### SAINT-PETERSBURG UNIVERSITY

Manuscript copyright

# LVOV ALEXANDER ALEXANDROVICH

## PHILOSOPHICAL NATURE OF WORLDVIEW: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH

Scientific specialty 5.7.8. Philosophical anthropology, philosophy of culture

A dissertation submitted for the degree of doctor of philosophical sciences

Translation from Russian

Saint Petersburg 2024

# Contents

Introduction	3
Chapter One Worldview as a metaconcept and a subject of lingua-conceptual anal	ysis38
1.1 Cultural Solipsism: Substantiation for the Problem	38
1.2 The world as the origin of worldview	51
1.3 The morphology of the concept	58
1.4 Worldview as a metacultural concept	68
1.5 History of philosophy as philosophical anthropology	78
Chapter Two. The Current Aspect of the Metaconcept of Worldview	92
2.1. Genealogy of the Concepts	92
2.1.1. Worldview in the Aspects of Weltanschauung and Weltansicht	
2.1.2. Ideology 2.1.3. The World Picture	
2.1.4. Summary	
2.2. The Paradigm Analysis of Worldview	114
2.3. The Constellation of Worldview	136
2.4. Summary	175
Chapter Three. The Historical Aspect of the Metaconcept of Worldview	
3.1. The History of the Concept of <i>Worldview</i>	178
3.2. The Concept of Worldview in the Russian Discourse	197
3.3. Did the Greeks Have a Worldview?	212
3.4. Summary	229
Chapter Four. The Inner Aspect of the Metaconcept of Worldview	
4.1. The Worldview Problematics as an Epoch-Making Manifestation	235
4.2. The World Unfolds Itself in Space and Time	254
4.3 Structural Unity of the World in the Light of the Theory of the Basic Myth	278
4.4 Cultural Evolutionary Perspective on Human Beings	288
4.5. Summary	
Conclusions	
References	

#### Introduction

Relevance of the research. Modern information milieu is full of appeals to the need to establish or define a specific ideology underlying certain discursive practices of modernity or political, social, educational and cultural projects. The 20<sup>th</sup> century saw a grandiose history of confrontation between the ideologies of liberalism, fascism (including the extreme form of National Socialism) and communism,<sup>1</sup> as a result of which the political map of Europe and the world has changed beyond recognition in comparison to the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The cultural, economic and political expansion that today can be observed in an increasingly globalized world certainly has its ideological foundations. However, more and more often we hear that ideology can be built on a certain worldview; a worldview needs to be justified; a worldview is a socio-political construct; there is a professional worldview of a certain social group, etc.<sup>2</sup> Various political and educational platforms hold conferences devoted to worldviews.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, on an intuitive level, it is clear that a worldview, unlike an ideology, refers rather to something individual, personal, subjective; a worldview does not call a person or a group of people to action, but reflects our own ideas of the world, which we live in. But are these worlds the same? Is a worldview merely some theoretical foundation for one's orientation in the world and, in that sense, a weakened form of ideology that requires one to take concrete action? Is a worldview individual or collective? And are we not confusing

<sup>2</sup> Vide: Armer E. V. A Picture of the World and a Picture of Social Reality: a Social Constructivist Approach // Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. 2013. № 366. Pp. 24—27. (*In Russian*); Podshibyakina T. A. Ideological Aspects of Worldviews: Research Methodology in Political Science // Zhurnal politicheskikh issledovanii. 2023. Vol 7. № 1. Pp. 38—49. (*In Russian*); Kharichev A. D., Shutov A. Yu., Polosin A. V., Sokolova E. N. Perception of Basic Values, Factors and Structures of Socio-Historical Development of Russia (Based on Research and Approbation Materials) // Zhurnal politicheskikh issledovanii. 2022. Vol. 6. № 3. Pp. 9—19. (*In Russian*); Shakin D.A. Professional Worldview VS The Worldview of a Professional // Sovremennye problem nauki i obrazovaniya. 2021. № 1. Pp. 26. (*In Russian*); Ibrahimov M. Historiosophy of Sport and Physical Culture as a Projection of Culturo-Ligical Meanings // Теорія і методика фізичного виховання і спорту. 2012. T. 2012. № 1. C. 107—115.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Dugin A. The Fourth Political Theory. St. Petersburg, 2009. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Exempli gratia: "Scientific and practical conference on the problems of world outlook and social sciences 'DNA of Russia'" (Oct 25—31, 2022, Sochi; "Rethinking Russia in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Challenges and Perspectives", Belgrade, Serbia, Apr 1—3, 2022.

worldviews and ideologies to please the evil of the day? Obviously, due to these kinds of questions, an analysis of worldviews is nowadays in great demand.

Many of those who have studied the history of the concept of worldview in a particular language have often encountered an analysis of purely philological or historical-linguistic material. The statement that the concept of worldview is a product of German language (Weltanschauung), and therefore of German-speaking culture as a whole, is a consensus among scholars of the humanities: in all studies of the last fifty years devoted to this or that aspect of worldview,<sup>4</sup> it is common to quote the classic citation from M. Heidegger that Weltanschauung is "not a translation from Greek or, say, Latin. There is no such expression as κοσμοθεορία. On the contrary, it is a word of specifically German coinage, and it has been coined precisely in philosophy".<sup>5</sup> Thus, the initial research position turns out to be that this concept has a purely Modern character, which has no correspondence with either the ancient or any other non-Modern traditions. At the same time, the completeness and complexity of the concept worldview, which ensures its meta-, or cross-cultural (i.e., crossing the borders of any one particular linguistic culture) potency, is revealed by the example of its usage in various national philosophical cultures. For example, in the context of Russian philosophical thought, this notion still plays an important role. The peculiarities of Russian-language usage not only accumulate original, nationallanguage (i.e. related to the universals and concepts of Russian culture) meanings in the concept of *worldview*, but also express certain stable cross-cultural connections, demonstrating the universal nature of philosophical thinking.

The concept of *worldview* has historically attempted to be clarified by proposing a typology of worldviews. Suffice it to recall the famous typologies proposed by W. Dilthey, M. Scheler, K. Jaspers, H. Gomperz and other authors of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. In this concept it is as if the most obvious and to put it

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The following comprehensive studies illustrate the point: Arutyunyan M. P. The Phenomenon of Worldview. Khabarovsk, 2006. (*In Russian*); Meier H. G. "'Weltanschauung': Studien zu einer Geschichte und Theorie des Begriffs." Ph.D. diss., Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster. Münster, 1967; Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids, 2002; Sire J. W. Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept. Westmount, IL, 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Heidegger M. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2001. P. 5. (In Russian).

tendentious signs of logocentric Western European culture had been merged. On the one hand, this is due to the traditional focus on the history and culture of Europe, which has so successfully existed in the school paradigm of teaching humanities disciplines at least since the 16<sup>th</sup> century. On the other hand, any attempt to defend the originality and autonomy of these or those intellectual movements throughout the entire classical history of philosophy was either qualified as an undermining of systematic thinking, or as non-philosophical games of the "native mind".

The widespread typologies of worldviews assert the heterogeneity of the phenomenon of worldview itself, treating it as a complex and historically defined way of grasping the world in its unity. At the same time, such typologies, with their large number, on the one hand, and with the always subjective principle underlying them, on the other hand, do not reveal the philosophical nature of the phenomenon of worldview itself. Rather, they represent dead schemes, templates, which had already in the 20<sup>th</sup> century given way to reasoned descriptions of the worldview and turned into mere enumerations, thus forming another "common place' in the humanities. With these notions, which constitute the school understanding of the essence of the worldview and are framed as a well-established paradigm in textbooks and lecture courses, the experience of analyzing the concept *worldview* in connection with its established interpretations in national philosophical cultures verges on. Nevertheless, the philosophical nature of this concept remains unclear and requires its own research.

Apparently, in the concept of *worldview*, fixed in its original German form (*Weltanschauung*) in the texts of the late 18th century,<sup>6</sup> has found conceptual completion of what previously existed in the minds of scientists and philosophers only as a vague idea of the world in its entirety. This shows that the very meaning expressed by the concept of worldview cannot be grasped and conveyed by a single concept or strict term, nor can it refer to one simple phenomenon. Rather, the concept, being a "cluster of meanings," refers us to a number of synonymic concepts: it is enough to open any dictionary, for example, of the modern Russian language,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm. Lfg. 10 (1954), Bd. XIV, I, I (1955), Sp. 1530, Z. 38.

to understand that there is an impressive family of related words, such as *mirovozzrenie* (worldview), *miroponimanie* (understanding of the world), *mirovospriyatie* (perception of the world), etc. In addition, such concepts as *worldview* and *ideology* are thought and used in reciprocal relation to one another. In modern philosophy they are often paired as conceptual synonyms: when we are talking about a collective subject — a social class, a group of people, etc. — the concept of *ideology* is often used, although it is often mistaken for *worldview* in the common usage of the word. Such an identification is not difficult to explain, since the concept of *ideology* initially emerged among French philosophers-materialists and revolutionary French enlighteners as a designation of a special "metatheory" covering all possible human knowledge; does it however then incorporate into its extension the concept of *worldview*?

A worldview is conceptually related to the concept of a world picture *(Weltbild)*. Although the three-part typology "mythological worldview — religious worldview — scientific (philosophical) worldview" is generally accepted, it does however not refer to any particular author, but is only recorded in textbooks,<sup>7</sup> the current world picture of a Modern person still does not represent a homogeneous semantic and axiological milieu. There is no doubt that humanity at the present stage of its history is equipped with advanced science and exceptional technology, has penetrated into the mysteries of the open space and has learned the fundamental laws of nature. However, it does not perceive the world as a universal canvas, but rather always deals with the mosaic of the world, in which there necessarily are "gray areas", filled in by diverse elements - mythological, religious, conspiracy, scientific, etc. In other words, modern people still grasp the world in different ways. The world is not identical by nature with the physical reality surrounding us; the world is given to us through the conceptual apparatus of our language, and thus the integrity of the world restored to our consciousness seeks to present it as a unified, value- and meaning-forming system within which we are able to orient ourselves.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Vide, e.g.: Markov B. V. Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 2014. (In Russian); Mironov V. V. Philosophy. Moscow, 2010. (*In Russian*); Spirkin A. G. Philosophy: A Textbook for Bachelors. Moscow, 2012. (*In Russian*).

From this perspective, the world is never enough as such; the world always appears to the person as a *con*dition to the mutual event.

The abovementioned substantiates the necessity to undertake a study of the philosophical nature of the worldview itself, which would, firstly, clarify the meanings inherent in the worldview as a concept; secondly, substantiate or refute the strictly Modern essence of the concept of *worldview*; thirdly, mark the limits of its applicability; fourthly, analyze the relation of the worldview to the world as its origin. Such a study would reveal the inherent features of the worldview as concepts, demonstrate the archaeology of the worldview as a meta-, or cross-cultural concept with transgressive characteristics to describe the concept of *worldview* itself with its synonyms (primarily *ideology* and *world picture*), showing areas of overlap with each other and identifying points of their divergence.

**Current research of the subject**. The concept of *worldview* is one of the most popular and frequently used in the modern Russian and foreign literature. It is firmly included in a number of traditional concepts of philosophy, political science, cultural studies, linguistics, psychology, theology and other research areas. Philosophy as a worldview discipline is well known from numerous textbooks and tutorials published in Russia and abroad, various worldviews are commonly referred to in connection with social, economic, cultural development of various societies, etc. One would expect that the problem of worldview has thoroughly been studied, but in fact the situation turns out to be the opposite: the more sources on the topic of worldview a researcher encounters, the vaguer and more obscure is the concept's extension. It can be argued that today *worldview* is a "common place" in the Humanities: its conceptual borders get vague, different authors put into its extension sometimes directly opposite and sometimes simply arbitrary meanings, and the achievements of previous epochs or paradigmatic features of specific philosophical and national traditions are not taken into account.

On the one hand, this is due to the fact that worldview is a widespread concept and has long ago (at least since the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century) acquired the right of

citizenship in the modern European languages. It can be heard in everyday speech, but the non-strict usage of the concept in everyday life does not mean that special disciplines cannot condition its consistent application as an important concept for them and establish the limits of its extension. Therefore, on the other hand, worldview is often privatized by means of specific vocabularies of politicians, psychologists, cultural scholars, theologians, etc., breaking away from its natural, inherent pragmatics. Therefore, the conceptual analysis of the concept of *worldview* turns out to be an important method for purifying it from the introduced meanings and connotators, and identifying those fields of application in which it is articulated in accordance with its inherent philosophical nature.

The methodological basis of the research was formed by the works of authors revealing the specificity of lingua-conceptual analysis: Yu. A. Asoyan, S. Yu. Boroday, A. Wierzbicka, S. G. Proskurin, Yu. S. Stepanov, as well as the thoughts expressed in the book by G. Deleuze and F. Guattari on the nature and essence of concepts in philosophy. The most important sources for the anthropological approach to the study of the worldview, myths and the conceptual expression of meanings through non-discursive means of culture (colors, music, etc.) are the works of V. V. Ivanov and V. N. Toporov, F. I. Girenok, J. Itten, C. Lévi-Strauss, D. Levitin, B. V. Markov, M. Pastoureau, N. V. Serov, J. G. Frazer, M. Eliade, et al. Problems of cultural evolution and the evolutionary approach itself to the study of human culture are considered in the works of D. Dennett, T. Dobzhansky, R. F. Inglehart, L. S. Klein, A. Mesoudi, D. L. Smail, E. Chason et al. The historical-scientific material necessary for understanding the statement of the problem of culture evolution and interpretation of universals in human cultures is presented in the works of F. de Waal, R. Dawkins, G. S. Levit, R. J. Richards, U. Hossfeld, P. Ekman, etc.

Original approaches to the justification of the worldview as a subject of philosophical reflection, as well as the typologies of worldviews and their critique, can be found in the works of W. Dilthey, H. Gomperz, B. Groethyusen, E. Husserl, A. Riehl, M. Heidegger, M. Scheler, F. E. D. Schleiermacher, K. Jaspers.

Important material, both conceptual and critical, necessary for the analysis of worldview and related concepts (ideology, world picture, etc.) in various fields of the Humanities were given by T. A. Akindinova, L. Althusser, J. W. Underhill, M. P. Arutyunyan, J. Ashmore, M. M. Bakhtin, R. Barthes, D. K. Bogatyrev (Burlaka), S. S. Gogotsky, W. von Humboldt, J. Derrida, A.-L.-C. Destutt de Tracy, D. A. Leontyev, L. P. Lobanova, H. Meier, V. V. Mironov, D. K. Naugle, T. I. Oizerman, J. W. Sire, D. V. Shmonin, et al.

A significant number of the studied sources on the topic revealed the specificity of the usage of concepts in connection with linguistic cultures or philosophical traditions. Thus, fruitful approaches to the analysis of words and the historical meaning of concepts (both in the content and methodological key) are reflected in the works of V. V. Vinogradov, V. Klemperer, R. Kozellek, P. Kozlowski, M. H. Kovalevic, E. I. Naumova, O. Yu. Plenkov, G. Teichmuller, B. Unbegaun, M. Vasmer, L. Febvre, S. Haffner et al. Especially noteworthy are the studies of J. Glucker, L. J. Zhmud, A. I. Zaitsev, W. Jaeger, R. Onians, M. Polenz, B. Farrington, M. M. Shakhnovich, revealing the specificity of the usage of the concept αἴρεσις in antiquity and the features of its pragmatics as well as understanding the historical, scientific and spiritual context of the era.

The historical-philosophical source base consisted of the works of Aristotle, J. Beaufret, G. W. F. Hegel, I. Kant, T. Carlyle, E. B. Condillac, O. Comte, K. Marx, J. Ortega-y-Gasset, Plato, R. Safransky, I. G. Fichte, M. Ficino, M. Foucault, F. W. J. Schelling, F. Engels. The most important resources on historical-philosophical and cultural criticism for the thesis were the works of F. C. Beiser, H. Bloom, V. V. Vasilyev, O. A. Vlasova, M. Gabriel, N. A. Dmitrieva, L. Katana, A. A. Krotov, P. Masson-Oursel, Yu. V. Perov, A. V. Pertsev, S. Pihlström, K. A. Sergeev, A. V. Smirnov, M. Ermarth.

Finally, the following representatives of Russian philosophy whose ideas shaped or influenced the research intuitions of the thesis, should not be ignored — among the others they are the works by N. A. Berdyaev, V. V. Bibikhin, E. V.

Ilyenkov, A. F. Losev, Yu. M. Lotman, I. I. Mechnikov, S. N. Trubetskoy, S. L. Frank, N. G. Chernyshevsky, L. I. Shestov, P. D. Yurkevich, et al.

The initial hypothesis of the thesis is that the worldview performs an adaptive function within a mobile and changeable human culture, which is embodied in the history of peoples in its specific forms. To trace the changes of worldview forms means to give words to the languages that have developed in human culture and articulate the unity of the world on a conceptual level; from this perspective, the language acts as the entelechy of any particular worldview. Thus, the object of the study is the worldview as a meta-cultural concept in the history of philosophy. The subject-matter of the study is the concept of *worldview* and its characteristics and historical forms, fixing the image of the world in specific philosophical traditions.

The goal of the research is to justify the statement that worldview is human adaptation of to the world within the framework of cultural evolution. This justification is possible by the means of the lingua-conceptual analysis of worldview as a meta-cultural concept (or meta-concept).

To achieve this goal, it is necessary to consistently fulfill the following tasks:

1. to justify the phenomenon of cultural solipsism as a special kind of solipsism within the concept of cultural evolution;

2. to justify the notion of meta-cultural concept (or meta-concept) as applied to worldview and demonstrate its productivity in the light of lingua-conceptual analysis;

3. to demonstrate that historical-philosophical study and the very material of the history of philosophy can become important components of philosophicalanthropological inquiry as a reflection of the spirit and specificity of a particular historical epoch or culture in relation to its intellectual achievements and currents;

4. to define and demonstrate the specificity of the concepts of *worldview* (in its inherent aspects *Weltanschauung* and *Weltansicht*), *ideology*, *world picture*, as well as establish their conceptual relationship;

5. to conduct a paradigmatic analysis of the worldview, i.e. to show the field of meaning in which the concept of *worldview* is articulated in the current field of the Humanities;

6. to conduct a comparative study of the main approaches to conceptualization of the *worldview* in order to establish its semantic constellation as a concept, allowing to reveal the formal characteristic properties of the worldview as a concept, despite the specificity of the authors' interpretations of the concept of the worldview and goals of the doctrine of the worldview;

7. to trace back the history of the concept of *worldview*: its emergence in German-speaking philosophy and dissemination to other modern European philosophical cultures, including Russian-speaking one;

8. proceeding from the formulated constellation of the concept of *worldview*, to demonstrate that *worldview* as a concept can be discussed not only within the framework of the Modern philosophy, but also in the non-Modern philosophy. This task is solved on the example of ancient Greek (Hellenistic) philosophical culture by identifying native to this culture the concept ( $\alpha$  ( $\alpha$ ) ( $\alpha$ ), reflecting the formal similarity with the constellation of the concept itself;

9. to study the specificity of the worldview discussions in connection with the concrete historical-philosophical material: when the worldview as a concept and a phenomenon of spiritual culture became the subject of philosophical interest and in connection with what the doctrine of the worldview became to be in demand;

10. to reveal the principles of understanding the world as a thing that is grasped by the worldview in relation to the notions of space and time as the fundamental ways of human orientation in culture;

11. demonstrate the structural unity of the world as an entelechy of the worldview (on the material of the theory of the main myth developed by V. V. Ivanov and V. N. Toporov);

12. to analyze the image of a modern human being as a bearer of a special type of worldview that reflects the specifics of technogenic digital culture.

Tasks (1-3) are fulfilled in the first chapter of the thesis and serve as a methodological basis for further research; tasks (4-6) are fulfilled in the second chapter of the thesis and reveal the specifics of the current aspect of the worldview as a meta-concept; tasks (7-8) are fulfilled in the third chapter of the thesis and reveal the specifics of the historical aspect of the worldview as a meta-concept; tasks (9-12) are fulfilled in the fourth chapter of the thesis and reveal the specifics of the implicit aspect of the worldview as a meta-concept.

#### The scientific novelty of the research consists in the following:

1. a new type of solipsism has been defined, namely, cultural solipsism, the essence of which consists in the fact that each particular culture is self-contained, and the basic concepts, meanings and values of one culture cannot be represented with the same degree of accuracy and adequacy within the Sprachraum of another culture;

2. the notion of metacultural concept, or meta-concept is substantiated, which is treated as a sense-forming cross-cultural transgression of concepts. If concepts on the level of formal logics are formalized as elementary semantic units and expressed verbally, then meta-concept refers to cross-cultural cluster of meanings, which can be grasped only by analyzing semantic functions of languages of different cultures;

3. it has been demonstrated that the study of meta-concepts allows meaningful analysis of the order of dialogue of cultures within the semiosphere (Yuri Lotman's term), and also becomes an important way to overcome cultural solipsism and justify the universality of human thinking. The universality of thinking, thus, consists in the ability to assert the conceptual uniformity of the world's entirety by various means of specific and irreducible cultures;

4. it has been revealed that the core of the problem of cultural solipsism is to clarify the philosophical nature of worldview as a way of grasping the world by means of a particular culture;

5. the fruitfulness of linguistic and conceptual approach to the study of worldview as a meta-concept has been substantiated. Structural layers of the concept

of *worldview* were revealed and analyzed, namely: current, historical and implicit, or latent;

6. it has been shown that due to analysis of current layer in the structure of the concept of *worldview* it is possible to formulate the constellation of the worldview, which reflects its formal characteristics as being a concept. On the basis of such a constellation, the non-Modern form of the concept of *worldview*, namely the concept of  $\alpha$  (resource) in ancient Greek (Hellenistic) philosophical tradition has been found. Thus, it is proved that the worldview is a meta-concept, i.e. it can be spoken about not only within the framework of the Modern philosophy, which means that the conceptual approach to justification of the universal character of philosophical thinking turns out to be fruitful;

7. it has been established that the world outlook turns out to be in demand in the situations of catastrophe (when the previous world is destroyed and the coming one is not yet created), which means that the worldview appears as a cultural adaptation of the humans to the big history that allows the humans to realize the unity with "their own" on the rational and emotional levels;

8. the philosophical and anthropological nature of historical-philosophical inquiries has been justified.

Theoretical and practical significance of the results obtained in the thesis. The materials of the thesis and the results obtained theoretically give a general idea about the relevance of such a concept as *worldview* for current social sciences and humanities. It was shown that worldview as a concept exists today as a "common place" in humanitarian knowledge, and the statement that it belongs to the discourse of strictly Modern philosophy and principles of its typology require revision and thorough analysis. Consideration of the history of the concept of *worldview*, as well as the study of possibilities of its articulation on the material of non-Modern cultures has a significant heuristic perspective. The conceptual analysis helps to demonstrate that any historically concrete worldview is a logical expression of the subjective perception of the processes in history. In this respect, any concrete worldview can be seen as a individual, specifically realized universal grasping of the world on a

semantic and, consequently, conceptual level. A change in our knowledge of the world entails a change in the language in which the unity of the world is expressed to us. Accordingly, the problem of exploring the philosophical nature of worldview as a way of grasping the world turns on the question of the conceptual means for this in particular cultures. The study of such conceptual means allows us to substantiate the free, creative, mythopoetic grasping of the world as a prerequisite for any systematic way of thinking about the world, expressed in mythological, philosophical, religious, scientific and other discursive practices. Consequently, posing the question of the philosophical nature of the worldview appears not only as a private question in the field of the philosophy of language, but also as the anthropological research, because, as A. V. Smirnov points out, the only being that is a condition of seeing the world as a whole is man, and the specific for human way of existence is understanding of speech and thinking as an unfolding coherence of the world.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, the conclusions of our research allow us to substantiate the tendencies to address the worldview issues, significant not only for the corpus of the Humanities, but also in the newly emerging political, ideological, educational — first and foremost, related to the university environment — processes. The results of the thesis can be applied both theoretically and practically in various fields of philosophical and social sciences and the Humanities, as well as be used in preparing lecture courses, seminars and practical classes in philosophical anthropology, social philosophy, history of philosophy, philosophy of language, cultural studies, political science, psychology and in compiling textbooks on the above disciplines.

The following **methods** were applied in the thesis:

1. *the method of lingua-conceptual analysis* — due to which the pragmatics of articulation of the concept of *worldview* in modern discourse of the Humanities was established, as well as the structural analysis of the concept of *worldview* according to the model proposed by Yu. S. Stepanov.<sup>9</sup> In accordance with this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Smirnov A. V. The Limits of Philosophy // Voprosy filosofii. 2023. № 1. Pp. 15–28. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Stepanov Yu. S. The Constants. The Dictionary of Russian Culture. An Essay. Moscow, 1997. P. 44. (In Russian)

method the concept is presented as a complex semantically loaded set, pragmatically revealing various connections with other concepts of a particular culture;

2. *the genealogical method* — its specificity consists in the fact that the certain ways of interpretation of the concept of *worldview* in different philosophical and linguistic traditions, both Modern and non-Modern (in particular, the Ancient Greek philosophical tradition within Hellenistic philosophy belongs to the latter) were scrutinized;

3. *the comparative method* — it was important for applying the identified constellation of formal characteristics of the concept of *worldview* to the material of Hellenistic philosophy, as well as in analyzing the meaning-generating means of different philosophical cultures, which allowed to connect the problems of different doctrines of worldview in the perspective of the project of "perennial philosophy" (*philosophia perennis*);

4. *the hypothetic-deductive method* — allowed to systematize the studied historical-philosophical material, formulate the initial hypothesis of the study and organize the work, designating the research goal and objectives for its achievement.

#### Validity and approbation of the results of research

The results of the study were presented by the applicant in the form of reports and papers at various Russian and international scientific-theoretical conferences:

1. International scientific conference *Rethinking Russia in the 21st Century: Challenges and Perspectives* in Belgrade, Serbia, April 1—3, 2023;

2. International scientific conference *Lost Harmony as a Theme of Spiritual and Cultural Sciences*, April 7–9, 2022, Institute of Philosophy, SPbSU (St. Petersburg);

3. *Russia and the "Anti-Russia": Historical and Psychological Aspect*. LI International Scientific Conference on Historical Psychology. St. Petersburg, May 16, 2022;

4. Annual International Conference of HSE School of Philosophy and Cultural Studies *Subject and Responsibility: Nature, Society, Culture*, October 06–08, 2022;

5. All-Russian Interdisciplinary Youth Scientific Conference with international participation *X Information School of Young Scientist*, September 19—22, 2022, Yekaterinburg;

6. XX International Conference of Young Scientists in Humanities and Social Sciences *Languages and meanings*, October, 25–27, 2022, Novosibirsk;

7. Scientific and Practical Conference on the Problems of Worldview and Social Sciences *Russia's DNA* (October 25—31, 2022, Sochi);

8. XXVIII International Scientific and Practical Conference *Modern Science: current issues, achievements and innovations*, Penza, December, 10, 2022;

9. International online-conference *Roman Ingarden and Our Times. An International Philosophical Congress*, Jagellonian University in Krakow, Poland, April 12—15, 2021;

10. International Warwick Continental Philosophy (online) Conference *Continental Philosophy and its Histories*, University of Warwick, UK, March 25—27, 2021;

11. CFP: Ischia and Naples International Festival of Philosophy 2021 (September, 23-26, 2021);

12. XIX International Scientific Conference of Young Scientists in the Humanities and Social Sciences *Topical issues of humanitarian and social research*, Novosibirsk, October, 11—13, 2021;

13. Second Stepin Readings *Reality in the Digital Age* (November 9—10, 2021);

14. First International Conference of Hellenistic Studies *Hellenic Political Philosophy and Contemporary Studies*, organized by the Center for Hellenistic Studies (headed by Dr. Filip Ivanovic, Center for Hellenic Studies in Podgorica, Montenegro) in Herceg Novi, Montenegro (September 29—October 4, 2019).

The results of the doctoral research were also represented in 52 publications, among which: 4 collective monographs (in which the applicant owns original articles or chapters), 48 articles (of which 9 are in Web of Science Core Collection / Scopus editions, 19 are in the editions, which are in the list of Higher Attestation

Commission of the Russian Federation; 20 are other scholarly papers including proceedings of the conferences). All 52 publications are presented in Russian Science Citation Index — РИНЦ).

#### **Research Papers Indexed at the Web of Science Core Collection and Scopus:**

- Lvov A. A., Osipov I. D. Metaphysics of the Heart as a Worldview Subject in Russian Philosophy // Voprosy Filosofii. — 2023. — Vol. 11. — Pp. 104—113. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. The Projects of Doctrine of Worldview In the Light of Lingua-Cultural Analysis // Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Filosofiya i konfliktologiya. — 2023. — Vol. 39. — №2. — Pp. 261—273. (In Russian).
- Lvov A. A. Did the Greeks Have a Worldview? A Comparative Study of Worldview's Genealogy // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. — 2022. — T. 38. — № 4. — C. 500—511.
- Lvov A. A. The Specificity of Historical-Philosophical Research in the Humanities // Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Filosofiya i Konfliktologiya. — 2021. — Vol. 37. — № 3. — Pp. 449—463. (In Russian).
- Lvov A. A. Anthropological Turn in Worldview Studies: Theoretical and Practical Aspects // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. — 2020. — T. 36. — № 2. — P. 279—290.
- Lvov A. A. The Burden of Freedom: The Doctrine of Subject in Thomas Carlyle's Works // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. — 2018. — T. 34. — № 4. — P. 534—542.
- Lvov A. A. On the Possibility of Freedom Beside the Subject: Michel Foucault and the Attempt of Overcoming of the Teleology of Modern Historicism // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. — 2017. — Vol. 33. — № 3. — Pp. 316—325.
- Polatayko S. V., Lvov A. A. The Existential and Heroic as the Subject of Philosophical reflection. Pondering Mikhail Pronin's "The Existence. The Forgotten Chernobyl" // Voprosy filosofii. — 2017. — № 5. — Pp. 45—54. (*In Russian*).

 Lvov A. A. Aesthetic politics as an Alternative and Requiem for a Political Aestheticism (Franklin Ankersmit. Aesthetic Politics) // Logos. — 2016. — Vol. 26 — №1 (110). — 142—148. (*In Russian*).

# Papers published in the leading peer-reviewed journals (mentioned in the list of Higher Attestation Commission):

- Lvov A. A. The Problematization of the Project of "Perennial Philosophy" By the Means of Lingua-Cultural Analysis // Vestnik Omskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye issledovaniya. — 2023. — № 1 (38). — Pp. 22—27. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. Dehumanization of History as an Antitheological Project. // Vestnik Omskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye issledovaniya. — 2022. — № 3 (36). — Pp. 25—29. (In Russian).
- Lvov A. A. The Conflict Circumstances of Historicism: From Teleology of History to Theology of the Current Man // Konfliktologiya. — 2022. — T. 17. — №4. — C. 115—130. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. Anthropological Character of Historical-Philosophical Analytics of Worldview // Lichnost'. Kul'tura. Obshchestvo. 2021. Vol. 23. № 4 (112). Pp. 106—115. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. The Ideal of Philosophy as a Strict Science in the Discussion of Historians of Philosophy // Vestnik russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii. — 2021. — Vol. 22. — № 4-1. — Pp. 11—23. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. Historians of Philosophy in the Situation of Hypertext // Vestnik Severnogo (Arkticheskogo) federal'nogo universiteta. Seria: Gumanitarnye i sotsial'nye nauki. — 2021. — Vol. 21. — № 2. — Pp. 99—109. (In Russian).
- 7. Lvov A. A. History of Philosophy as practices of Memory // Izvestiya Tul'skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye nauki. 2021. № 2. Pp. 155—164. Pp. 157—159. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A., Kryukova K. V. H. Gomperz's "The Doctrine of Worldview" as a Result of the philosophy of Empiriocriticism // Vestnik Voronezhskogo

gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seria: Filosofiya. 2021. № 3 (41). Pp. 37— 46. (*In Russian*).

- Lvov A. A., Kryukova K. V. Self-Identification in Conflict or the Dialogue of Cultures? An Anthropological Analysis of the Strategy of "Special Path" // Konfliktologiya. — 2020. — Vol. 15. — №2. — Pp. 38—53. (*In Russian*).
- 10.Lvov A. A. The Place of the Doctrine of Worldview in Max Scheler's Philosophical Anthropology // Lichnost'. Kul'tura. Obshchestvo. 2020. Vol. 22. № 3-4 (107-108). Pp. 127—138. (In Russian).
- 11.Lvov A. A. The Current Conceptions of the Worldview Phenomenon // Vestnik Russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii. 2020. Vol. 21. № 2. Pp. 11—23. (*In Russian*).
- 12.Lvov A. A. Social-Political and Critical Aspect in Contemporary History of Philosophy // Uchenye zapiski Krymskogo federal'nogo universiteta imeni V.I. Vernadskogo. Filosofiya. Politologiya. Kul'turologiya. —2019. — Vol. 5 (71). — №4. — Pp. 51—62. (In Russian).
- 13.Lvov A. A. Existential-Phenomenological Foundations of Psychology and Psychiatry // Izvestiya Tul'skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye nauki. 2019. № 3. Pp. 99—106. (*In Russian*).
- 14.Lvov A. A. Positivist with a Romantic Soul: Overcoming the Conflict of Worldviews in the Anthropology of I. I. Mechnikov // Konfliktologiya. 2019. Vol. 14. № 2. Pp. 96—114. (In Russian).
- 15.Lvov A. A. The Possibility of Cross-Cultural Understanding in the History of Philosophy: The Topical Positions // Vestnik rossiyskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seria: Filosofiya. — 2018. — Vol. 22. — № 3. — Pp. 365—376. (*In Russian*).
- 16. Vlasova O. A., Lvov A. A. The Conceptual Analysis of Existential-Phenomenological Tradition: Foundations and Perspectives // Znanie.
  Ponimanie. Umenie. — 2018. — № 2. — Pp. 94—102. (*In Russian*).
- 17.Lvov A. A. How Historians of Philosophy Substantiate Their Discipline: The Status of History of Philosophy and Historical and Philosophical Research //

Uchenye zapiski Krymskogo federal'nogo universiteta imeni V.I. Vernadskogo. Filosofiya. Politologiya. Kul'turologiya. —2017. — Vol. 3 (69). — №4. — Pp. 84—94. (*In Russian*).

- 18.Lvov A. A. Methodological Search in the Contemporary History of Philosophy // Diskurs. 2017. № 5. Pp. 10—16. (In Russian).
- 19.Lvov A. A. Science-Art: Modern Technologies in the Context of Contemporary Aesthetics // Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Seria 17. Filosofiya. Konfliktologiya. Kul'turologiya. Religiovedenie. 2015. № 3. Pp. 59—67. (In Russian).

#### Monographs (co-authored):

- Vlasova O. A., Dyakov A. V., Lvov A. A., Kolesnikov A. S., Tumanzan T. G. History of Philosophy in the Dialogue of Sciences and Cultures. St Petersburg: « Institut Mira i Issledovaniya Konfliktov» Publishing House, 2022. 128 p. (*In Russian*).
- Dudnik S. I., Osipov I. D., Bzstrova Ya. V., Lvov A. A., Kryukova K. V. Science as a Social Institution in Russian Modernization Projects. St. Petersburg Experience. — St Peterburg: «Vladimir Dal'», 2021. — 259 p. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. Age of COVID-19 in the Light of Ideology and Scientific World Picture // Philosophy of Science: History and Modernity. A Monograph / eds.
   D. Osipov, S. N. Pogodin. — St. Petersburg: POLITEKh-PRESS, 2020. P. 329—355. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. The Competence of Worldview in the Sphere of Education // Filosofiya obrazovaniya. Istoriya i sovremennost': Kollektivnaya monografiya. I. D. Osipov, S. N. Pogodin (eds.). — St. Petersburg: POLITIEKh-PRESS, 2019. — Pp. 46—66. (*In Russian*).

#### **Other scholarly publications:**

- Levit G. S., Hossfeld U., Lvov A. A. "Typological Thinking" and Neoplatonism in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century Biology // Philosophy of the History of Philosophy. — 2021. — Vol. 2. — Pp. 35—55. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. The Status of Studies of Concepts Within the Studies of Cultural Evolution // Vestnik Rossiiskogo filosofskogo obshchstva. — 2021. — № 3— 4 (97—98). — Pp. 203—220. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. Places of Memory in the history of Philosophy (To the Epistemological Analysis of Pierre Nora's Conception) // Paradigma: filosofsko-kul'turologicgeskiy al'manakh. 2021. № 35. Pp. 25—43. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. Russian Enlightenment as a Penomenon of Modernity // Filosofskiy poloilog: ahurnal Mezhdunarodnogo tsentra izucheniya russkoi filosofii — 2021. — № 2 (10). — Pp. 74—87. (*In Russian*).
- Levit G. S., Hossfeld U., Lvov A. A. Shaping German Evolutionary Biology: A Case Study of the Metaparadigm Hypothesis // Philosophy of the History of Philosophy. — 2020. — Vol. 1. — Pp. 241—257. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. From Humanism to Polytechnicism: The Tokens of the Age // Paradigma: filosofsko-kul'turologicheskiy al'manakh. — 2020. — № 32. — Pp. 64—79. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. The Universality of French Philosophy in the Postglobal World (the Case of Enlightenment) // Paradigma: filosofsko-kul'turologicgeskiy al'manakh. — 2020. — № 33. — Pp. 46—63. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. The Positive Foundations of the Axiological Aspect of Historical-Philosophical Research // Filosofskie nauki. — 2019. — Vol. 62. — № 10. — Pp. 55—67. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. The Discussions of Worldview in German Philosophy in late 19<sup>th</sup>—early 20<sup>th</sup> Century // Paradigma: filosofsko-kul'turologicgeskiy al'manakh. — 2019. — № 31. — Pp. 67—85. (*In Russian*).

- 10.Lvov A. A. The Subversive of Worldviews: Alois Riehl's Foundation of the Tasks of Non-Scientific Philosophy // Terra Aestheticae. 2018. № 2. Pp. 163—178. (*In Russian*).
- 11.Lvov A. A. Cosmopolitanism of Petrine Era as a Historical Stage of Russian Identity // Rossiya i «anti-Rossiya»: istoriko-psihologicheskij aspekt. Materialy LI Mezhdunarodnoj nauchnoj konferencii. — St Petersburg, 2022. — Pp. 24—30.
- 12.Lvov A. A. Three Ways of Deconstruction of the Subject of History // X Informacionnaya shkola molodogo uchenogo. Sbornik nauchnyh trudov. Central'naya nauchnaya biblioteka UrO RAN. — Ekaterinburg, 2022. — Pp. 295—302.
- 13.Lvov A. A. In Search for the "Evolutionary Clarity": The problem of Conceptualization of the Soviet Experience // Mezhdunarodnaya konferenciya «Civilizacionnye kody Rossii» (k stoletiyu «Filosofskogo parohoda»). Materialy konferencii. Sankt-Peterburgskij gosudarstvennyj universitet, Institut filosofii. — St Petersburg, 2022. — Pp. 530—532.
- 14.Lvov A. A. Canon and Tradition as Heuristic Waymarks in the Historians of Philosophy's Work // Aktual'nye problemy gumanitarnyh i social'nyh issledovanij. materialy XIX Mezhdunarodnoj nauchnoj konferencii molodyh uchenyh v oblasti gumanitarnyh i social'nyh nauk. — Novosibirsk, 2021. — Pp. 108—110.
- 15.Lvov A. A. G. A. Teichmüller's Antidarwinism and Its Place in the History of Natural Philosopshy // Revolyuciya i evolyuciya: modeli razvitiya v nauke, kul'ture, sociume. Trudy III Vserossijskoj nauchnoj konferencii. Russkoe obshchestvo istorii i filosofii nauki. — Moscow, 2021. — Pp. 263—266.
- 16.Lvov A. A. Value Principles oft the Historical-Philosophical Work // Politicheskoe prostranstvo i social'noe vremya: sistema koordinat v menyayushchemsya mire. Sbornik nauchnyh trudov XHKHV Mezhdunarodnogo Harakskogo foruma / ed. by T. A. Senyushkina, D. Tanchich. — 2019. — Pp. 147—159.

