relations, which since 1964 has been replaced by outright hostility⁴⁹⁶.

Such an acute confrontation between the Soviet Union and China, as a result, intensified the expansion of the geographical space of the two former "friends" in the international arena. Since the early 1960s, the two nations have been vying for the loyalty of various liberation movements and newly independent "third world" countries.

In the second half of the 1960s, the struggle for hegemony in the world communist movement unfolded simultaneously with the great-power aspirations of the Beijing leaders. The international situation of the People's Republic of China has deteriorated markedly. Relations with the West continued to be strained, some controversial issues remained unresolved; relations with the countries of Central and Southeast Asia deteriorated or remained unresolved. Chinese leaders considered a conflict with the USSR or the United States likely⁴⁹⁷. At the same time since the mid-60s. The border clashes (with India) testified to the ineffectiveness of the diplomatic strategy of the "five principles of peaceful existence" for the development of relations with the countries of the first and second intermediate zones.

In the mid-1960s, the threat of a potential war between China, Vietnam and the United States turned the "third line" program into a defense foreign policy concept that

⁴⁹⁶ Zhao Hongwei. Op. cit. P. 17. In Chinese.

⁴⁹⁷ Sveshnikov A.A. Concepts of the PRC in the field of foreign policy and national security. P. 99–100.

required large financial expenditures and later became ineffective. However, it has enriched and strengthened the content of the theory of "intermediate zones" as a strategy for internal economic development.

After Mao announced his new political concept at a meeting with Japanese Socialists (1964), its main provisions were implemented not only in articles and declarations, but also with the help of a "rifle", as demonstrated by the Sino-Indian war in two stages, the fighting and the events of 1969 on Damansky Island and in the area of Lake Zhalanashkol⁴⁹⁸.

It seems that Mao Zedong was extremely flexible in considering the theory of multiple zones in foreign policy thought. The periodization of zone theories is not clear enough and one stage easily passes into another. In our opinion, there are four of them. He singled out: **1) the "superpower zone" or "two worlds"** (camps), consisting of American imperialism and Soviet social imperialism; **2) the "socialist zone"**, consisting of all socialist countries; **3) the "first intermediate zone"**, including Asia, Africa and Latin America; and **4) the "second intermediate zone"**, representing the main capitalist countries of the East and West, with the exception of the two superpowers.

The 1966-1970s were marked by Mao's ascent to the world stage and the popularization of his ideas abroad. The transition from the revolutionary line to the creation of a united front of China, the United States and some third world countries has opened a new chapter in China's foreign policy. All this significantly aggravated the situation in 1969 after a series of border Soviet-Chinese conflicts and the proclamation of the Brezhnev doctrine of "limited sovereignty" after the introduction of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. We consider the political decisions and initiatives in the period between the IX and X congresses of the CPC⁴⁹⁹ to be quite fundamental and significant for China's foreign relations at that time. Thus, the implementation of China's policy in Bangladesh, Sudan, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Angola or other countries is best

⁴⁹⁸ Zhdanov V.L. Op. cit.

⁴⁹⁹ Hua Guofeng. Political report to the XI Congress of the CPC (the report was made on August 12, 1977, adopted on August 18) // Information portal "Studying the history of the Party and education". 2021. April 29th. URL: <http://www.hbctc.edu.cn/wsdx/info/1011/1135.htm> (accessed: 17.08.2022). In Chinese.

understood as an immoral opposition to the policy that the Soviet Union pursued in any of these regions⁵⁰⁰.

Mao Zedong's ideas about China and the new world order were finally reflected in his theory of the "three worlds". It began to develop as a response to the increasingly untenable one-way bias policy that Mao himself had previously proclaimed.

Mao Zedong's repeated attempts in the 1960s to implement the idea of "intermediate zones" in a rapidly changing world revealed an acute crisis of China's national identity. Then Mao, continuing the sharp struggle in the international arena, developed the idea of an "intermediate zone" into the theory of "two intermediate zones" and opposed both American imperialism and Soviet revisionism.

By the end of Mao Zedong's reign, China was gradually becoming an independent and strategically important state. Mao defined his philosophy of foreign policy with the following metaphor: "A wise monkey sits on top of a mountain and watches two tigers fighting in the valley below." The tigers in Mao's formulation were Moscow and Washington, and Beijing played the role of a wise monkey. And China has played this role in its foreign affairs quite successfully for a number of years, skillfully maneuvering against the background of the global confrontation between the USSR and the United States, carefully and prudently adjusting its foreign policy course depending on the emerging balance of forces and interests of the PRC at a given time⁵⁰¹.

Mao Zedong highlighted the real battlefield that unfolded between the two worlds in the vast zone separating the two rival states - a zone that includes many capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries of Europe, Asia and Africa. The countries of this "intermediate zone" became new allies of the socialist camp, since they served as a protective buffer, in the words of Mao himself, "the rear area of imperialism."⁵⁰² The struggle for the "intermediate zones", having turned into a center of confrontation simultaneously with the United States and the USSR, has become the most important foreign policy task for the PRC. Thus, the idea of an "intermediate zone", which

⁵⁰⁰ O'Leary G. Op. cit. P. 36.

⁵⁰¹ Kortunov A. About the wise monkey who came down from the mountain // Russian International Affairs Council. May 7, 2020. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/about-the-wise-monkey-who-came-down-from-the-mountain/> (accessed: 25.04.2022).

⁵⁰² China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era. Boulder, 1994. P. 30-31.

included what later became known as the "second and third world", reflected Mao Zedong's perception of international relations and the world order⁵⁰³.

By the early 1970s, Mao had resolved this crisis and placed China in the "third world." Thus, as part of the final refinement of the theory of "intermediate zones", the model of the "three worlds" arose. Mao Zedong put forward this concept as a reaction to the strengthening of Soviet hegemony, the deterioration of Sino-American relations and the rise of the "third world" countries.

It is no coincidence that in the second half to the end of the 1970s, Mao Zedong considered the Soviet Union to be the main security threat to the PRC. In the 1970s, the anti-socialist shift towards socialist states intensified in the international activities of the Chinese leadership; this manifested itself in the transformation of a "differentiated approach" to them into the basis of Chinese policy, in open confrontation between the PRC and an increasing number of socialist states⁵⁰⁴. In the second half of the 70s of the twentieth century. The great-power militaristic course of Mao Zedong, the policy of the "great leap forward", the "cultural revolution" led China into a state of deep economic and political crisis. The years of the "cultural revolution" brought China not only a crisis of foreign policy thought, but also caused significant damage to the international authority and prestige of the PRC. However, there has also been an economic revival in ties with developing countries.

An analysis of Mao Zedong's theory of the "three worlds" indicates that it is one of the integral, complete ideas of Mao Zedong. It was aimed at countering China's two superpowers, at isolating the Soviet Union as its main enemy in the 1960s and 1970s. The changing international situation and the dynamics of China's domestic policy at the same time forced Beijing to adjust this theory.

Thus, exploring the three main directions of the theoretical and methodological foundations of the foreign policy concepts of the first generation of Chinese leaders, we note the most significant influence of Marxism-Leninism simultaneously in combination with the traditional ideas of the Middle Kingdom. Mao Zedong shares the

⁵⁰³ Ibid. P. 111–112; Gillespie S. Op. cit. P. 111–112.

⁵⁰⁴ Borisov O.B. Op. cit. P. 29.

view of the "Tianxia" system. He also relies on the revolutionary Marxist, then anti-imperialist Leninist doctrine as determining the foreign policy course in the struggle against the semi-colonial position of the "young Republic of China"⁵⁰⁵. Guided by the ideological principles of V.I. Lenin and Sun Yat-sen on the liberation of the Chinese people from centuries-old slavery, Mao Zedong proceeds from the opposition and unity of contradictions, analyzes the relationship of interests between the political entities of the international community.

⁵⁰⁵ Lenin V.I. Complete works. Vol. 23. March – September 1913. Ed. 5-e. Moscow, 1980. P. 28–29; 166–167; His own. The complete works. Vol. 27. August 1915 – June 1916. Ed. 5-e. Moscow, 1962. P. 61–68; His own. The complete works. Vol. 28. Notebooks on imperialism. Ed. 5-e. Moscow, 1962. XVI, 838 p.; His own. The complete works. Vol. 40. December 1919 – April 1920. Ed. 5-e. Moscow, 1963. XXIV, 506 p.

**CHAPTER 3. THE FORMATION OF THE PRC'S FOREIGN POLICY
STRATEGY DURING THE PERIOD OF ECONOMIC REFORMS
AND OPENNESS (late 1970s – 1990s)**

**3.1. Deng Xiaoping's diplomacy: abandoning radical ideological propaganda
and struggle in favor of economic cooperation**

By the end of Mao Zedong's reign, China was gradually becoming an independent and strategically important state. Offering the world community, the theory of the "three worlds" together with the line of the "united front" ("grand alliance") with the United States, aimed at containing the impending threat of Soviet invasion, China, after the outbreak of the Afghan war in 1979, tried to "recalibrate the balance of power" in its favor and used the structure of the regional forces of the United States for this purpose.⁵⁰⁶

After Chairman Mao's death, Deng Xiaoping became the new national leader of the People's Republic of China. Formally, he did not hold senior positions in the CPC and the state, but his influence on the domestic and foreign policy of the People's Republic of China increased every year. During the years of the "cultural revolution" he was in the "shadow" of political life. Despite the fact that he belongs to the first generation of the Chinese Communist elite (老一代的革命家)⁵⁰⁷, he did not actively participate in the development of the internal and foreign policy of the PRC until 1973. Dan's foreign trips to the USA, Japan and other countries in the early 1970s. They made him the conductor of the foreign policy platform built personally by Mao Zedong. He actively participated in the work of the Tenth Congress of the CPC in August 1973, which proclaimed the task "... to strengthen solidarity with the proletariat, oppressed peoples and nations of the whole world, with countries being bullied by imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, hegemonism of the USSR and the USA." In one of his

⁵⁰⁶ Friso M.S. China's long march to national rejuvenation: toward a Neo-Imperial order in East Asia? // Asian Security. 2021. Vol. 17, no 1. P. 55–56.

⁵⁰⁷ Boyarkina A.V. Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Strategy during the period of economic reforms and Openness (late 1970s – 1990s) // Bulletin of the Russian State University. A series of Stories. Political science. International relations. 2023. No. 1. P. 97.

statements, he suggested a possible strike from the USSR and options for rapprochement with the West⁵⁰⁸.

Deng Xiaoping developed Mao's theory of the "three worlds" and pointed out the changes that had taken place in the world. He referred to such changes as ⁵⁰⁹:

- 1) many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have gained independence;
- 2) the impossibility of reviving the socialist camp;
- 3) the disintegration of the capitalist and imperialist system.

Developing the provisions of this theory at the 1st session of the National People's Congress of the 4th convocation in 1975, Deng Xiaoping reported on the emerging trend towards refocusing the struggle against superpowers and the "second world" on China's support for the "second world" and the progressive "third world".

Deng Xiaoping's triumph came at the 3rd plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation in 1978. This plenum and Deng Xiaoping's report on it became one of the most significant events in the history of China in the late 1970s - 1980s of the twentieth century. In his report, China's new leader spoke about the need to shift the center of gravity in party and state work to economic construction. He proposed to abandon the antagonistic class struggle and gradually and quite openly move within the framework of the socialist state to a regulated market economy, defining an unlimited period for this⁵¹⁰.

The PRC's foreign policy had to correspond to economic reforms and openness. This policy, according to Deng Xiaoping, was supposed to be the "second Chinese revolution"⁵¹¹ and an integral part of China's impressive economic growth, which would allow it to become an active participant in international life. Deng believed that the emphasis of the era had shifted from "revolution and war", which Mao defined, to

⁵⁰⁸ Sveshnikov A.A. Foreign policy concepts of the People's Republic of China and conceptual representations of Chinese international experts. P. 23–24.

⁵⁰⁹ Barach D. Op. cit. P. 225.

⁵¹⁰ Pivovarova E.P. What new things did the XVII Congress of the CPC bring to the theory of "socialism with Chinese specifics" // Problems of the Far East. 2009. No. 2. P. 146–147.

⁵¹¹ Deng Xiaoping. Reform is China's second revolution // Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Vol. III (1982–1992). Beijing, 1994. P. 119–120.

"peace and development". In this regard, China should rethink its tradition of interacting with allies and one major power to fight another⁵¹².

At Deng Xiaoping's initiative, the share of military spending in China's GDP has been gradually declining since 1979, and China has concentrated its limited resources on strengthening economic development⁵¹³. "The success of economic development," Deng Xiaoping believed, "will determine China's role in international affairs. If the country prospers, this role will increase." It is the modernization of the country in four areas (四个现代化), according to Deng, that will lead to a successful solution for Taiwan's return to the bosom of the motherland⁵¹⁴.

On the eve of the 3rd plenum of the 11th convocation of the CPC Central Committee, Deng launched a wide-ranging discussion with economists, philosophers, and historians, in which he sharply raised the problems facing the country and the party. He boldly and in a frank manner called for the liberation of consciousness (解放思想).

Speaking at party meetings, Deng Xiaoping tirelessly reaffirmed the commitment of the CPC and the people to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong (马克思列宁主义, 毛泽东思想), noting that they should be comprehensively and accurately understood and followed in all areas. The application of these tenets in practice should lead the country to prosperity and development (使马克思列宁主义, 毛泽东思想在实践中不断丰富和发展)⁵¹⁵. In fact, this meant that, only after receiving confirmation in practice, the theory serves as a criterion of truth.

The 3rd plenum of the 11th convocation of the CPC Central Committee became the watershed of the era of Mao and Deng. His decisions marked a new historical period of reforms and the policy of external openness and formed a new political course for modernization against the background of a revision of the ideological and theoretical base of the CPC. It is important to note in the work of the plenum the course for the peaceful reunification of Taiwan and mainland China, the approval of a course for the

⁵¹² Di Dongsheng. *Op. cit.* P. 9.

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁴ Usov V.N. *Op. cit.* P. 129.

⁵¹⁵ China Official Annual Report 1982/3. P. 44–45.

development of relations with the outside world for the study and borrowing of foreign, primarily Western, capital and technologies⁵¹⁶.

After becoming the universally recognized leader of the party and the state, Deng drew the attention of Chinese communists, intellectuals and youth to the need to think freely, speak and act boldly (解放思想, 开动脑筋, 实事求是). The decisions of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th convocation focused on a gradual transition from the revolutionary course of Mao Zedong to the problems of peaceful construction of socialism with Chinese specifics.

Developing his foreign policy strategy, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed "three great things." This is the fight against the so-called hegemony, that is, with the USSR; the protection of peace; the return of Taiwan and the unification of the motherland⁵¹⁷. The political leadership carried out management based on the developed model of collective leadership, including foreign policy. The lower layers of the bureaucracy carried out practical policies on the orders of the top management. Combining various management schemes, the CPC leaders built up foreign policy and claimed that their policies were precisely carried out by their subordinates⁵¹⁸.

Deng Xiaoping's model of leadership control of the collective leadership was used to resolve important issues, including: relations with major powers such as the United States and Russia, neighboring countries; issues related to sovereign territory, security issues. The members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Secretariat from 1980 to 1987 and the Politburo after 1987 were the top leaders who made these key decisions. Such leaders include: Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Li Peng from 1987-1989 and Jiang Zemin after 1989.

It should be noted that after Deng Xiaoping left the post of chairman of the Central Military Committee in 1989, the leadership model in the command was rarely

⁵¹⁶ The 3rd plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation. The XII Congress of the CPC. In Chinese; Deng Xiaoping. *The main issues of modern China*. P. 27–28.

⁵¹⁷ Smirnov D.A. *Ideological and political aspects of modernization of the People's Republic of China*. P. 185.

⁵¹⁸ Hsu Chih-Chia. *Foreign policy decision-making process in Deng's China: three patterns for analysis // Asian Perspective*. 1999. Vol. 23, no. 2, spec. iss. *On the Dynamics of Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula* (1999). P. 219.

used for decision-making⁵¹⁹. And in the following years, Dan increasingly trusted the collective leadership, including foreign policy. This leadership style is also emphasized by foreign analysts⁵²⁰.

Openness to foreign policy, the PRC's war in Vietnam and the negotiations on the most favored nation between China and the United States have become a confirmation of the Chinese model of collective leadership.

The decisive factor that led to the formation of China's foreign policy in the style of Deng Xiaoping was his reliance on his closest associates and on such influential members of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee as Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who played an important role in shaping this policy.

Deng writes in "Favorites": provided that "China ... turns up its nose and starts to be a hegemon, giving orders right and left, it will exclude itself from the "third world" and, of course, will cease to be a socialist state. This foreign policy was developed by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, and the current leaders will educate the younger generations in its spirit."⁵²¹

In an environment of heightened theoretical discussions and a "crisis of faith" associated with past mistakes and distrust of Chinese society towards official ideology, Deng Xiaoping set a central task – the elimination of contradictions, consisting in the inability of productive forces (still at a low level) to meet the needs of the population and the state. Dan tried to take the planned economy as a basis and connect it with the market economy. At the same time, Dan emphasized the need to intensify scientific policy research using foreign experience⁵²².

In leading the country, Deng Xiaoping creatively enriched the legacy of the classics of Marxism and Leninism, setting a course to "create his own integral and complete theory of building socialism based on the close connection of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the great practice of implementing the four

⁵¹⁹ Deng Xiaoping. *The international situation and economic problems // Selected works of Deng Xiaoping*. Vol. 3. Beijing, 2001. P. 353. In Chinese; Hsu Chih-Chia. *Op. cit.* P. 219.

⁵²⁰ Hsu Chih-Chia. *Op. cit.* P. 218.

⁵²¹ Deng Xiaoping. *Favorites*. Vol. II (1975-1982). Beijing, 1995. P. 147.

⁵²² Smirnov D.A. *Ideological and political aspects of the modernization of the People's Republic of China: from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping*. P. 149–151.

modernizations."⁵²³. And the main content of China's foreign policy was openness and cooperation.

Deng stressed that China's transition from an ideological component to a pragmatic foreign policy is the future of China. Deng Xiaoping rejected Mao's revolutionary approach based on class struggle in China's foreign policy. He has taken a number of measures – opening the economy to foreign trade and investment. At the center of his political philosophy was a pragmatic "cat theory"⁵²⁴: "a black cat or a yellow cat, as long as it catches mice, it is a good cat" («黄猫、黑猫，只要捉住老鼠就是好猫»). He first uttered this phrase in his homeland in Sichuan Province in 1962. at a meeting of the Secretariat of the East China Bureau of the Central Committee for Work in the countryside. At this meeting, the system of family contracts aimed at reviving the sole proprietorship was criticized⁵²⁵. Dan emphasized that the beaten path and the old form of economic and political relations should not be used. Deng Xiaoping's "cat theory" opened the door of thinking and activated the mechanisms of market functioning. He filled this phrase, which seemed to relate to economics, with a deeper theoretical understanding. Deng applied it to the international situation already in the early 1980s, when China began to develop cooperation with the capitalist world led by the United States. Deng Xiaoping tried not to jump to conclusions and miss opportunities for development. He believed that empty reasoning was useless, and the truth could only be verified in practice. Later, in 2001, at the APEC summit, this phrase became the opening speech of Malaysian Prime Minister M. Mohamad, who implied that Asia needs development most of all now⁵²⁶.

Guided by this principle, Dan understood that it was necessary to transform the rigid state command economy. In his articles and speeches, he emphasized the vulnerability and failure of Mao Zedong's "permanent revolution" and hoped that the improvement in people's living standards caused by reforms and openness would help

⁵²³ Smirnov D.A. Ideological and political aspects of the modernization of the People's Republic of China: from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping. P. 151.

⁵²⁴ The theory of "cats/cats" or "cats/cats" by Deng Xiaoping. Note that in Chinese grammar, nouns do not have the category of gender and number («邓小平的“猫论”»). Some sources also write about the white colour of cats.

⁵²⁵ Pantsov A.V. Deng Xiaoping. P. 269.

⁵²⁶ The story of the "theory of the black cat and the white cat" by Comrade Deng Xiaoping // Information portal "KPK News". URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/85037/8530953.html> (accessed: 07.08.2022). In Chinese.

restore the legitimacy of the Chinese state, which was still ruled by the Communist Party⁵²⁷.

Already at the 6th plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation in June 1981, there was a reassessment of the role and place of "Mao Zedong's ideas" at the present stage of the historical development of the People's Republic of China. The theoretical and methodological principles of socialist modernization and the main ways of their implementation were approved.

At the initiative of Deng Xiaoping, the members of the CPC Central Committee adopted a special "Decision on some issues of the history of the CPC since the formation of the People's Republic of China" («关于建国以来党的若干历史问题的决议»). Hu Yaobang delivered a report entitled "Comprehensive creation of a new situation for socialist modernization."⁵²⁸

In this "Decision", Deng Xiaoping emphasized the central position of the dominant role of Mao Zedong and his "ideas", including in foreign policy. He opposed a return to the "cultural revolution" and separated the "right" of the "ideas of Mao" from his mistakes («既要反对那种企图回到«文化大革命»和它以前的错误理论») ⁵²⁹. Such an assessment made it possible to mitigate the ideological tension in the country. The participants of the 6th plenum approved the main political and socio-economic guidelines for the near future. In addition, the main principles and objectives of the country's foreign policy were discussed in detail. It was noted that the leadership of the People's Republic of China will adhere to an independent foreign policy («坚持独立自主的对外政策») ⁵³⁰. The PRC intends to receive assistance from other countries and peoples and help other countries and peoples. As an active participant in international

⁵²⁷ Chen J. From Mao to Deng China's changing relations with the United States // Woodrow Wilson International Center for scholars. Working paper 1992. P. 2. URL: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/cwihpp_92_chen_jian_from_mao_to_deng_chinas_changing_relations_with_us_november_2019.pdf (accessed: 18.04.2022).

⁵²⁸ Today in the history of the party, on June 27, 1981, a "Decision was made on some historical issues of the party since the formation of the People's Republic of China" // Studying the history of the CPC and Education. 01.07.2021. URL: http://dw.xmxc.com/2021_07/01_15/content-21005.html (accessed: 17.04.2022). In Chinese.

⁵²⁹ Hu Yaobang's report at the XII Congress of the CPC // Information Agency of the Communist Party of China. 2012. September 27th. URL: https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348712095996447_16.shtml (accessed: 05.08.2022). In Chinese.

⁵³⁰ Hu Yaobang's report at the XII Congress of the CPC. In Chinese.

life, China understood that the full realization of its national interests could not be separated from the interests of all mankind⁵³¹.

At the 12th CPC Congress in September 1982, Deng announced a program course on "building socialism with Chinese characteristics." The Congress, based on the decisions of the 3rd plenum of the CPC Central Committee of the 11th convocation, confirmed the characteristics of the "national model" of socialism. With regard to the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China, it was emphasized at the congress that the mechanism for ensuring favorable international conditions for the implementation of socialist modernization and diversification of sources of foreign aid has been adjusted. This adjustment, in accordance with changes within China, included equidistance from the two superpowers, the fight against hegemony, and increased emphasis on cooperation with the "third world". The congress declared these goals to be the main foreign policy strategies for the development of the People's Republic of China⁵³².

At the XII Congress, Deng formulated the main strategic objectives for the 1980s: "accelerating the pace of socialist modernization, the struggle for the unification of the motherland, including Taiwan, and the struggle against hegemonism, for the preservation of world peace." It is noteworthy that the XII Congress of the CPC was a milestone change the Outlook of the political leadership of China, as diplomacy is implemented in a more flexible and expanded relations with foreign countries (《加紧社会主义现代化建设，争取实现包括台湾在内的祖国统一，反对霸权主义、维护世界和平，是我国人民在八十年代的三大任务。》)⁵³³.

At the congress, Deng emphatically stated that "no country should expect China to become their vassal and swallow the bitter fruit that harms the interests of the country." The more the world changes, the more it will manifest itself. Deng Xiaoping's commitment to the principle of practical results showed his strategic thinking. In other words, by formulating his theory, Deng Xiaoping enriched and creatively reworked the

⁵³¹ Hu Yaobang's report at the XII Congress of the CPC. In Chinese.

⁵³² Smirnov D. A. Decree, Op. cit. P. 151–152; Delyusin L.P. Op. cit. P. 166–167.

⁵³³ Deng Xiaoping opens the XII Congress of the CPC (September 1, 1982) // Information Agency of the Communist Party of China. 2012. September 27th. URL: <https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348710255841791.shtml> (accessed: 05.08.2022). In Chinese.

economic ideas already described. As Chinese researchers emphasize, he gradually, step by step, "groped for stones while crossing the river." By "stone" «石头», Dan means practical actions «实践» («摸着石头过河»)⁵³⁴.

3.2. A new model of China's relations with the outside world. The course of rapprochement with the Western world

Deng Xiaoping's rejection of radical ideological propaganda and struggle in favor of economic cooperation and rivalry became a bridge to the transition to peaceful diplomacy, including in resolving the issue of Taiwan's reunification with China.

January 1, 1979 Deng Xiaoping announced a policy to return sovereignty to China over Taiwan, Hong Kong (Hong Kong) and Macao (Macao). The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress adopted an "Appeal to Compatriots in Taiwan", which proclaimed a course for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue, and, in the event of reunification with the People's Republic of China, the preservation of the existing social order in Taiwan was allowed. The shelling of the islands of Kinmen and Matsu, which had been going on since 1958, also stopped.

Let's highlight the most important steps of Deng Xiaoping's peace diplomacy. On August 12, 1978, the People's Republic of China signed a Treaty of Friendship and Peace with Japan. On January 1, 1979, diplomatic relations with the United States were established. Together, the statement reflects the principles of the Shanghai Communique. The United States recognizes a unified China, and Taiwan as its province. The United States should end diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Deng Xiaoping believes⁵³⁵.

Such liberal changes in China were welcomed in the West. The President of the United States, J. Carter noted that "wise Dan is in a hurry to create a reasonable economic and political system and conclude an alliance with the United States of

⁵³⁴ List of classic quotes by Deng Xiaoping: the good cat is the one who catches mice (photos) // Information portal "Hesun xinwen". 2010. August 16. URL: http://news.hexun.com/2010-08-16/124602940_14.html (accessed: 07.08.2022). In Chinese; Professor of the Central Party School: it is necessary to correctly understand Deng Xiaoping's phrase "keep in the shadows, trying not to show yourself in any way" // Phoenix New Media Information Portal. 2014. August 12th. URL: https://sd.ifeng.com/zbc/detail_2014_08/11/2744473_0.shtml (accessed: 08.05.2022). In Chinese.

⁵³⁵ History of the Communist Party of China. 1st ed. Beijing, 1987. P. 418-421. In Chinese.

America against Moscow." This led to the inevitable rapprochement between the United States and China. In May 1978, in an atmosphere of secrecy, Z. Brzezinski, Deng Xiaoping, and Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua came to an agreement on the Taiwan issue. The Americans agreed to cancel the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan dated December 2, 1954, withdraw their contingent from the island and curtail diplomatic relations with the Kuomintang regime. The Chinese side did not oppose the supply of weapons to Taiwan⁵³⁶, which later received significant military assistance from the United States⁵³⁷.

The rapprochement between China and the United States was also evidenced by Deng's long visit to Washington, Houston in January 1979, during which agreements on scientific, technical and cultural cooperation, student exchanges, and the most-favored-nation trade regime were signed. Despite the rapprochement, the two powers, Western analysts say, remained rivals. However, their alliance was extremely important for the stabilization of the international situation. At the same time, during the negotiations, Deng called for the creation of an "international front" with the participation of the United States, Japan, and Western Europe in order to "pacify the Soviet Union."⁵³⁸

At the same time, China decided to "teach Vietnam a lesson" and continued to create tension on the northern border⁵³⁹. The situation of the war with Vietnam, its support from the USSR, Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and the capture of the capital (Phnom Penh) caused great anxiety and fear. In order to provide diplomatic support from Burma, North Korea, Nepal, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, Deng paid visits to these countries. Despite the serious losses of the Chinese armed forces in the Vietnam war, Deng's authority as the country's leader in the party and in the army has strengthened.

The changes in Beijing's foreign policy strategy have received support in Washington. The American political elite hoped that Deng was the man who would "etch the poison of communism" and change the Beijing course. After establishing full

⁵³⁶ Pantsov A.V. Deng Xiaoping. P. 379.

⁵³⁷ Barach D. Op. cit. P. 227.

⁵³⁸ Ibid.

⁵³⁹ Sveshnikov A.A. Foreign policy concepts of the PRC and conceptual representations of Chinese international specialists. P. 27; Barach D. Op. cit. P. 227.

diplomatic relations with the United States and Deng Xiaoping's trip to Washington, President J. Carter stated that "the Chinese need a long-term peace to implement modernization. However, the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the harsh measures in Tibet testified to the opposite. Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese political leadership did not extend economic freedom to the political life of the country. And democratic principles were broadcast to the outside world. The general course of the party remained untouchable, despite the political reforms⁵⁴⁰.

During his visit to the United States, Deng, calling for the United States, Japan, Europe, China and other countries to unite in the joint struggle against the Soviet Union, promised to paralyze the activities of the USSR and said that it was China that was the vanguard of the struggle against the "expansion" of the Soviet Union⁵⁴¹.

At the same time, the 80s of the twentieth century were marked by increased confrontation with the United States. The deterioration of relations was due to the US attempt to carry out a "velvet revolution" in China, like the European one, by "rocking" through agents of influence in the highest state and party bodies⁵⁴².

Western countries, including the United States, reacted negatively to China's actions in Vietnam. The supply of modern weapons by the United States to Taiwan has led to a difference of opinion in the political leadership of the People's Republic of China regarding the unilateral orientation towards the United States⁵⁴³. Trade and economic relations between China and the United States were also weakening in connection with the Taiwan issue, among other things. The solution to the problems of developing US-Chinese trade depended on the possibility of providing American long-term loans. But this was hardly possible in the face of unresolved major political issues⁵⁴⁴.

On January 30, 1979, speaking at a joint meeting of both houses of the US Congress, Deng Xiaoping said: "if Taiwan returns to the bosom of the motherland, we

⁵⁴⁰ Shilyaev E.P. Faces and profiles of the leaders of Red China. Kaluga, 2002. P. 76–78.

⁵⁴¹ Sveshnikov A.A. Foreign policy concepts of the PRC and conceptual representations of Chinese international specialists. P. 27.

⁵⁴² Glazunov O.N. Chinese Intelligence. Moscow, 2008. P. 30.

⁵⁴³ Barach D. Op. cit. P. 227–228.

⁵⁴⁴ Sladkovsky M.I. China: Basic Problems of History, Economics, Ideology. Moscow, 1978. P. 282–283.

will respect the existing order there, Taiwan as a local government will have its own rights, and, provided that there is one China, it will have its own army; trade with foreign countries, economic ties, humanitarian contacts, lifestyle cannot be changed, the capitalist economy cannot be changed, but on the condition that there will be "one China, not two China." He repeated the same provisions in an interview with the Japanese Prime Minister on December 6, 1979⁵⁴⁵.

Taking the course "one state – two systems" («一国两制») As a legal basis for the implementation of the peaceful concept of Taiwan's reunification with mainland China, Deng enshrined it in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. This led to the creation of Special Administrative Regions in December 1982. The position of the Chinese leadership was that cooperation with the United States would not develop unless there was sufficient mutual understanding on the Taiwan issue. This understanding was reached and recorded in a Joint Sino-American Communique (August 17, 1982), which stated that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would gradually decrease. This agreement opened up a fundamental opportunity for the beginning of direct contacts between China and Taiwan.

Currently, the problem of national unity is more acute than ever on the foreign policy agenda of the People's Republic of China. Already in the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping, based on the idea of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in 1963 about the return of Taiwan while maintaining a high degree of autonomy, considered it one of the most important tasks of the reunification of the motherland. He firmly believed that unification with Taiwan was possible in a historically short time during the 1980s. The decision on the reunification of Taiwan with China was largely determined by the position of the United States. The Communique of the 3rd Plenum of the 11th convocation indicated that with the normalization of Sino-American relations, prospects for the unification of the motherland are being created⁵⁴⁶.

⁵⁴⁵ Vinogradov A.V. Deng Xiaoping's inspection trip to the south and the development of the policy of openness to the outside world. P. 312.

⁵⁴⁶ Ibid. P. 311–312.

For the first time, the idea of "one state – two systems" can be found in the "nine points" of the statement by the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Ye Jianying, in 1981, but then it had not yet received such a name. Deng Xiaoping started putting forward the idea of "one state – two systems" in relation not to the Xianggang issue, but to the Taiwanese one. By implementing a policy of expanding international relations, China was to approach the level of developed countries in the next 50 years. In this regard, Xianggang and Taiwan had to remain stable. In addition, Dan was confident that in the next centuries, with the expansion of international relations, economic ties between foreign countries would also strengthen. It is noteworthy that in the small territory of Xianggang (香港) or Taiwan, the capitalist economy was not supposed to be suppressed by the billion-dollar socialist mainland China. The "one state – two systems" system implied a combination of capitalism and socialism, provided that the political course was maintained. Dan emphasized that the socialist economy would benefit from a small share of capitalism⁵⁴⁷.

Developing further the concept of peaceful unification of Taiwan with the continent, in 1983, in an interview with Professor Yang Liyu of Seton Hall University, "The essence of the unification of the Motherland issue," Deng noted that at that time the formulation "full autonomy" of the island of Taiwan was considered not approved because of its unlimited nature. In fact, only the People's Republic of China can represent China in the international arena. Deng Xiaoping explained the Chinese government's policy guidelines regarding the unification of both sides of the Strait and the establishment of the Taiwan Special Administrative Region. "Two Chinas" meant having "full autonomy", which was not applicable for the PRC at the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's rule in the 1980s. After unification with the motherland, Taiwan will retain its independence, Deng stressed. The Government of Taiwan, as the government of a special administrative region, will be considered a local authority and will enjoy only the rights granted to it, which provinces, cities, central subordination and autonomous regions do not have. A necessary condition is not to infringe on the interests of a single state. Peaceful unification is not the absorption of Taiwan by the continent, the

⁵⁴⁷ Deng Xiaoping. The main issues of modern China. P. 119–122.

continent by Taiwan. Party, administrative and military affairs (giving the island its own armed forces) will be managed by the Taiwanese government itself. This is an association based on three popular principles. According to Dan, this was unrealistic, as it includes nationalism, democracy and people's welfare. Dan believed that it was necessary to hold negotiations without foreign interference at the level of two parties. Calling on the Taiwanese government to familiarize itself with the nine points of Ye Jianyin's policy and course from 1981, Deng Xiaoping promised to guarantee safe humanitarian exchange between the mainland and the island and the development of a peaceful course for the unification of the motherland⁵⁴⁸.

In September 1982, British Prime Minister Thatcher arrived in Beijing on an official visit. After its negotiations, the main topic of which is the fate of Hong Kong, in 1983, the United Kingdom recognized the restoration of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. The agenda of the talks included three items: restoring sovereignty, ensuring the stability of Hong Kong before 1997, and governing Hong Kong after 1997.

In accordance with the 31st article of the Constitution of the people's Republic of China of 1982, the state may, if necessary, to establish special administrative regions («中华人民共和国宪法»第三十一条国家在必要时得设立特别行政区。在特别行政区内实行的制度按照具体情况由全国人民代表大会以法律规定») ⁵⁴⁹. This provision embodied the concept of "one country, two systems" and provided the Chinese Government with a direct constitutional basis for the creation of special administrative regions in certain regions in the process of peaceful reunification of the country.

In June 1983, the Chinese leadership formulated twelve basic steps to solve the Hong Kong problem:

1. It was decided to resume the exercise of sovereignty over the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on July 1, 1997.

⁵⁴⁸ Deng Xiaoping. Major issues in modern China. P. 25–27.

⁵⁴⁹ Constitution of the People's Republic of China (adopted and promulgated on 4 December 1982 at the 5th session of the 5th National People's Congress. URL: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/xinwen/2018-03/22/content_2052621.htm (accessed: 07.12.2023). In Chinese.

2. After the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty, in accordance with article 31 of the Constitution, a special administrative region is created on the territory of Hong Kong, which is directly subordinate to the Central People's Government and enjoys a high degree of autonomy.

3. The Special Administrative Region shall have the right to have legislative power, independent judicial power and the right of final judicial decision. Existing laws, decrees and regulations remain largely unchanged.

4. The Government of the special administrative region is made up of local residents. The main officials are elected at the local level or through consultations and appointed by the Central People's Government. Officials and police officers from various departments of the original Hong Kong Government may remain in their posts. Institutions in the Special Administrative Region may also hire British and other expatriates as consultants.

5. The current socio-economic system remains unchanged, the way of life remains unchanged. Freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, travel, movement, communication and religion are guaranteed. Private property, business ownership, legal inheritance and foreign investments are protected by law.

6. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region remains a free port and an independent customs territory.

7. The status of a financial center remains, the markets of foreign currency, gold, securities, futures and others will continue to open; free funds for entry and exit; the Hong Kong dollar circulates normally and is freely convertible.

8. The financial affairs of the Special Administrative Region remain independent.

9. The Special Administrative Region may establish mutually beneficial economic relations with the United Kingdom. British economic interests in Hong Kong will be respected.

10. The Special Administrative Region may independently maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and conclude agreements with countries, regions and relevant international organizations on behalf of Hong Kong, China. The Government

of the Special Administrative Region can independently issue travel documents to and from Hong Kong.

11. Social security of the special administrative region is provided by the Government of the special administrative region.

12. The above-mentioned principles and policies are established by the National People's Congress in accordance with the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and have remained unchanged for 50 years⁵⁵⁰.

We believe that these provisions have contributed to maintaining stability on the island and stopped the interference of external forces in the affairs of Hong Kong and Macao, including supporting these areas in developing the economy and improving the welfare of the population, preserving the long-term prosperity and stability of Hong Kong.

On behalf of Deng, special economic zones were created in Taiwan and Hong Kong, which caused a significant influx of foreign capital. In 1984, he noted that "there are two methods of settling the issues of Taiwan and Hong Kong – peaceful and non-peaceful. The latter method of solving the issue by force is not the best." To resolve the issue peacefully, it is necessary to understand the history and take into account the real situation in Taiwan and Hong Kong. These territories will not be able to flourish and develop stably without conditions for the preservation of the capitalist system. In this regard, a peaceful solution to the issue would become impossible, Dan believed⁵⁵¹.

From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping implemented foreign policy in the wake of an "independent and peaceful development strategy." The main objectives of this policy were to preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; create a favorable international environment for China's reforms and economic openness, modernization; maintain world peace and promote common development. The main content of Deng Xiaoping's diplomatic thought was to insist on opposing hegemony and power politics in international affairs and to make his own contribution to maintaining peace and development throughout the world. China will

⁵⁵⁰ "Practice in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under the principle of 'one country, two systems'". Full text of the White Paper. In Chinese.

⁵⁵¹ Barach D. Op. cit. P. 229–230.

never seek hegemony and will always stand on the side of the "third world" countries and fight for its rights and interests.

In April 1984 British Foreign Minister J. Howe visited Beijing. Deng Xiaoping explained to him the essence of China's reform and openness and informed him that after 1997, the PRC would send a small detachment to Xianggang, which would be not only a symbol of the reunification of this territory with the PRC, but also a stabilizing factor in maintaining sovereignty over it⁵⁵².

In September 1984, an official signing ceremony was held in Beijing for the draft Chinese-English Joint Declaration (中英联合声明). It provided for the unchanged socio-economic system of Hong Kong and the way of life of citizens, the preservation of Xianggang's status as a free port and an international financial center, the official name "Xianggang-PRC" and the right to join international organizations. All these provisions were enshrined in the "Basic Law of Xianggang" for a period of 50 years⁵⁵³.

Deng planned to bring China closer to the level of developed countries in the first fifty years and could not abandon the commitments he had made⁵⁵⁴. The idea of "one country, two systems", was emphasized by Deng Xiaoping – not an emotional outburst or a hoax, it's based on reality («“一国两制”不是一时感情冲动，也不是玩弄手法，完全是从现实出发的，其根本点在于尊重香港人民，相信香港人民，一切为了香港人民和整个中华民族的利益») ⁵⁵⁵.

By 1984, the ideological and theoretical design of the course for the unification of Taiwan was completed. On May 27-28, 1984, at a meeting of the Central Committee, the concept of "one state – two systems" was defined as a practical tool for uniting the PRC with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. From that moment on, the concept of "one

⁵⁵² Deng Xiaoping: The deployment of a garrison in Hong Kong is a symbol of the exercise of sovereignty // Unification Information Portal. 2022. 14 July. URL: http://www.tuanjiawang.cn/2022-07/14/content_8936376.htm (accessed: 05.08.2022). In Chinese.

⁵⁵³ Vinogradov A.V. Deng Xiaoping's inspection trip to the south and the development of the policy of openness to the outside world. P. 314–316.

⁵⁵⁴ Deng Xiaoping: garrisoning Hong Kong is a symbol of the exercise of sovereignty. In Chinese.

⁵⁵⁵ Deng Xiaoping's historical responsibility from the perspective of the concept of "one country – two systems" // Unification Information Portal. 2020. 20 August. URL: http://www.tuanjiawang.cn/2020-08/20/content_8887273.htm (accessed: 05.08.2022). In Chinese.

state – two systems" becomes an important part of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the official foreign policy of the People's Republic of China⁵⁵⁶.

Due to the difficult situation in the early 80s of the XX century. Deng has developed a number of recommendations on Beijing's positioning in the international arena. Professor V.Y. Portyakov identifies its causes: 1) the rapid dismantling of socialism in Eastern Europe; 2) the political and economic crisis in the USSR, which led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union; 3) the cessation of the existence of a bipolar system of international relations⁵⁵⁷. It should be noted that some Western scientists highly appreciate bipolarity as the foundation of stability inherent in the ideologies of the United States and the USSR; However, these arguments focus on relations between States during the Cold War and the decrease in the number of inter-State wars. The bipolar era of the Cold War was arguably more peaceful than the one that preceded it, as major wars between States are relatively rare and no militarized conflict has ever arisen between the two superpowers⁵⁵⁸.

In 1985. Deng Xiaoping argued that "the views of the Chinese state on the international situation have changed, and China's foreign policy has also changed." These important changes, in his opinion, consisted in:

1) changing the perception of the inevitability of a world war. It is possible that a large-scale world war will not happen for a long period of time, and there is a possibility of preserving world peace;

2) adjustment of the one-line strategy against the Soviet hegemony established in the past (一条线战略);

3) defending the thesis that "whoever engages in hegemony will oppose whoever engages in war, and whoever engages in war will oppose whoever engages in war."

Deng Xiaoping noted that "the real problems in the world are global strategic issues, one of which is peace, the other is economics or development. Peace is a

⁵⁵⁶ Deng Xiaoping's Historical Responsibility from the Perspective of the Concept of "One Country, Two Systems". In Chinese.

⁵⁵⁷ Portyakov V.Ya. Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy precepts and their modern interpretation. P. 14.

⁵⁵⁸ Yeisley M.O. Биполярность, прокси-войны и подъем Китая // Strategic Studies Quarterly. Vol. 5, no. 4 (WINTER 2011). P. 77.

problem of East and West, and development is a problem of North and South."⁵⁵⁹ Deng Xiaoping came to this conclusion after a thorough analysis of political changes in the world, suggesting that there is hope for the preservation of world peace⁵⁶⁰.

The change in the overall assessment of the international situation was reflected in the decision in 1985 to reduce the number of the People's Liberation Army from 4 to 1 million people. The "fatalism of inevitable war" in Mao's ideas in the 60s of the twentieth century changed in the mid-1980s to a practical and realistic position. Deng Xiaoping pursued a policy of reunification with the outside world, overcoming the imperfections of the outside world and objectively perceived its constantly changing appearance. These changes have led to the possibility of establishing ties with some socialist countries and communist parties (for example, the PRC's inter-party ties with the Socialist United Party of Germany or the Polish United Workers' Party). Although there were still contentious issues between the CPC and other Communist parties, Deng Xiaoping tried to find a basis for broad cooperation in various areas of international life, such as peace, disarmament, and certain regional issues. The goal of avoiding ideological dogmatism, recklessness and other mistakes gradually changed Deng Xiaoping's approach to these disagreements⁵⁶¹.

Speaking at a meeting of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee in June 1985, Deng expressed alarm about the arms race between the two superpowers. He emphasized the importance of the power of peace over the power of war, provided that a large-scale world war was avoided. Deng proposed to reduce the PLA contingent by 1 million people, which should have been a sign of the strength and confidence of the Chinese state and people⁵⁶².

Such a policy testified to Beijing's rethinking of relations with the outside world after the collapse of the bipolar global system. Under Deng's leadership, China has abandoned the ideological constraints of the past and adopted a policy based on practicality and experience, under the motto of "reform and openness." This policy has

⁵⁵⁹ Yang Chengxu. On the diplomatic thought of Deng Xiaoping // Information portal "News Centre". 2004. 09 August. URL: <https://news.sina.com.cn/o/2004-08-09/09053336886s.shtml> (accessed: 08.03.2022). In Chinese.

⁵⁶⁰ Deng Xiaoping. Selected Works. Vol. 3. Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1993. P. 127. In Chinese.

⁵⁶¹ Barach D. Op. cit. P. 231–233.

⁵⁶² Deng Xiaoping. The main issues of modern China. P. 145.

unleashed the creative and entrepreneurial potential of the Chinese people and allowed China to break out of self-imposed isolation.

In the early 1990s, Deng, in a number of his articles and speeches, proposed a solution to three tasks for China in foreign policy for the coming decade. At the XII Congress of the CPC, he declared opposition to hegemony and the preservation of world peace. It is necessary to strengthen the work on the unification of China with Taiwan and strengthen the modernization of China, he said. All this was supposed to be implemented within the framework of the theory of the "three worlds", focusing on the cooperation of the countries of the "first" and "second" worlds.

Discussing the problems of war and peace, including the expansion of trade relations between the Chinese state and the outside world, Deng Xiaoping contrasted the economies of the South and the North, backward countries and developed ones. Deng referred to the developed countries of the USSR, some countries of Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, which produced high-quality technologies and did not have to fear competition or increased exports from China. He noted that the improvement in the condition of some third world countries does not yet indicate their involvement in developed countries, but without solving economic problems, poverty still will not let go of most third world countries. Until the economy of the South receives appropriate development, capital and goods from the North will be limited⁵⁶³.

Based on Marx's theory of the dialectical contradiction between the economic and social movements, Deng explained that China and other non-Western countries would approach the postulated telos in the future⁵⁶⁴. "A country that is more industrially developed shows a less developed country only a picture of its own future," writes K. Marx. Deng Xiaoping understood that many European countries suffer from both capitalist development and its lack. It is necessary to get rid of "ancient, obsolete methods of production and the accompanying outdated ... political relations."⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶³ Deng Xiaoping. The main issues of modern China. P. 123–127.

⁵⁶⁴ Telos (Greek) – end, goal. In the ancient Greek philosophy of Aristotle – the ultimate goal of something; one of the four basic principles of being in philosophy.

⁵⁶⁵ Marx K. Capital. Critique of political economy. Vol. 1, book I. The process of production of capital. Moscow, 1988. P. 9.

In the mid-80s of the twentieth century. Deng Xiaoping spoke ambiguously about the stabilization of China's relations with capitalist countries. He stressed the importance of Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations for China. At a meeting with the Japanese delegation in 1985 Deng Xiaoping spoke about the "big triangle" in the international arena and China's weakness – "China is both a big and a small country. A large one is expressed in a billion-strong population with a shortage of arable land. On the other hand, it is a small underdeveloped or developing country."⁵⁶⁶

In the mid-1980s, based on the principle of "learning from the West,"⁵⁶⁷ Deng stated that he did not plan to use the ideological factor as a tool to determine the attitude towards any country, and offered friendship to any country (including the countries of the Soviet bloc), if only they were inclined to take a mutual position. On the one hand, this was dictated by a change in China's foreign policy, on the other hand, by the development of confrontation between the United States and the USSR. The place and role of the People's Republic of China has grown promisingly throughout the decade, and such a favorable international situation has formed a clearly positive interaction along with successfully implemented reforms. All this led to the emergence of "political storms" that engulfed the entire communist world⁵⁶⁸.

In the mid-80s of the twentieth century. Deng Xiaoping devoted a number of articles and speeches to the problems of convergence, that is, peaceful coexistence and cooperation between capitalism and socialism. In his work "The Initial path of modernization of the East – the Wenzhou model", he expressed the idea of two different ways of modernizing capitalism and socialism in the socio-historical development of mankind. As society develops, both socialism and capitalism form the Datong Society (大同). This theory was based on the principle of harmonious interaction between nations and States while maintaining differences. Such a device was supposed to eliminate the nature of conflicts. Chinese society saw this as a manifestation of

⁵⁶⁶ Wu Xiaohong. Keeping in the shade, trying not to show oneself in any way, but at the same time doing something real - about Deng Xiaoping's diplomatic thought // Information portal "News Centre". 2004. 10 August URL: http://news.cri.cn/gb/3821/2004/08/10/501@260667_2.htm (accessed: 08.05.2022). In Chinese.

⁵⁶⁷ Usov V.N. Op. cit. P. 128.

⁵⁶⁸ Di Dongsheng. Op. cit. P. 9.

bourgeois liberalism, and this theory was criticized⁵⁶⁹. Also, according to Dan, Western-style liberalization could lead to chaos. At the same time, the desire for harmony and universal evolution, which permeate the fabric of the entire Chinese culture, was clearly realized. Currently, it has become obvious that the modernization of Chinese society is a dynamic, complex, uneven and lengthy process⁵⁷⁰.

The desire to resolve the Taiwan problem and the expectation of US support was evidenced by the meeting in March 1987 in Beijing of the US Secretary of State J. Schultz with the Secretary General of the People's Republic of China, Li Xiannian (李先念). Li, noting the stable development of Sino-American relations, expressed hope for a resolution of the Taiwan issue and called on the United States to make efforts to resolve it. He praised the political situation as stable, stated the promotion of economic development, the continuation of the comprehensive reforms and openness («我们的政治局势是安定团结的，经济建设在稳步地向前发展，改革和开放在全面，深入地继续进行») ⁵⁷¹. During the celebration of the 15th anniversary of the signing of the Shanghai Communique, R. Nixon noted that the world of relations between the PRC and the United States could positively change («我们两国之间的世界是可以改变的，可以改变得更好») ⁵⁷².

In 1987, Taiwanese residents were allowed to return to mainland China "to the homeland of their ancestors" and restore family ties, which practically opened up the whole of China to them ⁵⁷³(台湾同胞回大陆深亲). This was evidenced by the meeting of Zhao Ziyang with representatives of Hong Kong and Macao and members of the People's Political Consultative Council of China (CPPCC) at the 5th session of the National People's Congress of the 6th convocation. It was emphasized that after 1984

⁵⁶⁹ Delusin L.P. Op. cit. P. 128.

⁵⁷⁰ Balchindorzhieva O. B. Modernisation of Chinese society: socio-philosophical analysis : Dr. Dis. Philos. Sci. Synopsis. Ulan-Ude, 2015. 42 p.

⁵⁷¹ Li Xiannian meets with Shultz There is hope that the United States and Shultz contribute to the resolution of the Taiwan question // Zhenmin Zhibao. 3 March 1987. P. 1. In Chinese.

⁵⁷² Celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué // Zhenmin Zhibao. 1 March 1987. P. 6. In Chinese.

⁵⁷³ Vinogradov A.V. Deng Xiaoping's inspection trip to the south and the development of the policy of openness to the outside world. P. 313; The Taiwanese authorities will allow Taiwanese compatriots to return to the mainland to restore kinship ties. All China expresses greetings and prepares for a warm welcome // Zhenmin Zhibao. 1987. 18 September. P. 1. In Chinese.

(the return of Hong Kong and Macao to the bosom of the People's Republic of China), the political leadership of the People's Republic of China exercised control over the sovereignty of the two regions. During the negotiations, the emphasis was placed on the settlement of the sovereignty issues of Hong Kong and Macao. The Chinese leadership claimed that it would not take any steps that would interfere with the prosperity and stability of these two areas («香港澳门问题解决值得谈黄予孙自豪。我们决不做妨碍港澳繁荣与稳定的事»). In addition, for centuries, the Qing Dynasty⁵⁷⁴, the military leaders of the Beiyang Army⁵⁷⁵, and the Kuomintang Party could not resolve this issue. However, under the leadership of the CPC, these territories have already come under the control of the PRC⁵⁷⁶.

In accordance with the international situation and conditions of the modernization of the People's Republic of China, focused on the main themes of peace and development, the diplomatic structure and foreign relations of the party were adjusted, as well as foreign policy aimed at independence, opposing hegemony and maintaining world peace⁵⁷⁷. China tried to influence the resolution of the conflict in the Persian Gulf and urged all States, including the Arab Union, negotiations to resolve the situation around the Iran-Iraq war («中国愿意同阿拉伯国家和其他国家一道做出努力缓和这一地区的紧张局势»)⁵⁷⁸.

In accordance with the principle of "one country, two systems", China, Great Britain and Portugal have reached an agreement to resolve the issues of independence of

⁵⁷⁴ Qing Dynasty 1636-1912 清朝 1636年–1911年 period

⁵⁷⁵ In 1895, the Beiyang Army, a new type of land army organised along modern lines, was established in Beiyang Province. The territory of Beiyang (north-east China) includes the coastal areas of Zhili (now Hebei), Liaoning and Shandong provinces, as well as the territory that is now part of the administrative unit, the central subordination city of Tianjin.

⁵⁷⁶ Zhao Ziyang at a meeting with representatives of Xiangyang and Aomen and members of the NPCSC on the settlement of Xiangyang and Aomen. Huang Yuxun is proud that we will never do anything to prevent the prosperity and stability of Xianggang and Aomen // Renmin Zhibao. 1987. 1 April. P. 1. In Chinese.

⁵⁷⁷ Advancing the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Report of Zhao Ziyang at the XIII CPC Congress / Shaoyang Institute, Hunan Province // Theoretical Study. 2021. 28 May. URL: http://www1.hnsyu.net/yyx/dzgz/llxx/202106/t20210602_111192.html (accessed: 12.05.2022). In Chinese.

⁵⁷⁸ Zhao Ziyang meets with the delegation of the Arab League Committee. Tensions in the Persian Gulf – a hot spot in the world // Zhenmin Zhibao. 1987. 6 September 1987. P. 1. In Chinese.

Hong Kong and Macao. The need to seek a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue in accordance with this principle was also highlighted⁵⁷⁹.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the economic situation in the country became more complicated, and prices rose. As a result, China's international position has changed dramatically. In the summer of 1989, the Chinese political leadership took harsh measures to suppress the Tiananmen Square uprising, and since that time China has been under sanctions from Western countries. Against this background, relations with the Soviet Union strengthened, especially after Gorbachev's visit to Beijing. In 1987, long-term negotiations with the USSR began on the issue of border settlement, the Vietnam-Kampuchea problem. From Deng's point of view, the USSR still threatened the security of the PRC. He demanded that the Soviet leadership resolve the Soviet-Afghan, border and Vietnamese-Kampuchea issues⁵⁸⁰.

This contributed to the revival of the Soviet-Chinese dialogue, which had reached an impasse since 1979, and the gradual normalization of bilateral relations in the mid-1980s. Without accepting the extension of the Friendship Treaty with the USSR, the political leadership of the People's Republic of China, through a new round of negotiations, began to develop economic ties with the Soviet Union again. Deng Xiaoping emphasized in an interview with M. Wallace the existence of "three obstacles in Soviet-Chinese relations and **one** in Chinese-American relations" (which have nothing to do with ideological content). The essence of these difficulties, he pointed out, is to protect the interests of regional security, and the obstacles consist precisely in: 1) the presence of Soviet troops near the Soviet-Chinese and Mongolian-Chinese borders; 2) the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan; 3) the Soviet Union's support for Vietnam⁵⁸¹.

With regard to Sino-American cooperation, the unresolved Taiwan problem was a serious obstacle to the normalization of relations. Deng Xiaoping, hoping for the

⁵⁷⁹ Advancement along the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Zhao Ziyang's report at the XIII CPC Congress. In Chinese.

⁵⁸⁰ Pantsov A.V. Deng Xiaoping. P. 454.

⁵⁸¹ Barach D. Op. cit. P. 228.

decision of American President Reagan to influence Taiwan, tried to gradually restore postal, trade, air and sea ties between Taiwan and China⁵⁸².

In the early 1990s, under the conditions of reforms, especially after the Tiananmen events, Deng Xiaoping was guided by the theory of Mao's "three worlds" and the principle of independence and independence in international relations, an open policy based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence. All this contributed to the strengthening of the theory of socialism⁵⁸³. The architect of the reforms himself made a special contribution to combining each step of economic reform with political steps⁵⁸⁴.

So, the theoretical attitudes of socialism with Chinese characteristics of Deng Xiaoping were reflected in the implementation of a peaceful diplomatic policy, the active expansion of friendly cooperation with all countries of the world, including developing ones. The PRC adhered to the course of combating hegemony, preserving peace, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, strengthening cooperation with neighboring states, and developing equal cooperation with developed countries, guided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics combined freedom of economic activity with an ideological and political platform of reform and openness, write Chinese researchers of the party school⁵⁸⁵. Deng Xiaoping's theory included problems not only of economics, politics, science, but also diplomacy, culture, etc. He clearly defined socialism and the methods of its construction.

At that time, the leadership of the CPC Central Committee demanded that Deng admit that the Tiananmen events represented a "counterrevolutionary act," but Deng Xiaoping resolutely refused to do so⁵⁸⁶.

It is worth noting that for many scientists, the Deng Xiaoping era represents a rejection of this "revolutionary" political model. Deng's legacy as a reformer is also linked to a narrative of clashes with a powerful "conservative" faction led by another

⁵⁸² Barach D. Op. cit. P. 229.

⁵⁸³ Smirnov D.A. Op. cit. P. 233.

⁵⁸⁴ Social Sciences in the PRC: Review of Prospects in the 21st Century. Moscow, 2005. P. 65.

⁵⁸⁵ China in the XXI century: chances, challenges and prospects: abstracts of reports of the XI International Scientific Conference "China, Chinese Civilization and the World" (Moscow, 27–29 September 2000). PART 2. Moscow, 2000. P. 69.

⁵⁸⁶ Maomao. Op. cit. P. 476.

party elder, Chen Yun. However, a wide range of new data over the past few years suggests that earlier estimates of Dan's performance require revision. According to Li Rui, a party veteran who served under both Mao and Deng, Deng was "half Mao Zedong."⁵⁸⁷

It is noteworthy that some data even suggest that Deng Xiaoping's rejection of democratic procedures was largely due to foreign policy reasons. Zhao Ziyang recalls the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and notes the lag in the military-technical level of the United States from the Soviet Union. According to Deng Xiaoping, all the Soviet Union had to do was hold a meeting of the Politburo in order to decide on the invasion. Could America do such a thing? Deng Xiaoping was sure that there are three governments in the United States, in interaction with which it is not clear who makes the final decision, whose words really matter. They mutually restrain each other⁵⁸⁸.

Although in the 1980s Deng Xiaoping delegated part of the management of foreign policy to Li Xiannian (who was deputy chairman of the party and then general secretary), Li Xiannian organized the work guided by Deng's ideas. According to Chinese historians, Li Xiannian questioned Deng's demand for approval of political decisions. In 1982, Hu Yaobang received a warning from "above" that he was playing too independent a role in foreign policy. Hu Yaobang replied to this: "I was a mouse who stood on the scales to weigh himself," is a Chinese expression meaning that he did not know his place⁵⁸⁹.

Another example: During the visit of the Soviet guests, Deng instructed the party elder, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chen Yun, to prepare and deliver a speech⁵⁹⁰ on whether China should improve relations with the Soviet Union, he wrote two reports – one for, the other against – so that he could submit the "correct" one to Deng Xiaoping for consideration.

⁵⁸⁷ Torigian J. Elite politics and foreign policy in China from Mao to Xi // Brookings. January 22, 2019. URL: <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/elite-politics-and-foreign-policy-in-china-from-mao-to-xi/> (accessed: 16.04.2022).

⁵⁸⁸ Zhao Ziyang. Secret Diary [Reform Process]. Hong Kong, 2009. 370 p. In Chinese.

⁵⁸⁹ Foreign policy under Mao's leadership. Hong Kong, 2019. 449 p. In Chinese.

⁵⁹⁰ Radchenko S. Unwanted Visionaries. Oxford, 2016. Audiobook. 16 h. 30 min.

At a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee in June 1985, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and Hu Yaobang expressed disagreement with Deng Xiaoping's overall strategy, but Chen supported him⁵⁹¹.

By 1991 Deng resigned from all official positions and his popularity declined, including due to the removal of two general secretaries from office. In addition, he was unable to prevent the Tiananmen Square protests or resolve them peacefully. And yet he had the opportunity to put an end to plans to support hardliners of interaction with the Soviet Union before and after the August coup⁵⁹².

Analyzing the foreign policy attitudes and diplomacy of the People's Republic of China in the 80s of the twentieth century, foreign analysts note the mistakes and contradictions of this policy. Professor of Columbia University J. Torigian believes that the decision of the Chinese leadership to invite Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, as well as 3,000 young Japanese people to visit Beijing, undermined Deng's reputation, since this act played an important role in organizing and conducting student protests in May 1989. In addition, meetings and negotiations with Mikhail Gorbachev led to unexpected consequences during the protests in Tiananmen Square⁵⁹³. These and other events have led China to international isolation.

Disagreements began in the political leadership of the People's Republic of China. However, due to the authority and influence of Deng Xiaoping, they, analysts say, were not significant and fundamental. It should be noted that the only time when Deng made controversial decisions among the Chinese elite on foreign policy issues was the Vietnam War in 1979. The war actually strengthened his position in relation to Mao Zedong's original successor, Hua Guofeng.

In 1988, after R. Gandhi's visit to the People's Republic of China, the process of normalization of relations between the People's Republic of China and the largest developing state of the "third world", India, began. On the other hand, there were still motives on the Indian side that did not remove the thesis of the "Chinese threat". Due to the growing Chinese complex power, which potentially threatened India's security, and

⁵⁹¹ State Defence University. A chronicle of Xu Xiangqian: 1901-1990. Beijing, 2016. 1331 p. In Chinese.

⁵⁹² Torigian J. Op. cit.

⁵⁹³ Ibid.

the unwillingness to be on an equal footing with China in the international arena, psychologically caused a sense of danger and anxiety among the Indian political leadership. In addition, borderline contradictions remained unresolved, which continue to the present day⁵⁹⁴.

In order to break out of international isolation after the Tiananmen Square incident⁵⁹⁵, Deng implemented a foreign policy expressed in 28 hieroglyphs. The idea "Behave with restraint and change the world for the better," (《韬光养晦, 有所作为》的思想) which was contained in them, gained the greatest popularity both in China and abroad. According to it, in its activities in the international arena, China should "coolly observe, strengthen its shaky positions, showing restraint; to cope with difficulties, to keep in the shadows and try not to show yourself in any way, to be able to defend, even if imperfect, but your own views, in no case to climb forward, in the first place, and at the same time do something real." ⁵⁹⁶ In scientific circles, this expression is described in a simplified and precise formulation: "Keep a low profile and keep in the shadows." The second part of the postulate 《有所作为》 in translation into Russian sounds like "some actions" or "doing something necessary."

In december 4, 1990 Deng outlined another set of principles that China had to adhere to in solving international problems. There were many unpredictable factors affecting the international situation, and contradictions were becoming more and more obvious. Dan found the current situation more complicated and chaotic than the period of the struggle between the two hegemonic powers for world domination. He was aware that some developing countries see China as the leader of the "third world". But one of the main Chinese attitudes was the categorical rejection of hegemonism. China is not strong enough yet and will not take a favorable position in the world. The question arises, in what way did China, in Deng's opinion, have to contribute? The answer was the creation of a mechanism for establishing a new international political and economic

⁵⁹⁴ China in the XXI century: chances, challenges and prospects. Part 1. P. 117–118.

⁵⁹⁵ The expulsion of demonstrators from Tiananmen Square in Beijing on 4 June 1989 was the object of serious political pressure and direct sanctions from leading Western countries.

⁵⁹⁶ The closest Russian-language version of this formula to the Chinese original is contained in the Russian translation of this collection / ed. by Y.M. Galenovich. See: Jiang Zemin. On Socialism with Chinese Specificity. Moscow, 2004. Vol. II-III. P. 473.

order. Taking the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" as a basis, Deng proclaimed the following elements of his foreign policy strategy⁵⁹⁷:

1. 冷静观察 – calmly observe and analyze (development);
2. 稳住阵脚 – safe (our own) position;
3. 沉着应付 – deal (with changes) patiently and confidently;
4. 韬光养晦 – stay in the shadows, trying not to show yourself in any way;
5. 善于守拙 – be able to behave with restraint;
6. 决不当头 – never unreasonably strive to become a leader;
7. 有所作为 – to strive for achievements⁵⁹⁸.

In the last years of his life, talking about the collapse of the Soviet Union and the development problems of developing countries that faced US pressure, Deng Xiaoping noted that there are "some third world countries" that want China to take the initiative of the leader of the third world. We must take this issue responsibly. This is a fundamental state policy. We can't afford it, we don't have enough strength of our own. There is absolutely no benefit from this, and many initiatives are being destroyed. China will always stand on the side of the "third world", and will never seek hegemony."⁵⁹⁹ The postulate of "keeping a low profile" means not casually blaming other countries, not saying or doing too much. Despite the problems in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, despite the sanctions imposed on the PRC by seven Western powers, the country adhered to one policy: to continue to establish good relations with the Soviet Union and with the United States of America, with Japan and European powers.

The premise of the "keep a low profile and keep a low profile" principle was that a real assessment of China's power and influence pointed to a huge development gap between China and industrialized countries such as the United States, European countries and Japan. Of course, "we can't just talk about "coolly observing, strengthening shaky positions, showing restraint," let alone "doing something

⁵⁹⁷ Cheng J., Yu-Shek Zhang, F. Wankun. Op. cit. P. 101–102.

⁵⁹⁸ On another version of the translation of Deng Xiaoping's twenty-eight-character strategy, see: Zhao Quansheng. *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach*. Hong Kong, 1996. P. 53–54.

⁵⁹⁹ Wu Xiaohong. Op. cit.

necessary." You should not emphasize the first and ignore the second, and you should not emphasize the second and dilute the first⁶⁰⁰. Some thought it unnecessary to mention the influence of China on the world that he "hides his strength," "asking for trouble" («有的观点认为, 讲«韬光养晦», 就不必要去讲中国对于的世界影响力, 这样容易«引火烧身»). Other critics believed that the concept of "staying in the shadows, trying not to show yourself in any way" was outdated, and this strategy needed to be revised, etc. They did not fully understand Deng Xiaoping's strategic thinking in international relations⁶⁰¹.

Deng Xiaoping's recommendations contributed to the settlement of the international situation around China, resisting pressure and sanctions from the West. As the third head of the People's Republic of China, Jiang Zemin, said, "practice has shown that this is the right course." In the context of the consolidation of Deng Xiaoping's theory at the XV Congress of the CPC, held in September 1997, as an important part of the ideological and political basis of the activities of the ruling Communist Party of China⁶⁰², Deng's statements at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. On the problems of the country's foreign policy, the PRC interpreted it as "a strategic course, an important political attitude based on the long-term fundamental interests of the Chinese people and major developments in the international situation and in the balance of forces in the world." At the same time, China was instructed to "continue to steadily follow this strategic course" and in the context of a continuous increase in its comprehensive power and international status. The active propaganda of Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy precepts, which began in the late 1990s, made them more famous both in China and abroad. Wang Yizhou, a professor at the School of International Relations at Peking University, predicted that the development of an efficient economy and the comprehensive power of the People's Republic of China would lead to a more comprehensive and grounded foreign policy course. This will cause China's transformation from "some actions" («有所作为») to "active actions" («积极作为») and

⁶⁰⁰ Wu Xiaohong. Op. cit.

⁶⁰¹ Professor of the Central Party School: it is necessary to correctly understand Deng Xiaoping's phrase "keep in the shadows, trying not to show oneself in any way". In Chinese.

⁶⁰² China in the XXI century: chances, challenges and prospects. Part 2. P. 57.

raise the status of the state to "an important participant in the international system, having its own views and proposals on most international problems."⁶⁰³

According to Chinese scientists, the focus of attention within the country was on economic development, and internationally, a course was developed to promote peace and joint development. Both strategies were interrelated. In the 90s of the XX century, significant changes took place in the international situation, some of them were identified by the leadership of the People's Republic of China as a challenge to the prevailing views on peace and development. First, there were changes in the former countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union collapsed, and the world socialist movement weakened. Secondly, the disintegration caused by democratization policies has intensified in developing countries. Regional conflicts have broken out in some of them. Thirdly, the combined power of the United States increased, the economy of which continued to be the engine of the global economy.

However, as noted in Chinese leadership circles, there are more positive changes in the world than negative ones, there are more chances than challenges, and the trend towards peace and development has become irreversible. This, according to the leaders of the People's Republic of China, was evidenced, in particular, by the following: the cold war ended, the bipolar system ceased to exist, and with it the main conditions and factors of the outbreak of the world war; as multipolarity developed, relations of mutual deterrence and mutual support between the powers began to develop; An integration trend has developed in the global economy, and economic relations between all countries of the world, especially between the great powers, have become even closer.

It was on the basis of this that Deng Xiaoping made two conclusions:

- 1) about the possibility of implementing reforms and openness for a long time;**
- 2) that the main attention should be paid to economic construction⁶⁰⁴.**

So, having analyzed the foreign policy attitudes of the leader of the second generation of Chinese leaders, Deng Xiaoping, in the period from the late 1970s to 1997,

⁶⁰³ Portyakov V.Ya. Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy precepts and their modern interpretation. P. 15, 24.; Zhang Diyu. Is it necessary for China to increase its interest in international affairs: "creative intervention" and fragments of Chinese diplomacy // *Shijie Zhishi*. 2012. No. 2. P. 14–21. In Chinese.

⁶⁰⁴ Zhao Meng. Historical epoch in the assessments of the PRC leadership from the beginning of reforms to the present // *Izvestiya of Altai State University*. 2011. P. 224.

the following conclusions can be drawn. Dan accepted the country in a decadent mood, in conditions of a "crisis of faith", an acute shortage of personnel, and nevertheless took a course towards peaceful diplomacy. In 1973-1974, before developing his own foreign policy course, Deng Xiaoping still relied on the theory of Mao Zedong's "three worlds". This theory served as a justification for the reason why the PRC established ties with the "second world" (Japan, Great Britain, etc. D.), but does not explain the development of China's relations with the United States of America ⁶⁰⁵.

At the initiative of Deng Xiaoping, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the concept of war and peace was revised and new foreign policy guidelines were put forward. They touched upon the problems of China's relations with the outside world and the principles of solving a number of topical issues⁶⁰⁶. At the XII Congress of the CPC, Deng laid down the fundamental characteristics of the foreign policy of **peace and independence** («独立自主的和平外交»). This strategy was implemented from 1982 to 1989.

So, in the process of developing a large-scale strategy for the modernization of China on the Chinese model of Deng Xiaoping, the previous concept of the development of the modern world was revised, which was reduced to the fact that its foundation is revolution and war. Deng's foreign policy concept indicated that the main instrument for regulating modern international relations is peaceful diplomacy, the core of which is the peaceful development of the country. An important area of Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy was cooperation with all, including capitalist, countries of the world, including the United States and Japan. An integral part of this new policy was the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States of America, the culmination of diplomacy initiated by President R. Nixon and Secretary of State G. Kissinger. The mutual overcoming of previous ideological stereotypes and disagreements led to the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. An important part of Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy strategy was the completion of the process of unification of the country according to the formula "one state – two systems", which

⁶⁰⁵ Barach D. Op. cit. P. 226.

⁶⁰⁶ Sveshnikov A.A. Foreign policy concepts of the PRC and conceptual representations of Chinese international specialists. P. 42–44.

provides for the preservation of the capitalist system in Xianggang, Macao and Taiwan, after their reunification with the PRC⁶⁰⁷. Realizing that China needed to develop both economically and politically, Deng created a stable external environment conducive to international trade and investment. In this regard, he abandoned Maoist support for the global anti-capitalist revolution and did not pay attention to maritime disputes with neighboring countries, preferring to gradually integrate the PRC into most of the Western international order led by the United States. It should be noted that Deng Xiaoping, who successfully pursued a policy of openness, improved relations between China and Western countries, which led China's industry to develop advanced technologies.

As an experienced leader, in order to overcome a difficult period, Deng proposed a number of policies that would later be divided into two phases: "keep your head down and behave with restraint" and "do something real/necessary", which means that China should behave with restraint in world affairs in order to avoid world pressure, while continuing to open up and reform. The international community, led by the United States, could adapt to it. But, on the other hand, due to military events such as the first Gulf War (1991), the Taiwan crisis (1995, 1996) and the bombing of the Chinese embassy during the Kosovo war (1999), China's investments in defense increased. In the 1990s, China needed to avoid the potential risk of falling behind in the development of new information technologies.

After the beginning of the implementation of economic reforms and the policy of openness to the outside world, Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy strategies in the field of international relations, focused on modernization, were embedded in economic construction. With Deng Xiaoping's departure, the development of China's international relations strategy has become more institutionalized.

At the initiative of Deng Xiaoping, **since the mid-80s** of the twentieth century, China's foreign policy has noticeably intensified. Despite the fact that Deng did not hold senior positions in the leadership of the People's Republic of China, he not only

⁶⁰⁷ Regzenova D.B.-O. Basic principles and the essence of Deng Xiaoping's reforms // Bulletin of Buryat State University. Philosophy. 2010. No. 6. P. 191.

reformed the country's economy, but also built its new foreign policy towards independent diplomacy⁶⁰⁸. The reform policy turned out to be a success with the organic combination of planned at the macro level and market regulation at the micro level. From 1978 to 1984, the reforms began to bring tangible results. There was steady GDP growth of 8.8%, industrial production grew, and the share of foreign investment gradually increased⁶⁰⁹.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, China's authority and influence in the world increased significantly. Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy ideas and concepts have radically changed China's foreign policy – a turn from preparing for war to pacification and a calm state. The core of China's foreign policy doctrine was Deng Xiaoping's modernization concept, which includes the idea of an "independent and independent foreign policy", the main goal of which was the accelerated socio-economic development of China.

The strategic **principle of "keeping in the shadows and trying not to show yourself in any way, not to climb into the first place"** (《韬光养晦,有所作为》的思想), the implementation of which took place **from 1989 to 1995**, determined the foreign policy direction of the People's Republic of China during the period of reforms and openness. Deng Xiaoping refused to set institutional limits. Like Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping's authority originates from his leadership, both revolutionary and as head of the Central Military Commission (until 1989). The patriarch's formula of Chinese reforms "to close the past, open the future" led, among other things, to the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations⁶¹⁰. Deng's concept of building socialism with Chinese characteristics opened up the country and provided theoretical and practical support for the revival of the Chinese nation. The period of Deng's leadership in the 1980s and 1990s is characterized by a lack of alliances and independence, which allowed China to play a key role in international relations. At a meeting with Brazilian President Juan

⁶⁰⁸ Di Dongsheng. Op. cit. P. 9; Torigian J. Op. cit.

⁶⁰⁹ Pantsov A.V. Deng Xiaoping. P. 433.

⁶¹⁰ Information materials. Series G. Ideological and theoretical tendencies in modern China: national traditions and searches for ways of modernisation. 14. XII All-Russian Conference "Philosophies of East Asian Region and Modern Civilisation" (Moscow, 22–23 May 2006). Moscow, 2007. P. 22.

Figueiredo⁶¹¹ in May 1984. Deng Xiaoping said that "China's foreign policy is independent and truly non-aligned. China does not play either the American or the Soviet card, ... and does not allow others to play the Chinese card." (1984年5月, 邓小平会见巴西总统若昂·菲格雷多时指出, «中国的对外政策是独立自主的, 是真正的不结盟。中国不打美国牌, 也不打苏联牌, 中国也不允许别人打中国牌») ⁶¹².

During the period of Deng Xiaoping's leadership, the influence of both traditional views and Confucian ideology (he shares a view of the "Tianxia" system) and liberalism can be traced from three areas of theoretical foundations in the evolution of foreign policy concepts. These foundations are expressed in the dialectical method of "incorporating capitalism into socialism." The period of reform and openness can be considered as the realization of the philosophy of "Tongbian" and "shi" in modern China. Deng Xiaoping carried out reforms that resulted in China's economic growth and the creation of a new economic system in China based on Western liberal ideas. However, these values and ideas of liberalism have not become prevalent in China's political culture.

With the changing foreign policy and economic situation, Dan proposes socialism and capitalism as an effective combined ideological model of the idea of ideology. However, it is too early to talk about the transformation of liberalism in China into a real force, but it proves its effectiveness by the example of the spread of liberal ideas in the Chinese economic sphere. In our opinion, a moderate or relatively liberal approach laid the foundation for the successful implementation of Dan's ideas and theories in the 1990s.

However, thanks to these concepts, the world began an era of applied and significant concepts, such as the key "theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics", "independent and peaceful diplomacy", "staying in the shadows", etc.

⁶¹¹ President of Brazil from 1979 to 1985.

⁶¹² China's foreign policy is independent and truly non-aligned // Information portal "CPC News". 2017. 19 September. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0912/c69113-29529025.html> (accessed: 06.08.2022). In Chinese.

**CHAPTER 4. THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE THIRD GENERATION
OF CHINESE LEADERS (1989–2003)**

**4.1. Jiang Zemin on the establishment of a multipolar and just world order
in international relations**

The tragic events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 had a significant impact not only on the internal life of Chinese society, but also on the foreign policy of the PRC. In the context of intensifying contradictions between social systems - capitalism and socialism - approaches to international problems changed in China.

At the 4th Plenum of the 13th CPC Central Committee held on June 23–24, 1989. (中国共产党第十三届中央委员会第四次全体会议·1989年6月23日至24日) "for supporting unrest and division in the party" («关于赵紫阳同志在反党反社会主义的动乱中所犯错误的报告») Zhao Ziyang was dismissed, and Jiang Zemin was elected the new General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee (江泽民). Already in his first public speeches and reports, he confirmed the policy line of Deng Xiaoping and identified 10 main directions for the further activities of the CPC. Regarding foreign policy, Jiang Zemin insisted on continuing the lines started by Deng Xiaoping⁶¹³.

However, despite the continuity of foreign policy, Jiang Zemin's diplomatic strategy was somewhat different from Deng Xiaoping's. The difference was in a more pragmatic management, paying maximum attention to the technological transformation of the PLA and the armed forces, equipping them with advanced standards. In addition, Jiang Zemin focused on the institutionalization of world problems and the “peaceful evolution” of liberating the PRC from the image of an enemy⁶¹⁴. He tried to solve the problem of a “soft transition” of the Chinese state and society from revolutionism to

⁶¹³ [Red Monument] The IV plenary session of the XIII Central Committee of the Communist Party of China //Information portal "Penpai". 2021. September 09. URL: https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_14430691 (accessed: 08.02.2022). In Chinese; The IV plenary session of the XIII Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (1989) // Government of the People's Republic of China 10.19.2009. URL: http://www.gov.cn/govweb/test/2009-10/19/content_1443091.htm (accessed: 05.02.2022). In Chinese.

⁶¹⁴ Miller L. H., Liu Xiaohong. Op. cit. P. 127–137.

authoritarianism and “modernization” of the PRC⁶¹⁵. Under him, China began to refrain from addressing important issues in the UN Security Council, insisting on continuous disarmament, which began in the 1980s. This approach is called the concept of “restraint” (“keeping low profile”).

The development of Beijing's new foreign policy concept and strategy took place in extremely difficult international conditions. After the events in Tiananmen Square, China's international isolation increased, accompanied by a widespread campaign of moral condemnation from Western political circles, led by the United States. The Chinese leadership has been criticized, including by former friendly communist parties. There were calls for a boycott of the PRC and even a severance of diplomatic relations with this state. Japan imposed sanctions on China in response to the mass crackdown on youth in Tiananmen Square, suspending bilateral exchanges of visits. By a joint decision of the G7 (Big Seven) countries, access to high technologies for Chinese specialists was closed, and programs for providing preferential government loans were frozen. This created obstacles in the implementation of the “four modernizations” policy, limited the development of the military-industrial complex, etc. Consequently, the international prestige of the PRC suffered enormous damage, and the importance of the Chinese factor decreased⁶¹⁶.

General Secretary Jiang Zemin, like Chinese President Yang Shangkun (杨尚昆)⁶¹⁷, pursued a policy of lifting the diplomatic blockade of the West and easing economic sanctions against China, while at the same time maintaining internal stability and development. The country successfully continued to promote the course of reforms and openness in line with the continuity of the course of Deng Xiaoping⁶¹⁸.

The CPC Central Committee, headed by Jiang Zemin, tried to mobilize Chinese society and give impulse to the development of domestic and foreign policy. During this difficult transition, the country's leadership did not allow sharp or dramatic actions, or

⁶¹⁵ Sveshnikov A.A. The foreign policy concepts of the PRC and the conceptual views of Chinese international relations specialists. P. 79; Korsun V. A. Op. cit. P. 7.

⁶¹⁶ Sveshnikov A.A. The foreign policy concepts of the PRC and the conceptual views of Chinese international relations specialists. P. 7–9.

⁶¹⁷ Yang Shangkun - President of the PRC from 1988 to 1993.

⁶¹⁸ Yang Shangkun in four important positions // Informational portal “Sohu” 06.03.2018. URL: https://www.sohu.com/a/233909609_100121900 (accessed: 08.08.2022). In Chinese.

any manifestation of confusion among many Chinese officials, including some party workers. Jiang Zemin and his team made significant efforts to calm the Chinese public after the events in Tiananmen Square⁶¹⁹. The defense and foreign policy of the PRC were strengthened. Even Western experts emphasized that China was successfully overcoming the crisis of understanding national interests and the relationship between domestic and foreign policies during that period⁶²⁰.

Against the backdrop of difficulties that arose in domestic and foreign policy in October 1992 Jiang Zemin confirmed his commitment to the innovative course of “peaceful reunification of the motherland” and “one state, two systems” (《一个国家、两种制度》的创造性构想). He was confident that the end of the confrontation between the two sides of the Strait and the gradual implementation of the peaceful unification of the motherland should lead to the stabilization of the situation on both sides.

At the 14th National Congress of the CPC (1992年10月12日至18日, 中国共产党第十四次全国代表大会), held from October 12 to 18, 1992, Jiang Zemin delivered a report on “Accelerating the Pace of Reform, Opening Up and Modernization to Enhance the Victory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (《加快改革开放和现代化建设步伐, 夺取有中国特色社会主义事业的更大胜利》的报告). The congress made three decisions that had far-reaching significance: 1) approval of Deng Xiaoping's theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics and enshrining it in the CPC Charter (《(一) 确立了邓小平建设有中国特色社会主义理论在全党的指导地位, 并将其写入党章》); 2) establishing the goal of reform of the socialist market economic system (《(二) 确立社会主义市场经济体制的改革目标》); 3) the party should seize the opportunity and accelerate the development of the country, focus on economic construction (《(三) 抓住机遇, 加快发展的决策和战略部署》)⁶²¹. This congress has gone down in history as accelerating the pace of reform and opening up.

⁶¹⁹ Korsun V. A. Op. cit. P. 55–56.

⁶²⁰ Chinese foreign policy: theory and practice (Studies on Contemporary China).

⁶²¹ The XIV National Congress of the CPC // Informational portal “Network of Communist Party members” 06.12.2012. URL: <https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/06/05/ARTI1338865692254329.shtml?from=singlemessage> (accessed: 05.21.2022). In Chinese.

Regarding the foreign policy line, the XIV Congress of the CPC confirmed the course towards reform and expansion of foreign relations, towards the struggle to transform the PRC into a rich and powerful democratic civilized modern socialist state. Adhering to the vector exclusively to avoid world war, Beijing has enlisted the support of the «Group of 77» and member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. At the same time, there were still pockets of instability - the gap between North and South, the aggravation of contradictions between developed and developing countries⁶²².

Jiang emphasized the tasks of the PLA, highlighting the trend towards a gradual expansion of the mission of the Chinese army as the economic and political power of the PRC strengthens. According to Jiang Zemin, “the troops must do a better job of protecting national territory, airspace and territorial waters, as well as national maritime interests, ensuring the unity of the motherland and the security of its sacred destiny.” An important factor that influenced the construction of the PLA during that period was the political reforms in Taiwan, which entailed a strengthening of the role of separatist elements in Taiwanese politics. In the 1990s one of the main tasks of the PLA was to exert military pressure on Taiwan in order to prevent the island from declaring independence from China⁶²³.

Jiang Zemin, called the “modern Deng Xiaoping,” proposed twenty-five orders, including six of them aimed at **developing foreign policy**. He considered it necessary to advance the cause of China's unification: Xianggang, Aomen, and the Taiwan Strait. At the same time, it can be assumed that Jiang perceived himself as the only spokesman for the fundamental interests of the nation due to the fact that the completion of the unification of the homeland is part of the fundamental interests of the state. Jiang Zemin put forward a political-ideological formula focused on the concepts of “motherland” and “nation” as identical to the concepts of “state” and “party”⁶²⁴.

In the early 90s of XX century Jiang Zemin began to develop a theoretical and practical complex of modern international order. He set a course to determine the rules

⁶²² Korsun V. A. Op. cit. P. 59–60.

⁶²³ Ibid. P. 112.

⁶²⁴ Cit. by: Galenovich Yu. M. Jiang Zemin's orders. P. 133–134.

of international community life. Jiang Zemin's foreign policy concept includes the following six components:

- 1) multipolarity and economic globalization;
- 2) independent and sovereign peaceful foreign policy;
- 3) hegemonism and power politics;
- 4) a new international political and economic order;
- 5) unity and cooperation with developing countries;
- 6) stable relations of friendship and cooperation between major states.

Let's take a closer look at these components of Jiang Zemin's foreign policy.

Multipolarity and economic globalization

During his thirteen-year stay in power, from 1989 to 2002, Jiang Zemin developed the most important theoretical and practical provisions for the implementation of foreign policy for the coming decades. Jiang Zemin formulated a large-scale concept of international relations, diplomacy and foreign policy strategy for the long term. He based it on principles and guidelines that were in tune with Chinese traditional political culture. They were formed in the late 80s - early 90s. XX century it is noteworthy that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC stated: under the leadership of the CPC Central Committee, the core of which is Jiang Zemin, "China continues to pursue an independent, independent, peaceful foreign policy that supports international and regional order and cooperation with all countries in the name of common development"⁶²⁵.

The key ideas of this course were:

- protect state independence and sovereignty, repel external aggression;
- peacefully resolve international disputes, resolutely oppose any manifestation of hegemony and power politics;
- based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, establish and develop friendly cooperation with all countries;
- actively develop relations of friendship and good neighborliness with neighboring countries, strengthen cooperation with developing countries;

⁶²⁵ Galenovich Yu. M. Moscow – Beijing, Moscow – Taipei. P. 309–310.

– pursue a policy of practicing external openness in a comprehensive manner.

At the XIV Congress of the CPC, President Jiang Zemin called for the establishment of a new world order - peaceful, stable, fair and rational based on mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Such an order should be based on the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity («。 。 。 在互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处等原则的基础上，建立和平、稳定、公正、合理的国际新秩序») ⁶²⁶

Western experts note the similarity of the wording of the provisions of the XIV Congress of the CPC with those developed back in the 1980s, the essence of which boils down to the peaceful provision of modernization and the prevention of world war. These postulates of Deng are so woven into the fabric of Chinese politics and ideology that they do not allow any adjustments ⁶²⁷. In foreign policy practice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC adhered to specific strategic guidelines. They can be presented in the following ideologies:

– the establishment of the cause of modernization as a national idea and its further strengthening in the conditions of creating a peaceful environment corresponding to the formula “peace and development”;

– approval of the “tendency towards multipolarity” (multipolarity) in the wake of an independent and standalone foreign policy, the architectonics of international relations, without relying on allied relations with great powers or blocs of countries; exclusion of China's subordination to the pressure of large states. In international affairs, China follows the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the peoples of the world. China determines its position and approach in international affairs based on the nature of the matter;

– research and use of the concept of “comprehensive state power”, the essence of which is to ensure national interests and state security. The strength of a state in the international arena is determined by its power and the magnitude of its military potential,

⁶²⁶ Jiang Zemin's report at the XIV National Congress of the CPC // Portal of the Central Government of the PRC. 07.04.2008. URL: http://www.gov.cn/govweb/test/2008-07/04/content_1035850_4.htm (accessed: 08.10.2022). In Chinese.

⁶²⁷ Korsun V.A. Op. cit. P. 60.

the degree of economic, scientific and technological development at the regional and global levels;

- the desire to develop “non-confrontational” relations and contacts with all members of the world community based on mutual trust and common interests on the basis of the “five principles of coexistence”;

- acceptance of the right to their own legitimate interests among all subjects of international relations – “small and large countries”, “strong or weak”. Replacing the policy of developing contradictions with maintaining a balance of power and the need to prevent any forms of force. In developing relations with other countries, China is not guided by considerations of commonality or differences in social structure and ideology, but puts smooth diplomatic relations above these differences;

- commitment to the peaceful resolution of international disputes and conflicts in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and international law. Conducting joint consultations through equal negotiations without the use of force;

- definition of the PRC into the system of developing socialist countries of the “Third World”. Implementation of a foreign policy with a main focus on relations with Third World countries.

These guidelines of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs especially emphasized: China does not participate in blocs, which excludes an alliance between Moscow and Beijing against third countries. In addition, Beijing emphasized the development of special relations with “developing countries in its immediate environment,” a kind of “belt of good neighborliness” that ensures peace on the borders of the PRC. These are primarily Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Russia remained outside this circle; Chinese leaders placed it “in a special position of the transition period”⁶²⁸.

Armed with four concepts – **multipolarity of the world (世界多极化)**, **economic globalization (经济全球化)**, **world peace (世界和平)**, **joint development of all countries (共同发展)**, Jiang called them the main trends of the modern world order.

⁶²⁸ Galenovich Yu. M. Moscow – Beijing, Moscow – Taipei. P. 313.

Unstable global situation at the end of the XX century. – the destruction of the bipolar system of international relations, the collapse of the USSR, the emergence of points of tension on the Chinese borders, the possibility of local conflicts, led, in our opinion, to the transformation of China’s foreign policy discourse. During these years, Jiang Zemin paid special attention to issues of national, regional and global security. If the generally accepted concept of “security” was not recorded in the materials of the XIV Congress of the CPC in 1992, over the next 20 years it was increasingly included in the political rhetoric of Chinese leaders. In the foreign policy discourse of the 1990s, this concept was associated mainly with instability in the world, the possibility of wars and clashes; in speeches at the beginning of the XXI century, security is discussed in relation to a wider range of challenges and threats. The Western (Anglo-Saxon) concept of “sovereignty” appears the greatest number of times in the report at the XIV Congress in 1992. This may be due to the fact that at that time the political language of the new, “open” China was just emerging to describe its idea of security; The leaders of the PRC used only this term. Subsequently, “sovereignty” was completely replaced by the term “security”⁶²⁹, which means “absence of danger or threat” (安全)⁶³⁰.

The Chinese language dictionary interprets “multipolar world” (“极世界”) as a model of international relations created in the early 1990s, in response to the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the dramatic change in the situation in Eastern Europe. This pattern changes from the position of one or two superpowers to more than two countries or groups of countries as the center of power⁶³¹.

Since 1992, multipolarity has been an important element of Chinese foreign policy, becoming increasingly important in the wake of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the death of a Chinese pilot in a collision with an American plane. It also indirectly influenced the foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Viewed through the prism of “equidistance” in the early 2000s, Russian political scientist A.D. Bogaturov, the rapprochement of the PRC with the USA, the West and movement

⁶²⁹ Evtushin K. A. The foreign policy of the PRC in the political rhetoric of Chinese leaders // RGGU Vestnik. History. Political science. International relations. 2016. Issue 2 (4). P. 82–83.

⁶³⁰ Xinhua Dictionary of Modern Chinese. Beijing, 1987. P. 7. In Chinese.

⁶³¹ Multipolar world // The Comprehensive Electronic Dictionary of the Chinese Language. URL: <http://www.hydc.com/cd/htm4/ci065256b.htm> (accessed: 01.20.2023). In Chinese.

away from Russia. He is sure that “multipolarity tempts us with the illusion of multiple choices.” Even then, Russia had an advantage over China - close political ties with the West. And China’s cooperation with Japan and the West was a higher priority than with Russia⁶³². However, already in the 2000s, after China’s joining the WTO, the popularization of the idea of a multipolar world in the PRC was “muffled”, making it more “ritual.” In the context of a “new” bipolarity formation and the emergence of the PRC as a prospective hegemonic power, the question arises of whether China is really a “revisionist” power (together with Russia), as it is qualified in American doctrinal documents⁶³³?

The leader of the People's Republic of China assessed international relations at the end of the XX century. as a bipolar system, which ceased to exist with the collapse of the USSR.

The first feature of the international situation at the turn of the XX–XXI centuries. Jiang Zemin believes that the **trend is towards modern multipolarity**. During this period, the main role belongs to large states, which cannot agree among themselves on control over the world community and for this reason cannot govern it. Talking about a monopolar, bipolar, and multipolar world, Jiang hoped in the future to build up the comprehensive potential of the state in order to take a leadership position, without involving the PRC in blocs and spheres of influence of any groups of countries. At the same time, he saw the direct difference between the PRC and the hegemonic country in that it illegally claims this role⁶³⁴.

While discussing the problems of war and peace, Jiang spoke about the **second feature** of China's foreign policy. He thought in two ways. On the one hand, he understood that economic development depended on peaceful coexistence over a long period of time. On the other hand, it is necessary to remember, Jiang said, about the likelihood of war and the strategic and tactical actions being taken by the Communist Party.

⁶³² Bogaturov A.D., Kosolapov H.A., Khrustalev M.A. Op. cit. P. 294.

⁶³³ Cit. by: Degterev D.A. Multipolar World Order: old myths and new realities // Vestnik RUDN. International Relations. 2019. Vol. 19, Issue 3. P. 415.

⁶³⁴ Galenovich Yu. M. Jiang Zemin’s orders. P. 169–171.

The Chinese leader considered national contradictions, territorial disputes and religious clashes to be the sources of conflicts and wars. National contradictions affect issues of self-affirmation of states. Jiang placed second place on territorial disputes potentially affecting China and its neighbors. Religious disputes are also an external problem for the Chinese state, including the position of Muslims in the USA, Russia, the Republic of Kosovo and other countries.

In this regard, Jiang developed another idea - about the intensification of international economic competition, the widening gap between the rich North and the poor South. We believe that the Chinese leader drew a parallel with the theory of Mao's "Three Worlds" and the modern concept of confrontation between North and South, within the framework of which confrontation with the United States, as the "First World," remained the main problem for the PRC, and China itself considered itself to be a large developing socialist state of the South⁶³⁵.

One of the initial principles of Jiang Zemin's foreign policy concept was the idea of world peace and the joint development of all countries. In his concept of foreign policy, two problems - peace and development - were closely associated with the interaction of two groups of countries: countries with a relatively high level of development and countries with a poor population, where the first owe a moral debt to the majority in economic and historical terms. The cultivation of hegemony and power politics, for example, the policies of the USSR and the USA in the mid-twentieth century, now applies to the USA and its allies. It can be assumed that the Chinese leader deliberately shifted the blame to the United States for the state of affairs in each country. Thus, Jiang tried to show leadership and form an alliance of states opposing the United States under the control of the PRC. This led him to believe that current economic globalization is in crisis⁶³⁶.

Talking about the inevitability of conflict on a global scale, the Chinese leader appealed to multipolarity. Thus, he emphasized that the world's shift towards multipolarity characterizes the modern history of international relations. The

⁶³⁵ Cit. by: Yang Yichen. On the Conditions of the Era and the International Situation within the Framework of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics // Journal of Ideological Theory. 1995. Issue 6. P. 9. In Chinese.

⁶³⁶ Yang Yichen. Op. cit. P. 6-8. In Chinese.

tendency/promotion towards multipolarity (走向多极化) is observed in politics, economics, both at the regional and global levels⁶³⁷. In his speech at the 5th Plenum of the 15th CPC Central Committee in November 2000, Jiang Zemin outlined the tasks of combating ethnic separatist forces, forces of terrorism and religious extremism in Xinjiang. He emphasized that maintaining the stability and development of ethnic and border areas is an important political task and is of great importance for maintaining the long-term socio-political stability of the country⁶³⁸.

Jiang Zemin emphasized that the era when the fate of the world was decided by large blocs of countries is gone and will never return. In this regard, his thoughts about the real situation were theoretical or abstract. Let us note that the terms “world order”, “monopolarity”, “bipolarity”, “multipolarity” seem, in the opinion of some Russian sinologists, to be ambiguous, unacceptable and not consistent with the actual state of affairs. Chinese scientific journals and monographs rarely publish studies on multipolarity due to the lack of interest in it in China. Jiang Zemin interpreted “multipolarity” as several centers opposing the United States. The concepts of “world order” and “multipolarity” are acceptable temporarily and only for some countries under certain conditions, Russian scientists argue. The statement about one center of power or one power demanding control over others is impossible in modern conditions. Such a world order does not exist today under the patronage of the United States or China. None of the centers of power is able to impose its will on others⁶³⁹.

It is noteworthy that Chinese political scientists, when discussing the forms of multipolarity, present it in different ways. In this regard, there are terminological differences. Thus, according to one of the interpretations, “the bipolar architectonics has been completely destroyed, while the multipolar one is still in its infancy and has not acquired a completed form⁶⁴⁰”.

⁶³⁷ Jiang Zemin at the UN Millennium Summit. September 20 // China Central Television. URL: <https://www.cctv.com/special/777/2/52021.html> (accessed: 01.30.2023). In Chinese.

⁶³⁸ Knowledge of history and love for the party are like stone. Today in the history of the party // China Construction Research Institute. 10.11.2021. URL: https://m.thepaper.cn/baijiahao_14848796 (accessed: 06.05.2022). In Chinese.

⁶³⁹ Galenovich Yu. M. Moscow – Beijing, Moscow – Taipei. P. 307–308.

⁶⁴⁰ Sveshnikov A.A. The foreign policy concepts of the PRC and the conceptual views of Chinese international relations specialists. P. 93.

The indispensable attributes of multipolarity were proclaimed to be the right of all states to independently choose their own path of development, to resolve controversial issues through peaceful negotiations, dialogue and consultations “in the spirit of mutual understanding and mutual concessions.” The central role of the United Nations in regulating international relations of the emerging multipolar world was emphasized.

In terms of the combined power of the powers, Beijing saw the United States as the world center and pointed to the following main centers of power: Europe, Russia, Japan and China. Since today there are many more centers of power with interconnected problems than in Jiang Zemin’s list, in fact one cannot help but think about large states of Europe, Latin America, Asia such as Germany, France, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Nigeria, South Africa, India, Indonesia, etc⁶⁴¹. In other words, a situation has arisen: “one superpower – many strong powers⁶⁴²”.

In his reasoning, Jiang emphasized the role of the factor of protecting peace, the predominance of peace over the possibility of a new war in order to improve relations with large states, for example, the United States.

The Chinese leader in his theory put forward two flexible, mutually exclusive theses that can be addressed in any situation:

1) the long-term formation after the Cold War of a multipolar structure with the separation or cooperation of various political forces. According to Jiang, this process is never-ending and is accompanied by struggle on the world stage. Jiang considered China to be a struggling force that resists emerging and existing dangers;

2) in the Chinese foreign policy course for the PRC there is a basis for confronting the interests of developed and developing countries, to recognize their contradictions or the nature of conflicts⁶⁴³.

At the same time, these factors led to the following discrepancies. The main paradox remained the conflict between the United States and its allies with some developing countries defending a new international fair order. At the same time, China

⁶⁴¹ Galenovich Yu. M. Moscow – Beijing, Moscow – Taipei. P. 307–308. His own. Jiang Zemin’s orders. P. 181.

⁶⁴² Sveshnikov A.A. The foreign policy concepts of the PRC and the conceptual views of Chinese international relations specialists. P. 93.

⁶⁴³ Cit. by: Yang Yichen. Op. cit. P. 6–7.

encouraged conflicts and did not physically prevent them, believing that escalation leads to the revival of the nation and the strengthening of China's economic power and potential in the world. The reason for these differences was, firstly, the hope of uniting with the United States and reaping the benefits of the partnership. Secondly, Jiang has constantly stated China's non-participation in blocs and global disputes.

Thus, Jiang Zemin tried to shape the world originally built on "Cold War thinking", brute force politics, expansion of military alliances, and bring it to respect the balanced interests of all countries and a fair world order⁶⁴⁴. Let us note that in its history, the PRC has not opposed the United States and has not participated in confrontation.

At the same time, multipolarity was considered by Jiang Zemin as a tool to counter hegemony, a means of weakening "the ability of a superpower to control and manipulate the international situation", i.e. it contained only a thinly veiled anti-American subtext. The anti-American and anti-NATO element of propaganda in favor of multipolarity in Russia and China was especially clearly manifested during the period of military actions by the United States and NATO against Yugoslavia in 1999, which were condemned by both countries. According to some Chinese political scientists, Washington decided to "put Beijing in its place," and at the same time warn Moscow by bombing the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in early May. Although US President Bill Clinton apologized to Jiang Zemin and the Chinese people, calling the incident a "tragic mistake," almost everyone in China was confident that the bombing was deliberate. This belief was further strengthened after the collision of a Chinese fighter with an American reconnaissance aircraft near Hainan Island on April 1, 2001, which resulted in the death of the Chinese pilot⁶⁴⁵.

On the eve of the new millennium, Jiang released conclusions drawn from the CPC's analysis of the development of the trend towards multipolarity, the main problems of the world and development. The ideas of the leadership of the CPC, which is not without admiration, about the only state, namely the United States, capable of resolving world conflicts for decades to come seem erroneous. According to Jiang,

⁶⁴⁴ Cit. by: Yang Yichen. Op. cit. P. 8.

⁶⁴⁵ Portyakov V.Ya. The Vision of Multipolarity in Russia and China and International Challenges // Comparative Politics. 2013. Issue 1 (11). P. 86–87.

today America is the judge of the world, but tomorrow everything can change and China will become such a power.

Speaking at the United Nations Millennium Summit (联合国千年首脑会议) in 2000⁶⁴⁶, Jiang Zemin emphasized his vision of moving towards multipolarity. He spoke of moving the international landscape towards multipolarity as the need of the hour, which serves the interests of the people of all countries and promotes peace and security throughout the world. This multipolar model differs from the historical situation in which major powers compete for hegemony and spheres of influence. Countries should be independent, and their mutual cooperation and various forms of partnership should not be aimed at other participants. Major powers have a particularly significant responsibility for maintaining world and regional peace and must respect small countries; strong states should support weak countries, and rich countries should help poor ones⁶⁴⁷.

The confrontation between all centers of the world is clearly visible here. It was in this kind of architectonics that the Chinese leader considered it necessary to trust each other without harming the interests of anyone.

At an extended meeting of the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee in September 2000 Jiang said that the contradictions between **monopolarity** and **multipolarity** will become the focus of struggle on the world stage in the 21st century due to the fact that large states will seek cooperation, being in a state of competition, balancing others. Maintaining world peace is a necessary prerequisite for promoting overall development which is also an important guarantee for maintaining world peace.

Let us agree with the opinion of Chinese professor Wang Junwei regarding the creative development of Jiang Zemin's foreign policy concept. Its necessity stemmed from an understanding of changes in the international strategic model, the trend of global military reform in general and the development of the country. Scientific and technological military training was the main method of improving the ability of the

⁶⁴⁶ The meeting of heads of state on 6-8 September 2000, held at the UN Headquarters. The aim was to define the role of the UN in the XXI century, which resulted in the signing of the Millennium Declaration.

⁶⁴⁷ Jiang Zemin's Speech at the UN Millennium Summit (Full Text) // Spots.CCTV. URL: <http://sports.cctv.com/news/special/zt1/qingnian/61.html> (accessed: 06.06.2022). In Chinese.

Chinese army to win high-tech wars and played a key role in the overall modernization of the PRC armed forces⁶⁴⁸.

Jiang Zemin's thoughts on the diversity of the world and the coexistence of different civilizations speak of the variety and recognition of socio-political forms. He called on the people and governments of all countries to promote the movement towards multipolarity, the assessment of which lies in economic globalization and the demands of protecting peace and stability throughout the world.