- 17.Lvov A. A. Methodological Communication as Interdisciplinary Symbiosis (On the Example of Existential-Phenomenological Tradition in the Philosophy of Psychiatry) // Kommunikativnye strategii informacionnogo obshchestva. Trudy XI Mezhdunarodnoj nauchno-teoreticheskoj konferencii. — St Petersburg., 2019. — Pp. 72—73.
- 18.Lvov A. A. The French Model in Philosophy: National Peculiarities or Dialogue of Traditions? // Gumanitarnoe znanie i duhovnaya bezopasnost'.
  Sbornik materialov V Mezhdunarodnoj nauchno-prakticheskoj konferencii. — 2018. — Pp. 194—199.
- 19.Polatayko S. V., Lvov A. A. Philosophy and "Naturalistic Approach" in Science // Aktual'nye problem gumanitarnykh i sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh nauk. — 2018. — Vol. 12. — № 4. — Pp. 86—89. (*In Russian*).
- 20.Lvov A. A. Subject of Cognition as a Political Subject: Worldview VS Ideology // Innovacionnye tekhnologii: osnovnye priznaki i rol' v razvitii sovremennogo obshchestva. Sbornik statej mezhdunarodnoj nauchnoprakticheskoj konferencii / pod obshch. red. A. V. Yakovlevoj. — St Petersburg, 2016. — Pp. 133—136.

**Structure of the thesis**. The thesis research consists of an Introduction, four chapters, eighteen paragraphs, Conclusion, and a list of References. The content of the thesis is presented on 360 pages. The list of references includes 488 sources, including 129 in foreign languages.

The main scientific results are reflected in the relevant published scientific articles presented by the author of thesis in the list of publications and reflected in the list of references. They can be grouped into three main rubrics: first, the results concerning the worldview problematic; second, the results concerning the methodological problematic (justifying the statement that historical-philosophical research can be understood as anthropological research); third, the results concerning the identification of various worldview, epistemological and historical-philosophical aspects necessary for the doctoral research in the works of certain philosophers or research developments.

- 1. M. Heidegger's classical position that worldview is a predominantly modern concept and that this concept cannot be found in antiquity was critically analyzed. Using the methodology of comparative philosophy, the genealogy of the concept of worldview was demonstrated and links were found to its manifestations in Hellenistic culture and philosophy, as well as in the thought of the early Modern Age. It was possible to present the concept of worldview not simply as a linguistic phenomenon, but as a metaconcept articulated in non-Modern European contexts and recognized as "worldview" in the language of modern philosophy. In this respect, semantic parallels have been drawn between the ancient Greek concept aipeous (in the sense of "philosophical school") and the term Weltanschauung, which emerged in the context of German classical philosophy and has its own epistemological features and potencies. The general semantic features of these concepts can be summarized in the following characteristics: 1) appearance at "turning points" of key periods of history; 2) articulation of the idea of integrity and coherence of the universe ("the world"); 3) free choice of a person to support a particular doctrine or point of view on the universe, or the world in the broad sense of the word, in connection with the understanding of its structure and its moral principles.<sup>10</sup>
- 2. Based on the analyzed works of modern and classical researchers, an original approach to a much more theoretically fruitful method of studying the phenomenon of worldview is justified. The productivity of working with the concept of worldview in the sense of "how" (*quammitas*) rather than "what" (*quidditas*) was demonstrated. From the anthropological perspective, it was possible to formulate three fundamental problems in connection with the articulation of the concept of worldview: first, the problem of accuracy in describing and conceptualizing worldview as a subject of philosophy; second,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Lvov A.A. Did the Greeks Have a Worldview? A Comparative Study of Worldview's Genealogy // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2022. T. 38. № 4. C. 500-511.

the problem of typology of worldviews developed in the works of former and contemporary philosophers; third, the problem of rejection of the established dichotomy "science — worldview".<sup>11</sup>

3. The diachronic study of the worldview phenomenon was carried out by means of linguo-conceptual analysis and genealogical method. In the course of this research, we managed to compare cultural and linguistic features of worldview problems in German, Russian and Anglo-American philosophical cultures; to discover disciplinary intersections of those branches of knowledge in which these doctrines of worldview are in demand; to compare the status of such doctrines in modern philosophy, taking into account the prevailing epistemological attitudes in German-, Russian- and English-speaking traditions. Among the unities identified in the above philosophical cultures are: the creation of an integrative system of views, including elements of both "scientific" and "non-scientific" philosophy; the combination of logical consistency of argumentation with creative freedom of research; the rethinking of the principle of self-care through the creation of a holistic conceptual picture of the world. The latter includes not only axiological and anthropological identification strategies, but also the justification of the initial positions on which these world pictures are built. Differences are also found concerning the discursive practices that substantiate these world pictures: they may be natural-scientific, traditional (including religious), linguistic (including communicative), and may also be intertwined. The analysis of the teachings of modern authors on worldviews has demonstrated, on the one hand, the relevance and demand for worldview problems in the perspective of the project of "perennial philosophy", on the other hand, the formation of a program of criticism of contemporary culture.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Lvov A.A. Anthropological Turn in Worldview Studies: Theoretical and Practical Aspects // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2020. T. 36. № 2. C. 279-290.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Львов А.А. Проекты «учения о мировоззрении» в свете лингво-концептуального анализа // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтология. 2023. Т. 39. № 2. С. 261-273.

- 4. The views of various researchers on the topic of heart metaphysics in Russian philosophy and the analysis of the heart concept in Russian culture are summarized and analyzed. It is demonstrated that since Russian philosophers give the truths of the heart a universal status, the concept of the heart in Russian philosophy is essentially connected with worldview problems and opens a new perspective for considering the acute dilemma of mind and heart discussed in modern philosophical anthropology and Christian philosophy. The worldview interpretation of the heart also revealed the activity aspect of the heart's nature, since the peculiarity of worldview as a cognitive phenomenon lies in the constant openness of the individual to the Other, which turns out to be a reconciliation of "reasonable" and "cardial" ways of cognizing the world. It has been established that such openness allows a person to regain his personal integrity and bring it to the cosmic fullness in the perception of the world. Thus, the way of revealing the cosmos of personality in overcoming the problem of solipsism and substantiating the "conciliar consciousness" as a special way of supraindividual thinking is outlined. Thus, the heart can be considered as the worldview center of a person and the object of educational practice, and consequently, the worldview as a matter of the heart can serve as a basis for moral guidance in life.<sup>13</sup> (The personal participation of the author of thesis in obtaining the above results is 70%.)
- 5. It is demonstrated that numerous approaches to the phenomenon of worldview in modern research humanitarian literature can be united into two directions anthropological (which include psychological and linguistic approaches) and pedagogical (which include philosophical and theological approaches). Based on the descriptive, comparative and hermeneutic analysis of the sources, it has been established that the interest in the phenomenon of worldview is connected, firstly, with its heuristic potential, secondly, with its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Львов А.А., Осипов И.Д. Метафизика сердца как мировоззренческий сюжет в русской философии // Вопросы философии. 2023. № 11. С. 104-113.

semantic universality and, thirdly, with the rethinking of the concept of the classical Modern European subject through communicative strategies (including the dialogue of cultures and the practice of translation).<sup>14</sup>

#### Group two: methodological one

- 1. Two main criteria of the project of eternal philosophy are analyzed: substantive, related to the systematization of various metaphysical, ethical and religious ideas, and formal, related to the research of the history of concepts and ideas. The interpretation of perennial philosophy on the basis of the formal method of linguo-conceptual analysis is substantiated, in accordance with which it is shown that the principles of elaboration of concepts of different cultures are universal, and, therefore, it is possible to build the work on the search for the first concept ("Ur-Konzept") to which the concepts existing now in different cultures are genealogically raised, or to identify the circumstances and conditions according to which such genealogy is impossible.<sup>15</sup>
- 2. The thesis that the concept of the history of philosophy and the field of historical-philosophical research can be interpreted in a philosophical-anthropological way was substantiated. On the example of analyzing the concept of worldview, it was possible to show that there are such phenomena, which reveal such important elements of the problem field of modern history of thought as historicity and spiritual relativism of philosophical search at the same time, the historical way of considering specific problems should take into account the conditions and context of their emergence. Based on the study of works on metaphilosophical reflection of domestic and foreign thinkers, it is demonstrated that modernity in the historical-philosophical perspective appears as a result of (re)comprehension of classical attitudes, and the historian of philosophy realizes himself in the situation of a speaker of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Львов А.А. Современные концепции феномена мировоззрения // Вестник Русской христианской гуманитарной академии. 2020. Т. 21. № 2. С. 11-23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Львов А.А. Проблематизация проекта «вечной философии» средствами лингво-концептуального анализа // Вестник Омского государственного педагогического университета. Гуманитарные исследования. 2023. № 1 (38). С. 22-27.

here and now. It is substantiated that the "understanding history of philosophy" turns out to be a propaedeutic for modern cross-cultural research within the framework of comparative philosophy, history of ideas and history of concepts.<sup>16</sup>

- 3. The question of whether it is possible to speak about the specific influence exerted by professional historians of philosophy on other sciences was investigated. Within the framework of humanities knowledge, it was established what directions exist in the contemporary dialog between the humanities and historical-philosophical studies, described the contribution made by historians of philosophy to the field of historical sciences, to various areas of political studies, to anthropology, theology and religious philosophy and other disciplines, and to the articulation of the practical aspect of philosophy as a way of life. It is shown that although the history of philosophy is often perceived as an auxiliary discipline, the contribution of historians of philosophy to the development of related and non-philosophical humanities is substantial: they help to reconstruct the genealogy of meanings, and concepts or ideas begin to become clearer as they articulate their native cultural milieu.<sup>17</sup>
- 4. It is demonstrated that the formation and strengthening of the history of philosophy as an academic discipline within the system of higher education and socio-humanitarian studies is an original version of philosophy as a rigorous science proposed by historians of thought. It is shown that the forms in which philosophical thinking is clothed can be conceptualized as ideologies that form the language peculiar to the epoch, and hence the schemes inherent in the carriers of such types of thinking. We review the characteristics that philosophy has acquired in its historical-philosophical dimension, and analyze M. Onfray's critical argument about the historical-philosophical canonization

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Львов А.А. Антропологический характер историко-философской аналитики мировоззрения // Личность. Культура. Общество. 2021. Т. 23. № 4 (112). С. 106-115.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Львов А.А. Специфика историко-философского исследования в гуманитарных науках // Вестник Санкт-Петербургского университета. Философия и конфликтология. 2021. Т. 37. № 3. С. 449-463.

of philosophical thinking, which is supported by other historians of thought as well.<sup>18</sup>

- 5. Based on the comparative analysis of epistemological attitudes of the history of ideas and the history of concepts, the peculiarities of these two approaches, points of convergence and divergence between them are established, and the most important consequences of their application by historians of philosophy in independent research disciplines (social anthropology, literary studies, linguistics) are described. The practice of canonizing forms of thought as an effective way of identifying a person with a certain "imagined community", which both conditions the way of thinking of its subject and is supported by it, is analyzed. This analysis allows us to argue that the quest of historians of philosophy itself, and consequently to the ideological forms of its representation; the methodological success of historians of philosophy lies in such features of their heuristic strategies that allow them to deal with the authentic genealogy of the present, within which modernity discovers its foundations.<sup>19</sup>
- 6. It has been demonstrated that historiography of the history of philosophy, being a reflection of the third order, opens a new angle of the classical problem, which consists in the fact that a person thinking historically does not so much label the problems of modernity by striving to reevaluate it, as by the act of his historically grounded thought he actually changes it. It is established that historical-philosophical research allows us to record the formation and development of the need for self-consciousness in regional cultures. It is substantiated that the historical-philosophical approach performs the function of a tool for understanding and identifying similarities and differences, which allows us to overcome the inherent Europocentrism of the Modern European tradition. It is shown that the history of philosophy and historiography of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Львов А.А. Идеал философии как строгой науки в дискуссии историков философии // Вестник Русской христианской гуманитарной академии. 2021. Т. 22. № 4-1. С. 11-23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Львов А.А. Историки философии в ситуации гипертекста // Вестник Северного (Арктического) федерального университета. Серия: Гуманитарные и социальные науки. 2021. Т. 21. № 2. С. 99-109.

thought turn out to be ways of recognizing diversity in studies of paradigmatic features and differences along with anthropology.<sup>20</sup>

- 7. On the basis of the study of research approaches characteristic of both Eastern and Western styles of philosophizing, as well as trends towards the integration of Eastern and Western styles of philosophizing, consistently supported by representatives of comparative philosophy, intercultural philosophy, and philosophy of language, it is demonstrated that historians of thought have effective tools to substantiate the possibility of constructive dialogue between different cultures of philosophizing. The function of the historian of philosophy, similar to the task of a breeder, to find out whether this or that philosophical culture is capable on the ground of a different, non-native philosophical tradition, is justified. Thus, it is demonstrated that current historical-philosophical discussions touch upon a whole range of issues related to the fruitful, constructive dialog of cultures, the possibility of mutual enrichment with the values and ideas of previously separated schools, currents and trends of regional philosophy.<sup>21</sup>
- 8. Based on the analysis of current historical-philosophical discussions among both foreign and domestic historians of philosophy, the conclusion that the radical rethinking of the concept of metaphysics and its history in the course of the development of primarily analytic tradition, as well as pragmatism, gave rise to such a phenomenon characteristic of these trends as antihistoricism is substantiated. We make a substantial assumption that in connection with the rejection of the traditional continental (and, in fact, Western European) understanding of metaphysics, the historical basis of philosophical discourse was also devalued.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Львов А.А. Социально-политический и критический аспекты в современной истории философии // Ученые записки Крымского федерального университета имени В.И. Вернадского. Философия. Политология. Культурология. 2019. Т. 5 (71). № 4. С. 51-62.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Львов А.А. Возможность межкультурного понимания в истории философии: современные позиции // Вестник Российского университета дружбы народов. Серия: Философия. 2018. Т. 22. № 3. С. 365-376.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Львов А.А. Историки философии в поиске оснований своей дисциплины: статус истории философии и историко-философская работа // Ученые записки Крымского федерального университета имени В.И. Вернадского. Философия. Политология. Культурология. 2017. Т. 3 (69). № 4. С. 84-94.

9. Based on the study of the most notable historical-philosophical projects of the twentieth-early twenty-first centuries, characteristic methodological approaches to rethinking the craft of the historian of philosophy as a philosopher, researcher, and scholar are investigated. We describe the most significant historical-philosophical approaches (comparative philosophy, history of ideas, doxography), the actualization of which allowed leading specialists of the twentieth century to rethink the value and significance of the history of philosophy as an independent research space.<sup>23</sup>

#### Group three: results concerning certain authors and research developments

- 1. Based on the epistemological analysis of the idea of cultural evolution, it was established that it is possible to rethink the history of mankind as the history of man, i.e. *homo sapiens sapiens*, and to fit it into a single evolutionary process: cosmic evolution biological evolution cultural evolution (triad initially proposed by T. Dobzhansky). It is substantiated that such a change in the perspective of historical perspective returns researchers from the fully speculative field of social projection of metanarratives to the field of studying the real and necessary, as it is given in the enlarged scale of the universal evolutionary process.<sup>24</sup>
- 2. It is demonstrated that T. Carlyle in his works applies the method according to which he tries to show that the historical person ("hero") is the subject of history, therefore, the hero is subordinate to Providence, or Nature. The analysis of his argumentation allowed us to formulate "Carlyle's paradox": although the hero occupies a passive position in relation to his fate, he is nevertheless endowed with the status of a weapon in the hands of Providence. It is substantiated that this point of view is a thoughtful approach to the creation of a qualitative, or metaphysical, description of man (as opposed to the quantitative approach characteristic of natural sciences and positive philosophy). It is shown that Carlyle's doctrine of veneration of heroes is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Львов А.А. Методологические поиски в современной истории философии // Дискурс. 2017. № 5. С. 10-16. <sup>24</sup> Львов А.А. Дегуманизация истории как антителеологический проект // Вестник Омского государственного педагогического университета. Гуманитарные исследования. 2022. № 3 (36). С. 25-29.

understood by him as a doctrine of freedom: to be free means for him to consciously accept the burden of Providence and realize it as his own life project.<sup>25</sup>

- 3. The historical and philosophical analysis of the "doctrine of worldview" of H. Gomperz, who positioned himself as the completion of the ideas of R. Avenarius, made it possible to supplement the ideas of empiriocriticism that had been developed in the epistemological key and to introduce the name of this Austrian philosopher into the domestic research literature.<sup>26</sup> (The personal participation of the author of thesis in obtaining the above results is 70%.)
- 4. The doctrine of Max Scheler's worldview is reconstructed based on the analysis and interpretation of the main provisions of his project of human philosophy and sociology of knowledge. It is demonstrated that for M. Scheler Christian love, which he contrasts with the bourgeois society contemporary to him, is not only an ethical but also an epistemological principle, the realization of which at various levels of knowledge leads Scheler to the necessity of justifying philosophical worldview as the highest level of disclosure of this principle. It is substantiated that metaphysics in the light of such principle of love is not considered to be cosmology and metaphysics of action, and man returns to his metaphysically grounded ideal of microtheos, or creator, associate of God in absolute creative impulse not only theoretically, but also practically.<sup>27</sup>
- 5. The concepts of existential and heroic as enduring problems of contemporary philosophical reflection are investigated. It is demonstrated that the experience of everyday life and the experience of events are revealed as social and ontological constants, within the framework of which the possibility of the heroic person to connect the past and the present is discussed. On the basis

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Lvov A.A. The Burden of Freedom: The Doctrine of Subject in Thomas Carlyle's Works // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2018. T. 34. № 4. C. 534-542.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Львов А.А., Крюкова К.В. «Учение о мировоззрении» Генриха Гомперца как итог философии эмпириокритицизма // Вестник Воронежского государственного университета. Серия: Философия. 2021. № 3 (41). С. 37-46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Львов А.А. Место учения о мировоззрении в философской антропологии Макса Шелера // Личность. Культура. Общество. 2020. Т. 22. № 3-4 (107-108). С. 127-138.

of specific historical-philosophical and anthropological materials, the experience of artistic comprehension of the problem of the hero in critical existential situations is summarized.<sup>28</sup> (The personal participation of the author of thesis in obtaining the above results is 50%.)

- 6. M. Foucault's project of opposing the subjective paradigm of the modern era to the "transversal" philosophy of history from the point of view of the results of his "postmodern" project is investigated. It is shown that his original methodological program (archaeology of knowledge) allows to question and redefine the epistemological boundaries of the subject of cognition itself. The process of formation of methodological determinism is described, which goes in parallel with the emergence of the pre-Cartesian subject as such. It is demonstrated that Foucault's search for an alternative epistemological program to the Cartesian project can be considered methodologically successful, and, consequently, that his search for the possibility of freedom outside the subject was successful as well.<sup>29</sup>
- 7. The essence of the actual global-network political representation in the context of F. Ankersmit's project *aesthetic politics*, which represents an original anthropological characteristic of the modern political subject, is analyzed. It is substantiated that the project of aesthetic politics is directly opposed to a truly aesthetic approach to politics and history, characteristic of authors of conservative worldview orientation, and this opposition is rooted in the change of bases from organic, natural, to logical.<sup>30</sup>
- 8. A new interpretation of existential-phenomenological tradition as a unified problem and applied field on the border of philosophy, psychiatry, psychotherapy and psychology is substantiated and proposed. The history of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Полатайко С.В., Львов А.А. Экзистенциальное и героическое как предмет философской рефлексии. Размышления над книгой М. Пронина «Экзистенция: забытый Чернобыль» // Вопросы философии. 2017. № 5. С. 45-54.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Lvov A.A. On the Possibility of Freedom Beside the Subject: Michel Foucault and the Attempt of Overcoming of the Teleology of Modern Historicism // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2017. T. 33. № 3. C. 316-325.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Львов А. Эстетическая политика как альтернатива и реквием по политическому эстетизму (Франклин Анкерсмит. Эстетическая политика) // Логос. 2016. Т. 26. № 1 (110). С. 142-148.

development of existential-phenomenological tradition as a change of four is reconstructed: general humanitarian, paradigms existentialphenomenological, social-critical, interdisciplinary paradigm of philosophy psychiatry. fundamental of The importance of the existentialphenomenological tradition in the light of this process is demonstrated. A number of concepts of existential-phenomenological philosophy, psychology, psychiatry and psychotherapy are singled out: ontological, methodological, anthropological, communicative and the status of each conceptual group is clarified. It is established that the conceptual core of the tradition is methodological concepts (phenomenological, hermeneutic, problem-subject), and they are the most stable in the transition from the philosophical to the applied field.<sup>31</sup> (The personal participation of the author of thesis in obtaining the above results is 50%.)

#### The statements to be defended are the following:

1. Philosophical anthropology allows to present the problem of untranslatability in the light of the dialogue of different cultures, each of which has already formed its own language, its own values and meanings, that are fundamental within those cultures themselves. The uniqueness of any national, philosophical, traditional or any other culture lies in its own unique linguistic practices of meaning-making. Each particular culture is then self-contained, and the basic concepts, meanings and values of one culture cannot be represented with the same degree of accuracy and adequacy within the linguistic space of another culture. This effect can be called cultural solipsism.

2. Each person is formed in the context of several cultures (musical, linguistic, national, religious, ethical, etc.). If there is a possibility to grasp the order of sensemaking of another culture by means of the culture one perceives as native, it means that the problem is not in principally inexpressible meanings, but in disclosure and substantiation of possibilities of expression of common, unified meaning, showing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Власова О.А., Львов А.А. Концептуальный анализ экзистенциально-феноменологической традиции: основания и перспективы // Знание. Понимание. Умение. 2018. № 2. С. 94-102.

points of convergence and divergence of native and alien cultures through reflection on formal means of expression of culture as such.

3. The problem of translatability can be considered in the light of communicative practice: a space is created for a dialogue of cultures, in which unified meanings, forming the metacommunicative level, are grasped and articulated by heterogeneous semantic means of specific cultures. The analysis of the dialogue of cultures allows to identify universal meta-concepts, that each culture specifically expresses by its own semantic means. Hence, one can introduce the analysis of metaconcepts as a philosophical work to overcome cultural solipsism and substantiate the universal character of human thinking. The universal character of thinking consists in the ability to affirm the conceptual uniformity of the world's entirety by various means of specific and irreducible cultures.

4. The scrutiny of the philosophical nature of the worldview as a way of grasping the world by means of a particular culture is the essential core of the analysis of ways to overcome cultural solipsism. To put a question about the philosophical nature of worldview turns to a presentation of the anthropological research, since the human being is the only being who acts as a condition of perceiving the world as a whole and who enters into relations with the world through conceptual language. The worldview as a meta-concept is not an exclusive feature of Modern philosophy, but is present in one form or another at the conceptual level in various philosophical and spiritual traditions.

5. There are three semantic layers (according to the model of Yu. S. Stepanov) in the metaconcept of *worldview*, typical of any concept. The first layer, current, reflects the semantic specificity of the concept of *worldview* in contemporary humanitarian literature and allows to make a constellation of its characteristic properties as a set of formal features. The second layer, historical, reflects interpretations of the meanings included in the scope of the concept of *worldview* in different historical periods, and those forms which this concept took in specific philosophical traditions as it spread in them. The third layer is implicit, or internal, in which the concept of *worldview* appears as a mythopoetic ability of man as a

member of a collective subject, discovering the intersection points of subjective images of life worlds (*Umwelten*) of each person involved in a particular worldview, to form a generic view of the world. The first two aspects concern formal definitions of worldview as how the world is grasped, while the third aspect concerns a substantive analysis of the world, i.e., what is grasped by worldviews in the respective cultures.

6. Lingua-conceptual analysis allows to demonstrate that any historically concrete worldview acts as a logical expression of the subjective perception of the processes in history. In this respect the human being appears no longer as a subject of knowledge or a pure transcendental *ego*, but as a bearer of the subjective image of his own life world (*Umwelt*). Consequently, any particular worldview can be seen as an individual, specifically realized universal grasp of the world at the level of language.

7. Language is the entelechy of the worldview. A change in our knowledge of the world entails a change in the language in which the unity of the world in its entirety is expressed to us. Changes in worldview forms allow to speak of changes in the various conceptual languages that have developed during the stage of human cultural evolution and that articulate the unity of the world through their inherent means of expression. Thus, from the point of view of cultural evolution, worldview performs the adaptive function of the humans to the world in the context of the big history.

8. Conceptual links between different cultures can be articulated in certain, language-specific ways and means. This assertion allows to connect the problematics of various doctrines of worldview presented in the history of thought, in the perspective of the project of "perennial philosophy". Thus, philosophical thinking can be seen as the collective thinking of mankind, acquiring specific forms in specific spiritual traditions or national philosophical cultures.

9. A personal worldview expresses people's inner certainty in their own creative freedom. This means that a worldview manifests itself as a cultural adaptation of the human being to the big history, which allows the human being to

realize unity with "their own" on a rational and emotional level. That is why the issue of worldview is so much in demand in situations of catastrophe and disasters, when the old world has already been destroyed and the new one has not yet been created.

10. Working with the material of the history of philosophy can be seen as a kind of philosophical-anthropological study. Due to historical-philosophical methods of research, a comparative study of the various systems of thought and intellectual traditions of different peoples becomes possible. Such approaches as based on the understanding of spirit of time (*Zeitgeist*) hermeneutics or philosophical comparativistics, allow a historian of philosophy to work as an anthropologist who studies the particularities of the articulation of meanings and ideas by means of a non-native culture. The distance necessary for anthropological research is achieved by recognizing the difference between the sense-producing means, used by researchers, and those used by thinkers of the past to frame their ideas.

# Chapter One Worldview as a metaconcept and a subject of lingua-conceptual analysis

#### 1.1 Cultural Solipsism: Substantiation for the Problem

One of the most important and complex problems in modern philosophy is the problem of translation. It has been classically posed as early as in the works of W. V. O. Quine. W. V. O. Quine demonstrated that any translation from one language to another inevitably encounters semantic uncertainty, which is characteristic of the meaning-forming potentialities of any language.<sup>32</sup> However, modern researchers go further in their search and ask whether it is possible to express by means of a certain culture the meanings that are peculiar to the discursive practices of another, fundamentally different culture, built on different grounds in comparison with the former. In this respect, it is interesting to apply the philosophical-anthropological approach, as it allows us to present the problem of translation in the light of the dialog of different cultures, each of which has already formed its own language, values and meanings, that have fundamental and determining significance within these cultures themselves. In this approach, important data from such fields as philosophy of language, epistemology, logic, philosophy of consciousness (this includes experimental cognitive research, which is being actively conducted today), etc. are in demand.

If we are able to grasp the order of how another culture produces meanings and sense, it means that it is not a matter of fundamentally inexpressible meanings, but that it is necessary to raise the question of the *possibilities* of expressing *the common*, unified meaning both by means of our native culture and by means of another culture. Discussing this problem, we enter the area that A. V. Smirnov suggests to call the *logic of meaning*.<sup>33</sup> Drawing attention to the insufficiency of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Quine W. V. O. Word and Object. Moscow, 2000. P. 13 ff. (*In Russian*); Nikonenko S. V. Analytical Philosophy: The Basic Conceptions. St. Petersburg, 2007. Pp. 338–340. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Smirnov A. V. The Logic of Meaning: A Theory and Its Application to the Analysis of Classical Arab Philosophy and Culture. Moscow, 2001. Pp. 63—64. (*In Russian*).

widespread understanding of language and thinking as the ability to operate with signs, he argues that the articulation of integrity and coherence by the means of large cultures that differ from one other is the universal human ability. At the same time, the foundations of such cultures are conceptualized in their respective philosophical traditions.<sup>34</sup> Hence, in our search we do not turn to something external, peculiar only to one particular culture and not peculiar to, or perhaps even directly opposed to, any other possible one. On the contrary, we seek to affirm the conceptual uniformity of the totality of the world through the various means of specific and irreducible cultures.

Let us stipulate that we understand culture in the ideational way characteristic of anthropologists. We agree with A. Mesoudi, who proposed the following generalized definition of culture: "[I]t is information acquired from other people through social transmission mechanisms such as imitation, learning, or language".<sup>35</sup> In these terms, cultures can range from national and traditional to linguistic, philosophical, and various behavioral cultures. At the same time, various cultural norms change over time, mutually influence each other, some are internalized and some are discarded. Consequently, in terms of modern evolutionism, a human being as a bearer of different cultures is understood not only as a physical but also as a historical being. Let us note that we do not mean by evolutionism the approach typical for the 19<sup>th</sup> century of applying a single mold to determine the level of "civilization" or "savagery" in the study of certain human communities. We proceed from the ideas formulated within the framework of the co-evolutionary direction in the study of human beings and their culture, developed in the modern, or Neo-Darwinian synthesis.<sup>36</sup> It understands history in two ways: on the one hand, as a "big history" in which the human beings act as objects, but at the same time, on the other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Smirnov A. V. The Limits of Philosophy // Voprosy filosofii. 2023. № 1. Pp. 15–28. (In Russian).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Mesoudi A. Cultural Evolution. How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences. Moscow, 2019. P. 23. (*In Russian*). On criticizing this approach in defining culture as information vide: Lewens T. Cultural Evolution. Conceptual Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. P. 44—60.
 <sup>36</sup> Mesoudi A. Cultural Evolution. How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences. Moscow, 2019. P. 58—104. (*In Russian*); Klein L. S. The History of Anthropological Doctrines. St.

Petersburg, 2014. Pp. 637-641. (In Russian).

hand, as subjects of a history, forming specific forms of culture in certain historical epochs and ages.

Despite the fact that the decisive moment of human's entry into the arena of "big history", is the emergence of language, modern cognitive scientists point out the complex and, in these terms, paradoxical nature of the action of linguo-genetic factors: "Kirby, Dauman, and Griffiths characterize language as a balance of innate ability and culture," and thus point to the need to study biological evolution, individual learning, and cultural transmission, with particular attention to the latter".<sup>37</sup> The paradox is that cultural transmission is, of course, impossible without culture already in place — yet it is language (along with the cognitive plasticity that guarantees the ability to learn) that is the essential condition for the creation of complex social behavior and hence culture.<sup>38</sup> It is known, among other things, that cultural evolution unfolds at a different pace than biological evolution (or, as it is also called, (neo-)Darwinian evolution). An important role in it is played by the Baldwin effect, i.e. the assimilation by an individual of a new adaptive ability, which he/she inherits to its descendants. D. Dennett called this effect "the crane of evolution", referring to its key feature: its ability to give evolutionary development a direction, i.e., to ensure the inheritance of types and patterns of behavior without their genetic fixation.<sup>39</sup> Researchers believe that we owe the origin of language to this evolutionary mechanism.<sup>40</sup>

Proceeding from the above, it is clear that at the level of any social practice and cultural behavior, there must then be certain *mental links* that allow people, as a gregarious higher primate, to bring together all the diversity of phenomena encountered in experience and in everyday practice and to express these connections in the process of communication (we deliberately emphasize the description of the humans as beings combining the natural and cultural). Moreover, no matter how

<sup>39</sup> Dennett D. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. Moscow, 1995. Pp. 64 ff. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Shryock A., Smail D. L. et. al. Deep History. The Architecture of Past and Present. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2011. P. 119.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Hurford J. R. The Language Mosaic and Its Evolution // Christiansen M. H., Kirby S. (eds.) Language Evolution. Oxford, 2003. P. 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Burlak S. A. The Origin of Language: Facts, Investigations, Hypotheses. Moscow, 2019. Pp. 386–390. (*In Russian*).

complex the system of such communication is, which, of course, is not reduced to language alone, it fits quite organically into the idea of global evolutionary development, since it represents the action of quite specific evolutionary mechanisms aimed at the development of new adaptations. To a first approximation, we can say that such mental links that ensure the unity of the man and the world, or adapt the humans as biosocial beings to the communication environment peculiar to them, are memes — units of cultural information that contribute to the cultural adaptation of people. The concept of *meme* (by analogy with *gene*) was proposed by R. Dawkins, who described it as "a cultural replicator", "a unit of transmission of cultural heritage" or "a unit of imitation" that emerged in the "broth of human culture".<sup>41</sup> The same idea of the importance of the role of memes in the formation of human culture is supported by D. Dennett.<sup>42</sup>

However, when analyzed in more depth, the picture becomes more complicated. As Yu. M. Lotman's research has shown, people live in the semiosphere, in the sphere of culture and the meaning relations created within it.<sup>43</sup> This view is consistent with modern evolutionary doctrine. For representatives of different cultures, colors, smells, taste sensations, as well as the perception of such complex phenomena as war and peace, freedom, friendship, life, death, love, etc. are conditioned, among other things, by the fact that they always formulate their attitude to them with the help of conceptual means peculiar to their collective thinking. It is characteristic that human beings are able to choose between expressive means of different languages, consciously complicating their thinking about the world. Thus, according to F. A. Steppun, V. I. Ivanov "each time, wishing to express himself as clearly and precisely as possible, switched to Greek".<sup>44</sup> This means that V. I. Ivanov perceived the conceptual connections available to him by the means of the ancient Greek language as adequate for describing and expressing his thought, even though he was not a native speaker of this language. The same is true of the artistic world

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Dawkins R. The Selfish Gene. Moscow, 2013. P. 326 ff. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Dennett D. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. Moscow, 1995. P. 120. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Lotman Yu. M. Semiosphere. St. Petersburg, 2000. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Steppun F. A. A Mystical Worldview. Five Images of Russian Symbolism. St. Petersburg, 2012. P. 225. (*In Russian*).

that poets, artists, and composers create in their works: sometimes a situation or event can be described more precisely and completely by referring to a language, image, or trope from a certain novel, or by referring to a certain painting or musical work. Here the semiosphere in which one exists reveals transgressive connections between different cultures, building an integrative, cultural mindset.<sup>45</sup> For example, the sounds expressed by the notes G or E-flat (Es) of the first octave have no semantic load by themselves, but when they are played in a certain sequence, with a certain length and at a certain tempo, many people will unmistakably recognize in this sound sequence the "fate theme" that opens L. van Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, one of the most mimetic themes in world music.

The contingency of the world, thus, is provided as a coherence of information units, which a person perceives within the semiosphere. At the same time, the semiosphere bears the tokens of evolutionary development, since it is described not only synchronically, but also diachronically.<sup>46</sup> The memes described above have the same dynamic nature. However, Yu. M. Lotman (unlike D. Dennett, for whom a meme is, in principle, any phenomenon of cultural life)<sup>47</sup> makes an important distinction between two levels of the organization of meaning: individual and collective. He understands the diversity of meanings at the level of collective consciousness as a chain of segments of cultural information, or a text, and at the level of individual consciousness as a sign. At the level of both individual and collective consciousness, two types of text formation can be identified:

[O]ne is based on a discrete mechanism, the other is continuous. Despite the fact that each of these mechanisms is immanent in its structure, there is a constant exchange of texts and messages between them. This exchange takes the form of semantic translation. However, any accurate translation presupposes that a mutually unambiguous relationship has been established between the units of any two systems, resulting in a possible mapping of one system onto the other. This allows the text of one language to be adequately expressed by means of the other. However, when discrete and nondiscrete texts are juxtaposed, this is in principle impossible. A discrete and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Cp.: Distin K. Cultural Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. P. 82-83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> Lotman Yu. M. Semiosphere. St. Petersburg, 2000. P. 543 ff. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> Dennett D. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. Moscow, 1995. P. 290. (In Russian).

precisely marked semantic unit of one text corresponds in another text to a certain semantic spot with blurred boundaries and gradual transitions to the area of another meaning. If there is segmentation *sui generis*, it is not comparable to the type of discrete boundaries of the first text. Under these conditions, a situation of untranslatability arises, but it is here that attempts at translation are particularly persistent and yield the most valuable results. In this case, what emerges is not an exact translation, but an approximate equivalence conditioned by a certain culturalpsychological and semiotic context common to both systems. Such non-legal and inaccurate, but in a certain respect equivalent translation is one of the essential elements of all creative thinking. It is precisely these "non-legal" convergences that give rise to new semantic connections and fundamentally new texts.<sup>48</sup>

In other words, the problem of translation in the key set by Yu. M. Lotman is understood as a problem of expanding the conceptual repertoire, and thus, as a meaningful linguistic activity of a person within the framework of heterogeneous cultures.

The way we grasp the world in its unity, philosophy calls *worldview*. However, what kind of unity of the world can we talk about if there are significant qualitative differences in approaches to grasping it? Are we talking about grasping the same world if the methods used for this purpose are radically different? Is it possible to build a constructive communication in a situation when interlocutors initially adhere to different images of reality? Do we speak of a worldview as an individual or collective grasp of the world? Based on the recognition of the peculiar possibilities and abilities of different cultures to develop their own worldviews or linguistic pictures of the world, we aim at investigating and discovering something implicit, which is still in the everyday usage, and therefore taken for granted, unnoticed by the native speaker — something that does not reveal itself as independent, unconditional, unfolding in different historical and linguistic settings. Accepting the idea of conceptual commensurability of language and the world means that the world unfolds for each native speaker as a representative of a particular linguistic culture. The study of linguistic cultures, in its turn, implies the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Lotman Yu. M. Semiosphere. St. Petersburg, 2000. P. 178. (In Russian).

identification and analysis of *cultural constants* by means of which a person, being a representative of a specific culture or several specific cultures, appears to be adapted to the world.

Thus, we find a new aspect of the stated problem: each culture, having its own unique linguistic practices, is closed to itself, and the basic concepts, meanings and values of one culture cannot be represented with the same degree of accuracy and adequacy within the linguistic space of another culture. We propose to call this effect cultural solipsism. Modern researchers distinguish at least five different types of solipsism, in the most general sense meaning the theory that the world does not exist without (or outside) its observer's mind (solus ipsum). According to (1) the ontological or metaphysical definition, the world is what is my thoughts about the world or depends on my thoughts about the world; in A. Schopenhauer's formulation, the world is "my representation". Another type of it, (2) epistemological, can mean either that I can only know my own world (strong version) or that all knowledge is based on or derived from knowing only my world (soft version). The third kind of solipsism, (3) *semantic*, concerns the claim that my language is the only language that makes sense; to clarify, we can say that my language is the only language that describes reality and in which true judgments can be made. The fourth position, or (4) methodological solipsism indicates that the content of my consciousness, experience, or mental states is the sole starting point of all scientific or philosophical inquiry. Finally, according to (5) ethical, or axiological solipsism, my will is the only ethically relevant one, and my world is the only moral world, where all human beings remain mere objects that can be described but cannot be attained.49

The listed definitions of solipsism give an idea of their interrelation with each other as different aspects of the same problem of perceiving *the world as my world*, that is, they allow us to speak about solipsism as a complex problem. The concept of *cultural* solipsism we propose, although it correlates with variants (2) and (3), is not reducible to either of them, because it points not to an individual but to a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Pihlström S. Why Solipsism Matters. NY., 2020. P. 15-21.

collective way of articulating the world: the world is what can be expressed by means of *our* culture. In these terms, cultural solipsism is a synthetic variant of types (2) and (3), and its characteristic awareness of the exclusive character of *our world*, reflected in a particular human culture, makes the researcher turn to the analysis of the principles of the existence of culture as a communicative space, i.e. to the analysis of semantic universals.

A remarkable example of this type of solipsism is the perception of color. Despite all attempts to physically and physiologically study and describe color, such an objective approach is never sufficient. It concerns such, for example, simple in methodological respect task, as to give a definition of color. In the absolute majority of cases, it can be done only on the basis of already existing cultural stereotypes. This allows researchers to expand interpretations of the phenomenon of color, offering an archetypal understanding of its meaning and significance.<sup>50</sup> French cultural scientist M. Pastoureau draws attention to the fact that it is impossible to reduce the problem of color perception to the level of individual physiology or psychology, and in this he sees the root of why it is so difficult to achieve formalization of our knowledge of color. For example, "red" in Western culture has traditionally denoted color proper, which is reflected in the various words for the color red.<sup>51</sup> Thus, light and darkness, expressed by white and black respectively, are only limits, boundaries that set the possibility of talking about color, creating a semantic space of "black-and-white — colorful".<sup>52</sup> Noteworthy is that the very concepts denoting colors in different languages can be mixed with color perception proper.<sup>53</sup> One thing is certain: no extra-cultural perception of color is complete, and therefore the concepts denoting certain color phenomena must inevitably testify to the connection of the perceiver of a certain color with the (cultural) context, which such perception only makes sense in. J. Itten drew attention to the same thing in his

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Vide: Serov N. V. The Color of Culture: Psychology, Cultural Study, Physiology. St. Petersburg, 2004. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Pastoureau M. Red. A History of a Color. Moscow, 2019. Pp. 12–13. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Pastoureau M. Black. A History of a Color. Moscow, 2019. Pp. 8—9; ibid., pp. 37. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> Serov N. V. The Color of Culture: Psychology, Cultural Study, Physiology. St. Petersburg, 2004. Pp. 508—516. (*In Russian*).

study of color: he notes, first of all, the symbolic meaning in the way colors were used by ancient peoples, and compares the multidimensionality of color meanings with no less outstanding invention of magical consciousness — hieroglyph.<sup>54</sup>

In other words, no matter how we measure the wavelength or register the brain reactions to the perception of certain color phenomena, it will not bring researchers closer to the mystery of the nature of color, over the solution of which the representatives not only within the field of sciences but also the Humanities are struggling, for which "color is primarily a social phenomenon, not a special substance, or a particle of light, and especially not a sensation. It is society, to a greater extent than nature, pigment, light, than the eye or brain, that 'produces' color, defines it and gives it meaning, regulates its use and its tasks, develops codes and values for it. Without society, without culture, there would be no colors that could be defined, named, classified, but only endless transitions from shade to shade, merging into one indistinguishable continuum".<sup>55</sup>

Another example of this kind of cultural solipsism is the perception of human emotions, the supposed universalism of which is criticized in the works by linguist A. Wierzbicka. In the modern Humanities, the works that offer various empirical evidence of uniform perception of human emotions in various types and kinds of human communities have become very influential. In particular, the studies of social psychologist P. Ekman, in which such emotions as sadness, longing, anger, surprise, fear, disgust, contempt, as well as various forms of pleasure are declared as basic and universal, take a vast audience.<sup>56</sup> A consequence of popular hypotheses of this kind, expressed by various linguists, psychologists and anthropologists, is the statement that in all human communities and cultures there are so called "basic emotions", and, therefore, they could be designated by quite certain words of specific languages. Starting from this thesis, A. Wierzbicka demonstrates that such an assumption is rather an evidence of linguacentricity, which is difficult for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Itten J. The Art of Color. Moscow, 2015. Pp. 15. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> Pastoureau M. Yellow. A History of a Color. Moscow, 2022. P. 10. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Eckman P. Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional life. NY., 2003. P. xvi.

researchers to ignore in their work for obvious reasons. In particular, she demonstrated that words denoting "gnev" or "pechal" in Russian have non-identical semantic contexts with the words "sadness" and "anger", which at first glance seem to be their full English synonyms.<sup>57</sup>

Another interesting and convincing example is music. There is a comprehensive literature dedicated to the philosophical understanding of music, but it is important for us to emphasize that the study of music of different peoples and different ages allows us to hold that a person belonging to a particular time and a particular culture learns to perceive certain musical structures as belonging to his/her culture. Despite the fact that we can measure the length of a sound wave, we nevertheless cannot hear the pitch of a sound in any other way than subjectively. The recipient of the sound becomes a kind of instrument for interpreting it as music (as well as meaningful intonations), and researchers have noted that "from the age of five, most people develop the ability to accurately recognize sounds that do not fall within a note and to distinguish between accusatory and questioning intonations".<sup>58</sup> In addition, in anthropological perspective, it is interesting that understanding the rhythmic pattern of a piece of music, the organization of the sound sequence in it, and other formal characteristics of the music we hear are not identical to the physical parameters of the sound waves acting on the eardrum. We hear music because we belong to a certain culture, in which this music is always perceived qualitatively, for example, as belonging to our own or another (different) culture. D. Levitin notes that "[a] certain arrangement of notes — gamma — can speak of the music of a certain culture, style, and a certain combination of rhythms does the same. Most of us may not be able to reproduce a complex Latin American rhythm, but we will immediately recognize it when we hear it and determine that it is from Latin American music, not from Chinese, Arabic, Indian or Russian".<sup>59</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> Wierzbicka A. "Sadness" and "anger" in Russian: The non-universality of the so-called "basic human emotions" // Athanasiadou A. et al. (eds.) Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualization and Expression. Berlin, New York, 1998. P. 3—28.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Levitin D. This Is Your Brain on Music. The Science of a Human Obsession. Moscow, 2023. P. 36. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 90.

It is noteworthy that when speaking about music, we speak of it as a language as well. In particular, this is manifested in the fact that the organization of music is similar to the features of language formulated by F. de Saussure. Thus, he distinguished four basic properties of language, separating them from the human speech activity itself:

1. Language is something quite definite in the heterogeneous set of factors of speech activity. It can be localized in a certain segment <...> of the speech act, namely where the auditory image is associated with a concept. <...> Language exists only by virtue of a kind of contract made by the members of the collective. <...> 2. Language, distinct from speech, constitutes a subject available for independent study. <...> 3. While speech activity as a whole has a heterogeneous character, language <...> is a phenomenon inherently homogeneous — it is a system of signs in which the only essential thing is the union of meaning and acoustic image, and both of these components of the sign are equally psychic. 4. Language is no less concrete in nature <...> than speech. Language signs, though psychical in their essence, are not abstractions; the associations, bound together by collective agreement and in their totality constituting language, are realities localized in the brain.<sup>60</sup>

It is easy to see that the above-mentioned properties of language are quite applicable to music as well; thus, the common metaphor of music as a language or the language of music ceases to be a metaphor and acquires its concrete meaning within the framework of structural analysis.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, scholars also talk about the peculiar notions that are characteristic of music as a language, which allows us to speak about the fruitfulness of conceptual understanding of a musical work as a way of organizing our understanding of the world.<sup>62</sup>

Thus, when speaking about the ways of articulating the world, we are not necessarily talking about language, although language is undoubtedly one of the meaning-making means of culture. However, as A. Wierzbicka herself notes in this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> Saussure F. de. The Course of General Linguistics // Saussure F. de. Works on Linguistics. Moscow, 1977. Pp. 52—53. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> There is, however, also a critique of the position that music is language — vide, e.g.: Kosilova E. V. The Ontology of Musical Meaning // Voprosy filosofii. 2023. No 1. Pp. 52—62. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Alkon E. M. Anthropology of Music and Harmony Archetypes (to the Problem of mastering the universals of musical language) // Vestnik kafedry UNESCO Muzykal'noe iskusstvo v obrazovanii. 2018. № 3 (23). Pp. 101—119. (*In Russian*).

connection, that "[w]e can get to thought only through words (no one has yet invented another way)".<sup>63</sup> At the same time, every culture bearer has in mind the way in which the native culture forms unique meanings that are lost in any, even adequate, translation into other languages rather than purely semantic properties of his/her native language — or, as in the case of bilinguals, his/her native languages. This is well illustrated by the way in which the cultural perception of color and the concepts by which this perception is expressed in particular languages, are related. There are also numerous examples of comparative studies of the underlying concepts of different unrelated and non-overlapping cultures.<sup>64</sup> In this respect, studies related to drawing parallels between fundamental concepts of classical Chinese and ancient Greek philosophy — such as "soul" and "self", for example — are of particular interest.<sup>65</sup> Despite the significant nuances of the articulation of these concepts in different philosophical and cultural contexts, researchers demonstrate that there are fundamental meta-linguistic and meta-cultural links, through which it would be possible to raise the question of a fruitful comparison of their "specific weight" in the context of their native discursive practices. We also find another example of the dialogue of cultures in the analysis of logical means of European and Arabic philosophical traditions. In this case, the attempt of representatives of each tradition to understand the essence of the other and to recognize them as equal in their strategies requires a certain skill and effort comparable to that of an anthropologist investigating a foreign culture.<sup>66</sup>

In addition, there are also important negative examples. For instance, American anthropologist R. Wagner tried to determine whether the Daribi people dwelling in Papua New Guinea have such a fundamental for us, Modern Europeans, concept as "culture". Wagner saw his task as describing a concept analogous to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> Wierzbicka A. The Understanding of Culture By the Means of the Keywords // Wierzbicka A. Semantic Universals and the Description of Languages. Moscow, 1999. P. 293. (*In Russian*).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> In what follows, we use examples from: Lvov A. A. The Positive Foundations of the Axiological Aspect of Historical-Philosophical Research // Filosofskie nauki. 2019. Vol. 62. № 10. Pp. 55—67. Pp. 62—63. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>65</sup> Yu J. Soul and Self: Comparing Chinese Philosophy and Greek Philosophy // Philosophy Compass. 2008. №3. Vol.

<sup>4.</sup> P. 604—618.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Vide: Vasilyev V. V. Arab Syllogism and the Unity of Reason: on A. V. Smirnov's Paper // Voprosy filosofii. 2019. № 2. Pp. 22—26. (*In Russian*).

Daribi concept that we Modern Europeans articulate as "culture", rather than what he, as an outsider, recognized as culture as a result of included observation. In other words, the anthropologist initially had to refuse to recognize a conventional system of actions and reactions, or *culture* proper, in terms of members of his native culture.<sup>67</sup> The result was negative, because it became clear that no strict and structured descriptor of this phenomenon for Daribi could be proposed, because this people itself does not have a concept comparable to the Modern "culture". However, does this mean that Daribi do not have any culture *indeed*?

It is well known that the absence of a clear and formulated concept in a language does not yet prove the absence of the phenomenon or meaning that would be expressed through that concept. Thus, the ancient Romans could not find religion in the true Latin meaning of the word among the Greeks; but does this mean that, although "[in] ancient Greece religion never occupied a dominant position in life comparable to the role of religion in ancient Rome, in ancient Egypt, in medieval Europe, or in the early Islamic states", <sup>68</sup> ancient Greek religion did not exist? In these terms, the language that a culture uses as a means of expression always has a wide range of semantic possibilities, and the ability to analyze them allows us to effectively reach agreement between cultures, facilitating their dialogue and correct mutual understanding. In this case, we encounter such a characteristic difficulty in conducting an anthropological study as the predetermination of parameters, and this difficulty can well be appreciated in historical-philosophical work as well. In the comparative study of similarities and differences in the concepts of dissimilar cultures, the historian of philosophy assumes the position of an anthropologist. In particular, certain phenomena articulated within the framework of distinctive non-European philosophical traditions are often interpreted today on the basis of predetermined criteria and principles of understanding as they have developed in the methodological apparatus of Western philosophy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> Jensen C. B. New ontologies? Reflections on some recent 'turns' in STS, anthropology and philosophy // Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale. 2017. № 25. Vol. 4. P. 525—544. P. 529—530.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> Zaitsev A. I. A Myth: Religion and Poetical Fiction // Zaitsev A. I. Selected Papers. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg, 2003. P. 451. (*In Russian*).

## 1.2 The world as the origin of worldview

The history of the emergence of concepts and their transformations in different national languages and philosophical cultures often substitutes for the essential analysis of the phenomenon that is denoted by this concept. Discussing in one of his lectures what is meant by the concept of *civilization*, F. Guizot said: "There is almost always more truth in generally accepted terms than in the most precise, the most rigorous in the appearance, scientific definitions. The generally accepted meaning of words is produced by common sense, and common sense is the genius of mankind".<sup>69</sup> Such an appeal to sensus communis is common in the Humanities and social sciences even nowadays. However, following the path of common sense, we seem to get involved in the dense mire of everyday, and thus unreflected word usage, thus blurring the clear contours of the scope of this or that concept: G. W. F. Hegel already noted that common sense is common because it is inherent in all people equally by default and does not deal with the experience of consciousness, however, such an experience is what makes consciousness special.<sup>70</sup> As a consequence, the Humanities and social sciences produce "commonplaces" that require thorough revision and critical analysis. At the same time, such "commonplaces", being tightly embedded within the framework of certain disciplines, may well fulfill the function of fundamental concepts or terms, the exact meaning of which, however, eludes strict definition, and, as a rule, cannot be even preliminary understood. This is exactly what the status of the concept of *worldview* in modern humanitarian discourse turns out to be. Philosophical research cannot be satisfied with only what is given at the level of common sense, but goes further in its reasonable search for clarification of concepts.

Understanding is conditioned and expressed by means of culture native to every human being. Accordingly, the pure transcendental subject, traditionally claiming epistemological universality in Modern philosophy, cannot be the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> Guizot F. The History of Civilization in Europe. Moscow, 2007. Pp. 21–22. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> Vide: Hegel G. W. F. The Phenomenology of Spirit. Moscow, 2008. Pp. 124–125. (In Russian).

condition of the world. Having accomplished the purifying procedure of phenomenological reduction to the level of the transcendental ego ( $\dot{\epsilon}\pi o \chi \dot{\eta}$ ), we will find no world in this ego. E. Husserl himself recognized the dispensability of the actual world for the subject he discovered: "[T]he meaning of the psychological study of consciousness is separated by a deep gulf from the meaning of the transcendental-phenomenological study, although the contents described on both sides may agree with each other. In one case we have data about the world, the existence of which is assumed, and we understand them as components of human mental life; in the other case, with parallel, semantically identical data, there is no question of this, because in the phenomenological attitude the world has no significance as reality at all, but only as a phenomenon of reality".<sup>71</sup> Believing that the whole world in its immediacy (which means: phenomenally, and according to Heidegger's interpretation, φαινόμενον — "self-as-itself-apparent, obvious" and at the same time "apparent, what is visible") is revealed before him,<sup>72</sup> Husserl encountered only the limits of individual consciousness. Dreaming of absolute cognitive freedom, the transcendental subject of phenomenology found itself locked in the skull of the phenomenologist himself.

However, is the study of such a world, which seems to coincide completely with the subjective image of the living world of each individual (or, as J. von Uexküll had put it, *Umwelt*), philosophical? Various thinkers have rebelled against this formulation of the problem, and, in particular, M. Scheler introduced a subtle distinction between the images of those worlds which lie as objects of research before the representative of empirical science and before the philosopher:

Philosophical cognition is in its essence *asymbolic* cognition. It seeks being as it is in itself, not as it presents itself as the bare moment of the fulfillment of the symbol that replaces it. Thus, the very function of the signifier becomes a problem for it. In its investigations, therefore, it has no right to accept as a premise either the existence of natural language and its meaning structure, or the existence of any artificial system of signs. Its subject is not *the world in speech* [beredbare Welt],

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> Husserl E. Cartesian Meditations. St. Petersburg, 2006. P. 95. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> Heidegger M. Being and Time. Moscow, 2011. P. 28–29. (*In Russian*).

i.e., the world already obliged to allow for the possibility of unambiguous mutual understanding about it, the possibility of unambiguous determination of its content in different acts of an individual or by different individuals, it is not the content of the world, which has already been selected and dissected in order to achieve the goal of "universal cognizability", but the given *itself*, including all its signs. Of course, in order to achieve this goal, philosophy uses language, both in a heuristic sense and for exposition — not, however, to define the subject by means of it, but only *to make visible* what is not definable by any symbols, since it is already defined in and through itself (author's italics. — A.L.).<sup>73</sup>

But here we must turn to our understanding of the world as a problem: indeed, the world given to us in concept and used simply, as Scheler says, "in speech", is the world of common sense, or "natural worldview".<sup>74</sup> At the same time, however, reflection on the condition of the world as a potential object of cognition is philosophical in its nature. Moreover, in asking the question about the condition of the world, coming to man in the answer, the philosopher looks deeper into what structures man uses to make the world happen. For the process of realization here is co-directional: on the one hand, as we have said, people always discover themselves in the world, but on the other hand, the world is always reproduced and maintained by the people. Consequently, the comprehension of the human being as a condition of the world is the comprehension of the nature of the human being as a meaning-making being, which is always concrete both in terms of its cultural origin and the order of articulation of the meanings it contains.

It is clear, however, that the world does not consist of any particular set or list of things or facts. The world avoids ontic certainty. In this connection, it is interesting to consider M. Gabriel's point of view, according to which it is impossible to put a limit to everything that fills the scope of the concept "world", since any such list would already require a new one to include the totality of facts and events reflected in it, and so *ad infinitum*. Thus, the totality of things, events, relations to them, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Scheler M. Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge // Scheler M. Selected Works. Moscow, 1994. Pp. 235—236. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> Scheler uses the concept of "natural worldview" as a synonym for Husserl's "natural attitude" — cf.: ibid, p. 204—205. (*In Russian*).

so on, constitute infinite lists, which, nevertheless, are not the world itself. Critics of this approach call it "flat ontology", which refuses to build a hierarchical image of the world.<sup>75</sup> However, M. Gabriel believes that "world" is a psychologically important concept for us, the use of which reveals our fear of the infinite physical reality, the universe. He points out that in fact it follows from this statement of the "non-existence of the world" that there is no rigid determination between different phenomena and things, but only an infinite number of connections between an infinite number of things. That is why, in his opinion, it makes sense to assert the existence not of the world, but of infinite fields of meanings that turn to man from one side to another: "The fact that we consciously (kognitiv) inhabit only some of these fields of meaning allows us to cognize something at all and to claim to know".<sup>76</sup> Accordingly, it is impossible to grasp the world in its conceptual unity in any way, since this concept would be logically empty. At one point he explicitly states that there can be no scientific worldview shaped by a socio-political or media agenda: "I would argue against such a worldview on the grounds that no world picture can be offered because the world does not exist. All worldviews are equally wrong insofar as they entrench our beliefs in accepting the world in general, which is already behind us raising big questions. The problem is that one has a worldview at all".77

However, on the other hand, *the world*, while not being any thing or the most complete being that absorbs all the diversity of things and events, is nevertheless a concept. Despite the consistent refutation of the existence of the world, M. Gabriel also argues that even such concepts as *unicorn*, or minotaur, or *spherical horse in a vacuum* (as a distant descendant of Aristotle's *goat-stag*) do exist in the appropriate context: "The question is not simply whether something exists, but always where it exists" (author's italics. — A.L.).<sup>78</sup> This approach to the analysis of the concept of *world* seems to us unreasonable: already J. Berkeley and E. Husserl in their classical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Vide: Frolov A. V. Categorical Foundations of the Metaphysics of the World // Filosofiya i obshchestvo. 2018. № 1 (86). Pp. 97—100. P. 99. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> Gabriel M. Die Erkenntnis der Welt – Eine Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie. München, 2013. S. 382.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> Gabriel M. Why the World Does Not Exist. Cambridge, 2015. P. 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 13—14.

works demonstrated that for our contemplation of a thing and the formation of some attitude to it, there is no difference between whether this thing is given to me in direct perception or I only think it in my consciousness. We wish to emphasize that it is what happens in ourselves in relation to this thing that is at issue, not its existence.

Our reflection of the world does not begin with our awareness of what the world is, but with the fact that it is. This fact of our consciousness is enough to turn to consciousness itself with the question of *the possibility* of the world's existence. In other words, we do not question *what* is before us, but *how* this something before us *is*. Even if we regard the problem of the world as a solipsistic problem — in the extreme case, which can hardly be theoretically refuted — we cannot help noticing that the question of the relation to the world is asked already in the world; this means that I, being a part of this world, destroy its pre-supposed wholeness by my reflection, and address it as something that cannot be conceived as a wholeness without me. Thus, the world always turns out to be co-existent, both in the sense of my co-existence with the world and my co-existence with my own, for whom the world exists in the same way as for me. Of course, we do not mean that the world is the same for any collective or community — in this respect we must distinguish between the world as *Umwelt*, inherent in purely subjective (individual, "my") perception, and *Welt* as such, inherent in subjective perception, given in language. We offer a view of the world different to, say, the phenomenological analysis of the world developed by M. Heidegger: for him, the analytics of Da-sein is connected with the clarification of the world and the existential discovery of the self as-present in the world.<sup>79</sup> This "worldliness of the world", which Heidegger refers to as "a kind of being of Da-sein, never a kind of being of something objectively present 'in' the world,"<sup>80</sup> has, in connection with the phenomenological approach, an objective character, for the world appears as a phenomenon of my consciousness; but objectivity says nothing about the world as something that already is in the sense of its conceptual becoming. Therefore, we understand the world, as that, which unfolds

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> Heidegger M. Being and Time. Moscow, 2011. Pp. 63—113. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> Ibid., p. 65.

in the human activity of interpreting of being by those means, which are available to man in any of the possible languages. Let us emphasize that we are not returning to a solipsistic interpretation of the world as a subjective experience, the outcome of which is the mere assumption of consciousness in the other. On the contrary, we speak of the disconnectedness of the world as that image of (physical) reality, which is eventually restored in its entirety in our world as a result of grasping and comprehending reality in various languages developed by human culture. Such an approach, from our point of view, is quite related to the evolutionary paradigm and, in particular, to the idea of cultural evolution: a human being is, on the one hand, a collective animal, but at the same time, on the other hand, humans are more than the animals, since their co-existence with the world makes them always the members of a collective and even several collectives, sharing their world through the linguistic means developed by human culture. Thus, we affirm not subjectivity in the perception and articulation of the world (in the sense of "my world", individual existence), but subjectivity in the perception and articulation of the world (in the meaning of "our world", or collective existence). A. V. Smirnov treats the world in a similar way, applying the category of understanding: "[W]orld, as it is presented to our understanding, cannot be considered *completely* objective; the world is rather a set of possibilities that are realized by our act of understanding it. But any act follows one of the possible logics of meaning, and no act follows all of them at once. This means that the world is not grasped in its true objectivity by any act of understanding".81

Analyzing the dialectics of the logical and the historical in the context of the study of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete in the works of K. Marx, E. V. Ilyenkov showed that the logical turns out to be the form in which the historical epoch with all the originality of the "words and things" represented in it is clothed, resulting in a discernible and clearly delineated image of a particular epoch.<sup>82</sup> He

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> Smirnov A. V. The Logic of Meaning. A Theory and Its Application to the Analysis of Classical Arab Philosophy and Culture. Moscow, 2001. P. 165. (*In Russian*). Cf.: ibid., p. 206–207.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> Vide: Ilyenkov E. V. The Logical and the Historical // The Issues of Dialectical Materialism. The Elements of Dialectics. Moscow, 1960. Pp. 310—343. (*In Russian*); Ilyenkov E. V. The Dialectics of Abstract and Concrete //

understood history as a material for itself, but history cannot present itself in the ready-made forms of the historical. History becomes only a duration, an abstract extension into the present (precisely, as "the present that is not fully formed")<sup>83</sup>, and without logical grasping it cannot be presented in the totality of its internal processes and connections, i.e. as a sequence of successive specific historical epochs. Among other things, E. V. Ilyenkov strongly disagrees with L. Althusser, who concluded in his *Reading "Capital"* that in his studies of history one should not focus on the history of the subject itself, but on how this subject is articulated and theoretically reproduced in the science of a certain period. From Ilyenkov's point of view, conceptual history is incapable of presenting history as a single and internally coherent process in which "[h]istorically passed stages <...> no longer seem to be just 'steps in the maturation of the present'," — they are in fact "understood as phases of a universal historical process, each of which emerged on the ruins of its former one, developed the age of its youth, its maturity and, finally, the period of decline, thus preparing the preconditions and conditions for the birth of the next historically distinctive epoch with its new, specific contradictions".<sup>84</sup>

We can agree with this view if we talk about history as a science, and about the historical as an objective aspect of the existence of nature and human culture in time. Of course, each epoch is distinctive and unique, and a clear distinction between them is possible only at the moment of reflection on the already formed historical material. Thus, for example, J. Huizinga demonstrated that the late medieval culture of the 15<sup>th</sup> century did already carry the seeds that sprouted and actualized in the Renaissance: "The few people for whom the humanistic forms of culture in France of the 15<sup>th</sup> century were acceptable did not yet herald the advent of the Renaissance. For their mood, their orientation, was generally determined by the Middle Ages".<sup>85</sup>

Ilyenkov E. V. Philosophy and Culture. Moscow, 1991. Pp. 276–293. (In Russian); Ilyenkov E. V. The Logical and the Historical // ibid., pp. 294–308. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Ibid., p. 307.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 308.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Huizinga J. The Autumn of the Middle Ages. St. Petersburg, 2018. P. 575. (In Russian).

form before it becomes really new in spirit".<sup>86</sup> The point here is that a person inhabiting a particular age in history has to inevitably look at the unfolding sequence of past, present, and future subjectively. Of course, we can detach ourselves from our time and try to take a reflective stance, but for living people, not for subjects of cognition, the world never unfolds as an objective, already given thing. We do not fill the world with ready-made formulas, but rather comprehend it, inhabit it — and in these terms, the world for us is always *Umwelt*, not a ready-made *Weltbild*. Consequently, it is fundamentally important for the people that the logical conditions the historical in its concreteness, but even more important is the order of speech that describes the world in which they live — in other words, the language that underlies the world where the people discover themselves.

## 1.3 The morphology of the concept

The question of translation could be reduced to how it is possible (and whether it is possible) to express by the means of a certain culture the meanings and senses inherent in the discursive practices of another, fundamentally different culture, built on different grounds from the former. If we can grasp the order of how a certain culture makes meanings, this means that it is not a question of fundamentally inexpressible *meanings*, but that it is necessary to raise the question of the *possibilities* of expressing a *common* meaning both by means of our own culture and by means of another culture.<sup>87</sup> Our research is therefore concerned with the constants of culture, capable of expressing in a distinctive and self-conscious way the single common cultural sense (as they articulate the meanings that address us to human culture itself as one of the stages of universal evolutionary development,<sup>88</sup> or to the semiosphere) of man's adaptation to the *world*. In other words, the way, in which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup> Ibid., p. 556.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Smirnov A. V. The Logic of Meaning. A Theory and Its Application to the Analysis of Classical Arab Philosophy and Culture. Moscow, 2001. Pp. 63—64. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Vide: Dobzhansky T. Evolution, Genetics, and Man. NY., London, 1959. P. 1—8. Th. Dobzhansky's idea of three stages of universal evolution will be discussed in more detail in Chapter four.

man articulates the world by the means of the culture that has shaped him, testifies to the fact that there is a special capacity for cultural adaptation.

It is necessary to clarify, how exactly such an adaptation is realized. We have said above that worldview is the way we grasp the world in its unity. Despite the fact that the world can be represented by means of different languages, we call worldview the way the world is grasped (or *how to* grasp the world) in conceptual unity, i.e. through the concepts of a particular language as the basis of speech and, in particular, national languages. We deliberately distance ourselves from discussing the question of whether and in what terms we can speak of, for example, a color or musical worldview — although this could be an interesting subject of anthropological research; but it is obvious that any reflection of the world takes place in a conceptual way. In these terms, worldview is firmly connected with language as a means of conceptual communication, and we consequently understand language as also the means by which man recognizes his/her belonging in thinking to his/her collective. In general, genuine thinking is hardly the work of an individual: the human being always thinks in the ways that have been formed in his/her culture. Thinking, therefore, is an indispensable condition for the actualization of those mental connections that make language a way of man's cultural adaptation to reality, and thus a way of articulating the world. Thus, returning to the clarification of the concept of worldview, we can say that conceptual language is the entelechy of worldview. At the expense of what, then, is worldview actualized through language?

In our research, we start with the strategy of identifying and substantiating cultural concepts, developed by Russian and Western philosophers of language, linguists, lingua-anthropologists and known today as lingua-cultural concept studies.<sup>89</sup> Today, this field of research represents one of the most important areas of knowledge along with others in the ensemble of the Humanities and sciences of man. It can also be presented as a promising research area at the intersection of sociocultural anthropology, philosophy of language, as well as an important

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Asoyan Yu. A. The Practice of Concept Studies: From "Cultural Categories" to "Conceptosphere" and "Semantics of Concepts" // Kul'turologiya. 2008. № 1 (44). Pp. 5–26. P. 17 ff. (*In Russian*).; Stepanov Yu. S. Constants. The Dictionary of Russian Culture. An Essay. Moscow, 1997. Articles «Concept», «Constant». (*In Russian*).

methodological branch of cultural studies or philosophy of culture. Concept studies developed from the works of structuralists, who studied language and problems of the origin of language, as well as mythology and religious beliefs of various peoples of the world. Among its predecessors are E. Benveniste, G. Dumézil, V. Ya. Propp, et al.; the works of such researchers as A. Wierzbicka, N. D. Arutyunova, Yu. S. Stepanov, S. G. Proskurin, et al., influenced the formation of concept studies as a method of research in modern Humanities.<sup>90</sup>

In particular, we are close to the approach of Yu. S. Stepanov, who distinguishes three semantic layers (or "components") in a concept: first, it is the basic, or current element; second, it is the non-actual, "passive" elements, which are rather the historical content of a particular concept, than an immediately readable semantic set today; third, it is the internal form of the concept, which, although, as a rule, is not realized by the native speakers of the language, which the concept is represented in, but is always captured in the external, or verbal form.<sup>91</sup>

A. Wierzbicka shares similar views on the principles of meaning articulation. She states: "I believe that people do have the same thinking abilities, but I think that this is due to the use of language and the fact that all natural languages, in principle, have the same expressive power. I say 'in principle', because some ideas are easier to express in some languages, than in others. But if in some language there were no way to express the concepts of 'whole', 'if' or 'because', its expressive power would indeed be limited".<sup>92</sup> Could it be that the above concepts ("all", "if", "because") are arbitrary? The point is that they are morphologically (i.e., at the level of form) related to each other — without one, it is impossible to construct, understand, and reproduce the other. When I say "whole", I am primarily referring to the holistic unity of coexisting elements. What this unity is, whether it is realized in space or time, is open to debate; however, if it is not initially given to me as a concept of the one, which as such is more than a mere set of constituent elements, then I will not be able

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Vorkachyov S. G. Ex pluribus unim: Lingua-Cultural Concept as a Synthesis Formation // Vestnik RUDN, series Linguistics. 2016. Vol. 20. No 2. Pp. 17—30. P. 18. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> Stepanov Yu. S. Constants. The Dictionary of Russian Culture. An Essay. Moscow, 1997. P. 44. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> Wierzbicka A. The Semantic Universals and "Primitive Thinking" // Wierzbicka A. Semantic Universals and Basic Concepts. Moscow, 2011. Pp. 54—90. P. 56. (*In Russian*).

to establish any relationship between events or phenomena. The problematization of the world thus appears not only as an ontological but also as a semantic task: conceptually, the world always appears as a meaningful whole in the interconnectedness of its contents, allowing one to think of the homogeneity of time and space.

A. Wierzbicka herself testifies to the non-randomness of the given set. Starting from G. W. Leibniz's idea of the empirical search for the fundamental semantic units of any human language as the only true one, she states: "[T]here is a set of semantic primitives coinciding with the set of lexical universals, and this set of primitivesuniversals is the basis of human communication and thinking; and the languagespecific configurations of these primitives reflect the diversity of cultures. <...> More than two decades of intensive research on my part and that of my colleagues have led to the identification of a set of a few dozen concepts, apparently lexically embodied in all the world's languages, which can be regarded as semantic primitives from which all other concepts are built. This list includes, among others, such metapredicates as 'if', 'because (of)', 'all' and 'not', and such predicates of intellectual activity as 'know' and 'think' <...>".<sup>93</sup> Each representative of humanity, being a speaker of his or her own native language (or languages), uses different concepts within the cultures represented on the Earth, but this does not mean that people are in principle not able to articulate these or those meanings, to agree on them in the process of intercultural dialogue. The following judgment is much clearer: "Different ways of thinking do not make human cultures mutually impenetrable, if the initial conceptual resources are common".<sup>94</sup>

It is interesting in this point to compare the proposed understanding of the cultural concept with the production of concepts as a task of philosophical creativity. In their famous book *What is Philosophy* G. Deleuze and F. Guattari offer this very understanding of philosophical activity. The philosophers should create concepts, and their philosophical work should also be subjected to certain rules and techniques:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> Ibid., p. 60. <sup>94</sup> Ibid., p. 74.

A philosopher is a friend of the concept, he is potentially dependent on the concept. This means that philosophy is not just the art of forming, inventing or manufacturing concepts, for concepts are not necessarily forms, findings or products. It would be more accurate to say that philosophy is a discipline consisting in the creation of concepts. So, the friend turns out to be a friend of his own creations? Or does the reality of the concept refer to the potency of the friend, merging the creator and his double into one? To create more and more new concepts — this is the subject of philosophy. Since a concept must be created, it is connected with the philosopher as a person who possesses it in potency, who has the potency and skill to do so.<sup>95</sup>

In these terms, we see that their idea of a concept is akin to the idea of an artist's painting, a work of art, which must always be correlated with the name of the master who created it. It follows then that philosophical creativity is not only a personal endeavor, but a nominal, personal one, connected with an active creative intention: "Concepts do not wait for us ready-made, like celestial bodies. Concepts do not have heavens. They must be invented, manufactured or, rather, created, and without the signature of the one who created them, they are nothing".<sup>96</sup> Elsewhere, Deleuze concretizes his thought in connection with the authorial status of philosophical creation: "If concepts are objects of creation, then we must say that these concepts are, as it were, signed. They have a signature; and it is not that the signature establishes a connection between the concept and the philosopher who created it; to a much greater extent the concepts themselves are signatures".<sup>97</sup> Here we have the idea of a strong correspondence between the concept and its creation by the philosopher, the experience of its comprehension, experiencing — in short, of the newly created concept becoming a fact of human culture as the third phase of universal evolutionary development. This is the existential meaning of philosophical creativity. Thus, in one of his lectures on Leibniz, Deleuze also gives the example of Aristotle, who says in his writings that it is time to stop.<sup>98</sup> However, Leibniz does

<sup>95</sup> Deleuze G., Guattari F. What Is Philosophy? Moscow, 2009. P. 9. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Deleuze G. Lectures on Leibniz. 1980, 1986/87. Moscow, 2015. P. 40. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Ibid., p. 26–27.

not stop — Deleuze considers this at the level of subjective reasons that move the philosopher. In fact, the point here should be that there is no time and place to stop, and stopping does not yet guarantee a final description, a finished recognition of the concept. Should not this elaboration of the authorial status of a concept be compared with Hegel's well-known experience? In a famous letter to F. I. Niethammer of October 13, 1806, when Jena was occupied by the French, G. W. F. Hegel, a professor of the university there, recalls: "I saw the Emperor himself — this world soul — when he rode out on horseback on a reconnaissance. It is truly an amazing feeling to contemplate such a person who, being here, in this place, sitting on a horse, embraces the whole world and dominates it" (italics added. -A.L.).<sup>99</sup> This testimony, filled with the details of what Hegel had seen, indicates two important points. On the one hand, Hegel certifies the highest point of the development of the spirit in the concrete form here and now; it is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Andrei Bolkonsky, lying on the field of Austerlitz and hearing Napoleon's voice, is Hegel's Deleuzian double, the "anti-Hegel". But on the other hand, it is in this personal testimony that something is revealed that the Emperor himself — "this very individual", "centered at this point" ("<...> ein solches Individuum zu sehen, das hier auf einen Punkt konzentriert <...>")<sup>100</sup> — could not see anyhow: it is precisely at this moment that reflection on the course of world history reveals itself in the concrete pose of a concrete person — if Andrei Bolkonsky in Leo Tolstoy's novel, seeing Napoleon's fat thighs covered with pants, feels disappointment, then Hegel, who observed this hypostasis of the world spirit on horseback, speaks of an amazing feeling ("eine wunderbare Empfindung"). In this very Napoleon, the totality of the world is concentrated at this moment, just as the totality of the world is concentrated in a concept successfully coined in by a philosopher.<sup>101</sup>

If we summarize the way Deleuze and Guattari understand the essence and nature of the concept, we can identify the following characteristics of the concept:

• a concept has its history;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Hegel G. W. F. Works of Various Years. In Two Volumes. Moscow, 1973. Vol. 2. P. 255. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Cit.: Schild W. Napoléon und Hegel // Europa nach Napoléon. Brill, 2018. S. 56.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> Cf. Deleuze G., Guattari F. What Is Philosophy? Moscow, 2009. P. 13. (In Russian).

- however, a concept somehow becomes;
- and each concept "must therefore be seen as a point of coincidence, condensation and accumulation of its constituents";
- a concept is complex;
- a concept always has an author;
- a concept is noncorporeal and does not coincide quite with the states of things in which it is realized. It is "infinite in its soaring flight, that is, in its speed, but finite in the motion by which it describes the outlines of its constituents";
- the concept is non-discursive, it is not a proposition, it is intensional and is an event itself.<sup>102</sup>

With the exception of the points related to authorship, we can say, perhaps, that this understanding of the concept is akin to the ideas of linguists outlined above. However, from our perspective, we cannot say that concepts are invented by philosophers themselves — rather, philosophers discover them. Speaking about the problems of communication, which is carried out at different levels and also faces certain difficulties at different levels, B. V. Markov remarks: "It is obvious that society, and even more so the world community, should develop some universal language in which representatives of different cultures could agree with each other. Philosophy has long been such a language. Its seemingly abstract concepts claimed to describe the world from a universal point of view. Of course, historically, it has reflected the view of the world mainly from the point of view of an enlightened European. Today, when the interaction of cultures has become more intense, reaching the point of confrontation, it is necessary to make additional efforts to create new codes of universal communication".<sup>103</sup> However, if particular philosophers set about creating such codes on their own, arbitrarily, that is, in the words of Deleuze and Guattari, *inventing* the concepts, we cannot escape the trap of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Ibid., pp. 23—31.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> Markov B. V. People and Signs. Anthropology of Interpersonal Communication. St. Petersburg, 2011. P. 21. (*In Russian*).

any kind of "centrism": we will inevitably be forced to design such a "universal" language according to the linguistic models familiar to us as speakers. At the same time, we can try to discover some universal codes and, through this, try to reach concepts suitable for describing universal phenomena of human culture as such (although specifically expressed in the concrete language cultures).