Domestic science has been writing about “globalization” and its role in the international order since the 1990s. A. D. Bogaturov, N.A. Kosolapov, calling it the “absorption syndrome” of material and virtual tendencies and innovations⁶⁴⁹. The unipolar structure of the world, led by the United States, not yet strengthened after the collapse of the bipolar system, meets the debut of China and India. Scientists believe that it was China and India that were the first to discover the unspoken comprehensive leadership of the United States in the changing configuration of the world in the 90s XX century⁶⁵⁰.

By "economic globalization," China's leader understood the process of developing a global organic economic sphere, formed through foreign trade, capital flows, technology transfer, service provision, interdependence and interconnection, resulting in world economic activity extending beyond national borders⁶⁵¹. Describing economic globalization, the leader of the PRC saw it as an objective tendency, accompanied by the development of social productive forces.

However, in the process of economic globalization, the status and position of countries are extremely different. While developed countries are enjoying the “dividends” of globalization, the vast majority of developing countries continue to suffer from underdevelopment. Lack of development funds, debt burdens, deteriorating

⁶⁴⁸ For more information, see: Wang Junwei. Jiang Zemin and the Military Revolution with Chinese Characteristics // 90 Years Since the Founding of the Communist Party of China: An Anthology. 2011. Vol. 2, Issue 5. In Chinese.

⁶⁴⁹ Bogaturov A.D., Kosolapov H.A., Khrustalev M.A. Op. cit. P. 335.

⁶⁵⁰ Galenovich Yu. M. Jiang Zemin's orders. P. 351.

⁶⁵¹ Economical globalization. URL: <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E5%85%A8%E7%90%83%E5%8C%96/245085?fr=aladdin> (accessed: 06.02.2022). In Chinese.

terms of trade, increased financial risks and a huge gap in technological levels put developing countries at a disadvantage, Jiang Zemin argued⁶⁵².

Jiang linked China's desire and plans not to remain among the laggards with economic globalization. Economic globalization has also been fraught with contradictions - taking into account the demands of developing countries and with the support of developed countries, China has contributed to maintaining peace and stability throughout the world. However, this policy encouraged the actions of Western countries, led by the United States.

Jiang Zemin relied on the thesis that it is difficult for any state to ensure its security alone and that only on the terms of cooperation and ensuring mutual interests is it possible to effectively respond to global challenges. Therefore, such an attitude could lead to new problems, and the Chinese leader did not deny them. The gap between North and South represents one of the criteria of the irrational old international political and economic order, which does not cause any key transformations. **Economic globalization**, according to Jiang Zemin, is **the second feature of the international situation**. He identified the following trends⁶⁵³:

- 1) strengthening economic cooperation in the field of technology against the backdrop of increased competition on a global scale;
- 2) the rapid rise of scientific and technological progress, which transforms traditional methods of production and orients them towards the information economy;
- 3) movement of financial capital associated with the 1997 crisis in Southeast Asia.

This main demand of Jiang Zemin - to fit into the processes of economic globalization - suggests that the nature and purpose of this phenomenon leads to the management of capitalism. Only this will make it possible to ensure the economic sovereignty and state security of developing countries. The leader of the PRC was clearly aware of the need for a joint and effective mechanism for action by the CPC and its leaders in protecting the Chinese nation.

⁶⁵² Jiang Zemin: Humanity Needs a Mutually Beneficial Economic Globalization // Information portal "China News Service". 09.08.2020 URL: <https://news.sina.com.cn/world/2000-09-08/124970.html> (accessed: 06.09.2022). In Chinese.

⁶⁵³ Galenovich Yu.M. Jiang Zemin's orders. P. 196–203.

In this regard, we will give several examples that demonstrate the results achieved by the PRC in a short period of time in astronautics thanks to the economic globalization. In 2003 China becomes the world's third space power with its own manned space program and is building a national orbital station. In 2007, he created anti-satellite missiles. In 2011, the first orbital station was launched; in 2012, carries out the first manned flight and creates, along with the American, Russian and European ones, its own national satellite navigation system “Compass” (北斗卫星导航系统).

Independent and sovereign peaceful foreign policy of the PRC

Having substantiated China's course towards implementing an independent and sovereign peaceful foreign policy of the PRC at the XIV–XV Congresses of the CPC, Jiang Zemin outlined three of its distinctive factors. **First**, the class socialist character of the state fixes the peaceful content of politics. And the struggle for a peaceful environment becomes the main and long-term goal of such a course. Self-sufficient and independent character is the **second** distinguishing feature. China is trying to build friendly and partnership relations with other countries. He takes an independent position in this, without participating in alliances or blocs. The sovereign direction of China's foreign policy constitutes the **third** unique feature, which does not allow third parties to interfere in its internal affairs.

According to Jiang Zemin's logic, there are two priority directions in foreign policy, which 1) reveal effective cooperation with China's neighbors, pushing it to ensure peace on the borders with neighboring states; 2) determine the development of relations with developing, and, what is especially important, with developed countries. Movement in these directions will provide China with a priority position and status in the future as the largest developing country in the world⁶⁵⁴.

Jiang identified several principles that formed the basis of his strategic foreign policy. The **first principle** he considered was the struggle against the policies of large developed hegemonic states, the use of military force, etc. **The second principle** is the protection of the interests of the people, state and nation, which is the foundation for normal relations between China and its partners. **The third principle** is to benefit from

⁶⁵⁴ Yang Yichen. Op. cit. P. 8–9. In Chinese.

economic cooperation with developed countries. The fourth principle states that the Communist Party of China is a link of governance that connects not only the Chinese state and people, but also international parties that shape the nature of relations between the respective states. Undoubtedly, this is determined by the Communist Party. Jiang emphasized this principle. The fifth principle is aimed at confronting major world powers, since they are guilty of infringing on the interests of developing countries. This principle provides grounds for flexible changes to documents (the UN Charter, for example)⁶⁵⁵.

Building on Deng Xiaoping's strategy of "observing with cold, strengthening shaky positions with restraint, dealing with difficulties, keeping a low profile, and trying not to show oneself," Jiang emphasized "creating a peaceful environment conducive to China's modernization, reform and opening up." Speaking about arms reduction, Jiang Zemin named the main culprits in the arms race, which continue to build up military potential, not wanting to reduce it to 90-95% - these are the United States and its Western allies.

As part of the move towards multipolarity and the course towards an independent and sovereign peaceful foreign policy, Jiang Zemin's foreign policy theory developed an approach to regional multilateralism. It was based on a number of principles and positions set out by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Singapore on July 24, 1993. Qian proposed starting "security cooperation with bilateral and regional security dialogues at different levels and through different channels in response to the diversity of the region. Thanks to such dialogues and consultations, countries trust in each other will increase. China will actively participate in these dialogues and consultations." Qian also put forward general principles on which the multilateral security process should be based: all countries should be treated as equals based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence; not to organize or join any military bloc directed against other countries; no country should interfere in the internal affairs of other countries; disarmament and arms control must be carried out in a fair and reasonable manner; Efforts must be made to stop the arms race and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and territorial

⁶⁵⁵ Galenovich Yu.M. Jiang Zemin's orders. P. 207–209.

disputes, border disputes and other disagreements between states in the region must be resolved peacefully, without the use of force.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin reiterated this position later and noted Beijing's skepticism about a comprehensive regional security system. He noted that the creation of a security mechanism “must be based on the real conditions of the region, which are diverse⁶⁵⁶”.

In 1993, statements by the Chinese Foreign Ministry analyzed the global situation - the collapse of the bipolar system and the movement towards multipolarity – as creating an opportunity for countries in the region to strengthen cooperation and concentrate on economic development. Foreign Ministry officials announced that China is studying proposals for regional security cooperation and is now “ready to explore with other countries in the region a common regional security mechanism based on mutual trust⁶⁵⁷”.

These statements and general principles represented China's temporary position while Chinese analysts and officials discussed and assessed sensitive issues and formulated long-term policies. Many military and civilian analytic centers have been tasked with studying the issue of multilateral security and making policy recommendations to leadership. While analysts at the China Foreign Policy Research Institute continued to assess the new situation and develop policy recommendations, the outlines of Chinese thinking on multilateral security could already be discerned from comments by Chinese officials and researchers from civilian and military analytic centers in Beijing, by published articles and statements⁶⁵⁸.

90s XX century raised the question of China's involvement in maintaining strategic security in the region. The situation of uncertainty and direct threats to the national security interests of the PRC, including the destabilizing entry of Soviet army into Afghanistan, was of concern. The threat of separatism also forced the Chinese government to strengthen its borders and negotiate a reduction in armed forces in areas

⁶⁵⁶Garrett B., Glaser B. Multilateral security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its impact on Chinese Interests: views from Beijing // *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. June 1994. Vol. 16, no. 1. P. 15.

⁶⁵⁷ Shirk S.L. Chinese views on Asia-Pacific regional security cooperation // *The National Bureau of Asian research*. 1994. Vol. 5, no. 5. P. 7–8.

⁶⁵⁸ Garrett B., Glaser B. *Op. cit.* P. 15–16.

bordering Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In this regard, the need arose to create a mechanism for bilateral Soviet-Chinese, then multilateral border negotiations. In 1992, in Tashkent, most CIS countries concluded a collective security treaty (CST). According to this treaty, countries pledged to act together in the event of an external attack by a state that is not a member of the treaty. However, we emphasize the ineffectiveness of interaction through the CST, since the new situation in Central Asia brings new challenges and security threats (which only exacerbate conflicts with each other) and reduces the interest of the participating countries in collective action. Note that China in the early 90s XX century was just beginning to move from foreign policy isolation to active diplomacy on a regional scale, the task of which is to normalize relations with neighboring countries and create a “belt of good neighborliness”⁶⁵⁹. So, on April 26, 1996 in Shanghai, the heads of five neighboring states B.N. Yeltsin, Jiang Zemin, N. Nazarbayev, A. Akaev, E. Rakhmonov* signed an Agreement on strengthening confidence in the military field and mutual reduction of armed forces. This Agreement was the beginning of the formation of regular contacts of the Shanghai Five. At first, her activities focused on resolving security issues on the borders between China and the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Later, the Shanghai Five concentrated on solving their common tasks of countering international terrorism, ethnic separatism, religious extremism, the so-called. cross-border “three evils”, as well as drug trafficking. With the inclusion of Uzbekistan, this association became a model of regional cooperation, which later became known as the “Shanghai process”. A whole concept of the “Shanghai process” on issues of security and trade and economic cooperation has emerged, the authors of which are such famous analysts as Xia Yishan, Zhao Huasheng, Yu Sui and others. The implementation of this process testified to the establishment of new forms of world order through consent and non-violent methods⁶⁶⁰.

The existing format of consultations was considered by China as a promising mechanism for interaction on security issues in the region, consistent with the Chinese strategic guidelines reflected in the formula “rely on the north, stabilize Western

⁶⁵⁹ Russia's and China's Policies in Central Asia in the Late XIX – Early XXI Centuries. Barnaul, 2014. P. 340–342.

*Since 2007 – E. Rakhmon.

⁶⁶⁰ Korsun V. A. Op. cit. P. 63.

governance, and concentrate the main efforts on the east and south”⁶⁶¹. This meant that with the emergence of the problem of securitization⁶⁶² of Islam and terrorism, the PRC, within the legal framework, had the opportunity to intensify the fight against separatist groups on the territory of its own state⁶⁶³. In this regard, Jiang Zemin expressed several considerations related to Russia and the regions neighboring the PRC. In relations with the CIS countries and Russia, the PRC adhered to the principle of deterrence in the use of nuclear weapons. An agreement was reached on the mutual reduction of armed forces on China's border with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with a total length of 7,000 km⁶⁶⁴. In addition, Jiang foresaw a situation where the growth of China's military power would pose a threat to a number of states in the future⁶⁶⁵. China was also concerned about the presence of American troops in Afghanistan, and then their disorderly withdrawal. Beijing, in addition, was concerned about a new round of extremism in the traditionally Islamic XUAR of the PRC. Observers were inclined to see in this circumstance an incentive for Beijing to intervene not only in the economy, but also in political processes in Central Asia, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are most dependent on China⁶⁶⁶.

So, analyzing the foreign policy concepts and practical international policy of the PRC under Jiang Zemin, it can be argued that it was generally peaceful and independent in nature. Its goal is to strengthen the sovereignty and reliable defense of the PRC. Jiang laid down the following guidelines in China's foreign policy: solving economic

⁶⁶¹ Russia's and China's Policies in Central Asia in the Late XIX – Early XXI Centuries. P. 343.

⁶⁶² The Copenhagen School of International Relations introduces the term "securitization" to denote that the nation or social community, rather than the individual, is the referent object of security, arguing that security primarily concerns social communities and only derivatively concerns individuals. For more information, see: Khudaikulova A.V., Neklyudov N.Ya. *Op. cit.* P. 134.

⁶⁶³ Securitization means that some issue poses an existential threat requiring measures to prevent it, justifying such actions. The securitization of Islam occurs not only in the media but also at the level of academic research through the reproduction of an orientalist approach to constructing the "image of the other." For more information, see: Russia's and China's Policies in Central Asia in the Late XIX – Early XXI Centuries. P. 345; Ragozina. S. *Defending "Traditional" Islam from the "Radical": The Discourse of Islamophobia in the Russian Media // State, Religion, Church in Russia and Abroad. 2018. Issue 2. P. 273.*

⁶⁶⁴ Agreement Between the Russian Federation, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Republic of Tajikistan and the People's Republic of China on Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces in the Border Region // Electronic Fund of Legal and Normative-Technical Documents. URL: <https://docs.cntd.ru/document/901779315> (accessed: 09.09.2023). In Chinese.

⁶⁶⁵ Galenovich Yu. M. Jiang Zemin's orders. P. 220.

⁶⁶⁶ Safronova E.I. The Role and Place of Russia and China in Solving the Political and Economic Problems of the SCO // *Russia-China Cooperation in the Interests of Ensuring the Security of the SCO Geopolitical Space: Problems and Prospects. 2021. P. 123–135.*

problems and strengthening the current political, socio-economic order in China. This course is based on multi-vector cooperation between China and all countries of the world, including Western countries led by the United States.

Hegemony and power politics

It is known that historically the Chinese Empire fought with its neighbors, but never actually occupied them for a long period of time or turned them into colonies. On the contrary, it exported Confucian philosophy and transformed their image within the framework of cultural imperialism⁶⁶⁷. Obviously, this process continues to this day.

In the 1990s there was a further evolution of the views of the military-political leadership of the PRC, led by Jiang Zemin, towards the peaceful rise of China, which was based on economic and military power⁶⁶⁸.

The Chinese economy and military power were rapidly growing. Between 1980 and 1990 Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita doubled. GDP rose 13.2% in 1992, 13.4% in 1993, then 11.8% in 1994. This indicator in China was already comparable to those of the USA, Japan and Germany. Defense spending increased by 50% by 1993, with the budget estimated at US\$22–37 billion⁶⁶⁹. Many Western experts predicted that China would become a world-class power by 2020. However, Chinese researchers have modestly anticipated 2020 or 2030 as the time of a real great power for China⁶⁷⁰.

In the Chinese Xinhua Dictionary, the concept of "hegemony" ("霸权主义") refers to the policy of oppression and aggression against small and weak countries carried out by some large and powerful powers in order to control the world community⁶⁷¹. Imperialist and colonial powers provoked two world wars, pursued policies of force, or carried out forced possession. After the 1950s two superpowers, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, competed for world hegemony, causing violent unrest and global instability. In other words, "hegemonism" implies the condemnation of a group of individuals, states, that do not have legal rights and usurp the place of the ruler.

⁶⁶⁷ Hsü I.C.Y. Op. cit. P. 994–995.

⁶⁶⁸ Korsun V.A. Op. cit. P. 57.

⁶⁶⁹ Hsü I.C.Y. Op. cit. P. 992.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid. P. 993–994.

⁶⁷¹ Xinhua Dictionary of Modern Chinese. Beijing, 1987. P. 19.

Chinese President Jiang Zemin emphasized the issue of hegemony and power politics. He referred these two concepts (“霸权主义和强权政治”) exclusively to other states. Hegemony and power politics became ubiquitous. Local conflicts arose one after another due to factors such as ethnicity, religion, territory and resources. Separatist, terrorist and extremist forces began to put powerful pressure on the international community (“霸权主义和强权政治仍然存在。由于民族、宗教、领土、资源等因素引发的局部冲突此起彼伏。各种分裂势力、恐怖势力和极端势力给国际社会不断带来危害”) ⁶⁷².

According to Jiang Zemin, hegemony and power politics caused legitimate anxiety and fear among the population, which led to a “new interventionism” that was gaining momentum ⁶⁷³. Compliance with generally accepted basic norms of international relations, the “five principles of peaceful coexistence”, support for the authority of the United Nations, assistance in establishing a new international political and economic order that will be peaceful, stable and fair - this is an effective alternative to hegemonism and power politics. This is still the most difficult task facing all peace-loving countries and peoples, and the common mission that all heads of state undertake, Jiang Zemin emphasized (“。。。维护公认的国际关系基本准则，特别是和平共处五项原则，维护联合国的权威及其不可替代的作用，推动建立和平稳定、公正合理的国际政治经济新秩序，仍然是一切爱好和平的国家和人民所面临的艰巨任务，也是我们在座的各位元首所肩负的共同使命”) ⁶⁷⁴.

Condemning hegemony and politics of power, Jiang Zemin declared that China would never claim hegemony. The force that China has and will use is necessary for national defense ⁶⁷⁵.

⁶⁷² Jiang Zemin's Speech at the UN Millennium Summit (Full Text). In Chinese.

⁶⁷³ Jiang Zemin: "Neo-interventionism" is Hegemonism // Information agency “China News”. 08.26.1999. URL: <https://www.chinanews.com.cn/1999-8-26/26/55.html> (accessed: 06.11.2022). In Chinese.

⁶⁷⁴ Meeting of the Five Heads of State of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (with photos) // Information Agency “Renminwang”. 08.28.1999. URL: <http://www.people.com.cn/item/ylq/news/wuguo6.html> (accessed: 06.11.2022). In Chinese.

⁶⁷⁵ Jiang Zemin's Ideas on National Defense and Military Building // AHOHOAK International Institute for Defense Research. 08.07.2021. URL: <http://www.cdsndu.org/ru/index.php/zgjswha/752.html> (accessed: 09.04.2022).

In 1996 Jiang Zemin spoke about the use of force by the United States on the issue of human rights. In “To Fully Guarantee the implementation of Human Rights in accordance with the Law” (“充分保障人民依法享受人权”), he wrote that attaching importance to human dignity is a traditional virtue of the Chinese nation and a matter of national sovereignty; Human rights are a product of history, the full realization of which is a gradual process of development related to the economic and cultural level of each country. The right to subsistence and development are the most basic and important human rights in China. Civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights are indivisible and interdependent as a whole. This is consistent with China's national conditions and is therefore an inevitable path for the development of the human rights cause in China. (“在中国生存权和发展权是最基本、最重要的人权；集体人权与个人人权，经济、社会、文化权利与公民、政治权利紧密结合和协调发展，这适合中国国情因而是中国人权事业发展的必然道路”)⁶⁷⁶. For Jiang Zemin, violation of human rights is a violation of international law. The state and power are much more important than the individual person⁶⁷⁷.

In contrast to Washington, which, under the slogan of protecting human rights, pursued an aggressive policy and interfered in the internal affairs of other countries, including the PRC (XUAR), Beijing directed all its efforts towards building a moderately prosperous society and creating a new environment for the cause of “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” . This course found justification in the documents of the XVI Congress of the CPC (中国共产党第十六次全国代表大会于2002年11月8日至14日)⁶⁷⁸, at which the Chinese leadership reassessed the leitmotif of the era⁶⁷⁹. China will never claim hegemony or engage in expansion. He stands for the fight against terrorism in all its forms, the leader of the People's Republic of China

⁶⁷⁶ An Introduction to the Main Chapters of Volume II of "Selected Works of Jiang Zemin". 08.11.2006. URL: <http://news.cctv.com/china/20060811/104576.shtml> (accessed: 06.11.2022). In Chinese.

⁶⁷⁷ Hu Xiaoqing, Jiang Zemin on Human Rights // Research Institute of Party History and Documentation under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. 04.15.2014. URL: <https://www.dswxyjy.org.cn/n1/2019/0228/c423720-30918686.html> (accessed: 09.04.2022). In Chinese.

⁶⁷⁸ Jiang Zemin's Report at the XVI National Congress of the Communist Party of China // Party School of Fudan University Central Committee. URL: <https://dangxiao.fudan.edu.cn/59/a0/c9736a88480/page.htmhtml> (accessed: 08.23.2022). In Chinese.

⁶⁷⁹ Zhao Meng, Op. cit. P. 225.

said at the 16th CPC Congress⁶⁸⁰. The only superpower that has far more military, economic, political, technological and cultural influence than any empire throughout history is the United States⁶⁸¹.

According to Jiang Zemin, one of the most pressing problems of the PRC is the unification of the shores of the Taiwan Strait. It exists in both domestic and foreign policy as an integral and primary part of them. Taking a course towards the unification of his homeland, Jiang Zemin demanded Taiwan with all its inhabitants to become part of the People's Republic of China and to submit to the authority of the CPC. It is symbolic that the desire of the first leader of the PRC to subordinate the country to the leadership of the CPC filled Deng Xiaoping's concept of "one country, two systems" with new content. There is one China with a socialist system. In Xianggang, Aomen and Taiwan, the capitalist system will remain in place for a long time. Jiang Zemin assessed Deng's theory as a philosophical and scientific system with the prospect of comprehensive enrichment. He spoke a lot about it at the 16th Congress of the CPC and in subsequent speeches in the context of deep study of it, following Marxism, and about arming the entire party with this theory⁶⁸².

Chinese researchers believe: if Deng Xiaoping's policy can be defined as "bringing peace and development to the forefront," then Jiang Zemin's policy can be defined as "defending a fair new international political and economic order, defending a new concept of security"⁶⁸³. In 1995, at the initiative of Jiang Zemin, China began a series of military exercises and missile "tests" against Taiwan, whose leadership was seeking international recognition of its status as a sovereign and independent country and mostly abandoned the goal of "national unification" with China. President of the Republic of China and first President of the Kuomintang Central Committee from 1978–1988. Jiang Jinguo (Chinese: 蔣經國), and then his successor from 1988 to 2000.

⁶⁸⁰ Jiang Zemin's Report at the XVI National Congress of the Communist Party of China (9) 11.08.2002. Chapter 9: International situation and foreign work // Information Agency "Xuanjiangjia". 12.31.2018. URL: http://www.71.cn/2018/0131/1049937_9.shtml (accessed: 08.09.2022). In Chinese.

⁶⁸¹ Zhao Jing. The PRC foreign policy transition under Jiang Zemin (with a focus on Sino-Japanese relations) // *Revista de Historia Actual*. 2005. Vol. 3, núm. 3. P. 72.

⁶⁸² Jiang Zemin. On Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Vol. 1. Moscow: Monuments of Historical Thought, 2002. P. 14–20.

⁶⁸³ Yi Xiaoxiong. Chinese foreign policy in transition: understanding China's «peaceful development» // *The Journal of East Asian Affairs*. Spring/Summer 2005. Vol. 19, no. 1. P. 78–79.

Li Denghui (Chinese: 李登輝) pursued a pro-American policy, adamantly rejecting the peaceful overture of the “smiling diplomacy” of the “world united front”, which undermined Taiwanese vigilance. Provided that Beijing abandons communist ideology in favor of private enterprise, free markets and the “Three People's Principles”, cooperation with Taiwan will be possible. These principles were perceived by Taiwan's leaders as Abraham Lincoln's three ideals: “government of the people, by the people, and for the people,” which do not correspond to communist ideology. Taiwan considered the preservation of the political, economic, and military systems to be a contradictory formula in the event that Taiwan accepted the status of a Special Administrative Region under the control of Beijing due to the fact that the reunification of Xianggang with its homeland took place within a peaceful framework, and Britain did not plan to start a military conflict; the leadership and people of Taiwan, on the contrary, were politically active, had an independent food system and defended their way of life. Being “protected” by the United States under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the Taiwanese leadership did not accept the concept of “one country, two systems,” and any interference in the island’s internal affairs could be interpreted as damaging “the security of the West Coast and causing US concern⁶⁸⁴”.

If Taiwan declares independence, Beijing will have to attack for several reasons: memories of centuries of humiliation at the hands of “Western barbarians” and, worse, the Japanese; the People's Liberation Army's desire to defend China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity as a way to improve its tarnished post-Tiananmen image and justify increasing its defense budget; widespread national consensus supporting the use of force against an independent Taiwan⁶⁸⁵.

This led Jiang Zemin to formulate his next thesis about resolving the issue of Taiwan's independence without renouncing the use of military force, in order to promote a peaceful resolution of the issue primarily with the United States in the future.

Although the crisis in the Taiwan Strait did not lead to a military confrontation between the two sides, there was growing concern throughout East Asia that their

⁶⁸⁴ Hsü I.C.Y. Op. cit. P. 918–919.

⁶⁸⁵ Christensen Th. J. Chinese realpolitik // Foreign Affairs. September/October 1996. Vol. 75. P. 45–47.

differences over "national unification" could escalate into war not only between China and Taiwan, but also between China and the United States and, hence, will put in the risk regional stability in the near future. At a time when it will be drawn into a protracted struggle with the social, political and economic consequences of the financial crisis, the increase in military tensions and the escalation of military conflicts in the Taiwan Strait will have a more destructive impact on the entire Asia-Pacific region⁶⁸⁶.

The strategy for developing relations with Taiwan, according to Jiang Zemin, should be built in the direction of "peaceful reunification" by economically tying the island to the mainland, bringing closer the level of their economic dependence, expanding human ties and, subsequently, the soft incorporation of the island into the structure of the Chinese state on extremely wide autonomy. At the same time, preferring to act with a "kind word," China did not forget about the "revolver."

At the XV and XVI CPC Congresses, Chinese President Jiang Zemin called on Taiwan to conduct "political negotiations" and reach an agreement to end the "state of hostility." Taiwan responded positively to China's proposal to resume negotiations and put a peace agreement on the negotiation agenda. In October 1998 Koo Chen-fu, President of the Taiwan Cross-Straits Exchange Foundation, led the Taiwanese delegation to meet his Chinese counterpart, head of the Taiwan Strait Association in Shanghai, and Jiang Zemin in Beijing. This was an attempt to smooth relations between China and Taiwan.

In an attempt to understand the nature of the problems between Taiwan and the PRC, Chinese researchers are asking questions: what are the reasons for the resumption of negotiations and the possible stabilization of relations between both sides? What is the outlook for bilateral relations that could help reduce tensions in the Taiwan Strait? In the period between China's halt in hostilities and the resumption of semi-official contacts, both sides reassessed their bilateral relations and formulated strategies to advance their respective "national interests." The incompatibility of national interests as defined by China and Taiwan, and the strategies adopted to promote them, will shed

⁶⁸⁶ Yu Taifa. Relations between Taiwan and China after the missile crisis: toward reconciliation? // Pacific Affairs. Spring, 1999. Vol. 72, no. 1. P. 39; Yi Xiaoxiong. Op. cit. P. 78.

light on the relationship between the two sides in the near term and provide clues as to whether the future of war or peace awaits the Taiwan Strait⁶⁸⁷.

Despite the resumption of negotiations, Taiwan's relations with China became increasingly tense. Moreover, the government in Taiwan expected that following the return of Hong Kong in 1997 and the planned return of Macao in December 1999, China, fueling nationalist sentiments, will actively seek a breakthrough or at least tangible progress toward unification with Taiwan. In this regard, tensions with China are bound to escalate as Taiwan will not compromise its status as a sovereign country and will most likely reject unification with China in the foreseeable future. Chinese scholars believed that China would accelerate and complete its diplomatic isolation by contacting the thirty countries that still maintained official relations with Taiwan⁶⁸⁸.

This pessimistic view of relations with China has prompted the island's leadership to reconsider its national security policy. Taiwan's national security policy and its foreign relations, defense strategy, economic interaction with the PRC and the implementation of constitutional reform took center stage in the issue of island independence. China's forced "missile tests" have caused a temporary rift among the CPC leadership and Taiwanese people over whether "elastic" or "pragmatic diplomacy"—efforts to overcome diplomatic isolation and achieve international recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state—should remain the nation's top priority task.

In response to increasing tensions with China, Taiwan modernized its defense capabilities, made purchases of advanced weapons, accelerated its own development of missiles capable of attacking airports and military installations along the coast of mainland China, and completed the reorganization of its army by 2000. Taiwan began to accept the possibility of a large-scale naval attack from China. Consequently, he began to abandon a defense strategy based on such a scenario. Taiwan's bloated divisions were reorganized into smaller, more compact, "sophisticated" joint force

⁶⁸⁷ Yu Taifa. *Op. cit.* P. 41.

⁶⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

brigades with greater firepower and force mobility. This scenario was considered more likely by many Taiwanese defense strategists⁶⁸⁹.

In order to prevent China from implementing its diplomacy in Latin America and the African continent, where most of the countries that still recognize it are located, Taiwan contributed a significant share of capital to a \$300 million development fund founded by Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Belize. He also offered Paraguay US\$50 million in economic assistance⁶⁹⁰. Taiwan used various means, including visits by high-ranking government officials to countries that do not have formal relations with Taiwan, and carried out high-level diplomacy such as President Li Denghui's participation in the "General Congress through the Panama Canal" to enhance its international status.

Contrary to earlier expectations that military coercion would force wealthy Taiwanese to emigrate and frighten most of the island's residents into compromising with China, Beijing has faced a further rise in separatist sentiment in Taiwan since the missile crisis.

In the 90s XX century The Taiwan problem has become an even bigger bone of contention between China and the United States. In 1995 Washington decided to change its attitude towards China as previously a most favored nation country, and increased its rhetoric on the issue of human rights. In order to use the Taiwan card for the so-called "involvement" of the PRC, the Clinton administration turned to the almost forgotten "oxygen" - the military alliance between the United States and Japan.

Some Japanese and Western experts have viewed Sino-Japanese relations as a "zero-sum game". They believed that China's transformation as a political, economic, and even financial center in the region would inevitably worsen Japan's economic problems. Along with the expansion of economic ties, political relations between China and Japan will also worsen after the end of the Cold War, and China's policy towards Japan has reached its limit in the current conditions⁶⁹¹.

⁶⁸⁹ Yu Taifa. Op. cit. P. 42.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁹¹ Zhao Jing. Op. cit. P. 67.

An important milestone towards the unification of China was the transition of Macau to the jurisdiction of the PRC. This process took place painlessly and without political incidents. Analysts explain this primarily by the less politicized attitude of the leadership of this region and the citizens of Aomen themselves compared to Xianggang⁶⁹².

Speaking about the Taiwan issue at a meeting in Washington with US President B. Clinton, Jiang Zemin recalled that this problem is mentioned in all three joint Sino-US communiqués (中美三个联合公报)⁶⁹³, which are strictly observed. The Taiwan question is about China's sovereignty. According to Jiang Zemin, the Taiwan issue is the most sensitive and important key issue in Sino-American relations, and in recent years, the political leadership of the PRC, led by President Jiang Zemin, has continued to advocate for the peaceful reunification of the motherland in accordance with Deng Xiaoping's "one country, two systems" approach, while not renouncing the use of force, but not against Taiwan compatriots, but against the interference of foreign forces in the sovereignty of the PRC, against the proclamation of "Taiwan independence" and attempts to separate Taiwan from China ("台湾问题涉及到中国的主权。我们主张按邓小平同志提出的«一国两制»的方式完成祖国的和平统一。我们不承诺放弃使用武力，但这绝不是针对台湾同胞的，而是针对干涉台湾问题的外国势力，针对«台独»和那种要将台湾从中国分裂出去的企图。")⁶⁹⁴.

The Chinese leader advocated non-interference in the Taiwan issue by Western forces, including those whose interests are aimed at the implementation of "Taiwan independence" and attempts to separate it from the mainland.

⁶⁹² China in the XXI Century: Opportunities, Challenges, and Prospects. Part 2. P. 62.

⁶⁹³ The Three Joint Communiqués between the PRC and the US are a complex of three joint statements made by the governments of the United States and the PRC: the "Sino-American Joint Communiqué" (the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972), the "Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China" (1978), and the "Communiqué of August 17, 1982". The three communiqués have become an important foundation of Sino-US relations.

⁶⁹⁴ Jiang Zemin paid his first state visit to the United States. The third stop: Washington // CCTV.com URL: <http://news.cctv.com/lm/808/-1/57589.html> (accessed: 05.11.2022). In Chinese.

Solidarity and Cooperation with Developing Countries

Viewing itself as a developing country not obliged to pay historical debts to major powers, China believed that it should not enter into conflicts with developed countries. It was necessary to establish relations with them, and maintain positive relations with developing countries.

The Chinese leadership attached great importance to relations with neighboring countries among all developing countries. A prosperous and stable Southeast Asia should have served the interests of fast-developing China. In order to solve the task of China's foreign policy to protect state interests, ensure peaceful development in border and territorial areas, the search for multilateral protective mechanisms in response to the creation of economic unions such as the EU and NAFTA began. The idea of "new" regionalism within ASEAN was being developed. It was aimed at including China in the structures of multilateral cooperation within a larger geographical region, but in such a way as to curb the processes of changing global economic balance. The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1999 and solidarity measures to overcome its consequences gave an impetus to the formation of regional identity⁶⁹⁵.

In his report on the work of the government for March 1994, Premier Li Peng said that China "supports the idea of conducting a dialogue on issues of security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and makes a contribution to achieving this goal." The processes of cooperation developed in an even more active direction in May 1994, when the Center for International Studies of the State Council jointly with the University of Foreign Affairs and the Chinese Institute of International Strategic Studies organized an international meeting on issues of security in the Asia-Pacific region in Beijing. At this meeting, Foreign Minister Qian for the first time promised that China would play an "active role" in the ASEAN Regional Forum. At the first meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok in July 1994, Qian Qichen made a speech in which he expressed China's support for ARF as "a place for dialogue between

⁶⁹⁵ Timofeev O.A. Models of integration in East Asia: China's influence and the US position // Russia and the APR. 2009. Issue 2. P. 53.

countries of the Asia-Pacific region to expand common understanding of political issues and issues of security and trust"⁶⁹⁶.

While neighboring countries experienced both reasonable and sometimes groundless concerns about China's future policies, especially in the context of growing its military might, Jiang Zemin proposed two theses to the neighbors.

The first thesis implies that China has good neighborly relations of friendship and cooperation with neighboring countries that should be developed, regardless of whether these states have territorial claims against China or not. **The second thesis** says that China's neighboring countries and Southeast Asian states should accept the rapidly developing China and recognize that a rapidly developing Southeast Asia corresponds to it.

However, China's neighbors were still not convinced that a strengthening China does not pose and will not pose a threat to their interests, including in resolving unsolved border issues.

Developing the ideas of alliance relations with the "Third World", Jiang Zemin called for even greater solidarity and cooperation with developing countries, since both China and these states pursue common goals of asserting state independence and economic development. Jiang was well aware that there was no danger to China's own independence. However, the Chinese leader tried to maneuver between the contradictions of developed and developing countries and overcome the situation where the United States and Europe had dominated international affairs for centuries.

Developing ideas of cooperation between China and Africa, in 2000 Jiang Zemin proposed building a partnership of a new type between China and the African continent, putting forward the thesis of equal partnership with other countries (obviously in an attempt to correct the situation of insufficiently active development of relations in the past). In addition, the idea of creating a just and rational international political and economic order in terms of cooperation with Africa seemed to Jiang Zemin as a mechanism for regulating internal problems.

⁶⁹⁶ Qian Qichen's speech at the ASEAN Regional Forum // Renmin Ribao. 07.26.1994. In Chinese.

China's relations with South Asia were also built on the principles of permanent good neighborliness and stability turned to the 21st century. India, an object of special attention and at the same time the main competitor of China in the group of developing countries. Today, China and India - countries with a population that together exceeds half of the planet's population, have become in a short time the leading economies of the world (China is second, India is fifth), acting as rivals in the struggle for dominance in South Asia. Although China is ahead of India in terms of economic growth and export growth, India may overtake China in the next decade, according to some forecasts. However, not all agree with these forecasts, noting that China's rapid growth continues, China itself receives dividends from globalization and is more deeply integrated into the world economy than India. The civilizational factor plays a special role in the unprecedented "rise" of the Chinese and Indian economies. Both civilizations have great potential for self-renewal and self-development, which protects them from the destructive impact from outside⁶⁹⁷.

As the situation around the disputed border territories of China and India shows, in the course of efforts by both sides to mitigate tensions in the territorial dispute, a solution to this problem has not yet been found. Despite mutual interest in expanding trade and economic ties and developing political relations, the prospects for resolving the border problem seem very uncertain. The situation is complicated by the policy pursued by both sides of constantly increasing their military potential against the background of deep contradictions between them on a number of complex international problems affecting the interests of both parties⁶⁹⁸.

Thus, returning to the economic construction of a new order in South Asia, Jiang spoke out for the openness of all regions, counteracting hegemony and interference from outside. In practice, however, he advocated the closure of regions to the United States and Western countries.

⁶⁹⁷ Deych T. L. *Africa in China's Strategy*. Moscow, 2008. P. 87.

⁶⁹⁸ Smirnov D.A. *China and India: in search of a solution to the territorial problem* // Institute of the Far East, RAS. 11.07.2016. URL: <http://old.ifes-ras.ru/publications/online/1953-smirnov-da-kitaj-i-indiya-v-poiskax-resheniya-territorialnoj-problemy> (accessed: 04.12.2022).

Another area of China's interests were its relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 东南亚公约组织) in regional and world affairs. Developing the ideas of cooperation between China and this organization, Jiang stated in 1997 that ASEAN countries have become comprehensive partners for dialogue and their friendship is based on mutual complementarity and benefits.

In the 1990s, relations between China and Latin American countries began to develop actively. These countries were becoming increasingly important for the PRC, since this was one of the few regions where China could act as the "senior partner". Jiang Zemin called for the establishment and maintenance of political relations, contacts and dialogue. However, unlike the states of Africa, this was about relations between governments and leaders of the respective states.

Adopting a course of developing relations with Latin American countries, Jiang used common principles of relations, common approaches of China to issues of international cooperation along the line of South-South. **The first area** of interaction was the establishment of dialogue between leaders. In a short time, Vice President of Brazil Marco Maciel, President of Colombia Andres Pastrana Arango, Foreign Ministers of Colombia, Mexico and Chile visited Beijing. In 2001, Jiang Zemin visited a whole group of Latin American countries - Cuba, Brazil, Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile⁶⁹⁹.

He considered mutual understanding in the field of international cooperation, the implementation of diplomacy, the practical activities of organizations as **the second area**. **The third area** is related to the expansion of trade and economic relations, increasing investments, developing in the field of high technologies. Latin America was seen by China as a source of raw materials and a market for Chinese products. In turn, Latin American countries sought to get out from under the tutelage of the United States by diversifying cooperation with other countries of the world, and China was seen as a fairly promising partner. Until 1999, Latin America did not occupy an important place in Beijing's foreign policy. The reduction of ties between these countries and Japan – the second largest trading partner and investor in Latin American countries after the

⁶⁹⁹ Deych T.L. Op. cit. P. 92–93.

United States, which suffered from the Asian crisis and was forced to curtail its programs - played no small role. From this moment on, China's ties with the region, which was actively developing the niche that had emerged, developed more and more intensively. The growing presence of China in Latin America has become a new phenomenon in the Western Hemisphere. China's penetration into Latin American countries was related to gaining access to new markets for sales and raw materials, as well as an attempt to counter the active policy of the Taiwan government in the region. The region accounted for about 20% of China's food imports and more than 20% of purchases on the world mineral raw materials market⁷⁰⁰. In addition, South America was the main supplier of food for China. 60% of China's soybean imports came from Brazil and Argentina, 80% of fish flour imports – from Peru and Chile, 60% of poultry meat imports – from Argentina and Brazil, 45% of wine and grape imports – from Chile⁷⁰¹.

The fourth principle was aimed at the prospect and development of the strategy and tactics of future relations and the resolution of more serious problems. Strengthening China's cooperation with Latin American countries should take place in the political sphere, in the economic sphere, in the cultural and social aspects, in activities to strengthen peace, security and legal issues, in the development of relations between China and Latin American and Caribbean regional organizations. In the political sphere, exchanges, at the level of higher authorities, political parties, local authorities, etc. were envisaged. Cooperation in the international sphere was based on adherence to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, strengthening the role of the UN, forming a more just international political and economic order, democratization of international relations, support for the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries.

In the struggle for peace and security, mutual understanding in the military sphere grew, exchanges of military visits, joint training of personnel, peacekeeping and assistance in the development of the armed forces of the region's countries were held. Cooperation in the fight against terrorism, new security threats and instability were

⁷⁰⁰ Borzova A.Yu. Features of relations between the PRC and Latin American countries at the present stage // Vestnik of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series: General History. 2009. Issue 4. P. 28.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

strengthened. Thus, the strengthening of political and cultural ties and the increase of China's economic influence in the region testified to the formation of its multilateral policy in Latin American countries⁷⁰².

A special place was occupied by the partnership and interaction between China and such regional powers as Argentina and Brazil. These states can objectively be recognized as leaders of the Latin American economic and political process, some of the largest countries in the region by population, GDP and other statistical indicators. The applied analysis of these relations is a priority for the formation of a comprehensive geopolitical map of the modern world, since the trajectory of their development allows us to state the emergence of a fundamentally new axis of partnership "China - Latin America", which is part of the large-scale process of the formation of China as a superpower.

China tended to form alliances with developing countries. China and Latin American states maintained close relations at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum and the Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FOCALAE). Jiang Zemin applied the principle of long-term vision to the Latin American direction in China's foreign policy: regardless of the actual state of current relations, maintain and develop ties in anticipation of the future, based on the fact that the parties will subsequently have a need to coordinate larger issues. The expansion of China's cooperation with Latin American countries was facilitated by some reduction of attention to the region from the United States, as well as the desire of the countries themselves to develop cooperation with the EU, Asian and African countries⁷⁰³.

Most developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, in turn, positively perceived cooperation with China. They liked the Chinese development model, the assistance provided by China, and they agreed to consider China the "country of the South" and the leader of developing countries, taking into account China's readiness to defend their interests on the world stage and play a counterweight role in the relations of these countries with the United States. China and the countries of the South had a

⁷⁰² Borzova A.Yu. Op. cit. P. 28.

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

mutual interest in cooperation, particularly in the UN, where their positions on most issues (trade terms, human rights, external debt, poverty and disease eradication, etc.) most often coincided. The goal of ensuring China's leadership in the group of developing countries was also followed by its specific policy towards the "South" countries with which close contacts were maintained and generous assistance was provided.

Stable Friendly and Cooperative Relations Between Major Powers

In his foreign policy concept, Jiang Zemin put forward the guideline of developing permanent, long-term, stable friendly and cooperative relations between major powers. Chinese leader referred to major powers China, Russia, USA, Japan, EU countries. China is a major socialist country developing against the others, mainly capitalist.

President Jiang Zemin believed that China should be treated appropriately, since it is a major power pursuing an independent policy and not entering into temporary or permanent alliances. This position made it possible for China to ensure the support of the majority of states, including major powers. These countries are interested in supporting the PRC.

We will separately note Jiang Zemin's course on **developing peaceful relations between China and the Russian Federation**. Relations between Russia and China are relations between major powers within the group of major states. The normalization of new relations and their continuation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China began in December 1992 (the visit of the first President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin to Beijing and the visit of the Secretary General of the CPC Jiang Zemin to Moscow)⁷⁰⁴.

Notably, articles with sharp criticism of the territorial concessions made by Jiang Zemin to Russia began to appear in Chinese publications⁷⁰⁵.

During his visit to Moscow, the Chinese leader emphasized the economic complementarity of both countries. "The maintenance of good neighborly and friendly

⁷⁰⁴ Galenovich Yu. M. Moscow-Beijing, Moscow-Taipei. P. 25; Rummyantsev E.N. Acute problems of Chinese politics. Moscow, 2003. P. 99.

⁷⁰⁵ Rummyantsev E.N. Op. cit. P. 99.

relations is both the strong desire of our peoples and the noble mission of political figures," said Jiang Zemin. On issues of world politics, the Chinese leader insisted on the multipolarity of the world. In his opinion, the bipolar system ceased to exist after the end of the Cold War. This led to "the regrouping of various forces and the growth of a tendency towards multipolarity." As a result, Russia could no longer claim the status of a superpower and hegemony. Jiang meant the common position of Beijing and Moscow⁷⁰⁶. At the time described, Beijing regarded Russia as the country following the course of American foreign policy. He took a wait-and-see position.

When approaching relations with the Russian Federation, President Jiang Zemin took into account the following factors:

- 1) The interests of the PRC;
- 2) The interests of the Russian Federation and the bilateral interests of China and Russia;
- 3) Issues of interest to all major powers;
- 4) Relations between major powers and developing countries;
- 5) The nature of relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC with states formed on the territory of the former USSR.

In 1994, Jiang Zemin proposed a new type of interstate relations. It was based on the Joint Declaration on the Basic Principles of Relations between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation signed in 1992 by the heads of the two states. The document proclaimed that both sides "consider each other friendly states," respecting the right of the people of any country to freely choose the ways of its internal development. This document guaranteed the transition of Sino-Russian relations to stability and laid the foundation for them after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In September 1994, the parties established "constructive partnership relations" that contributed to the further development of "equal and trusting partnership relations aimed at strategic interaction in the XXI century." Feeling concerns about the United States striving for hegemony and unipolarity, Russia and China signed the Joint

⁷⁰⁶ Galenovich Yu. M. Moscow – Beijing, Moscow – Taipei. P. 25; Rummyantsev E.N. Op. cit. P. 92–93.

Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order in 1997⁷⁰⁷.

From 1998, trade and economic ties between the two countries began to recover after a temporary stagnation, continuously demonstrating record growth. The concept of "strategic partnership" penetrated ever deeper into the consciousness of the peoples of the two countries; the rapidly developing Sino-Russian relations became a prerequisite for the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation⁷⁰⁸. In 2000, Jiang initiated the signing of this Treaty, which put Russia in a passive position towards the USA and the PRC. Since it required the country to promise not to allow armed clashes along the Russian-Chinese border, it explained to the countries of Europe, the USA and Japan that the PRC would not enter into an alliance with Russia directed against them. The international community highly appreciated the content of the Treaty, believing that the establishment of interstate relations of a new type by China and Russia would contribute to the development of a multipolar world, serve to maintain peace and stability on Earth and be conducive to the establishment of a new international order⁷⁰⁹. Jiang Zemin paid special attention to the fundamental interests of nations and states that were able to ensure firm friendship. This was a distinction of the modern era – taking into account fundamental interests had become necessary to build relations of a new type and a new international political and economic order. Such an order, in Jiang's opinion, could turn the PRC into an independent player on the world stage, not allowing it to infringe on its own interests and the interests of other major powers.

China maintained stable, forward-looking relations with the **countries of Western Europe**. As part of the new PRC leadership's foreign policy concept under Jiang Zemin, the European Union was assigned the role of one of the main partners contributing to China's modernization and growth of welfare. Moreover, in the 1990s,

⁷⁰⁷ China in the XXI Century: Opportunities, Challenges, and Prospects. Part 1. P. 27.

⁷⁰⁸ An important milestone in history. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the PRC to the Russian Federation Liu Guchang // Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Russian Federation. 07.19.2004. URL: <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/cerus/rus/dszc/ftml/t143423.htm> (accessed: 06.19.2022).

⁷⁰⁹ Jiang Zemin: The essence of socialist democratic politics is for the people to become masters of their country // Pravda. 08.14.2001. URL: https://www.pravda.ru/politics/803740-czjan_czemin_suschnost_socialisticheskoi_demokraticheskoi/ (accessed: 06.19.2022).

after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of the United States positions on the international arena, the European Union began to play an important role for China as a strategic partner in relations with the United States of America. Jiang gave European states to understand that by establishing relations with China, they were establishing relations with the largest representative of the developing world. The infrastructure of bilateral relations after the 1989 crisis gradually developed and was supplemented with new cooperation mechanisms. In 1994, China and the EU established a political dialogue on an equal footing, with mutual respect, recognition of sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Beijing and Brussels held meetings at various levels, from experts to foreign ministers.

The Chinese vector of foreign policy towards Germany and France developed in two main directions: trade and economic relations and human rights issues (primarily the Tibetan issue). The 1995 European Commission document "Long-term Policy on Relations with China" proposed expanding areas of mutual cooperation by establishing the so-called "five pillars", which consisted in promoting human resource development, economic and social reforms in China, fighting poverty, environmental protection, scientific, technical and business cooperation. At the same time Beijing in relations with European partners began to occupy more firm positions, defending its right to independently conduct its internal policy. For example, in 1995 a UN resolution condemning China for human rights violations triggered a wide discussion, the so-called "Human Rights Dialogue". This was a discussion of issues that concerned the human rights community of Europe in a closed manner. As a result, in 1997-1998 the main members of the EU adopted the document "Towards a Global Partnership with China"⁷¹⁰.

In 1999, Jiang emphasized the special partnership relations between the two sides and the consistency of Europe's positions with China on important issues regarding the formation of a new international order. The United Kingdom and France were the first to establish diplomatic relations and open the door to China. These countries played a

⁷¹⁰ Vinogradov A.O., Luschik M.O. On the history of the formation of PRC-EU relations // China in world and regional politics. History and modernity. 2017. Vol. 22. Issue 22. P. 356–357.

significant role in the process of promoting the PRC to Western Europe. In 2000, a meeting of the leaders of China and the countries of the European Union was held in Beijing, and the Premier of the State Council of the PRC Zhu Rongji paid visits to Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, as well as to the headquarters of the EU. In 2000, the President of France Jacques Chirac arrived on an official visit to China, and in 2002 – German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder⁷¹¹. Jiang viewed relations between the European Union and China as special, different from relations with the United States or Russia. From 2001, relations between Beijing and Brussels, as well as between China and individual EU member states, strengthened, as evidenced by the signing of a number of documents. The rapprochement of Europe and China was influenced by the deterioration of European-American relations in the early 2000s due to different approaches of the EU and the US to the war on international terrorism and military intervention in Iraq⁷¹².

Regarding **relations with Japan**, President Jiang Zemin considered China and Japan to be important Asian states with geographical advantages and deep historical roots. Looking to the future of the two countries' relations, Jiang outlined three important points⁷¹³:

1) **Bear responsibility for the historical zigzags that do not diminish the level of friendship and good neighborliness.**

2) **Face the truth in assessing the difficult period of Japan-China relations.** Here the PRC President means refraining from arms buildup based on Japan's state interests and striving to promote the cause of peace and development in Asia and the world. He was convinced that "Japanese militarism should not raise its head again."

3) **Conducting an exclusively peaceful foreign policy will contribute to China and Japan playing a leading role in Asia and the world in the future.** In this regard, taking into account each other's interests in creating the future world and

⁷¹¹ Western Europe experts discuss Jiang Zemin's European tour // News portal "News Center". 10.14.1999. URL: <https://news.sina.com.cn/china/1999-10-14/21659.html> (accessed: 06.19.2022); Jiang Zemin's speech at the German Association for Foreign Policy on relations between China and the EU, China and Germany // China News Network. 04.10.2002. URL: <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/2002-04-10/26/177016.html> (accessed: 06.19.2022). In Chinese; Deych T.L. Op. cit. P. 72.

⁷¹² Vinogradov A.O., Luschnik M.O. Op. cit. P. 360.

⁷¹³ Galenovich Yu.M. Jiang Zemin's orders P. 307–309.

supporting the idea that Japan will not take up arms is the main condition for developing favorable good neighborly relations between the two countries.

Sino-American relations occupied a special place in the PRC's foreign policy concept, as the countries were the main trading partners and in leading positions. After President Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States in 1997, the countries defined the goals, principles and guiding course of developing a constructive strategic partnership oriented towards the XXI century. This then led to the development of mechanisms for regular consultations between the two countries' defense departments. In 1999, the process of negotiations on China's accession to the World Trade Organization began.

Jiang Zemin proposed to the US to gradually build stable and constructive, special relations without confrontation. In Washington, multilateral processes in East Asia were noted, in which China began to play a leading role. In turn, in 2001, the US Department of Defense used the term "strategic competitor" to characterize China. Later, the "3C" formula defined the content of Sino-American relations (Candid, Constructive, Cooperative). After the September 11, 2001 events, the PRC leadership supported the US-led anti-terrorism campaign⁷¹⁴. The thesis on developing cooperation was aimed primarily at the area of political cooperation. Jiang planned such relations that, on the one hand, eliminate the factors complicating bilateral interaction. On the other hand, the continuous advancement of Sino-American relations could ensure the elimination of the "harmful cycle" complicating bilateral relations. Speaking of the exceptionality of such relations, Jiang noted that he would like to see two equal major powers on the world stage.

Jiang considered the Taiwan problem a disturbing factor. According to the Chinese leader, the solution of this issue could be postponed or frozen. Jiang planned to regulate the mechanism of meetings and consultations at the first stage, then transfer to bilateral contacts between leaders on important international affairs.

At the meeting with B. Clinton in 1997, Jiang Zemin, analyzing the themes of the current era, noted that in the new historical conditions, China's and the US's common interests did not weaken, but grew. The basis of cooperation between the two countries

⁷¹⁴ Timofeev O.A. Op. cit. P. 58.

should be the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as strengthening environmental protection, fighting against international crime, illegal drug trafficking and international terrorism ("在新的历史条件下,中美两国的共同利益不是减少了,而是增加了。。。防止大规模杀伤性武器的扩散,加强保护环境,打击国际犯罪、毒品走私和国际恐怖主义活动")⁷¹⁵.

In his speech titled "Strengthening Mutual Understanding and Friendly Cooperation" at Harvard University, Jiang Zemin emphasized the need for "friendly cooperation between Chinese and Americans, which will have an impact on the world in the future" ("中美两国人民的友好合作对世界具有重大影响")⁷¹⁶. The Chinese leader stressed that China is not engaged in expansionism and does not pose a threat to any country. He is ready to treat all countries of the world as equals, conduct friendly exchanges and cooperate with each other for mutual benefit on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. It is no wonder that China and the United States have differences, but in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world, promoting the development and prosperity of their countries and the world economy, solving global problems, the countries share common responsibilities and need to strengthen cooperation ⁷¹⁷.

Jiang understood that constructive relations with the US were necessary in certain specific areas based on a common position. Thus, he proposed, **first of all**, to stimulate close and constant regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. **Secondly**, to coordinate positions on acute issues (international terrorism, prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, etc.). **Thirdly**, Jiang Zemin tried to insist on expanding the trade and economic interests of the PRC. **Fourthly**, the Chinese leader was convinced that both the US and China must solve transnational problems together. **Fifthly**, by

⁷¹⁵ President Jiang Zemin and US President Clinton met with reporters, delivered speeches on Sino-US relations, the situation in Asia and other issues, and answered reporters' questions // Xinhua News Agency. 06.28.1998. URL: <http://www.people.com.cn/9806/28/current/newfiles/b1011.html> (accessed: 06.20.2022). In Chinese.

⁷¹⁶ On November 2, 1997, Chinese President Jiang Zemin delivered a speech titled "Strengthening Mutual Understanding and Friendly Cooperation" at Harvard University. URL: <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/p/2008-12-15/175616851955.shtml> (accessed: 06.20.2022). In Chinese.

⁷¹⁷ President Jiang Zemin gave an interview to the New York Times to explain his position and views on Sino-US relations and other issues // China Central Television. URL: <http://www.cntv.cn/lm/808/33/59561.html> (accessed: 06.21.2022). In Chinese.

becoming the engine of world development together with China, the US could direct technologies and investments to the huge Chinese market.

So, according to Jiang Zemin's logic, the key to promoting and developing bilateral relations lay in understanding common interests and the United States accepting the idea of perceiving China as an equal partner on the world stage. In addition, in Jiang's conviction, Washington should not have hindered the accelerated development of China.

4.2. The development of the foreign policy concept of Beijing's new World Order: achievements and omissions

The implementation of Jiang Zemin's foreign policy concept was designed to renew the existing international order. Its main direction was strengthening multipolarity. In 1991 from the UN rostrum, China called for the creation of a mechanism for a new world arrangement⁷¹⁸. At the XIV Congress of the CPC in 1992, Jiang Zemin emphasized that in the future there is a possibility of struggle for a peaceful international environment and prevention of a new world war. Chinese diplomacy was called upon to direct efforts to ensure the security of the country, create favorable external conditions for Chinese national renaissance.

The "five principles of peaceful coexistence" of Mao Zedong formed the basis of Jiang Zemin's new world order. China, not agreeing with the unipolar US-centric model of the world, tried to build relations in such a way as to counter the policy pursued by the United States, setting the goal of creating a multipolar world structure. This situation later led to the emergence of such organizations as the SCO and BRICS⁷¹⁹.

The idea of a new international political and economic order in the world was chosen by China as one of the key provisions supporting the confrontation between various and diverse world forces, helping China escape confrontations with them.

At the same time, the Chinese leader linked the creation and maintenance of a peaceful environment on the planet with the recognition of the diversity of the world

⁷¹⁸ Korsun V.A. Op. cit. P. 90–91.

⁷¹⁹ Zou Lihuai. Relations between Russia and China in the context of the emerging new world order // Historical and socio-educational thought. 2018. Vol. 10, Issue 4-1. P. 102.

and intercivilizational respect for differences. This idea implied confrontation and opposition in the whole external world. It meant the development of several, not one, centers of power. The PRC made it clear to developing countries that it supports them in their struggle against the United States, without leading it.

The real filling of the new concept of international relations was provided by factors of economic interdependence of states, while the guarantee of regional and global security based on Western democratic values was ignored.

The humanitarian and political component of the new international political and economic order was devoid of new content. Calls to "acquire as many friends as possible" continued to sound, but at the same time continued to uphold justice, equality and mutual benefit. In fact, Beijing's leaders remained true to general principles.

After the death of the architect of Chinese reforms and openness Deng Xiaoping in February 1997, the world public was concerned about the direction in which the most populous country in the world would move. From September 12 to 18, 1997, the XV Congress of the CPC (中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会, 1997年9月12日至18日) was held.

It was convened at a critical period for the country. In China and the world, many wondered if the patriarch's reforms would continue. It was a time of choice to continue the past and herald the future. A decisive step in this difficult time was taken by the General Secretary of the CPC of the PRC Jiang Zemin. In the report "Hold High the Great Banner of Deng Xiaoping Theory and Advance the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics into the XXI Century" («高举邓小平理论伟大旗帜, 把建设有中国特色社会主义事业全面推向二十一世纪»的报告») he clearly outlined the key steps for the development of the PRC.

Among the most important tasks outlined, let's analyze the eighth and ninth: **8.** "Promote the peaceful reunification of the motherland." ((8) 推进祖国和平统一). **9.** "The international situation and foreign policy." ((9) 国际形势和对外政策⁷²⁰).

⁷²⁰ Jiang Zemin's report at the XV National Congress of the CPC (09.12.1997). Chapter 9: The International Situation and Foreign Policy // Information Portal "Network of Communist Party Members". 09.27.2012. URL: <https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348726215537612.shtml> (accessed: 02.01.2023). In Chinese.

By taking the path of "openness to the outside world", "inviting others" and "going abroad", Jiang Zemin followed the principles laid down by his predecessor Deng Xiaoping. Under Jiang Zemin, this foreign policy vector was supplemented by an orientation towards developing foreign economic ties, increasing the use of advanced foreign technology, expanding exports, introducing new forms of foreign economic relations and attracting foreign capital.

The concept of "the revival of the greatness of the Chinese people" as a unifying national idea also extends to foreign policy. This national idea, aimed at uniting all strata of Chinese society both at home and abroad, consisting in creating the most powerful economic power in the world and formulated as "the revival of the greatness of the Chinese people", predetermined China's participation in global economic processes as a counterweight to developed countries, and primarily the US. In addition to the economic part of this strategy, the political component, which Beijing did not openly declare, was also obvious⁷²¹. At the XV CPC Congress in 1997, Jiang Zemin repeatedly mentioned the need to fight against hegemonism, the non-application of the policy of force or interference in China's internal affairs and those of other states, a unipolar system of world order, etc. ("要反对霸权主义,。。。不能以任何借口干涉他国内政,更不能恃强凌弱。。。")⁷²².

Based on the idea of world progress and cooperation as a tendency of the modern era, Jiang Zemin at the XV CPC Congress declared "maintaining world peace and promoting common development" one of the three main tasks in the new world ("进入新世纪,。。。维护世界和平与促进共同发展,是我们必须抓好的三大任务")⁷²³. Note that the Chinese leader first introduced the concept of "the modern era", or "当今时代". Then this term becomes widespread in the documents of the XVIII and XIX CPC Congresses already under Xi Jinping.

⁷²¹ Pomozova N.B. "Community of Shared Future": the evolution of China's foreign policy concept (late 1990s – present) // Vestnik RGGU. «Political Science. History. International Relations» Series. 2019. Issue 2. P. 79–80.

⁷²² Jiang Zemin's report at the XV National Congress of the CPC (09.12.1997). Chapter 9: The International Situation and Foreign Policy // Information Portal "Network of Communist Party Members". 09.27.2012. In Chinese.

⁷²³ Communiqué of the V Plenary Session of the XV Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (10.11.2000) // Portal of the Central Government. 07.11.2008. URL: http://www.gov.cn/govweb/test/2008-07/11/content_1042437.htm (accessed: 02.01.2023). In Chinese; Li Anzeng. Op. cit. P. 6–12. In Chinese.

At the XV Congress, the leader first mentioned the concept of "common interests" in the context of improving and developing relations with the "Third World" on the basis of the "five principles of peaceful coexistence". Jiang tried to bring interests closer or combine them, expand mutually beneficial cooperation and deal with challenges together.

Despite disagreements between countries, he insisted on the need to refrain from confrontation, proceed from the long-term interests of all parties, and counter arbitrary imposition or threats of sanctions ("要寻求共同利益的汇合点, 扩大互利合作, 共同对付人类生存和发展所面临的挑战。对彼此之间的分歧, 要坚持对话, 不搞对抗, 从双方长远利益以及世界和平与发展的大局出发, 妥善加以解决, 反对动辄进行制裁或以制裁相威胁")⁷²⁴.

In 1997, the Joint Chinese-American Statement consolidated the position of the two sides, which share "fundamental common interests"⁷²⁵. In 2002, the PRC President Jiang Zemin and US President G. Bush declared a common responsibility for peace in the world, which is only growing⁷²⁶. This indicated the beginning of the formation of the theory of "combining China's interests" first with developed countries and the "Third World", and then with the entire world community as a strategic course⁷²⁷.

Based on the policy of openness as a long-term state strategy, Jiang called for actively expanding the placement of capital abroad, deepening the foreign trade system, and developing the international market; in other words, acting within the framework of the openness strategy, combining the methods of "inviting in" and "going out". At a meeting with delegates of the All-China Conference on Work with Foreign Investors, he noted that "inviting in" and "going out" are interrelated sides of the Chinese course,

⁷²⁴ Jiang Zemin's report at the XV National Congress of the CPC (09.12.1997). Chapter 9: The International Situation and Foreign Policy // Information Portal "Network of Communist Party Members". 09.27.2012. In Chinese.

⁷²⁵ Press conference by President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin, 1997 // USC US China – Institute. October 29, 1997. URL: <https://china.usc.edu/president-clinton-and-president-jiang-zemin-joint-press-conference-1997> (accessed: 08.11.2022). In Chinese.

⁷²⁶ President Jiang Zemin held talks with visiting US President Bush // Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America. 2002.02.21. URL: <https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/xw/t34143.htm> (accessed: 08.23.2022). In Chinese.

⁷²⁷ Liu Xiaoyang. China's common interests theory in the context of international strategy // Contemporary International Relations. 2018. Vol. 28, iss. 2. P. 130–131.

which stimulate the horizon and keep in sight the markets of Europe, North America and numerous developing countries⁷²⁸.

In the late 1990s, Jiang Zemin proposed to accelerate the implementation of the "going out" (“走出去”) economic strategy, encouraging state enterprises in the country to be active abroad in search of natural resources. He planned to increase economic power through the "going out" strategy and, as a result, raise the prestige of the PRC and its place in the international community. As a result of this initiative, China's foreign trade with Southeast Asian, Latin American and African countries rich in natural resources increased sharply from 2001 to 2007, enlarged by 600%. Tens of thousands of Chinese companies strengthened cooperation in all developing countries, fueling their economies with investments⁷²⁹. Thus, the success of their "Chinese model" investors were implicitly indebted to the recipient countries. The willingness of the Chinese government and its state-owned enterprises to do business in any country in the world, under any conditions, became generally recognized. The Ambassador of Sierra Leone to Beijing S. Johnny in an interview about Chinese construction projects in his country noted: "If one of the G8 countries wanted to rebuild a sports stadium, we would still be negotiating. The Chinese don't hold environmental impact assessments, human rights, bad and good governance meetings"⁷³⁰.

However, not all governments were as optimistic about the way China does business. Chinese enterprises faced resistance in a number of countries, for example, Papua New Guinea, Peru and Zambia. Negative environmental impact and violations of safety standards, labor legislation norms caused acute conflicts with local residents in all these countries⁷³¹.

Thus, the search for new forms and methods of ensuring a solid international peace, both economic and political, forced Jiang Zemin to develop a new concept of security. For the first time he proposed it in 1996, emphasizing that the old method of

⁷²⁸ Jiang Zemin. *On Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*. Vol. 1. P. 307–308.

⁷²⁹ Economy El.C. The game changer: coping with China's foreign policy revolution // *Foreign Affairs*. 2010. Vol. 89, no. 6. P. 145.

⁷³⁰ *Ibid.* P. 146.

⁷³¹ *Economy El.C. Op. cit.*

military buildup does not correspond to the modern world order. Developing the provisions of the concept in 1999, he defined the core of the new theory of security.

Jiang Zemin attributed **five** basic principles of the new order⁷³²:

1. The principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression and non-interference in internal affairs must be firmly adhered to. Compliance with these principles is a necessary and absolutely mandatory prerequisite for peaceful coexistence. This message to European leaders to separate the sovereign affairs of the PRC and their external activities within the framework of cooperation with China.

2. The principle of resolving international disputes between states by peaceful means in the event of clashes and conflicts in one region or another must be firmly adhered to; one must consistently and completely renounce the thinking of the Cold War era and any kind of coercive actions engendered by such thinking (Jiang constantly called on major countries to renounce the use of force. In the event of a threat with military force in relations with any country, the PRC sought to restrain partners from building up armed forces and called for refraining from military actions. Perhaps this is a veiled threat from the PRC. The thesis about the thinking of the Cold War applies to the relations of the USSR with the USA. The Chinese leader made it clear that the PRC remains outside of this phenomenon in the present and future, and is generally negative about it).

3. The principle of sovereignty and equality of all states in the world must be firmly adhered to. States, regardless of whether they are large or small, rich or poor, strong or weak, ...should not place themselves above the international community. The active role of the UN in maintaining and preserving peace in the world must be fully respected and this role developed (Jiang, addressing Europeans, assured them of his support in case of disagreements on some issues with the USA).

4. The principle of respectful attitude towards the situation within each country must be firmly adhered to, striving for commonality while preserving differences; each state has the right, based on the situation that exists within that country, to independently choose its social system, development path and way of life. Differences in history, cultural traditions, social system and value systems of all states must be respected; these differences should

⁷³² Galenovich Yu.M. Jiang Zemin's orders. P. 230–245.

not become an obstacle to the development of normal interstate relations, and even less should they be used as a pretext for interference in the affairs of other states (the basis of this principle, adopted after the collapse of the USSR and socialist regimes in Europe, was the strengthening of economic ties between the PRC and other countries. Maintaining normal interstate relations by strengthening economic ties should be separated from the social system, way of life, value system and culture of each country. In the view of Western and Russian political scientists, it seemed unreasonable for the PRC to require neighboring states not to comment on the ideology of the PRC). The value system is also shared by each individual, and states should not prohibit their population from stating the value system of a particular subject or territory.

5. The principle of mutually beneficial cooperation and joint development must be firmly adhered to. Developed countries and developing countries should cooperate, be in equal relations and mutually respect each other's interests, develop together. It is necessary to reform the irrational old world economic order and, thanks to this, promote the protection of the interests of all states in the world, especially the numerous developing countries. No state should use its economic, technological and financial advantages for the purpose of harming the economic security and development of other countries (here Jiang Zemin insisted that countries in Europe, the US and others should not harm the economic security of the PRC).

Speaking from the UN rostrum in 2000, Jiang Zemin, in his own way interpreting the role of the UN in the new millennium, confirmed the PRC's commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, recognizing its irreplaceable role and devotion to the cause of strengthening a just world.

The international situation as a whole has improved, Jiang noted, peace and development have become the themes of this era and the common aspiration of people all over the world: "There is still a long way to go to solve the two basic strategic problems of world peace and development and establish an equitable and reasonable new international political and economic order"⁷³³.

⁷³³ Jiang Zemin at the UN Millennium Summit. September 20th. In Chinese.

Developing the idea of the need to establish a new international economic order, Jiang Zemin called for a rational and just world. The construction of a new international economic order was closely linked to the development of China and its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region (APR, 亚太地区). Jiang attached particular importance to this region. An effective and influential regional cooperation mechanism in Asia with Asian characteristics, Jiang considered the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC). Back in 1993 at the First Meeting of Leaders of Participating Countries of the Forum in Seattle, Jiang emphasized that because of the joint efforts of all countries situated in the Asia-Pacific region, the region itself is characterized by a relatively stable political situation, sustainably maintains high rates of economic development, has broad trade prospects, active investment dynamics and huge potential for cooperation⁷³⁴.

In 1994 at the meeting of APEC member countries in Bogor (Indonesia) (亚太经合组织), the Chinese leader proposed five principles of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region in the future ("相互尊重、协商一致; 循序渐进、稳步发展; 相互开放、不搞排他; 广泛合作、互利互惠; 缩小差距、共同繁荣; 的亚太经济未来发展五项原则»).

First, mutually respect each other and reaching consensus through consultation; all APEC member countries at different stages of economic development, with different social systems, should show mutual respect, coexist in peace and good neighborliness, etc. This is a universal principle for resolving international economic problems, in Jiang Zemin's view. **Second**, gradual progress in the field of international cooperation. **Third**, the need to open up to each other without excluding others; disagreements should not lead to isolation. **Fourth**, take advantage of surplus labor resources, transfer of technology, construction of infrastructure. **Fifth**, reduce development gaps between member organizations and open markets for developing country products, trade liberalization, investment growth, etc⁷³⁵. In conclusion, President Jiang repeatedly

⁷³⁴ Speech by the President of the People's Republic of China Jiang Zemin at the first informal meeting of APEC leaders (Seattle, 11.20.1993) // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_58/zyjh/t10450.htm (accessed: 06.13.2022). In Chinese.

⁷³⁵ Galenovich Yu.M. Jiang Zemin's orders. P. 254–257.

stressed the obligations of developed countries towards underdeveloped ones and colonial domination as the source of poverty.

Notably, the Chinese leader also highly appreciated the activities of ASEAN and the SCO in the initial stage of creating a new economic order. These organizations format open and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Jiang linked the implementation of the concept of a new type of security with the functioning of the SCO. This platform serves as an example of the practical implementation of the first steps in building a model of multilateral cooperation and interstate relations for the theory and practice of modern international relations. Most experts and analysts pay significant attention to considering the SCO's practice on issues of regional security cooperation, countering new challenges and threats⁷³⁶.

Within the foreign policy concept of Jiang Zemin, the PRC together with the CIS countries, formerly part of the USSR, practically embodied a new world order and achieved concrete results. The desire of the PRC's political leadership to put the country at the forefront of the international platform meant the political, economic, military and cultural ability to have a constructive dialogue and reach agreements on important political decisions regarding territorial borders. According to Jiang Zemin's logic, the concept of a new type of security contained principles that figured in Jiang's foreign policy doctrine, namely trust in the countries of the former USSR on the issue of arms reductions. The PRC sought to explain to the Russian Federation's Government that there is no need to build up a military presence on the borders. However, Chinese leaders forced the Russian side and SCO member countries to accept an agreement on a 100-kilometer zone along the border of Russia and the PRC. This also indicated some mistrust of Beijing's leaders towards Russia and the Far East in particular and that relations between these countries were seen as partner but not allied.

Developing ideas about the increase in subversive activities of terrorists and separatists in the territories of Russia, China and the CIS countries, Jiang Zemin attached particular importance to joint actions of countries and mutual trust in the

⁷³⁶ Lavrov V.S. The dynamics of the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization // *Moscow Journal of International Law*. 2008. Issue 1. P. 204.

"Shanghai spirit". Jiang Zemin noted that in order to ensure international security, China and other countries must abandon the "mentality of the Cold War" and, on the basis of a new security concept, promote mutual and common interests⁷³⁷. This meant that China was rethinking some positions of its foreign policy as part of countering the US military presence in Central and South Asia. Thus, the Executive Secretary of the SCO Zhang Deguang noted that this organization will never become an anti-Western military-political alliance⁷³⁸.

Emphasizing the need and importance of resolving security issues and mutual openness, Jiang called for the recognition and respect of the diversity of the world. The "Shanghai spirit" requires recognizing that countries and peoples with different cultural heritages can and should live in harmony. Jiang Zemin particularly noted "the equality of countries and the need to reduce the gap between North and South. If these conditions are not met, the planet Earth will not be able to find peace and stability" ("上海精神»要求我们坚持大小国家一律平等。上海精神»要求我们加强相互协作、谋求共同发展。南北差距扩大、贫富悬殊的问题不解决，世界就得不到具有牢靠基础的安宁和稳定")⁷³⁹.

Jiang Zemin's new concept of security contained three elements. The first is the source of danger; the second is the main conditions for creating international security; and the third is the methods of maintaining long-term security by the state.

Professor Yan Xuotong⁷⁴⁰ believes that the threat to international security is determined by the *political relations of a group of countries*, rather than differences in military power. In his opinion, when the GDP of the People's Republic of China reaches the level of the GDP of the United States of America, world development will be determined by two megatrends (两超趋势). They will stimulate the shift of world

⁷³⁷ Strengthening good neighborliness and friendship and jointly creating a bright future - speech by the President of the PRC Jiang Zemin at the National Cultural Centre of Thailand // CCTV.com 12.22.2011. URL: <http://news.cntv.cn/china/20111222/115918.shtml> (accessed: 08.24.2022). In Chinese.

⁷³⁸ Kashkarayeva Ch. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a mechanism for strengthening China's influence in Central Asia // University News (Kyrgyzstan). 2009. Issue 1. P. 309.

⁷³⁹ Promoting the "Shanghai Spirit" and contributing to peace in the world. Speech by President Jiang Zemin at the St. Petersburg Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC 06.08.2002. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gjhdqzz/lhg_59/zyjh/t10897.htm (accessed: 06.16.2022). In Chinese.

⁷⁴⁰ A Chinese scholar, proponent of realism in international relations theory, head of the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing.

centers from Europe to East Asia. The policy of protecting hegemony by military force has a significant probability of realizing the threat to international peace and security. However, such powers as China, Japan, Germany, Russia do not conduct military expansion. The military might of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, Japan will decrease. China, having overtaken Russia in military strength, will only yield to the United States. Washington, on the contrary, traditionally relies on military might when applying political, economic and other sanctions against other countries⁷⁴¹.

The new concept of security argued that the threat to security in the process of multipolarization is created by the policy implemented in relation to this process, the policy of struggle for achieving hegemony by using military force⁷⁴².

Thus, in the 1990s, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, the CPC leadership, based on the developments of political scientists and economists, found a conceptual and theoretical justification for China's position on the establishment of a new international order. Beijing defined its foreign policy in relation to three groups of countries, which confirmed the continuity of its foreign policy and the concept of "Three Worlds". Special emphasis was placed on orienting towards cooperation with the developing world.

The analysis of China's foreign policy ideas and concepts from the 1990s to the early 2000s shows that President Jiang Zemin implemented a restrained, unobtrusive and at the same time independent foreign policy strategy. The fundamental changes in European and world politics at the turn of the 80s and 90s of the XX century were defined by Jiang Zemin as a challenge to established views of the world and development. The theory of multipolarity of the world becomes the main in the political discourse and political science of China in the 90s of the XX century. Within the framework of the Chinese theory of multipolarity of the world, two areas of interstate relations are clearly distinguished: relations with developing and developed states.

⁷⁴¹A practical method of international studies / edited by: Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuotong. In Chinese; Yan Xuotong, He Ying. Op. cit. P. 350–252. In Chinese.

⁷⁴²Sveshnikov A.A. The foreign policy concepts of the PRC and the conceptual views of Chinese international relations specialists. P. 111.

At the same time, during the reign of Jiang Zemin, Beijing took the course of cooperation and friendship with almost all countries of the world. He sought to maintain a peaceful and stable situation, and thanks to domestic policy, the country began to turn into a modernized and developed power. The third generation of leaders pursued an active foreign policy, sought to form a favorable international environment, while strengthening the internal management mechanisms of the CPC. The purpose of such a foreign policy was to maintain peace throughout the world and promote general development. China began to participate more actively in international organizations and changed the paradigm of the theory of international relations, paying more and more attention to strengthening national identity and solving problems of economic security. Since 1997, Jiang Zemin has consistently promoted the course of "accelerating the tendency of multipolarity at the global and regional levels, in politics and in economics"⁷⁴³.

For sustainable development, Jiang Zemin believed, it is necessary to establish a new international order. It should consist in democratizing international relations and reforming the international trade, financial and economic system in order to protect the legitimate rights and interests of developing and developed countries.

China's foreign policy, Jiang argued, should be peaceful and defensive in nature. At the same time, it is necessary to strengthen the comprehensive power of the Chinese state, transition from a unipolar model to a multipolar architecture of international relations, believed the leader of China.

In his foreign policy, Jiang Zemin clearly followed the reform course of Deng Xiaoping's post-revolutionary period, emphasizing the pursuit of an independent and autonomous line. In all directions, Beijing continued to protect economic interests and solve security problems at a new level within the framework of the emerging new international political and economic order⁷⁴⁴. This led to China becoming one of the leaders of integration processes at the beginning of the XXI century, to a certain extent linking the two key subregions - Northeast and Southeast Asia. His efforts to resolve

⁷⁴³ Portyakov V.Ya. The vision of multipolarity in Russia and China and international challenges.

⁷⁴⁴ Miller L.H., Liu Xiaohong. Op. cit. P. 140–141.

security issues through political and diplomatic means in the ASEAN area were particularly noticeable⁷⁴⁵.

Thus, the traditional views of Chinese thinkers about the nature of foreign policy are expressed in the leader of the PRC's approach to multipolarity and contribute to the formation of a more fair and democratic compared to unipolar or bipolar international relations system, since this order ensures the equality of all members of the international community and contributes to the preservation of peace and stability.

Let's outline the characteristic features and qualitative changes in Jiang Zemin's foreign policy concepts reflected in the three theoretical and methodological directions of China. **First, the conceptualization of Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy course is deepened and expanded.** His 28 hieroglyph Directive ("observe calmly, secure our position...") indicates that China should maintain relations of peaceful cooperation with all states; the People's Republic of China should have special relations with the United States of America, despite the numerous confrontations and disputes between the two countries. According to this strategy, China should act cautiously towards the US.

Secondly, in his concept Jiang emphasizes the **implementation of high-level active diplomacy**. Traditional views of Chinese thinkers about the nature of foreign policy (neighborhood policy, non-forceful approach) serve as the foundation for the country's "peaceful transition" to improving China's international image. "The theory of relations", "constructivism of the process" (the liberal approach of Qin Yaqing and others) are reflected in the foreign policy strategy. Thus, the third generation of leaders also sought to contain tension and prevent possible escalation of relations between China and other major powers.

Since Jiang Zemin became the leader, the foreign visits of the Chinese President have noticeably increased. As Jiang's visit to the US in 1997 shows, a meeting at the highest level is an effective means of creating the impression of improving relations between the two countries both within the country and abroad. Zhu Rongji visited the US in April 1999 to discuss China's entry into the WTO, which was an example of a visit to discuss a specific issue. Jiang attaches special and exclusive importance to

⁷⁴⁵ China in the XXI Century: opportunities, challenges and prospects. Part 1. P. 42–43.

relations with the US. The stumbling block - the Taiwan problem - remains in a "suspended" state. With regard to Western European countries, the Chinese leadership supports its foreign economic steps with diplomatic practice⁷⁴⁶.

Thirdly, Jiang Zemin expresses dedication to a regional approach. During the 1990s, regional integration intensified. China joined APEC in 1991 and participated in UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. China participates in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and participates in ASEAN as an observer. The ARF foreign ministers' meeting mechanisms serve as a consolidating and legitimate instrument in the spheres of peace and security. In the late 1990s, the third generation of CPC leadership under Jiang Zemin proposed a new concept of security based on the understanding of the concept of national security by the leaders of the previous generations of China's leaders - Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, the main idea of which was clarified and improved during a number of important internal Chinese and international forums. Since 2001, within the framework of the SCO, cooperation in the field of security and promotion of military and political trust in the Asia-Pacific region has gradually been deployed⁷⁴⁷.

In the fourth place, within the framework of the global and regional approaches, the Chinese leader attaches great importance to constructivism and the theory of globalization, which are undoubtedly present in the spectrum of Western concepts of international relations and in the foreign policy thought of China during the Jiang Zemin period. By introducing four concepts - multipolarity of the world, economic globalization of the world, peace throughout the world, joint development of all states - Jiang was the first of the leaders of the PRC who contributed to the economic revival of the PRC and, after the period of revolutions (Mao, Deng), laid the financial and economic foundation for China's future global leadership.

⁷⁴⁶ Tsvyk A.V. The Chinese Vector of Germany's Policy After 1998 // Vestnik of MGIMO University. 2016. Issue 2 (47). P. 162.

⁷⁴⁷ Liang Zhenpeng. China's New Security Concept and Its Practice Within the SCO in the XXI Century // Far Eastern Affairs. 2017. Issue 5. P. 48.

CHAPTER 5. THE PEACEFUL RISE OF CHINA AND ITS HARMONIZATION IN THE THEORIES OF HU JINTAO

5.1. The concept of “peaceful rise” is Beijing's foreign policy course to ensure regional and international stability

Since fourth-generation leader Hu Jintao came to power in 2003, Chinese political scientists and politicians have been raising a question about what will be the most effective diplomatic strategy that will allow Beijing to increase its political influence in Asia and strengthen its position in the world. The political leadership of the PRC, led by Hu Jintao, relying on the development of international relations based on multipolar approach, continued to pursue a policy of “reform and opening up” concentrating on the ideas of reviving the Chinese nation.

The PRC leadership tried to develop theories that were close in scope and content to the ideas of Mao and Deng Xiaoping. The fourth generation of modern Chinese leaders called themselves representatives of “new thinking” (《新思维》). Traditionally, Hu Jintao and his team used concise and sonorous expressions or slogans to announce their foreign policy course for the “rise” of China 《中国崛起》.

The leader of the fourth generation of Chinese leaders, Hu Jintao, analyzing history, proposes to draw lessons from the past that China should remember. He says that the turmoil and strife during the Warring States period (战国时代) lead to the collapse of the Zhou dynasty (周代, c. 11th century – until 221 BC). Hu Jintao emphasizes the importance for contemporary China of the ancient Chinese monument of the Qin dynasty – “Annals of the State of Lu, covering the Spring and Autumn Period” (《吕氏春秋》) of 239 BC. It substantiates the provisions on “universal grace and well-being” (《天下太平, 万物安宁》)⁷⁴⁸. The provisions on grace and well-being were further developed in the teachings of Confucianism, as well as followers of Taoism, Legalism, etc. In a generalized form, they say that throughout the world, as well as in

⁷⁴⁸ The Great Dictionary of Idioms Jiuyun / ed. Shen Micheng, Song Fujun. Changchun, 2008. P. 861. In Chinese.

the Celestial Empire, there should be no disorder, people, society, and the state live peacefully and in tranquility. Hu Jintao reminds: the treatise of the first teacher Confucius (孔子)⁷⁴⁹ “Lun Yu” (“Judgments and Conversations”) contains an important saying that underlies many key foreign policy concepts of the modern Chinese leadership, including the idea of “elevation” – «和而不同» (“unity without unification” or “harmony of the diverse and dissimilar”).

Hu Jintao emphasizes that Confucius is the first historically reliable creator of philosophical foreign policy theory in China. In the great teacher's postulate “君子和而不同，小人同而不和”⁷⁵⁰ 和 “harmony” and 同 “identity/unity,” Hu Jintao emphasizes, are two concepts to which Confucius attaches great importance. Confucius calls for getting along with the environment, but not identifying with it, but conforming to it. These two concepts are not identical but can cooperate with each other. This, according to Hu Jintao, is called harmony, which means that there are differences in aspects and there is diversity, but they can be united. The overlap or mixing of the same things and phenomena is called “identity/unity” “同”.

Already in his first public speeches, Hu explained that China needs a concept that combines the ideas of reviving the Chinese nation, state, growing national consciousness, expressing self-identity and pride. Such a doctrine should have been the strategy (concept) of the “peaceful rise of China” («中国和平崛起的战略/中国和平崛起的概念»). The President of the People's Republic of China personally organized a research group of eight people to develop a foreign policy concept. Chinese political science centers were established, whose research was aimed not only at neutralizing fears and concerns in the world in connection with the strengthening of China and its influence, but also at gaining the status of a great power.

Political scientists, analysts and representatives of the expert community have begun to develop research on the problems of strategic culture (historically recurring) and “grand strategy” in China. According to scientists from the Chinese Academy of

⁷⁴⁹ Confucius' lifetime (551–479 BC).

⁷⁵⁰ Authentic text and interpretations of «Judgements and Conversations “Harmony of the Diverse and Dissimilar” » // Characters. 29.03.2021. URL: <http://www.vrrw.net/wx/27684.html> (accessed: 16.07.2023). In Chinese.

Social Sciences, the concept of “peace” in Chinese sounds like “heping” «和平» and is a combination of two words “和” («he») and “平” («ping»). The hieroglyph “平” means “flat, calm, stable, and fair”⁷⁵¹. Jiang Xiyuan of the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies argues that in the context of Chinese strategic culture, “和平” implies “expansion”⁷⁵². According to him, this combination can be interpreted as a combination of “同” (“communication/identity”) and “一” (“unity”) with “unity of opposites.” In the ancient Chinese postulate «天下太平», the concept “平” can be translated, or rather interpreted, to mean two completely different things. In the traditional interpretation, it means “to bring peace to the whole world.” Given China's notion of the “superiority of the Middle Kingdom” through which all its dynasties ruled, the term takes on a more forceful connotation and can be interpreted to mean “to rule or stabilize a state.” This is what Jiang Siyuan aptly describes as “the unity of a high degree of idealism and cold-blooded realism.”⁷⁵³

For the theoretical and methodological basis of the new strategic culture of the PRC, Chinese political scientists took the tenets of the ancient Chinese strategic culture, which is close and consonant with the current foreign and security policy of China. The first sketches for developing the concept of “peaceful rise” were published by the famous Chinese political scientist, professor at Peking University Ye Zicheng. In the article “It is Extremely Important for China to Implement a Strategy of Major Power Diplomacy,” the author, relying on the modern school of realism and liberal views, proposed a fairly effective strategy for the PRC to achieve the status of a world power. He emphasized that, faced with new challenges, China must implement a strategy of great power diplomacy that would lead to China's leadership on the world stage. Its essence was the implementation of six factors:

- 1) China, facing many difficulties, must pursue major power diplomacy;

⁷⁵¹ Dictionary of Modern Chinese. Beijing, 1987. P. 870.

⁷⁵² Jiang Xiyuan. China's World or the World's China. Beijing, 2009. P. 124. In Chinese.

⁷⁵³ Ibid.

2) with an attitude towards the United States of America as a great power, establish a policy of force against the United States in international affairs and at the same time stimulate cooperation between China and the United States: a paired strategy;

3) China's new multipolar strategy: the key is the struggle for Europe and the transformation of the United States;

4) China's strategy as a major power is the struggle for dominance in East Asia: compliance with the duties and obligations corresponding to China's status as a major power in the international system;

5) the principle of independence of China as a major power, based on non-entry into alliances with other countries;

6) China should play an active role in building the economic and political system in East and Southeast Asia.⁷⁵⁴

In his work "China's Grand Strategy: The Main Challenges to China's Establishment as a Great World Power and Strategic Choices," published in 2003, Ye Zicheng noted the merits and highly appreciated the contributions of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in gaining China's independence and self-reliance. He emphasized that the grand strategy of the "great revival of the Chinese nation," which was launched by Mao and Deng, and developed by Jiang Zemin, is in the formative stage⁷⁵⁵.

Studying the history of China's transformation into an advanced empire starting from the era of Western and Eastern Zhou (西周, 东周)⁷⁵⁶, Ye Zicheng especially emphasized the phenomenon of the five-hundred-year history of the existence of **the Huaxia system** («华夏体系 500 年的大历史») and the Huaxia people, who lived in the states of Qi, Chu, Wu, Yue, Wei, Zhao and Qin. The 500-year history of the development of the Huaxia people has great practical importance for understanding the modern international system. According to Ye Zicheng, China is a superpower, the Celestial Empire has always been more developed and much stronger than the Roman

⁷⁵⁴ Ye Zicheng. It is extremely important for China to implement a strategy of major power diplomacy. Some reflections on China's Diplomatic Strategy. In Chinese.

⁷⁵⁵ Ye Zicheng. China's Grand Strategy: The Main Challenges to China's Establishment as a Great World Power and Strategic Choices. In Chinese.

⁷⁵⁶ The reign of the Western and Eastern Zhou Dynasty. P. 11.

Empire and other great empires of the world. Today, China is able to learn from its cultural and historical past and assume its rightful place⁷⁵⁷.

Noting the scale of Ye Zicheng's research work, it is worth paying attention to some of his omissions. For instance, Professor E does not cite sources. For some reason, he arbitrarily credits Deng Xiaoping with spreading non-aligned diplomacy to the Third World⁷⁵⁸. Let us note that non-alignment diplomacy arose earlier, even under Mao Zedong. It is obvious that Deng Xiaoping's authority and influence are affecting Ye Zicheng's opinion.

Discussing the process of China's integration into the world community, Ye Zicheng gave priority to the economic development of the country. He also rightly argued that in world history, states without the support of armed forces do not become great powers. The process of China's emergence as a world power and its integration into the world community is largely associated with relations with the United States, wrote Ye Zicheng. The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is closely related to the American strategy towards China and the Chinese strategy towards the United States. The United States of America is the only power, Professor Ye emphasized, capable of unleashing a large-scale war against the PRC⁷⁵⁹.

In addition to the strategic importance of relations with the United States, Professor Ye pointed to the growing world market as a factor in China's modernization; The United States is the only world power on which the security interests of the PRC and the solution to the Taiwan issue together with America depended.

According to Professor Ye, the prerequisite for China's transformation into a world power can be considered the concept of multipolarity and the strengthening of China's "soft power" in three areas: politics, economics, and diplomacy, in order to avoid the fate of the fall of the USSR.

Ye Zicheng insisted on three models of multipolarity that would help prevent large-scale conflict with the United States and provide favorable conditions for emerging as a great/major power:

⁷⁵⁷ Ye Zicheng. *The Rise of China: The 500-year history of the Huaxia system*.

⁷⁵⁸ Ye Zicheng. *Inside China's grand strategy: the perspective from the People's Republic*. P. 190.

⁷⁵⁹ See: Ye Zicheng. *China's Grand Strategy*.

- multipolarity under American leadership with the presence of several forces, but not equal ones;
- multipolarity of balance, without the leadership of one of the countries (Europe, Russia, Japan, China, USA);
- a model of competition that can escalate into world wars (conflicts between France, Germany, England, Russia, Austria, Italy).

The Chinese professor considered harmonious and correct relations with large states such as the European Union, Russia, the USA, and Japan to be a necessary condition for stimulating multipolarity.

Ye Zicheng recommended that the Chinese leadership strengthen cooperation with the United States, Japan, Europe, NATO countries and other major countries. As part of his concept, he proposed the following system of relations between the PRC and the world: **PRC – USA, in second place, PRC – USA - Russia, then PRC – USA – Europe, PRC – USA – Japan, PRC – India and relations of the PRC with other developing countries**⁷⁶⁰. Relations with Japan, the professor believed, appear to be the most difficult, while relations with the Russian Federation are the best among large states. China strengthened cooperation and interaction with Russia in Central Asia, Russia and China created the SCO, and its financial support also strengthened. China's relations with Europe have become balanced and aimed at further developing multipolarity.

Analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of China's emergence as a world power, Professor Ye recommended the implementation of pragmatic strategies in five main areas⁷⁶¹. **First**, he explored the economic and military-strategic options for China's rise. **Second**, he explored the possibilities of favorable relations with the United States. **Thirdly**, he analyzed approaches to interaction with other developing countries. **Fourth**, he proposed shared prosperity with neighboring countries and **finally** identified a mechanism for peaceful unification with Taiwan. There are political conditions for the transformation of China into a rich and powerful state. At the same time, it is crucial to

⁷⁶⁰ Ye Zicheng. China's Grand Strategy.

⁷⁶¹ Ye Zicheng. Inside China's grand strategy: the perspective from the People's Republic.

overcome various shortcomings that prevent this: the Taiwan issue, which limits China's international influence; low level of education and health care, GNI; limited possibilities for scientific and technological breakthrough; the discrepancy between the national power of the PRC and the growth of its influence in the world.

The author analyzed the conditions conducive to China's status as a world power and emphasized that China has "sufficient Comprehensive National Power" to achieve this. Comprehensive National Power includes a country's survival capacity, development potential, and international influence. Furthermore, in the field of security, apart from territorial disputes with neighboring countries, the situation is also favorable. Reviewing China's shortcomings in achieving Comprehensive National Power, the author expressed hope that these shortcomings would be corrected⁷⁶².

In "Inside China's Grand Strategy: The View of the People's Republic," Ye avoided analyzing the development of China's strategy towards its neighbor India. India, an emerging power, acts as a counterweight to China's dominance on the Asian continent. However, many Russian and Western experts argue that any literature on Chinese foreign policy will be incomplete if it does not examine bilateral relations between China and India⁷⁶³.

Another Chinese political scientist, Professor Yan Xuetong, provided scientific justification for the "peaceful rise of China" in his works. Explaining the meaning of this concept, he pointed to "development" and "wealth" («发展»和«富有»). Yan Xuetong believed that "rise" was more serious than "development" and "wealth." "Rise" is a concept for a large country and is not suitable for small ones. A large country becomes one of the few influential and important countries in the world and plays a key role in the international community. And the process of the rise of such a country is that its international status is constantly increasing and approaching the status of the greatest power. Professor Yan clarified that "rise" is China's goal (目的), and "peace" is the form and tool⁷⁶⁴.

⁷⁶² Ye Zicheng. Inside China's grand strategy: the perspective from the People's Republic. P. 17, 19.

⁷⁶³ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁴ Yan Xuetong. Discussion one. P. 5-6. In Chinese.

Professor of Tongji University (Shanghai) Men Honghua, relying on the works of international relations theorists (A. Organski, H. Morgenthau, G. Modelski, R. Gilpin, et al.), developed thoughts about the causes and factors of the formation of great powers, as well as about changes in the world order and modernization leading to the rise of China. He emphasized that coordination, confrontation, and ambiguity represent the three main ways of the rise of a great power. According to the professor, as part of the development of China's grand strategy, national power, strategic concepts, and international institutions act as sources for the development of China's strategic culture, laying realism, morality and the desire for cooperation at its core. He stressed that in order to achieve the China's grand strategy ambitious goals, the country must adhere to this strategic position of not giving in to temptation and deception, despising grievances and winning at the present time⁷⁶⁵.

According to Men Honghua, one of China's strategies in relations with the United States is to make economic construction a top strategic priority, strengthen economic integration and thus create an economic buffer zone. When developing an economic strategy for cooperation within the framework of regional economic integration, China should focus on long-term interests and a strategy for actively ensuring common regional security⁷⁶⁶. This may contribute to the growth of China's national strategic interests and its gradual movement from regional to global, then to a world power⁷⁶⁷.

The strategy of “the rise of China” was also developed by Zheng Bijian, Deputy Director of the Publicity Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Vice-President of the Central Party School of the CPC. The immediate occasion for his invocation of this concept was his official visit to the United States in December 2002, during which Zheng witnessed widespread propaganda about the “Chinese threat” and the “Chinese collapse.” Zheng believed that the People's Republic of China would develop peacefully and in turn help maintain a peaceful environment. Speaking at one of the leading US think tanks, the Council on Foreign Relations, in a

⁷⁶⁵ Men Honghua. The rise of china and its strategic response. In Chinese.; The strategic path to the rise of China. P. 667. In Chinese.

⁷⁶⁶ Guo Shuyong. Strategy lectures. Beijing, 2006. P. 287–289. In Chinese.

⁷⁶⁷ Honghua M. China's national identity in transition: Domestic and international perspectives (1982–2012) // Social Sciences in China. 2013. №. 9. P. 54–66. In Chinese.

speech entitled “New Opportunity for China-U.S. Relations” he “united” the US and China in combating the threat of terrorism. The events of September 11, 2001, could, in his opinion, restore opportunities for improving China-U.S. relations⁷⁶⁸.

Multiple trips to Europe and the USA, communication with the political and expert elite allowed Zheng Bijian to politically and philosophically evaluate the historical attempts of Germany and Japan to gain leading positions in the world, which was still perceived negatively throughout the world. According to Zheng Bijian, the rise of the great powers in the past leads to an imbalance in global political structures and the outbreak of wars since these states have chosen the path of aggression and expansion⁷⁶⁹. The rise of a great power often leads to major changes in the international structure and world order. Zheng insisted on the only choice: "to rise firmly and peacefully." That is, strive for a peaceful international environment for one's own development and use one's own development to maintain world peace.⁷⁷⁰ Rethinking these facts and their circumstances led the political scientist to the idea of formulating a new foreign policy course with an emphasis on the concepts of “peace” and “development”⁷⁷¹.

It is believed that Zheng first introduced the concept of "China's peaceful rise" into scientific circulation in November 2003 in a speech at the plenary session of the Bo'ao Forum for Asia with a report entitled "A New Path for China's Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia" («中国和平崛起新道路和亚洲的未来»). This marked the beginning of a wider debate on the issue of China's rise in political, economic, and scientific circles.

Zheng Bijian emphasized that the term “peaceful” is aimed against the concept of the “Chinese threat”, and “rise” is aimed against the views of the “Chinese collapse”⁷⁷².

⁷⁶⁸ China's peaceful rise: speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997–2005. P. 7–8.

⁷⁶⁹ Pathak S. The «Peace» in China's peaceful rise // E-International Relations. 2015. October 15. URL: <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/59090> (accessed: 25.07.2022).

⁷⁷⁰ “China's peaceful rise” is becoming a hot topic. // Information portal “China News”. April 8, 2004. URL: <https://www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2004-04-08/26/422973.html> (accessed: 13.08.2022). In Chinese.

⁷⁷¹ Pomozova N.B. Sociological Discourse Analysis of the Context of the Concept of “Peaceful Development” of China (2002–2004) // Uchenie zapiski. 2021. No. 2. P. 220.

⁷⁷² Zheng Bijian. China's road of peaceful development and the building of communities of interests.

Zheng predicted China's strategic growth by 2050. According to him, it will take another 45 years, before it can be called a modernized, moderately prosperous country. On this challenging road China will face three transcendencies before it succeeds⁷⁷³.

The first threat is associated with an unprecedented increase in energy consumption, which leads to higher oil prices and a shift in the center of resource consumption to China.

The second serious problem is that environmental literacy and its protection in China are at an extremely low level. This poses a threat to the global community.

Another threat concerns economic growth, which has caused a significant gap in the social development of the PRC. Zheng gave several examples of the tensions Beijing will have to face: between high GDP growth and social development, between technological upgrading and increasing job opportunities, between maintaining development momentum in coastal areas and accelerating development in inland areas, between promoting urbanization and developing agricultural areas, between reducing the gap between rich and poor and maintaining economic vitality and efficiency, between attracting foreign investment and increasing the competitiveness of domestic enterprises, etc.⁷⁷⁴.

A gap has formed between the city and the countryside. Therefore, this leads to increased internal regional contradictions. The disconnect between economic and social development is causing a steady increase in population and exacerbating problems associated with insufficient food supplies, deteriorating nutrition and education, employment problems and demographic threats. All this leads to uncontrolled migration processes and puts pressure on neighboring states, creating challenges to their territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.

Zheng's concept of "peaceful rise" did not only describe China, and this was one of the points that critics in China pointed out. The concept required the rest of the world to support China in creating an international environment in which such an approach could be applied. And this could lead China to address the internal challenges facing its

⁷⁷³ Zheng Bijian. China's «Peaceful Rise» to great-power status. P. 21.

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid.

“peaceful rise.” Zheng tried to find answers to these questions in his later articles and speeches, which refined his basic idea. According to Zheng Bijian, there are many internal obstacles to the “peaceful rise.” These include resource scarcity, environmental pollution, corruption, political instability, and uneven socio-economic development. Internationally, China faces powers, most notably the United States, that are protecting their own economic and political interests. Zheng believed that a clear explanation of China's intentions could lay the foundation for a broader framework of cooperation that would moderate the rise of China's economic and political influence. It will also serve as a guiding principle for Chinese leaders and society in finding solutions to complex problems. The author hoped that this would be a constant reminder to China to strive for development and peace and then ensure its own rise⁷⁷⁵.

On April 18, 2004, at a round table on “China's Peaceful Rise and Economic Globalization,” Zheng Bijian delivered a speech on “China's Peaceful Rise and Opportunities for the Asia-Pacific Region.” In his speech, he recalled that China's rise will not follow the aggressive and expansionist stance of the great powers of the past, which led to tension and stress in the international political structure and even armed conflicts. Instead, China will pursue a peaceful path to development. Zheng expressed hope that the path of peaceful rise that China is following will contribute to a more important part of world development and the convergence of common interests with the world⁷⁷⁶.

Developing the idea of “peaceful rise,” Zheng Bijian and other Chinese researchers substantiated **the prerequisites and reasons for the rise of China**. Thus, the director of the EU-China Research Center, Jing Men, noted in his writings that since the formation of the PRC, Beijing has mainly participated in military conflicts and wars in the following cases: the Korean War (1950–1953), the Sino-Indian war (1962), Sino-Soviet border conflict (1969), Sino-Vietnamese conflict (1974), and Sino-Vietnamese war (1979). All wars and conflicts broke out either on the borders of China or on the territory of China's neighbors. A special feature of military clashes is that all these cases

⁷⁷⁵ China's Peaceful Rise: speeches of Zheng Bijian. P. 6–7.

⁷⁷⁶ Zheng Bijian. Toward a Global Convergence of Interests and Building “Communities of Interests”. In Chinese.; Zheng Bijian. China's road of peaceful development and the building of communities of interests.

of the use of force occurred during the Cold War. These cases showed that China attaches great importance to the security of its borders. Unlike the Soviet Union or the United States, China has no security interests in other continents and has never projected its power to other regions outside of East Asia. China, located in East Asia, prioritizes security in the region. According to Men Jing, this indicates that the international situation during the Cold War was unfavorable for the development of peaceful interstate relations⁷⁷⁷.

Chinese political scientists named the PRC's accession to the UN in 1971 as **the next important prerequisite for the rise of the PRC**. China's accession to the UN was a breakthrough in China's interstate relations. Until 1971, China's diplomatic activities were limited mainly to the socialist bloc and the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This opportunity allowed China to gradually develop and establish diplomatic relations with the largest number of countries ever possible in the history of the Chinese state.

The desire to establish relations of friendship and cooperation with all major powers, according to Chinese political scientists, was consistent with China's policy aimed at promoting a multipolar structure after the end of the Cold War. Such a policy not only created a favorable external environment for China, but also increased its international status and formed its positive image⁷⁷⁸.

Analyzing China's foreign policy in recent decades, Wang Yizhou, deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, noted that China's foreign policy has transformed from one focused on itself and its own development to an external one, paying attention to both its own development and the development of the entire world population. By the end of 2003 China has established diplomatic relations with more than 160 countries and regions. China began to eradicate poverty, which led to an increase in the standard of living of the population. China's development has also contributed to global economic growth.

⁷⁷⁷ Men Jing. *Op. cit.* P. 5

⁷⁷⁸ Domestic and foreign training boosts national image – experts comment on Hu Jintao's visit // Information portal “News Centre.” April 4, 2003. URL: <https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2003-06-04/15381135740.shtml> (accessed: 04.09.2022). In Chinese.

In the process of building Comprehensive National Power and rapid economic growth, the country has risen to second place in the world. Economic growth has outpaced that of Japan, second only to the United States. In 1995, purchasing power parity in China amounted to 3.535 billion US dollars⁷⁷⁹. This indicated that the Chinese leadership and people felt the greatness of the nation and realized that China was finally achieving international recognition.