Concepts, due to their logical form, are fixed in certain epochs as concepts of a particular national language or even national tradition. The philosopher works with these concepts, bringing them out of their static position and thus revealing their potential. The effectiveness of this approach can be assessed by the example of such a project as *the history of concepts* (*Begriffsgeschichte*), which became well-known in connection with the fruitful historical and philosophical research by R. Koselleck.<sup>104</sup> The results obtained in the course of these studies were successfully explicated on socio-political problems. This approach allowed R. Koselleck and his collaborators to develop an original project rethinking the key concepts of the modern thesaurus of the Humanities, which constituted the terminological structure of the Modern political space (a vivid example is the reconstruction of the concept of *capitalism* and its cultural-philosophical justification).<sup>105</sup>

However, it should be noted that the history of concepts also has its methodological predecessor, although it did not, apparently, have a direct influence on the development of R. Koselleck's thought. We mean the study of the history of concepts (*Studium zur Geschichte der Begriffe*) by G. A. Teichmüller (1832—1888), the founder of the Yuriev school of philosophy. He became a true pioneer of this topic. Being a historian of ancient thought by the nature of his philosophical activity, a faithful disciple of the famous founder of university philosophy A. A. Trendelenburg, Teichmüller did a lot in the field of research on the texts of the pre-Socratics and Aristotle, and these intensive studies of the classical tradition not only made his first fame, but also gave him a powerful conceptual impetus for an

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> Koselleck R. Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache. Frankfurt am Main, 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> Naumova E. I. Cultural-Philosophical Justification of the Development of the Concept of "Capitalism" // Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seria 7: Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya i sotsial'nye tekhnologii. 2014. № 5 (25). Pp. 29–33. (*In Russian*).

independent creative search. We will not expand here on his original neo-Leibnizianism (which has been generally considered by Russian historians of philosophy)<sup>106</sup> and will focus purely on his project of the history of ideas.<sup>107</sup>

According to Teichmüller's idea, the history of philosophy often turns out to be a narrative full of inaccuracies and retellings of the influences that certain philosophers had on each other, that is, in fact, a historical-psychological study of the historians of philosophy. However, this is far from the task of science, for true science requires consistency in the arguments considered and balance in its results. Consequently, it is necessary to deal precisely with what philosophers produce and what their real business (*Angelegenheit*) is, and this is concepts and, consequently, the history of concepts. At the same time, he notes that the main work falls on historians of classical philosophy, since the European tradition owes its philosophical concepts entirely to the thinkers of antiquity. In this, by the way, he calls himself a follower of A. Trendelenburg.<sup>108</sup>

A. A. Kozlov, a student of Teichmüller, in his review article on his teacher's work, clarifies the distinction between the history of philosophy and the history of concepts. The history of philosophy deals specifically with the systems that appear in certain ages and serve as a source for the emergence and development of concepts, while the history of concepts considers concepts in their formation, development, and their "journey" through various systems: "For the history of concepts, one of the important tasks is the study, so to speak, of *the wandering of a concept*, whereby, remaining essentially the same, it, for the sake of adjusting to the environment in which it is applied, can take a somewhat *abnormal* and even *fantastic* form. <...>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> Berdnikova A. Yu. "Back to Kant" or "Back to Leibniz"? A Critical View from the History of Russian Metaphysical Personalism // Kantovsky Sbornik. 2017. Vol. 36. № 2. Pp. 33—45. (*In Russian*); Ivleva M. I. Formation of the Spiritualist Philosophical System in the Works of G. Teichmüller // Pravo i praktika. 2019. № 1. Pp. 325—328. (*In Russian*); Ezri G. K. The Philosophy of Lotze and Teichmüller and the Russian Religious Philosophy of "All-Unity": Commonality of Approaches in Ontology and Anthropology // Mezhdunarodnyi zhurnal gumanitarnykh i estestvennykh nauk. 2018. № 11—2. Pp. 122—126. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> On the essence of historical and philosophical views of G. A. Teichmüller and their place in the history of thought vide: Lvov A. A. The Ideal of Philosophy as a Strict Science in the Discussion of Historians of Philosophy // Vestnik russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii. 2021. Vol. 22. № 4-1. Pp. 11—23. (*In Russian*); Lvov A. A. Historians of Philosophy in the Situation of Hypertext // Vestnik Severnogo (Arkticheskogo) federal'nogo universiteta. Seria: Gumanitarnye i sotsial'nye nauki. 2021. Vol. 21. № 2. Pp. 99—109. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup> Teichmüller G. Neuen Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe. I. Heft: Herakleitos. Gotha, 1876. S. v—vi.

[O]ne and the same concept can pass in different forms and formations through different, from the point of view of the history of philosophy, systems, and even through completely different fields of knowledge, such as, for example, philosophical and religious".<sup>109</sup>

Despite the fact that R. Koselleck actually worked in the field of history, nevertheless, the issues he investigated directly relate to socio-philosophical issues. The method he used has quite similar characteristics to the project of G. A. Teichmüller: "[H]e believes that the notion of history itself had a long period of historical development, extending from Herodotus to Gibbon, before it achieved conceptualization as a fundamental mode of human existence in the nineteenth century. Before this epoch, men certainly possessed a number of ideas about 'history', viewing it as a method of research ('inquiry'), a place ('the past'), a process (temporality), a practice (memorialization, celebration, remembrance), a literary or, more precisely, rhetorical genre (history writing), and even a manifestation of an ontological category (humanity)".<sup>110</sup> This understanding of history is a challenge to the positivists' view of the study of past events as an account of what really happened (according to L. von Ranke's famous statement): given the ease with which we use the concepts of *democracy, state, freedom*, etc. in political, social, cultural, philosophical, and everyday discourse without much thought, it is necessary to realize when they were formed and whether we can speak of their enduring historical meaning. Koselleck and his collaborators introduce the notion of a "saddle period" (Sattelzeit), when many classical concepts used after Aristotle seemed to be reborn in the conditions of modernity — we are talking about the century between 1750 and 1850 (the period between 1750 and 1850).<sup>111</sup> It is also remarkable that those "adventures of concepts" can be traced not only in the context of modern historical research, because concepts grow with all kinds of topical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> Kozlov A. A. Gustav Teichmüller (End) // Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii. 1894. Book 24. Pp. 661—681. P. 662. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> White H. Foreword // Koselleck R. The Practice of Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Stanford, 2002. P. IX—X. Cf. with Koselleck's juxtaposition of Geschichte and Historie in: Koselleck R. The Practice of Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Stanford, 2002. P. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>111</sup> Koselleck R. The Practice of Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002. P. 5ff.

connotators, being used in other fields of knowledge. Thus, the study of concepts makes history a real evolutionary theory of the diachrony of human culture, while history ceases to be a once-for-all given immutable space of universal meanings.

### 1.4 Worldview as a metacultural concept

Combining and generalizing the achievements of the above-mentioned scholars in the field of linguistic conceptual analysis, we can propose the following meaning-generating system: the interaction of lexical primitives-universals determines the variability of the formation of the described metapredicates, such as "if", "because (of)", "all", etc.; metapredicates, in turn, interact with primitives-universals and generate complex, or composite cultural concepts, which, on the one hand, reflect the semantic uniqueness of each of them, and, on the other hand, represent specific ways of organizing semantic links of concepts between different cultures. Consequently, we can speak not only about the fundamental untranslatability of concepts of one language into other languages, but also assert the fundamental possibility of a typological analysis of the meaning-generating structures that determine the existence and semantic diversity of the concepts of each culture.

Concepts are untranslatable into other languages due to their nature; it consists in the fact that a concept, according to the figurative definition of Yu. S. Stepanov, is "a lump of culture in human consciousness; something in the form of which culture enters the mental world of a person".<sup>112</sup> In fact, it means that any translation is possible then only with reliance on cultural concepts, while they themselves cannot be translated. In this connection it is convenient to distinguish between a concept (of culture) — *conceptus*, and a notion (of experience) — *notio*. In this distinction we start from the work already done by I. Kant on the distinction of concepts. Kant's distinction between concepts of reason and concepts of intellect: "Concepts of reason serve for *conceptual comprehension*, just as concepts of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> Stepanov Yu. S. Constants. The Dictionary of Russian Culture. An Essay. Moscow, 1997. P. 40. (In Russian).

intellect serve for *understanding* (perceptions)" (Kant's italics. — *A.L.*).<sup>113</sup> In our case, the word *conceptus* reflects precisely those two features that Kant, in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, discovers in the concepts of reason (or, *ideas*): first, they consist of *notiones*, i.e., pure notions of reason; second, it is their ability to transcend the limits of possible experience.<sup>114</sup> For cultural concepts, which are themselves *concepti* not only in name but also in nature, such transgression is also characteristic: it is the only thing that makes them essentially "clots of meanings", indistinct in their boundaries. Etymology well illustrates the essence of the concept (of culture) and its difference from the notion (of experience): if the former comes from *concipere* ("to gather, capture, take, compose, conceive" — actually, from *capio*, "to grasp, hold, possess" with the prefix indicating joint action), the latter comes from *notare* ("to mark, designate, represent by signs"). This is also evidenced by calques from Latin *conceptus*, available, for example, in the Russian ("понятие" from Old Russian "пояти" — "to grasp, to take") and the German (*Begriff* from *greifen* — "to grasp") languages.

A concept in its philosophical aspect becomes such a semantic unit, which acquires its meaning by transcending the boundaries of one paradigm or one problem field. Its essence lies precisely in its ability to transgress: it reconciles the diversity of its own interpretations by *over* coming the established boundaries of a particular linguistic culture. But this is not the invention of the new — rather, we are dealing with the actualization of the conceptual possibilities offered by philosophical thinking of the implicitly present strategies of meaning-making. So, philosophers are not at all invent or make concepts up — they discover concepts: this is a perpetually ongoing work that testifies to the power of the transgressive movement and the questioning of the semantic certainty of the boundaries it overcomes. Accordingly, in a methodological sense, we can hold that a notion (*notio*) is a certain historical and cultural form ( $\mu o \rho \phi \eta$ ), while a concept (*conceptus*) is the matter that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> Kant I. Collected Works in 8 Volumes. Vol. 3. The Critique of Pure Reason. Moscow, 1994. P. 282. (*In Russian*). <sup>114</sup> Ibid., c. 288.

fills it with content ( $\delta\lambda\eta$ ), which means that we can reconstruct it by enumerating (always incomplete) a number of genealogically related notions.

The study of cultural constants, thus, allows us to better understand not only how the linguistic pictures of the world of other nations or the nation to which we ourselves as native speakers belong are formed. The most important consequence of working with the material of lingua-cultural conceptual analysis is the realization of the existence of uniform or at least comparable *principles* of grasping different aspects of the world and the basic ability to express (reflect) them in linguistic activity. Thus, the human being appears as the world's fastener (*copula mundi*). This concept was first proposed by the Italian Neoplatonist M. Ficino, who used it to develop the doctrine of man as a microcosm. From Ficino's point of view, man is the center of the world, or, as he himself says in his treatise Plato's Theology (*Theologia platonica*), "the meaning of everything in the universe, the continuation of the chain of the world, the face of all things and the knot and fastener of the world (copula mundi)".<sup>115</sup> For the Italian humanist, it is important that man does not have his own place in the world in the sense in which we say that everything has its place in the world in relation to things; on the contrary, man with his being, his soul, embraces all the diversity of the world so that he as a microcosm is a reflection of the complexity of the external universe, the macrocosm. Commentators point to this detail as the ontological foundation of the human soul, refuting notions of its static location, for the function of the soul is to mediate between the divine and material spheres of the cosmos. This role of mediator implies the unconditional premise that in the soul itself there is a kind of dual relation to both the mind and the material world.<sup>116</sup> Thus, the human soul, or, in the terms of modern philosophy, consciousness, as the fastening of the world, is both a reflection of the diversity and complexity of the world order and its unity in a concrete being — in human being.

If we move away from the poetic notions of the Italian Neoplatonists, we will see that the very concept of *copula* also has the grammatical meaning of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> Cit.: Howlett S. Marsilio Ficino and His World. New York, 2016. P. 103.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> Lauster J. Marsilio Ficino as a Christian Thinker: Theological Aspects of his Platonism // Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy. Leiden, Boston, Köln, 2002. P. 45–70. P. 48.

conjunction of predicate and subject in a sentence. It is known that the problems of the conjunction of subject and predicate were already dealt with by ancient logicians: for example, Aristotle noted its importance for the thinking of the constituents of this conjunction, i.e. as the correlation of subject and predicate in a proposition, as well as for establishing the truth of this correlation. Subsequently, grammarians and linguists became interested in the problem of the conjunction, and their views on this problem changed polarly: from the necessity of recognizing the grammatical function of such a conjunction in a sentence expressed by a single word (in the most common case for Indo-European languages, it is the verb to be and its forms) to the denial of its own purely grammatical function and the recognition of the importance of its lexical component. In many respects, the refusal to recognize the status of the grammatical conjunction of the verb to be can also be attributed to the gradual rejection of the "Eurocentrism" of scholars in the Humanities: the systematic study of non-Indo-European languages and the peculiarities of their grammar made it possible to correct and expand the ideas of linguists and philosophers, who dealt with the problems of language, about the relationship between grammatical and lexical meanings of various members of the sentence. For example, experts point out that such a concept characteristic of all Indo-European languages as *being*, which for centuries has been naturally thought by the Western science as an indispensable logical and grammatical element of any proposition, is absent in Chinese, and the function of a conjunction is realized by various conjunctive verbs.<sup>117</sup> A. V. Smirnov points to the same problem of the specific status of *being* as the basis of the Western European style of philosophizing in his research.<sup>118</sup> Discussing the fundamental fork in the road of Western European thought of the Modern Age, he notes that this fork consists in the necessity to choose between the modes of telling — existence and activity, — which are always in opposition to each other. Thus, for example, Descartes, when discussing the subject of cogito, always chose existence (the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> Vide: Aleksandrova M. L. The Problem of a Conjunction as an Organizing Element of a Sentence // Vestnik moscovskogo instituta lingvistiki. 2012. № 1. Pp. 6—9. P. 9. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> Smirnov A. V. The Logic of Meaning. A Theory and Its Application to the Analysis of Classical Arab Philosophy and Culture. Moscow, 2001. Pp. 101—103. (*In Russian*).

position of *cogito ergo sum* is interpreted precisely as a justification of existence), although the order of verification of the validity of this concept itself refers to activity. A. V. Smirnov argues:

Turning at the fork of existence/action in the direction of action, making a fundamental choice in its favor, we will turn to the path of another way of meaning-making. The life of consciousness, its unfolding in the forms of the world picture, speech, logic, theoretical constructions, will be entirely different. The major culture that has chosen to act is Arab (pre-Islamic and Islamic). Its experience is invaluably different from that of Europe, and therefore represents a treasure trove of cogito unfolding that requires careful investigation. Is the fork of existence/action the only one at which the paths of the unfolding of the cogito diverge? Scarcely. One can speculate that the experience of other large cultures may show us other forks, other underlying meanings that are paired in the same way that action and existence are paired. The future of philosophy lies in such an investigation.<sup>119</sup>

Noteworthy, that the formal expression of the function of a conjunction in a sentence is only a specific phenomenon within a particular linguistic sphere. Indeed, the function of the conjunction is realized in various formal ways, which may differ from each other and even serve as characteristic properties of their own languages. In this respect, from our perspective, there is a clear correspondence between, firstly, the linguistic means of expressing the unity of the relations of the members of a sentence, secondly, the unity of logical structures and, thirdly, the unity of the world represented in human language without regard to its linguistic specificity.

Thus, the status of the human being as the world's staple lies in his reasonable way of expressing the unity of the world in language, although this unity may be realized and expressed by the speakers themselves in different ways. In these terms, to overcome cultural solipsism means not to accommodate all the semantic diversity of living cultures into one single formalized world, but, on the contrary, to affirm the cultural uniqueness of diverse worlds, while revealing the universal order of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> Smirnov A. V. «Big Culture» and cogito // Pragmatics of Philosophical Text: Proceedings of the All-Russian Scientific Conference XV Tauride Philosophical Readings "Anakharsis" (Crimea, Sudak, Novy Svet, Sept 16—19 2019). Simferopol, 2019. Pp. 7—8. P. 8. (*In Russian*).

meaning production for all cultures. If we are talking about language, which serves, as F. de Saussure puts it, as "the basis for all other manifestations of speech activity",<sup>120</sup> then such complex entities as *metacultural concepts*, or *metaconcepts*, can help us in this. Let us substantiate this proposed term.

The term of *metaconcept* should be interpreted as a meaning-forming supracultural transgression of concepts. If concepts at the formal-logical level are formalized as elementary semantic units and expressed verbally, then a metaconcept refers to an intercultural clot of meanings that can be grasped only by analyzing the meaning-generating functions of languages of different cultures. In essence, the study of metaconcepts allows us to meaningfully analyze the order of cultural dialogue within the semiosphere. At the level of cultural evolution, we see that people have created different national traditions and cultural systems, but at the same time, the concepts of their cultures always condition the frameworks of these cultures themselves. The essence of the above-discussed problem of cultural solipsism appears in the light of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity. It is known that fundamental concepts existing in each particular culture are always translated into the language of another culture with a lot of reservations, assumptions and comments. Discussing the hypothesis of linguistic relativity put forward by B. L. Whorf and E. Sapir and nowadays actively refuted by philosophers (e.g. S. Pinker) rather than linguists, A. Wierzbicka draws attention to the fact that the concept libertas cannot be adequately understood outside the context of Latin language and, consequently, of Roman culture — just as the concepts of *cboboda*, *liberty*, *freedom*, *Freiheit* or — let us add from ourselves —  $\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\theta\epsilon\rho\dot{\epsilon}\alpha$  cannot be adequately understood simply through translation, without any attention to the cultural context that gave rise to them and gave them meaning.<sup>121</sup> In other words, every concept is colored by nuances and shades of its native culture as a meaning-generating environment, sometimes inaccessible for the native speaker. However, every

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> Saussure F. de. The Course of General Linguistics // Saussure F. de. Works on Linguistics. Moscow, 1977. P. 47. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> Wierzbicka A. The Semantic Universals and Description of Languages. Moscow, 1999. Pp. 271–272. (*In Russian*).

concept, being a "clot of meaning", is dynamic, and therefore can refer to such unconditional and extra-cultural semantic fields, which are the subject of the study of philosophy. Here, humanity, as it were, reaches a qualitatively different level of generalization and strives, at the level of philosophical reflection, to create a unified intercultural meaning space. The space of philosophical problems is such that the ideas of Thales, Parmenides, Lao Tzu or the texts of the Mahabharata turn out to be in actual demand, and each particular contemporary author strives to overcome the conventions of his linguistic culture in order to partake of the open space of unconditional meanings.

Worldview is one of such metaconcepts, and yet it has its own genealogy. This does not mean that the previous concepts of specific cultures coincide in their scope with this Modern concept (otherwise it would have been constructed as a result of reflection on the phenomenon). In order to clarify the essence of the metaconcept of *worldview*, it is necessary to take into account two circumstances. On the one hand, there are pre-Modern forms, as well as (apparently) non-European concepts that we could recognize as *worldview*. We will further substantiate this statement by the example of the study of the ancient Greek concept ac (philosophical doctrine, philosophical school). On the other hand, not only purely speculative but also historical analysis demonstrates the transgressive character of worldview: conceptually, it is in demand in the history of thought, when the culturally and historically established world begins to fall apart and a mental effort is required to put it back together.

If we consider *worldview* in the key of lingua-conceptual analysis, it turns out that it contains all the elements distinguished by Yu. S. Stepanov. We will demonstrate that *worldview* has a topical semantics, which is not only reproduced in culture (including everyday culture), but also forms semantic series with similar concepts (such as *ideology*, *world picture*, and for the Russian language — *миросозерцание*, *мироотношение*, *мировидение*, etc.). It is important for us that the peculiarities of the articulation and usage of this concept are also characteristic of other languages, in which the word itself was adapted or transferred as a trace

from the German *Weltanschauung* (or in some cases *Weltansicht*). That is why we speak about, so to speak, the metaconceptual status of *worldview*. It is not a formally fixed term, a definition of the world, but rather the ability to grasp the world as a unity of concepts articulated in a particular philosophical culture.

Developing the proposed approach, we should notice that the world manifests *itself* through language, and thus bears the signs of a certain epoch. However, we always interpret the text before us not only as a free, unconditioned thought, but as a fact of the age, which is reflected in the very way in which the thoughts expressed in it are presented. The study of a detailed topology suggests, among other things, that we are dealing with the topography of a particular epoch, which the people formed within a given culture compiled in their activities, recording the outlines of the cultural continents and new lands lying before them as clearly and precisely as was possible. However, there is a danger here of treating the matter in the way that M. Merleau-Ponty points out in connection with the recorded text: "Philological analysis of texts leads nowhere: in texts we find only what we ourselves have put into them, and if philosophy has demanded our interpretation, this is already the history of philosophy".<sup>122</sup>

Are we not engaged, indeed, only in historiography, investigating the transformation of concepts into notions, thus only pointing to their dead forms? In connection with the above, there is no doubt that the scope of the concept of *worldview* itself — since it takes such a concrete linguistic form for its expression, — includes its various historical forms, which in a number of classical and modern studies are regarded as types of worldview itself. From our perspective, it is impossible to decompose worldview as a single phenomenon of mental and spiritual life and activity of various peoples, who conceptualized the world in different historical ages into various independent or at least relatively discrete types, which would exist separately from other types of worldview in different periods of history. On the contrary, worldview as an ability of a cultural human being is a dynamic concept and should be considered in connection with its formation, and not be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> Merleau-Ponty M. The Phenomenology of Perception. St. Petersburg, 1999. P. 6. (In Russian).

analyzed by a static typology. In addition, it is also necessary to be able to separate this internal structure from various concepts that form a single semantic series with worldview. It is not uncommon, for example, to identify worldview and ideology, particularly in German (*Weltanschauung/Ideologie*) or Russian (*MupoBo33peHue/udeoлогия*). This distinction can be achieved in two ways: on the one hand, by reconstructing the history of the concept of worldview (taking into account the development of this concept in other languages and the origin of the word itself), and, on the other hand, by criticizing historically developed typologies of worldview. At the same time, criticism is directly related to the most important integrative task of our research, namely, to identify the "ideal constellation" of the concept of *worldview*. This can be achieved by having in mind the most detailed approaches to the authors' experiences of conceptualizing the concept of *worldview* in a comparable historical period. This is the hermeneutic component of the historical-philosophical approach in anthropological research.

Finally, the identification of the internal form of a concept, which cannot be reflected by the speakers of a particular culture, but which is nevertheless reflected in the verbal form — the name — of the concept itself, is possible in the closest way in the already mentioned study of the formation and establishment of the concept in the corresponding language. However, if we are talking about the substantiation of the worldview as a constant of a particular culture, it is still necessary to demonstrate, that even in addition to the word-forms recognizable and familiar to us as speakers of Modern European languages, there were other ways of its expression. Here we enter the ground of not so much historical-philosophical (comparative), but to a greater extent anthropological research. Thus, the task arises to reveal the inner content of the concept of *worldview* as a metacultural concept, or metaconcept, i.e. as a timeless "bundle of meanings" articulated in other, non-Modern discourses and cultures. This can be helped by the previously mentioned identification of the "ideal constellation" of the concept of worldview, since historically interest in worldview studies arose in certain periods marked by similar events and requiring theoretical constructions comparable in their heuristics. By reconstructing a concept comparable to the Modern concept of *worldview* in the context of ancient Greek culture of the transitional period from classical antiquity to the age of Hellenism, we are fulfilling an exactly anthropological task, as we seek to identify common meaning clots in the contexts of different cultures. In doing so, we follow the logic of the idea of *dialogue of cultures*, according to which we can reach mutual understanding only if there are conceptual points of contact between different cultural contexts.

This, in our view, is the overcoming of cultural solipsism through the conceptual analysis of cultures. In fact, here we are dealing with the classical idea of self-knowledge, when the questioner begins to understand himself better by turning to the figure of the Other. Interestingly, there are also important methodological developments of the theme of dialog of cultures in the context of the practice of self-knowledge. For example, when characterizing in his research the peculiarities of Dostoevsky's poetics the aspiration of his characters to affirm the other by their "penetration", to discover and reveal in the other's self a subject, rather than an impassive object, M. M. Bakhtin drew from the ideas expressed by the poet and thinker V. I. Ivanov, who summarized such an attitude to overcoming solipsism with the formula "thou art".<sup>123</sup> Noteworthy is that this formula itself appears in Ivanov's program poem The Man, in which it is presented as an extended comprehension of the Delphic inscription "E" as "ɛĩ," i.e., "thou art", revealing the inner dialogue between the petitioner and the God-oracle.<sup>124</sup> In the short article *Thou* art, where Ivanov specifically deals with this question, he discusses the idea of the identity in religious consciousness of the microcosm and the macrocosm among other things — an identity, of which the representative of modern individualistic society has turned to be deprived: "When the modern soul finds 'You' in its 'I' again, as the ancient soul found it in the cradle of all religions, then it will realize that the microcosm and the macrocosm are identical - that the external world is given to man

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> Ivanov V. I. Th Native and the Universal. Moscow, 1994. Pp. 294—295. (*In Russian*); vide: Bakhtin M. M. The Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics // Bakhtin M. M. Collected Works in Seven Volumes. Moscow, 2002. Vol. 6, p. 15. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> Bibikhin V. V. Know Thyself. St. Petersburg, 1998. Pp. 16–20. (In Russian).

only in order that he learns the name 'You' both in the inaccessible neighbour and in the inaccessible God — that the world is the revelation of his microcosm. For what religious thought calls the primordial paradise, is the normal relation of macrocosm and microcosm — the noumenal all-sensibility of things as equally and identically existing together inside and outside man, the son of God <...>".<sup>125</sup>

It should be noted that such concepts as world, nature, reality are not scientific concepts, because positive science does not aim to clarify them. The clarification of concepts is the task of philosophy. Just as the observation of water cooling and its subsequent heating shows that ice, water, and steam are three states of one substance, not three separate substances, so philosophical inquiry seeks to organize the individual cognized elements of reality to the level of the world or nature. In other words, the very existence of philosophy as an ordering human intellectual activity serves to confirm the strong formulation of the anthropic principle: the universe or the world are as the man see them. To see here means to interpret simultaneously by the means of different languages — whether the language is musical, color, or national — expressed in a particular speech activity. The consistency of this statement can be justified only in the sense that it is the human gaze that gives meaning to the concepts of *the universe* or *the world*, recreates them as a single cosmos out of the whole variety of elements. In other words, the ontological problem of the world turns into the problem of human ontology and, in these terms, into a philosophical-anthropological problem.

#### 1.5 History of philosophy as philosophical anthropology

Not only the results of fieldwork with primitive peoples or archaeological data can provide material for philosophical and anthropological research. An important field in this respect is the history of philosophy, due to the methods of which it becomes possible to make a comparative study of various systems of thought and intellectual traditions of different peoples. It is noteworthy that historicalphilosophical research emerged at about the same time as anthropology was being

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> Ivanov V. I. Th Native and the Universal. Moscow, 1994. Pp. 94-95. (In Russian).

formalized as a discipline. The first modern (actually, Modern) historian of philosophy is often referred to as the German priest J. J. Brucker, since it was he who applied an adequate methodology in his historical-philosophical work.<sup>126</sup> Thus, the emergence of an academically recognized history of philosophy can be attributed to the 18<sup>th</sup> century;<sup>127</sup> although, for example, the famous multi-volume study devoted to the "general development of philosophical thought in time", edited by G. Santinello, begins in the Renaissance.<sup>128</sup> It should be noted that anthropology as a concept related to scientific research also appears for the first time in the title of the work of the Renaissance scholar from Leipzig Magnus Hundt, Anthropologium de hominis dignitate, natura et proprietatibus, de elementis, partibus et membris humnani corporis etc.". de spiritu humano etc. de anima humana et ipsius appendicitis (Anthropology concerning the dignity of man, nature and properties, elements, parts and members of the human body etc., of the human spirit etc., of the human soul, and appendices thereto), published in 1501.<sup>129</sup> On the other hand, the history of philosophy as a discipline is formalized almost compulsorily and for quite a long time is perceived precisely as a "gallery of delusions" (in Hegel's phrase), that is, as a pure enumeration of what this or that thinker, due to objective historical circumstances, thought in the transmission of a certain translator, who is himself a representative of a particular age and a particular culture. It is known that Aristotle created the first and "the earliest history of philosophy, built according to a certain inseparably linking exposition with criticism";<sup>130</sup> the very word plan, "anthropology" ( $\alpha \nu \theta \rho \omega \pi o \lambda o \gamma i \alpha$ ), which meant, however, knowledge about the spiritual nature of man, is also attributed to his Nicomachean Ethics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> A detailed study of the work of J. J. Brooker vide: Catana L. The Historiographical Concept 'System of Philosophy'. Its Origin, Nature, Influence and Legitimacy. Leiden and Boston, 2008.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup>Lvov A. A. How Historians of Philosophy Substantiate Their Discipline: The Status of History of Philosophy and Historical and Philosophical Research // Uchenye zapiski Krymskogo federal'nogo universiteta imeni V.I. Vernadskogo. Filosofiya. Politologiya. Kul'turologiya. —2017. — Vol. 3 (69). — №4. — Pp. 84—94. — P. 86. (*In Russian*).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> Piaia G., Santinello G. (eds.) Models of the History of Philosophy. New York, 2011. P. vii. Also vide: Lvov A.A. Methodological Search in the Contemporary History of Philosophy // Diskurs. 2017. № 5. Pp. 10—16. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>129</sup> Hoßfeld U. Geschichte der biologischen Anthropologie in Deutschland. Von den Anfängen bis in die Nachkriegzeit. Stuttgart, 2016. S. 37—38.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> Aristotle. Metaphysics. Moscow, 2006. P. 428 (commentaries to book A). (In Russian).

It is known that within the framework of classical science a ban on methodological syncretism was formulated; in historical and philosophical studies it is especially noticeable due to the notorious European logocentrism — an idea whose supporters by default recognize as philosophical only such a research that takes place within the intellectual space of Western Europe. This attitude toward forms of reflection other than the Greek tradition was formulated by Hegel and supported by the followers of the German spirit in the philosophy of the 20<sup>th</sup> century: "It was with the Greeks and only with them that it [philosophy. — A.L.] was such, to remain such for those who still drink from the Greek source, but not for others. There is, Heidegger will say, no Chinese or Indian philosophy. Not because the Chinese or Hindus refrained from thinking. He they did not think in a philosophical way, that is, in a way that is repelled by the Greeks".<sup>131</sup> It turns out that the Indian or Chinese traditions (both ancient and modern) are not considered in the course of the history of classical philosophy, and even if they are, they are considered as examples of pre-philosophical forms of reflection — poetic or religious.<sup>132</sup>

Such a position of classical philosophy seems very valuable for the philosophical anthropologist: the study of linguistic universals and the constants of different cultures that they condition turns out to be a promising approach to a fruitful, non-ideological critique of the notorious Eurocentrism. We should not refuse to identify ourselves as Modern Europeans just because Modern European thought once claimed to be universal. In a certain sense, it is a brilliant conjecture that the universality of thought can be achieved through language (the language of Modern European or other, non-Modern European philosophy or culture), i.e. it can be reached already on the other side of any concrete language. But for this it is necessary to start from the already existing linguistic cultures, which have somehow developed — and the historical-philosophical material is in this regard of great use.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> Beaufret J. Dialogue with Heidegger. Greek Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 2007. Pp. 235–236. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> Vide: Lvov A. A. The Possibility of Cross-Cultural Understanding in the History of Philosophy: The Topical Positions // Vestnik rossiyskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seria: Filosofiya. 2018. Vol. 22. № 3. Pp. 365—376. (*In Russian*).

History of philosophy as an independent discipline, and not only doxography, enters the ensemble of philosophical sciences and has been actively developing, apparently, since the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. During this period, three major phases can be distinguished:<sup>133</sup> *the first* (conventionally 1800—1830s) was marked by the work of system builders — J. G. Fichte, F. W. J. Schelling, and especially G. W. F. Hegel. For them, the history of thought, as well as the history of all mankind, was also a material for verification and substantiation of their own world-historical constructions. Thus, within the grandiose conceptual system of Hegel's philosophy, the history of philosophy appeared as a reflection of the process of self-discovery by the absolute spirit of itself, and Hegel's project became the final stage of this movement. Schelling developed similar views: his lectures on the history of Modern philosophy, delivered in Munich, were structured as an examination of the doctrines that preceded his natural philosophy, and in addition led to the necessity of asking whether philosophy existed among other modern European peoples besides the Germans.<sup>134</sup>

In *the second phase* (the middle to the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century), the history of philosophy, largely under the influence of F. A. Trendelenburg, the Neo-Hegelians and the Neo-Kantians, developed as an independent research discipline. A reasoning-positivist perspective becomes the main in the history of thought, largely inspired and justified by the dominance of a strictly mathematized natural-scientific view of the world. The focus of the research interest of historians of philosophy was the causes and circumstances of the unfolding of the history of thought. On the one hand, this approach opposed the Hegelian project of unfolding the history of philosophy, stated as "the emergence and ascent, transition and return to itself of the 'creative subject,' knowing itself in the main historical moments of the unfolding of the truth of being-as-consciousness";<sup>135</sup> but, on the other hand, it could not satisfy the claims of reason to investigate the inner movement of thought

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> Also vide: Lvov A. A. Anthropological Character of Historical-Philosophical Analytics of Worldview // Lichnost'. Kul'tura. Obshchestvo. 2021. Vol. 23. № 4 (112). Pp. 106—115. Pp. 109—111. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> Schelling F. W. J. Works in 2 vols. Moscow, 1989. Vol. 2. P. 554. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> Sergeev K. A., Perov Yu. V. Hegel's History of Philosophy in the Context of Modern Metaphysics // Hegel G.

W. F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Book 1. St. Petersburg, 2006. P. 58. (In Russian).

in its history, embodied in specific systems and views of historical figures. G. Schnedelbach, in a work devoted to a review and analysis of the history of German philosophy for the years 1831—1933, expressed a very fruitful idea that it was during this period of time that it experienced a crisis of self-identification.<sup>136</sup> The same phenomenon is eloquently described in one of the books by F. Beiser, an American historian of the German philosophical tradition of the 19<sup>th</sup> century:

Schnädelbach maintains, philosophers struggled to define the purpose and identity of philosophy itself. The decline of metaphysics, the collapse of the speculative systems, and the rapid rise of the empirical sciences, all left philosophers wondering what they should do next. <...> Philosophy had given birth to all the sciences; but now that her children had grown up, she seemed to have no purpose anymore. This predicament of philosophy was well put by Wilhelm Windelband some fifty years later: 'Philosophy is like King Lear, who, having shared all his goods among his children, is now thrown out on the street like a beggar'."<sup>137</sup>

At this time philosophy, having been overthrown from its pedestal as the highest speculative discipline and discredited in its ability to create theoretical systems, was demoted in rank, and the only function it managed to retain was the function of analyzing the diverse but disordered achievements of the individual sciences.<sup>138</sup> And the synthetic function of forming a unified image of the world was given to positive science alone, and it was entrusted with the production of values and moral norms. More specifically, true philosophy, according to A. Comte's idea, should unite in one place. According to A. Comte, true philosophy should unite all spheres and manifestations of private and social human existence on the basis of research and analysis of its main characteristics — thought, feeling and action. By understanding the hitherto spontaneously moving evolution of people as a social animals, we will be able to give them an accurate assessment, and this in turn will give us the opportunity to "wisely intervene" in its course.<sup>139</sup> Let us point out two

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> Schnaedelbach H. Philosophy in Germany 1831—1933. Cambridge, 1984. P. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> Beiser F. C. Late German Idealism. Trendelenburg and Lotze. Oxford, 2013. P. 23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> Krotov A. A. Positivism and Comparative Philosophy // Vestnik VGU. 2006. №2. Pp. 38—46. P. 45. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>139</sup> Comte A. General View of Positivism. Moscow, 2012. P. 54. (In Russian).

characteristic examples. In the first case, Comte asserts the universal character of positivism as a justification of the science of morality: "<...> the positive direction, better than any other, will always consider as the main source of real morality the direct rise, at the same time spontaneous and systematic, of social feeling, which it will try, if possible, to develop even from the most tender age, using all the methods that can be indicated by sound philosophy".<sup>140</sup> Elsewhere he argues that the emergence of a positive doctrine of morality is a natural ideal and a worthy conclusion of positive philosophy, which seeks to subordinate to its apparatus all the diversity of surrounding reality: "The indication of the highest social properties characterizing positive thinking would not be complete enough if it were not supplemented by a brief assessment of its natural ability to systematize, finally, human morality, which will always constitute the main application of the true theory of humankind".<sup>141</sup> It is noteworthy that Comte did not attach much importance to any historical-philosophical research because, first, he did not need an additional scientific component to his project of positive philosophy (which was already conceived as a quite scientific, auxiliary, and methodological discipline), and second, he regarded the history of thought as nothing more than a gallery of fallacies of the researchers of previous centuries, "having long ago fulfilled their purpose, and even bringing them to a dead end".<sup>142</sup> It was even characteristic of the followers of positivist philosophy to reduce the history of thought to a psychological study of the character of this or that philosopher and the conditions in which his thought developed (for example, this kind of analysis is often carried out by H. Taine in his works).<sup>143</sup>

Thus, by the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, a broad picture painted by the spirit of positivist philosophy was already unfolding, in which the objective dependence of moral, social and — in the long run — value orientations on the successes of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> Ibid., p. 118.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup> Comte A. The Spirit of Positive Philosophy: A Discourse of Positive Thinking. Moscow, 2012. P. 47. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup> Krotov A. A. Auguste Comte and the Genesis of the Positivist Conception of the Historical and Philosophical Process // Filosofskie nauki. 2016. №9. Pp. 7–20. P. 7. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> Ibid., p. 17 ff.

positive science and the underlying epistemological attitudes of positive philosophy clearly emerged. On the one hand, this state of affairs could not but give rise to such a characteristic feature of the time as nihilism, both in the fields of science and morality. On the other hand, it is historians of philosophy who are the ones to make meaningful remarks in the broken-out worldview discussion about the tasks and goals of philosophy.