The development of a direction for the implementation of the “peaceful rise of China” was preceded by repeated revisions of Beijing’s foreign policy course. The general trend in his policies was to move from a revolutionary approach to cooperation and from war to peace. Focused on domestic modernization, Chinese diplomatic efforts were aimed at maintaining a peaceful and favorable environment in accordance with the decisions of the XVI CPC National Congress (2002). The Chinese political leadership was convinced that by actively participating in international affairs it could advance its national interests⁷⁸⁰.

Another important prerequisite for the peaceful rise of China, political scientists believe, was a change in Chinese national identity. Chinese national identity is closely linked to its past experiences. History and experience shape China's identity, with national pride at its core. In the eyes of the Chinese, a country's cultural greatness determines its power in the world. Therefore, the state with higher cultural achievements has the right to respect and influence.

The negative experiences that followed the Opium Wars destroyed the sense of superiority and added a sense of inferiority to the formation of China's national identity. The unification of China in 1949 not only ended external devastation and internal chaos, but also intensified China's efforts to restore its former greatness. In its diplomatic relations, the PRC began to identify itself more as a preeminent power in the international system, believing that the prestige of the state corresponded to its status.

⁷⁷⁹ Hsü I.C.Y. Op. cit. P. 992–993.

⁷⁸⁰ Resolution of the XVI National Congress of the Communist Party of China on the Report of the XV Central Committee (adopted at the XVI National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 14 November 2002) // Communist Party Members Network. September 27, 2012. URL: <https://fuwu.12371.cn/2012/09/27/ARTI1348736045006812.shtml> (accessed: 08.11.2022). In Chinese.

Gone are the days when China was treated unequally by the colonialists and imperialists, and the injustice needed to be corrected.

China's rise was impossible without strengthening national security. According to China's leader Hu Jintao, to ensure a peaceful and stable international environment, it was necessary to align its national security with global security interests. His ideas on strengthening national security were developed in the works of Chinese political scientists and analysts (Li Baojun⁷⁸¹, Wu Baiyi⁷⁸², Su Hao⁷⁸³, Zheng Bijian⁷⁸⁴, Yang Zemian⁷⁸⁵, et al.). Gradually, since 2002, Hu Jintao and his associates, relying on political scientists, developed a new concept of national security for the PRC (新安全观).

Chinese political scientists include the return of Xianggang to the PRC in 1997 and other factors as prerequisites for the formation of a new security concept. This point of view is shared, for example, by Professor I. Xu and other specialists in modern Chinese history⁷⁸⁶.

In the early 2000s. Hu Jintao's concept of the "peaceful rise of China", supported by the political leadership of the PRC and the expert community, meant that the "peaceful rise" officially became the doctrine of China's national development (《和平崛起》战略升格为中国国策). Its content was revealed in speeches by Chinese leaders at various international forums. This concept was presented in detail in the writings and speeches of Chinese President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan. Hu Jintao first used the term "peaceful rise" at a symposium dedicated to the 110th anniversary of the birth of Mao Zedong on December 26, 2003 (2003年12月26日, 胡锦涛在纪念毛泽东诞辰110周年座谈会上, 首次使用《和平崛起》这个术语)⁷⁸⁷. In December 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao, during his visit to the United

⁷⁸¹ Li Baojun. The formulation of China's new security concept and its main elements // Information portal «Fanwen Center». 2001. № 7. URL: <http://fanwen.geren-jianli.org/934814.html> (accessed: 08.11.2022). In Chinese.

⁷⁸² Wu Baiyi. The Chinese Security Concept and its historical evolution // Journal of Contemporary China. 2001. Vol. 10, iss. 27. P. 275–283.

⁷⁸³ Hao Su. Geopolitics and strategic patterns // Conference paper. China's Perspective on New security Concept. Beijing, June 7, 2004. Presentation for the workshop China's Perspective on New Security Concept. Unpublished.

⁷⁸⁴ China's Peaceful Rise: Speeches of Zheng Bijian.

⁷⁸⁵ Yang Zemian. China's Diplomacy and Security Theory in the New Era // Comparative politics. 2019. Vol. 10, no. 2. P. 56–68.

⁷⁸⁶ Hsü I.C.Y. Op. cit. P. 981–992.

⁷⁸⁷ "China's peaceful rise" is becoming a hot topic. In Chinese.

States, giving a speech at Harvard University, also used the term “peaceful rise.” In this speech, entitled "Turning Our Eyes on China" (《把目光投向中国》的演讲), he elaborated on the idea of the "peaceful rise of China." Wen Jiabao emphasized the development conditions of China during that period – its peaceful rise, reform and opening up⁷⁸⁸. The prime minister emphasized: China is becoming more powerful, which can be interpreted as a direct statement of foreign policy ambitions⁷⁸⁹.

In March 2004, in a speech by the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan, four characteristics of the “peaceful rise” were said:

- 1) in China there are conditions for a peaceful rise (《第一，中国有和平崛起的环境》);
- 2) China resolutely pursues a peaceful course through peaceful means (《第二，中国决心以和平的手段去完成崛起》);
- 3) China's peaceful rise cannot be separated from the rest of the world (《第三，中国的和平崛起离不开世界》);
- 4) the ultimate goal of a peaceful rise is the establishment of peace (《第四，和平崛起的最终目标是缔造和平》).

Therefore, a peaceful rise is associated with reforming the internal policy and expanding external relations.

In March 2004, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, at the II session of the X National People's Congress (中华人民共和国第十届全国人民代表大会第二次会议), revealed the essence of China's peaceful rise. He emphasized the difference between "China's peaceful rise" and "China's rise." The "Peaceful Rise of China" aimed to "build a comprehensively prosperous society" at home and "maintain world peace and promote common development" in the outside world. China does not and will not strive for hegemony (第一，中国和平崛起就是要充分利用世界和平的大好时机，努力发展

⁷⁸⁸ Yan Xuetong. Discussion one. P. 5. In Chinese.

⁷⁸⁹ Pomozova N.B. Sociological Discourse Analysis of the Context of the Concept of “Peaceful Development” of China (2002–2004). P. 222.

和壮大自己。同时又用自己的发展维护世界和平。**第二**，中国的崛起，基点主要放在自己的力量上。独立自主、自力更生、艰苦奋斗，依靠广阔的国内市场，充足的劳动资源和雄厚的资金储备，以及改革带来的机制创新。**第三**，中国的崛起离不开世界，中国必须坚持开放的政策，在平等互利的原则下同世界一切友好国家发展经贸往来。**第四**，中国的崛起需要很长的时间，恐怕要多少代人的努力奋斗。**第五**，中国的崛起不会妨碍任何人，也不会威胁任何人，也不会牺牲任何人。中国现在不称霸，将来强大了也永远不会称霸)⁷⁹⁰。

In July 2004 Hu Jintao stated that China's development brings happiness not only to the Chinese people, but also creates opportunities for the development of countries around the world. According to Chinese leaders, a peaceful rise includes a national defense strategy, large-scale economic development, and diplomatic outreach. Compared with Jiang Zemin's foreign policy, it has a more cultural structure, an international perspective, and is enriched with modern ideas and concepts. The most noticeable change in this strategic concept is the transfer from neighboring countries to distant Europe⁷⁹¹.

The implementation of the strategy of “the peaceful rise of China,” noted Chinese leaders, is impossible without the support of its neighbors, which includes Russia. In order to gain their favor, it was proposed to help neighbors economically and in a timely manner to overcome the syndrome of national greatness and the great power approach, especially “offensive” for small neighboring countries. The ability of the PRC “on the basis of rational economic principles to establish long-term and sustainable strategic partnerships with large countries possessing reserves of energy and mineral raw materials” (for example, to make full use of Kazakhstani oil and gas, the natural resources of Russian Siberia, etc.) should have an impact extremely important influence on China's "peaceful rise" strategy⁷⁹².

⁷⁹⁰ Wen Jiabao. Op.cit. In Chinese.

⁷⁹¹ Zhang Ming. Op. cit. In Chinese.

⁷⁹² Cit. by: Lomanov A. Zhongguo heping jueqi (Peaceful Rise of China) // Russia in Global Politics. January 10, 2005. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/chzhungo-hepin-czzyueczi-mirnoe-vozyshenie-kitaya/> (accessed: 16.07.2022).

During the early 2000s, a spirited debate emerged in the People's Republic of China regarding the country's position and influence, with discussions taking place in both the party press and society. This discourse not only explored China's standing and role in the world but also questioned whether the country had achieved superpower status. Many participants in the discussion emphasized that the high international status of the state and a vital resource of universal application are the key to the peaceful rise of the PRC. And cultural and moral values most effectively solve the problems of achieving the international status of a great power. China is increasingly exerting cultural influence on East, Southeast and Central Asia.

Beijing believed that the peaceful rise of the Chinese state depended on three essential components of national comprehensive power:

- 1) the growth and quality of the Chinese population;
- 2) economic development;
- 3) political power and influence.

Thus, Professor Liu Yiyu expressed confidence that the impact of China's "peaceful rise" depends on whether it challenges the position of the United States as a global hegemon. As a "responsible great power," China began to exert powerful influence on Central Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.

At the same time, this growing influence was also influenced by inhibitory factors and contradictions. Thus, in **Central Asia**, due to the weakening position of Russia and the ousting of China by the United States, not entirely favorable opportunities for such influence have arisen, despite the strengthening of Beijing's trade and financial positions in this region. **In Northeast Asia**, Russia and China faced a common need to resist "forced compression" from the NATO bloc and the United States, it was believed in Chinese scientific circles⁷⁹³. The likelihood of conflicts **in relations between China and Japan** has increased. Japan was concerned about the reunification of Taiwan with the PRC, since it imported 99% of oil and iron, 91% of coal through the Taiwan Strait along the so-called Japan Line (extending from the Caspian Sea through the Indian

⁷⁹³ China: Topical issues of foreign policy as reported by political scientists of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and Singapore. Moscow, 2007. P. 49.

Ocean, the Malacca Strait, and the Taiwan Strait). Such a dangerous conflict involving the United States and China could lead to a nuclear Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese government was rethinking its attitude towards the rise of China, which led to a gradual improvement in relations⁷⁹⁴. On the issue of security on the **Korean Peninsula**, through the mechanism of trilateral and multilateral consultations (USA, PRC, Kazakhstan, and DPRK), China tried to remove the factor of tension and showed itself as an influential regional and global power. Given American interference and arms sales to the island, Beijing was expressing dissatisfaction with the balance of power, Professor Liu said. **In Southeast Asia**, the influence of the PRC has increased significantly, despite the establishment of friendly and allied agreements between the ASEAN countries and other ones. This prevented China from expanding its influence in the region and did not contribute to resolving problems around the islands in the South China Sea. The most important task of the PRC was to maintain and develop economic ties with its neighbors. **In South Asia**, the United States and Japan tried to draw India into their orbit and limit the space for China's actions. In turn, Beijing tried to propose a new diplomatic model of relations between Pakistan and India, which would neutralize the activities of terrorist groups and the threat from India of supplying Chinese weapons to Pakistan.

Professor Liu Yiyu concludes that all these states, not being friends of China and being under pressure from the United States, slowed down China's progress towards global hegemony, and in this regard, the PRC still had regional influence⁷⁹⁵.

Professor Yan Xuetong analyzes China's rise strategy (中国崛起战略) from the following aspects: the core of the domestic strategy is to strengthen national power in the shortest possible time; and external strategy is how to deal with external containment (中国崛起战略涉及两个方面, 对内战略的核心是如何在尽可能短的时间里提高国力, 对外战略则是如何应对外部遏制)⁷⁹⁶. The professor writes that contradictions and conflicts will inevitably arise with other countries, and it is necessary

⁷⁹⁴ Hsü I.C.Y. Op. cit. P. 1005.

⁷⁹⁵ China: Topical issues of foreign policy as reported by political scientists of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and Singapore. Moscow, 2007. P. 63–72.

⁷⁹⁶ See: Yan Xuetong, Sun Xuefeng. China's Rise and its Strategy. In Chinese.

to develop requirements or principles for strengthening the military power and combat readiness of the PRC. Then, based on these basic principles, address the security issues that China will face in the 21st century. The effectiveness of the strategy for the rise of the country and its security implies the creation of a favorable environment⁷⁹⁷. Developing thoughts about the reasons for the rise of China's status, Professor Yan, firstly, assesses the political prerequisites that give rise to inadequate assessments of the status of the PRC's power (positive or negative). Positive political reasons for overestimating China's power include the belief that China should take on more international responsibilities. The international community and many developing countries share a common expectation that China should take more international responsibility for the world economy and security⁷⁹⁸.

Positive political reasons have led some scholars to underestimate China's power status in order to eliminate the perception of a "Chinese threat" or to prevent the Chinese government from repeating the mistakes of the collapse of the Soviet Union by engaging in a military arms race with the United States of America. Many Chinese political scientists were concerned that recognizing China's de facto power could lead the world's superpower, the United States, to treat China as a major rival⁷⁹⁹.

Many Western experts saw China's rise as a threat to the world. They were especially concerned about the growing military power of the PRC. They believed that China already poses a threat to the current international order. To encourage their governments to pursue preventive policies against China, they emphasized that the PRC's comprehensive power surpassed that of Japan and that China was likely to challenge American power status. Their estimate of China's national defense budget was several times higher than figures from official Chinese sources⁸⁰⁰.

In order to calm public sentiment, the Chinese political leadership officially changed the term "rise" to "peaceful development" («和平发展») in 2004. This was

⁷⁹⁷ See: Yan Xuetong, Sun Xuefeng. China's Rise and its Strategy. In Chinese.

⁷⁹⁸ Yan Xuetong. The rise of China and its power status. P. 6–7.

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid. P. 7–8.

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid. P. 7.

preceded by intense debate among Chinese scientists and political scientists⁸⁰¹. The concept of “rise” has virtually disappeared from official discourse since 2005 due to the growth of discrepancies and doubts. The new terminology of “peaceful development” was introduced into the scientific community for deeper study and discussion⁸⁰². Chinese political scientists have noted that the term "rise" implied the achievement of superpower status⁸⁰³. “Rise” in Chinese has a much larger scale, which makes it necessary to talk about the creation of a new concept in the field of international strategy. Professor Yan drew a parallel between "uplift" and the concept of "national revival", which has the same meaning. Both concepts mean restoring China's powerful status to the level of prosperity that existed during the heyday of the Han, Tang, and early Qing dynasties⁸⁰⁴. China's 2005 White Paper, entitled "China's Peaceful Development Road" (2005 年, 中国国务院新闻办公室发表《中国的和平发展道路》白皮书), stated that China is following a path that will use the peaceful international environment to promote economic growth, democracy, civilization and harmony, and that China will bring positive contribution to world peace through its national development (《中国人民正努力把自己的国家建设成富强、民主、文明、和谐的现代化国家, 并以自身的发展不断对人类进步事业作出新的更大的贡献》)⁸⁰⁵.

Soon after this statement in Beijing, a lively debate began in political and scientific circles on the status of Taiwan and on possible scenarios for the development of the situation. However, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) leadership has expressed concern that an excessive commitment to peace could significantly weaken support for the continued allocation of financial resources to modernize the military⁸⁰⁶. In this regard, the question of how the PRC leadership should approach national

⁸⁰¹ Yan Xuetong. The rise of China and its power status. P. 13.

⁸⁰² See: Lomanov A. Zhongguo heping jueqi (Peaceful Rise of China).

⁸⁰³ Yan Xuetong. The International Environment and International Strategy for China's Peaceful Rise. P. 5. In Chinese.

⁸⁰⁴ Yan Xuetong. The rise of China and its power status. P. 13.

⁸⁰⁵ China's White Paper. China's Peaceful Development Road. Part 1. In Chinese.

⁸⁰⁶ Glaser B.S., Medeiros E.S. The Changing ecology of foreign policy-making in China: the ascension and demise of the Theory of «Peaceful Rise» // The China Quarterly. 2007. No. 190. P. 305; Hayoun J. R. The Meaning of China's «peaceful development» concept // Observer Research Foundation. Occasional Paper. 2009. No. 12. P. 2.

security in this process of peaceful development has become a new agenda for research and discussion⁸⁰⁷.

Lively discussions in the political leadership and in the expert community during the reign of Hu Jintao clearly demonstrated that a qualitatively new type of thinking had been formed in society and the state, recognizing the need not only for revival, but also for the powerful rise and uplift of the PRC.

During the reign of Hu Jintao, scholars and politicians revived and creatively enriched the discourse of the theory of “convergence/contact” of “China's communities of common interests” (《利益汇合点》和《利益共同体》). The declaration of this theory began under President Jiang Zemin in 1989 (refer to Chapter III). After the XV CPC Congress, Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao, Men Honghua⁸⁰⁸, Liu Xiaoyang⁸⁰⁹, Zheng Bijian⁸¹⁰ and other experts complemented and developed this concept. At the I session of the X National People's Congress in 2005 (中华人民共和国第十届全国人民代表大会第一次会议), Premier Zhu Rongji reaffirmed the pursuit of an independent and independent peaceful foreign policy, strengthening, unity and cooperation with developing countries, and protecting interests. He noted the need to develop relations with developed countries, continue to deepen friendly good neighborly relations, expand common interests and properly resolve differences based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence⁸¹¹. Zhu Rongji's instructions were enshrined in the White Paper "China's Peaceful Development Road" in 2005, which spoke of uniting the fundamental interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of the peoples of the world on the path of peaceful development. It was understood that the convergence of common interests occurs at two levels. The first level included a **combination** of China's national interests with the common interests of the countries of the world. The second level contained an

⁸⁰⁷ Wang Yizhou. China's state security in a time of peaceful development: A new issue on research agenda // *China & World Economy*. 2007. Vol. 15, no. 1. P. 77–86.

⁸⁰⁸ Men Honghua. Evolution of National Identity in China through the Prism of Domestic and Foreign Policy (1982–2012). P. 54–66. In Chinese.

⁸⁰⁹ Liu Xiaoyang. Common interests of states: concept and mechanism // *World Economy and Politics*. 2017. No. 6. P. 102–121. In Chinese.; Liu Xiaoyang. Op. cit. P. 124–152.

⁸¹⁰ Zheng Bijian. Op. cit. In Chinese.

⁸¹¹ Government Work Report read by Zhu Rongji on 5 March 2003 at the 1st Session of the 10th National People's Congress // China Government Network. Bulletin of the State Council. 2003. № 11. URL: http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2003/content_62011.htm (accessed: 28.07.2022). In Chinese.

expansion of the discussion of common interests from a regional to a multilateral format⁸¹².

Under Hu Jintao's initiative, the theory of "community of common interests in all aspects" was expanded to the theory of "community of common interests in different fields and at different levels with countries and regions." It creatively enriched with theoretical works the idea of a comprehensive international "convergence of interests," which Zheng Bijian developed in detail in his article. He revealed the mechanisms for forming close "communities of interests" with different countries and regions in different areas and at different levels⁸¹³.

At the beginning of the 21st century Chinese scholars in the field of international relations have increasingly raised the question of the creative development of China's foreign policy concept in a new era in which new relations between the PRC and the international community are being formed. The concept of "new thinking in diplomacy" and "a quiet revolution in thinking", they believed, were the answer to global and regional challenges⁸¹⁴. At the same time, they considered it necessary to introduce and apply the New Security Concept in diplomatic practice. Based on the analysis of Chinese history, Beijing's diplomacy over the years has come to understand the realities of the 21st century⁸¹⁵. In the process of implementing foreign policy objectives, the PRC government tried to equally take into account four historical objectives: modernization, national unity, social reform and the revival of China as a great power⁸¹⁶.

During these years, Chinese diplomacy became a multilateral and multi-vector system, an important component in the concept of "great power diplomacy," says political scientist Su Changhe. China's participation in multilateral international institutions over the past 20 years and its contribution to solving regional and global problems has marked the emergence of "new thinking" in this area, a "quiet revolution"

⁸¹² China's Peaceful Development Road. Part 1: Peaceful development is the road to China's modernization. In Chinese.

⁸¹³ Zheng Bijian. *Op. cit.* In Chinese.

⁸¹⁴ Su Changhe. Exploring the New Chinese Foreign Policy: Multilateral International Institutions and New Chinese Thinking in Diplomacy // *World Economy and Politics*. 2005. No. 4. P. 11–16. In Chinese.

⁸¹⁵ Zhang Baijia, Ma Zongshi. National objectives vs. strategic choices: lessons from Chinese diplomacy // *Contemporary International Relations*. 2010. Iss. 6. P. 1.

⁸¹⁶ *Ibid.* P. 13.

has occurred, which has led to "new thinking" in diplomacy («中国外交新思维»)⁸¹⁷. Having analyzed the practice of "new Chinese diplomacy", Su Changhe concludes that its application can lead to the emergence of an image of "liberal/free China" in the international arena. This is due to a qualitatively different understanding of the concepts of national sovereignty and management of world problems that exist on the basis of multilateral international institutions and will be of great importance for Asian states and the world as a whole⁸¹⁸.

The key idea of the "new thinking" was based on liberal principles. Firstly, China's "new diplomacy" contained the content of the liberal theory of international relations. Secondly, the image of a "free China" was shaped by international institutions, not domestic politics, and how the world community saw China was important to the Chinese themselves⁸¹⁹.

Professor Dong Manyuan from the China Institute of International Studies believes that the interests of the survival and development of the Chinese people are part of the common interests of all humanity. In realizing peaceful development, China needs to cope with common challenges and threats. This leads to problem solving based on the common interests of humanity⁸²⁰. The author lists the following threats that are associated with the common interests of humanity: 1) a threat to the space of existence and development of humanity, which consists of climate change, reduction of arable land; 2) reduction of non-renewable resources, predatory destruction of renewable resources; 3) destruction of the ecological landscape; 4) politics of power and hegemony; 5) the threatening growth of unpredictable factors in the field of traditional and non-traditional security (terrorism, the continuous proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, transnational crime, financial crises in Asia, Russia, Mexico and other countries, etc.). All this indicates that the protection of universal human interests depends on the peaceful development of China. While building mutually beneficial and win-win relationships with other countries, China will rely

⁸¹⁷ Su Changhe. Exploring the New Chinese Foreign Policy. P. 11. In Chinese.

⁸¹⁸ Ibid. P. 14.

⁸¹⁹ Ibid. P. 13–16.

⁸²⁰ Dong Manyuan. Op. cit. P. 15–21. In Chinese.

mainly on the Chinese people's own resources, experience, and creativity to achieve a peaceful path⁸²¹.

In December 2010, Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo, who oversees Chinese foreign policy, in an article entitled “Adhere To The Path Of Peaceful Development,” raised the following important questions regarding the development of the PRC at the present stage: for what reason does China propose the path of peaceful development; what is a peaceful path of development; what are the directions of China's development and its strategic intentions; how to evaluate China's development; after the PRC begins to develop, will it be a hegemon and what impact will the rapid development of the PRC have on relations with other countries, etc. Dai Bingguo tried to consistently answer them and convince the Western world that China does not have aggressive plans and strategies. Dai Bingguo believed that China should take a more assertive stance towards the world⁸²². Dai Bingguo is convinced that “by adhering to the path of peaceful development, rather than following subjective thinking or fantasy, everyone understands that the world today is undergoing great changes, China is on the verge of great changes, the relationship between China and the world has changed in many ways, and China should make the most of these changes, to follow the path of global development and respect for the national interests of other countries”⁸²³.

The politician believed that “China needs to go through this road, this path. The whole world can see that over the past thirty years, the PRC has overcome the historical stages of aggression and hegemony and, in the era of globalization, is paving a new road, relying on work and experience, on mutually beneficial cooperation, in order to achieve peaceful development. China should follow modern economic globalization, reform and opening up, through the development of peace and international cooperation with countries in the world, properly handle contradictions and tensions, play a constructive role in international affairs, promote the establishment of world order, moving along the path of reform,” concludes Dai Bingguo⁸²⁴.

⁸²¹ Dong Manyuan. Op. cit. P. 15–21. In Chinese.

⁸²² Dai Bingguo. Sustainable progress on the path of peaceful development // Information portal "Xinlan Caijing". 07 December, 2010. URL: <http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20101207/12049067499.shtml> (accessed: 25.07.2022). In Chinese.

⁸²³ Ibid.

⁸²⁴ Dai Bingguo. Op. cit.

The strategic importance of China's peaceful development had a significant impact on the whole world, including Russia. Of particular importance has become the problem of the spread in the Russian Federation of the “China threat theory”, the “China demographic expansion theory”, the “China environmental threat theory”, and the “theory of loss of balance in the balance of power between China and Russia”.

The Society for Strategic Research of the People's Republic of China offered a balanced approach and called for refuting these phenomena, which have no scientific basis and have a negative impact on the consciousness of the two peoples. Due to the gap in the economic development of the two countries, significantly ahead of China, they became widespread in the early 2000s among part of the Russian media, the Russian elite. According to Chinese researchers, Russia is the only country that has benefited economically and militarily from China's peaceful rise. The above theories arose in response to lack of cultural understanding, historical doubts, unfounded claims, etc.⁸²⁵. Russian political scientists believe that establishing in the minds of the concept of “mutual benefit and common gain”, based on pragmatic cooperation, serves as an effective way to create not only a fair and rational international order, but also stability in the regions⁸²⁶.

The practical implementation of “peaceful rise/development” began in the first half of the 2000s. Beijing has made a series of diplomatic efforts to reassure its neighbors, as well as other countries, of its peaceful intentions. An intensive program of military diplomacy with other countries was developed to ease regional concerns about China's military modernization. China has sent high-level military delegations to sixty countries. China's dependence on the global economy, its limited military capabilities, its desire to project an image of a responsible power in the world (《做负责任大国》), and its newly developed approach, which relies more heavily on shared security, led to closer cooperation with the international community. This behavior indicated that China was “gradually abandoning its revolutionary heritage.” The idea of "peaceful development" showed Beijing's efforts to develop good neighborly relations, its responsible role and easing the concerns of other countries. The Chinese government

⁸²⁵ China: Topical Issues of Foreign Policy as Reported by Political Scientists of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, and Singapore. P. 44–49.

⁸²⁶ Ibid. P. 52.

was determined to convince the world that the country's rise was aimed at "building a comprehensive, prosperous society" within the country and "maintaining world peace and promoting common development" in the world («维护世界和平， 促进共同发展»). Chinese leaders and scholars have tirelessly proclaimed China's "benefit to the world and its non-quest for hegemony."

It is noteworthy that after its formation, this idea received support from Chinese military leaders. The path of peaceful rise has been China's choice as its international strategy and will be widely accepted by neighboring countries, said Cao Gangchuan, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China (CMC). This path of peaceful rise is based on an understanding of the relationship between peace and development and the international situation.

There is no doubt that China's growing international influence in the years described largely neutralized its desire to start a civil war with Taiwan. The PRC made efforts to create an attractive and "soft" international image, which led to an awareness of the responsibility of a great power for the formation of a stable international order and building good neighborly relations with the world based on mutual interests and cooperation. China was determined to show the world that a responsible great power would take into account not only its national interests, but also the interests of people around the world. Domestic concerns about China's image and relations with the outside world will play an important role in China's decisions related to the Taiwan issue.

Men Jing believes that China has transformed itself from a revolutionary state to one that emphasizes international cooperation and mutual benefit. Such changes encouraged the PRC to pursue a peaceful path in its development. However, a peaceful path is not guaranteed if Taiwan wants to change the status quo and achieve independence from China.

So, based on the above, we can identify five features of the "development path of China's peaceful rise", substantiated in the concept of Hu Jintao.

The first feature is that the PRC has unswervingly adhered to economic construction as the core and set development as the priority of the Communist Party of China in governing and renovating the country.

The second characteristic is a determination to open up to the outside world and to insist on being connected to rather than separated from economic globalization. Since the 1990s two historical events and two strategic choices of China in the process of its peaceful rise have amply demonstrated this. The first historical turning point occurred in the late 1970s, when the CPC began to correct the mistakes of the cultural revolution and reconsider fundamental questions of how to build socialism and carry out a new scientific and technological revolution in the context of economic globalization. The second historical turning point occurred in the 1990s, when the confrontation between the two world trends of economic globalization and anti-globalism, as well as the Asian financial crisis, put China's peaceful development path before severe tests. Even the political leadership led by Jiang Zemin decided to participate in economic globalization further actively in accordance with the principle of “seek advantages and avoid disadvantages” (《趋利避害》的原则).

The third feature is active participation in economic globalization and defending its independence. Consciously achieve the "five pillars" (自觉的做到《五个依靠》) – rely on concept renewal and system innovation; rely on the restructuring of its own industry; rely on the development of the domestic market; rely on broader and deeper development of human resources, that is, improving the quality of personnel training and accelerating the progress of science and technology to solve resource and environmental problems.

The fourth characteristic is to pursue strategic relationships and advocacy that aim to reform and take into account all aspects to achieve a combination of reform, development and research.

The fifth feature is that China has strived to rise by adhering to the world's independent foreign policy of never returning to hegemony or becoming a hegemon. Since the late 1990s China adhered to the path of peaceful rise and development, which demonstrated the rejection of the closed path, narrow outlook and boasting (《坐进观天、夜郎自大》). There is no doubt that China was unable to develop without peace and

strived for a peaceful international environment in order to maintain world peace through its own development⁸²⁷.

At the same time, while defending and strengthening its independent status as a key and one of the central poles of a multipolar world, China faced numerous external challenges. Thus, Russian sinologists critically assessed the role of the PRC as a global pole. Its weaknesses were associated with the incompleteness of the process of reunification of the country (Taiwan issue), demographic pressure, the presence on the outskirts of large regions with a titular non-Han population (Tibet, Xinjiang) and with the specifics of the political system. China had obvious potential for further growth, but its implementation required long-term, multifaceted efforts.

Thus, in general, during the reign of Hu Jintao, the world's perception of China remained contradictory and ambiguous. It changed under the influence of certain events within the PRC. The events of 1989 changed the image of post-reform China to a negative image, according to the West, of authoritarian rigid leadership, limited political freedoms and violations of human rights protections. The Chinese leadership and Hu Jintao have created a fairly positive image of a developing and expanding China.

5.2. The building of a “harmonious world” in the foreign policy strategy of the People’s Republic of China at the beginning of the 21st century

An important theoretical basis for Hu Jintao's new international policy in the early 2000s becomes the concept of a “harmonious world”. It was more logical, it continued and supplemented the previous doctrine of the “peaceful rise of China”, then “peaceful development”⁸²⁸.

The concept of a “harmonious world” was enshrined in the documents of the XVI Congress of the CPC, which set a course for building a harmonious socialist society («构建社会主义和谐社会») as part of the comprehensive construction of a society of average prosperity («全面建设小康社会»). In foreign policy, Hu Jintao and

⁸²⁷ The Path of China's peaceful rise // National Association for Research on Innovation and Development Strategy. 14.10.2015. URL: http://www.ciids.cn/content/2015-10/14/content_11707681.htm (accessed: 04.12.2022). In Chinese.

⁸²⁸ Zheng Yongnian, Tok Sow Keat. «Harmonious society» and «Harmonious world»: China’s policy discourse under Hu Jintao. Nottingham, 2007. P. 9.

his team have put forward the task of protecting the interests of Chinese citizens. At the XVI Congress, a policy was adopted to develop a single fundamental idea of a people-oriented foreign policy («核心是以人为本»)⁸²⁹.

Emphasizing the vital need for modern Chinese leadership to rely on tradition, the current Chinese government led by Xi Jinping is pursuing a new campaign to open up and introduce traditional Chinese culture into the country's foreign policy management. One of the main factors in the revival of traditional political culture is the spiritual void that needs to be filled with Confucianism as a modern form of educational model. Xi Jinping is interested in ensuring that political culture contributes to the fight against corrosive social vices and the influence of foreign cultures⁸³⁰.

In Xi Jinping's concept of a "community of a common destiny for all mankind," the Confucian Doctrine of the Mean is also essential and fundamental. In traditional Chinese culture, "perfection is morality, which is the basis of the Doctrine of the Mean". This principle emphasizes fairness, peacefulness, and impartiality that "let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail through Heaven and Earth, and all things will be nourished and flourished"⁸³¹.

In his report to the XVI Congress, Hu Jintao substantiated the general principle on which relationships with all countries are built – peaceful coexistence. In the report of Premier Wen Jiabao, he prioritized three groups of countries: **relations with developing countries; relations with neighbors; relations with developed countries**⁸³². These priorities were further developed in the report of Hu Jintao at the XVII Congress in 2007 and at the XVIII Congress of the CPC in 2012.

At the II session of the X National People's Congress in 2002, the PRC's commitment to a multipolar model, ensuring common benefits from the globalization

⁸²⁹ Report of Wen Jiabao on the work of the government at the II session of the X National People's Congress (full text) // Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in Khabarovsk. 17.03.2004. URL: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgkhh/chn/xwdt/04news1/t115719.htm> (accessed: 04.12.2022). In Chinese.

⁸³⁰ Zi Yang. Xi Jinping and the restoration of traditionalism in China // AsiaNews. 07.11.2017. URL: <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Xi-Jinping-and-the-Restoration-of-Traditionalism-in-China-41252.html> (accessed: 22.07.2023).

⁸³¹ Chen Zhaohe. The Chinese cultural root of the community of common destiny for all mankind. P. 721.

⁸³² Wen Jiabao's Report on Government Work at the 2nd Session of the 10th National People's Congress (full text). In Chinese.

process, pursuing an independent and independent foreign policy, opposing hegemony and power politics, terrorism, traditional and non-traditional threats, etc.⁸³³.

The session strengthened Beijing's arguments regarding the protection of world harmony and the just cause of humanity, as well as the “one-China principle” as the basis for solving the Taiwan issue⁸³⁴.

At the IV Plenum of the XVI CPC Central Committee in 2004 Hu Jintao defined the content and goals of building a “socialist harmonious society” (《把“社会更加和谐”作为党的重要奋斗目标》)⁸³⁵. He developed these provisions in his speech at the Central Party School in February 2005. The President of the People's Republic of China noted that in building a socialist harmonious society, the unity of ideals not only of the Chinese people, but of all humanity is necessary. He pointed to a social ideal that consolidated the parties of the world based on Marxist theory⁸³⁶. In other words, the political leadership of the PRC moved away from the slogan of class struggle and strived for social harmony. Cultivating the concept of harmony did not exclude the desire to achieve strategic advantages.

Building on the Manifesto of the Communist Party of 1848⁸³⁷, Hu Jintao combined the thesis of the comprehensive and free development of every person with the ancient Chinese idea of harmony between man and nature, as well as the three civilizations (material, political, and spiritual)⁸³⁸.

In the course of developing a new foreign policy course, the leadership of the CPC and Chinese society increasingly raised the question of whether the application of the idea of “harmony” in the development of a modern foreign policy strategy is sufficient and appropriate; How important is this for building a harmonious world, overcoming the country’s global crisis and solving global problems of humanity?

⁸³³ Wen Jiabao's Report on Government Work at the 2nd Session of the 10th National People's Congress (full text). In Chinese.

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ The Glorious Years of New China. Building a harmonious society // Information portal "Chinese Youth Network". 16 November, 2019. URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1650346767190147688&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed: 23.07.2022). In Chinese.

⁸³⁶ Introduction to the main chapters of Comrade Hu Jintao's book "On Building a Socialist Harmonious Society" // Information portal "Renmin Wang". 26 April, 2013. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0426/c64094-21285606.html> (accessed: 07.01.2022). In Chinese.

⁸³⁷ Marx K., Engels F. Manifesto of the Communist Party. P. 63.

⁸³⁸ Galenovich Y.M. Hu Jintao's motto: social harmony in China. P. 21, 81.

Summarizing these tasks, Hu said that in order to build a harmonious world, it is necessary to consolidate the understanding of different communities of harmony, nature and man in it⁸³⁹.

In September 2005, at a meeting of the UN General Assembly, Hu Jintao raised the issue of a harmonious world and the coexistence of all countries and peoples in it before the world community. In the report, "Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity" («努力建设持久和平，共同繁荣的和谐世界»), he called for addressing the two major challenges of peace and development. Hu Jintao emphasized that local wars and conflicts caused by varying reasons keep cropping up, the wealth gap between the North and South continues to widen, and people in many countries are still being denied of the right to subsistence and even survival. International terrorist groups and ethnic and extremist religious forces continue to operate in some regions; and cross-boundary problems such as environmental pollution, drug trafficking, transnational crime, and deadly communicable diseases have become more salient. Hu expressed concern that humanity is still far from realizing the ideal of universal peace and common development («同时，世界和平与发展这两大问题还没有得到根本解决。因各种原因导致的局部战争和冲突时起时伏，地区热点问题错综复杂，南北差距进一步拉大，许多国家人民的基本生存甚至生命安全得不到保障，国际恐怖势力、民族分裂势力、极端宗教势力在一些地区还相当活跃，环境污染、毒品走私、跨国犯罪、严重传染性疾病等跨国性问题日益突出。人类实现普遍和平、共同发展的理想还任重道远») ⁸⁴⁰.

At the UN General Assembly meeting, President Hu Jintao put forward a four-point proposal to create a "harmonious society" in the world:

- 1) cultivation a new security concept with the UN in the core;

⁸³⁹ Information materials. Series G: Ideological and theoretical trends in modern China: national traditions and searches for ways of modernization Vol. 15. XIII–XIV All-Russian Conferences "Philosophies of East Asian Region and Modern Civilization". Part 2. Moscow, 2008. P. 122.

⁸⁴⁰ Hu Jintao's speech at the summit dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the UN formation // Central Government Information Portal. 16 September, 2005 URL: http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2005-09/16/content_63871.htm (accessed: 07.01.2022). In Chinese.

- 2) the UN should promote developing countries to accelerate development;
- 3) all country's right to independently choose its own social system and path of development should be respected;
- 4) the UN should be supported in taking on new threats and new challenges⁸⁴¹.

The theory of “harmonious world” was enshrined in subsequent documents of the CPC and in statements by the leadership of the PRC. In the 2005 China White Paper “China's Peaceful Development Road” stated that humanity has only one Earth, a home. Building a harmonious world, lasting peace, and shared prosperity is the common aspiration of people around the world (《人类只有地球一个家园。建设一个持久和平、共同繁荣的和谐世界，是世界各国人民的共同心愿，是中国走和平发展道路的崇高目标。中国认为，和谐世界应该是民主的世界，和睦的世界，公正的世界，包容的世界》)⁸⁴².

At the Second Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA, 亚洲相互协作与信任措施会) in the Republic of Kazakhstan on June 17, 2006, in Almaty, Chinese President Hu Jintao called for building a harmonious Asia with sustainable peace and common prosperity. He said that Asia is vital to China's development, and the good neighborly foreign policy of partnership, security, and prosperity together with Asian countries aims to create a better future for Asia⁸⁴³.

Hu Jintao's concept of “building a harmonious society” reveals traditional ideological principles: the desire for unity, which is achieved through the combination of opposites, and the desire for harmony and tranquility. The socialist harmonious society that China is trying to build, Hu said, should be based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law, fairness, sincerity, and friendship, full of vitality, stable, harmonious coexistence of man and nature (《明确提出构建社会主义和谐社会的重大任务，这表明，随着我国经济社会的不断发展，中国特色社会主义事业的总体布

⁸⁴¹ Kuzyk B.N., Titarenko M.L. China-Russia-2050: strategy of co-development. Moscow, 2006. P. 534.

⁸⁴² China's White Paper. China's Peaceful Development Road. In Chinese.

⁸⁴³ Hu Jintao's speech at the Second Meeting of Leaders of CICA Member States (full text) // Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 17.06.2006. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/yzxhhy_683118/zyjh_683128/200606/t20060617_9388787.shtml (accessed: 07.01.2022). In Chinese.

局，更加明确地由社会主义经济建设、政治建设、文化建设三位一体发展为社会主义经济建设、政治建设、文化建设、社会建设四位一体。我们所要建设的社会主义和谐社会，应该是民主法治、公平正义、诚信友爱、充满活力、安定有序、人与自然和谐相处的社会»)⁸⁴⁴.

Analyzing and creatively developing the theory of Hu Jintao's "harmonious world" («和谐世界»重要理念), Chinese researchers identify three levels. At the **first level**, the CCP leadership moves from the idea of "peaceful rise" to the idea of "harmonious world." Scholars believe that the previous foreign policy formulation did not correspond to the attractive image of the PRC. The world community was no longer wary of China. Hu's diplomacy was becoming "Chinese, distinctive and socialist"⁸⁴⁵. Hu Jintao's diplomacy is the diplomacy of "socialist affairs with Chinese characteristics"⁸⁴⁶. He combined the experience of previous generations and scientific views. The idea of "cooperation" and the concept of "peace and development" are united in Hu's socialist diplomacy. Scientific development and social harmony become the basic requirements for the development of socialism with Chinese characteristics, as well as the indispensable needs of achieving healthy and rapid economic and social development, and they must be unswervingly implemented («科学发展，社会和谐，是发展中国特色社会主义的基本要求，是实现经济社会又好又快发展的内在需要，必须坚定不移地加以落实»)⁸⁴⁷.

Hu Jintao advocated eliminating and resolving conflicts and preventing clashes. Chinese political scientists note that the leadership's course was based on the "Marxist line of peace," the predecessors and ardent adherents of which were Jiang Zemin, Liu

⁸⁴⁴ Introduction to the main chapters of Comrade Hu Jintao's book "On Building a Socialist Harmonious Society". In Chinese.

⁸⁴⁵ Wang Rui. Cognitive comments of American scientists on the concept of "harmonious world": dis. ... mag. [S. 1.], 2011. P. 48. In Chinese; Wang Qun. The concept of harmonious peace and the basic principles of international law // Information portal "Guangmingwang". 2007. 12 November. URL: https://www.gmw.cn/01gmr/2007-11/12/content_695993.htm (accessed: 07.11.2022). In Chinese; Galenovich Y.M. The New Face of China. Book 3. P. 65.

⁸⁴⁶ Hu Jintao: Strengthen the united front and build socialism with Chinese specificity // Information portal "Sohu". 13 July, 2006. URL: <http://news.sohu.com/20060713/n244242332.shtml> (accessed: 07.06.2022). In Chinese.

⁸⁴⁷ Commitment to and development of socialism with Chinese characteristics are the main directions of progress of modern China. URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1685767131900451056&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed: 07.11.2022). In Chinese.

Shaoqi, and Hu Yaobang. Conversely, Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping pursued the “line of battle”⁸⁴⁸

The second level is the theorization of a harmonious world. By promoting the idea of a harmonious world, the political leadership and the scientific community have refuted the thesis that China has not developed its own modern theories of international relations. Hu Jintao considered the world to be colorful and diverse. He gradually moved away from the multipolar approach. Multipolarity seemed to him less effective, and he identified another part of it, namely multiplicity. Chinese President did not place the PRC above other centers of power⁸⁴⁹.

The third area combines Marxism with China's traditional civilization. The Sinicization of Marxism presupposes the preservation of the leading role of the Marxist school and the national idea of the Chinese ethnic group. Some critics of the "harmonious world" theory argue that the Chinese leader rejected the Marxist philosophy of struggle and advocated Confucian gentleness and moderation (温和的儒家哲学)⁸⁵⁰.

Having put forward the theory of a “harmonious society” in China, Hu Jintao transferred it to the entire “harmonious world” of humanity, and then to the “limits of great unity”, or «大同». However, the harmonious world of mankind faces numerous challenges, the Chinese leader believed. Talking about threats and challenges in the 21st century, on the world stage, including China, Hu Jintao avoided the direct meaning of the term “international terrorism” because this caused a clash of interests with Political Islam. He replaced it with the softer expression “unconventional threats.”

The concrete implementation of building a harmonious society and world began with the “Decision” of the VI Plenum of the XVI CPC Central Committee in 2006⁸⁵¹. Speaking at this plenum, Hu Jintao said that the modern foreign policy of the PRC is aimed at achieving a harmonious world without threats and wars, and at peaceful development. The term “development” is becoming one of the key ones in the concept

⁸⁴⁸ Galenovich Y.M. The New Face of China. Book 3. P. 71–74.

⁸⁴⁹ Ibid. P. 72.

⁸⁵⁰ Ibid. P. 75–76.

⁸⁵¹ Decision of the CPC Central Committee on several important issues of building a socialist harmonious society (adopted at the VI Plenum of the XVI CPC Central Committee on 11 October 2006) // News Agency "Zhenminwan". 19 October, 2006. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/72347/6347991.html> (date of address: 24.07.2022). In Chinese.

of President Hu Jintao. It was confirmed at the XVII CPC Congress in 2007 and found practical implementation in subsequent years⁸⁵².

The central idea in Hu Jintao's report at the XVII Congress of the CPC, dedicated to the foreign policy actions of the PRC, was the task of the great cause of unifying the fatherland, all Chinese and the Chinese nation («十、推进“一国两制”实践和祖国和平统一大业，十一、始终不渝走和平发展道路»). It was noted that the PRC intends to adhere to the long-term prosperity and stability of Xianggang and Aomen in the new situation. Based on Deng Xiaoping's rather tough position regarding the recognition of Taiwan as an indivisible territory with the People's Republic of China, Hu Jintao flexibly applied two principles: “one country, two systems” and “peaceful unification of the fatherland” («和平统一、一国两制的»方针») and softened his approach to the historical relationship between the Taiwanese and the residents of the People's Republic of China. Hu did not directly force them to become Chinese citizens. It appears that he considered the concepts of “one China” and “one country” separately. Initially, Deng Xiaoping considered Taiwan as an integral part of the Chinese nation and subject to the “system” of the PRC⁸⁵³. Hu Jintao implied a different approach, in which “the world” and “the motherland” are national assets.

Discussing the principles of the PRC's foreign policy towards Xianggang, Aomen, and Taiwan, Hu emphasized the importance of the unity of the entire Chinese nation in connection with the difficult situation in the international arena.

Implementing the principles of “one country, two systems,” Hu Jintao assured the people of Xianggang and Aomen of maintaining democratic autonomy. “The people of Xianggang rule Xianggang,” “the people of Aomen rule Aomen.” He spoke of fully supporting the Government of the Special Administrative Region in governing according to the law, which focuses on developing the economy, improving the living standards of the people and promoting democracy; encouraging people from all walks of life in Hong Kong and Macau to work together under the slogan of love of country, love of Hong Kong and love of country and Macau, as well as promoting social

⁸⁵² Galenovich Y.M. The New Face of China. Book 3. P. 146–147, 163.

⁸⁵³ See: Galenovich Y.M. The New Face of China. Book 3. P. 246–247.

harmony, strengthening exchanges and cooperation between the mainland and Hong Kong and Macau, and actively support for Xianggang and Aomen in conducting foreign exchanges, and advocated resolute opposition to external interference in the affairs of these territories («保持香港、澳门长期繁荣稳定是党在新形势下治国理政面临的重大课题。我们将坚定不移地贯彻“一国两制”、“港人治港”、“澳人治澳”、高度自治的方针，严格按照特别行政区基本法办事；全力支持特别行政区政府依法施政，着力发展经济、改善民生、推进民主；鼓励香港、澳门各界人士在爱国爱港、爱国爱澳旗帜下和衷共济，促进社会和睦；加强内地与香港、澳门交流合作，实现优势互补、共同发展；积极支持香港、澳门开展对外交往，坚决反对外部势力干预香港、澳门事务»)。⁸⁵⁴

On the issue of unifying cross-strait people, Hu Jintao hoped for the unity of Taiwan, one nation in Taiwan and the mainland. The Chinese leader affirmed the ideas of concord, harmony, and harmonious world. The PRC leader strongly condemned the position on "Taiwan independence" or separatist activities that seriously threatened the peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait (which the Chinese leader strongly defended). Compatriots on both sides of the Strait must jointly oppose and contain separatist activities for "Taiwan independence" («当前，“台独”分裂势力加紧进行分裂活动，严重危害两岸关系和平发展。两岸同胞要共同反对和遏制“台独”分裂活动»)。⁸⁵⁵

Hu Jintao was resolute in his commitment to preserving peace in the strait and in advocating for the unity of all Chinese people, emphasizing that China is the shared homeland of over one billion three hundred million compatriots on the mainland and twenty-three million residents of Taiwan. At the same time, Hu Jintao did not

⁸⁵⁴ At the opening ceremony of the XVII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Hu Jintao makes a speech (full text). Ch. X: Carrying Forward the Practice of "One Country, Two Systems" and Advancing the Great Cause of Peaceful National Reunification // China Internet News Centre. 14 November, 2007. URL: http://www.china.com.cn/fangtan/zhuanti/djt/2007-11/14/content_9228561_10.htm (accessed: 14.07.2022). In Chinese; Ch. XI: Unswervingly Following the Path of Peaceful Development // China Internet News Centre. 14 November, 2007. URL: http://www.china.com.cn/fangtan/zhuanti/djt/2007-11/14/content_9228561_11.htm (accessed: 14.07.2022). In Chinese.

⁸⁵⁵ At the opening ceremony of the XVII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Hu Jintao makes a speech (full text). Ch. X: Carrying Forward the Practice of "One Country, Two Systems" and Advancing the Great Cause of Peaceful National Reunification. In Chinese.

emphasize the difference in the proportion of the population of small Taiwan and large mainland China.

New provisions in the policy of the Chinese leader include the recognition of the “one China principle,” which is a format for an agreement to end hostility, confrontation on both sides of the Strait and maintain a position of peaceful development for them («坚持一个中国原则，是两岸关系和平发展的政治基础»)⁸⁵⁶.

In the XI section of Hu Jintao's report “Unswervingly Following the Path of Peaceful Development” at the XVII Party Congress, the highest goal of contemporary China was sounded – from **peace to development** («世界和平方向发展»). The leader of the PRC meant by them the key global interests for all humanity. Considering the population of the PRC to be an integral part of all humanity, he emphasized universal human interests as the interests of the Chinese people and the nation. Peace was said to be China's primary national interest and universal human interest. A peaceful approach to the issue of the main interests of humanity is a unifying principle for all parts of humanity, Hu Jintao believed⁸⁵⁷.

President Hu saw the main goal of the PRC's foreign policy as the struggle to ensure peaceful conditions and the formation of a peaceful environment as key areas of activity for the further development of the country⁸⁵⁸. First, Hu believed, it is significant and important to bring the idea of development to the forefront, to harmonize and achieve harmony of common interests. Smoothly form first harmonious bilateral, regional, then global relationships within the framework of peace and development. Stability on a planetary scale in protecting the world excludes the policy of war and participation in Chinese military actions⁸⁵⁹.

The Chinese leader called **development or progress the key task of humanity**. From Hu Jintao's point of view, development is a necessary condition for China's peace policy. The strategy and tactics of such a foreign policy were determined by the PRC

⁸⁵⁶ At the opening ceremony of the XVII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Hu Jintao makes a speech (full text). Ch. X: Carrying Forward the Practice of "One Country, Two Systems" and Advancing the Great Cause of Peaceful National Reunification. In Chinese.

⁸⁵⁷ Galenovich Y.M. The New Face of China. Book 1. P. 35–36.

⁸⁵⁸ Ibid. P. 36.

⁸⁵⁹ At the opening ceremony of the XVII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Hu Jintao makes a speech (full text). Ch. XI: Unswervingly Following the Path of Peaceful Development. In Chinese.

government and enshrined in official documents for the next 50–100 years⁸⁶⁰. Beijing's focus on the long-term state of peace, on creating a more favorable environment for the peaceful development and modernization of China over the course of decades has also made it possible to build corresponding relations in the regions adjacent to the PRC and in the international community⁸⁶¹.

“Currently, in the international situation as a whole, there is a tendency towards a softening of tensions; ...at the same time, limited or local wars take place,” Hu said. “There is competition between major powers in the fields of science and technology, economics and military affairs, although friction and conflict occur”⁸⁶². At the same time, from this thesis one should take into account the likelihood of postponing a world war while building up one's own military power. Hu Jintao did not rule out the threat of a postponed war.

Speaking about negative trends on the world stage, Hu focused on the turbulent state of the world, hegemony, imbalance in the global economy, traditional and non-traditional threats, and other challenges. From this reasoning, we can conclude that numerous challenges and threats characterize the current situation, and China must respond to this in the same way as a significant part of the world community («同时，世界仍然很不安宁。霸权主义和强权政治依然存在，局部冲突和热点问题此起彼伏，全球经济失衡加剧，南北差距拉大，传统安全威胁和非传统安全威胁相互交织，世界和平与发展面临诸多难题和挑战») ⁸⁶³.