In many respects, this perception of the history of philosophy was due to the reaction of the professors of the 1830s to Hegelianism and its founding father. For example, E. A. Bobrov (1867-1933), a student and follower of G. A. Teichmüller, attributed the growth of interest in the history of thought itself partly to the inability of the professors, who replaced the classics of German philosophy, to demonstrate systematical thinking, partly to the search for rigor in philosophical research. Here is what he writes about F. A. Trendelenburg (1802–1872), who influenced his teacher: "<...> he was a remarkable connoisseur of philosophical literature and must justly be regarded as one of the founders of the present accurate historicalphilosophical method <...>. If we take into account that in Germany, and in other countries among the representatives of philosophy now prevails a predilection for the study of the history of philosophy in preference to philosophical original work in contrast to the systematic hobbies of philosophers <...>, it will become clear to us what a great role played in this revolution of the interests of philosophical research Trendelenburg, who replaced in the Berlin influential chair Hegel as well as Schelling".<sup>144</sup> The contemporary researcher also notes that Trendelenburg's influence, among other things, had a significant impact on the formation of the customary verification of the ideas of academic philosophers through reference to the works of predecessors, appeals to predecessors, and their competent citation: "This procedure contributed greatly to the flourishing of historical-philosophical research and the transformation of the history of philosophy into one of the main

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup> Bobrov E. A. Recollections of Teichmüller // Filosofiya v Rossii: materialy, issledovaniya, zametki. Vypusk 1. Kazan, 1899. Pp. 25—48. Pp. 27—28. (*In Russian*).

philosophical disciplines".<sup>145</sup> With regard to A. Trendelenburg's historicalphilosophical project itself, it can be said that it became one of the key (besides logical and ontological) points in the decisive overcoming of Hegel's hegemony in academic philosophy in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It was important for him to show the strict historical dimension of this or that philosopher's thought, to offer a comprehension of his ideas on the basis of the historical and linguistic circumstances that objectively conditioned them. Just as the professor form Berlin turned to Aristotle and Plato in his logic and worldview, so in his historical and philosophical studies he strove for a rigorous and accurate understanding of the texts of both contemporary authors and thinkers of the past. Because Trendelenburg's aim was above all to reveal the unique individuality of a particular philosopher, he influenced W. Dilthey, R. Eucken, and F. Brentano, becoming the immediate precursor of their metaphysical and at the same time worldview projects.<sup>146</sup> Of course, here we are dealing not only with abstract conclusions, but we also have documentary evidence of awareness of this kind of spiritual continuity: for example, W. Dilthey, in a speech on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, delivered on November 19, 1903, mentioned that among other teachers of the University of Berlin who had influenced him, he would like to mention F. A. Trendelenburg. Dilthey sincerely regretted that this name had already been forgotten at the beginning of the twentieth century, and that the younger public of that time did not understand to what extent the generation of the founder of Lebensphilosophie was indebted to this Berlin scholar.<sup>147</sup>

Apparently, it was W. Dilthey, in his historical reconstructions of the worldview of the early Modern period, who was one of the first to discover the relationship between historical-philosophical and anthropological research. His follower and student B. Groethuysen (1880—1946) proposed a more detailed elaboration of this problem, which allowed him to justify an original project of philosophical anthropology. According to Groethuysen, philosophical anthropology,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> Demin M. R. Adolf Trendelenburg: Philosophy as Theory of Science // Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. 2010. №2 (24). Pp. 195—200. P.198. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> Beiser F. C. Late German Idealism. Trendelenburg and Lotze. Oxford, 2013. P. 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

along with the sociology of knowledge and typologies of worldviews, would constitute a fundamental meta-discipline. The assertion of a historiographical approach in anthropological research makes the very problem field of anthropology similar to what we would now call "critical metahistory" or "cultural hermeneutics".<sup>148</sup> No matter how a person labels him/herself, no matter what grammatical constructions or so he/she applies to him/herself, he/she is doomed to search for an answer to the question of his/her own essence, he/she is doomed to self-discovery. In his *Philosophical Anthropology*, the philosopher argued that this new research field is novel only in appearance, and in fact it is nothing but the latest version of the ancient vector of thought, of the inner dialectic taking place in the depths of the self, between the "I live" (vivo) and the "I think" (cogito), but remodeled and expanded into an open dialogue between people, ages and cultures.<sup>149</sup> In these terms, a person strives to know him/herself through various means and methods, seeking an answer to the question of his/her essence in art, in religion, in philosophy, in life itself — but it is impossible to imagine that a being as multifaceted as the human being could be revealed only through one of these approaches. An integrative tool is needed, which would make it possible to synthesize all the various directions of person's search for an answer to the question of himself. Philosophical anthropology is such an instrument, and it is quite natural that "[i]t would be the task of philosophical anthropology, through this wealth of data, to find the way in which man thinks about himself".150

The combining of anthropology with hermeneutics allows for a fruitful analysis of texts as testimonies of specific ages and specific life situations of their authors, since it questions the predetermination of those concepts that remain outside the frames of established research approaches, in particular intellectual history. Philosophical anthropology, therefore, asserts third-order reflection over the initial reflection of human linguistic practice and second-order historical-philosophical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> Ermarth M. Intellectual History as Philosophical Anthropology: Bernard Groethuysen's Transformation of Traditional Geistesgeschichte // The Journal of Modern History. 1993. Vol. 65. No. 4. P. 673—705. P. 686. <sup>149</sup> Ibid., p. 687—688.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> Groethuysen B. Anthropologie philosophique. Paris, 2014. P. 12.

reflection (while philosophy itself is the first-order reflection). Already in his early studies, B. Groetuysen showed that in the process of understanding, a pre-discursive and pre-reflexive distance is established between a person and his own situation of the speaker's self. Language, communication through the dialogue and reflection in it all tend to spread a deep impulse of self-distance, which is implicit in human existence itself. The self-consciousness of a person who enters into communication with the Other initially manifests itself in his/her mediation as a speaker, conscious of him/herself as a carrier of language. This kind of reflexive practice should lead to a better understanding at the level of the sign and even preverbal system of communication than extended discursive practices, and philosophical anthropology itself is then conceived as a discipline of double reflection.<sup>151</sup> In other words, philosophical anthropology appears as an ontology of the human, since the human being is always rooted in a communicative, linguistic, cultural, and historically specific situation, which means that the hermeneutical approaches discovered by W. Dilthey can and should be extended to it as a special subject of philosophical research.

One cannot help mentioning the concrete application of these ideas by Groetuysen in his works on the formation of the bourgeois worldview in eighteenthcentury France. He considers the process of emancipation of a middle-class man, an urbanite economically independent of the ideological power of the church. The preconditions for this had been building up for quite a long time, but it was in the classical era that the bourgeois found his worldview as the order of the world he understood in a language he understood; the consequence of this worldview shift was a sense of the alienness of the clergy as a different, language-speaking social group.<sup>152</sup> Groethuysen seeks to capture the *Zeitgeist*, the characteristic presence of which W. Dilthey recognized, and in accordance with his teacher's subjectivist method, he seeks to "take into account all available evidence and transform it into

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup> Ermarth M. Intellectual History as Philosophical Anthropology: Bernard Groethuysen's Transformation of

Traditional Geistesgeschichte // The Journal of Modern History. 1993. Vol. 65. No. 4. P. 673—705. P. 684—685. <sup>152</sup> Groethuysen B. The Bourgeois: Catholicism vs. Capitalism in Eighteenth-Century France. New York, 1968. P. 19–20.

an internally unified and humanly consistent narrative".<sup>153</sup> Groethuysen's study is filled with eyewitnesses' testimonies of this historical period: he literally lets the reader hear the direct speech of the characters of this age, thus bringing him into the thick of the language of each of the characters. Such a move gives an idea of the extent to which the communicative means of a certain group of people differ from the thesaurus and the way of thinking of the others. This is the manifestation of the epistemological attitude of Groetuysen, who did not recognize the confinement of philosophical anthropology within a single field of study or the application of a unified method.<sup>154</sup> He seems to fuse anthropological and historical-philosophical issues, not only showing how the process of formation of a new social class proceeded, but also revealing the qualitative criteria for distinguishing the bourgeois from other anthropological types. Obviously, the communicative problematic we are addressing here cannot but find its concrete forms in the relationship with the Other.

The works of W. Dilthey and his followers and contemporaries named above should be referred to *the third phase*, in which attempts to overcome the scientism and positivism characteristic of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century are found. Up to WWI (and in some cases even later), worldview problems were at the foreground of philosophical interest, which directly or indirectly contributed to the formation of such important aspects of modern philosophy as axiological, anthropological, and linguistic. At the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup>—20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the axis of historical and philosophical attention of leading thinkers shifted towards worldview philosophy, and it is historical and philosophical reflection, moving in the direction of the abovementioned problems, that turns out to be methodologically constructive, a discipline that is not confined only within the limits of reasoned reflection.

The aspiration to distinguish the *Zeitgeist* of each particular historical age behind historical and cultural processes had an important propaedeutic influence on the formation of the understanding history of philosophy, which is so relevant for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>153</sup> Kon I. S. Philosophical Idealism and the Crisis of Bourgeois Historical Thought. Moscow, 1959. P. 109. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> Groethuysen B. Anthropologie philosophique. Paris, 2014. P. 11.

cross-cultural research in contemporary comparative philosophy.<sup>155</sup> The founder of comparative philosophy, P. Masson-Oursel, who was a disciple of the anthropologist L. Lévy-Bruhl, considered various scenarios of the development of knowledge in the Humanities from simple and often declarative statements to the level of scientific facts and doctrines on the examples of moral teaching, linguistics, anthropology and ethnology, and even comparative psychology.<sup>156</sup> From his perspective, it is wrong to think that philosophy is an exclusively Greek invention, and, moreover, such a view is a simplification of the same order as the ideal images with which philosophy still works: "This philosophy, which will be comparative, must not take man or the human mind as its subject, but different human types or types of mind <...>. We take as a man as such, a man sui generis, perhaps a Greco-Roman sage, or a sincere believer of the Middle Ages, or a Renaissance humanist, or Rousseau's natural man, or, again, the man of 1789, or a Moder European; so many separate members of the same family are successive branches of one common trunk".<sup>157</sup> However, truly reliable knowledge begins when we seek to find out what are the principles of synchronous development of ideas in very different cultures and traditions. The comparativist approach implies a wide application of such an important tool as analogy, because for the comparativist researcher it is important not to show what a particular thinker thought on this or that occasion at this or that time (then the researcher's judgments will be predetermined by the environment in which he/she was formed), but to try to make proportions of analogies. For instance, in the light of this approach, it makes sense to examine and compare Socrates's attitude towards sophists in Athens in the 5<sup>th</sup> century B.C. and Confucius's attitude towards Chinese sophists, his contemporaries. Such an approach will give our study of a certain historical-philosophical phenomenon more objectivity, and, consequently, will bring philosophical research closer to scientific research.<sup>158</sup> Thus, the history of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>155</sup> Kolesnikov A. S. The History of Current Philosophy // Vestnik rossiiskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seria: Filosofiya. 2015. № 3. Pp. 77–93. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>156</sup> Masson-Oursel P. Comparative philosophy. London, 1926. P. 32ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> Ibid., p. 33—34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> Ibid., p. 45–50.

philosophy, historiography is a way to account the diversity of the research of paradigm uniqueness and its differences together with cultural anthropology.<sup>159</sup>

Here we also touch upon the topic of worldview, since one of the targets of the project of comparative philosophy was Eurocentrism, already described above. Europocentric stances formed one of the challenges to overcoming the tendency to systematization that had developed in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and many authors of the 20<sup>th</sup> century did their best in their attempts to overcome it. The perception of the European tradition as not only a model, a measure of the authenticity of philosophical pursuits, but also as the only possible philosophical tradition in general became so ingrained in consciousness that, for example, J. Derrida at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw one of the resonances of his philosophical activity in overthrowing this attitude to the world and history.<sup>160</sup> In general, the emergence of worldview problems was predetermined initially by the intuitive and later more and more clearly articulated demand of the time for the development of a theory of values and a rethinking of the status of man in the world. An interesting example of such a conscious struggle with the idols of the Modern European metanarrative is the reflection of the canon of modernity. Indeed, in the philosophical and literary sphere, we are constantly confronted with canonical lists that condition and affirm the images and boundaries of certain traditions. The attempts to justify or critically examine such a "Western European canon" can be found in the works of R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, J. Passmore, as well as the famous traditionalist H. Bloom. Although the latter did not deal with the history of philosophy in the strict sense of the word, his study of the European literary and cultural canon, headed by the figure of Shakespeare, is very revealing in connection with the principles of the paradigm of Europeanness. In doing so, he concluded that there is a productive influence in poetry that provides a poetic piece with true aesthetic value.<sup>161</sup> However, it is in this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup>Lvov A. A. Social-Political and Critical Aspect in Contemporary History of Philosophy // Uchenye zapiski Krymskogo federal'nogo universiteta imeni V.I. Vernadskogo. Filosofiya. Politologiya. Kul'turologiya. —2019. — Vol. 5 (71). — №4. — Pp. 51—62. — P. 56. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup> It is interesting to note that J. Derrida's ideas echoing the project of comparative philosophy are discussed in his lecture Philosophy and Philosophical Nationalism, vide.: Derrida J. Positions. Moscow, 2007. P. 131 ff. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>161</sup> Vide: Bloom H. The Anxiety of Influence. A Theory of Poetry. Oxford, New York, 1997.

aspect of productive mutual influence that we usually consider any canonical constellation of authors, for example, in relation to the history of Modern Age philosophy. In this case, of course, we cannot avoid such a "non-classical" criterion as "they were simply the best".<sup>162</sup> Bringing into the canon has a significant impact on the disposition of the worldview, and due to it, the canon itself becomes possible. In this point we see the significance of directing historical-philosophical research towards the analysis of worldviews — in fact, it makes it possible to conceptualize the history of philosophy as a philosophical anthropology of modernity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>162</sup> Kuklick B. Seven Thinkers and How They Grew: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz; Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Kant // Philosophy in History. Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy. Cambridge, 1984. P. 125–140.

# Chapter Two. The Current Aspect of the Metaconcept of *Worldview*

## 2.1. Genealogy of the Concepts

#### 2.1.1. Worldview in the Aspects of Weltanschauung and Weltansicht

The point is that the Russian-speaking tradition did not care about conceptual purity after the Russian-language calque of the common German word *Weltanschauung* emerged and consolidated. German authors themselves did not care about this purity when translating into German, for example, such not identical for a native Russian speaker terms as "миросозерцание", "образ мыслей" and so on. Throughout the XIX century and further on in the beginning of the XX century, *Weltanschauung* will have an important meaning in different fields of the Humanities (from linguistics and psychology to theology and philosophy). In particular, in late 19<sup>th</sup> century, in connection with the formation of neo-Kantianism and, simultaneously with it, positivist philosophy of science, it became relevant to distinguish between two types of philosophy — scientific and non-scientific philosophy was meant philosophy's attempts to create special worldviews (even the term of "worldview philosophy" — *die weltanschauunglische Philosophie* — appeared).

On the one hand, it is obvious that we deal with the calquing of one concept from German into Russian. This perspective is also justified by the history of the translation of this concept into other Western European languages, including Slavic.<sup>163</sup> On the other hand, these synonyms in the national discourse, and simply in everyday usage acquire their conceptual independence when philosophers take up the task and propose different typologies of worldview. An illustrious example of this is M. P. Arutyunyan's idea that worldview solves the task of ordering the "primary chaos of existence" with the help of its functionalities —

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> Kowalewicz M. H. Übersetzungsprobleme des Begriffs "Weltanschauung" // Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte.
2013. Vol. 55. P. 237—249; Underhill J. W. Humboldt, Worldview and Language. Edinburgh, 2011. P. 15—19.

"мироощущения" ("world sensation"), "мировосприятия" ("world perception"), "миропонимания" ("understanding of the world"), "миропреобразования" ("transformation of the world"), etc. — and the variety of its forms, such as myth, ideal, world picture, utopia, ideology, legend, etc. Such functionalities and forms of worldview allow the external world to transform "into the internal world, opening up with images, meanings and values existentially significant for a person".<sup>164</sup> Such an approach is actively discussed in modern theoretical linguistics and philosophy of language;<sup>165</sup> for example, J. Underhill has contributed to clarifying the widespread confusion about the English concept of *worldview*. He pointed out that the German concepts of *Weltanschauung* and *Weltansicht* were merged in this concept for various reasons. In particular, this was due to the not exact usage of the word *Weltanschauung*, which had taken root in English in the context of linguistics by B. L. Whorf. However, these concepts, which have their own meaning and conceptualization in German usage, lost their independence when translated into English.<sup>166</sup>

Underhill proposed to analyze *worldview* in connection with the integration of the above mentioned German concepts as semantic shades of a single concept. For this purpose, he developed a system of definitions, which can be represented as an order of juxtaposed semantic areas that constitute a conceptual unity. In the center of such a system, depicted as five circles from smaller to larger, there is a core *world perceiving*, followed by the area of *world conceiving*, then mental area, or *cultural mindset*, then *personal world* and, finally, (world) *perspective*. The first two areas reveal the meaning of *worldview-as-Weltansicht*, the second three *worldview-as-Weltanschauung*. It should be noted, however, that this experience of clarifying worldview is not an attempt to classify concepts; it is precisely the thematization of merged meanings within the scope of a certain synthetic concept.<sup>167</sup> It should be noted, by the way, that the clarification of the established concept of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> Arutyunyan M. P. The Phenomenon of Worldview. Khabarovsk, 2006. Pp. 98–99. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> Chabrolle-Cerretini A-M. La vision du monde de Wilhelm von Humboldt: Histoire d'un concept linguistique, -Lyon, ENS Éditions, 2007; Trabant J. Traditionen Humboldts. Frankfurt a. M., 1990.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> Underhill J. W. Humboldt, Worldview and Language. Edinburgh, 2011. P. 14–15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> Ibid., p. 134—135; ibid., p. 145.

*worldview* required the researcher not just to propose synonymous concepts or words for each meaning contained in it, but precisely to unfold *worldview* as a certain integrative semantic formula.

Weltanschauung took root as an independent concept in French poststructuralism. Apparently, this is due to the neo-Marxist critique then represented by L. Althusser and his circle, from which some prominent representatives of French poststructuralism also emerged,<sup>168</sup> as well as the Frankfurt School and the New Left movement. Be that as it may, we can see that from the essence of this concept it denotes a certain historical set of views on reality, the surrounding world. Thus, M. Foucault understood Weltanschauung as a certain disposition of knowledge, which is characteristic of a given episteme. As is known, Foucault's "episteme" means "a special configuration of 'words', 'things' and 'representations' that sets the conditions for the possibility of points of view, knowledge and sciences characteristic of a certain historical epoch".<sup>169</sup> According to Foucault, the category of microcosm is such a "worldview" characteristic of the Renaissance episteme, since it, on the one hand, acts as a category of thinking and, on the other hand, expresses the correspondence of the highest comprehensible order ("high spheres") to the lowest ("depths of the earth").<sup>170</sup> In the same sense of the special practice of knowledge and, as a consequence, of disciplinary practice, G. Deleuze also uses this concept in his analysis of the Foucauldian method.<sup>171</sup> J. Derrida interprets this notion in an expanded meaning in comparison with the previous two cases, although he also adheres to the perspective that *Weltanschauung* is directly connected with a certain historical form that a certain knowledge takes: "[H]istoricity in general would be impossible without the history of philosophy, and the latter would be impossible in its turn if there were only hyperbole on the one

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>168</sup> Cf. L. Althusser's view on the practical aspect of K. Marx's philosophy: Lvov A. A. On the Possibility of Freedom Beside the Subject: Michel Foucault and the Attempt of Overcoming of the Teleology of Modern Historicism // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. — 2017. — Vol. 33. — № 3. — Pp. 316—325. — P. 320—321.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> Kolesnikov A. S. Michel Foucault and His "Archaeology of Knowledge" // Foucault M. Archaeology of Knowledge. St. Petersburg, 2012. P. 13. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> Foucault M. Words and Things. Archaeology of the Humanities. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 67. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> Deleuze G. New Archivist // Foucault M. Archaeology of Knowledge. St. Petersburg, 2012. P. 392. (In Russian).

hand and certain historical structures, *Weltanschauungen*, on the other. Philosophy's own historicity takes place and is constituted in this transition, in this dialog between hyperbole and a certain finite structure, between the surpassing of totality and its closure, in the very distinction between history and historicity <...>".<sup>172</sup> Neo-Marxism turns out to be an illustrative conceptual space here, since the very concept of *Weltanschauung* (as well as "Mировоззрение" in Russian-speaking culture) was firmly connected with the concept of *ideology* as interpreted by K. Marx in it. Thus, we find that ideology adjoins the concept of *worldview* in the aspect of its historical certainty, finality, formal completeness, which in *Weltanschauung* was noted by Heidegger as well.

*Weltansicht* is a concept of much more specific application than *Weltanschauung*. In particular, it is the term used by J. G. Fichte in his meditations on various reflexive ways of perceiving the world that has ceased to be simple (*einfach*). Fichte counts five such perspectives of the world in his work *Instruction to the Blessed Life, or also the Doctrine of Religion*, namely: the world given to the external senses and considered genuine; the world as a law of order ("equal right in the system of rational beings"); a view of the world from the point of view of true and perfect morality; a view of the world from the point of view of religion; and a view of the world from the point of view of a single, absolute, and complete science.<sup>173</sup> In other words, for the contemplator in each of these perspectives the world is revealed as a certain unity, as an already given ordering, which the contemplator himself is ready to perceive, being, as it were, at a certain level of his development.

In addition, this concept seems to be one of the key concepts for W. von Humboldt's philosophy of language. Scholars note that by *Weltansicht* he meant the way in which language shapes the way speakers of that language look at the world and comprehend the world. Consciously or unconsciously, we all act out such

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>172</sup> Derrida J. Writing and Difference. Moscow, 2007. P. 97. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>173</sup> Fichte J. G. The Instructions Towards Blessed Life, or The Doctrine of Religion as well // Fichte J. G. Works. St. Petersburg, 2008. Pp. 647—648. (*In Russian*).

worldview schemes all the time, just as we reproduce them in language.<sup>174</sup> Humboldt argued that "<...> languages that have reached high degrees of perfection are characterized by their own worldviews (*Weltansichten*)".<sup>175</sup> This same grasping of language as a world and worldview (and this is how V. V. Bibikhin translates *Weltansicht*) is questioned by M. Heidegger in his famous article *The Path to Language*.<sup>176</sup> Here we find the origin of the idea that allowed us to qualify the Humboldtian study of language as linguistic anthropology: the question of the essence of language for him turns out to be a guide not only to the external, which it covers as conceivable, but also to the internal, to that "spiritual force of the nation" that produces language, solves the special task of its formation.<sup>177</sup>

However, not all researchers agree with this translation of *Weltansicht*: for example, taking into account the Humboldtian conceptual apparatus, L. P. Lobanova is inclined to translate this term as "world picture". She points out that Humboldt introduces the concept of *grammatische Sprachansicht*, which she proposes to translate by the phrase "grammatical picture of language", meaning that *Ansicht* (which in essence can be translated as "view", both literally and figuratively) is understood as a certain perspective view of something else in Leibniz's philosophy.<sup>178</sup> It is noteworthy that she holds the same view with regard to the mentioned term in Fichte's writings.<sup>179</sup> A detailed analysis of the German-language word usage is beyond the scope of our task; nevertheless, we can notice that the concept of *worldview* is adjoined to the concept of *the world picture* in the aspect of totality of encompassing the conceivable world, its gathering and holding in unity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>174</sup> Underhill J. W. Humboldt, Worldview and Language. Edinburgh, 2011. P. 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>175</sup> Humboldt W. von. On the Comparative Study of Languages in Relation to Different Ages of Their Development // Humboldt W. von. Collected Works in Linguistics. Moscow, 2000. P. 322. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>176</sup> Heidegger M. On The Way to Language // Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg, 2007. Pp. 364—365.

<sup>(</sup>*In Russian*). Cf.: Heidegger M. Der Weg zur Sprache // Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt a.M., 1985. B. 12. S. 237–238.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>177</sup> Humboldt W. von. On the Difference in the Structure of Human Languages and its Influence on the Spiritual Development of Mankind // Humboldt W. von. Collected Works in Linguistics. Moscow, 2000. P. 47. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>178</sup> Lobanova L. P. Grammatical Picture of Language, Thinking and Spiritual Development of the People in the Conception of W. von Humboldt // Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seria 9: Filologiya. 2014. № 4. Pp. 75—89. P. 75—76. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>179</sup> Lobanova L. P. Ethical Foundations of the World Picture in the Philosophical Conception of J. G. Fichte // Biznes. Obshchestvo. Vlast'. 2013. № 16. Pp. 2—10. (*In Russian*).

to the subject of language. Like psychologists, they also speak about the relationship between the concepts of *worldview* and *the world picture* — for example, I. Vankova emphasizes the fundamental connection between the world picture and the cultural aspects of the native language for its speaker.<sup>180</sup> This is, undoubtedly, manifestation of one of the principles laid down in the works of W. von Humboldt — the connection between individual thinking and social thinking.<sup>181</sup>

In the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, neo-Humboldtians (first of all, J. L. Weisgerber) returned to W. von Humboldt's ideas about the double function of a human being as a bearer of language: the human being is thought of as a member of the linguistic community, but also as an individual, manifesting his/her spiritual characteristics through speech activity.<sup>182</sup> Due to their research, the interest to such concepts reflecting different aspects of the "linguistic world picture" as *Weltansicht*, *Weltgestaltung*, *Weltbild* returns.<sup>183</sup> So, let us move from the connection of the analyzed aspects of *Weltanschauung* and *Weltansicht* of the single concept of *worldview* to the associated concepts of *ideology* and *world picture*, respectively.

## 2.1.2. Ideology

Traditionally, the emergence of the very concept of ideology is associated with the name of A. Destutt de Tracy. He was influenced by E. B. Condillac and P. J. G. Cabanis, who laid the foundations of philosophical materialism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century; following Condillac, who, with the help of the method characteristic of his philosophy, built a unified system of knowledge about the world on the basis of strict principles of empiricism,<sup>184</sup> he sought to create a "science of sciences", an interconnected system of ideas about the surrounding reality. By *ideology* he

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup> Underhill J. W. Creating Worldviews: Metaphor, Ideology and Language. Edinburgh, 2011. P. 77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> Humboldt W. von. On the Difference in the Structure of Human Languages and its Influence on the Spiritual

Development of Mankind // Humboldt W. von. Collected Works in Linguistics. Moscow, 2000. P. 51. (*In Russian*). <sup>182</sup> Weisgerber J. L. Mother Tongue and The Formation of Spirit. Moscow, 2004. P. 142 ff. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>183</sup> Boroday S. Yu. Language and Cognition: An Introduction to Postrelativism. Moscow, 2020. Pp. 37—39. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup> Vide: Boguslavsky V. M. Condillac. Moscow, 1984. Pp. 110—111. (*In Russian*). For Condillac himself, the foundation of such a system is an empirical study of nature, vide: Condillac E. B. Treatise on Systems // Condillac E. B. Works: in 3 vols. Moscow, 1982. 2 vol., pp. 9—10. (*In Russian*).

understood the study of how ideas arise, how human consciousness works, and what are the objective principles of true knowledge: "<...> so long as certainty has been reached as to the origin of our ideas, then everything we say afterwards about the way we express these ideas, combine them, teach them, govern our feelings and actions, and guide the feelings and actions of others, will be nothing but the consequences of these original truths, built on stable and unchanging foundations drawn from the very nature of our being. For these primordial truths form what is called ideology in the proper sense of the word".<sup>185</sup> The program of the ideologists was opposed to the program of rationalist inquiry, which rested on the deductive logic of the truth of the initial principles. Moreover, ideology, which Destutt de Tracy himself understood as "a part of zoology",<sup>186</sup> turned out to be a synthetic project, which sought to bring the various disciplines and branches of knowledge of the age of Enlightenment to epistemological unity.<sup>187</sup> Empirically biased ideologists were extremely popular in revolutionary France, which was also because of the pedagogical orientation of their work. S. S. Gogotsky in his Philosophical Lexicon reports that "[in] this age (of Enlightenment. — A. L.) ideology was everywhere, even at the theater and in novels, although the school of ideologists has not yet received a definite development. Ideology, in terms of the school, appears only together with the French Revolution, acts together with it and strengthens together. Whereas the revolution defends political freedom, ideology gathers the fruits of mental freedom".188

After the fall of Napoleon's empire, the fame of the ideologists and their teachings declined. However, the most important consequence of their activities was the introduction of the very concept of *ideology* into the philosophical thesaurus with all its attendant connotations. Already K. Marx and F. Engels in their 1846 work *German Ideology* sharply contrast various *ideologies* with the science of *history*, as if they were historically past worldview types or private and erroneous views: "<...>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>185</sup> Destutt de Tracy A.-L.-C. The Foundation of Ideology. Ideology in its Own Sense. Moscow, 2013. Pp. 171—172. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>186</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>187</sup> Lanin D. A. Translator's Foreword // Ibid., p. 12. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup> Gogotsky S. S. Philosophical Lexicon. Kyiv, 1857. 2 vol., p. 770. (In Russian).

morality, religion, metaphysics and other kinds of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness lose the appearance of independence. They have no history, they have no development <...>".<sup>189</sup> In this work, the authors make eloquent use of the concept of *ideology*, applying it to the political and social analysis of the collective views of a particular social group on the processes occurring in society and — more broadly — in the entire history of humankind. Actually, in Marxist terms, ideology produces precisely the generalizing, systematizing effect that the French materialists had in mind. As we have seen, French poststructuralists tended to understand *Weltanschauung* in a similar sense. Thus, *ideology* and *worldview* conceptually converge, creating by that special discursive links not so much with the humanities as with various manifestations of real politics (as M. Foucault's analysis of the disciplinary practices of prison, clinic, and mental hospital, or J. Derrida's original studies of writing and logocentrism).

The point is that universal history (which for the young Marx was the only science: "We know only one science, the science of history")<sup>190</sup> is divided, according to the author of *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, into two interrelated parts: the history of nature and the history of people. Actually, in this point Marx, as the heir of the Enlightenment, continues to develop the idea of E. Condillac, the predecessor of French ideologists, who believed that there is no science other than the history of nature (although the French philosopher proposed a division of this science different to that of Marx).<sup>191</sup> Science deals with the history of nature, while""<...> almost all ideology is reduced either to a perverse understanding of this history [i.e., the history of people — *A. L.*], or to a complete abstraction from it".<sup>192</sup> "The history itself is a *valid* part of the *history of nature*, of the becoming of nature by man," — the philosopher asserted in his early work.<sup>193</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>189</sup> Marx K., Engels F. German Ideology // Marx K. Economical-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and Other Early Philosophical Writings. Moscow, 2010. P. 403. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>190</sup> Ibid., p. 391 (note).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>191</sup> Condillac E. B. On the Art of Reasoning // Condillac E. B. Works: in 3 vols. Moscow, 1982. 3 vol., pp. 6 ff. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup> Marx K., Engels F. German Ideology // Marx K. Economical-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and Other Early Philosophical Writings. Moscow, 2010. P. 391—392, прим. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>193</sup> Marx K. Economical-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 // Ibid., p. 355.

Thus, by ideology, the young Marx understands the abstract in Hegelian terms propositions and phrases that are inherent in the engaged spokesmen of the respective class interests. At the same time, being quite inaccurate, not strict in their word usage, these ideologies fulfill the function of integrative discursive practices expressing the entirety of the world picture of a given collective subject.

This historical-philosophical remark clarifies the question of why *ideology* turns out to be a much more developed and better-studied concept. The key to solving this question could be found in an interesting methodological move, quite characteristic of the Humanities, which is found already in Plato. In the second book of *The Republic*, Socrates proposes to transfer the study of the question of justice to a concrete example, which would show all the inherent characteristics of justice without additional strain of mind (368d).<sup>194</sup> Socrates likens this method to writing in large letters, which allows one to read what is written without difficulty at first, and then to move on to smaller words, if only they are equivalent. Such a methodological move could well be regarded as a trick, if it had not been offered an anthropological basis, which is discovered in his theory of alienation by Russian scholars of Marx's early philosophy, K. N. Lyubutin and A. A. Koryakovtsev. From their perspective, because of the division of labor, social classes arise, which are not free from interand inner-class contradictions, and class and group goals and interests express different ideologies.<sup>195</sup> At the same time, it is clear that since human being is an integral and logically necessary form in the unfolding of natural history, a science of the humans is not only possible, but this science can and must be as accurate as other natural sciences. This is guite expressed by the worldview postulate from the German Ideology: "It is not consciousness that determines life, but life determines consciousness".<sup>196</sup> Consequently, it is ideologies that are nothing but reflections of true, objectively existing formations in the materialistically understood science of history, and it is these ideologies that have a transitory character in comparison with

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> Plato. Republic // Plato. Dialogues. Book Two. Moscow, 2008. P. 144. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>195</sup> Lyubutin K. N., Koryakovtsev A. A. K. Marx's Manuscripts // Marx K. Economical-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and Other Early Philosophical Writings. Moscow, 2010. P. 759–760. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>196</sup> Marx K., Engels F. German Ideology // Ibid., p. 403.

precise and rigorous comprehensive knowledge. Noteworthy is that the Soviet Marxist philosophers argues that it is possible to create a scientific ideology that would represent "the highest achievement of the scientific study of the social and historical process". At the same time, K. Marx and F. Engels themselves were proclaimed creators of "scientific philosophy and scientific worldview, the content of which is not exhausted by philosophy".<sup>197</sup>

It is obvious that, as in the case of the concept of *worldview* (further we will see that this is also true for *the world picture*), the predicate scientific performs the function of a politically significant connotator. The point is that the text of T. I. Oizerman quoted by us also hides a certain contradiction within itself. On the one hand, the scientific worldview, under the rubric of which Marxism passes, is declared to be science (and even "scientific ideology"), but for the author this is not the same as ideology in Marxist terms:

The denial of philosophy as a worldview turns out to be a very contradictory theoretical position. <...> All philosophy is a worldview, although a worldview is not necessarily a philosophy: there are religious worldviews, atheistic worldviews, etc. <...> We speak of feudal, bourgeois, communist worldviews. Marxism as a whole is a certain worldview <...>. Depending on the nature of beliefs <...> types of worldviews <...> are distinguished. The orienting function of a worldview is possible due to its integrating function, i.e. such a kind of generalization of knowledge, experience, needs, which makes it possible to outline relatively distant goals, justify certain sociopolitical, moral, scientific ideals, criteria, etc.<sup>198</sup>

At first glance, it would seem that what is proposed here is to treat the Marxist worldview as a metaposition, i.e., a view distanced from transient historical conditions that always advocates unified and unchanging principles (in science, ethics, economic or political relations, etc.). However, it is obvious that any principles articulated in science bear the stamp of time and of certain worldviews in the atmosphere in which they were derived. On the other hand, we can say that when

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>197</sup> Oizerman T. I. The Problems of Historical-Philosophical Science. Mocsow, 1982. P. 244. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>198</sup> Ibid., c. 139—140.

we call Marxism a worldview, we mean to redeem the society of classes, which, as we know, are the bearers of ideology as their "collective consciousness". But even here a contradiction arises, since Marxism is understood as the only correct scientific worldview, however, opposing itself to non-Marxist (or, which is the same thing in this case, non-Soviet) science. Does this mean that the notorious political component of the Party's and government's leadership in linguistics and genetics is important here — or should we, as Marx's scholars point out, understand the meaning of communism primarily in economic rather than political terms?<sup>199</sup> If we speak of the political meaning of communism, we are inevitably confronted with the struggle between political groups and the bearers of a certain group consciousness, i.e. ideology, but if we understand it primarily in economic terms, then the possibility arises of detaching the Marxist view from specific economic formations, justifying it as a scientific position.

In other words, the connotator "scientific" in the concept of "worldview" or "ideology" unconditionally indicates only that we are dealing with a political construct, while the other meanings are the subject of discussion. Subsequently, the phenomenon of ideological meanings generating numerous connotators and creating their own worlds with special sign systems ("mythologies") was investigated by R. Barthes in his works. He pointed out that myth is a universal form in which any ideas or doctrines can be presented.<sup>200</sup> Similar views were also expressed by M. Eliade, linking the development of consumer society with its endless advertising images with myth-making activity. Thus, he saw an immediate connection between the "semi-philosophical ideologies and fantasies" of Modern European philosophers of the 12<sup>th</sup>—19<sup>th</sup> centuries, who one or another proposed a threefold scheme of the development of history and society (he considers the stages of this influence from Gioacchino da Fiore to Lessing and through him to the sensimonists, Comte, German classicists and D. S. Merezhkovsky), and variations on the theme of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>199</sup> Lyubutin K. N., Koryakovtsev A. A. K. Marx's Manuscripts // Marx K. Economical-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and Other Early Philosophical Writings. Moscow, 2010. P. 766. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>200</sup> Barthes R. Myth Today // Barthes R. Selected Works: Semiotics. Poetics. Moscow, 1994. P. 72. (In Russian).

myth of universal renewal.<sup>201</sup> He also analyzes the various ideologies of totalitarian states and the culture of consumer society from the standpoint of analyzing the mythological attitudes hidden in them. Proceeding from the fact that "[s]ome aspects and functions of mythological thinking form an important component of the human being itself",<sup>202</sup> Eliade analyzes the themes of "return to origins", "noble origin" and the myth of the noble hero, which at the ideological level were developed in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries by the representatives and theoreticians of diverse political systems. In addition, he reveals the manifestation of mythological thinking in the practices of modern consumer society, from advertising and mass media to contemporary art. A contemporary and witness of the formation of totalitarian regimes in Europe, philosopher B. Russell was also inclined to compare the spread of political ideologies together with intrinsic intolerance comparable to how the religious doctrines used to spread.<sup>203</sup> N. A. Berdyaev metaphorically calls heterogeneous and different in their nature political ideologies, which rose in early 20<sup>th</sup> century, "dictatorships of worldview" and connects their emergence and successful propaganda in the 1920s-30s with the technologization of the life of social masses.<sup>204</sup> It is noteworthy that Berdyaev contrasts the technogenic ideologies of his time with the natural worldview of the Middle Ages, and this contrast reveals a conceptual opposition to the total scientificity of modernity with its expression in machine technology and the creative religious mysticism of Christianity.

The emergence of ideological interpretations not only of philosophy or science, but also of religion is not accidental at all: for example, L. Stevenson points out the similarity between Marxism and Christianity from the point of view that the values and principles of these doctrines are expressed in social institutions and the way of life of large social groups. He also refers to political doctrines:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>201</sup> Eliade M. The Aspects of Myth. Moscow, 2010. Pp. 178–179. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>202</sup> Ibid., pp. 180 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>203</sup> Russell B. New Hopes for a Changing World. London, 1951. P. 125–126.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>204</sup> Berdyaev N. A. Man's Fate the Current World. To the Understanding of Our Age // Berdyaev N. A. Philosophy of Free Spirit. Moscow, 1994. P. 333. (*In Russian*).

Some of these views, as was the case with Christianity and Marxism, find expression in human communities and institutions. In this case, they turn out to be not just intellectual theories, but a way of life subject to change, development and decline. A system of ideas about human nature that is shared by a particular group of people as the basis of their way of life is usually called an ideology. Christianity and Marxism are certainly ideologies in these terms; and even value subjectivism can, as noted earlier, provide an ideological basis for political liberalism. Thus, an ideology is more than a theory, but it involves some theoretical conception of human nature.<sup>205</sup>

Noteworthy is that another source (with reference to T. Geiger), which also notes the importance and significant influence of Marx's view of ideology, says the same thing: "All metaphysical and theological concepts in which the metaphysical or religious original feeling is clothed in the (inadequate) form of a cognitive statement are 'ideological' from the very beginning".<sup>206</sup> The closeness of religion to ideology in the cognitive-practical relation to the world is also noted by some Russian scholars.<sup>207</sup>

It should also be mentioned that in recent decades, both in foreign and Russian literature, the study of the history of political languages, developed for the first time within the framework of the "Cambridge method" in the study of the history of ideas, has been increasingly developed.<sup>208</sup> Based on the works of R. Koselleck, P. Koslowski and A. O. Lovejoy,<sup>209</sup> Q. Skinner, J. Pocock, M. Richter, J. Tully and others seek to justify and demonstrate with the help of historical and philosophical approach how ideology is legitimized in the texts of the corresponding epoch. In this regard, they treat the very notion of ideology as a special form of linguistic practice. These historians of ideas see their task in clarifying the nature of discursive practices that constitute specific forms of power relations in history. In their opinion, this

Cambridge School: theory and Practice of Intellectual History. Moscow, 2018. P. 7. (*In Russian*). Also vide: Lvov A. A. The Specificity of Historical-Philosophical Research in the Humanities // Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Filosofiya i Konfliktologiya. 2021. Vol. 37. № 3. Pp. 449—463. Pp. 453—454. (*In Russian*). <sup>209</sup> On the development of the method of basic concepts of history (Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe) vide: Richter M. Opening a Dialogue and Recognizing an Achievement: A Washington Conference on the "Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe" // Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. 1996. Vol. 39. P. 19—26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>205</sup> Stevenson L. Ten Theories of Human Nature. Moscow, 2004. P. 20. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>206</sup> Philosophical Dictionary. Moscow, 1961. P. 243. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>207</sup> Bogatyryov D. K. Religions and Ideologies. St. Petersburg, 2019. P. 71. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>208</sup> Atnashev T., Velizhev M. Cambridge School: History and Method // Atnashev T., Velizhev M. (eds.),

approach allows us to show that "even within the philosophical tradition it was recognized that political society was, when viewed in the concrete, a secular and consequently a time-bound phenomenon".<sup>210</sup> It should be noted that in the light of this methodology the very concept of *ideology* is deprived of any evaluative characterization and essentially means the language established, shared and practiced by the majority of specific authors in a given age. However, a number of historical and philosophical examples have shown that various practices of knowledge can be formed also under the influence of certain political ideologies: for example, in the history of Russian philosophy, knowledge was formed not so much as a result of the systematic study of the Western European tradition as (and to a greater extent) in the polemics of ideological currents in connection with their attitude to ideological problems.<sup>211</sup>

Thus, it is clear that the concept of *ideology* is related to the concept of *worldview* in the aspect that, like *worldview*, it also claims to be inclusive and expresses knowledge about the world in its unity. However, if *worldview* always points to its bearer, i.e. by nature it is subjective, *ideology* is always focused on the person as an object and, accordingly, does not need the subjective role of its bearer. In the case of ideology, we deal first of all with the transformation of the entire surrounding reality into the world of things, the world of objects and instances, and this transformation is always connected with the historical conditions of existence of this or that social group or society as a whole. However, this does not exclude the emotional component: as E. Gentile notes, "[i]deology is not only some logical, rational calculations similar to a philosophical system or a scientific theory. In every ideology there is emotion, there is something mythological as well as normative and purely logical; every ideology has a practical and not only a theoretical meaning; every ideology sets a certain model of behavior rather than proposing a method of knowledge".<sup>212</sup> In these terms, we see that both ideology and worldview are aimed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>210</sup> Pocock J. G. A. The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton NJ, 1975. P. 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>211</sup> Bystrov V. Yu., Kamnev V. M. Historians of Philosophy and Ideology: Russian Experience // Studia Culturae. 2019. № 41. Pp. 18–30. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>212</sup> Gentile E. Fascism. History and Interpretation. St. Petersburg, 2022. P. 147. (In Russian).

at a certain way of articulating the world, although the directions of their actions occur differently.