The leader of the PRC considered the principles and goals of the UN Charter to be an important and mandatory approach to neutralizing threats – a joint response to challenges and threats will provide all states with the harmonious peace envisioned by Hu Jintao. The call of the Chinese leadership to protect the common problems of mankind seems extremely important and new – it is the community and common

⁸⁶⁰ Kuzyk B.N., Titarenko M.L. Op. cit. P. 525, 531.

⁸⁶¹ Portyakov V.Y. From Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao: The People's Republic of China at the Beginning of the XXI Century: Essays. Moscow, 2006. P. 133.

⁸⁶² Cit. by: Galenovich Y.M. The New Face of China. Book 1: Situation in the Party. P. 38.

⁸⁶³ At the opening ceremony of the XVII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Hu Jintao makes a speech (full text). Ch. XI: Unswervingly Following the Path of Peaceful Development. In Chinese; Cit. by: Galenovich Y.M. The New Face of China. Book 1: Situation in the Party. P. 38–39.

interests of mankind that are necessary conditions for the promotion of world harmony.

Chinese President was confident that the multipolarity of the world is irreversible and is closely related to economic globalization. And this, in turn, leads to the acceleration of the technological revolution, global and regional cooperation. Countries are becoming increasingly interdependent, the international balance of power is tilting toward maintaining global peace, and the international environment is generally stable. This situation is generally in the interests of China and the whole world («世界多极化不可逆转，经济全球化深入发展，科技革命加速推进，全球和区域合作方兴未艾，国与国相互依存日益紧密，国际力量对比朝着有利于维护世界和平方向发展，国际形势总体稳定»)。⁸⁶⁴

Hu suggested that leaders of other states should think about jointly solving problems and promoting the cause of humane peace and development. This is part of the complex of fundamental interests of all countries and peoples and is also a common aspiration. The political leadership of all countries should aim to build a “harmonious world, lasting peace and shared prosperity.”

China’s head of state confirmed the development of friendly cooperation with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. By promoting strategic dialogue with developed countries and strengthening mutual trust, the PRC sought to deepen cooperation, properly resolve differences, and promote the long-term, stable, and healthy development of mutual relations⁸⁶⁵.

At the XVII Congress of the CPC, the leader of the PRC outlined his approach to the common points of contact of humanity in modern international relations: politics, economics, culture, security, and the environment. In the political sphere, Hu proposed that all nations respect each other, proceed from the principle of equality, and advocate common agreements. On the path to world harmony, the main ideals in the field of economic relations are cooperation, complementarity, globalization, equality, balance of

⁸⁶⁴ At the opening ceremony of the XVII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Hu Jintao makes a speech (full text). Ch. XI: Unswervingly Following the Path of Peaceful Development. In Chinese.

⁸⁶⁵ Ibid.

interests, common benefit. In the cultural sphere, it is necessary to show universal concern for the flourishing of world culture and the introduction of the experience of each country. In the field of security – rejection of military methods of resolving conflicts, joint defense of peace and security on the planet. The specificity of the problem of environmental protection lies in the belief that the Earth is our common home, which all countries and peoples are obliged to preserve.

The content of Hu Jintao's report at the XVI Congress of the CPC showed that the Chinese leader represented his country and people as an equal part of humanity with common destinies. The report emphasized the basic principle of foreign policy, namely: the thesis of the equality of all states, which cannot be divided into large and small, strong and weak, rich and poor. This goes against the very nature of foreign policy. Developing states, or states of the South, to which China belongs, lack the global fairness of the Global North.

Hu Jintao's thesis that China, advocating peaceful resolution of conflicts and not engaging in expansion, has never posed a threat to its partners, and has not sought to become a hegemon can be considered important.

The Chinese leader did not ignore his intention to continue to expand the policy of opening up to the outside world. This was an integral part of Hu Jintao's concept of a community of humanity and its interests, a community of destinies. Do not isolate yourself solely in your own “specifics”, do not interfere with the development of others.

Global problems, Hu Jintao believed, focus on the standard of living and development of the South and North. Developing countries depend heavily on China's success («我们将继续以自己的发展促进地区和世界共同发展，扩大同各方利益的汇合点，在实现本国发展的同时兼顾对方特别是发展中国家的正当关切。我们支持国际社会帮助发展中国家增强自主发展能力、改善民生，缩小南北差距») ⁸⁶⁶.

⁸⁶⁶ At the opening ceremony of the XVII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Hu Jintao makes a speech (full text). Ch. XI: Unswervingly Following the Path of Peaceful Development. In Chinese.

Hu's report to the congress again raised the question of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the basis for relations with all countries of the world, including developed ones («中国坚持在和平共处五项原则的基础上同所有国家发展友好合作»). At the same time, the leader did not mention any country, including the United States. He did not single out or weaken their role. Hu creatively developed Mao's idea of relations with three groups of countries.

He considered the **first group** to be **developed countries**; these states were important for China. The content of the policy towards developed countries, according to Hu, is the long-term, stable and healthy development of interaction with this group of countries. The goal, according to President Hu, is to establish a strategic dialogue that strengthens these stable, long-term and healthy relationships. Reflecting on the fact that there is still no trust between states in the world, the Chinese leader tried to find ways to establish mutual trust with other countries («我们将继续同发达国家加强战略对话，增进互信，深化合作，妥善处理分歧，推动相互关系长期稳定健康发展»).

The **second group** consists of **countries neighboring China**. The head of the PRC singled out neighboring countries in the complex of external relations. They are special. Peripheral states must be peaceful, stable and show mutual trust. In such conditions, the PRC will be able to develop economic, trade, cultural and other ties. Hu Jintao suggested that all neighboring countries should build relations with China on the basis of partnership and good neighborliness. Exclusively business relations with neighboring countries are the key to mutually beneficial cooperation («我们将继续贯彻与邻为善、以邻为伴的周边外交方针，加强同周边国家的睦邻友好和务实合作，积极开展区域合作，共同营造和平稳定、平等互信、合作共赢的地区环境»).

It is noteworthy that the PRC traditionally builds friendly relations with the large **third group of developing countries**. Due to the fact that the world is full of unfairness, China sympathized with developing countries and supported their demands on developed countries. This explains China's attempt to take responsibility and actively

participate in international affairs («我们将继续加强同广大发展中国家的团结合作，深化传统友谊，扩大务实合作，提供力所能及的援助，维护发展中国家的正当要求和共同利益»).

The report concluded with an important thought about the unity of humanity. Hu steadfastly emphasized the commonality of aspirations and destinies in the inextricable link between China and humanity («中国发展离不开世界，世界繁荣稳定也离不开中国。中国人民将继续同各国人民一道，为实现人类的美好理想而不懈努力»)⁸⁶⁷.

In the documents of the XVII Congress of the CPC, in connection with fundamental changes in the world, the formulation “peaceful rise” was changed to “peaceful development” due to its somewhat acute nature. As a result, it was decided to soften the term and use “the concept of peaceful development” in the public space, which has become the “new philosophy” of both foreign and domestic policies of China.

Hu Jintao's concept and his practical foreign policy showed that the PRC leader remains committed to the policy of peaceful development and confirms China's intention to promote military modernization: “Taking into account the common strategic interests of national security and development, it is necessary to coordinate economic construction and national defense construction, comprehensively realize the unity a prosperous country and a strong army” («国防和军队建设，在中国特色社会主义事业总体布局中占有重要地位。必须站在国家安全和发展战略全局的高度，统筹经济建设和国防建设，在全面建设小康社会进程中实现富国»)⁸⁶⁸.

So, at the XVII Congress of the CPC, the theory of “harmonious world” was creatively refined, which became the general guiding concept of China’s diplomatic work in the new period (新时期). Evidence of a creative approach to the

⁸⁶⁷At the opening ceremony of the XVII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Hu Jintao makes a speech (full text). Ch. XI: Unswervingly Following the Path of Peaceful Development. In Chinese.

⁸⁶⁸At the opening ceremony of the XVII National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Hu Jintao makes a speech (full text). Ch. IX: Opening Up New Prospects for Modernization of National Defense and the Armed Forces // China Internet News Centre. 14 November, 2007. URL: http://www.china.com.cn/fangtan/zhuanti/djt/2007-11/14/content_9228561_9.htm (accessed: 04.12.022). In Chinese.

development and consolidation of the concepts of “harmonious society” and “harmonious world” in the foreign policy agenda was a wide discussion in the scientific and political world of China on the issue of interpretation of the theorization of “socialist harmonious society” and “harmonious world.” Thus, one group of politicians and scientists supported the idea of a “harmonious world” because it advocates global liberal values. Prominent politicians and scholars such as Yu Keping (the Director of the Center for Chinese Government Innovations at Peking University), Zhou Ruijin, Liu Ji, and Xie Tao strongly advocated a strong state based on the ideology of democratic socialism and the promotion of political and democratic reforms and greater public participation in making political decisions. They believed that a “harmonious world” could only be achieved through the CCP’s political reforms and political and party innovation⁸⁶⁹.

When discussing the reasons for putting forward the idea of a “harmonious society,” Yu Keping put forward “accepting class struggle as a key link,” especially during the “Cultural Revolution.” “Anyone who denied or opposed class struggle was severely criticized. It is believed that the first breakthrough of Deng Xiaoping’s reform is a shift in emphasis from class struggle to economic construction. At the same time, the process of transition from reducing the factor of class struggle to proclaiming social harmony is long and difficult,” the author believed⁸⁷⁰.

Another group of political scientists and experts who support the idea of a “harmonious society” include Professor Gong Xiantian (Peking University), New Left intellectuals such as Cui Zhiyuan, Wang Hui (Tsinghua University), and Wang Shaoguan (Chinese University of Hong Kong). They were more likely to favor the interests of marginalized social groups and the working class. This group was interested in issues such as income redistribution, sustainable development, education reforms and improving China’s social security system. However, representatives of this camp were

⁸⁶⁹ Zheng Yongnian, Tok Sow Keat. *Op. cit.* P. 11.

⁸⁷⁰ Yu Keping, Deputy Director of the Translation Bureau of the CPC Central Committee: Emancipation of Consciousness and Political Progress // China News Network. 17 July, 2007. URL: <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2007/09-17/1029112.shtml> (accessed: 29.07.2022). In Chinese.

extremely critical of many politicians and scientists advocating a “harmonious world” and globalization⁸⁷¹.

Some Western political scientists have presented the idea of a harmonious transition and the creation of a new international order as an alternative to the liberal democratic model. The political model of China is traditional, according to Italian researcher O. Coco, periodic rise of a leader (hegemon) is inevitable in it, in this regard, the leadership of the PRC is destined to encounter opposition from the still dominant West, a world that is not ready to believe in a new model of peaceful coexistence. Together with China's consistent economic development and growing political influence, this phenomenon indicates the retreat of the hegemonic approach⁸⁷².

So, by offering the world the concept of a “socialist harmonious society,” China’s political leadership transferred its own model of sociocultural harmonization to international society. China's proposal for a socialist harmonious world order was aimed at how to confront humanity's global problems, global threats, and conflicts. The commitment of the political leadership and Hu Jintao was so serious and decisive that it made one believe in China's ability to maintain the unity of all countries and peoples. At the same time, this thesis caused mixed reactions among Western experts. O. Coco believed that there was a significant contrast between the peaceful and constructive vision of a harmonious society and the historical hegemonic presence, which belied the credibility of the Chinese proposal and understanding of Chinese intentions⁸⁷³.

In the process of building a socialist harmonious society, Hu Jintao said at the XVII CPC Congress that it is important to use the **concept of “soft power.”** This is one of the effective means of implementing the strategic course to transform the country by the middle of the 21st century into a leading world power.

The concept of “power”, one of the central ones in political science and the theory of international relations, takes on a new meaning with the introduction into

⁸⁷¹ Zheng Yongnian, Tok Sow Keat. Op. cit. P. 10–11.

⁸⁷² Coco O. Contemporary China and the «Harmonious» world order in the age of globalization // The Chinese Journal of Global Governance. 2020. No. 6. P. 17.

⁸⁷³ Ibid. P. 17.

scientific circulation of the term “soft power” by the director of the Center for International Relations at Harvard University in the USA, Professor Joseph Nye⁸⁷⁴. Professor Nye divides state power into “hard” and “soft”, calling the material elements of the total state power “hard power”, and its spiritual components “soft power”⁸⁷⁵.

J. Nye compares “power” to “weather and love, which are easier to experience than to define or measure”⁸⁷⁶. According to Nye's work, the idea of "soft power" is based on the ability of one country to shape the preferences of other countries.

This kind of “soft power” – the ability to influence others and get the results you want – attracts societies, rather than forcing them to follow your interests, but through coercion⁸⁷⁷. Subsequently, this term receives the generally accepted interpretation of “soft power”.

In modern philosophical and political science research, the term of “soft power” has acquired the character of a concept. This means that this term has a multi-layered semantic structure, ambiguity, and diversity.

An analysis of the works of Chinese authors indicates that, in their opinion, the origins of China’s “soft power” can be traced to the treatises of the “ancestors”. In addition, they associate “soft power” with the concept of Comprehensive National Power (国家综合国力).

According to this formula, the Comprehensive National Power consists of military, economic and cultural strength, which, in turn, is multiplied by political power (figure 3)⁸⁷⁸.

⁸⁷⁴Joseph Nye has also been a Senior Fellow of the Aspen Institute (USA), Director of the Aspen Strategy Group, North American Chairman of the Trilateral Commission, and a participant in a number of meetings of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Aspen Institute was founded in 1950 by billionaire Walter Paepcke, one of the initiators of the 68th directive of the US National Security Council, which consolidated the Cold War doctrine. In other words, the Aspen Group is a closed club of high-ranking politicians who develop strategies for world order.

⁸⁷⁵ Nye J. *Soft Power. The means to success in world politics*. New York, 2004. P. 67–68.

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.* P. 1.

⁸⁷⁷ *Ibid.* P. 5.

⁸⁷⁸ Yan Xuetong, He Ying. *Op. cit.* P. 123.

综合国力= (军事实力+经济实力+文化实力)×政治实力

Figure 3 – Components of Comprehensive National Power
[military power + economic power + cultural power) × political power]*

Military and economic power constitute “hard power,” while cultural and political power constitute “soft power”⁸⁷⁹.

In Chinese, the term “power” is interpreted as *liliang* «力量» (power; ability; to exert an effect), and as *quanli* «权力», and as *shili* «势力/实力», and as *guoli* «国力» (established by the state)⁸⁸⁰. Let us note that Chinese political scientists clearly separate the terms «权力» and «实力». The first one they associate with state coercion, political power, this is more of a social concept; the second is the physical concept of performance and power⁸⁸¹. In Chinese, the term “soft power” is conveyed by several concepts – *ruan shili*, *ruan liliang*, and *ruan quanli*, but politicians and scholars often use the term «软力量» (“ruan liliang”) or «软实力» (“ruan shili”)⁸⁸², which is translated as “soft power.” In the report to the XVII CPC Congress, the President Hu Jintao used this very term –«软实力»⁸⁸³.

*Made by the author.

⁸⁷⁹ Yan Xuetong, He Ying. Op. cit., p. 123.

⁸⁸⁰ Dictionary of Modern Chinese. Beijing, 2002. P. 775, 1048, 1154, 481. In Chinese.

⁸⁸¹ Yan Xuetong, He Ying. Op. cit., p. 115; Xinhua Dictionary of Modern Chinese / Dictionary Compilation Editorial Board. Beijing, 1987. P. 691.

⁸⁸² Practical method of international research / ed. Sun Xuefeng, Yan Xuetong. In Chinese; Yan Xuetong, He Ying. Op. cit. In Chinese.

⁸⁸³ Chinese soft power and its implications for the United States: competition and cooperation in the developing world: A report of the Center of strategic and international studies / ed. by C. McGiffert. [S. l.], 2009. P. 11.

Although J. Nye and Western experts classify the economy as a “hard power” tool, the economic model and the power of the state can at the same time be a “soft power” resource. Other states will become more willing to cooperate with an economically attractive country, as this may mean profitable investments⁸⁸⁴.

According to H. Kissinger, the Chinese approach to understanding the world order was significantly different from the Western one. Chinese emperors considered it impractical and even unwise to have relations with states that were geographically distant from the Middle Kingdom. Thus, the founder of the Ming dynasty in 1372 said that “the countries of the Western Ocean lie far away, and the peoples living overseas come to China through the seas. Despite the number of these people, the emperor receives them on the principle that those who arrived in China decently and modestly leave with gifts”⁸⁸⁵. China does not export its ideas to other countries, but neighboring peoples themselves had to come to the emperor to get closer to the culture, since there is no other culture other than Chinese⁸⁸⁶.

In his book «On China» H. Kissinger explored the methods and strategic approaches of Chinese civilization and described his rich experience of communicating with Chinese leaders of the late 20th century. Kissinger sought evidence of the existence of differences between Western and Eastern countries in the tactics and strategies of political games through examples of intellectual games: chess and checkers «围棋» («围» *wei* – enclose, surround, «棋» *qi* – checkers)⁸⁸⁷.

It is known that the concept of “soft power” is not the original invention of Hu Jintao, his like-minded people, and the scientific community. Back in the 1990s in China, a discussion was launched in scientific circles around the concept of “soft power” and two theoretical scientific schools emerged – “cultural” and “political”. The studies of Wang Huning, Yu Xintian, Pang Zhongying, the most famous representatives of the “cultural school”, had a greater influence on political decision-making than the works of the followers of the “political school”. The central role of culture in the implementation

⁸⁸⁴ Radikov I.V., Leksyutina Y.V. Op. cit. P. 21.

⁸⁸⁵ Kissinger H. Op. cit. P. 16–17.

⁸⁸⁶ Ibid. P. 17.

⁸⁸⁷ Dictionary of Modern Chinese / ed. the Editorial Board of the Institute of Linguistics, Academy of Social Sciences of the People's Republic of China. Beijing, 2002. P. 1308. In Chinese. Kissinger H. Op. cit. P. 25.

of soft power was fully supported by the Chinese leadership. The “cultural school” experts included thoughts, ideas, principles, as well as institutions, the country’s political course, and national culture as an integral part of the entire foreign policy system as the basic values of “soft power”⁸⁸⁸.

In 1993 and 1994, the first academic articles by professor and party leader Wang Huning were published in the PRC, devoted to determining the structure of China's national "soft power".

It was Wang Huning who considered cultural dominance one of the most spiritual primary sources of state power⁸⁸⁹. He attributed to this concept the political system and political leadership, national spirit and character, the international image of society, the foreign policy strategy of the state, the ability to determine the type of international systems and the development of science and technology. All these elements make up the culture as a whole⁸⁹⁰.

Applying a traditional, predominantly non-force foreign policy in all directions, China at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries acted as a special state in which the leadership, combining traditional management characteristics, made efforts to strengthen and grow national power through the tools of “soft power”.

Building up “soft power” also became a priority in Hu Jintao’s foreign policy. Under him, China declared itself as a new center of “soft power.” Humanitarian cooperation between China and other states especially intensified in 2005–2006, including within the framework of the SCO in Central Asia. Multilateral interaction in the field of education and cultural activities has led to the formation of a positive image of the PRC⁸⁹¹.

To solve the problems facing the PRC, a whole set of strategic guidelines was developed: “going out” («走出去»), use “two types of raw materials, two markets” (raw materials from the country and other countries, domestic and world markets), “two

⁸⁸⁸ Glaser B.S., Murphy M. Soft power with Chinese characteristics // *The Ongoing Debate*. 2009. March 10. P. 13–18. URL: http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/090310_chinesesoftpower_chap2.pdf (accessed: 04.12.2022).

⁸⁸⁹ Wang Huning. Culture as national power: "soft power". In Chinese; Op. cit. *Cultural Expansion and Cultural Sovereignty: Challenges of the Concept of Sovereignty*. In Chinese.

⁸⁹⁰ Wang Huning. Culture as national power: "soft power". In Chinese; His own. *Cultural Expansion and Cultural Sovereignty: Challenges of the Concept of Sovereignty*. P. 93. In Chinese.

⁸⁹¹ Russian and Chinese policy in Central Asia in the second half of XIX – early XXI centuries. P. 380–381.

imports, one export” (import of raw materials and capital, export of capital), to develop “cross-border economics”. This is exactly how it was intended to “turn weakness into strength.” The first of these directions meant a course to attract foreign investment into the country; the second direction reflected a sharp increase in encouraging the development of transnational economic activities of Chinese enterprises (中国企业跨国经营).

An important step towards establishing multilateral economic and technical cooperation was China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

To achieve strategic opportunities in practice, the PRC leadership ordered the organization of a program consisting of a series of scientific meetings and special lectures conducted by Chinese scientists and senior leaders. In the period from 2003 to 2006 this program included themes of the rise and fall of great powers in the history of mankind – the means of achieving their rise, the reasons for the frequent wars that arose between them, and also the questions of whether and, if so, how a great power in the modern world could rise without recourse to military conflict with the main characters in the international arena. These lectures were subsequently reworked into a 12-part documentary series “The Rise of the Great Powers,” in which each episode is represented by a sovereign state, for example, Great Britain, France, the USSR, the USA, Japan, etc. A. Lomanov and O. Boroch note that until the 1960s hegemonic states demanded an imperial system of international relations, and at the present stage one must have the ability to innovate in science and technology. A great power must combine its own state interests with the attractiveness of “soft” and “hard” powers.

China's announcement of the beginning of the implementation of the concept of "soft power" was officially made by Hu Jintao in 2007 in a speech at the XVII CPC Congress, where the need to increase the importance of "soft power" in foreign policy and foreign economic policy was noted. However, at this congress the topic of “soft power” was included in the section devoted to the development of culture, rather than foreign policy. Since then, the normative Chinese interpretation of “soft power” has become “culture-centric.” The cultural interpretation of “soft power” is a conscious choice of the PRC government.

The resolution of the XVII CPC Congress on the report of the XVI Central Committee clearly showed a focus on advanced socialist culture, the creation of a system of basic socialist values, strengthening cultural construction, and increasing the cultural “soft power” of the state («要坚持社会主义先进文化前进方向，建设社会主义核心价值体系，兴起社会主义文化建设新高潮，激发全民族文化创造活力，提高国家文化软实力，更加自觉、更加主动地推动文化大发展大繁荣») ⁸⁹².

Since 2007, the Chinese government has been active in promoting language and culture abroad and developing Chinese Cultural Centers (CCCs) and international exchange programs for teachers, e.g. «Teach in China» and «Volunteer in China». Confucius Institutes, cultural and research centers have become the most effective and successful projects to popularize the linguistic traditions of the People's Republic of China in the world ⁸⁹³.

Tao Ran, a professor from School of Economics at Renmin University of China, believes that Confucius Institutes improve the image of the PRC, as they are part of China's "soft power" diplomacy. Professor Tao is confident that if China improves its image in the international arena, it will strengthen its “soft power”, the leadership will be forced to answer to the civil society of the PRC and to the international community, “and not just spend money abroad” ⁸⁹⁴

The first Confucius Institute was established in 2004 in Seoul. The purpose and objectives of Confucius Institutes and Classes is to teach the Chinese language and disseminate Chinese culture by organizing scientific conferences, events and competitions dedicated to China, and conducting a standardized test of proficiency in Chinese language (HSK). Confucius Institutes have become a world-famous brand in the field of linguistic and cultural communication, which, based on quality and intensive

⁸⁹² Resolution of the XVII CPC Congress on the Report of the XVI Central Committee // National People's Congress. 06.11.2007. URL: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/zggcddsbcqgdbdh/2012-11/06/content_1742190.htm (accessed: 30.07.2022). In Chinese.

⁸⁹³ Sergeeva A.A. Chinese language as a tool for the implementation of the "Chinese dream" // Official website of the Russian Council on International Affairs. 25.09.2013. URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytcs-and-comments/analytcs/kitayskiy-yazyk-kak-instrument-realizatsii-kitayskoy-mechty/> (accessed: 30.07.2022); Teach in China. URL: <https://www.cicee.org/teach/china/abroad/> (accessed: 04.12.2022); Volunteer in China. URL: <http://www.gooverseas.com/volunteer-abroad/china> (accessed: 30.07.2022).

⁸⁹⁴ Sorokina O. Does Beijing's Trojan Horse Limp // BRICSBusinessMagazine. URL: <http://bricsmagazine.com/ru/articles/hromaet-li-troyanskiy-kon-pekina> (accessed: 07.12.2023).

development, has created a reputable and influential international educational community. There are currently 548 Confucius Institutes and 1,193 Confucius Classes in 154 countries and regions around the world. The number of students who have taken part in various programs of Confucius Institutes exceeds 12,720,000 people. Confucius Institutes strengthen the system, standards, and content of education, and continue to deepen reforms of teaching staff, teaching resources, and teaching methods. Over the past decade, 300,000 Chinese teachers have trained at Confucius Institutes; 9,300 volumes of educational materials and reading books were jointly developed; increased use of the Internet and big data⁸⁹⁵.

At the end of 2005, the Ministry of Education of the PRC established 32 Confucius Institutes in 23 countries⁸⁹⁶. The largest number of Confucius Institutes have been created in the USA –72 Institutes and 32 Confucius classes. In Canada there are 9 institutes and 14 classes, in Mexico there are 5 Confucius Institutes. There are 38 Confucius classes in 26 African countries⁸⁹⁷.

At a meeting with Chinese diplomats in July 2009, Hu Jintao emphasized that the first twenty years of the 21st century will remain a period of “strategic opportunity” for China. “Future opportunities will be even more “important”... As we move into the new century, a number of global and strategic events have had a significant impact on the international political and economic environment. World and development remain the main themes of our era, the competition of complex power becomes more fierce, most developing countries demand equal participation in international affairs in order to achieve increased democratization in international relations; During the international financial crisis, the economic financial system and the structure of global economic governance were greatly damaged, the prospects for a multipolar world became more uncertain, and the international situation revealed some new features and trends that deserve increased attention.” Hu Jintao emphasized that “the PRC needs to expand its

⁸⁹⁵ Boyarkina A.V. Place and role of Confucius Institutes in popularising and promoting in the countries of the world the concept of "Community of the common destiny of mankind" // *Izvestia Oriental Institute*. 2021. No. 4. C. 17.

⁸⁹⁶ Huang Yanzhong, Bates G. Op. cit. P. 18.

⁸⁹⁷ Toh Han Shih. Experts differ on China's «soft power» in Africa. URL: <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1287767/experts-differ-chinas-soft-power-africa> (accessed: 07.12.2023).

horizons... and constantly improve its level of response and management of international affairs in the face of the new situation”⁸⁹⁸.

At the VI Plenum of the XVII CPC Central Committee, which was held in Beijing from October 15 to 18, 2011, issues of cultural development of China were put on the agenda, which raised Chinese culture to a new stage of development. The significance of this plenum is comparable to the forum on literature and art, held in February 1942 in Yan'an, at which Chairman Mao spoke (1942年2月, 毛泽东的《整顿党的作风》演说和《反对党八股》的报告). It should be noted that the problems of cultural development were deeply discussed at the VI plenary meeting of the XIV convocation of the CPC Central Committee in 1996, which indicates the continuity of political leadership and the preservation and continuation of traditions⁸⁹⁹.

During the VI Plenum of the CPC Central Committee, the government formulated a new strategic goal for the development of China – building of a “Powerful Cultural State” (《向文化强国进发》). After the completion of the VI plenum, a key final document was released: “Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Major Issues Pertaining to Deepening Reform of the Cultural System and Promoting the Great Development and Flouring of Social Culture” (《中央关于深化文化体制改革若干重大问题的决定》), consisting of nine points. It noted that “culture is the lifeblood of a nation and is the spiritual home of its people. China's vast and rich ancient culture, which provided a powerful spiritual force for the development and growth of the Chinese nation and made a major, indelible contribution to the progress of human civilization”⁹⁰⁰. China, as a major and responsible power, is raising its “soft power” to enhance its international competitiveness, said the “Resolution” of the VI Plenum. The document also spoke about “the emergence of Chinese culture outside, increasing the

⁸⁹⁸ Speech by CPC President Hu Jintao and other leaders at the 11th meeting with diplomatic representatives // Phoenix News Agency. 20.07.2009. URL: https://news.ifeng.com/mainland/200907/0720_17_1259451.shtml (accessed: 09.05.2022). In Chinese.

⁸⁹⁹ [Experience]. Xinhua News Agency Han Bin: deep professional education // Cultural Heritage: the difference between protection and utilisation // Xinhuanews Agency. 2011. 07 August. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/zgjx/2011-08/07/c_131034312.htm (accessed: 07.30.2022). In Chinese.

⁹⁰⁰ Resolution of the CPC Central Committee "On Some Important Issues Regarding Deepening the Reform of the Cultural System, Promoting the Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture" (adopted at the VI Plenum of the XVII CPC Central Committee on 18.10.2011 // Government of the People's Republic of China. 25.10.2011). URL: http://www.gov.cn/jrzq/2011-10/25/content_1978202.htm (accessed: 25.07.2022). In Chinese.

international influence of this culture, which shows the world community a new image of China”⁹⁰¹.

At the VI plenum, achievements of cultural development were noted, both within and outside the country. The Chinese leadership realized how important it was to disseminate Chinese cultural values in the world and export Chinese products, and the PRC would not be able to compete in the field of culture with other countries without spiritual development.

The Chinese leadership, Hu Jintao said at the 6th Plenum, is seriously faced with the even more ambitious task of multiplying the volume of imports of cultural products into China over its exports and promoting its own values and ideas. A great state must export not only material, but also cultural products⁹⁰².

The Wen Jiabao government set a goal at the plenum of the CPC Central Committee to implement cultural reform by 2020, and to integrate cultural industries into the arsenal of the state economy. The international competitiveness of Chinese culture was to be greatly enhanced⁹⁰³.

At the VI plenum, problems were also revealed. In the field of culture, the following were noted: a lack of “influential works of art”, personnel are not adequately trained, which means that the work and training of party and government committees on culture should be strengthened and the gap in cultural education in high schools and colleges should be eliminated, etc.⁹⁰⁴. In addition, there is no balance in the development of culture in the city and the countryside. Profits from the cultural industry are small. The international influence of Chinese culture must be strengthened.

The decisions of the VI Plenum of the CPC Central Committee also stated that the transition of culture to a market economy could lead to the displacement of state cultural organizations from the market and their loss of channels for distributing their products, which threatened the cultural security of the state. The cultural views of the

⁹⁰¹ Borokh O.N. From "soft power" to "cultural power". URL: <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Ot-myagkoi-sily-k-kulturnomu-moguschestvu-15643> (accessed: 04.12.2023).

⁹⁰² Lomanov A.V. Problems of "cultural security" in the modern policy of China. P. 129.

⁹⁰³ Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on Some Important Issues Concerning Deepening the Reform of the Cultural System, Promoting the Development and Prosperity of Socialist Culture (adopted at the VI Plenum of the XVII CPC Central Committee on 18.10.2011. In Chinese.

⁹⁰⁴ Ibid.

Chinese population became more and more diverse; in general, the level of culture in Chinese society increased, but at the same time, the country experienced a decline in morality. The development of culture was challenged by globalization, in which the PRC is involved. The country has favorable conditions for learning about foreign achievements and enhancing the “soft power” of its culture, however, China is faced with intense international competition⁹⁰⁵.

China is still “acting as an importer of Western cultural brands and products... the Chinese cultural space is full of “vanity, vulgarity, and kitsch”⁹⁰⁶.

The theme of competition in the field of culture on the global stage was also heard in the speech at the VI plenum by the prominent ideologist of the CPC, Li Changchun. He emphasized that in the modern situation it is necessary to develop traditional and modern culture simultaneously and “constantly expand the international influence of Chinese culture, form the “soft power” of culture corresponding to China’s international position, firmly hold the initiative in the international struggle in the field of ideology and culture, and actually protect cultural security of the state”⁹⁰⁷. China is an “ancient and civilized state” (《文明古国》), as well as a “great state of civilized resources” (《文明资源大国》) but cannot yet be considered a “powerful cultural state”⁹⁰⁸.

The topic of developing and strengthening “soft power” in the field of culture was also raised in the speeches of the leaders of the CPC and the documents of the XVIII Congress of the CPC in November 2012. Hu Jintao in his report “Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to Complete the Building of a Moderately Prosperous Society in all Respects” (《坚定不移沿着中国特色社会主义道路前进为全面建成小康社会而奋斗》的报告) defined a number of directions of economic, political, military and diplomatic nature, along which the country will have to develop over the next five, and probably ten years, using “soft power”.

⁹⁰⁵ Lomanov A., Borokh O. Op. cit. P. 14–16.

⁹⁰⁶ Chinese minister dissatisfied with the market's influence on culture // BBCRussian.com News Service. 2010. 07 August. URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/international/2010/08/100806_china_mass_culture.shtml (accessed: 08.13.2022).

⁹⁰⁷ Li Changchun. Op. cit. in Chinese.

⁹⁰⁸ Ibid.

Hu Jintao spoke of the “cultural lifeblood of the nation” as promotion of socialist culture. He intended to begin a qualitatively new rise in socialist cultural building, strengthening the cultural “soft power” of the country⁹⁰⁹.

The Chinese leader recalled that all countries and peoples have only one Earth and world. And the rule of might or the “law of the jungle” is not a way of coexistence; the strong cannot create a better world. Wars and poverty do not promote development. A harmonious world of common prosperity is the desire of the people of all countries⁹¹⁰.

The traditional, XI section of the report, “Continuing to Promote the Noble Cause of Peace and Development of Mankind” (《十一、继续促进人类和平与发展的崇高事业》), was devoted to the main foreign policy innovation in Hu Jintao’s theoretical arsenal – the provision on the concept of “scientific development” and the inclusion of China in the world history of mankind with traditional Chinese ideology and culture and values such as identity, harmony, etc.

Hu Jintao continued to creatively develop foreign policy towards the three groups of countries. He paid due attention (as at the XVII CPC Congress in 2007) to relations primarily with **developed countries** – to expand the scope of cooperation, wisely eliminating differences and stimulating the creation of a new type of relations between large states, characterized by long-term, stable, and healthy development (《中国坚持在和平共处五项原则基础上全面发展同各国的友好合作。我们将改善和发展同发达国家关系，拓宽合作领域，妥善处理分歧，推动建立长期稳定健康发展的新型大国关系》). China intended to further strengthen relations of friendship and good neighborliness with **neighboring countries**, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation, and ensure that they benefit more from the development of their great neighbor (《我们将坚持与邻为善、以邻为伴，巩固睦邻友好，深化互利合作，努力使自身发展更好惠及周边国家》).

⁹⁰⁹ Report of Hu Jintao at the XVIII CPC Congress (8.11.2012). Ch. VI: Developing a Strong Socialist Culture in China // Information portal "CPC News". 2012. 18 November. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151-6.html> (accessed: 27.07.2022). In Chinese.

⁹¹⁰ Report of Hu Jintao at the XVIII CPC Congress (8.11.2012). Ch. XI: Continuing to Promote the Noble Cause of Peace and Development of Mankind // Information portal "CPC News". 2012. 18 November. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151-11.html> (accessed: 27.07.2022). In Chinese.

Regarding a group of **developing countries**, Beijing was ready to work with them to protect their legitimate rights and interests and forever remain their reliable friend and partner («我们将加强同广大发展中国家的团结合作，共同维护发展中国家正当权益，支持扩大发展中国家在国际事务中的代表性和发言权，永远做发展中国家的可靠朋友和真诚伙伴»)。⁹¹¹

Hu Jintao announced the expansion of China's zone of interests to the global level. The Chinese leader called on countries to understand human existence, share a common destiny and realize the common interests of mankind («合作共赢，就是要倡导人类命运共同体意识，在追求本国利益时兼顾他国合理关切，在谋求本国发展中促进各国共同发展，建立更加平等均衡的新型全球发展伙伴关系，同舟共济，权责共担，增进人类共同利益»)。⁹¹²

A vital innovation in the foreign policy corps was the declaration by the XVII Congress of a course towards the formation of a “**New Type of Great Power Relations**” («**新型大国关系**»). This direction has become the basis of the modern foreign policy strategy of the PRC. In building relations with **neighboring countries**, China proposed to strengthen “friendship with unfailing goodwill, in the spirit of partnership,” and “diligently ensure that they benefit more from China’s development” («我们将坚持与邻为善、以邻为伴，巩固睦邻友好，深化互利合作，努力使自身发展更好惠及周边国家»). The last phrase can also be interpreted as “trying to benefit neighboring countries through one’s own development,” since the meaning of the hieroglyph is “惠” – “kindness, mercy, to do good, to show honor”⁹¹³.

The Report to the XVIII Congress of the CPC also defined the future paradigm of interaction and stimulation of cooperation with Russia. Modern practice confirms the vitality and correctness of this course of China, which is consonant with the course of the Russian Federation “Turn to the East”.

⁹¹¹ Report of Hu Jintao at the XVIII CPC Congress (8.11.2012). Ch. XI: Continuing to Promote the Noble Cause of Peace and Development of Mankind. In Chinese.

⁹¹² Ibid.

⁹¹³ New Qihai Dictionary of the Chinese Language. P. 412. In Chinese.

At the same time, changes in regional and global politics and international relations, including in Asia, dictated the need to rethink previous, sometimes unsuccessful approaches on the part of the PRC, the USA and Russia to one of the painful and intractable problems – the nuclear program of the Korean People – Democratic Republic (DPRK). The concept of “soft power” of the PRC and the actions of preventive diplomacy tried to resolve the North Korean nuclear problem, which affects the security of the PRC and the Far Eastern borders of Russia, among others. China, as the host and organizer of the six-party negotiation process, took a neutral position. Chinese, South Korean, Russian, and American researchers have not essentially proposed a solution to the problem of security guarantees for a post-nuclear North Korea. The scientific debate became especially acute in the spring of 2017 after a series of nuclear weapons tests and ballistic missile launches in North Korea. Chinese and Russian political scientists and military experts showed great interest in the development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and proposed scenarios for the development of further events⁹¹⁴. Obviously, it is still difficult to talk about further progress in the process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula⁹¹⁵. It is worth noting here the need to increase the role and importance of preventive diplomacy as an important tool of China’s “soft power”⁹¹⁶. China, using its “soft power” resources, supported the North Korean regime, but its influence on the DPRK still remained limited at the economic, foreign policy and cultural levels. On the one hand, according to Chinese experts, China’s position and the isolation of North Korea led to the impossibility of using “soft power” resources in North Korea. On the other hand, a solution to the North Korean issue has not yet been found, but the PRC's policy and operational means, which are not working, would be a step in the right direction. Pyongyang, in turn, used China's strategic calculations and the DPRK's position in it.

⁹¹⁴ Boyarkina A.V. Development of the situation around the conflict on the Korean Peninsula in 2017: forecasts of Russian experts // *Discourse-Pi*. 2017. No. 1 (26). C. 119.

⁹¹⁵ Chinese and Korean researchers on diplomatic mediation of China in the North Korea nuclear issue / K.F. Lykov, A.V. Boyarkina, E.V. Kovylyina, S.A. Mefodieva, O.V. Kuzmina // *Indian Journal of Science and Technology*. 2016. Vol. 9. (20). P. 309.

⁹¹⁶ Boyarkina A.V., Lykov K.F., Pecheritsa V.F. Preventive diplomacy as a tool of "soft power" of the PRC // *Bulletin of Transbaikal State University*. 2015. No. 9 (124). P. 50–57.

North Korea's cultural diplomacy has been particularly successful and has widely hosted cultural events, demonstrating the tactical nature of its use of “soft power”⁹¹⁷.

So, the formation of the concept of “soft power” in the official documents of the CPC and the NPC showed that since the announcement of the CPC Central Committee on the implementation of this concept from 2007 to 2012, a line aimed at ensuring the future peaceful development of the Chinese state and the inclusion of China has been clearly traced into global processes. The CCP and the Chinese state pay special attention to the development of cultural “soft power”, which contributes to the creation of a positive and attractive image of the country in the international arena.

But let’s ask ourselves: is China’s “soft power” effective today? Has she achieved her goals? The critical debate surrounding China's soft power in recent years is multifaceted, and only one aspect is examined here in order to highlight the complexities and issues that undermine Chinese soft power based on its non-power base. The interconnected nature of “soft” and “hard” power, the role of systemic forces and China’s effective maneuvering in real conditions contribute to the strengthening of China’s influence and its even greater development in the near future. If the concept of “soft power” is fundamentally related to the “non-coercive” nature of the influence of any state, then China undoubtedly has “soft power” and successfully models the behavior of states without making them feel threatened. If China can achieve its goal using various means and without harming anyone, then weakly formulated demands or complaints against the authenticity of China's soft power remain baseless and unnoticed⁹¹⁸. It is obvious that the leader of the fifth generation does not plan to abandon this tool, as evidenced by Xi Jinping’s statements in 2023 about increasing the role of “soft power” in education and culture⁹¹⁹.

⁹¹⁷ Boyarkina A.V., Mefodieva S.A., Kuzmina O.V. Strategy of application of "soft power" of the PRC in relation to the foreign policy of the DPRK // *International Relations*. 2017. No. 1. P. 79–89.

⁹¹⁸ Pecheritsa V.F., Boyarkina A.V. China’s soft power: changing priorities // *ESPACIOS*. 2017. Vol. 38 (47). P. 1–14.

⁹¹⁹ Zhao Zhanlu. Accelerate the construction of a powerful educational state with Chinese specificity // News Agency "Zhenminwang". 04 July. 2023. URL: <http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0704/c40531-40027166.html> (accessed: 08.27.2023). In Chinese.

The theorization and implementation of the theory of “soft power” testifies to it as an instrument for conducting the foreign policy of the PRC, developing its economy and culture at the beginning of the 21st century.

Summarizing the above, we can draw the following conclusions.

Firstly, strengthening and promoting “soft power” remains one of the main goals in the foreign policy of the PRC in the early 2000s. Forming a positive perception of China and its leaders by the population of the country, as well as a “Cultural Charm Offensive” on the world stage, strengthening the influence of the PRC in the world - all these were priority tasks of the cultural construction of the Chinese state of the 21st century.

Secondly, “soft power” serves as a political tool in pursuing the policy of “new regionalism” in regional and international processes. New types of diplomacy are emerging that contribute to the effective implementation of the new model of international relations of the PRC. China's application of the "new diplomacy" strategy involved maintaining good neighborly relations with surrounding countries, peacefully resolving disputes, and resolving contradictions through diplomatic means.

Thirdly, we can identify several ways to implement Chinese “soft power” within the country and abroad – diplomacy, international institutions, investments, a peacekeeping mission to the UN and humanitarian assistance, the education system and student exchanges, the country’s language, and the degree of its popularity in the world.

Fourth, during the reign of Hu Jintao, the economic factor of “soft power” in the foreign policy of the PRC intensified. It was manifested in the active participation of the PRC in regional institutions: ASEAN, APEC, BRICS, SCO, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, etc. And the Chinese model of the “Beijing Consensus” has become attractive to countries with “rising economies.” By strengthening economic fundamentals, China emphasized actively preventing the escalation of contradictions and resolving them.

Fifthly, the cultural sphere of the PRC has become a significant criterion for China's presence in the global information space. International scientific forums and conferences are held annually. Appropriate measures are being taken at the leadership level to export Chinese cultural products to the outside world.

Sixth, the Chinese leadership, as part of the creation of a “powerful cultural state” within the concept of a “harmonious world,” considered the Chinese language and culture as powerful resource levers that help strengthen the positive image of the country abroad. The cultural promotion of China's soft power in the world was a pragmatic decision of the Chinese government, and to spread it around the world, branches of Confucius Institutes are opening, the purpose of which is to create an atmosphere accessible and conducive to learning the culture and traditions of China.

An analysis of Hu Jintao’s foreign policy theories and concepts and the implementation of his strategic course in 2003–2012 indicates that the Chinese political leadership, with the support of the scientific community, developed landmark foreign policy strategies that provided China with a powerful socio-economic and political rise in the world. During the reign of Hu Jintao, a special style of leadership of the country was developed, pragmatic and preserving elements of tradition and continuity. This leadership style involved a significant number of factors that relied on institutions and collective leadership through various Working Groups. At the same time, the country's political leadership was armed with an important tool of social influence – the Internet. Chairman Hu tried to emphasize the real impact of the current foreign policy and new initiatives that will become the basis for the foreign policy of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders, led by Xi Jinping.

The economically successful implementation of Deng Xiaoping’s strategy and the strengthening of military-economic potential under Jiang Zemin led to the successful development of a new doctrine of “the rise of China.” Beginning in 2003, in response to the supposedly growing Chinese threat and the concerns of other countries about Chinese foreign and defense policies, Hu Jintao first proposed the “rise of China,” which was transformed due to its rejection by the outside world into the “peaceful rise of China.” "Peaceful rise" was established as the national development strategy of the PRC. Its essence was the initial movement towards the status of a real great power. It relied on Deng Xiaoping's precepts of “peace and development,” multipolarity and multilateral cooperation. The concept of "peaceful rise" emphasized China's soft power and willingness to solve internal problems and improve the well-being of the Chinese

people. It marked the contribution of fourth-generation Chinese leaders to China's diplomacy. In the early 2000s, on the foreign policy front, China faced new traditional and non-traditional challenges and threats: international terrorism and separatist movements, strategic containment. It is against these destructive phenomena that Chinese foreign policy concepts and Beijing's practical foreign policy course were directed – against the politics of power, hegemony and for China to achieve the status of a great global power. Hu Jintao believed that the idea of “peaceful rise” neutralizes the theory of the “China threat.”

Within the framework of the concepts of “peaceful rise/development,” a new stage in the multifaceted theory of “China’s common interests” was outlined (2003–2007). It gradually transformed from strengthening bilateral relations between the PRC and the USA to consonance and combination of common interests at the regional level, then to a movement towards the global. It is obvious that after 2007, the Chinese leadership’s interest in the ideas of “peaceful rise/development” became less acute. The next foreign policy concept put forward was the building of a “harmonious society” in China, followed by a “harmonious world”, which marked a shift in the leadership’s understanding of China’s position in the world and, accordingly, its overall international strategy. By 2012, the “harmonious society” and its foreign policy alter ego “harmonious world” had become the defining discourse of President Hu Jintao’s reign. Chinese political scientists point out their close relationship. The leader of the PRC was clearly aware that in order to achieve a more sustainable way of development, China needed to go beyond economic development. “Harmonious peace” served as a signal that China was moving to a new stage of development in the foreign policy field.

Combining ideas of “peaceful rise” then “peaceful development” with “socialist harmonious society” and “harmonious peace”, Beijing tried to synchronize its foreign policy actions with its domestic ones. Hu Jintao demonstrated to the world all the values of the ancient culture of the Celestial Empire and changed the image of the country as a “world factory.”

Strengthening global influence, the qualitative modernization of the armed forces, the build-up of advanced technologies, intelligent weapons and the implementation of a

decisive foreign policy indicated a transition to “hard power”, China’s strategic breakthrough forward. “Soft power” continued to remain in China’s foreign policy arsenal, although China’s implementation of the “strong but not hard” foreign policy approach led to a gradual fading of interest in it⁹²⁰.

Then, at the XVII Congress of the CPC, the beginning of the implementation of the concept of “soft power” was officially announced. She scientifically substantiated the need to naturally continue and organically integrate China into the “harmonious world.” Forming almost a single whole, the components of this harmonious world were supposed to contribute to the pursuit of a peaceful and independent foreign policy, the protection of national interests and the formation of a favorable image of the country in the world. After the XVIII CPC Congress, the effective and successful implementation of the concept of “soft power” was complemented by the strategy of creating a “powerful cultural state,” which further enhanced the development of culture during the period under review. At the same time, the implementation of the concept of “soft power”, accompanied by the rapid economic growth of China, aroused fears on the part of the West, which sees in this the establishment of a world order “Chinese style”⁹²¹.

Summarizing what has been said, we emphasize that the traditional ideas of Chinese thinkers about the nature of the foreign policy of the leaders of the fourth generation are based on a broad cultural and positive understanding of the world, on a new type of geopolitical relations. It defines security, international, regional, national, based not on violence and war, but on a culture of peace and non-violence. Ensuring security through a culture of peace is especially relevant for the PRC. Hu Jintao's strategic concepts contain a truly significant number of traditional ideas. The evolution of Hu Jintao’s foreign policy concepts, starting with “peaceful rise”, “peaceful development”, continuing with “harmonious peace” and the concept of “soft power”, as important strategic ideas, substantiated the foreign policy vector of the fourth generation PRC leadership. Guided by the approaches of realism and liberalism, enriched by

⁹²⁰ Boyarkina A.V. The rise of China's "hard power": a strategic breakthrough in the "new era" // *Voprosy politologii*. 2018. Issue 11, no. 39 (8). P. 1025–1047.

⁹²¹ Information materials. Series G: Ideological and theoretical trends in modern China: national traditions and searches for ways of modernization Issue 15, ч. 2. P. 120–121.

Confucian materialist ideas in government, Hu and his associates apply the theory of “harmonious peace.” They laid the theoretical foundation for China's foreign policy for the fifth generation of leaders. You can also give an example of Hu Jintao’s application of a liberal approach in the formation of the concept of “soft power”. This allows us to build a model of Chinese social reality from the position of social classes and create a more “large-scale” and structural idea of it.

CHAPTER 6. THE FORMATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL AND THEORETICAL BASE OF DIPLOMACY OF THE FIFTH GENERATION OF CHINESE LEADERS

6.1. Xi Jinping's concepts of Chinese foreign policy are a creative justification for the establishment of a just world order of the 21st century

In the face of a complex and changeable international environment, the authorities of the new generation of PRC leaders changed the diplomatic course of the PRC, focusing on the active introduction of innovation into the diplomatic corps. After the XVIII CPC Congress in 2012 and Xi Jinping's rise to power, Deng Xiaoping's foreign policy dictum of “hide your strength and bide your time” was discarded.

Elected at the XVIII CPC Congress in 2012, the new General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, Xi Jinping, continues the country's successive course of development. Since taking office as President of the People's Republic of China in March 2013, he has made a number of important statements on Chinese foreign policy issues, which allows analysts in China and around the world to talk about Xi Jinping's diplomacy⁹²². He put forward the slogan "new era" (《新时代》), indicating a change in China's domestic and foreign policies. According to Chinese researchers, “the novelty of the new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics” lies in the **large-scale practice of socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era**. Its distinctive feature is the provisions of the “five eras.” The “five epochs” represent the ideological basis for the formation of a new course for China, which the country's leader substantiates in the work “Xi Jinping's Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in a New Era”⁹²³. One of the key provisions of the “five epochs” is the approach of China to the center of the world stage in order to contribute to the development of humanity based on sinicized Marxism.

⁹²² Ponomarenko L.V., Solovieva T.M. PRC – Africa: new benchmarks of relations // Bulletin of Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Ser.: International Relations. 2015. No. 1. P. 32.

⁹²³ Wen Chaoxia. "New" in Xi Jinping's new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics // CPC News Agency. 2018. 18 February. URL: <http://theory.people.com.cn/big5/n1/2018/0218/c40531-29825926.html> (accessed: 28.08.2021). In Chinese.

The philosophical content of Xi Jinping's expression «计利当计天下利，求名应求万世名» means that the strategic plan should be a plan for all the inhabitants of the Celestial Empire, and not a plan for personal gain, it should remain for centuries and will be honored by generations. The strength of Xi Jinping's thoughts and reasoning shows the attitude of the leader of a large country towards other countries, full of confidence, pragmatism, and responsibility. The leader of the PRC thus reveals the ideal of a society of traditional culture, reflecting the main characteristics of socialism with Chinese characteristics, which helps maintain the attractiveness of the PRC in the international arena. It is no coincidence that China's modern foreign policy is based on the principles of the value of harmony and the protection of mutual respect, strengthening cooperation, coexistence, and mutually beneficial development.

At the SCO summit in Qingdao in 2018, Xi Jinping proudly quoted philosophical reflections from books about the ideal system of state governance: "Shang Shu"⁹²⁴, "The Canons of Yu and Yao" (around the 16th-1st centuries BC). He believes that Confucian philosophy is an important part of Chinese civilization, and traditional society in the times of the mythical emperor Yao (around 2188-2067 BC) represented a "world for all" («世界大同») in universal harmony («大道之行，天下为公»). Xi Jinping is close in spirit to the sayings of the authors of The Book of Documents, which say that first it is necessary to harmoniously manage one's own family/clan, then govern the country, and then unite countries and coexist in harmony⁹²⁵. Yao was of good moral character and understood that if harmonious relations are established between families, then social harmony is also present in the state. After achieving social harmony in the state and coordinating its interests, neighboring countries could also harmoniously cooperate. This is a system of governance of "small and large", "near and far" state entities.

At the XIX Congress of the CPC, Xi Jinping noted that the "new era" reveals three components of modern Chinese diplomacy – three-dimensionality, multi-level and

⁹²⁴ 《尚书》 – A collection of ancient Chinese historical documents and descriptions of events. A major Confucian treatise and the earliest history of the Middle Kingdom. It dates back to the Zhou era, around the 10th century BC.

⁹²⁵ The book "Shang Shu". Full text and comments of the original text of the "Canon of Yao" // Information portal "Culture". URL: http://www.360doc.com/content/21/1006/19/259476_998519500.shtml (accessed: 22.07.2023). In Chinese.

multi-dimensional (全方位、多层次、立体化的外交)⁹²⁶. Xi Jinping's diplomatic activities began before he entered the political arena as the leader of one of the world's largest countries. From 2008 to 2012, as Vice President of China, he visited 40 countries and regions of the world. The most notable events of this kind can be considered Xi Jinping's visit to the USA in 2012 and 2017, to Russia in 2013 and 2017, and to Europe in 2019⁹²⁷.

Under the peaceful and independent foreign policy enshrined in the report to the XVIII Congress of the CPC, the Chinese leadership formed an updated foreign policy doctrine that meets the requirements of the new era. The XIX Congress of the CPC (2017) became a sign of Chinese diplomacy "in the new era." While preserving the continuity of Jiang Zemin's theory of "three norths, four seas"⁹²⁸, Mao Zedong's theory of "three worlds" and others, creatively developing and supplementing them, Xi Jinping and his like-minded people formed new and key foreign policy concepts based on scientific substantiation by scholars: **"major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics", "new type of international relations", "new type of relations between major powers" and "community of shared future for mankind"**.

The first practical foreign policy steps of Xi Jinping were based on the theory of "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" (中国特色大国外交), which confirmed the achievement of the strategic goal of restoring the status of a superpower. In the early years of Xi Jinping's leadership, the emphasis in foreign policy shifted from the economic to the political sphere. The theory of "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" was based on forming international relations of a large country and was aimed at global steps based on the concept and spirit of a great state. In it, Xi Jinping substantiated the logical connection of modern foreign policy with traditional political culture, turning it into "diplomacy with Chinese characteristics"⁹²⁹.

⁹²⁶ Boyarkina A.V. On the issue of great power with Chinese specificity in the "new era". P. 129–140.

⁹²⁷ Xi Jinping's new diplomacy with Chinese characteristics / A.V. Boyarkina, V.F. Pecheritsa, T.A. Vasileva, E.E. Nechai // *Laplace em Revista (International)*. 2021. Vol. 7, no. Extra E, Aug. P. 83.

⁹²⁸ This doctrine was adopted by the Military Council of the CPC Central Committee in 1993. Its essence is the peaceful extension of China's dominant influence as a "middle state" to the "three Norths": US, NATO, and Russia.

⁹²⁹ Xi Jinping's new diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. P. 84; Boyarkina A.V. Comprehension of "great power diplomacy with Chinese specificity": common and distinctive // *Vestnik of Russian State University of Humanities. Ser.: Politology. History. International Relations*. 2021. No. 3. P. 79–97.

To understand the essence of "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics", let us trace the prerequisites for its formation. First, we note that the signing of the unequal Treaty of Nanking put China in a humiliating position for two centuries in its relations with Great Britain, Germany, France, and other Western powers. Three most difficult historical stages took shape: 1949-1978; 1978-2012; from 2013 to the present. Only in recent years has the PRC felt truly capable of responding to the challenges of the modern era and gradually implementing "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics". Its formation aims to acquire a "Chinese image" in the PRC's foreign policy within the framework of building "New Type of International Relations" and a "Community of Shared Future for Mankind", that is, to eliminate inconsistencies between China's identity and foreign policy course.

It is noteworthy in this regard to note the traditional and modern Chinese approaches to the study of the Chinese national character or "national spirit", expressed in several key factors that form the national identity of China:

- natural environmental conditions, namely: a significant territory represented by the Central Plain and the deltas of the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers;
- the national genetic pool, including the historical memory of a five-thousand-year history passed down through the generations;
- the national character and worldview of an individual are related to traditional culture, in which Confucianism cements the moral and ethical norms of the Chinese ethnic group, etc.⁹³⁰.

Professor Yang Jiemian from the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies proposes integrating the solution of future tasks to deepen and mutually promote the theory of diplomacy with the theory of security as a means of international interaction to provide theoretical leadership. The scholar speaks of the long and difficult path of building the theory of "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics." He emphasizes that academic works on the development of diplomatic theory lag the practical actions of the leadership and political situation. Yang Jiemian believes it is

⁹³⁰ Speshnev N.A. The Chinese: peculiarities of national psychology. St. Petersburg, 2017. P. 14–32.

necessary to raise awareness and take practical measures to facilitate theoretical research and innovations⁹³¹.

The ideas of Xi Jinping about foreign policy in the "new era" are creatively supplemented in the works and reports of other the PRC's leaders and political scientists. Li Keqiang and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wang Yi defined several aspects of China's foreign policy in the "new era" in 2013 and 2014⁹³², or features that distinguish the diplomacy of a great power with Chinese characteristics from the diplomacy of other great powers in the world (especially the USA):

1. The merging of Chinese interests and the interests of all countries through more proactive diplomatic practice (《中方利益与各方利益的汇合点,通过更为主动、积极的外交实践,回应国际社会的期待》);

2. Working to build "new type of major power relations" to achieve lasting peace in the world (《中国将积极构建新型大国关系,为实现世界的持久和平作出不懈努力》);

3. Forming a more peaceful, stable, developed and prosperous environment with neighboring countries (《继续把周边作为外交优先方向,塑造更加和平稳定、发展繁荣的周边环境》);

4. Establishing relations with developing countries based on a new concept of fairness and benefit and building a community of shared future with developing countries (《大力弘扬新型义利观,构建与发展中国家的命运共同体》);

5. Create an upgraded version of the Chinese economy and share opportunities with the world (《打造中国经济的升级版,。。。与世界共享机遇、共创繁荣》);

6. Further expansion of openness and sharing opportunities for common prosperity (《进一步扩大对外开放,与世界共享机遇、共创繁荣》);

⁹³¹ Boyarkina A.V. On the issue of great power with Chinese specificity in the "new era."

⁹³² China's "One Belt, One Road" diplomacy is comprehensively promoted // Xinhuanews News Agency. 2014. 15 December. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-12/15/c_1113640936.htm (accessed: 08.07.2023). In Chinese; Speech by Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, at the II International Peace Forum. Exploring the path of great power diplomacy with Chinese specificity // Consulate General of the People's Republic of China in St. Petersburg. 2013. 27 June. URL: <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cgstp/chn/zgxw/t1053901.htm> (accessed: 08.07.2023). In Chinese.

7. Defend positions to form a modern world order and actively participate in reforming and improving the international system («继续做当代国际秩序和公认国际关系准则的维护者，同时更积极有为地参与国际体系的变革与完善»);

8. In 2015, the beginning of the comprehensive implementation of the "Belt and Road" diplomacy was announced («“一带一路”外交全面推进的号角。日前，中央经济工作会议提出，2015年进入“一带一路”的全面实施阶段»)⁹³³. Then in 2017, Wang Yi develops this theory, focusing on supporting economic globalization; working for stable relations between the major powers of the world; maintaining stability in neighboring countries and promoting regional cooperation; and enhancing the prestige of cooperation between BRICS countries⁹³⁴.

According to Chinese scholars, this theory should be implemented in the following directions. First, it indicates China's increased ability to shape the world and show greater activity in regional and international affairs. Minister Wang Yi notes that China prefers to resolve disputes through dialogue and negotiations and resolutely rejects the use of force. He also emphasizes that China's approach to resolving conflicts and hot spots should be "justified," and confirms China's principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. This is evidenced by China's readiness in May 2023 to contribute to resolving the crisis in Ukraine (an initiative that includes 12 points).

Second, China intends to defend its own interests and maintain regional stability. For example, its approach to the issue around the islands in the South China Sea considers the interests of the Chinese people, historical facts, regional peace and international law. China also warns external forces not to create problems and undermine efforts to develop a code of conduct in the South China Sea.

Third, to implement new type of international relations, China intends to cooperate with major powers. Currently, the United States calls China its rival in its security strategy reports. Despite the escalation of trade wars against China, economic

⁹³³ Wang Yi talks about great power diplomacy with Chinese specificity. 2013. 27 June. URL: <https://news.12371.cn/2013/06/27/ARTI1372346444992690.shtml> (accessed: 08.11.2023). In Chinese.

⁹³⁴ Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Opening of Symposium on International Developments and China's Diplomacy in 2017 // Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. 2017.12.10. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/201712/t20171210_678651.html (accessed: 17.08.2023).

and political problems, and uncertainty in China-U.S. relations, China emphasizes the importance of cooperation and mutual respect. Paradoxically, China calls on the US to increase its economic volume and strengthen **partnership**, not **rivalry**.

Fourth, the diplomacy of heads of state is a distinctive feature of "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics." This is the highest form of interstate interaction, playing a key role and possessing exclusive strategic significance. From 2019 to 2022, Xi Jinping conducted four targeted diplomatic events, including the Boao Forum, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, the China-Africa Cooperation Forum and the first China International Import Expo.

It should be noted that "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" under the leadership of Xi Jinping is the legacy and development of China's diplomatic practices aimed at "breaking with the mainstream models of international discourse where the West is strong, and China is weak"⁹³⁵. Such a position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China contributes to the fact that in recent years China has adopted an increasingly tough, and in the opinion of some Western analysts and media, even aggressive foreign policy position known as "wolf warrior" diplomacy⁹³⁶ (《战狼外交》)⁹³⁷. Chinese diplomats associate "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" with upholding fairness, emphasizing that "kneeling for the people" is not a "tradition"⁹³⁸. Such a diplomatic strategy defends national interests and is one of the five key elements of "Xi Jinping Thought"⁹³⁹. Here Chinese diplomats and Foreign Minister Wang Yi have to extremely subtly regulate international relations. It is precisely thanks to Foreign Minister Wang Yi that the tone and actions of China's foreign policy steps have changed over the past three years.

⁹³⁵ Several major theoretical issues in gaining the right to influence the international agenda // Zhenmin zhibao. People's Forum. 2017. 27 February. URL: <http://www.rmlt.com.cn/2017/0227/461456.shtml> (accessed: 08.05.2023). In Chinese.

⁹³⁶ A metaphorical expression that appeared in Chinese media in 2020 describes a different style of behavior of Chinese diplomats, more assertive and decisive.

⁹³⁷ Hua Chunying. Response of the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson responded to the "wolf warrior": Can China be only a "silent lamb"? // News Agency "Zhenmin wang". 10.12.2020. URL: <http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2020/1210/c1002-31962452.html> (accessed: 08.11.2023). In Chinese.

⁹³⁸ Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying's regular press conference on December 10, 2020 // The MFA of the PRC. 10 December 2020. URL: http://gr.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/fyrth/202012/t20201210_3167153.htm (accessed: 08.12.2023).

⁹³⁹ Xi Jinping's innovations and the PRC's party-state discourse are brought together under the general title "Xi Jinping's Thoughts on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era".

The modern Chinese diplomacy also includes the concept of **"new type of relations between major powers"** (《新型大国关系》). Since 2014, Xi Jinping has paid special attention to it. This idea includes the second most important foreign policy doctrine – **"new type of international relations"**⁹⁴⁰, the distinctive features of which are "cooperation and common gain." Note that the concept of "new type of international relations" can apply to almost all states, and "new type of relations between major powers" ("interstate relations of a new type") imply interaction between China and the USA. As early as 2010 and 2015, the political leadership of the PRC emphasized the coordinating role of both countries in relations with all countries, despite their different economic, social systems, cultural traditions, and stages of development. In 2015, Xi Jinping noted that "China and the United States must adhere to the right direction of building 'China-U.S. interstate relations of a new type.'"

In 2019, Xi Jinping pointed to the need for strategic thinking and strengthening the role of "strategic buttons" ("战略扣子") within the strategic concept of "new China-U.S. interstate relations between major powers" ("中美新型大国关系"). These "buttons" perform the functions of "positioning" and "guidance" in China's development. The basis for building "new China-U.S. interstate relations between major powers" is maintaining a peaceful and stable international environment for China's internal development, i.e. realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Xi Jinping uses the concept of "new type of interstate relations" to describe China-U.S. relations in the hope of increasing China's role in these bilateral relations⁹⁴¹. However, in 2021, the diplomatic rhetoric of the Chinese side changed at a meeting within the framework of the high-level strategic dialogue with the United States in Anchorage: from the traditionally friendly tone, Chinese diplomats moved to sharply accusing the United States of human rights violations, Washington's inconstancy in defending freedom of the press, "unfounded" tariffs on goods from China introduced under President Trump, "interference in Beijing's internal affairs" on issues of Hong

⁹⁴⁰ Chinese: 新型国际关系.

⁹⁴¹ Li Zhen. Xi Jinping's political wisdom in building a new type of China-U.S. relations between major powers // Qiushi wang News Agency. 24.06.2019. URL: http://www.qstheory.cn/llqikan/2019-06/24/c_1124664986.htm (accessed: 21.08.2023). In Chinese.

Kong, Xinjiang and Taiwan, etc. But even despite the conflicting situation, the Chinese political narrative forms a positive view of working together with the United States to strengthen strategic communications, promote mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation, and properly resolve disagreements on the path of healthy and stable development.

In recent years, the concept of "new type of relations between major powers" characterizes Washington as a serious force in the international order, and the United States appears to be the only country in the world that can fundamentally shape China's future. Professor Se Tao sees a crisis in Washington's contradictory undemocratic actions if the principle of "diversity in harmony" is not observed. Otherwise, both the PRC and the USA may become victims of the tragedy of great power politics, he believes. China's relations with many of its neighbors, such as Japan and Myanmar, are also problematic.

The situation around the Korean Peninsula shows how North Korea turns from a false friend into a real enemy, and South Korea from a potential friend into a potential enemy. Beijing can choose friends and enemies, but it cannot choose neighbors. Surrounded by unfriendly neighbors, China – or any other country in this regard – is unlikely to allow itself global ambitions, the professor says⁹⁴².

In the report to the XVIII Congress of the CPC Hu Jintao creatively developed Mao Zedong's theory of "three worlds." First, in terms of relations with developed major countries; second, relations with neighboring or contiguous countries; and finally, relations with the majority of developing countries. The precursor to the creation of "new type of international relations" was also the strategy of "partnership relations of various formats" (《结伴而不结盟》), developed by Jiang Zemin in the late 1990s⁹⁴³.

The report to the XVIII Congress emphasized that China intends to expand the scope of cooperation with **developed countries**, eliminating disagreements and "promoting the creation of a new type of relations between major states characterized by long-term, stable and healthy development" (推动建立长期稳定健康发展的新型大国

⁹⁴² Xie Tao. Chinese Foreign Policy with Xi Jinping Characteristics // Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. November 20, 2017. URL: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/11/20/chinese-foreign-policy-with-xi-jinping-characteristics-pub-74765> (accessed: 08/14/2023).

⁹⁴³ Xi Jinping's new diplomacy with Chinese characteristics. P. 84.

关系)⁹⁴⁴. Speaking on March 23, 2013 at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the President of the PRC, Xi Jinping, called on members of the international community to jointly promote the process of establishing a new type of international relations based on mutually beneficial cooperation of all countries, big and small, strong or weak, rich or poor⁹⁴⁵.

In building relations with **neighboring countries**, China proposes to strengthen friendship "with unchanging benevolence, in the spirit of partnership" (与邻为善,与邻为伴), "strive to make them benefit more from China's development" (努力使自身发展更好惠及周边国家).

At a conference in October 2013 dedicated to diplomatic work with neighboring countries, Xi Jinping emphasized the strategic importance of neighboring countries in terms of history, geography, environment, and diplomatic relations. The leader of China stressed the importance of realizing the community of shared destiny, which begins in neighboring countries. In his opinion, the international community must understand China's domestic and foreign policy, its history. And the integration of the "Chinese dream" with the dreams of the inhabitants of neighboring countries will contribute to their common and stable development⁹⁴⁶. The PRC leadership makes efforts to cooperate with neighboring countries, first of all in order to accelerate their connection to the infrastructure of the "Belt and Road" mega-project⁹⁴⁷.

It is noteworthy that from 2014, the expansion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China's international ties begins in five priority areas: developing relations with major powers, with neighboring countries, with developing countries, implementing

⁹⁴⁴ Vinogradov A.O. New type of relations and the New Silk Road. To the question of China's foreign policy innovations // China in world and regional politics. History and Modernity. 2015. Vol. 20, no. 20. P. 70.

⁹⁴⁵ Follow the trends of the times and promote world peace and development. Xi Jinping's lecture in MGIMO (Moscow, 23 March 2013) // Information Agency "CPC News". 25.03.2013. URL: <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0325/c40531-20902911.html> (accessed: 21.08.2023). In Chinese.

⁹⁴⁶ Xi Jinping: Let the sense of community of common destiny take deep root in neighbouring countries // Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China. 2013.10.25. URL: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/activities_663312/t1093870.shtml (accessed: 21.08.2023); Xi Jinping: Let the neighbouring states accept and understand the "community of destiny" // Xinhua Wan News Agency. 2013, 25 October. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-10/25/c_117878944_2.htm (accessed: 21.08.2023). In Chinese.

⁹⁴⁷ Ibid.

measures of "economic diplomacy", and successfully holding international events in the country⁹⁴⁸.

In relations with **developing countries**, China will strengthen unity and cooperation, defend their legitimate rights and interests, and also support them in increasing their representation and voice in international affairs, remaining "forever their reliable friends and sincere partners"⁹⁴⁹. The content of creating "new type of international relations" is constantly replenished by the practical activities of the diplomacy of a major power with Chinese characteristics in the "new era".

The model of "new type of international relations" is not as large-scale as the "community of shared future for mankind", although they are interrelated. In general, this concept is filled with the same content as the idea of "new type of relations between major powers". It is based on resolving conflicts, mutual respect, mutually beneficial cooperation, honesty, and justice. The concept focuses on China's vision of international relations, characterized by the protection of core interests and the goal of becoming a great power⁹⁵⁰.

In assessing the results of the PRC's diplomatic activities within the framework of "new type of international relations", we will highlight **several main directions of Chinese foreign policy in the new era**:

1) **Active participation of the PRC in global governance.** This concept has firmly entered the Chinese discourse. Wang Yi characterizes China during this period as more mature, approaching the center of the world stage and called upon to stabilize global chaos⁹⁵¹. In 2017, China proposes its own interpretation of human rights, paying special attention to the principle of state sovereignty⁹⁵².

2) The advancement by Xi Jinping of significant and key foreign policy ideas that determine the course of the country: the "Chinese dream", the promotion of the theory of "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics", the creative filling of

⁹⁴⁸ Chinese Foreign Minister named five priority areas of the country's foreign policy for the next year // News Agency "Zhenmin van". 17.12.2013. URL: <http://russian.people.com.cn/31521/8487067.html> (accessed: 21.08.2023).

⁹⁴⁹ Vinogradov A.O. New type of relations and the New Silk Road. To the question of China's foreign policy innovations. P. 70.

⁹⁵⁰ Boyarkina A.V. On the issue of great power diplomacy with Chinese specifics in the "new era." P. 129–140.

⁹⁵¹ Portyakov V.Ya. Foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in 2016 // Problems of the Far East. 2017. No. 1. P. 4.

⁹⁵² Leksyutina Y.V. Participation of the PRC in global governance // Problems of the Far East. 2020. No. 2. P. 17.

the "peaceful development path", the "Belt and Road Initiative", the concept of "interstate relations of a new type", or "new type of relations between major powers".

3) **The concept of "humankind as a community of shared future"**, seen as an important and necessary contribution for China to world theory of international relations in the 21st century, an important course in realizing the "Chinese dream" and achieving the "world dream".

4) In recent decades, there has been a rapid growth in **trade relations between the PRC and the USA**, but the US trade deficit with China has become a real obstacle to normal trade relations between the two countries⁹⁵³. However, according to the Chinese side, the US measures aimed at addressing the issue of intellectual property are intended to prevent China from increasing its role in global production chains and fix it in a low role of assembler of finished products in the system of international division of labor⁹⁵⁴. Despite the coronavirus, US President Biden's ban and the US Treasury Department's ban on investing in sensitive high-tech sectors of China, Hong Kong and Macao, in 2021 trade between China and the US increased. Washington's and the West's attempts to weaken China are failing. In 2021–2022, the volume of China's foreign trade exceeded \$6 trillion.

5) China is expanding its military potential and economic dictate⁹⁵⁵. **Conflicts in the South China Sea (except the Taiwan Strait), on the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku), the Korean Peninsula** have a negative impact on China-U.S. relations⁹⁵⁶. Overcoming the negative consequences of the Hague Tribunal's decision on the ownership of a number of islands in the South China Sea and adjacent waters between ASEAN and China, with the support of Laos and Cambodia, the Chinese government achieved that the arbitral decision was not mentioned at the meeting of foreign ministers in Vientiane in July 2016⁹⁵⁷.

⁹⁵³ Zimenkov R.I. Trade and economic relations of the USA with the BRICS countries // USA and Canada: Economics, Politics, Culture. 2020. Vol. 50, no. 8. P. 61–62.

⁹⁵⁴ Leksyutina Y.V. "Trade wars" or struggle for the renewal of the world order // Problems of the Far East. 2019. No. 2. P. 63.

⁹⁵⁵ Davydov A.S. PRC – USA – Russia: geopolitics and pandemic // Problems of the Far East. 2020. No. 2. P. 129.

⁹⁵⁶ Portyakov V.Ya. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 2016. P. 7; Davydov A.S. Op. cit. P. 129.

⁹⁵⁷ Portyakov V.Ya. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 2016. P. 7.

6) The PRC is striving for the position of a world superpower equal to the USA, i.e. in essence recreating a "new bipolarity", which undoubtedly further increases the risks of confrontation and can in the future plunge the world into a state of strategic uncertainty. The American vector of China's foreign policy retains key positions with a simultaneous increase in the rigidity of its rhetoric and practical implementation⁹⁵⁸.

7) The popularization of Xi Jinping's idea of "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" activated internal opposition in the ranks, which led to the events in Hong Kong, posing a threat to the implementation of the concept of "one country - two systems"⁹⁵⁹.

8) Since 2016, relations with Russia and Europe, Central Europe in particular, have become priority areas of the PRC's foreign policy.

9) China's strategy for implementing the "Belt and Road" mega-project acts as an instrument of China's domination in Eurasia⁹⁶⁰. An important aspect of this initiative is in global economic governance and the promotion of the implementation of the UN sustainable development goals by 2030⁹⁶¹. It is obvious that a number of countries receive linked loans for the implementation of projects of this mega-strategy, and their debt to China is growing.

10) In recent years, the discussion of the concept of the "Indo-Pacific region" (IPR) and practical actions to form it with the participation of the USA, Japan, Australia, and India has attracted attention. This strategy enhances India's international status⁹⁶².

11) China is strengthening **relations with Russia** and gradually building an ideological construct within the Eurasian space. Due to the intensification of the geopolitical dynamics of Eurasia, the political role of both China and Russia is increasing⁹⁶³. Despite economic, financial restrictions and braking factors in bilateral

⁹⁵⁸ Portyakov V.Ya. Main features of the PRC foreign policy in 2019 // Society and State in China. 2021. Vol. 51, no. 40-1. P. 310.

⁹⁵⁹ Davydov A.S. Op. cit. P. 127, 135.

⁹⁶⁰ Portyakov V.Ya. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 2016. C. 10; Balakin V.I. Prospects for economic dominance of the PRC on the continent of Eurasia // Problems of the Far East. 2020. No. 4. P. 115, 117.

⁹⁶¹ Wan Peng. Xi Jinping explained the "Chinese project" of Asia-Pacific development, enriching the content of global economic governance // CPC News Agency. Xuexi Lushan. 23.11.2016. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n1/2016/1123/c385474-28888606.html> (accessed: 08.02.2023). In Chinese.

⁹⁶² Petrovsky V.E. Op. cit. P. 112–123.

⁹⁶³ Balakin V.I. Op. cit. P. 115, 117; Portyakov V.Ya. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 2016. P. 4–12.

development, Russia's special attitude towards the post-Soviet republics makes China consider Russia the "key state" in implementing the project of the "Silk Road Economic Belt"⁹⁶⁴.

In recent years, Moscow and Beijing have created a unique mechanism of relations, the key link of which is regular permanent meetings of the leaders of the two countries. Russia and China provide each other with support to strengthen national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, the North Caucasus, etc.). They jointly oppose Western sanctions. The signing in March 2023 of the "Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Deepening Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Coordination for the New Era" and global sustainable development, as well as bilateral trade, economic, political and energy agreements mean a qualitative expansion of the strategic partnership between the two countries⁹⁶⁵. We note that our cooperation in politics and economics is still contradictory. For Russia, it is strategically important to make maximum use of China's experience in building a modern economy based on universal digitization⁹⁶⁶.

It is noteworthy that China does not declare Russia to be a "major state" of the modern world. The Chinese formulation clearly indicates that "new type of relations between major powers" first of all implies overcoming the spirit of confrontation that the parties overcame back in the late 1980s. Russia, the European Union, and all other countries and interstate formations, China does not consider to be truly great powers in connection with the fact that Russia does not have sufficient financial and economic resources to have a decisive voice in shaping the new international order and is focused on solving its own problems, and Europe is not independent and subjective in foreign policy⁹⁶⁷.

At the same time, given the rather large number of new foreign policy ideas and mechanisms for their implementation at the regional and global levels, it is difficult to

⁹⁶⁴ Portyakov V.Ya. Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China in 2016. P. 10.

⁹⁶⁵ Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on Deepening Relations of Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation Entering a New Era. 21 March 2023 // Administration of the President of Russia 2023 URL: <http://kremlin.ru/supplement/5920> (accessed: 08.10.2023).

⁹⁶⁶ Ostanin V.A., Pecheritsa V.F., Boyarkina A.V. Russian-Chinese economic cooperation in the concept of global digitalisation // Bulletin of the Transbaikal State University. 2022. Vol. 28, no. 4. P. 128.

⁹⁶⁷ Boyarkina A.V. On the issue of great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the "new era". P. 87.

determine which concepts are leading and which are subordinate to them. The impression is created that the Chinese political leadership easily "juggles" these ideas.

Symptomatically, when analyzing Xi Jinping's modern concepts, we often encounter vagueness, ambiguity, and lack of concreteness of these ideas in the modern Chinese foreign policy discourse. In this regard, in the opinion of many Russian experts, it is easy to fall into the so-called "sinology trap", which deprives of an unbiased, critical perception of Chinese interpretations. "It is necessary to apply to the Chinese situation the general concepts, methods and theories of comparative political science or other systemic disciplines"⁹⁶⁸.

The new concepts are all-embracing, multi-aspect and formulated in such a way that some Western countries⁹⁶⁹ find it difficult to oppose them with their own ideas or propose other forms of international cooperation.

Such key Chinese foreign policy strategies as the concept of "community of shared future for mankind"; the concept of "new type of relations between great powers" and others are implemented within the framework of a new diplomatic and ideological approach of transforming China from a large state into a strong one. It is applied both theoretically and practically, and diplomacy is becoming increasingly innovative⁹⁷⁰.

So, what unites and makes special the key concepts in Xi Jinping's diplomatic practice?

Common

1. They all aim to realize the national idea of the "Chinese dream" of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
2. Marxism is the most important source of these diplomatic theories, especially Marx's idea of "sinicization" based on historical and dialectical materialism.
3. Xi Jinping's diplomacy is closely linked to the country's fundamental interests, and the corresponding theories possess characteristics of Chinese civilization.

⁹⁶⁸ Denisov I.E., Adamova D.L. Op. cit. P. 88.

⁹⁶⁹ In Chinese discourse, the concept of "Western countries" (西方国家) usually refers to North America and Europe. Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, Southeast and South Asia are perceived as developing countries.

⁹⁷⁰ Szczudlik J. Towards a «New Era» in China's great power diplomacy // The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). 2018. No. 1 (161). P. 1–2.

4. This foreign policy complex is based on the continuity of Chinese civilization, expressed in stable philosophical and cultural concepts of "the Great Unity", "the World is for Everyone" and many other ancient postulates.

5. The concepts of "new type of international relations", "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics", "new type of relations between major powers" and "community of shared future for mankind" are not described as clearly and unambiguously in official documents. They contain many general and declarative, sometimes vague expressions. The vagueness and lack of concreteness of Chinese foreign policy concepts makes them difficult for the Western mindset to understand. It can be illustrated by the geoeconomic initiative "Belt and Road", the concept of "community of shared future for mankind", which are woven into the theory of "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" and are an integral part of it. The concept of "community of shared future for mankind", the theory of "major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" are implemented in five aspects. These elements have roots in the philosophical tradition of Ancient China of the Five Elements (五行以为).

6. These key ideas show China's perception of the international community, its vision of globalization and world order. They represent a new form of international relations based on mutually beneficial cooperation, which is gradually becoming a reality.

Distinctive

1. The foreign policy importance of the concept of the "Community of Shared Future for Mankind" (CSFM) in the country's current course is evidenced by its enshrinement in the Program Section of the CPC Charter and the Constitution. The concept is aimed at providing a favorable global environment for trade growth through strengthening transport links. It is noteworthy that the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the risks and shortcomings of global interconnectedness, which cannot but affect the development of this Chinese mega-strategy. In addition, we agree with the opinion of Russian and Chinese experts that most of the foreign policy and foreign economic actions of the Chinese state on the international arena are aimed at supporting the implementation of CSFM.

2. As an all-encompassing integration idea that combines all other key foreign policy concepts, the theory of "Community of Shared Future for Mankind" is the most symbolically significant idea of Xi Jinping. This concept reflects China's vision of a new world order in which it should play a more significant role.

3. The "Belt and Road Initiative" is given a principal place in building a "Community of Shared Future for Mankind" and the concept of "new type of international relations."

4. This mega-project, according to Chinese researchers, testifies to superpower geopolitics.

6.2. The “community of common destiny for mankind” is a key link in the ideological basis of China’s foreign policy strategy for “a new era”

According to scholars and experts, the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" of Xi Jinping is multifaceted, comprehensive and complex to understand⁹⁷¹. It creatively develops the main foreign policy complex of "a new type of international relations" (“新型国际关系”), which serves as the basis of Beijing's modern foreign policy strategy.

In 2007, the concept of "community of shared destiny" was officially adopted in the report of the XVII Congress of the CPC, in which Hu Jintao applies it to describe the special relations between Taiwan and mainland China, and since then Beijing has used this term to emphasize important and unique relations with other countries, in particular China's neighbors⁹⁷². In October 2013, at the landmark working meeting on China's foreign policy in the near abroad, Xi Jinping substantiated the key directions of the PRC's diplomatic strategy towards neighboring countries⁹⁷³.

This strategy, Xi Jinping said, is based on four concise principles - "friendliness, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness" (亲, 诚, 惠, 容的理念). They include

⁹⁷¹ 人类命运共同体 only translates in English like this: «a community of shared destiny for mankind», «community with a shared future for mankind», «a community of common destiny» (CCD).

⁹⁷² Boyarkina A.V. The role of the concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" in the implementation of China's global dream // Issues of national and federal relations. 2018. No. 8, issue 6 (45). P. 840.

⁹⁷³ Key words of China. Materials of the XIX Congress. Book 2: Chinese-Russian text. Beijing, 2018. P. 420–421. In Chinese.

positions of good neighborliness, friendship, partnership, maintaining the security of neighboring countries. The concept of "friendliness" means for the Middle Kingdom to strengthen good-neighborly and equal relations with neighboring countries; to organize regular meetings and mutual visits. All this is done in order to expand the circle of China's friends and partners ("朋友圈").

The position of "mutual" benefit provides a favorable regime and creates a close network of common interests. To integrate bilateral interests and raise them to a higher level is the task of joint development of China and neighboring countries in the process of implementing the "community of common destiny for mankind."

The idea of "benevolence" reflects tolerance and the desire to find common ground, leaving aside contradictions. It emphasizes the possibility of universal co-development in the Asia-Pacific region. The concept of "friendliness, sincerity, mutual benefit and benevolence" in the modern world confirms the PRC's foreign policy line to follow the path of peace and development⁹⁷⁴.

The foreign policy concept of the CCD of the PRC is based on the principles of high morality and ethics. It meets the ideals of harmonious development of the whole world. The leader of China emphasizes the vital need for the concept of "true justice and benefit" in international construction. He believes that the popularization of moral principles and moral ideals contributes to the successful rise of developing countries, that strict adherence to the principles of mutual benefit and win-win ("互利共赢原则") is necessary.

Xi Jinping believes that it would be right to refuse the position of "I win - you lose" ("不搞我赢你输") and strive for both parties or many partners to win, follow the resolution of issues of mutual benefit, the principles of friendship, moral duty and justice. This is the main foreign policy approach of Beijing, which has become a symbol of China's "soft power" along with traditional ethics and value ideals⁹⁷⁵.

⁹⁷⁴ Key words of China. Government management / Bureau of Chinese Language Publications and Distribution. Beijing, 2019. P. 542–545. In Chinese.

⁹⁷⁵ Ibid. P. 534.

Beijing demonstrates the position of "truth, business relations, emotional closeness and sincerity" by building effective relations with many developing countries. The Chinese state seeks to achieve such trusting relations with many other states, including great powers.

The concept of CCD was first enshrined in China's relations with other sovereign states in the "White Paper on China's Peaceful Development" in September 2011 and in Hu Jintao's report to the 18th CPC Congress in November 2012. In October 2013, Xi Jinping announced the realization of the development goals of neighboring countries and the "sense of common destiny"⁹⁷⁶.

The authors of the CSDFH concept relied on the "White Paper on China's Peaceful Development" ("中国的和平发展" 白皮书), published in September 2011. They proposed to recognize and understand changes and developments in the world from the perspective of this concept⁹⁷⁷.

The White Book says: "The modern global community begins to realize that the interests of countries, regions or nations cannot be separated from the common interests of all mankind, and all mankind is bound by a common destiny" ("不同制度、不同类型、不同发展阶段的国家相互依存、利益交融, 形成“你中有我、我中有你”的命运共同体。人类再也承受不起世界大战, 大国全面冲突对抗只会造成两败俱伤")⁹⁷⁸.

The authors of the concept emphasized that China is committed to the cause of maintaining peace in the world and promoting the common development and prosperity of all countries, defining new aspects of the common interests and values of mankind and seeking new ways to solve problems⁹⁷⁹, and the concept of "community of common destiny for mankind" contributes to solving numerous problems through cooperation between countries and the implementation of inclusive development⁹⁸⁰.

⁹⁷⁶ Boyarkina A.V. Chinese researchers on the philosophical and cultural foundations of Xi Jinping's concept of "community with a shared future for mankind". P. 128.

⁹⁷⁷ Wang Gonglung, Han Xu. Op. cit. P. 97.

⁹⁷⁸ The Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China published the White Paper "China's Peaceful Development" (full text) // Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China. 09.06.2011. URL: <http://www.scio.gov.cn/m/ztk/dtzt/58/3/Document/999959/999959.htm> (accessed: 18.08.2022). In Chinese.

⁹⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁸⁰ Ding Jun, Cheng Hongjin. China's proposition to build a community of shared future for mankind and the middle east governance // Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. 2017. Vol. 11, no. 4. P. 2.

The idea of the "shared destiny" of peoples sounds in many of Xi Jinping's speeches during his visits to other countries⁹⁸¹. The leader of the PRC continues to develop the CCD concept and promote its implementation with the participating countries on leading global platforms and international organizations. He speaks of a multilateral approach in global affairs and sustainable development, improves global governance.

The persistent call of the Chinese leadership to support the activities of the UN, the G20 group (二十国集团), the SCO countries, BRICS (金砖国家) and other international organizations, to promote the world order and the international system in the direction of reasonable, fair and common development of mankind sounds insistently. The vital need for the implementation of the concept of "common destiny" sounded in Xi Jinping's speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations on March 23, 2013. Later he repeatedly developed the content of this ideational system of strategic significance for the peace and development of all countries and peoples.

At the Boao Forum (博鳌亚洲论坛) in 2013, Xi Jinping shared his view that "the world is increasingly becoming a community where its fate is intertwined with the fate of all countries." Global development remains a serious problem; the world economy has entered a period of deep restructuring and its recovery remains difficult⁹⁸². Mankind has only one Earth, and it is home to all countries.

Common development, which is the basis for sustainable development, meets the long-term and fundamental interests of all people in the world. The inhabitants of the "global village" should develop a sense of "shared destiny," follow the trends of the times, adhere to the right direction, stick together in difficulties and ensure development in Asia and the rest of the world ("人类只有一个地球, 各国共处一个世界。共同发展是持续发展的重要基础, 符合各国人民长远利益和根本利益。我们生活在同一个

⁹⁸¹ Comment: Xi Jinping's visit will help create a closer China-Africa community with a shared future // Russian.News.Cn 07.20.2018. URL: http://russian.news.cn/2018-07/20/c_137337970.htm (accessed: 08.19.2022).

⁹⁸² Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. Traditional ideas of the Middle Kingdom in connection with Xi Jinping's concept of "community of common destiny for mankind"; The keynote speech of President Xi Jinping at the annual conference of the Boao Forum for Asia 2013 (full text) // Information portal "Network of CPC News". 04.07.2013. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2013/0407/c64094-21045989.html> (accessed: 19.08.2022). In Chinese.

地球村,应该牢固树立命运共同体意识,顺应时代潮流,把握正确方向,坚持同舟共济,推动亚洲和世界发展不断迈上新台阶")⁹⁸³.

In this regard, the countries of Asia, united by a "common destiny," are called upon to promote economic integration in the region and thus increase their competitiveness. China, for its part, will actively participate in the process of regional cooperation in Asia and promote regional and subregional cooperation with non-Asian regions and countries⁹⁸⁴.

At the conference in October 2013 dedicated to diplomatic work with neighboring countries, Xi Jinping emphasized the strategic importance of neighboring countries in terms of geography, environment and diplomatic relations.

The leader of China emphasized that "the awareness of the community of shared destiny begins with neighboring countries"⁹⁸⁵, noting that when China implements diplomacy with neighboring countries, it will need to apply a three-dimensional, multi-element strategy to go beyond time and space.

The PRC leadership makes efforts to cooperate with neighboring countries, first of all in order to accelerate their connection to the infrastructure of the construction of the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) and the "XXI Century Maritime Silk Road"⁹⁸⁶, united in a single "One Belt, One Road"⁹⁸⁷ system. This project proposes moving from building bilateral "communities of shared destiny" to regional "communities of shared destiny," and then to a "community of shared destiny for mankind."

Xi Jinping notes that the main task and purpose of ensuring the country's fundamental interests in diplomatic work is to maintain peace and stability in the region. Strengthening and promoting people-to-people and cultural diplomacy, humanitarian exchanges, as well as strengthening public opinion in the long-term development of relations between China and neighboring countries contribute to the implementation of

⁹⁸³ The keynote speech of President Xi Jinping at the annual conference of the Boao Forum for Asia 2013 (full text) // Information portal "Network of CPC News". 04.07.2013. In Chinese.

⁹⁸⁴ Xi Jinping: Let neighboring countries accept and understand the "community of destiny" // Central Government Portal. 10.25.2013. URL: http://www.gov.cn/ldhd/2013-10/25/content_2515764.htm (accessed: 08.19.2022). In Chinese.

⁹⁸⁵ Xi Jinping: Let neighboring countries accept and understand the "community of destiny". In Chinese.

⁹⁸⁶ “丝绸之路经济带”和“21世纪海上丝绸之路”.

⁹⁸⁷ Xi Jinping: Let neighboring countries accept and understand the "community of destiny". In Chinese.

China's domestic and foreign policies. This also popularizes the Chinese language and way of thinking, fulfills the desires of neighboring countries to achieve prosperity and opportunities for regional development, allowing neighboring countries to better understand the concept of "community of shared destiny"⁹⁸⁸.

In October 2013 in Indonesia, the leader of China announced the joint building of the "China-ASEAN Community of Shared destiny" (中国 - 东盟命运共同体) and the "XXI Century Maritime Silk Road" ("21 世纪海上丝绸之路").

The thesis about China's close cooperation with ASEAN countries⁹⁸⁹ Xi Jinping developed at the Asian Boao Forum in 2015, emphasizing: "We must discuss and find solutions to common issues together. To be a great power means bearing great responsibility for regional and global peace and development, not striving for a monopoly on managing the regional and world order"⁹⁹⁰.

At this Forum, Xi Jinping proposed four principles that contribute to creating a regional "community of shared destiny." First of all, all countries must uphold mutual respect and equal treatment. Secondly, adhere to the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation and common development. Thirdly, all countries need to achieve universal, comprehensive, joint and sustainable security. Finally, adhere to inclusiveness, mutual learning and exchanges between different civilizations ("迈向命运共同体，必须坚持各国相互尊重、平等相待。迈向命运共同体，必须坚持合作共赢、共同发展。迈向命运共同体，必须坚持实现共同、综合、合作、可持续的安全。迈向命运共同体，必须坚持不同文明兼容并蓄、交流互鉴")⁹⁹¹.

ASEAN countries cautiously support relations with the powerful neighbor within the CCD concept. The ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership Vision to 2030, accepted at the ASEAN-China summit in November 2018, merely "takes note" of it.

⁹⁸⁸ Xi Jinping: Let neighboring countries accept and understand the "community of destiny". In Chinese.

⁹⁸⁹ 东南亚国家联盟, Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN.

⁹⁹⁰ Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. From the idea of Confucius "between the four seas, all people are brothers" to Xi Jinping's "community of the common destiny of mankind" P. 71; The keynote speech of President Xi Jinping at the annual conference of the Boao Forum for Asia 2015 (full text) // CCTV.com 03.29.2015. URL: <http://news.cntv.cn/2015/03/29/ARTI1427561680663412.shtml> (accessed: 19.08.2022). In Chinese.

⁹⁹¹ The keynote speech of President Xi Jinping at the annual conference of the Boao Forum for Asia 2015 (full text). In Chinese.

The vision itself represents a compromise between China's ambitious agenda for a more cohesive ASEAN-China community and ASEAN's selective and pragmatic approach that embraces these initiatives offering economic, financial and practical benefits. At the same time, ASEAN is concerned with preserving its central role in an open and inclusive regional order⁹⁹².

At the same time, at the ASEAN summit in June 2019, China expressed concerns about the "Indo-Pacific direction" and India as an emerging center of power in the regional order. Its economic potential and strategic weight should be taken into account and used in the interests of the development of ASEAN countries as a reliable motorway line with many points of entry and exit between member states, not only with Beijing⁹⁹³.

The active phase of implementing the CCD concept began in 2014. Beijing implemented this new foreign policy strategy and offered the peoples of the world solutions to global problems⁹⁹⁴. It claimed that based on the concept of "community of common destiny for mankind," a new world order could be formed based on the principles of peace, humanity and trust⁹⁹⁵.

Global partnership first at the bilateral, then regional and finally global levels, joint and sustainable development - this is the path of mankind, Chinese leaders believe. They call on big and small countries to "adhere to the principle of mutually beneficial cooperative relations and reject unilateral actions; adhere to the new concept of achieving results that will benefit all parties"⁹⁹⁶. The "win" will be mutual, both "bilateral" and "multilateral or common" ("携手构建合作共赢新伙伴")⁹⁹⁷.

To this end, China is developing cooperation at all levels with political parties and civil society organizations in many foreign countries. In this multilateral

⁹⁹² Hoang Thi Ha. ASEAN's Ambivalence Towards a «Common Destiny» with China // *Assessing ASEAN-China. Relations ASEAN Focus*. 2018. Iss. 6, December. P. 10–11.

⁹⁹³ Hoang Thi Ha. Understanding China's proposal for an ASEAN-China Community of common destiny and ASEAN's ambivalent response // *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. 2019. Vol. 41, no. 2. P. 247.

⁹⁹⁴ Kozykina N.V., Muratshina K.G. Features of modern China's diplomacy. Ekaterinburg. P. 19.

⁹⁹⁵ Kai Jin. Can China build a community of common destiny? // *The Diplomat*. 2013. November, 28. URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/can-china-build-a-community-of-common-destiny/> (accessed: 18.08.2022).

⁹⁹⁶ Speech by PRC President Xi Jinping during the debate at the 70th UN General Assembly // Xinhua News Agency. 09.29.2015. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-09/29/c_1116703645.htm (accessed: 18.08.2022). In Chinese.

⁹⁹⁷ Kozykina N.V., Muratshina K.G. Op. cit. P. 20.

cooperation, not only the Communist Party of China and the State Council participate, but also the All-China Congress of People's Representatives, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the People's Liberation Army of China, and local government bodies. China is also expanding military ties abroad.

The political leadership of China understands that in order to build a global partnership network, it is necessary to establish a broad, multilateral dialogue. By the beginning of the XXI century, the PRC has established partnership relations with 97 countries and hundreds of international organizations worldwide⁹⁹⁸.

The course of establishing equal partnership relations between states received a new impetus for development after the XIX Congress of the CPC. In many of his speeches, the leader of the PRC stated that global partnership relations (全球伙伴关系) contribute to expanding the zone of interests of the PRC with developing countries and strengthening cooperation with leading countries of the world. Partnership relations and "new type of relations between great powers" serve as the basis of Beijing's modern foreign policy strategy.

The guidelines of such a policy are the concept of "true justice and benefit" ("正确义利观"); the position of "truth, business relations, emotional closeness and sincerity" ("真实亲诚"); the concept of "friendliness, sincerity, mutual benefit and benevolence" ("亲诚惠容"); the concept of global governance (全球治理观).

In September 2015, in his speech at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping proposed on behalf of China to form a global partnership of a new type with all countries, including developed states, on the principles of equality and mutual respect. Note that in relations with developed states, Xi Jinping rarely uses the concept of "community of common destiny for mankind." Due to political and strategic mistrust between China and some Western countries, the Chinese government emphasizes common economic interests and describes this partnership as a "community of common interests" ("利益共同体")⁹⁹⁹.

⁹⁹⁸ Key words of China. Government management. P. 533. In Chinese.

⁹⁹⁹ Speech by PRC President Xi Jinping during the debate at the 70th UN General Assembly (dull text). September 29, 2015. In Chinese.

At this session of the UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping proposed to implement the concept of "community of common destiny for mankind" as a model of global governance in five areas: **politics, security, development (economic, social, technological, etc.), culture and the environment**¹⁰⁰⁰. Overall, these five dimensions reflect the wide range of interactions in which Beijing must restructure global governance in order to integrate with the world and achieve global leadership.

During official visits to Germany and France, the PRC President called on the leaders of these countries to establish close ties within the "community of common interests." In 2015, speaking in the British Parliament, Xi Jinping noted that "China and Britain are becoming an increasingly interdependent community of common interests"¹⁰⁰¹.

In 2015–2016, Xi Jinping strengthens diplomatic contacts with Western Europe¹⁰⁰², pays great attention to Sino-African cooperation¹⁰⁰³, Sino-Arab relations on issues of successful counterterrorism¹⁰⁰⁴. At the "G20" summit in 2016 in Hangzhou, the Chinese leader confirmed China's progressive movement towards the formation of the concept of "community of common destiny for mankind." This strategy contributed to solving the issues of reforming the World Bank quotas and including the yuan among the IMF reserve currencies¹⁰⁰⁵.

Xi put forward the concept of creating a "community of shared destiny" in cyberspace, which aroused active responses from the international community¹⁰⁰⁶. As

¹⁰⁰⁰ Speech by PRC President Xi Jinping during the debate at the 70th UN General Assembly (dull text). September 29, 2015. In Chinese.

¹⁰⁰¹ Xi Jinping speaks in the British Parliament // Xinhua News Agency. 10.21.2015. URL: http://xinhuanet.com/world/2015-10/21/c_128339832.htm (accessed: 28.08.2020). In Chinese.

¹⁰⁰² Xi Jinping meets with German President Joachim Gauck // Xinhua News Agency. March 28, 2014. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-03/28/c_1110002837.htm (accessed: 28.08.2020). In Chinese; Xi Jinping meets with French Prime Minister Manuel Valls // Xinhua News Agency. January 30, 2015. URL: http://xinhuanet.com/world/2015-01/30/c_1114199898.htm (accessed: 28.08.2020). In Chinese.

¹⁰⁰³ Comment: Xi Jinping's visit will help create a closer China-Africa community with a shared future.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Xi Jinping. Work together for a bright future of China-Arab relations. At the Arab League Headquarters. Cairo, 2016, 21 January // Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. URL: <http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zgyw/t1335484.htm> (Accessed: 21.08.2022); Full text of China's Arab Policy Paper. January 13, 2016 // The State Council, the People's Republic of China. URL: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publications/2016/01/13/content_281475271412746.htm (Accessed: 21.08.2022).

¹⁰⁰⁵ "The main events were not related to the economy": world media about the G20 summit // Tass.ru. 09.06.2016. URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3597693> (accessed: 21.08.2023).

¹⁰⁰⁶ Xi calls for shared future in cyberspace // China Daily. 2015. 17 December. URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2015wic/2015-12/17/content_22730279.htm (accessed: 21.08.2023).

part of the implementation of this concept, the World Internet Conferences are held annually in Zhejiang Province¹⁰⁰⁷.

On February 10, 2017, the fundamental principle of China on building a CCD, which lies in achieving common growth through discussions and cooperation, was included in the UN General Assembly resolution on global governance¹⁰⁰⁸, as well as in the resolution of the 55th session of the UN Commission for Social Development "Social Dimensions of the New Partnership for Africa's Development" calling on the international community to support Africa's development¹⁰⁰⁹.

An important component of the CCD concept is Xi Jinping's "Belt and Road Initiative". Many countries and their leaders, together with experts, assess the significance of this initiative as a unique platform oriented towards the development of the Asian, European and African continents¹⁰¹⁰.

The CCD concept and the "Belt and Road Initiative" are based on the implementation of common interests and interaction of all countries and peoples¹⁰¹¹. At the same time, the "Belt and Road Initiative" is intended for practical implementation, but our study does not aim to analyze the effectiveness of the implementation of this strategy. This mega-project is also having a significant interest to Russia within the framework of reasonable cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)¹⁰¹².

On January 18, 2017, Xi Jinping made another landmark statement at the United Nations in Geneva - with the main report on creating a "community of common destiny for mankind," stating that China is fully committed to the cause of creating "one home for all mankind." He appeals to the world community to "pass the torch of peace from

¹⁰⁰⁷ China calls for creating a community with a shared future in cyberspace // Russian Newspaper. 10.21.2019. URL: <https://rg.ru/2019/10/21/kitaj-prizyvaet-sozdat-soobshchestvo-edinoj-sudby-v-kiberprostranstve.html> (accessed: 21.08.2023).

¹⁰⁰⁸ Chinese landmark concept put into UN resolution for first time // Xinhua. 2017. February 11. URL: http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-02/11/c_136049319.htm (accessed: 21.08.2023).

¹⁰⁰⁹ Chinese landmark concept put into UN resolution for first time.

¹⁰¹⁰ Boyarkina A.V. The role of the concept of "community of common destiny for mankind" in realizing China's global dream. P. 838–846.

¹⁰¹¹ Boyarkina A.V. The Chinese "Belt and Road Initiative" in the context of Xi Jinping's concept of "community of common destiny for mankind" // Theories and Problems of Political Studies. 2020. Vol. 9, Issue 1A. P. 120–140.

¹⁰¹² Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. The "Belt and Road Initiative" – new opportunities for the development of Russia's Far East: experience and problems // Vestnik of Transbaikal State University. 2019. Vol. 25, Issue 3 (22). P. 48–57.

generation to generation," support intercivilizational development. China's proposal to build a CCD contained an appeal for joint and mutually beneficial development¹⁰¹³.

Then, at the XIX Congress of the CPC in October 2017, the leader of the PRC consolidated the thesis about the multitude of common challenges facing mankind and the application of important values of international cooperation based on the combination of the interests of different countries¹⁰¹⁴. In his large-scale report¹⁰¹⁵, the leader of the PRC especially emphasized the 12th section: "Adhere to the path of peaceful development and promote the building of a 'community of shared destiny for mankind'" ("我们呼吁, 各国人民同心协力, 构建人类命运共同体, 建设持久和平、普遍安全、共同繁荣、开放包容、清洁美丽的世界")¹⁰¹⁶.

The provisions of Xi Jinping's CCD concept are creatively elaborated by representatives of his team and Chinese political scientists. They lay a good foundation for the formation of a theory of "common interests" of China. It plays an important role not only in cultivating common interests and raising the national status and power of China, but also in establishing a new world order.