### 2.1.3. The World Picture

The concept of *the world picture* was conceptualized at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup>— 20<sup>th</sup> centuries within the framework of sciences. Its author is considered to be the physicist H. Hertz, who under this term understood "a set of internal images of external objects, from which it is possible to obtain information about the behavior of these objects by logical means".<sup>213</sup> Later on, A. Einstein, M. Planck and other scientists actively participated in its development, striving on the basis of their research to develop and propose a unified, even universal world picture, which would consistently cover all ideas about the physical universe. Thus, M. Planck in his speech at his inauguration as rector of the University of Berlin on October 15, 1913, said that in the basis of any honest and laborious search for the truth of nature must necessarily lie a strong faith in its comprehensibility, in the fact that a person is able to comprehend the laws of the universe and accurately describe them. As long as we are unable to provide a comprehensive world picture that would reflect all existing ideas about the structure of the universe, we should "fill this void", into which science has not yet penetrated, with the help of "practical reason": "A worldview that can be called scientific can be so constructed that it will be able to withstand any onslaught as long as it [o]nly contains internal contradictions and is consistent with experiential data".<sup>214</sup>

Subsequently, the concept of *the world picture* spread in the Humanities. This was greatly facilitated by the activity of W. Dilthey. Dilthey, who is credited with the consolidation of this concept in the philosophical dictionary. It was he who believed that metaphysics as a dogmatic doctrine of transcendent entities contributes

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>213</sup> Yartseva K. V. The Concept of "World Picture". Adaptive Function of the World Picture // Vestnik Pomorskogo universiteta. Seria: Gumanitarnye i sotsial'nye nauki. 2010. № 4. Pp. 87—90. P. 87. (*In Russian*). <sup>214</sup> Planck M. New Ways in Physical Studies // Pod znamenem marksizma. 1923. №1. Pp. 72—82. P. 81. (*In Russian*).

to the formation of a unified image of the world: "By metaphysics we understand a form of philosophy which treats the world whole, defined in relation to the vital element [of a human being], as if it were an objectivity independent of this vital element. <...> The conjugation of unity, interrelationship, substance with its accidents, essence in accidental multiplicity, contained in the world picture, are treated as if these concepts were perfectly clear expressions of objective relations".<sup>215</sup>

In general, this concept usually refers to a broad and conventional context of some objectively formed views, in relation to which the individual acts as an active subject — a recipient. However, a human being perceives exactly what has been independently accumulated; that is why the world picture appears as a sphere of fixed stars, which the ancients thought of as a boundary between the sublunar and supralunar worlds. It should reflect the established ideas about reality, and such reflection should be perceived like constantly changing images in a kaleidoscope, which, however, once falling out, make a certain unity of their definite (and therefore recognizable) forms. Of course, we cannot help mentioning the attempts to distinguish the concept of the world picture from the concept of worldview. In particular, the most important distinction is that *the world picture* "represents the totality of worldview knowledge about the world, 'the totality of the subject content possessed by man' (Jaspers). It is possible to distinguish a sensual-spatial world picture, spiritual-cultural, metaphysical. They also speak about physical, biological, philosophical pictures of the world".<sup>216</sup> Worldview was thought of as something more personal, individual, psychologically rooted in the inner world of a person.

In this point we approach the anthropological dimension of the concept of *the world picture*, which was pointed out by M. Heidegger. In his famous article *The Age of the World Picture* (*Die Zeit des Weltbildes*) he connects the dominance of Modern European science with the emergence of ideas about the proportionality of the humans to the world revealed to them: "The main process of the Modern Age is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>215</sup> Cit.: Plotnikov N. S. Life and History. Wilhelm's Dilthey's Philosophical Program. Moscow, 2000. P. 185. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>216</sup> Philosophical Dictionary. Moscow, 1961. P. 278. (In Russian).

the conquest of the world as a picture. The word 'picture' means now: the construct of a defining representation. Man struggles here for the position of such a being, which gives measure and prescribes a norm to all things".<sup>217</sup> Heidegger's usage of the word "being" (Seiende) in relation to both human and that which constitutes the world points to the special way of being of the Modern European person. On the one hand, such a person perceives the world as a perspective order, as a computable juxtaposition of things unfolding before him/her as an observer; this is also how the artist acts, beginning with the Renaissance to create, recreating a world ordered by the mathematical principles of perspective. On the other hand, he/she him/herself becomes an integral part of this world, being subject as an entity to the principle that orders the world. This principle is perfectly manifested when we speak about the diversity of world pictures — especially, perhaps, in relation to the human, it is noticeable when we speak about the biological (or natural) world picture, represented by the grandiose classification of living beings by Linnaeus and Lamarck. Max Scheler wrote about the same desire to master nature and assert his dominance over it in his 1926 work Knowledge and Labor. He connected human domination over nature with human confidence in their position in the world as a place of action of elements and processes beyond his control: "As a consequence of the orientation of our life process, we can only wish to master nature as deeply as it determines in the course of its development by means of a directly practically graspable *causa efficiens*. And until it is there, we have only to wait to see what happens...".<sup>218</sup> Here we approach the important conjecture that a coherent world picture acts as a certain epistemological utopia that is found in the human lifeworld. The projection of the body of laws of nature as epistemological certainty onto a constantly moving and shifting world makes it not only predictable but also ontologically safe. It is in the metaphysical oblivion of language, in the refusal to move in its wake, that Heidegger saw the lack of risk in the search for truth.<sup>219</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>217</sup> Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg., 2007. P. 72. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>218</sup> Cit.: Philosophical Encyclopaedical Dictionary. Moscow, 2003. P. 365. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>219</sup> Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 304—305. (In Russian).

Noteworthy is that *the world picture* as a concept has acquired specific connotations and purely linguistic semantics in linguistics.<sup>220</sup> As mentioned above, in many respects this concept began to be correlated with the concept of *worldview* after the works of W. von Humboldt, and then — through the active and uncritical use of the concept of *Weltanschauung* by B. L. Whorf. Taking into account the specificity of Humboldt's own usage of the concept of *Ansicht*, his reasoning about the grammatical picture of language should be recognized as a theoretical development of his thesis that language fully manifests the national character and essence of a particular nation. Thus, he argues that grammar in language

provides the purely intellectual endeavor with a firm foundation through the division of concepts formed in it and labeled by it in the distinction of their categories and their transformations within each of them. It contributes to the lively rise of poetic forces through its inherent mode of symbolization and through the variety and freedom of expression for every kind of connection of thought. It influences, finally, the musical sense through the precise definition of longitude and accent, through the dimensionality of connected speech and the rhythm of unconnected speech.<sup>221</sup>

All those features that we associate with the linguistic means of expression, with the semantic and aesthetic uniqueness of languages, are conditioned by the grammatical system, which shapes the thinking of the speakers of a language and, consequently, develops the spiritual and intellectual forces of a nation. To this we must add that grammar, according to Humboldt, also acts as "the organ[s] by means of which language achieves its highest aims, not merely in the designation of concepts, but also in accompanying coherent thought in its movement, in the instantaneous change of its direction and in all its turns, so as to ensure its structuredness, its need for a correlative subordination of concepts".<sup>222</sup> That is why the analysis of syntax is so important in grammatical studies, because it is with its

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>220</sup> Vide e.g.: Valeeva D. R. The Concepts of "World Picture", "Conceptual World Picture" and "Linguistic World Picture" in Conceptual Studies // Filologicheskiy aspekt. 2018. № 3 (35). Pp. 63—69. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>221</sup> Cit.: Lobanova L. P. Grammatical Picture of Language, Thinking and Spiritual Development of the People in the Conception of W. von Humboldt // Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seria 9: Filologiya. 2014. № 4. Pp. 75—89. P. 77. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>222</sup> Ibid., p. 82.

help the development of creative application of linguistic means, and thus the perfection of the spiritual development of the nation is achieved.

It is interesting to compare these linguistic studies with the way philosophical and anthropological thought developed in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The development of the idea of universalism and particularism as methods of research of cultures and spiritual life of nations has yielded interesting fruits in this respect. Following W. Dilthey, the position that particularism is an important methodological attitude in historical research was developed by E. Rothacker. The essence of this view consists in recognizing history as a means by which the spirit cognizes itself in its individual manifestations (for example, in the history of a particular country, people or national culture). It is commonly said that such an approach is essentially based on the position of historicism; indeed, E. Rothacker linked historicism and the method of individuation — in this regard, P. Koslowski remarks: "Therefore 'life" and 'history' have something in common: in both, not general ideals, but particular ideals are affirmed: ideals that refer to time, that refer to particular living masses... The deepest root of historicism is not in its will to practice history alone, but in its insight that the particular creative realizations of human practice must be 'individual', that is, that they must always and with necessity refer to the particular tasks of particular communities".<sup>223</sup> Although such a view leads ultimately to cultural relativism, this should not be seen as a negative side-effect at all. On the contrary, the development of the popular spirit (Volksgeist) in certain historical circumstances (Zeitgeist) is actually the individualization of a particular culture. In this way, special historicallyconcrete universals, or totality, emerge, each of which has its own surrounding world, or environment (Umwelt).

A person turns out to be both the bearer of such totality and its creator, just as it happens in Humboldt's linguistic anthropology. Therefore, it is correct to speak of a special historicist (which would also mean cultural) world picture, where a particular culture in its historical conditions plays the role of a paradigm in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>223</sup> Cit.: Koslowski P. A Philosophy of a Historical School: Erich Rothacker's Theory of the Geisteswissenschaften (Human Sciences) // Methodology of the Social Sciences, Ethics and Economics in the Newer Historical School. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1997. P. 517—518.

accordance with which man carries out his spiritual and practical activities. In this case, the world picture itself — whether it is a language, a historical and cultural formation, or certain natural-scientific views — fulfills the same role as the first image ( $\pi \alpha \rho \alpha \delta \epsilon_{1} \gamma \mu \alpha$ ) in the work of the demiurge in Plato's *Timaeus*. It is true that the demiurge uses only a perfect and unchanging primordial image in the creation of the world (28a-b),<sup>224</sup> but this is his divine essence; the human essence, both in relation to culture and language, is initially determined by history and the peculiarities of the national character. This, incidentally, is an important point of contact between Humboldt's views and Rothacker's historicism: "[The language is] the organ of inner being, even of this being itself, insofar as it achieves, step by step, inner clarity and outer realization. It is, therefore, connected by all the finest threads of its roots with the power of the national spirit, and the stronger the influence of the spirit on language, the more natural and richer the development of the latter. In all its complex weave, it is only a product of the linguistic consciousness of the nation, and therefore the main questions about the origins and inner life of language <...>. In general, it is impossible to properly answer without rising to the point of spiritual power and national identity".<sup>225</sup>

Thus, the concept of *the world picture* refers to the epistemologically important paradigmatic function of our cognitive abilities. It is also related to our ability to orient ourselves in the world and in history, playing the role of a universal pattern, according to which human beings act and think as subjects in specific historical, cultural, linguistic, natural conditions. By its very nature, *the world picture* makes us modern (we emphasized this temporal aspect in connection with Fichte's discussion of world perspectives) because it refers to historical and cultural concreteness; it is in these terms that we speak of the predominantly Modern European nature of its emergence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>224</sup> Plato. Timaeus // Plato. Dialogues. Book Two. Moscow, 2008. P. 469. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>225</sup> Humboldt W. von. On the Difference in the Structure of Human Languages and its Influence on the Spiritual Development of Mankind // Humboldt W. von. Collected Works in Linguistics. Moscow, 2000. P. 47. (*In Russian*).

## 2.1.4. Summary

We have considered the logical specificities of the concepts associated with the concept of *worldview*. Although we do not aim to strictly distinguish one concept from another and admit that in certain contexts they may overlap or be interchangeable, nevertheless, it is important for us to point out those points of contact that make these concepts comparable at all.

Firstly, this series of concepts asserts the necessity of the subject as the bearer or recipient of a worldview. Regardless of what the semantic features of these concepts are, they are in a certain way associated with a certain proponent, who realizes them in his or her practice. Interestingly, these concepts can indeed be interchangeable. For example, Hegel in his lectures on aesthetics spoke about various worldviews as the artistic and creative originality of this or that author.<sup>226</sup> L. Althusser links creative search with the ideological context that the author (artist or playwright) reconstructs in his/her work.<sup>227</sup> But in any case, a subject is needed who turns out to be the bearer of these worldview or ideological attitudes, or who shares this or that world picture.

Secondly, each of the set of these concepts seeks to represent one or another way of grasping the world as a hitherto disparate variety. In this case, the *worldview* may be related to creative impulses or to the psychological properties of a person's orientation in reality; the *ideology* may be a collective way of relating to a given reality, the subject of expression of which is a class or a certain collective; the *world picture* is important to the one who accepts it on the basis of recognizing the truth of the principles of its construction — and in these terms we can speak of a plurality of world pictures. However, in all these cases, the subject is involved in the maintenance of this unity of the world, he/she takes an active part in the maintenance of its integrity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>226</sup> Hegel G. W. F. Lectures on Aesthetics. St. Petersburg, 2007. Vol. I. Pp. 609-614. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>227</sup>Vide: Althusser L. On Art. Moscow, 2019. Pp. 68—96. (In Russian).

Thirdly, the concepts of *worldview*, *ideology* and *world picture* imply conceptual equality of their subjects. Diving into the history of the concept of *worldview*, we will see that it implied the identification of its proponents with each other as early as in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Those who defended or proclaimed the corresponding worldview or ideological statements spoke out insofar as they could be heard and understood by their associates. This does not mean that at a certain point in time a certain group of people thought exactly the same way; rather, it is a question of the way of interpreting certain statements, which made it possible to recognize in the speaker one's own or another's. This is an important observation because it problematizes the notion of what it means to share a particular worldview, ideology, or world picture at the anthropological level — and this, in turn, takes the concept of *worldview* beyond the narrow confines of Modern European philosophical culture.

Fourthly, it is acknowledged that every worldview, as well as every ideology, and after the scientific revolutions of the 16<sup>th</sup>—18<sup>th</sup> centuries — and the world picture, has a pronounced historical character. Essentially, there are no extrahistorical worldviews or ideologies; there are no epistemologically satisfactory worldviews or ideologies, which would be established once and for all and would not undergo any subsequent changes. This is due, on the one hand, to the evolving positive sciences, to the fact that our set of knowledge is constantly changing, but, on the other hand, our interpretation of the world around us is also becoming an important factor. In this point, our study converges with the project of the theory of interpretation proposed by D. Davidson and originally developed by R. Rorty. According to this project, any language, be it natural human language or the language of science, is artificial and relative. There is nothing behind the statements in different languages except the correspondences that the speakers themselves construct in specific situations.<sup>228</sup> Following this theory, we can say that the Modern Europeans' intention to dominate over nature, which Scheler and Heidegger (among

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>228</sup> Vide: Nikonenko S. V. Analytical Philosophy: Basic Conceptions. St. Petersburg, 2007. Pp. 354—355. (*In Russian*).

others) spoke about, makes them constantly reassemble the world around historically and culturally conditioned meaning structures.

## 2.2. The Paradigm Analysis of Worldview

The history of philosophy is often either identified with philosophy, because that is how philosophy was taught in higher education, or recognized as the scientific hypostasis of philosophy proper. Nevertheless, such a view is a relatively recent acquisition of our educational system. As early as F. W. J. Schelling, in his Lectures on the Method of University Education, saw the main task of teaching philosophy as revealing to his students the "organic Whole of science" and determining the inner aspiration and orientation of his cognition as a scientist engaged in a special discipline to the "totality of cognition".<sup>229</sup> In addition, from Schelling's perspective, the teaching of philosophy should strengthen morality and statehood, that is counteracted by everyday reason, which "through false and superficial culture has degenerated into emasculated, empty resonance and which considers itself, however, absolutely educated".<sup>230</sup> At the same time, however, philosophical inquiry is opposed to all crowding and formulaic ideas, and therefore the philosopher is an opponent of all ochlocracy and immoral behavior, which contributes to the rapprochement of people, and with maximum success - to the unification of the nation (as Fichte dreamed of). In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a fruitful critique of the structures of higher education in relation to the tasks of modern philosophy can be found, in particular, in J. Ortega-y-Gasset, who refuted the popular opinion that the Humanities are needed only for the formation of "general culture" among experts of narrow professional training. He argued that conceptions of culture had changed significantly since the time of medieval universities — universities were now research-oriented, and in this respect their mission should be rethought. He believed

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>229</sup> Schelling F. W. J. Lectures on the Method of University Education. St. Petersburg, 2009. P. 6. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>230</sup> Ibid., p. 46.

that "teaching culture" should be understood as conveying "the system of vital ideas that time has in store. This is the primary task of the university".<sup>231</sup>

And what about now? When analyzing the newly published textbooks on philosophy in Russia today, it turns out that in the Russian literature the idea of paradigmatic heterogeneity of philosophy has been strengthened. In other words, various authors argue that it does not have the formalized status of a science, but breaks up into some separate intellectual directions and conceptual strategies. It is also noted that the recently published textbooks for higher education institutions have another significant shortcoming: "A philosophy textbook should provide answers to the main worldview questions. The point is not even that the authors' position contradicts the data of modern science, but that the textbook should express and justify a certain position".<sup>232</sup> Special attention should be paid to the historical-philosophical component traditionally presented in philosophy textbooks with all the detail and completeness.<sup>233</sup> Is not there a fundamental paradox, connected with the fact that the refusal to express a definite value position of the authors of textbooks is connected with an attempt to avoid any undesirable ideological attitudes, constantly keeping in memory the experience of Soviet educational literature?

An important task is to describe the *paradigmatic image of the worldview* that has emerged so far. By *paradigm analysis* we mean the study of those basic features that make up the most popular image of this or that problem or phenomenon within the framework of "normal science". Here we refer to the principles of paradigm composition as described by T. Kuhn. It is known that the three most important sources that allow a paradigm to acquire its conventional features are textbooks, popular literature, and philosophy. Kuhn says: "All three types of information describe the established achievements of past revolutions and thus reveal the basis of the modern tradition of normal science. To fulfill their function, they do not need

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>231</sup> Ortega y Gasset J. The Mission of University. Minsk, 2005. P. 34. (*In Russian*). Also vide: Polatayko S. V., Lvov A. A. Philosophy and "Naturalistic Approach" in Science // Aktual'nye problem gumanitarnykh i sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh nauk. 2018. Vol. 12. № 4. Pp. 86—89. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>232</sup> Goryunov V. P., Gura V. A. Current Textbooks in Philosophy: An Attempt of Comparative Analysis // Trudy SPbGTU. 2011. №513. Pp. 48—52. P. 50. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>233</sup> Ibid., c. 49.

reliable information about the way in which these foundations were first found and then accepted by professional scientists".<sup>234</sup> In this respect, a paradigm analysis of the current state of worldview in the Humanities will help us not so much to clarify the history of its emergence (since it is irreducible to the history of the concept of *worldview*), as to point out to us the characteristic, typical signs of this "common place" in the Russian as well as foreign social sciences and Humanities.

It should be noted that by introducing certain names we do not mean to indicate the authorship of the positions or arguments that are presented. In the framework of paradigm analysis, we deal mainly with textbooks and encyclopedic publications written by specific specialists, but it is assumed that they present conventional, and in these terms impersonal, theses. An important element in such an analysis is the research of author's generalizations, which, however, cannot reflect the views of any author. Therefore, the paradigm analysis does not imply a substantive discussion; its task is to identify typical features of understanding and interpretation of certain concepts that are firmly embedded in the disciplinary thesaurus.

One of the fundamental problems is the discussion of the relationship of philosophy to worldview and further thematization of the concept of *worldview*. Thus, V. V. Mironov believes that philosophy is one of the forms of worldview, arising from the need of man to cognize the world and his place in it.<sup>235</sup> It is also pointed out that there are three forms of worldview — mythological, religious and philosophical — as well as everyday, so to say, "zero" worldview. <sup>236</sup> Noteworthy is that such an everyday form is not the subject of philosophical study. Rather, we are here confronted with the psychological ability to perceive the world, which is inherent in every human being without regard to his or her historical or cultural conditions of existence. It should be noted that this position about the presence of an initial, pre-reflexive level in the typology of worldviews is quite characteristic and can be traced as a methodological technique already in the context of German

<sup>236</sup> Ibid., pp. 11–16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>234</sup> Kuhn T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Moscow, 2003. P. 180. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>235</sup> Mironov V. V. Philosophy. Moscow, 2010. P. 11. (In Russian).

classical philosophy, for example, in J. G. Fichte's reasoning about the bifurcation of knowledge through itself and its nature, or "splitting of the unified world".<sup>237</sup> Later, this idea would be taken up by existential philosophy through S. Kierkegaard's idea of the world of ordinary people, or, as M. Heidegger would call it, *das Man*.

A. S. Karmin and G. G. Bernatsky propose to identify the following main characteristics of worldview, although they recognize that it is difficult to give a clear definition to the concept:

- firstly, it includes a certain set of general views of a person about the world and his/her place in it;
- secondly, these views are not just knowledge about reality, but are formed beliefs;
- thirdly, worldview determines the orientation of a person, as well as his or her life positions, purpose and meaning of life. Worldview is manifested in the behavior of an individual.

At the same time, the authors specify that there are various types and variants of worldviews, in which these characteristics appear in different ways, as well as mythological, religious, atheistic, developing in struggle with religious, and scientific types of worldviews as examples.<sup>238</sup>

In addition, they claim that there is also a "spontaneous worldview", by which they mean the same thing that was qualified above as "everyday". This view is also devoid of any reflection, or, as our source says, its content does not become the subject of philosophical reflection. The following thought supports this statement: *"[W]orldview function of philosophy consists in the fact that philosophy acts as a means of expression, systematization and justification of worldview, as a theory of solving worldview questions.* The worldview of a person who does not know

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>237</sup> Fichte J. G. Works. St. Petersburg, 2008. Pp. 640-641. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>238</sup> Karmin A. S., Bernatsky G. G. Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 2009. P. 24. (In Russian).

unsystematized" (authors' italics. — A.L.).<sup>239</sup> Thus, we see that worldview, on the one hand, is heterogeneous and there are different types of it, on the other hand, that these types are obtained as a result of the application of philosophy to the order of life of this or that person. Consequently, by doing so, the authors endow philosophy with worldview functions — but not a particular philosophical doctrine or the experience of the life or thought of a particular philosopher, but precisely philosophy as a type of human cultural activity, one of the theoretical disciplines. Of course, this may raise questions about, for example, whether we can speak of the same function in relation to history or biology, or in general, to the sciences or any other theoretical systems. We will deal with these questions in a certain paragraph.

It should be noted that philosophy is not always understood as a theoretical tool for the cultivation of worldview, but the paradigmatic is the recognition of it, according to A. G. Spirkin, as a theoretical core of worldview, "around which formed a kind of spiritual cloud of generalized commonplace views of worldly wisdom, which is a vital level of worldview. But worldview also has a higher level — a generalization of the achievements of science, art, the basic principles of religious views and experience, as well as the finest sphere of moral life of society. In general, it would be possible to give the following definition: *worldview is a generalized system of human (and society) views on the world as a whole, on its own place in it, understanding and evaluation by a person of the meaning of his life and activities, the fate of mankind; a set of generalized scientific, philosophical, socio-political, legal, moral, religious, aesthetic, value orientations, beliefs, convictions and ideals of people" (author's italics. — A.L.).<sup>240</sup>* 

At the same time, the author considers it possible to qualify this or that type of worldview depending on the answer to the basic question of philosophy, and in its formulation proposed by F. Engels.<sup>241</sup> Accordingly, the author proposes two pairs of correlating worldviews: idealistic and materialistic, religious or atheistic. But at the same time the integrity of the proposed division is not maintained, and the author

118

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>239</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>240</sup> Spirkin A. G. Philosophy: A Textbook for Bachelors. Moscow, 2012. Pp. 13–14. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>241</sup> Engels F. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of German Classical Philosophy Moscow, 1989. P. 31. (In Russian).

establishes that the difference between philosophy and worldview lies in the broader scope of the concept of worldview: it also includes its everyday form, while philosophy is theoretical by definition.<sup>242</sup> It is interesting that in another place A. G. Spirkin states that "[t]here are three main types of worldview - worldly (everyday), religious and philosophical".<sup>243</sup> However, he does not give the basis for this typology.

B. V. Markov in his author's textbook also calls the worldview and methodological function of philosophy obvious, and argues that it is philosophy that should play the role of a communicative mediator for various disciplines that are separated from each other in the world of highly specialized knowledge.<sup>244</sup> At the same time, he asks about the essence of philosophy in its worldview aspect: "What is philosophy today: a theoretical form of modern *worldview*; an *ideology* justifying the interests of the ruling class; a *methodology* of scientific cognition; a form of wisdom complementing or competing with religion? <...> The answers to these questions require a rethinking of the image of philosophy, which was formed back in the XIX century and which fulfills a critical function in relation to religion and ideology" (author's italics. — A.L.).<sup>245</sup> It should be noted that here the author refers to historical examples of understanding the essence of philosophy in various philosophical trends: thus, the representatives of the philosophy of life and some neo-Kantians spoke about philosophy as a theoretical form of modern worldview; K. Marx and his followers wrote about its ideological status; positivists considered philosophy in methodological terms; finally, philosophy appears throughout the history of thought, beginning with the philosophizing of Socrates. Applying those approaches to the thematization of our concept, which we have met on other occasions, we could say that here, too, worldview is understood as a certain form of reflection over one's life, over the flow of time in which a person appears from birth to death.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>242</sup> Spirkin A. G. Philosophy: A Textbook for Bachelors. Moscow, 2012. P. 14. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>243</sup> Philosophical Encyclopaedical Dictionary. Moscow, 1989. P. 367. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>244</sup> Markov B. V. Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 2014. C. 9. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>245</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

That the worldview is of extreme importance is noted by T. I. Oizerman :

Any worldview is formed of beliefs. <...> Beliefs are characterized first of all by the energy, persistence, and determination with which they are expressed, justified, defended, and contrasted with other beliefs. From this point of view, a belief does not coincide simply with a statement regarding what is considered true, useful, etc. It is an active stance for or against some other beliefs. <...> These beliefs characterize 1) the essence of natural and social phenomena; 2) people's interested attitudes toward certain phenomena; 3) generalizations that in their significance go beyond the special field of scientific knowledge.<sup>246</sup>

It is important here to point out the special axiological and ethical dominance of the worldview attitude, which is manifested not only in the way an individual sees the world, but also in the fact that he/she is ready and able to accept a different worldview attitude. Besides, any worldview turns out to be the basis for scientific or special disciplinary interpretation of the world or its part; besides strictly scientific knowledge, there are also assumptions, certainty in what (so far) has not (yet) found its convincing proofs, and the like. In general, this kind of ethical aspect of the worldview attitude can be compared with the ideas about the psychological essence of worldview developed by K. Jaspers. He argued that worldview always represents a certain universal integrity, and if we are talking about knowledge, it is not a separate, private knowledge, but in a cosmic, universal sense: "After all, worldview is not just knowledge, it manifests itself in evaluations, in the order of preference of values".<sup>247</sup>

If we summarize the achievements of Russian social scientists, the following list of the most characteristic features or elements of worldview comes to the fore: first, *epistemological* (i.e., relating to the principles of cognition of the world and its laws); second, *axiological* (or value, allowing to distinguish between good and evil and evaluate acts in accordance with the norms); third, *moral* and *volitional* (relating

https://iphlib.ru/library/collection/newphilenc/document/HASH010896462d320b6dff553108?p.s=TextQuery (Access date: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>246</sup> New Philosophical Encyclopedia. [Electronic resourse] — URL:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>247</sup> Jaspers K. Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. Berlin, 1919. S. 1.

to the attitudes and motivations of the individual to act); fourth, *praxiological* (or *behavioral* — determining the behavior of the individual in accordance with his views).<sup>248</sup> It is noteworthy that this structure of worldview is devoid of psychologism and is even of an emphasized epistemological nature. This shows that modern post-Soviet researchers increasingly see worldview as a heuristic potential and associate with it the further development of values and principles, including in the educational environment.<sup>249</sup>

One of the most substantial studies of worldviews in a philosophical way was offered by M. P. Arutyunyan.<sup>250</sup> On the one hand, it is a classical ontological study, taking into account the most notable concepts of mainly foreign, but also domestic predecessors (although they are considered mainly in the genre of doxography).<sup>251</sup> On the other hand, in the book *The Phenomenon of Worldview*, as well as in a number of other publications, the author develops the practical, or pedagogical aspect of the phenomenon of worldview. Thus, it is interpreted in an ontological (subjective-phenomenological) and educational (objective-social) way, which allows us to talk about the conceptual symmetry of the study.

M. P. Arutyunyan's position is based on the fact that worldview as a spiritualpractical construct allows one to effectively orient oneself in the world with the help of various forms of its expression (such as myth, ideal, world picture, utopia, ideology, legend, etc.),<sup>252</sup> and, at the same time, to adapt the external world to the inner world in practice. Therefore, it is proposed to consider worldview as a phenomenon of human consciousness, which explains similar to psychological

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>248</sup> Akinin M. A., Pavlova V. V. The Problem of Philosophy as a Worldview in Contemporary Society // Obshchestvo: filosofiya, istoriya, kul'tura. 2019. № 10 (66). Pp. 21–26. P. 22. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>249</sup> Vide: Kos'kov S. N., Seregina T. V. Principles of Worldview — Principles of Being //Vestnik Tverskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Seria: Filosofiya. 2019. № 1 (47). Pp. 57—69. (*In Russian*); Ryakov E. E. Problems of Formation of Humanistic Worldview of Students in Contemporary School // Obrazovanie v XXI veke. Materialy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii. Mezhdunarodnyi institute professional'nogo razvitiya pedagoga; Irkutskiy gosudarstvennyi universitet; O. M. Kolomiets, M. G. Golubchikova, I. I. Kapalygina, R. K. Kyyakbaeva (eds.). 2019. Pp. 617—620. (*In Russian*).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>250</sup> The further observation of the authors in this paragraph is the development of a review first given in: Lvov A. A. The Current Conceptions of the Worldview Phenomenon // Vestnik Russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii.
 2020. Vol. 21. № 2ю – Pp. 11–23. – P. 14–21. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>251</sup> Vide chapter 1.2 "Historical Formation and Transformation of Meanings of the Concept of 'Worldview'" in: Arutyunyan M. P. The Phenomenon of Worldview. Khabarovsk, 2006. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>252</sup> Ibid., c. 98–99.

formulations of various "worldview functionalities" ("мироощущение" — "world sensation", "мировосприятие" — "world perception", "миропонимание" — "world understanding", "миропреобразование" — "world transformation", etc.). Applying the phenomenological method, M. P. Arutyunyan reveals the following essential characteristics of worldview:

1. it ontologically represents a forming and self-reproducing unity of spiritual and practical aspects of human life and activity;

2. it turns out to be an effective tool of human adaptation to the external world;

3. its ontological nature is ambivalent and allows to encompass the wholeness in its opposite (e.g. mental-visual, rational-intrinsic, scientific-unscientific, etc.);

4. its nature is polyphonic in its types and forms and is characterized by the diversity of views, which is effectively manifested in the dialogue of cultures (in this we see a convergence with the concept of the dialogue of cultures of V. S. Bibler);<sup>253</sup>

5. it is axiological — worldview cognition is never complete, always dynamic, subject to interpretation and creative rethinking;

6. transcendent and everyday "realities of being and thought" collide and combine in it, which allows it to carry out self-regulatory and self-organizing function of the subject to society;

7. it contains the unity of practical and theoretical attitudes of life activity, cognition and ordering of the world by a person.<sup>254</sup>

In a number of publications, M. P. Arutyunyan develops and discusses the problem of worldview mainly in an educational context.<sup>255</sup> Here two important tendencies of its research converge: the first one is connected with the practical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>253</sup> Ibid., c. 36—37.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>254</sup> Arutyunyan M. P. The Concept of Worldview: A Phenomenological Approach // Sotsial'nye i gumanitarnye nauki na Dal'nem Vostoke, 2008, № 3 (19). Pp. 11—21. Pp. 20—21. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>255</sup> Arutyunyan M. P. The Idea of "Corporate Spirit" in Education: A Methodological Approach // Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. 2006. № 2. Pp. 78—82. (*In Russian*); Arutyunyan M. P. Worldviews and Education: The Emergence of a New Paradigm // Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. 2004. № 12. Pp. 32–37. (*In Russian*); Arutyunyan M. P. Worldview: The Ontological Foundations of "Paideia" // Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. 2006. No 12. Pp. 66–71. (*In Russian*); Arutyunyan M. P. Worldview Problems of Humanizing the School. Teacher — Student: An Invitation to Reflection. Khabarovsk, 1998. (*In Russian*).

aspect of worldview, and the second one manifests itself in the characterization of modernity as a period of deep worldview crisis, which "consists of the obvious fact that none of the existing worldviews does not meet the current challenges, the increased pace and rhythms of social transformations, globalization of social life, the aggravation of the key contradictions of the era, threatening humanity with destruction". <sup>256</sup> As a result, self-identification of members of various communities and human adaptation in the world become more difficult, and thus human alienation increases.<sup>257</sup> This statement is characteristic of works that comprehend the qualitative change of the world and denounce the devaluation of the former position of man in it. Started as a criticism of bourgeois society and way of thinking by K. Marx and M. Stirner, this trend has been developing continuously and was taken up by many philosophers and sociologists of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> — early 21<sup>st</sup> centuries, like P. Bourdieu, M. Castells, D. Bell, J. Baudrillard, A. Badiou, and others.

Discussing the practical aspect of worldview in education, M. P. Arutyunyan points to the paradoxical character that the subject of education acquires in it:

This paradox declares itself with sufficient obviousness in the present, although it has its origins in distant history, characterizing the Way and the established states of human existence. In this regard, the paradox of worldview in the conditions of modernity can be formulated as follows: *in human education a person forms a worldview that fits into the world, however, in the real forms of being, education does not utilize its (worldview) essential potential* (author's italics. — *A.L.*).<sup>258</sup>

In other words, the characteristics of worldview, obtained in the course of phenomenological research, are on the periphery of attention of the modern consumer-production society. Worldview forms a microcosm in a person, and a person in turn finds himself in the macrocosm of the world around him. But the creative and internally integral human being, the formation of which is the goal of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>256</sup> Arutynyan M. P. The Phenomenon of Worldview. Khabarovsk, 2006. P. 146. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>257</sup> Ibid., p. 147.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>258</sup> Ibid., p. 133.

education (understood as the practice of "paideia"),<sup>259</sup> is not in demand. The tragedy of modernity, therefore, is that "[i]n the conditions of modernity the established traditions, cultural and historical mechanisms of adaptation to the changing world are collapsing, the established values, meanings and life orientations of a person are 'falling apart'", and "[f]unctioning forms of worldviews are unable to hold the essential purpose of a person's worldview — the ordering and harmonization of the worlds of person's being".<sup>260</sup>

It should be said that such ideas about worldview and its educational potential are quite widespread in domestic (and partly foreign) philosophical and journalistic literature;<sup>261</sup> that is why the project of M. P. Arutyunyan's phenomenological analysis of worldview seems to us in a sense to be the quintessence of ideas about worldview in domestic humanitarian literature. We should add that philosophical interest in the phenomenon of worldview is also reflected in historical and philosophical studies, which produce valuable material for conceptual research.

In the middle of 20<sup>th</sup> century, a paradigm view of worldview is also rendering in the Western European tradition, both Anglo-American and continental. This is seen primarily in those sources that seek to summarize information on the topic and present worldviews in a conceptual light. Here there are also historical excursions into the understanding of worldview by one or another author, but at the same time the counterpoint is an integrative, as it were synthetic representation of worldview in humanitarian science. An illustrative example of this is David Keith Naugle's remarkable study of the concept of *worldview* in terms of thematic scope and literature.<sup>262</sup> This book is one of the most representative and cited works reflecting a theological approach to the study of worldview; in it we find not only an account of the confessional view of the phenomenon of worldview, but also a rich factual

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>259</sup> Arutyunyan M. P. Worldview: The Ontological Foundations of "Paideia" // Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. 2006. No 12. Pp. 66–71. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>260</sup> Arutyunyan M. P. The Concept of Worldview: A Phenomenological Approach // Sotsial'nye i gumanitarnye nauki na Dal'nem Vostoke, 2008, № 3 (19). Pp. 11–21. P. 11. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>261</sup> Vide the critique in: Lvov A. A. The Competence of Worldview in the Sphere of Education // Filosofiya obrazovaniya. Istoriya i sovremennost': Kollektivnaya monografiya. I. D. Osipov, S. N. Pogodin (eds.). St. Petersburg, 2019. Pp. 46—66. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>262</sup> Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids, 2002.

examination of the various historical, cultural, scientific, and philosophical circumstances of the concept. His monograph includes a special chapter on the philological history of worldview, which discusses the various views on the origin of the word itself, the meanings given to it by the "founding fathers", and the peculiarities of its use in German and Anglo-American discourses.<sup>263</sup>

In his study of the concept of *worldview*, Naugle states that the question of whether Christianity is a worldview, whether such a concept as Christian worldview does not diminish or impoverish the essence of the Evangelical doctrine, is still debatable in the Protestant community. From his point of view, however, we can say that a Christian worldview exists without questioning the dogma of Christianity itself. For this purpose he proposes to "naturalize" the concept of worldview on the basis of evangelical truth; for this purpose he introduces the fundamental concept of the heart, which should be understood as "the necessary ability of human consciousness to the basic spiritual orientation and view of reality, which determines the way of human existence in the world".<sup>264</sup> In general, it is the heart, understood in Western Christianity as the receptacle of life, where life enters and from which it emanates, that Naugle sees as analogous to the Modern concept of *worldview*:

From a scriptural point of view <...> the heart is responsible for how a man or woman sees the world. Indeed, what goes into the heart from the out- side world eventually shapes its fundamental dispositions and determines what comes out of it as the springs of life. Consequently, the heart establishes the basic presuppositions of life and, because of its life-determining influence, must always be carefully guarded. <sup>265</sup>

Such an interpretation is an example of the metaphor of the heart as a "secluded corner of the inner house", which is very common in Christian theology.<sup>266</sup> We can bring similar examples in the context of Russian religious philosophy; the most striking (but by no means the only) of them is undoubtedly P. D. Yurkevich's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>263</sup> Ibid., p. 55–67.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>264</sup> Ibid., p. 290.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>265</sup> Ibid., p. 272.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>266</sup> Augustine. Confessions. Moscow, 1991. P. 203. (*In Russian*); Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids, 2002. P. 272ff.

doctrine of the heart as the center of the Christian's vital and moral power. Revealing this thesis, Yurkevich draws attention to the fact that the Christian beginning of morality "firstly, <...> is closely connected with the biblical doctrine of the heart, and secondly, because the needs of modern practical philosophy are too great, and we think that it needs to find out the spirit and character of the Christian doctrine".<sup>267</sup> In this way the evangelical principle affirmed by Christ, according to which "where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them" (Matt. 18:20), is restored. However, it should be noted that worldview as a matter of the heart (and this thesis can be recognized as a common place in Christian theology regardless of confessional specifics) proves to be a solid foundation for moral guidance in life. It is Weltanschauung, interpreted as inner spiritual certainty, that contributes to the self-perfection of man and his disclosure as imago Dei - the image of God.<sup>268</sup> This is also insisted upon by the proponents of the modern domestic project of educational theology, according to which "[C]hristian  $\pi\alpha_1\delta\epsilon_1'\alpha$  and, more broadly, the Christian (scholastic) educational paradigm fits organically into the context of rational theology, one of the foundations of which is the principle of man's creation in the image and likeness of God (εἰκόνα Θεοῦ)".<sup>269</sup>

At this point we approach the pedagogical component of the worldview phenomenon proper. D. Naugle does not pay any attention to it, except in connection with the moral perfection of the believer; this can be explained by his initial position of a liberal Protestant scholar, who pays more attention to the existential situation of the individual than to the individual as a member of a spiritual tradition. Nevertheless, such "traditionalist" concepts exist, and an example here is the Russian project of theology of education, which is based on biblical dogmatics and the tradition of Russian Orthodoxy and takes into account modern pedagogical practices; this contributes to the "formation of the Orthodox Church's own —

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>267</sup> Yurkevich P. D. The Heart and Its Importance in the Spiritual Life of Man // Yurkevich P. D. Works. Moscow, 1990. P. 102. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>268</sup> Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids, 2002. P. 343.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>269</sup> Shmonin D. V. The Mystery of the Answer: An introduction to Rational Theology. St. Petersburg, 2021. P. 59. (*In Russian*).

research and evaluation – position".<sup>270</sup> The fact that man's faith in God, the desire for knowledge of divine wisdom and the truth of Revelation are also realized in pedagogical practice, was written about as early as St. Augustine; <sup>271</sup> however, it is important to note that this requires a certain "hidden subject", in the words of the St. Paul, "the inner man", who finds pleasure in the law of God (Rom. 7:22).

Consequently, the spiritual education of this "inner man" through the knowledge of the Holy Scripture should be understood as a moral and soul-helpful practice, which ultimately implies pedagogical attitudes for responsible and conscious confession of faith. In this case, worldview acts as the semantic core of the believer's internal self-organization; it reflects the spiritual essence of the person. Similarly, the typology of worldviews can be understood as a reaction of the believer's consciousness (in the worldview type of theism, opposite to atheism) to the historical forms of rational cognition of reality, represented in such types as idealism, materialism, irrationalism (united in the worldview type of gnosticism) and positivism (constituting the worldview type of agnosticism).<sup>272</sup>

A quite conventional interpretation of worldview is presented in the following definition: "Worldview is the totality of the results of metaphysical thinking and research, with metaphysics understood as a science that unites in a single whole the forms of knowledge of the world: firstly, various 'natural' types of worldview, associated by tradition with an epoch, nation, race, etc.; secondly, philosophy, which strives for a priori knowledge (i.e., knowledge independent of the amount of inductive research) in all fields; and thirdly, the results of the concrete sciences".<sup>273</sup> Here we also see as a comment H. Meyer's remark,<sup>274</sup> that "worldview hides philosophy in itself", i.e., on the one hand, it strives for integral and universal knowledge about the cosmos, but on the other hand, it also includes various

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>270</sup> Shmonin D. V. Philosophy, Theology and Value-Sense Sphere in Education // Vestnik Russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii. 2015. Vol. 16. № 4. Pp. 206—221. P. 218. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>271</sup> Shmonin D. V. The Wisdom of the Philosopher and the Christian Idea of Education // Vestnik Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. A. S. Pushkina. 2019. № 3. Pp. 7—17. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>272</sup> Burlaka D. K. Thinking and Revelation. A Systematic Intriduction in Christian Metaphysics. St. Petersburg, 2011. Pp. 335–338. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>273</sup> Philosophical Dictionary. Moscow, 1961. P. 368. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>274</sup> We mean: Meyer H. Geschichte der abendländischen Weltbild, 5 Bde. Würzburg, 1947–1949.

axiological attitudes. As we can see, not only ontology but also axiology plays an important role here, which M. Scheler actively applied in the discussion of worldview. But at the same time, we should add that worldview itself is the property of an individual, a private person; if we speak of a philosophical system or of some collective and epistemologically binding phenomenon, we should also have in mind such a form as the doctrine of worldview (Weltanschauungslehre). In the Germanspeaking discourse, this is quite a familiar concept, especially after significant discussions in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, although its formation was anticipated by the works of positivists, in particular E. Dühring. "The doctrine of worldview" can be defined as "such a science (Wissenschaft), which is intended to create unquestionable links to all these (logical. -A.L.) views, and which can therefore be used for the transition from individual sciences and practical life to the reconstruction of reality".<sup>275</sup> That is, in addition to the purely theoretical, worldview is potentially supposed to have also a practical aspect, which is actualized with the help of a special science, as it were, "the science of sciences", and thus translates our knowledge of the world into our attitude to it and action in it.

We should also add the results that the American researcher J. Ashmore has come to. Summarizing many works dedicated to our topic, and at the same time formulating his own approach to it, he proposes to distinguish three aspects with the help of which it would be possible to cover the most diverse manifestations of worldview. He understands the very term *worldview* as a view and interpretation of the universe and events in it in an accepted way by an individual or a group of individuals. This is quite a conventional approach to our concept, the same interpretation we find in a variety of sources. In general, Ashmore believes that a worldview cannot be described in precise terms, that it is elastic and is rather "an involuntary precipitate crystallized in the mind of an individual or in the social outlook of a group, as in the case of Hellenistic Greece or medieval Europe".<sup>276</sup> In these terms, he proposes to distinguish three aspects of worldview: first, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>275</sup> Grimm J., Grimm W. Deutsches Woerterbuch. Leipzig, 1955. B. 28, S. 1538.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>276</sup> Ashmore J. Three Aspects of Weltanschauung // The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring, 1966), pp. 215—228. P. 215.

relational one, second, the categorical one, and third, the phenomenological one. However, he stipulates that this three-part division is not exhaustive in nature.<sup>277</sup>

All the manifestations that we could perhaps characterize as everyday worldview, or worldview in the sociological or cultural sense, belong to the first aspect. This is what allows people as representatives of a certain geographical or cultural (in the broad sense) community to navigate the world using historically developed behavioral and communicative strategies. J. Ashmore distinguishes two main groups of factors that condition such a behavior — external, or stable factors that cannot be changed (these include race, terrain, climate, and natural resources that support the life and activities of a person or society) and internal, or changing (these include ways of thinking, or mentality, as well as language). The first group can also be referred to as the physical factors group and the second as the mental factors group.<sup>278</sup>

For instance, the fact that vastness of territory can explain literacy is confirmed in the United States or China (we are talking about the 1950s), where the percentage of illiterate or little literate people is quite high, and in Denmark or Switzerland, which have the highest literacy rates. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule: for example, the USSR, which was the world's largest country in terms of land area, had a negligible percentage of illiterate or little literate people.<sup>279</sup> Here, however, it is more reliable to see not so much a theoretical principle as an empirical regularity, a correlation that cannot be elevated to the status of a law. The diversity of linguistic and communicative means and forms existing on the Earth can be considered as an example of the use of language as a psychological factor. Each nation, using its own language, produces its own world picture (this position quite repeats one of the interpretations of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis). A remarkably succinct and at the same time prerogative summary of this position can be considered

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>277</sup> Ibid., p. 227.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>278</sup> Ibid., p. 216—218.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>279</sup> Ibid., p. 217.

the phrase of C. Peirce that if Aristotle had been a Mexican, his logic would have been different.<sup>280</sup>

As for the other two aspects of worldview, they derive from the answer to the question of the relation of the human "I" to the world. In one case we have "the integration of the inner state of man and something from the outer state of the universe", and this mutual relationship between man and the world is devoid of any dominance and of any predetermined outcome of mutual communication. In the other case we have something subordinate to a structure existing independently of the "I".<sup>281</sup> An example of the first case is the developed doctrines of categories of Aristotle and Kant, an example of the second is Hegel's phenomenology.

Both Aristotle and Kant understand categories as the most general concepts, that they have a relation to the contemplation of the world (as *Weltanschauung* is rendered in the Russian translation of *The Critique of Judgment*) and that they are complementary to some individual experience.<sup>282</sup> However, their functions of categories are different. Aristotle believed that any order of speech, which also expresses the worldview of a person, can be analyzed logically, and this analysis is possible with the help of the most general concepts that can cover the diversity of human experience. Kant, on the other hand, believed that Aristotle's categories were empirical in origin and arbitrary, and that in fact they must be derived a priori. Thus derived, the categories could explain the principle of the action of reason, and hence the order of formation of proposition, since a worldview can find expression only in the form of proposition.<sup>283</sup>

As for the phenomenological aspect, the most impressive example is the dialectical study that Hegel carries out in his works. The successive passage of consciousness through the stages of its development — from sensual data through self-consciousness to the highest forms of spirit, from one stage to the opposite one, and the removal of the resulting mereology — expresses precisely the detailed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>280</sup> Ibid., p. 220.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>281</sup> Ibid., p. 223.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>282</sup> Ibid., p. 225.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>283</sup> Ibid., p. 225.

illumination of the worldview of individual consciousness, which aspires to an allembracing and absolute idea. Noteworthy is that Hegel's most complete and compositionally unified work, reflecting such an adventure of consciousness in its struggle with itself and self-knowledge, is his *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Ashmore says in this regard, "Hegel's dialectic is a logic, not of abstract concepts, but of human convictions: cognitive, ethical, social, aesthetic, and religious. Few, if any, would turn to Hegel's writings as treatises on worldviews. And yet the whole course of his dialectic is a demonstration of worldview".<sup>284</sup>

We could object to the aspects of worldview proposed by J. Ashmore in the same spirit as Kant objected to Aristotle's categories: these aspects are empirical and quite random. There is no need to speak only about three such aspects of worldview, as the author himself admits. What, then, could we consider paradigmatic, i.e. generally accepted, in his presentation? The distinguished accidental feature turns out to be a conceptual incompleteness: it turns out that worldview as such, although not clearly defined as a concept, cannot be captured by the proposed aspects, and its scope varies depending on the criteria we propose for analysis. Consequently, it appears to be simply *a natural setting* for a person's successful activity in a given community, an instrument that expresses our complex cognitive organization of language or consciousness, or a universal view of the established regular order of things comprehended in its totality. It appears that the first aspect is somehow inherent in every person or even community, but can this be said of the second or the third one, i.e. critical or phenomenological aspects? But they appear as the results of reflection on our natural attitude of ordinary worldview, which, as we have seen, is a characteristic condition for any typology of worldviews.

At the same time, an important feature of the study of worldviews today is that such a subject of research requires a truly interdisciplinary approach. This peculiarity is clearly manifested when worldview is considered as a human ability to ask questions about the ultimate foundations of existence, about the meaning of life, about the reasons for the origin and purpose of the existence of the universe; in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>284</sup> Ibid., p. 227.

this aspect, it becomes a subject of interest not only for theologians, but also for quite positivistic evolutionist psychologists, who qualify worldview as one of the adaptive abilities of the human mentality.<sup>285</sup> Philosophers share similar ideas about worldview, treating it, on the one hand, as a practice of self-analysis and, on the other hand, as a theoretical basis for the model of "own — the Other" definition.<sup>286</sup>

The research group led by D. A. Leontiev (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow) has achieved significant results in developing the phenomenon of worldview in the context of psychology. In their research, they have taken into account the achievements of their predecessors who had already tried to concretize and comprehend the phenomenon of worldview in psychological terms.<sup>287</sup> Therefore, the publications of this group can be regarded as, in a certain sense, a summary of classical positions and, at the same time, as an original project.

They define worldview as "a more or less coherent system of generalized human ideas about the general laws to which the world, society and man are subject, as well as about the characteristics of an ideal, perfect world, society and man".<sup>288</sup> At the same time, the development of worldview is influenced both by the subject's knowledge of the world around him and by "socio-cultural schematisms", peculiarities of the language person uses, other meaning-generating sign systems; not the least role in the formation of worldview is played by the subject's personal meanings, and therefore the real state of affairs in one's worldview can be distorted. Consequently, the worldview "always bears a peculiar imprint of individual and personal characteristics, knowledge about the world forms in it an alloy with beliefs, not always clear representations and unconscious schematisms and stereotypes".<sup>289</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>285</sup> Taves A., Asprem E., Ihm E. Psychology, meaning making, and the study of worldviews: Beyond religion and non-religion // Psychology of Religion and Spirituality. Special issue: Atheism, Agnosticism, and Nonreligious Worldviews. 2018. Vol. 10 (3). P. 207–217.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>286</sup> Sire J. W. Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept. Westmount, IL, 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>287</sup> Leontiev D. A., Mospan A. N. World picture, Worldview and Definition of Indeterminate // Mir psikhologii. 2017. № 2 (90). Pp. 12—19. Pp. 13—16. (*In Russian*).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>288</sup> Leontiev D. A. Worldview // Sibirskiy psikhologicheskiy zhurnal. 2003. № 18. P. 152. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>289</sup> Ibid.

In worldview one could discern four aspects: substantive (characterized by postulates expressing for the subject the world regularities), value (subjective system of ideals), structural (reflects the internal organization of worldview as a unity of elements), functional (correlation of worldview structures with practical human activity). As a realization of the methodological principle of worldview research, D. A. Leontiev also proposed *the technique of ultimate meanings*, which contributes to the psychological diagnosis of personal structures through their projection in the individual worldview. This technique consists in reconstructing the system of personal beliefs about the goals and meanings of human life, and its epistemological basis is structural analysis, phenomenological analysis, and content analysis.<sup>290</sup>

It is important for the researcher-psychologist that worldview is not a purely personal phenomenon, but it is directly related to the way a person interacts with people around him/her, how he/she communicates with them. Therefore, the main structural components of his worldview are generalizations, or "generalized judgments that apply to a class of objects. Generalizations have to do not only with knowledge formulated by man himself in the form of generalizations of individual experience, but also with generalizations borrowed from culture and from other people in a ready-made form. <...> A particular case of generalizations are proverbs — worldview generalizations formulated by an ethno-cultural community in the course of the history of its development".<sup>291</sup>

It should be noted that worldview performs such a function because it is the core of a person's image or person's picture of the world; however, if the worldview itself is associated with the above-mentioned generalizations, then the worldview includes all of the person's knowledge and ideas about the world in general. Due to the fact that the subject projects him/herself with his/her unique attitudes onto the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>290</sup> Leontiev D. Approaching Worldview Structure with Ultimate Meanings Technique // Journal of Humanistic Psychology. 2007. 47(2). P. 243—266.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>291</sup> Leontiev D. A. Tarvid E. V. Selection of proverbs as a worldview projection // Izvestiya TRTU. 2005. № 7 (51). Pp. 70–72. Pp. 70–71. (*In Russian*).

world picture, the peculiarities of the study of worldview contribute to the understanding of personality.<sup>292</sup>

It is also necessary to pay attention to the fact that psychologists distinguish two main forms of worldview — myth and inner activity. Depending on how active an individual's position is in relation to the development of a worldview, he or she either passively assimilates it in a ready-made, axiomatic form (as a myth), or actively processes his or her own experience with the help of reflection, thinking within the framework of his or her own picture of the world and critically relating to his or her own postulates (as an internal activity). At the same time, the product of worldview activity is subjective certainty in relation to the world picture.<sup>293</sup>

Taking into account the objectives of our study, we will not delve into further consideration of the psychological context of interpreting the phenomenon of worldview. At this stage, we can already notice two important aspects of it. First, worldview is interpreted as a structure-forming beginning of one's personality, and therefore its analysis acquires a great heuristic sense. Secondly, worldview is connected not only with the mental life of an individual, but to a much greater extent it is revealed in its functional sense in the process of interaction of individuals with each other, allowing them to compare their world pictures. Thus, the psychological approach here comes into contact with the communicative dimension of human existence, discussed already in the framework of the existential-phenomenological project.<sup>294</sup>

However, this example opens up for us further possibilities of criticizing worldviews both as a subject of typology and as a concept, precisely because it is absolutely typical in its epistemological basis. Is it possible, indeed, to hold the epistemological diversity of the concept of *worldview* by such essentially essentialist methods? Is it not a dynamic rather than a static concept that cannot be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>292</sup> Leontiev D. A., Mospan A. N. World picture, Worldview and Definition of Indeterminate // Mir psikhologii. 2017. № 2 (90). Pp. 12—19. C. 17. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>293</sup> Ibid., p. 17—18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>294</sup> Vlasova O. A., Lvov A. A. The Conceptual Analysis of Existential-Phenomenological Tradition: Foundations and Perspectives // Znanie. Ponimanie. Umenie. 2018. № 2. Pp. 94—102. (*In Russian*); Lvov A. A. Existential-Phenomenological Foundations of Psychology and Psychiatry // Izvestiya Tul'skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye nauki. 2019. № 3. Pp. 99—106. (*In Russian*).

comprehended *per se*, but can only be analyzed in interaction with something external to itself, with something that makes it manifest itself in specific forms? We will further attempt such a critique and show that the typological approach to worldview does not reveal its true essence, but rather formalizes and impoverishes its content.

Summarizing the paradigm analysis of worldview, we should say the following. Modern social science has managed to enrich itself with many "common places", which constitute the essential content of manuals on the social sciences and Humanities. One of such common places is worldview and its various interpretations. For example, the textbook typology of worldview proposed by the authors of many textbooks for higher education is a triple division. It is accepted that worldview includes mythological, religious, and scientific types, and the everyday worldview as a "zero", or starting pre-reflective type is also emphasized. However, the very scope of the concept of worldview is often interpreted in an arbitrary and empirical way, which means that worldview is understood as any value position of a person or a group of people in relation to a certain image of the world. Then one speaks of idealistic, atheistic, materialistic, mechanistic or any other worldview without specifying the basis of such a typology. As a rule, however, such "classifications" of worldviews are impersonal, they have no authors and cannot be discussed on a par with typological projects once proposed by representatives of various philosophical schools and movements. Each author, after all, presupposes the necessity of the criteria he/she uses to justify his/her own perspective — in the case of worldview, we find ourselves on the shaky ground of a natural, pre-reflexive attitude towards worldview itself as a phenomenon, and therefore we do not speak of its living meaning-generating manifestations, but only of a reasonably comprehensible concept.

## 2.3. The Constellation of Worldview

We can distinguish four nodal points that reveal the characteristic properties of worldview as a phenomenon of human culture and condition the constellation of its discursive space as a metaconcept.

## A. Worldviews have a heterogeneous structure that lends itself to typologization. This means that there is a certain type of worldview that is the best or most perfect at the moment.

The most important feature of this characteristic is that each of philosophers or analysts of worldview offers their variants of such a type, and even if these answers coincide being the same concepts, what each particular author puts into them does not coincide. At the same time, it is argued that such a best type of worldview either emerged historically or it can be constructed speculatively. This position has been justified in different ways, offering one or another theoretical basis for it. For example, W. Dilthey in his studies rose to such a level of generalizations as the law of worldviews formation. He proceeds from the fact that a worldview is not monolithic within itself, and there cannot be a single worldview for all people. Although there is a certain Zeitgeist, i.e., ideas floating in the air that form a collective worldview on the basis of the inherent experience of all mankind, worldview is a deeply personal component of the inner world and existential guidelines for each particular person. The general law of Dilthey's worldview is to explain the incomprehensible with the help of the clearer, so that the moods, the countless shades of people's attitudes toward the world form the substratum of the worldviews that develop from them.<sup>295</sup>

All worldviews, insofar as they attempt to give a complete solution to the riddle of life, are usually constructed in the same way: they represent a unified

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>295</sup> Dilthey W. Types of Worldviews and Their Detection in Metaphysical Systems // Cultural Studies. XXth century. Anthology. Moscow, 1995. Pp. 219—220. (*In Russian*).

system in which solutions to questions about the meaning and significance of the world are formulated on the basis of a single world picture (the concept with which Dilthey associates worldviews): "Every manifestation of life develops into a single whole in which the same relations to the world are structurally connected. So the worldviews are regular systems in which this structure of our mental life is manifested. Their basis is always a certain picture of the world, which arises as a result of a regular and consistent work of our cognition".<sup>296</sup> Let us note here that worldviews (exactly in the plural, since Dilthey singles out religious, poetic and *metaphysical* types) are the results of thinking activity. True, researchers have noted the paradoxical nature of this typology of worldviews. In fact, Dilthey's attitude to the problem of worldview was not unambiguous throughout his creative activity, and many of the provisions he once expressed he himself later revised and clarified. N. S. Plotnikov points out that "Dilthey's texts devoted to the typology of worldviews" appeared in an era when from all sides there were calls for a 'revival of metaphysics', which after a long period of scientific-critical philosophizing could finally satisfy the 'thirst for a whole worldview". "After an era of conscious abstinence and abstraction from metaphysical and religious problems, we dare once again to approach the questions which happen to lie at the heart and which have always preoccupied humanity and its deepest thinkers".<sup>297</sup> At the same time, he states that Dilthey's ideas on worldview "are difficult to interpret in a consistent way",<sup>298</sup> although it is fair to treat them as an attempt to define and identify a special "metadiscourse' in relation to philosophy, within which the principles of what in philosophical theory in general should be considered argument, principle, and method are established. A worldview encapsulates a set of assumptions about what a philosophical theory should look like".<sup>299</sup>

The combination of metaphysical and sociological problems in M. Scheler's approach to the study of the problem of the human extended the boundaries of the

- Russian).
- <sup>298</sup> Ibid., p. 188.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>296</sup> Ibid., p. 220.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>297</sup> Plotnikov N. S. Life and History. Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophical Program. Moscow, 2000. P. 184. (In

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>299</sup> Ibid., p. 190.

previous attempts of representatives of the philosophy of life to develop a philosophy of worldview, primarily, as a philosophy of worldview types. The point is that the theoretical studies that existed at that time analyzed only those cultural achievements and processes that took place or were directly formed already within the framework of Modern European culture. In addition, Scheler did not support the philosophical relativism that his colleagues would share:

The basic tenets of the philosophy of worldviews (*Weltanschauungsphilosophie*) in the form in which it was developed by Dilthey and — in different variants — by other German thinkers such as Max Weber, Karl Jaspers, Gustav Radbruch and Karl Mannheim, are as follows: 1. there are a limited number of worldviews that have formed the basis of all philosophies and intellectual systems; 2. these basic approaches to understanding reality derive from the temperament of the thinker and from his or her life experience, and the philosophy that each thinker develops can only be understood if it is seen as an expression (conscious or unconscious) of one of the basic worldviews; 3. no philosophy is absolutely true, but each is true in relation to the life experience (*Erlebnis*) of its author. The very essence of the philosophy of worldviews in such a case was to systematize philosophical relativism and to justify itself as an independent philosophy.<sup>300</sup>

As a matter of fact, Scheler did not share such relativism in philosophical terms, since he was convinced that truth is one, and any historical or sociological analysis (where such relativism is possible) is complementary to philosophy. Nevertheless, in a number of his works we find the idea that the highest modern metaphysics, which brings a person to the position of a philosophical worldview, can no longer be considered a cosmology and metaphysics of the subject — it becomes a meta-anthropology and metaphysics of action. Such a stage can be reached only by consistently mastering three types of knowledge: 1) knowledge for the sake of domination or achievement, in which domination over nature is achieved; 2) essential or educational knowledge, in which the realization of the human essence proper emerges; 3) metaphysical or knowledge for the sake of salvation, in which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>300</sup> Staude J. R. Max Scheler. An Intellectual Biography. London, 1967. P.154.

human being is understood as a microtheos, and it is through it that a person is given the first approach to God.<sup>301</sup>

On the example of H. Gompertz's draft of the doctrine of worldview (*Weltanschauungslehre*) it is convenient to trace the logic of constructing a typology of worldview. Gompertz, as a representative of empirio-criticism, singles out five stages, or five worldviews, and at the same time points out that modern cosmotheory (Kosmotheorie — a concept equivalent to worldview for him), which constitutes the fifth, or pan-empirical stage, has successively passed through animistic, metaphysical, ideological and critical forms. These stages are examined in their relation to the basic concepts of the doctrine of worldview, which Gompertz considers to be substance, identity, relation, and form. Thus, in the perception of substance, as well as any other highlighted concept, the *animistic* worldview acts as a starting point, being a natural attitude. For the bearer of such a worldview, all things in the world are animated, everything is full of deities and everything is alive in a certain way. Bodies and things are understood as living beings, but with the emergence of natural science the inquisitive gaze also comes to see dead forms, namely inanimate "groups of singular cases", <sup>302</sup> that are no longer associated with singular manifestations. It is at this point that a contradiction sets in, which is overcome at the next stage, the *metaphysical* stage, which is such that the cosmotheorist (as the subject of cognition is called) discovers in the world various substances accompanied by accidents ( $\S13$ ). As a consequence, the idea of two kinds of substances, ideal and material, arises. Hence the idea that the world is divided in two, so that dualistic views prevail at this level. However, the refutation of metaphysical positions is provided by psychology, which "proceeding from the premise that knowledge can consist only in representations of things, and showing that representations are always conditioned by sense perceptions, comes to make the demand that our knowledge of the unity and constancy of a thing must also rest on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>301</sup> For a detailed reconstruction of M. Scheler's doctrine of worldviews vide: Lvov A. A. The Place of the Doctrine of Worldview in Max Scheler's Philosophical Anthropology // Lichnost'. Kul'tura. Obshchestvo. 2020. Vol. 22. № 3-4 (107-108). Pp. 127—138. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>302</sup> Gomperz H. The Doctrine of Worldview. Vol.1. St. Petersburg, 1912. P. 83. (In Russian).

sensually perceived elements".<sup>303</sup> Accordingly, psychology postulates the concept of the sensually apprehended thing, that is, the concept of the empirical, which generates a contradiction and forces the cosmotheoretical concepts of substance and thing to the next, *ideological* level.

Noteworthy is that by ideology Gompertz means the former discipline or science of the emergence of ideas in the spirit of the French sensationalists. At this stage the idea of a thing is formed, which "does not contain in itself a special substantive element at all, but is only a complex of qualities, and its unity and permanence, according to this, is also exhausted by the relatively permanent union of these qualities".<sup>304</sup> Thus, here we are dealing with the idea of the thing, which is formed from the overcoming of the "substantive and attributive" image of the schematized reality. However, this worldview level also proves to be unstable; at this level there is a contradiction with practice, as practical activity is confronted with the idealism emanating from the mentality. At the *critical* stage it turns out that the human mind brings many qualities of an object under the single concept of substance and thinks of them as qualities of a single and constant thing. Substance is then understood as a "subjective addition to qualities", 305 and in this a fundamental overcoming of the previous strictly ontological stage is expressed. Indeed, if now we do not think of substance as possessing an existence of its own, by means of which we could explain the existence of the rest of the actual world around us, it is impossible to treat such a concept of substance in any other way than as an inner subjective experience. Consequently, we no longer take a legislative dogmatic view of the world, but, on the contrary, we try to treat it critically, understanding its purely subjectivistic principle, which lies within ourselves, who observe the world. Having identified the contradiction between the criticism of principles and the order of their emergence in the subject of contemplation of the world, the worldview system develops further to the modern (for Gompertz) level of pathempiricism, at which it is revealed to us that that "subjective addition" which substance represents is found

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>303</sup> Ibid., p. 116—117.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>304</sup> Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>305</sup> Ibid., p. 157.

in feeling, and can be demonstrated, pointed out: "<...> it is that sensuous impression of the whole <...> which precedes the representation of the individual qualities and is only differentiated in them, but which unites them also after this differentiation, since it continues to envelop them as well".<sup>306</sup> Further the development of the worldview does not continue, and we now have in evidence that idea of the order and principle of contemplation of the world, as it was formed by the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the philosophy of empirio-criticism. Note that in this final *pathempiricist cosmotheory* we find moments of all the previous stages of development: animistic, metaphysical, ideological, and critical (§15). Thus, for Gompertz, worldview is not a body of data or knowledge that is organized like a single classification system, that is closed and complete, and that can be taught to others; worldview is an attempt to show that the unity of our knowledge of the world, built on the ordering and analysis of data from positive disciplines, will always be either incomplete or fragile.

However, there are also critical views on this kind of typology. For example, M. Heidegger thinks of worldview as a new form of mythology, which only aims to create some abstract-historical perspecive, on which science with its successes of measurement and accuracy of research would still be based. This form of mythology is the worst of historical forms: it is only some "account of the past" (*Historie*), historiography, and not at all the very historical quest, the string of co-events inherent in Heidegger's understanding of *Seynsgeschichte*, and echoed in Herodotus's iotopía.<sup>307</sup> Worldview therefore appears to be an attempt to squeeze the whole world into the initially given framework of the world picture, and since these frameworks are always predetermined, there can be no dynamic unfolding of the world. It is only necessary to be content with the positivity of the observed picture, as if we were only perceiving subjects, but not questioning our being: "Each epoch of philosophy has its own necessity. We must simply recognize philosophy for what it is. Nevertheless, we cannot prefer one epoch to another, as is possible with respect

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>306</sup> Ibid., p. 168.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>307</sup> On Heidegger's distinction between *Historie* and *Geschichte* vide: Inwood M. A Heidegger Dictionary. Oxford, 1999. P. 90–92.

to different worldviews".<sup>308</sup> In other words, Heidegger calls for a philosophical autonomy that would make the very event of human thought epochal (in terms of phenomenological  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi \alpha \chi \dot{\eta}$ ), meaningful and necessary in itself. But no worldview and no worldview-philosophy can ensure this — their essence does not contain necessity, they are more or less accidental, but rather lead their bearer to oblivion, whereas it is through thought that man can come to the realization of himself as actual being, Dasein. In this case we are really dealing with a necessity of the same order as Plato states in the myth of the cave: this certain divine necessity, when the prisoner is freed from his fetters, and the chance of his freedom will then consist in the consciousness of leaving the cave and the consciousness of returning afterwards. Then the person who was liberated by someone will become the one who has liberated him/herself — and in this, of course, there is nothing accidental. It is interesting to note that later Heidegger's disciple G. Marcuse in his work One-Dimensional Man will point to one of the qualitative abilities of the civilization process to transform rational thinking into a mythological state,<sup>309</sup> and M. Eliade will analyze the emergence and functioning of mythological constructions within the framework of mass media society.310

For Heidegger, modern scholars note that worldview is connected with science, with the formation of *a world picture (das Weltbild)* — "the construct of a defining representation".<sup>311</sup> Science, in its turn, is connected with a special type of thinking — calculating, while philosophy is based on comprehending thinking.<sup>312</sup> Heidegger, on the other hand, points out that philosophy itself stands out as a form from worldviews, and is therefore relevant to any worldview; it can outline what constitutes a certain worldview, but it cannot shape it, it cannot create a new one. Heidegger even connects the very notion of worldview with the preaching, almost ideology, that is characteristic of Modern thought from Descartes to Nietzsche. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>308</sup> Heidegger M. Zur Sache des Denkes // Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt a.M., 2007. B. 14, S. 70.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>309</sup> Marcuse H. One-Dimension Man. Moscow, 2009. P. 250 ff. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>310</sup> Eliade M. The Aspects of Myth. Moscow, 2010. P. 182–189. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>311</sup> Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 72. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>312</sup> Nekrasova N. A., Nekrasov S. I. Worldview as a Subject-Matter of Philosophical Reflection // Sovremennye neukoemkie tekhnologii. 2005. №6. Pp. 20–23. P. 21. (*In Russian*).

worldview reared up, spread its wings, hitherto restrained by metaphysics, and, Heidegger believes, thus marked the formation of European nihilism. It is noteworthy that the power of worldview, according to Heidegger, is total, and it is associated as a concept with the formation of the Modern world picture.<sup>313</sup>

It is interesting to note that Heidegger's ideas echo those of his predecessors, W. Dilthey and A. Riehl. The influence of the former can be seen in the fact that worldview for Heidegger is closely connected with the understanding of the picture of the world, more precisely, with the world that unfolds before us as a picture. By picture in this case, we mean the creation of a defining representation; a person here acquires a point of view, a position that gives measure and standards to all things.<sup>314</sup> As for the influence of the second, Heidegger, in Basic Concepts of Metaphysics, calls worldview "the personal conviction of the individual thinker", whose influence extends to his followers.<sup>315</sup> This is quite consistent with the views of A. Riehl, who believed that the only possible worldview claiming to encompass reality in its entirety could be, and therefore must be, mechanistic.<sup>316</sup> In his article *The Age of the* World Picture, Heidegger again draws attention to the characteristic property of universality and, at the same time, discreteness of the worldview. The objectivity of the world picture means that it is representative of the Modern civilization as a special process of conquering the world unfolding before him. With the perfection of mathematical science and the unlimited power of universal calculation, planning and organization, technology encircles the person and begins to dominate him; as motors drown out being and the former Greek cosmos collapses under the onslaught of the second nature, which can be measured and to which it is possible to set the necessary parameters, the same is in the Modern world, where a struggle of worldviews, which absorbed metaphysics, takes place. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the ominous words "gigantism" and "Americanism", firmly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>313</sup> Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 234. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>314</sup> Ibid., p. 72.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>315</sup> Ibid., p. 452.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>316</sup> Riehl A. Scientific and Non-Scientific Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 1901. P. 6. (In Russian).

associated for Heidegger with both the crisis and the quest for the fullness of the Modern subject, sound in the article.<sup>317</sup>

 $\alpha$ . In addition, A. Riehl believed that a worldview is a sermon of a scholarch to which the public pays attention, and therefore always in this form of unscientific philosophy much of the teacher himself is preserved.<sup>318</sup> In connection with this thesis, we come to an implication of the mentioned characteristic of worldview, namely, that worldview is connected with the criterion of partisanship in philosophy. Indeed, this or that worldview always bears personal traits: we can say that these attitudes are connected with a thought-out life strategy of a particular person, or we can choose already existing attitudes that were developed by thinkers of different epochs and cultures. In any case, we encounter here a situation of a certain appeal, exhortation, beckoning ( $\pi\rho\sigma\tau\rho\epsilon\pi\tau\kappa\delta\varsigma$ ) to join some already existing group that has developed a recognizable program of action in connection with its holistic views of the world. In an original way this criterion is conceptualized in the context of Russian philosophy. In particular, N. G. Chernyshevsky develops the well-known "principle of partisanship" in philosophy, which is essentially reduced to a discussion of the relationship between the teachings of certain authors and their political views. The said principle and is defined as follows: "Political theories, and any philosophical doctrines in general, were always created under the strongest influence of the social position to which they belonged, and every philosopher was a representative of any of the political parties fighting in his time for predominance over the society to which the philosopher belonged".<sup>319</sup> Let us recall, that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, K. Marx proposed to designate such a relationship by the concept of *ideology*. L. Shestov, who fiercely fought against any worldview as a manifestation of loyalty to a particular philosophical or literary camp or as a complete system of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>317</sup> Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 72–73. (In Russian); ibid., p. 86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>318</sup> Vide: Riehl A. Scientific and Non-Scientific Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 1901. P. 9. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>319</sup> Chernyshevsky N. G. An Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N. G. Works in 2 vols. Moscow, 1987. Vol. 2, p. 147. (*In Russian*).

views, rebelled against this common — even vulgar<sup>320</sup> — notion of a thinker's dependence on the epoch:

[N]ow that everyone is so clearly aware of its impotence, when even metaphysicians have taken up the natural sciences and do not for a moment take their eyes off the theory of knowledge does it really make sense now to consider the needs of reason! Isn't it the other way around? Isn't the main task of our time to learn the art of bypassing (or even destroying) all those numerous roadblocks, which under various pretexts were built in the olden days by powerful feudal lords of the spirit and only due to the eternal conservatism of cowardly and short-sighted human nature still continue to be considered insurmountable, even "natural" obstacles to the movement of our thought? Why the end? Why the last word? Why a worldview...? Of course, I am talking about philosophy and philosophers, people who strive to see, learn, experience as much as possible in life. For ordinary worldly practice, finality will still remain an unchanging dogma. A house without a roof is certainly no good... But incomplete, disorderly, chaotic, not leading to the goal set by reason, contradictory as life itself — are they not closer to our souls than systems, even great systems, whose creators did not care so much about recognizing reality as about "understanding it"?<sup>321</sup>

Artistry in life and work, to which L. Shestov was so attracted, had nothing to do with such completeness, which seemed to him the fate of armchair professors or creators of dead scholastic doctrines, but not of free philosophical thought. Only the crowd, the ordinary person without any of his/her own thoughts and spiritual aspirations demands a worldview as a complete, once-for-all prescribed program of action. Following this program saves the person of the crowd from the necessity to doubt and suffer, and at the same time — to create and think. It is the people-"hired conscience" who are in charge of drawing up such projects: "To praise oneself is considered a reprehensible immodesty, to praise one's party, one's philosophy, one's worldview is considered almost a supreme duty".<sup>322</sup> Of course, "one's own" is spoken of here ironically, if not contemptuously. Worldview (which he also

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>320</sup> Thus, V. V. Zenkovsky attested Chernyshevsky's position as "simplified biologism" — vide: Zenkovsky V. V.

The History of Russian Philosophy. Leningrad, 1991. Vol. 1, part 2, p. 135. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>321</sup> Shestov L. I. Apotheosis of Groundlessness. Moscow, 2000. P. 454. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>322</sup> Ibid., p. 472.

understands as a kind of ideology given by someone outside) always turns out to be someone else's after-thought, thinking after someone else; but this is not genuine, unfree thinking, which must be fought against, as the heroes of Shestov's existential analysis do: Shakespeare, Dostoevsky, Leo Tolstoy, Kierkegaard, and others. At this point we come to the next characteristic feature of the worldview, namely, its connection with unscientific philosophy.

## **B.** Worldview belongs to the field of non-scientific philosophy.

At the turn of 19<sup>th</sup>—20<sup>th</sup> centuries, there was a clear understanding that philosophy can be scientific and non-scientific; this distinguishing could be formulated in different ways, but its essence lies in the opposition between the scientific world picture and axiological image of the world. The scientific world picture mainly takes into account the achievements of positive knowledge about the world and is built as a result of successful mastering of reality by the methods of positive sciences; at the same time, philosophical research is assigned only the epistemological function of systematizing or interpreting the achievements of scientific and technical progress. An important distinguishing feature of this world picture is that researchers strive with all their might to present it as an objective (and in this sense reliable), full and complete reflection of the surrounding reality. Accordingly, here we are dealing with a theoretical picture of the world. Unlike it, the axiological image of the world does not imply completeness — on the contrary, being opposed to the scientific world picture as a subjective image, it indicates the subject's practical independence in constructing this image. As a project, the axiological image of the world is open, and everyone is free to choose his or her priorities and attitudes to reproduce this world in its integrity and completeness independently of anyone else. As we will see, this characteristic property logically adjoins the previous implication.