In Beijing, they believe that the implementation of the concept of "community of common destiny for mankind" can be achieved on the basis of an effective model of global governance. A new system of global governance is extremely necessary for China and the whole world in connection with adapting to new changes in the global balance of power and promoting reforms in the system of global governance.

The strengthening of global governance takes place along with the increase in global challenges, and promoting reforms in this area is becoming a leading trend. China understands that the system of global governance is jointly used by all countries of the world, regardless of their size, strength and prosperity, and opposes one country concentrating power.

¹⁰¹³ Sharing responsibility and promoting global development: Xi Jinping's keynote speech at the annual opening ceremony of the World Economic Forum 2017 // Xinhua News Agency. 01.18.2017. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0118/c64094-29031339.html> (accessed: 21.08.2023). In Chinese.

¹⁰¹⁴ Report of Xi Jinping to the XIX National Congress of the Communist Party of China. October 18, 2017. Chapter 12: Adhere to the path of peaceful development and promote the building of a "community of common destiny for mankind" // Xinhua News Agency. 10.28.2017. URL: <http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1028/c64094-29613660-14.html> (accessed: 21.08.2022). In Chinese.

¹⁰¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁶ Ibid.

The PRC leadership implements a policy of multilateralism based on the principles of joint consultations, joint construction and joint use of achievements. In order to consolidate the position of a responsible power and defend the equality of countries in any circumstances, the PRC government advocates expanding the representation and voting rights of developing countries in international affairs. In this way, China intends not only to activate the concept of global governance, but also to establish a world order corresponding to its national interests and ensure the support of the countries participating in the "community of common destiny for mankind."

Adherence to the "correct concept of justice and interests/benefits" is the basis of the foreign policy thinking of the leader of China. This idea of equal interests is based not on the interests of individual countries, but on the interests of the whole world. According to this concept, peoples and governments need to solve problems and uphold justice, moral priority in politics and adhere to mutual benefit and common development, find points of intersection of interests, observe the principles of equality and provide maximum possible assistance to developing countries in the economy.

The philosophical connotation of Xi Jinping's expression "when planning for benefit, plan for the benefit of the whole world; when seeking fame, seek fame throughout the world" ("计利当计天下利, 求名应求万世名") means that the strategic plan should be an idea for all the inhabitants of the Middle Kingdom, rather than a plan for personal gain, it should remain for ages and be honored by generations.

In this way, the leader of China reveals the ideal of traditional culture society, reflecting the main parameters of socialism with Chinese characteristics, in order to promote justice, solidarity with other countries and maintain attractiveness on the international arena¹⁰¹⁷. Not by chance, as a result of this, China's current foreign policy is based on the principles of harmony, mutual respect, strengthening cooperation, coexistence and mutually beneficial development.

Adhering to Confucian thought of "unity in diversity" ("和而不同") and accepting the strategy of "seeking common ground while reserving differences", China's

¹⁰¹⁷ Xi Jinping's quotes. In Chinese.

foreign policy reflects the establishment of prosperous and friendly relations between nations, interaction that leads to achieving "social harmony"¹⁰¹⁸.

In September 2018, the Chinese government proposed to combine the "Ice Silk Road" ("冰上丝绸之路") project and the concept of "community of common destiny for mankind". These two initiatives "are linked by a common destiny and development and have global significance and international influence."

They aim to enhance China's political and economic power in this promising region, stimulate new Arctic scientific research, open up new opportunities for the commercial use of new sea routes and the development of natural resources¹⁰¹⁹. This Beijing initiative received the support of the Russian leadership and was enshrined in the new Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation until 2035¹⁰²⁰.

Another platform for developing the "community of common destiny for mankind" is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO 上海合作组织). Thanks to China, it has become a real global Eurasian organization. At the SCO Summit in Qingdao in 2018, Xi Jinping stated that the SCO has a great significance in creating a "community of common destiny for mankind." It is one of the main "mechanisms for achieving shared destiny."

Xi Jinping calls the SCO a universal, effective, constructive and "most important innovation in the theory and practice of international relations" structure. In opinion of the Chinese leader, the SCO countries are able to resolve any conflict situations, demonstrating the true "Shanghai spirit", rooted in Confucianism, namely: mutual trust, equality, mutual benefit, respect for the diversity of cultures and the aspiration for joint development¹⁰²¹.

At the Beijing summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in summer 2018, the President of the PRC emphasized that the youth of China and Africa promote

¹⁰¹⁸ Xu Jingen. Op. cit. In Chinese.

¹⁰¹⁹ China has published a White Paper outlining its Arctic policy. This is Beijing's first official document dedicated to the Arctic. // Russian.News.Cn. 01.26.2018. URL: http://russian.news.cn/2018-01/26/c_136926688.htm (accessed: 21.08.2023).

¹⁰²⁰ Tikhonov S. The Arctic development strategy will be ready by July // Russian Newspaper. 05.30.2020. URL: <https://rg.ru/2020/05/13/iurij-trutnev-strategiia-razvitiia-arktiki-budet-gotova-k-iuliu.html> (accessed: 21.08.2023).

¹⁰²¹ Xu Jingen. Op. cit. In Chinese.

friendly cooperation between China and Africa and should actively participate in the implementation of the "Belt and Road Initiative". The younger generation should make its own contribution to creating a "community of common destiny for mankind"¹⁰²². In developing ties and cooperation with Africa, China adheres to the concept of "honesty, effectiveness, spiritual closeness and sincerity" and a proper understanding of justice and benefit¹⁰²³.

The Chinese leadership regards these concepts and principles as strategies for China's solidarity and cooperation with African countries, which will lead to the development of Sino-African interaction¹⁰²⁴.

In 2018, PRC President Xi Jinping visited the UAE and four African countries – Senegal, Rwanda, South Africa and Mauritius. In the opinion of the Chinese leader, the concept of the China-Africa community of common destiny and the “Belt and Road Initiative”, the Agenda 2063 of the African Union¹⁰²⁵ and the UN Agenda for Sustainable Development are combined with the development strategies of African states in the new era. China has transferred its experience in poverty alleviation to Africa. This should give a powerful impulse to the development of the African continent¹⁰²⁶.

The Chinese concept of the CCD has found active support and trust not only on the African continent but also in Asia, especially among China's closest neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region. China's foreign policy towards these states is based on trust and the principles of multipolarity.

For the Chinese leadership and for Xi Jinping, the implementation of the security concept within the "community of common destiny for mankind" in the Asia-Pacific

¹⁰²² Xi Jinping called on youth to promote the building of a community of common destiny for mankind // Russian.News.Cn. 08.29.2018. URL: http://russian.news.cn/2018-08/29/c_137428618.htm (accessed: 23.08.2023).

¹⁰²³ Wang Yi on the importance of Chinese President Xi Jinping's speeches for the development of China-Africa relations // Russian.News.Cn 09.06.2018. URL: http://russian.news.cn/2018-09/06/c_137450281.htm (accessed: 23.08.2023).

¹⁰²⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁵ The guiding framework for Africa's development is the African Union's Agenda 2063. Comprehensively complementing the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, Agenda 2063 lays the foundation for building resilience and socioeconomic progress across the continent. For more information, see: Message on Africa Day. 25 May 2018 / UN Secretary General. URL: <https://www.un.org/sg/ru/content/sg/statement/2018-05-25/secretary-generals-message-africa-day-scroll-down-french-version> (accessed: 22.08.2023).

¹⁰²⁶ The comment: Xi Jinping's visit will help build a closer China-Africa community of common destiny. In Chinese; Wang Zefei: Three state visits opened the "big year" of China-Africa relations // Huangqiu shibao. 04.04.2018. URL: <https://opinion.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnK7n1k> (accessed: 13.05.2023). In Chinese.

region is extremely important. Already in 2022, at the Boao Asian Forum, held under the motto "Peace and Pandemic: Interaction for Global Development and a Common Future" ("携手迎接挑战, 合作开创未来"的主旨演讲) in full isolation due to the prevention of the COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak¹⁰²⁷, the PRC President and foreign and Chinese scholars especially highlighted the role of the global security initiative in preventing the consequences of geopolitical trials. However, for this all countries need to be closely linked together in order to avoid the region being divided by external forces ("。。。各国需要紧紧联系在一起, 避免地区被外力分离")¹⁰²⁸.

The concept of the CCD has received particularly active support and trust from the Russian Federation. In a telephone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Wang Yi stated that "the strategic leadership of the leaders of the two countries is the greatest political advantage of China-Russia relations... As responsible major powers, China and Russia must not only promote bilateral relations to a higher level, but also together with all objectively and impartially positioned countries counter any actions that undermine the international order and disrupt the course of history, defend universal peace and stability, uphold international justice and global progress"¹⁰²⁹.

China adheres to the following principles of multipolar approach.

First, the principle of sovereign equality, which is the most important norm regulating interstate relations. All countries, regardless of size, strength and wealth, are equal.

Second, constructive dialogue and consultations that contribute to reasonable global governance in the modern world. Aggression or the threat of use of force, hegemony and power politics must be rejected.

¹⁰²⁷ The current pandemic caused by the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus.

¹⁰²⁸ The Boao Forum for Asia is a strong voice of the times aimed at creating a community of common destiny for mankind // China Youth Daily. 04.22.2022. URL: http://news.youth.cn/hotnews_41880/202204/t20220422_13635658.htm (accessed: 19.08.2022). In Chinese.

¹⁰²⁹ Wang Yi held a phone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov // Russian.News.Cn 07.18.2020. URL: http://russian.news.cn/2020-07/18/c_139221145.htm (accessed: 19.08.2022).

Third, the rule of law is crucial for establishing legal international relations. International law must be applied equally to all, and double standards or selective application of international law must be rejected.

Fourth, mutually beneficial cooperation stimulates joint development and expands areas of common interests based on mutual benefit¹⁰³⁰.

China proposes a multilateral approach in implementing the "community of common destiny for mankind" to the UN for solving global problems. In addition to the UN, China participates in solving world problems within such platforms as the "G20", APEC, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Asia-Europe Summit and other global forums. The EU, ASEAN, the African Union, the League of Arab States, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and other international organizations have contributed to the cause of peace and development by developing regional cooperation. This shows China's striving for global cooperation, a "community of common destiny for mankind", multilateralism, which represent important tendencies of our time¹⁰³¹.

Chinese diplomacy is increasingly active in European countries. In March 2019, Xi Jinping visited the China-France Forum on Global Governance. The PRC leader called on the leading countries of Europe to be active participants, jointly responsible for the future and fate of all mankind.

The President of the PRC believes that China and France together promote the progress of civilization and uphold the principles of mutual respect and trust, equal relations, openness, inclusiveness, mutual benefit and cooperation, jointly seeking to uphold the basic principles of international relations, promote the improvement of the global governance system. In Xi Jinping's view, the essence of global governance lies in joint discussion, joint construction and joint use, as well as the formation of a "community of common destiny for mankind".

In addition, in defending multilateralism and free trade, maintaining the leading role of the UN on the international stage helps create a new model for economic growth.

¹⁰³⁰ Yang Jiechi. Op. cit.

¹⁰³¹ Ibid.

Beijing calls on European countries to participate in the joint construction of the “Belt and Road Initiative” and expand investment cooperation¹⁰³².

At the II Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April 2019, Xi Jinping confirmed that multi-vector investment cooperation has a positive impact on the formation of a "community of common destiny for mankind"¹⁰³³.

The international community regards this resolution as the first UN resolution that "demonstrates the wide recognition of China's concept of a ‘community of common destiny for mankind’ by UN member states and represents a significant contribution by China to global governance"¹⁰³⁴. On March 17, 2017, 15 members of the UN Security Council unanimously adopt Resolution 2344 to extend the mandate of the mission in Afghanistan for one year - until March 17, 2018, which also includes the creation of a "community of common destiny for mankind". Many scholars and political scientists estimate that the concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" is not only an innovative multipurpose foreign policy strategy of the PRC, but also an important part of world politics. It is enshrined in UN documents¹⁰³⁵.

The concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" is an organic integral part of the general voluminous work "Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" ("习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想"). Xi Jinping's thoughts and reflections demonstrate the confidence, pragmatism and responsible attitude of the leader of a great country towards other states.

The characteristic features of the CCD concept, emphasizing its important scientific, cultural and geopolitical significance, are as follows: **Firstly**, a deep understanding of the conceptual idea of a "community of common destiny for mankind". **Secondly**, taking into account and understanding the provisions (potential consequences) of implementing the concept of a "common destiny." The CCD concept reflects China's

¹⁰³² Xi Jinping: All countries are responsible for the future of the planet // Russian newspaper. 03.27.2019. URL: <https://rg.ru/2019/03/27/si-czinpin-vse-strany-v-otvete-za-budushchee-planety.html> (accessed: 19.08.2022).

¹⁰³³ Xi Jinping attended and delivered a keynote speech at the opening of the 2nd “Belt and Road” Forum for International Cooperation // Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Russian Federation. 04.30.2019. URL: <http://ru.china-embassy.org/rus/ztbd/yidaiyilu/t1659867.htm> (accessed: 19.08.2022).

¹⁰³⁴ The building of a "community of common destiny for mankind" is enshrined for the first time in a UN resolution // Xinhua News Agency - People's Daily. (accessed: 20.08.2023). In Chinese

¹⁰³⁵ Chinese landmark concept put into UN resolution for first time.

five main aspects of international cooperation with other countries, namely: politics, security, economy, culture and ecology. **Thirdly**, the deep realization of its authors of the importance and necessity of "living and developing together." **Fourthly**, its close connection with the practice and implementation of foreign policy in the new era. China's foreign policy strategy provides a constructive and responsible course for close interaction with other countries in various fields.

According to Professor Zhang Denghua, the main motivating force behind the implementation of the concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" is the escalation of territorial disputes between China and ASEAN states in the South China Sea. This is a necessary condition for Beijing to establish ties with ASEAN countries, since the thesis adopted as the guiding principle of China's diplomacy with its neighbors - "the neighborhood is the main thing" ("周边是首要"), contributes to the successful implementation of China's diplomacy with neighboring countries¹⁰³⁶.

At the same time, in Professor Zhang Denghua's opinion, not all the provisions of the concept are spelled out and substantiated, some of them are only designated and represent general principles with an unclear meaning¹⁰³⁷. A number of issues have only been raised and there are no answers yet as to how these principles can be applied in practice, develop plans for different partner countries and economic sectors. Many Russian researchers agree with him¹⁰³⁸.

Seeking global solidarity, China was the first to deal with the first and most terrible wave of the COVID-19 epidemic and led the fight against this terrible disease. Speaking at a special G20 leaders' summit dedicated to measures to combat the pandemic, Xi Jinping emphasized that the new pneumonia epidemic is a serious test for every country in the "global village." There was a national mobilization, joint protection

¹⁰³⁶ Zhang Denghua. The concept of «community of common destiny» in China's diplomacy: meaning, motives and implications. 2. P. 199.

¹⁰³⁷ Ibid. 2. P. 204.

¹⁰³⁸ Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. From the idea of Confucius "between the four seas, all people are brothers" to Xi Jinping's "community of the common destiny of mankind" P. 71; Pecheritsa V.F. The concept of Xi Jinping's "community of common destiny for mankind": from idea to practical implementation. P. 66–67.

and joint control, openness and transparency were implemented. These measures contributed to achieving victory in the people's war (人民战争) against the epidemic¹⁰³⁹.

Another acute problem, the solution of which was determined at the XIX Congress of the CPC in 2017, within the framework of the concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind", became the problem of eradicating poverty in China and the world¹⁰⁴⁰.

The relevance of this topic is undeniable, especially in connection with China's effective experience in combating poverty in the country and in the world. It can be stated that in recent years China's transition to a new model of poverty reduction, the development and implementation of poverty reduction and inclusive growth programs worldwide have created a need for comparative studies of targeted poverty reduction measures that can be studied and disseminated among some developed and developing countries. By implementing comprehensive eradication measures within the country and abroad, China, facing problems, is ready to work together with other countries in order to free all mankind from poverty¹⁰⁴¹.

The high rates of economic growth and industrialization have significantly exacerbated environmental problems in China - the next element of the implementation of the CCD concept by the fifth generation of leaders.

As in many countries of the world, the environmental situation in the PRC is the result of the country's intense development over the past decades at the expense of harsh exploitation of natural resources and environmental degradation. According to data, about a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions, or almost 50% of China's annual emissions growth, requires an assessment of the environmental protection mechanism or laws of sustainable economic development¹⁰⁴².

¹⁰³⁹ Boyarkina A.V., Pecheritsa V.F. The Chinese experience of combating COVID-19 under conditions of limiting the mobility of the population // *Izvestia of Irkutsk State University*. 2021. Vol. 36. P. 61.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ruban L.S., Boyarkina A.V. The significance of Xi Jinping's concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" in China's state regulation and international policy // *Questions of National and Federal Relations*. 2021. Vol. 11, issue 4 (73). P. 1214.

¹⁰⁴¹ Boyarkina A.V. Fighting poverty in China in the context of the idea of "community of common destiny" from 2013–2020 // *World Politics*. 2021. Issue 3. P. 63–82.

¹⁰⁴² Boyarkina A.V. Xi Jinping's global strategy for building an "ecological civilization" in the new era // *Ethnosociety and Intercultural Communication*. 2020. Issue. 10 (148). P. 115.

At the same time, the most acute issue for the PRC is emissions of CO₂ into the atmosphere. At the same time, fossil fuels remain in first place in terms of use in the world, and it is important for states to possess energy resources that are needed for the industrial sector, transport, strengthening defense capabilities, household functioning, and all together this ensures economic independence of countries¹⁰⁴³.

In the context of overcoming the crisis associated with COVID-19 and resuming production and economic processes, China is again actively fighting with air pollution. Chinese industry is inflicting tangible damage on the environment, affecting not only the quality of ecology of neighboring countries in the region, but also the overall situation on the planet as a whole. China's national development strategy includes tasks for building an "ecological civilization" (生态文明建设).

In this logic, the country's leadership implements a course for the construction of an "ecological civilization." This idea, put forward at the XVII Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2007, was included in its Charter at the XVIII Congress in 2012. At the XIX Congress of the CPC in 2017, PRC leader Xi Jinping called for the protection of nature and preservation of the purity of the planet, since man and nature are one community ("人与自然是生命共同体, 人类必须尊重自然、顺应自然、保护自然")¹⁰⁴⁴. The new version of the PRC Constitution of 2018 is based on these concepts, which in their essence postulate the transition to ecological thinking in China and in the world as a whole.

An important layer of research in this area belongs to the Chinese school. The thoughts and commandments about the harmonious coexistence of man and nature have saturated the entire millennia-old culture of China. In China, the word culture "文化" consists of two symbols-concepts (hieroglyphs): "文" (writings, heavenly signs) and "化" (change). This term means "change of written signs", the evolution of the written

¹⁰⁴³ Ruban L.S., Pecheritsa V.F., Boyarkina A.V. Russia in the new geopolitical and geoeconomic reality between Washington and Beijing // Questions of National and Federal Relations. 2021. Vol. 11, Issue. 8 (77). P. 2293.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Xi Jinping on behalf of the XVIII CPC Central Committee delivered a report to the XIX National Congress of the Communist Party of China (full text). Chapter 9: Accelerate the reform of the system of ecological civilization and build a beautiful China // Network of Communist Party Members. 10.18.2017. URL: <https://www.12371.cn/2017/10/18/ARTI1508315414608762.shtml> (accessed: 20.08.2022). In Chinese.

heritage. The concept of "ecology" in this country is interpreted as the interrelationship between human life and various elements of the environment.

China has revered the virtue of life from ancient times, and the "Book of Changes" says that "the great virtue of heaven and earth is life." The Chinese understand the term "ecological culture" (生态文化) as the harmonization of the relationship between man and nature, as well as the "soft" and powerful driving force of the environment. Compared to "hard measures" such as administrative laws, "soft power" has appeal¹⁰⁴⁵.

Significantly, many Chinese experts consider traditional national concepts in this area from the point of view of Marxist doctrine. Professor Chen Zhenyi proposes to integrate Marxist teaching on "ecological civilization" and traditional Chinese thought in order to harmoniously build and develop it in China. Scholars analyze ancient Chinese ecological concepts such as "unity of nature and man", "frugal use of nature," and "restrain oneself as required by nature" ("天人合一、节物利用、以时禁发") and link them with Xi Jinping's theory of building a "socialist ecological civilization."

With Xi Jinping's coming to power, a new qualitative stage began in the construction of China's ecosystem. In the spring of 2014, it was announced that China was entering a period of "new stage" of economic development. In his speeches, Xi Jinping repeatedly noted that "golden and silver mountains" and "emerald waters and green mountains" are needed.

Based on these images, a whole environmental protection concept emerged - the "two mountains theory" ("两山论"), covering two main categories: "green waters and emerald mountains" and "golden and silver mountains." This theory is a key proposition of Xi Jinping in building an "ecological civilization" in the new era and implies the transformation of an industrial civilization into an ecological one. It explains a new paradigm for interpreting the relationship between man and nature¹⁰⁴⁶.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Boyarkina A.V. The environmental direction in China's foreign policy strategy // Vestnik of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia. Series: International Relations. 2021. Vol. 21, issue. 2. P. 327.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Boyarkina A.V. Xi Jinping's global strategy for building an "ecological civilization" in the new era. P. 118.

We believe that the main difference between Hu Jintao's environmental policy and Xi Jinping's similar policy lies in the fact that under the latter's leadership, the development model that harms or even destroys the environment is becoming a thing of the past¹⁰⁴⁷. Once opposed to limiting emissions, Chinese leaders now agree that climate change is a serious global problem that can only be addressed through intergovernmental cooperation.

China's modern vision of an environmental strategy was presented in Xi Jinping's report to the 70th session of the UN General Assembly in September 2015, where he called on the international community to "preserve Mother Nature" and "take the path of green, low-carbon, circular and sustainable development" ("顺应自然、保护自然的意识, 坚持走绿色、低碳、循环、可持续发展之路").

Only joint cooperation based on the principles of green, low-carbon, recycling and sustainable development can ensure victory. Green, low-carbon ("低碳绿色"), circular and sustainable production and a healthy (green) lifestyle ("绿色生活方式") can open up a civilized path for the development of production, well-being and good ecology, Chinese scholars believe.

The construction of an "ecological civilization" in combination with the concept of a "community with a shared future for mankind" from a philosophical point of view refers to modern ideas of building a healthy and environmentally sustainable ecosystem¹⁰⁴⁸.

China supports proposals from a number of countries on climate change: it has increased its contribution to the Secretariat fund in accordance with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), signed the Paris Agreement at the XXI Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC¹⁰⁴⁹. China's climate commitments given in the UNFCCC in 2015 represented its achievements in mitigating the consequences of climate change.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Boyarkina A.V. The environmental direction in China's foreign policy strategy. P. 331.

¹⁰⁴⁸ Ibid. P. 332.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Ibid.

The PRC leader proposes to create an "ecological community" ("建设生态文明共同体"), which is an organic part of the "common community" of mankind. At his initiative, the South-South Climate Change Cooperation Fund of 20 billion yuan was established in China, Guidelines for the Development of Green Belt and Road Construction were issued. He emphasized the dialectical unity of economic development and environmental protection in the process of forming an "ecological civilization." According to the Chinese leader, this is the only way to implement the concept of CCD¹⁰⁵⁰.

Speaking at the Paris Conference of the United Nations on Climate Change in 2015, Xi Jinping noted that China is the world's first country in the field of energy saving, use of new and renewable energy sources. Xi Jinping acknowledged that decades of China's rapid economic growth "have damaged the environment and resources". The speech cited figures on China's reduction of carbon dioxide emissions to a maximum of 60-65% by 2030 and an increase in forest reserves. Some of his proposals were aimed at promoting the concept of CCD¹⁰⁵¹.

Speaking at the general debate of the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, Xi Jinping, emphasizing that the COVID-19 pandemic is not the last crisis for mankind, supported coordinated interaction between countries within such multilateral formats as the "Belt and Road Initiative", the concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" and other foreign policy strategies. To achieve this, China, Xi Jinping outlined, will increase the size of its proposed national contributions and seek to create a carbon-neutral economy by 2060 after passing the peak of carbon dioxide emissions by 2030.

In September 2020, speaking at the UN biodiversity summit, Xi Jinping noted the special role of eco-culture in China's development and the "harmony of the whole universe" ("万物和谐").

¹⁰⁵⁰ Boyarkina A.V. Xi Jinping's global strategy for building an "ecological civilization" in the new era. P. 119; Her own. The environmental direction in China's foreign policy strategy. P. 333.

¹⁰⁵¹ Boyarkina A.V. The environmental direction in China's foreign policy strategy. P. 333.

He emphasized that its construction is included "in all aspects of the country's socio-economic development." In this speech, President Xi Jinping put forward four proposals, the first of which is "to adhere to the concept of 'ecological civilization' and strengthen the dynamics of building a beautiful world" ("一是坚持生态文明, 增强建设美丽世界动力")¹⁰⁵².

In this regard, the development of the concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" has further actualized the problem of environmental protection in China and in the world. At the same time, if the construction of eco-culture and an "ecological civilization" does not affect the reduction of harmful emissions into the atmosphere, rivers and seas, the reduction of coal consumption by China, the collection of domestic sewage in cities and towns, etc., the level of air pollution can reach critical indicators.

Obviously, CO₂ emissions are growing due to the economic boom in Asia, and primarily in China. Taking into account China's international commitments, the willingness of its government to solve complex environmental protection tasks, there is hope that Xi Jinping's entire eco-strategic complex will help transform the concept of an "ecological civilization" from Chinese to global, or world.

And the development of a new biodiversity program to the 2050 horizon within the framework of the first UN-organized global conference in the field of ecological civilization on the topic "Ecological Civilization – Creating a Common Future for Life on Earth" in Kunming at the end of 2021¹⁰⁵³ will contribute to the qualitative recovery of the economy after the COVID-19 epidemic and compliance with eco-culture and "green" development.

According to Professor Zeng Jinghan of Chinese origin from the University of Lancaster (UK), the concept of a "new type of relations between great powers", the "Belt and Road Initiative" and the concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" are not strategic plans of China reflecting certain geopolitical goals of Beijing or Xi Jinping himself. The idea of a "community of common destiny for mankind" is the

¹⁰⁵² Boyarkina A.V. The environmental direction in China's foreign policy strategy.

¹⁰⁵³ Torin A. Kunming Agreement: How to Ensure Biodiversity Conservation on Earth? // International Affairs. 02.15.2021. URL: <https://interaffairs.ru/news/show/29082> (accessed: 10.01.2023).

opaquest. The professor's main argument is that these ideas should be understood as multifunctional slogans for studying China's foreign policy concepts¹⁰⁵⁴.

Thus, in our opinion, since 2013 China has been trying to introduce new standards of international relations, and this indicates that Xi Jinping is quite effectively implementing his ideas with inevitable and complex problems. Thus, the analysis of Xi Jinping's foreign policy concepts and initiatives shows that since 2013 to the present, by putting forward such large-scale, multifaceted and long-term concepts, China plans to take the place of leader in the new multipolar world that is taking shape.

In domestic and foreign policy, Xi Jinping continues to maintain continuity while creatively renewing his course. He remains committed to Marxist ideas and believes that the party is needed to ensure leadership and prevent instability. Xi Jinping has inherited this sense of following Leninist theory and emphasizes that China needs a party to defend its sovereignty and overcome uncertainty in the future¹⁰⁵⁵.

Xi Jinping's concept of a "community of common destiny for mankind" is central and integrated into China's modern foreign policy strategy. In it, the PRC leader shows the inseparable link between the fundamental provisions of Chinese traditional culture and Beijing's modern political course. The CCD concept shows ways and methods of solving acute problems facing mankind. Xi Jinping proposes mechanisms for implementing this theory. An enormous contribution to China's foreign policy strategy is also Xi Jinping's "Belt and Road Initiative". It is increasingly becoming an effective platform for China's economic advancement into the global economy. This initiative is a key link in building a "community of common destiny for mankind" and the concept of "international relations of a new type."

The CCD concept is of interest within the country and is supported by many representatives of the international community, including in Russia. They like the fact that, following the idea of the "common destiny" of mankind, China seeks to uphold common interests, an equal world, and is ready to share the results and opportunities of

¹⁰⁵⁴ Boyarkina A.V. On the issue of great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the "new era". P. 90.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Denmark A. 40 years ago, Deng Xiaoping changed China – and the world // The Washington Post. URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/12/19/40-years-ago-deng-xiaoping-changed-china-and-the-world/> (accessed: 16.04.2023).

its development with all peoples. The concept of China's global security based on the principle of indivisibility and security has also received the approval of the international community¹⁰⁵⁶.

The PRC expands the scale and prospects for implementing the CCD concept: from the level of "bilateral communities of common destiny" - "regional communities of common destiny" – to the "community of common destiny for mankind."

With this concept, China offers the international community a scientifically sound model of global governance. Its necessity is caused by the adaptation of countries and peoples to new changes in the global balance of power, regardless of their size, their strength and prosperity. It is opposed to the idea that only one country should concentrate power. In the opinion of the Chinese leadership, the concept of global governance is vitally important not only for the PRC, as a responsible world power, but for the whole world.

Examining the traditional views on foreign policy of the leaders of the fifth generation and Xi Jinping personally, we note the clear expression and the most extensive inclusion in the foreign policy discourse of the "tianxia" system. The ideological reasons that prompted China to include the countries of the nearby seas and their peoples within its sphere of influence are precisely related to the concept of "tianxia." Xi Jinping views some Pacific countries as part of the ancient world of the Middle Kingdom, which he intends to restore its primary position and significance in the region where China's role is not disputed.

The Marxist influence in implementing the CCD concept is obvious. The PRC leadership relies on the rich traditional political culture developed over centuries and the theoretical provisions of Marxism. The application of Marxist theory in modern Chinese society is aimed at strengthening political, economic, spiritual and cultural life. The political leadership of the PRC understands that with the successful development of the country, there are more opportunities to implement the CCD concept.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Xi Jinping put forward a new concept of security in the world // Independent Newspaper. 04.21.2022. URL: https://www.ng.ru/world/2022-04-21/1_8424_china.html (accessed: 20.08.2023); Beckley M., Brands H. Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China. New York, 2022. 304 p.

The accumulated experience of development, enriched with Marxism, provides China with the chance and opportunity to offer the world constructive development programs based on close cooperation and unity of peoples. Therefore, the traditional culture of the Middle Kingdom, fertilized by modern ideas of Marxism, significantly influences the formation of China's foreign policy strategy and the world agenda. It promotes the advancement of a "policy of openness, mutual benefit and cooperation" for all countries.

During Xi Jinping's leadership, the world-system approach from Western theories of international relations is close to modern concepts of a "new type of relations between great powers", "community of common destiny for mankind", the "Belt and Road Initiative". In practice, it is precisely that they transform the classical definition of a *world economy* into a *world empire*. The logic of China's actions at the present stage confirms the thesis about its behavior in the style of a *world empire*.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the ideological foundations of the study of the foreign policy concepts of the PRC of five generations of leaders since 1949 to the present day, carried out in the dissertation, allows to come to the following general conclusions.

1. An analysis of the traditional ideas of Chinese thinkers about the nature of foreign policy shows that the ideological and philosophical platform of most foreign policy ideas and strategies of the PRC are based on ancient Chinese systems, such as "tianxia", "harmonious world", "gongsheng", "tongbian", et al. In China, starting from the 2-nd century BC, this thought, thanks to a complex, centuries-long consistent development, transformed Confucianism into an official ideology that consolidated the connection of philosophical thought with political state institutions.

2. Developing and proposing solutions to pressing foreign policy problems, Chinese scientists, using the method of materialist dialectics of K. Marx, comprehensively explore the modern world historical process, its patterns and trends, identify its main problems and contradictions and make a significant contribution to the theory of Marxism. Meanwhile, some contradictory provisions in the Chinese version of modern Marxism require a deeper scientific analysis, justification and explanation of these contradictions and, possibly, adjustments to this teaching, which should explain how it is necessary to integrate into the existing complex reality of the modern world and difficult international relations.

3. Analysis of the influence of Western theories of international relations on the foreign policy ideas of the PRC in the second half of the 20th and the first quarter of the 21st centuries shows that they played a certain role in adjusting the foreign policy concepts of modern China. At the same time, there is a normative discrepancy between "Chinese" and "Western" views on international relations and world order. Western theories of realism and liberalism, in our opinion, cannot explain the behavior of non-Western countries. Of course, in recent decades, Chinese political scientists have enriched the theory of international relations with new approaches. Western authors of IR also admit this. Classical realism is unable to explain a great number of the problems of modern Chinese foreign policy due to the fact that this school takes little account of

Chinese political culture. In order to update existing theories of international relations and recommendations for implementing an effective foreign policy course of the PRC, a great number of Chinese scientists are turning to the study of the experience of Pre-Qin philosophers. Therefore, Yan Xuetong generalizes a number of theories within the framework of his own methodology for analyzing state government, developed by Pre-Qin philosophers. The development of political ideas in the pre-Qin period in the view of this scientist, as well as the theory of state formation of Xu Tianbo and "relational management", "constructivism of process" of Qin Yaqing, in contrast to Western schools, largely explain the increase in aggregate national strength in the international arena. Modern Chinese constructivists – Qin Yaqing and others – advocate culturally oriented behavior of the state and society. The historical method, they rightly believe, is effective from the point of view of objectivity and impartiality in the interpretation of events. They defend the positions of the Confucian tradition in conjunction with the implementation of diplomatic strategy and foreign policy in order to maintain peace with other states and the security of the modern PRC. The theory of globalization and deglobalization has a positive impact on the political and economic development of China at the present stage and confirms the thesis about China's constant foreign policy behavior in the style of a world empire. To summarize, we believe that the Chinese school of IR is rapidly evolving, and the Chinese scientific community, by analyzing and comparing the works of compatriots and Western international relations theorists (constructivists, criticizing them, entering into debates with them), enriches the modern concepts of Chinese foreign policy.

4. Having examined the foreign policy ideas of the PRC in the first years of people's power (1949–late 1950s), we will highlight several factors that determined the main patterns of large-scale Chinese foreign policy strategies. The structure and process of China's domestic politics influenced the formation and evolution of its foreign relations strategies. The development and development of foreign policy concepts is a process of subjective-objective communication in the understanding of international relations (see Appendix A). The shortcomings of Mao Zedong's theory, noted by Western critics, could turn into advantages, since changes and deviations lead to the successful implementation of the theory. Appendix B demonstrates the similar

communication positions and perceptions of international relations between Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Mao Zedong creatively combined Marxism with the traditions of Chinese culture, which created continuity for the further development of his foreign policy theories.

5. During the period of the “Cultural Revolution,” the central idea of the Chinese leadership was Mao’s idea of “permanent revolution,” which formed the theoretical background of his practical plans in the 1960s and 70s. Mao Zedong sought to achieve influence in the countries of the “third world”; with this strategic goal, the theory of "three worlds" was developed. At the end of the 1960s. In China, anti-Soviet rhetoric sharply intensified. Aimed at emerging from the era of humiliation of the great Chinese nation by foreign imperialist powers, radicalization also had a significant impact on the internal politics of the CCP. The radicalization of China's foreign policy during the years of the Cultural Revolution led to the emergence of China as an independent and strategically important state. At the same time, the "Cultural Revolution" combined foreign and domestic policies. The prestige of the PRC in the USSR, countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America fell sharply.

We highlight the theory of "division of three worlds", the theory of "two intermediate zones" as its predecessor among Mao Zedong's foreign policy ideas. These ideas are the most flexible and effective in building an independent state, defending the position against the "first world", the USSR and the U.S., possessing nuclear weapons. Mao, with extremely limited options, pushed forward the process of world revolution. Despite often contradictory ideas and decisions, Mao in some cases revised his viewpoint and tried to increase his credibility in the eyes of other world leaders. The concepts of the Chinese leaders of the first generation (Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and others) are characterized by a radical, revolutionary and class ideological approach to the analysis of China's international activities and international relations. In this regard, a one-sided approach in their diplomatic activities. Due to various reasons and circumstances, not all Chinese foreign policy concepts discussed in this dissertation were put into practice and remained declarations. The theory of ideological confrontation with the USSR and the strategy of rapprochement with the United States

were developed. Since Mao Zedong applied his own system of thought, or doctrine - "Mao Zedong's ideas", the period of his rule can be called "ideological" ("思想").

Finally, when examining the evolution of the ideological foundations of the PRC, one cannot fail to note their linguistic and political development. Each of the leaders of five generations used their own terminology of foreign policy thought. It is noteworthy that after Mao Zedong's death, the tactics of oratory and foreign policy discourse changed due to the rapid changes in the contemporary international environment. In building a foreign policy strategy in the management of the state, Chairman Mao relied on the criterion of "harmony" and the concept of "zhengming". In this case, the evolution of the cultural and historical features of ideological foreign policy terminology becomes clear, and how the process of transformation occurs from the initial and simple concepts of "idea", "thought" (思想, thought) – "theory" (理论), then to the most complex and meaningful phenomenon – "concept" (概念). Turning to the clichéd, metaphor-filled folk political language of Mao Zedong, we mainly emphasize his use of the concepts of “idea” and “thought” in patterns, syntagmatic connections and lexical units. This found understanding and support among the masses of China (illiterate peasants, workers, et al.). Largely thanks to a brief and accessible presentation of political thoughts and ideas, their repeated repetition and indoctrination (which would become a characteristic feature in the political discourse of all leaders), Mao Zedong came to power with his CCP party. In this regard, we note the witty remark of L. Wittgenstein (1961) about the world and language, indicating the boundaries of the human world, in their unity. Starting with the leaders of the second generation and further, foreign policy discourse is gradually enriched with the concept of “**theory**”. The term appears to refer to a sequence of individual thoughts. During the leadership of Jiang Zemin, a rather complex concept "观念", meaning “**concept, ideas, belief system, thoughts.**” In this combination the concept "观" is translated as "look", and "念" – how to “learn; read”.

6. Refusal of radical ideology, propaganda and struggle within the framework of peaceful and quiet diplomacy in favor of economic cooperation became the main content of the foreign policy doctrine of Deng Xiaoping and his followers. It also

contributed to a restrained and pragmatic formulation of China's major strategic objectives for the coming decades. Deng Xiaoping abandoned Mao's revolutionary approach based on class struggle in Chinese foreign policy. He took a number of measures – opening the economy to foreign trade and investment. The national traditions established by Deng such as "loving your country, " "unity with the people, " and "persevering in the face of difficulties" ensured a stable external environment and fairly rapid economic development during that period.

7. A new model of China's relations with the outside world, based on the normalization and harmonization of civilized interaction with other countries, appeared at the turn of the 70s and 80s. XX century. On the initiative of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s – early 1980s. the concept of war and peace was revised and new foreign policy guidelines were put forward. They touched upon the problems of China's relationship with the outside world and the principles for solving a number of pressing issues. We note that an innovation in the country's foreign policy is the desire of second-generation Chinese leaders to cooperate with various countries. Deng Xiaoping, scientifically substantiating his foreign policy course of opening the PRC to the world market system, since the late 70s to the late 90s. 20th century switched China's economic interest to Western countries led by the United States and carried out significant systemic reforms. Deng Xiaoping for the first time openly announced to the world community about China's backwardness. Deng Xiaoping's theory or concept of "peace and peaceful development" was aimed at ensuring regional and international stability. Based on the views of the main Chinese reformer, the political leadership of the PRC at the turn of the 1980–1990s. rethought the vision of the world after the collapse of the bipolar global system.

An important criterion for strengthening the foreign policy framework for the second generation of leaders was the trust of foreign states, which subsequently depended on the foreign policy course of Chinese diplomacy, based on three basic principles, namely:

- oppose hegemony;
- maintain world peace;
- strengthen unity and cooperation with third world countries.

Later, in the late 1980s and 1990s, there was a lack of alliances between China and other countries, the state acquired independence, which allowed China to play a key role in international relations. He abandoned radical ideological propaganda and struggle and advocated economic cooperation. Deng's foreign policy ideas and theories were more optimistic than Mao's. The tendency of the era, Deng believed, has already shifted towards "peace and development", and world war would not become a reality in the near future, since there were more supporters of peace than supporters of war.

We as well note that it was under Deng Xiaoping that the provision of theoretical justification for the foreign policy steps of the Chinese government and the coordination of planning research in the field of international relations began. The active implementation of Western theories of IR begins precisely in the era of Deng Xiaoping, who began a close rapprochement with the West and a departure from the USSR.

8. Jiang Zemin's ideas and concepts made a great contribution to the establishment of a multipolar and fair world order in international relations. Moreover, his work in the struggle to increase the country's international prestige and strengthen international relations is certainly a legacy of the modern generation of diplomats and politicians. Formulating his concept, Jiang Zemin emphasized the implementation of active diplomacy at the highest level. Chinese third-generation leaders were willing to interpret cultural traditions correctly, use resources sensitively, and understand the characteristics and rituals of the countries with which China sought to deepen diplomatic relations. From this point to the present, Beijing's foreign policy concepts, as well as its practical policies, have become more open, peaceful and sovereign.

9. The development of Beijing's foreign policy concept of a new world order was accompanied by both achievements and omissions. Jiang Zemin was more cautious and consistent in his foreign policy views than his predecessors (Hua Guofeng and others). By continuing Deng Xiaoping's reforms, he tried to restore China's international image as a more open, tolerant, and cooperative major power. The smooth evolution of his theories and concepts from "the rise of China" to "peaceful rise" and then to "peaceful development" ensured the progress of the implementation of the concepts of the fourth generation of PRC leaders. Despite the differences between the degree of perception of

international relations by Mao and Deng, there was a similar position shared by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin - a constant desire to improve the international status and national dignity of China in the international community.

Jiang Zemin's restrained foreign policy strategy was aimed at transforming China into a fairly significant force in international relations, updating the existing world order, and contributing to the strengthening of multipolarity. In practical terms, it ensured the creation of the SCO, the strengthening of China's position in ASEAN, and accession to the WTO.

10. Hu Jintao and his associates substantiated the concept of "peaceful rise" and implemented Beijing's foreign policy to ensure regional and international stability. The leaders of the fourth generation in their concepts ensured the national development of the PRC in the context of world harmony by including the country in international institutions. Emphasis was placed on developing multilateral cooperation, sharing common interests, and jointly solving regional and global problems.

11. The concept of a "harmonious world" put forward by Hu Jintao made a significant contribution to the formation of a positive image of China abroad, to the propaganda, popularization and promotion of socialist Chinese culture at the turn of the 20th–21st centuries. This was aimed at building lasting peace, China's self-development and the co-development of all mankind. Hu Jintao's ideas such as "harmonious world", multipolarity, democratization of international society and a new concept of security have received approval and support in a great number of countries around the world.

12. Xi Jinping's concepts of Chinese foreign policy are creatively based statements of a just world order in the 21st century. They are the most open and developed and form the basis of the decisions of the 18–20th Congresses of the CPC, where it was repeatedly emphasized that China is pursuing a peaceful and independent policy. The history of China's international relations since 1949 shows that it should not shy away from the international political and economic agenda. China must use the international system to protect and enhance its capabilities. Until a few years ago, analysts and scholars spoke of the "rise of China" as a forecast of its future strategy. Now China has already risen, and one of the state foreign policy tasks of the Chinese government is to maximize the

strengthening of the PRC in the international arena. This is Xi's metaphor of "black swans" and "gray rhinoceroses". The Chinese leader introduced four new concepts into diplomacy that define foreign policy strategy: "great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics", "new type of international relations", "new type of relations between great powers" and "community of common destiny for mankind". The innovations of "great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" and other key ideas and programs of Xi Jinping have changed the tone of foreign policy. In recent years, their implementation has promoted tougher diplomacy, metaphorically called "wolf warrior" diplomacy. Xi Jinping and his associates need to find a new growth model. This allows us to talk about the fixation of the current situation both within the country and the ability of the PRC to project its power beyond its borders. Presumably, China will become stronger, but at the same time, it will not become weaker in the foreseeable future. Provided that there are no radical changes in the system of international relations, which Xi Jinping warned about at the 20th CPC Congress in 2022. The Taiwan problem remains complex, open and controversial. China firmly and even harshly calls on the United States to stop creating new factors that could lead to increased tension in the Asia-Pacific region and around Taiwan. The United States of America threatens the peaceful implementation of Xi Jinping's ideas and concepts. He is extremely concerned about the situation around Taiwan, which has been escalating since August 2022 after the visit of Speaker of the US House of Representatives N. Pelosi to Taipei. In 2023, China began a determined struggle against "Taiwan independence" and took steps towards reunification. On the other hand, despite the PRC's systematic military exercises, the U.S. government intends to continue to supply arms to Taiwan and provoke China.

13. The "community of common destiny for mankind" is presented to the fifth generation of PRC leaders as the key link in the ideological foundation of China's foreign policy strategy "for a new era". This concept, put forward by Xi Jinping, is designed to be active in all areas of foreign policy and to build a community of nations on the basis of common interests. It is an important symbol of China's foreign policy. Understanding and applying the provisions of the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" contributes to the struggle of China and all mankind

against global challenges and threats (wars, terrorism, epidemics, et al.). The "community of common destiny for mankind" attaches fundamental importance to the construction and strengthening of a global eco-culture. The ecological dimension justified in the CCDM concept is a new feature of Beijing's foreign policy.

Analyses of the content of the concept of the "community of common destiny for mankind" and the first experience of its implementation show that the problems facing the world can only be solved together. Even large states cannot do it alone.

An important part of the "community of common destiny for mankind" concept is China's transformation towards an active foreign policy strategy and a new model of great power relations. The Chinese leader also justifies the need to strengthen diplomatic neighbourhood (or near abroad diplomacy), expand and deepen cooperation with ASEAN, SCO, and other countries.

The first experience of realizing the theory shows that it will be extremely difficult to put it into practice. Not only due to the fact that it is not ideal and in occasionally contradictory. It is difficult to implement, whereas there are objective inhibiting factors in the world: the inertia of the leaders of a variety of countries; a number of "neglected" and difficult to solve regional and global problems; conscious actions of destructive forces of the West, which not only do not recognize Beijing's ideas on building a new world order, but also oppose them in every possible way. They accuse China of rigid nationalism and chauvinism, of attempting to take control of the rest of the world.

Our analysis of the PRC's foreign policy ideas, theories, and concepts shows that not all of them are deeply scientific. Some of them are individual slogans, statements and speeches. Some of them suffer from utopianism and descriptiveness, and are not supported by a predictive calculation of the prospects of the Chinese state's foreign policy. During the period under study, China experienced three major and large-scale phases of development: the Mao Zedong era, the development during the Deng Xiaoping era, and after the fifth generation of leaders came to power, there is a gradual, strategically deliberately slow transition to the large-scale concepts and initiatives of the Chairmen Xi Jinping.

The development and evolution of Chinese foreign policy strategies is a process of learning and adaptation, during which China has gone from an isolated revolutionary

state to an active participant taking its place in the international system. It has to be admitted that not all the concepts of Chinese leaders have managed to make the transition from simplified generalizations and hypotheses to reliable analytical conclusions. The main task of foreign policy concepts is to rise from description to scientific analysis, to generalisation, and to identify general patterns of international life and China's foreign policy.

At the same time, China opposes and will not continue to submit to the hegemonism of individual powers (the United States). The 20th CPC Congress held in October 2022 showed that China's leader Xi Jinping is extremely cautious in his assessment of the global situation and interaction with countries, and, in our opinion, is prudently preparing for "storms and tempests". Today, China finds itself in an "uncomfortable" position where there is a factor of unpredictability and the world, in the opinion of the Chinese government, is at a historical fork in the road. This calls for a more firm and decisive foreign policy. In the current conditions of social development, Chairmen Xi offers the world community its own model of development based on just peace and co-operation with other states.

Xi Jinping's multidimensional geopolitical concepts and geo-economic initiative "One Belt, One Road" and other strategies reflect not only the sentiments of Chinese society, but also attract the support of many nations around the world, especially in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They trust China, anticipating that through cultural values, rich in unique traditions, and socio-economic achievements, China can lead the renewal of the world on the just principles of friendship and co-operation.

Beijing is trying to preserve its national traditions quite effectively without being drawn into the "Western agenda" with all the benefits and successes or failures that globalisation and integration into the international political and economic system have brought it. As a consequence, this situation seems to be the most favourable to the PRC leader; in this regard, the US attempt to isolate China is still perceived by the Western world as an unfavourable development. China's own path, its modern foreign policy is most constructively presented as the result of a combination of various traditional approaches combining intangible power and social constructive values.

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
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
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APPENDIX A


Diagram of international relations during the reign of Mao Zedong¹⁰⁵⁷



1949 – early 1960s




1964–1973



1973–1978 years

¹⁰⁵⁷ Comp. by the author.



1978–1989 years

APPENDIX B

Grand Strategies and Concepts of Chinese Foreign Policy 1949 – present day (2023)¹⁰⁵⁸

Strategies and Concepts	in Mao Zedong's (1949–1976)	During period of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin (1978 – early 2000s)	During the rule of Hu Jintao (2003–2012)	Xi Jinping era (2013–present)
	1	2	3	4
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “theory of two worlds” (1950s); - course “lean to one side” (1946 – early 1950s); - the concept of “five principles of peaceful coexistence” (mid-1950s); - theory of “two intermediate zones”; - the “third front” program and the “three worlds” doctrine (mid 1960s – late 1970s) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “reforms and opening up” (1980s); - keep a cool head and maintain a low profile. (1990s); - theory of multipolarity of the world (late 1990s – early 2000s) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the concept of “peaceful rise” (2000s); - the theory of “harmonious peace” and the concept of soft power (2007–2012) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the concept of the “community of common destiny for mankind”, “great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”; - “One Belt, One Road” initiative (since 2013)

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Continuation of Appendix B

	1	2	3	4
Foreign policy reasons (mainly)	Relationship line with Moscow. War and revolution	Line of relationship with Washington. Transition to multipolarity. Opening up to the outside world. Peace and development	Line of relationship with three groups of countries	Joint division of interests, obligations and mutually beneficial cooperation of all states of the world. Aggravation of trade, economic, poetic relations with the USA
Content and character of the era and world order	The era of wars and revolutions. Hobbesian anarchy characterizes international relations. Balance of powers during the Cold War	Peace and development became the theme of the era. Anarchist International Society	Peace and development are the theme of the era. Movement to a multipolar international community	A confidently emerging multipolar world with three attractions of centers of power: Russia, China and the USA. Multipolar international community
Ideology and traditional political and philosophical styles	Revolutionary internationalism and realism	Independent and a peaceful diplomatic strategy. Non-class approach, balance of power; pragmatism and realism; Taoism	Socialism with Chinese characteristics. An independent and peaceful diplomatic strategy. Classless; socialism; pacifism; Confucianism	Socialism with Chinese characteristics in a new era. The CCP revives and updates Confucian ideas using the values of traditional culture. The process of borrowing elements of traditional Chinese ideology is accelerating and is associated with their renewal
The goals and means of major concepts and strategies	Maintain state sovereignty and national independence; bring about an international revolution through wars and confrontations. Ensure the security of the state and increase international status and prestige	National development by opening up the country and reaching the global market in a peaceful environment to realize the four modernizations. Establish a new international political and economic order	To achieve both national development and world harmony by joining international institutions, promoting multilateral cooperation and reforms	Preserve state sovereignty in order to revive the Chinese nation and national independence. Active participation of the PRC in reforming the mechanisms of global governance and promoting Chinese interests in Eurasia, Latin America, Africa and other continents

	1	2	3	4
The aspirations and possibilities of big concepts and strategies	Using China's extremely limited capabilities to revive the process of world revolution	Concealing one's capabilities and intentions, pursuing practical interests through international influence and prestige	Recognition of increased opportunities, demonstration of goodwill towards international peace and concord/harmony	Xi Jinping completes the process of transforming China into a state with a capitalist society and the Party at the center of the system
Models of strategic behavior	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Alliance and pseudo-strategic alliance. 2) Emphasis on political and military dimensions as a strategic state 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Strategy of non-entry into alliances. 2) Strategic partnership. 3) Emphasis on economic, political and military dimensions as a major regional power 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Strategy of non-entry into alliances. 2) Strategic partnership. 3) Emphasis on economic, political and military dimensions as a major power 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Consolidation of power in the hands of the leader of the PRC. 2) Strengthening Chinese nationalism combined with the economic achievements of the PRC. 3) Emphasis on political, economic, cultural, military, environmental dimensions as a global power