Contemporary scholars note that the concept of *worldview philosophy* was first coined in by E. Cassirer, who relied on Kant's distinction between school and

world (universal) philosophy and argued that Kant understood the latter as worldview philosophy, which served as the basis for the distinction between scientific and worldview philosophy.<sup>323</sup> Cassirer also believed that the previous development of science in the 19<sup>th</sup> century had centered around one crucial hypothesis: the justification of the unity and uniformity of human nature. In the end, the explanatory power of positive knowledge surpassed the abilities of metaphysics, but a paradox arose due to the crisis of philosophical self-knowledge that emerged at the same time.<sup>324</sup> The above-mentioned A. Riehl shared the similar views. In his public lectures, he initially stipulated that since the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, philosophy had been displaced from its formerly legitimate place by the positive sciences, and interest in it had become interest in "historical reminiscence".<sup>325</sup> From his perspective, philosophy can have the status of either scientific or non-scientific, with the former acting then as a critical investigation of the foundations of our knowledge, and the latter implementing a worldview project and developing a theory of values (axiology), the proper and improper (ethics), in general, realizing the ideas characteristic of the Leibnizian project of perennial philosophy (philosophia perennis). As for the history of philosophy, A. Riehl believed that it is the history of "the development and transformations of the concept of the history of philosophy".<sup>326</sup> Another important task of the history of philosophy is the study of those historical forms that philosophy took in the course of its development as a science. For example, ancient Greek philosophy was a science in the proper sense of the word, and Aristotle did not qualify it in any other way than as ἐπιστήμη.<sup>327</sup> But after the successes of Copernicus and Galileo, after the discoveries of I. Newton and R. von Mayer, it is no longer possible to allow philosophy to participate in the formation of our world picture. Following Kant, he limits the sphere of activity of

Pololzhskoi akademii gosudarstvennoi sluzhby. 2008. №4. Pp. 191—196. P. 195. (In Russian.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>323</sup> Nekrasova N. A., Nekrasov S. I. Worldview as a Subject-Matter of Philosophical Reflection // Sovremennye neukoemkie tekhnologii. 2005. №6. Pp. 20—23. P. 21. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>324</sup> Zalevsky A. V. Philosophy of Man: A Worldview Shift in Understanding of Human Nature // Vestnik

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>325</sup> Riehl A. An Introduction to Modern Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 1904. P. 1. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>326</sup> Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>327</sup> Vide, e. g., *Metaphysics*, Book α, 993 b: «ὀρθῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ τὸ καλεῖσθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἀληθείας» — «It is also correct that philosophy is called the science of truth» (transl. by A. V. Kubitsky) — Aristotle. Metaphysics. Moscow, 2006. P. 41. (*In Russian*).

the human mind to the universe of experience, within the boundaries of which the natural sciences are engaged in the formation of reliable knowledge, and philosophy performs the function of their methodological justification, ceding to them its usual claims to the development of a complete knowledge of the world. Therefore, we can say that philosophy as a science turns into *the philosophy of science*, and moves to the background as an auxiliary methodological field in relation to the science itself, which has moved to the forefront.<sup>328</sup>

A. Riehl paid much attention to the justification of the strict correspondence between sciences and philosophical methods of research. On the one hand, he distanced himself as much as he could from the speculative metaphysics and natural philosophy represented in the doctrines of the German idealists: he demands that any system should take into account and strictly acknowledge the achievement of experimental investigations and tests of nature. In this rigor and thoroughness of the synthetic way of knowing the world (by the methods of the positive sciences on the one hand, and by the forces of the transcendental critical method on the other) Riehl saw the success of science. That is why he considered philosophy to be a science, and demanded its scientificity, correct application of its categories and strict consistency in conclusions. However, philosophy has another hypostasis, nonscientific; it has as its main task the holistic explanation of the world. When the Greeks first began to be preoccupied with questions about the nature and laws of the world around them, and natural philosophers only made timid attempts at theoretical knowledge of the universe, then philosophy, from Riehl's perspective, began to play exactly the role that is now, in Modern Age, assigned to science. As it is known, it was the early natural philosophers who stimulated observation of the processes occurring in the surrounding world, although from the extant works we can see that they did not seek to give their research the character of empirical research. Accordingly, we can speak of Greek philosophy not only (and by the standards of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>328</sup> Riehl A. The Vocation of Philosophy at the Present Day // Lectures delivered in Connection with the dedication of the Graduate College of Princeton University in October 1913. Princeton, 1914. P. 58—59.

Modern knowledge, not so much) as a science, but also as a field of study that expressed the *worldview* attitudes peculiar to ancient intellectuals.

When creating a universal picture of nature and comprehending the place of the human in it, they limited themselves to those explanations of the world that were available from purely theoretical positions, and therefore any philosophy turned out to be the result of the work of a single person, who was followed by a larger or smaller number of adherents. The point is that in philosophical systems the worldview, i.e. the system of the universe based on the principles of juxtaposition of all elements and their interconnection into a single whole is always presupposed by the very study of the surrounding reality, and is not a consequence of the search for truth. Such a system is therefore always based on the arbitrariness of its author, and the figure of the creator of a philosophical doctrine, like a keystone in the arch structure of a *devil's bridge*, cannot be eliminated from the system created by him/her. Thus, the randomness by which a worldview was created is a reliable indicator not of its scientific character, but of its artistic one, and in these terms many philosophers can also be qualified as poets, whose aesthetic quests brought the whole worlds to life.

M. Scheler believed that it is worldview that constitutes a certain natural grid of concepts and values, which every nation and every representative of this nation possesses, and which are formed by various historical and social experiences of these nations. Everything else (art, science, politics, etc.) are only intellectual manifestations (*Bildungsweltanschauungen*) of the originally unified and integral conglomerate of the natural worldview. Researchers of Scheler's thought point to the synthetic character of his anthropological project: "Scheler's philosophy offers a twist on the ancient pursuits of self-knowledge and the contemplation of being. And it exemplifies a merging of Western and Eastern approaches with a deep care and concern for the non-human world. His method employed gaining knowledge from science, phenomenology, and through the uncovering and cultivation of solidarities, that is, seeing connections, relations, and bonds with ourselves, others, and the rest of the organic and inorganic world".<sup>329</sup> Such a comprehensive conception, which required practical explication of once stated theoretical (ethical, axiological, anthropological) foundations, forced the philosopher to turn to the analysis of a special, philosophical worldview. Unlike M. Weber, who believed that philosophy should be subordinated to science, and its task was to catalogize and organize various worldviews, Scheler was convinced that it was philosophy that should deal with worldview problems as its creative task: "Through a metaphysics that could establish norms by which to evaluate *Weltanschauungen*, not only could the philosopher describe the various *Weltanschauungen* in terms of interrelatedness of their ideal contents; he could also determine their objective value as knowledge, indicating both their errors and their insights".<sup>330</sup>

In particular, in the article *The Philosophical Worldview* M. Scheler points out that as it developed, academic German philosophy did not participate in the construction of worldviews: "For decades it confined itself to being merely the handmaiden of the positive sciences, testing their premises, methods, and aims. Thus, the philosophy of the last third of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was almost entirely reduced to the doctrine of cognition and mental experience. But just as philosophy cannot be the handmaiden of the Church's faith, neither can it be the mere handmaiden of the sciences".<sup>331</sup> Further describing the defeats of positivism, neo-Kantianism, and historicism, due to their denial of metaphysics, Scheler seeks to justify a particular philosophical worldview concerned with reaching out into the transcendent. He emphasizes that a person has no choice whether or not to form in him/herself a metaphysical idea and a metaphysical feeling — that is, the idea that it is as a being that exists only through itself and on which all other beings depend that underlies the world and the person him/herself.

In other words, Scheler calls a philosophical worldview the ability to navigate the world by observing and investigating its metaphysical grounding: "But a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>329</sup> McCune T. J. The Solidarity of Life: Max Scheler on Modernity and Harmony with Nature // Ethics and the Environment. 2014. Vol. 19, No. 1. P. 49—71. P. 66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>330</sup> Staude J. R. Max Scheler. An Intellectual Biography. London, 1967. P.156—157.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>331</sup> Scheler M. Selected Works. Moscow, 1994. P. 3. (In Russian).

philosophically free investigation of the absolute is possible not only because metaphysics is always something real. The human has also the legitimate means of cognition to cautiously and thoroughly, within strictly delineated boundaries, cognize the basis of all things — always imperfectly, indeed, but truly and with obviousness. And in the same way the human has the capacity, in the core of his/her personality, to find a living communion with the basis of all things".<sup>332</sup> It is precisely such a worldview attitude that brings a person closer to acquiring the knowledge of salvation. The same as for W. Dilthey, different types of worldview do not arise from the will to knowledge alone — they are derivatives of the position taken in life, life experience, and the whole structure of our mental whole.<sup>333</sup> The development of worldviews is determined by the will for the stability of the world picture, the evaluation of life, the work of the will, resulting from a number of stages of mental development.<sup>334</sup>

**β.** The implication of this characteristic is that worldview as a research issue can be described and solved in the field of practical, rather than theoretical, philosophy. This transition was already marked in the works of the representatives of neo-Kantianism. As is known, among the Neo-Kantians, worldview was considered a false and unscientific problem, the development of which was not encouraged. Their research program was primarily aimed at liberating philosophy from any spiritual or subjective attitudes, at the so-called secularization of philosophy, and was associated with the task of substantiating the scientific status of philosophy. N. A. Dmitrieva in this connection remarks: "<...> it was in the independence of philosophy from worldview attitudes that the Neo-Kantians saw the condition of objectivity and scientificity of philosophical knowledge in general. The realization of this task for the Russian Neo-Kantians was all the more important because for their opponents

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>332</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>333</sup> Also vide: Zotov A. F., Melvil Yu. K. Bourgeois philosophy of the mid-Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. Moscow, 1988. [Electronic resourse] — URL:

http://sbiblio.com/BIBLIO/archive/sotov\_burjuasnaja/09.aspx (access date: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*). <sup>334</sup> Dilthey W. Types of Worldviews and Their Detection in Metaphysical Systems // Cultural Studies. XXth century. Anthology. Moscow, 1995. P. 220; ibid., p. 224. (*In Russian*).

— Russian religious thinkers — philosophy was predominantly represented as a 'worldview'".<sup>335</sup> However, while the Neo-Kantians considered worldview principles to be an insufficient basis for scientific philosophy, they saw the development of a worldview an understandable and fruitful endeavor in practical application. This also applied to political decisions and sympathies, and generally to participation in social and political activities, where the Cohenian idea of developing an ethical principle lay at the heart of it: "As is known, it was Cohen's intention to extend the transcendental method to all kinds of knowledge, including ethics, focusing on the 'fact of law'. <...> But for its realization, Cohen formulated an important ethical task: to achieve the 'unity of man' within the framework of a unified humanity, since only in humanity does the individual person act autonomously as "a goal in itself".<sup>336</sup>

It is noteworthy that the young Heidegger also uses the concept of *worldview* in a broad sense close to ordinary usage, i.e. as the general attitude of the subject to the object of his attention, based on his "natural attitude". Thus, for example, in a 1915 paper he speaks of the substance of *the medieval worldview* as a factor in the stability of the clerical Catholic world.<sup>337</sup> This sense of the natural attitude (or, as M. Scheler would call it, "a relatively natural worldview")<sup>338</sup> is quite tightly associated with both the theoretical and practical aspects. It should be noted that for the young Heidegger himself the concept of "worldview" was connected with Catholicism; thus, already in his youth he believed that only Catholic neo-Scholasticism could be called a true worldview and defended his point of view in his personal correspondence.<sup>339</sup> Subsequently, in the works of the 1930s and later, Heidegger made a strict distinction between ontology and worldview, emphasizing that ontology as "original science' can only provide formal content, that is, in a religious

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>335</sup> Dmitrieva N. A. Philosophy as Science and Worldview: Toward a Question of Pacifism in German and Russian Neo-Kantianism // Logos. 2013. № 2 (92). Pp. 138—154. P. 141. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>336</sup> Ibid., p. 143.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>337</sup> Heidegger M. Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus // Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt a.M., 1986. B. 1. S. 225—226.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>338</sup> Vide: Scheler M. The Problems of Sociology of Knowledge. Moscow, 2011. P. 62. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>339</sup> Van Buren J. The Earliest Heidegger: A New Field of Research // A Companion to Heidegger. Oxford, 2005. P. 20; ibid., p. 25.

sense unstrict and therefore not limited in its ontic application to the individual positive domain of Christian experience".<sup>340</sup> In his studies, however, he focuses almost exclusively on the theoretical aspect of the concept of *Weltanschauung* as it takes shape in the history of Modern Age metaphysics. Very eloquent are the words of a contemporary scholar who reconstructs in detail and in a consistent manner the dual practical-theoretical meaning inherent in this concept:

In general, the definition of worldview without reference to the motivations for action is incomplete. I will limit myself to one example: Michael Inwood's definition: "Weltanschauung is fundamentally a 'view of life', a view of our position in the world and how we should act." Note the final words in the sentence: how we should act. It is rather interesting that the quote is taken from a paper explaining the technical terms of Heidegger's philosophy, which suggests that this function applies not only to social movements but also to the world of theory building. We would not be wrong to say that we affirm thereby the mutual dependence between society, science, and philosophy.<sup>341</sup>

In other words, we are talking about Heidegger's meaningful retreat to the position of theoretical discretion, refusing any kind of practical philosophy. But this renunciation means at the same time recognizing what one is renouncing: is not it an attempt to hide in that Syracuse that Heidegger was wickedly and wittily asked about visiting in the memorable year of 1934?<sup>342</sup>

In Heidegger's meditations of 1938—39, there is a short sketch entitled *Worldview and Metaphysics*, which can be seen as preparatory sketches for a lecture that was later embodied in the text of *The Age of the World Picture*. In addition to enumerating the various aspects characteristic of the formation of a worldview, Heidegger also formulates a remarkable aphorism: "Worldview is the attainment of the affirmation of the power of unconditional thoughtlessness in an age of perfect meaninglessness".<sup>343</sup> In general, this is what his understanding of human relation to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>340</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>341</sup> Griffioen S. On Worldviews // Philosophia Reformata. 2012. Vol. 77, No. 1. P. 19–56.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>342</sup> Bibikhin V. V. The Deed of Heidegger // Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 5. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>343</sup> Heidegger M. Besinnung // Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt a.M., 1997. B. 66, S. 402.

the machine, mechanistic world of Modern science, which, as we know, does not think and is not connected to thinking by any bridges, looks like in a concentrated form.<sup>344</sup> Is not this neglect of the practical aspect symptomatic? After all, Heidegger's contemporaries — W. Dilthey, M. Scheler, K. Mannheim, and others considered worldviews primarily in terms of action, not a particular epistemological attitude.

K. Jaspers also considered worldviews in the same way. In his *Philosophical* Autobiography he points out what task he set himself when working on the book on the psychology of worldviews: "The most essential thing, the book said, was the individual's independent choice of life; the author only gives some explanations that contribute to the comprehension of the self and open up possibilities for such a comprehension. The book appealed to the inherent responsibility of each person for his or her choice and offered help in orientation, but did not try to teach how to live".<sup>345</sup> When asked what a worldview is, Jaspers gives the following answer: "At any rate, something whole and something universal. When, for example, we speak of knowledge, it means not individual knowledge, but knowledge as a whole, as a cosmos. After all, a worldview is not just knowledge, it manifests itself in evaluations, in the order of preference of values".<sup>346</sup> In his book, he indeed gives samples of different worldviews characteristic of different personality types with exemplary systematicity and skillful structuring, and for the first time prescribes four types of *private limit situations* with concrete examples in situations of struggle, death, accident (*Zufall*), and guilt. Jaspers emphasizes that none of these situations can exist without the other, which also expresses the unity and assemblage of the inner world of a person, most clearly revealed in these particular psychologically extreme situations. It is in these conditions of the empirical world that human existentiality makes itself known.<sup>347</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>344</sup> Heidegger M. A Conversation on a Country Road. Moscow, 1991. Pp. 137–138. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>345</sup> Jaspers K. Philosophical Autobiography // Pertsev A. V. Young Jaspers: The Birth of Existentialism from the Foam of Psychiatry. St. Petersburg, 2012. P. 232. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>346</sup> Jaspers K. Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. Berlin, 1919. S. 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>347</sup> Ibid., S. 227–228.

It is known that Jaspers's book, which marked his transition to the camp of philosophers, gained controversial fame. Indeed, the work of the young doctor of psychology was more like a sermon than the meticulous theoretical study that many expected from him. Thus, Heidegger's teacher H. Rickert published a sharp critical article about it.<sup>348</sup> Heidegger himself also did not share Jaspers's analysis of the psychology of worldviews. His main objection was the following: by means of any positive science one cannot even hope to come close to understanding what Jaspers in his work calls "limit situations" (this position was analyzed by many authors who wrote about both Heidegger and Jaspers).<sup>349</sup> Nevertheless, Heidegger believed that the analysis of limit situations was the strongest feature of the work; later in *Being* and Time he would turn not so much to Jaspers's typology of worldviews as to his idea of the limit and limit situations.<sup>350</sup> The psychology of worldviews, proceeding from positive grounds, does not approach the *Dasein*-problem as such, and in this case such a psychology only seeks to become a doctrine of life, turning again and again to a one-dimensional subject devoid of the properties of science, who is impelled to take a certain position in relation to the objective world.<sup>351</sup> Heidegger does not recognize any reason for the psychology of worldviews to become or to become such a doctrine of life — rather, it must clarify the principles and means of self-contemplation.<sup>352</sup>

An important conclusion from Heidegger's critique of Jaspers's project will allow us to move on to the next characteristic. It is known that Heidegger demanded from the philosophical quest to pave the way to a dynamic grasp of the essence of being as a process, as a constant movement toward those horizons that make being meaningful. The worldview then turns out to be only a static construction, an

<sup>351</sup> Noteworthy is that in the late 1920s-30s a whole string of works appeared, focusing on the problem of the irrationality of modern society and the degradation of its subjects — vide.: Mulligan K. Foolishness, Stupidity, and Cognitive Values // The Monist. 2014. Vol. 97. No. 1. P. 66—85. P. 68 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>348</sup> Jaspers K. Philosophical Autobiography // Pertsev A. V. Young Jaspers: The Birth of Existentialism from the Foam of Psychiatry. St. Petersburg, 2012. P. 235. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>349</sup> Vide, e.g.: Safranski R. Heidegger: German Master and His Time. Moscow, 2005. (*In Russian*); Vlasova O. A. Karl Jaspers: A Philosopher's Way. St. Petersburg, 2018. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>350</sup> Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids, 2002. P. 179 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>352</sup> Heidegger M. Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen" // Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt a.M., 1976. B. 9, S. 9.

abstraction snatched from the movement toward the truth of the world. The plurality of worldview forms also speaks against it; it means that we are not talking here about the world that is grasped in the existent subject, in *Dasein*, but about something fundamentally different, non-philosophical, even alien to philosophy: "Worldview is not a subject of theoretical knowledge, neither in terms of origin nor in terms of use. It is not simply held in memory as a certain stock of knowledge, but is a subject of interrelated beliefs that more or less explicitly and directly determine life and living".<sup>353</sup> Indirectly, this also confirms that the positive sciences give an unsatisfactory answer to the question of the possibility of a worldview, that is, they present the subject of cognition as some function of the world (actually, as a subject in relation to the object). In genuine philosophy, which Heidegger outlines in his review as a program, there is the possibility and condition of assembling the subject around its own existence and through this its "dis-subjectivation", for the removal of the subject-object opposition is imposed by science. The human is transformed into a creator, and he/she reveals him/herself as a world, not as a picture, but as a problem, a question, a dynamic relation to being. The active position that Jaspers invited his readers to take, for Heidegger, in fact, meant a direct path to the oblivion of being and averaging, that is, to becoming the proverbial das Man. At this point we come to the next distinctive feature of the worldview associated with its anthropological problematics.

**Γ.** The doctrine of worldview (Weltanschauungslehre) is a comprehensive project or integrative discipline. It encompasses not only philosophical disciplines themselves, such as ethics, aesthetics, axiology, ontology and epistemology, etc., but also related ones, such as sociology of knowledge, psychology, linguistics, etc., as well.

The success of positive sciences and the growth of the authority of positive philosophy by the 20<sup>th</sup> century led to a sharper delimitation of the spheres of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>353</sup> Heidegger M. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2001. P. 6. (In Russian).

influence of philosophy and science. Philosophically intended scientists sought to solve the most important philosophical problems by means of science: a very illustrious example of this are I. I. Mechnikov's reflections on overcoming the disharmony of human nature, getting rid of the fear of death and, as a consequence, a decisive revision of the existing social institutions and legislation.<sup>354</sup> At the same time, R. Avenarius refuses the previous metaphysical tasks that philosophy has traditionally set for itself. Instead of speculative problems, he proposes to focus on solving the riddles of nature by positive sciences, but at the same time he recognizes the need for some kind of integrative discipline, which would be able to unite, bring under a single denominator all the diversity of achievements of positive research

Where has thinking that addresses the whole found its scientific development? It is clear that we cannot look for it in those disciplines that deal with individual parts, areas or aspects of the given in experience. On the contrary, we should expect that there is a special scientific thinking that considers as its task — as opposed to the sciences in the close sense of the word — the scientific understanding of the whole. Consequently, such scientific thinking must differ from the private sciences by the scope of the concept of its object and by the content of this concept — must stand in the closest connection with it. For this content meets us in parts in the objects of individual sciences, even if in the most indefinite form; as the highest concept, it must elevate the private understanding of sciences to the most universal understanding of the sciences.<sup>355</sup>

Noteworthy is that in the very next paragraph he admits that philosophy is such a science ("according to the testimony of history", as he says). In this point he is echoed by H. Gompertz, who states that "philosophy, in order to solve its task, needs the isolation and development of the private sciences, then our study puts it at the end of the series of sciences".<sup>356</sup> In addition, he agrees with Avenarius that "[a] philosopher, to the best of his ability, is also engaged in the special sciences".<sup>357</sup> In this case, the philosopher, as knowledge in the special disciplines becomes more

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>354</sup> For more details vide: Lvov A. A. A Positivist with a Romantic Soul: Overcoming the Conflict of Worldviews in the Anthropology of I. I. Mechnikov // Confliktologiya. 2019. Vol. 14. № 2. Pp. 96—114. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>355</sup> Avenarius R. Philosophy as Thinking about the World. Moscow, 2007. Pp. 17–18. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>356</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>357</sup> Ibid., p. 19.

complex, should give way to the specialists, and he himself should gradually move to the position of a contemplator of the whole, based on the data of the individual sciences as parts of this universal knowledge. However, their views on the fate of philosophy differ: while Avenarius proposes to deprive philosophy of all kinds of "accidental" disciplines — logic, ethics, aesthetics, etc., since they can be considered only auxiliary philosophical disciplines and cannot move philosophy on the way to the comprehension of the whole, Gompertz proposes to bring all the variety of private philosophical sciences under three fundamental principles (about which we will speak further on): noology, ontology, cosmology. But for him philosophy is also valuable first of all in connection with its epistemological function: "The philosophical discipline, which is now called metaphysics or theory of cognition, and sometimes subdivided into metaphysics and theory of cognition, we will next call the doctrine of worldview, or cosmotheory".<sup>358</sup>

Among German researchers of the relationship between consciousness and society in the first half of the 20th century, there arose a desire to propose a "third way" that would constitute a kind of median option in relation to the idealistic (Hegelian) and materialistic — Marxist or positivist. Thus, for example, M. Weber and E. Troeltsch tried to bypass the Scylla and Charybdis of idealism and materialism by putting forward the idea that the emergence of religious norms and ideals is independent of social conditions, and a major role in this process is played by historical circumstances in which people seek to apply these ideals to any social order.<sup>359</sup> One such scholars was M. Scheler; he attempted to develop an original sociology of knowledge that would be such a "third way" and, as the author himself hoped, lay the foundation for all cultural politics.<sup>360</sup> Scheler's notion of a *relatively natural worldview* has received wide coverage primarily in the works of German sociologists. Moreover, the development of Scheler's doctrine of instincts inherent in living beings is directly connected with the *philosophical* worldview, unlike other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>358</sup> Gomperz H. The Doctrine of Worldview. Vol. 1. St, Petersburg, 1912. P. 15. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>359</sup> Staude J. R. Max Scheler. An Intellectual Biography. London, 1967. P. 163–164.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>360</sup> Vide: Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens // Schriften des Forschungsinstitutes für Sozialwissenschaft in Köln. Vol. II. München und Leipzig, 1924/2013. S. 4.

possible worldview forms. This doctrine, many provisions of which M. Scheler based on vitality. Scheler based many of its provisions on the vitalistic natural philosophy of his teacher, the biologist H. Driesch, and became an important point in the development of the philosophical doctrine of man as a metaphysical system. And though the project itself remained unfinished, having been cut short by the philosopher's sudden death, nevertheless it is possible and necessary to speak about the internal interrelation of those ideas, which he thought over, starting at least from the 1920s. It is no coincidence that analyzing worldviews is such an important enterprise for Scheler. He sincerely believed that in order to overcome any cultural differences and ideological conflicts, governments should enlist the help of worldview analysts (*Weltanschauungsanalysis*), and that it was such experts who could teach politicians how to avoid unilateralism and class bias in their activities. He was even inclined to see *Weltanschauungsphilosophie* as a special philosophical complement to parliamentary activity in Germany.<sup>361</sup>

M. Scheler's project of philosophical anthropology was aimed at overcoming many contradictions and problems that were articulated in the philosophical schools that preceded him, primarily neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. His unfinished philosophical system, therefore, does indeed become an important stage on the way to the formation of not only a new ethics, axiology, but also presents a vivid example of the unity of the philosophical view of the complex problem of man as such. However, his doctrine of worldview was combined with the obviously metaphysical orientation of his anthropological and ethical studies, while the doctrine of worldview was also developed by many authors quite far from metaphysics — the already mentioned M. Weber and K. Mannheim, G. Radbruch and others. An original example of this is the book *Heaven and Worldview in the Circle of Times* by the Danish historian and cultural scholar F. Troels-Lund, in which he writes that he considers his task to be "[...] to find out how people of that epoch [1th century — *A.L.*] looked at life, what colors were painted in those times in human relations and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>361</sup> Straude J. Max Scheler: An Intellectual Portrait. London,, 1967. P. 153 ff.

human activity itself<sup>2</sup>. <sup>362</sup> Apparently, we should talk about the influence of historical and worldview studies of W. Dilthey in this case. In general, despite the criticism of contemporaries and descendants, Dilthey's studies allowed to substantiate the anthropological dimension in the history of culture, raising the question of understanding a particular historical period of time from the point of view of the person's attitude to the world, the manifestation of human experiences in a particular epoch. Thus, on the one hand, the interesting anthropological aspect of historical and philosophical activity received an impetus for development,<sup>363</sup> and on the other hand, the philosophical analysis of worldview, which is of interest to us. It can hardly be said that the doctrine of worldviews was formulated by Dilthey as a special research direction, but the fact that his research influenced the formation and, in some points, (for example, by setting a typological tendency) predetermined the development of the very problematics of the philosophical doctrine of worldviews is, in our opinion, undeniable.

In addition, it was Dilthey's development of the philosophical doctrine of worldview in the historical-philosophical aspect that serves as an important stage in the substantiation of the anthropological aspect of this problematic; in other words, the anthropological aspect of historical-philosophical activity received an impetus for development.<sup>364</sup> The most original perception of Dilthey's method of "experiencing' of the historical person"<sup>365</sup> was offered by his student and editor of Dilthey's collected works, B. Groethuysen, who substantiated the historical-philosophical interpretation of the problem field of philosophical anthropology. Recall that Groethuysen argues for two basic points of view, or perspectives, from which a person unfolds him/herself. These two starting positions are life and knowledge of life, or *vivo* and *cogito*. On the one hand, all human beings recognize themselves in the way they live and act, and this authentic philosophy of life is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>362</sup> Lund T. F. Heaven and Worldview in the Circle of Times. Odessa, 1912. P. 1. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>363</sup> Ermarth M. Intellectual History as Philosophical Anthropology: Bernard Groethuysen's Transformation of

Traditional Geistesgeschichte // The Journal of Modern History. 1993. Vol. 65. No. 4. P. 673-705.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>364</sup> Ibid., p. 673–705.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>365</sup> Bibikhin V. V. A History of Contemporary Philosophy (The Unity of Philosophical Thought). St. Petersburg, 2014. P. 243. (*In Russian*).

reflected in art and in religion, which encapsulates the "dominion of life over life",<sup>366</sup> or conceptions of a transcendent world beyond the world of everyday life. On the other hand, philosophy retreats from man, from his life, and seeks a foothold outside the world. The distance that philosophy assumes in relation to the people allow us to look at them as if from the outside, but at the same time in wholeness, which leads to the question of what they are without regard to their personal interest, or, as Groethuysen says, their "personal egoism" in relation to their own life. In other words, what we have before us is the dialectic inherent in the philosophical science of man, which consists in the opposition of life to knowledge.<sup>367</sup>

Thus, anthropology is thought of as an ontology of the human, since the human is always rooted in a communicative, linguistic, cultural and historically specific situation, and therefore hermeneutical techniques are appropriate here. Groethuysen addresses the situation, which he tends to interpret as a distinction between the "I" and the way language is used by each individual at the level of "I-Thou".

 $\gamma$ . In this point we come to *the implication* of the above characteristic, namely, that the proposed doctrines of worldview, and the worldview projects themselves, which are formulated within their framework, testify to a greater extent to the changes that have taken place with the worldviews themselves. This means that these kinds of doctrines of worldviews are important indicators of how we ourselves, as subjects of worldviews, are changing in specific historical and cultural circumstances. The most striking marker of this consequence is, of course, the means of expressing our ideas and desires - the language we use. This language turns out to be the discursive space in which the subject of a certain worldview reveals and justifies his or her life world. In his dissertation on empathy (*Das Mitgefühl*), B. Groethuysen analyzed how human understanding entails the establishment of a prior discursive and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>366</sup> Groethuysen B. Anthropologie philosophique. Paris, 2014. P. 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>367</sup> B. Groethuysen's ideas of worldview as well as the ones of his predecessors were also discussed in: Lvov A. A. Anthropological Turn in Worldview Studies: Theoretical and Practical Aspects // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. — 2020. — T. 36. — № 2. — P. 279—290. — P. 283—285.

reflective distance between the individual and his own situation.<sup>368</sup> "I" entering the understanding of "I-Thou" never bypasses the implicit distance between the subject itself and its language, even before its confrontation with the strange or recalcitrant Other. Language, dialogic communication, and reflection all seek to diffuse the deep impulse of self-distance that is implicit in human existence itself. Philosophical anthropology asserts a second-order reflexivity over original reflexivity. This reflexive practice should lead to a better understanding at the level of the iconic and even preverbal system of communication than deployed discursive practices. Groethuysen understands philosophical anthropology as a fundamental meta-discipline along with the sociology of knowledge and typologies of worldview. It is the affirmation of a historiographical approach in anthropological research that makes anthropology similar to what we would now call critical metahistory or cultural hermeneutics.<sup>369</sup> Generally speaking, this kind of reflexive practice should lead to a better understanding (besser-verstehen - a word taken in the footsteps of Dilthey's thought) at the level of the sign and even pre-verbal system of communication than deployed discursive practices.<sup>370</sup> Thus, the interdisciplinarity of the worldview problematic is locked in the way in which the order of the world presented to us is expressed.

However, there were also those who believed that Diltheyan historical relativism had a bad influence on the formation and development of philosophy as a strict science. Among them a special place is given to E. Husserl, who defended his project of a science of the phenomena of consciousness: "The main argument of his criticism was that historicism, like naturalistic psychologism, dissolves ideal significance in factual givenness. <...> The question of establishing the significance of cultural phenomena is reduced by historicism to the question of their actual origin and functioning in a relative historical context".<sup>371</sup> Accordingly, no systematic and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>368</sup> Große Kracht K. Zwischen Berlin und Paris: Bernhard Groethuysen: (1880–1946). Eine intellektuelle Biographie. Tübingen, 2002. S. 26.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>369</sup> Ermarth M. Intellectual History as Philosophical Anthropology: Bernard Groethuysen's Transformation of Traditional Geistesgeschichte // The Journal of Modern History. 1993. Vol. 65. No. 4. P. 684.
 <sup>370</sup> Ibid., p. 685.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>371</sup> Plotnikov N. S. Life and History: Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophical Program. Moscow, 2000. P. 162. (*In Russian*).

strictly descriptive methodology is out of the question here, because historicism seeks to root the generally significant phenomena necessary to phenomenology in their historical factuality. In other words, there is no objective significance of this or that phenomenon outside of what has actually happened — something with which Husserl, of course, could not agree.

Husserl's own reasoning revolves around the question of worldview as a special result of the cognitive activity of the man of the modern era and, as a consequence, the change in the life world of the Modern European. Husserl formulates this question as follows: "Should not something similar be possible with regard to the concrete world in general? If, thanks to the Renaissance turning back to ancient philosophy, we are already firmly convinced, like Galileo, of the possibility of a philosophy, an episteme, which creates an objective science of the world, and if it has already been shown that pure mathematics in its application to nature fully satisfies the postulate of the episteme in its gestalt sphere, then was not the idea of nature, constructively definable in the same way in all its other aspects, prefigured for Galileo?"<sup>372</sup> The modern systematization of the world began with the project of mathematical natural science, and an important condition for this was the epistemological identity of the rational basis of the world itself and the rational method underlying this system, which makes it possible to conceptualize philosophy as a rigorous science. Thus, this seemingly belated reflection re-veals an essential point: the task of constructing and forming a worldview was set simultaneously with the task of constructing a systematic philosophy, which was the epistemological ideal of Modern metaphysics.

It is not accidentally, therefore, that it was in his paper *Philosophy as a Strict Science*, that Husserl pointed to the source of this kind of worldview debate: from his perspective, Hegel's doctrine radically weakened all the efforts of philosophy to become a science, since it was the first time that the idea of "the relative truth of all philosophy for its time" was sounded with such conviction.<sup>373</sup> The consequence of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>372</sup> Husserl E. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. St. Peterburg, 2004. P. 53. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>373</sup> Husserl E. Philosophy as a Strict Science // Husserl E. Selected Works. Moscow, 2005. P. 190. (In Russian).

this position was a rejection of the search for any absolute foundations of truth and a rejection of the very idea of an extra-historical form of philosophy. No more, no less, than Husserl accuses Hegel of historicism, relativism, and, later on, of exacerbating skepticism: "Through the transformation of Hegel's metaphysical philosophy of history into skeptical historicism, the essentially new 'philosophy of worldview' has been determined, which in our days seems to be spreading rapidly, and in general, with its mostly anti-naturalistic and sometimes even anti-historical polemics, wants to be precisely skeptical. And since it appears to be free from that radical aspiration to scientific doctrine which constituted the great characteristic of the new philosophy up to Kant, therefore everything said above about the weakening of philosophical and scientific aspirations applied to it".<sup>374</sup>

Husserl is apparently referring here to a passage in the *Preface* to Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, which speaks of the eternal inconsistency between the task of philosophy and its ultimate forms of expression.<sup>375</sup> This passage mainly refers to the fact that every thinker is conditioned by his historical moment, for philosophy itself is an epoch captured in a concept. But what Husserl means above all is an attempt to justify such a philosophical knowledge, which would not depend on any historical epoch, would not be conditioned by any external, temporal, and in these terms accidental circumstances. In solving worldview problems, Husserl therefore naturally saw the influence of historicism, which had spread in philosophy already after Hegel's death — namely, in the philosophical program of W. Dilthey. His fundamental phenomenological project was aimed precisely at achieving strictness in philosophy, and in this respect, unlike Dilthey's reasoning, asserted the generalizability of science and philosophy.<sup>376</sup> Despite the fact that the founder of phenomenology later recognized the haste of his criticism of Dilthey's project, we cannot help noticing: in a sense, it was Husserl who in his speech about philosophy as a strict science expressed what many of his contemporaries were only thinking

<sup>374</sup> Ibid., p. 190-191

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>375</sup> Hegel G. W. F. The Philosophy of Right. Moscow, 1990. P. 55. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>376</sup> Vide: Plotnikov N. S. Life and History. Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophical Program. Moscow, 2000. P. 13. (*In Russian*).

about. This can be seen in the case of the positivists, who denied any heuristic value whatsoever to philosophy, reserving to it the right only to perform epistemological functions — classification, analysis, justification, etc. — in relation to a giant volume of factual data obtained in the course of experimentation.

### $\Delta$ . The subject of a worldview necessarily interprets his/her own living world.

Both worldview as a phenomenon and the doctrines of worldview themselves as experiments of reflection on the cultural circumstances of historical human existence always presuppose a certain subject. At the same time, this subject is always connected with the situation of his/her own unique life world, which organically enters into the eventfulness of the life world of other subjects. In this respect, it is natural to develop the question of the human being as a subject of philosophical knowledge.

If we turn again to A. Riehl's views, we will see that he considers the human being from two positions: firstly, from the external, or objective, in which case the human being is understood as one of the subjects of research by means of science and physiology. Secondly, from the internal, or subjective position. It is on this position that substance emerges, endowing philosophical research with its own subject, because the human being is the only living being who possesses goal-setting. Modern natural science, inseparable from the foundations of the evolutionary doctrine, is known to deny teleology in nature. Speaking of this in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Riehl recalls E. Dubois-Reymond's well-known formula "Ignoramibus!",<sup>377</sup> thus returning to the Kantian limitation of the human capacity for cognition. In addition to this teleological idea, man also possesses a moral sense, which is what philosophy in the traditional sense (such as *life philosophy*, interpreted in the spirit of the ancient principle of  $\gamma v \tilde{\omega} \theta t$  σεαυτόν) should be concerned with, while scientific

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>377</sup>Vide: Haeckel E. The Riddle of the Universe. Moscow, 1935. Pp. 224–226. (In Russian).

philosophy as such should be resolutely limited to the framework of the theory of knowledge.<sup>378</sup>

Interestingly, a similar heuristic fork is also characteristic of the Baden neo-Kantian school. Since the unity of philosophy and its traditional three-part canon of truth, good, and beauty is constituted in practical reason, the boundary between the theory of values (as Badenians interpreted philosophy) and individual positive sciences, which cognitive material the theoretical mind works with, turns out to be insurmountable. In this connection, T. A. Akindinova notes: "The emerging tendency to irrationalism was aggravated by attempts, bypassing the question of the genesis of values, to justify their 'generalizability'. The followers of Windelband and Rickert see it in the 'psychophysiological reality' of the subject — in "striving" (Kohn), 'attraction' (Christiansen). But this meant the naturalization of the very nature of value, its reduction from the proper human form of the subject's activity ('practical reason') to the psychic ability of desire and, consequently, completely contradicted the Kantian separation of 'general faculties of the soul' and 'transcendental faculties', thus becoming a variant of Schopenhauer's interpretation of Kant: 'the 'core of the subject, determining all forms of its activity, was no longer the moral will, but unconscious desire".<sup>379</sup> We would like to emphasize that A. Riehl solves the problem of worldview as a project to create a system of knowledge in aesthetic terms. Already in his Princeton speech on the vocation of philosophy, the idea of the necessity of recognizing values and axiological systems was expressed, and he saw the task of philosophy in formulating them in a Cartesian way, clearly and distinctly, thus achieving harmony of spiritual aspirations in human life: "It is this vocation that the philosophy of the past has fulfilled to a much greater extent than any scientific purpose, and the same dual purpose is its mission today".<sup>380</sup> While we should not overestimate the power of philosophy as a discipline to provide worldview unity, we

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>378</sup> Riehl A. Scientific and Non-Scientific Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 1901. P. 24. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>379</sup> Akindinova T. A. The Problem of Worldview Integrity in German Philosophy and Aesthetics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Doctoral Thesis for Specialization: 09.00.03, 09.00.04 / St. Petersburg technological institute of refrigeration. — St. Petersburg, 1991. P. 124. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>380</sup> Riehl A. The Vocation of Philosophy at the Present Day // Lectures delivered in Connection with the dedication of the Graduate College of Princeton University in October 1913. Princeton, 1914. P. 63.

should also not forget that, apart from it, no other science can provide such unity in terms of values.

According to R. Avenarius's doctrine, there is a natural human concept of the world, which later varies under the influence of philosophical theories. This natural concept of the world consists in the fact that the environment surrounding a person and the statements and actions of people in relation to it and to each other are quite adequate, and also adequate to the behavior of this person — both in relation to people and to the environment. This relation to the world is possible due to our experience, which can be analyzed, so that the contents of a person's statements about the world will correspond to the empirically given system of the world. As a consequence of human introjection (i.e., the distinction between the world external and internal in relation to every single thing, and subsequently any kind of doubling of the world in general), the world varies. The task of philosophy (and, generally speaking, of psychology)<sup>381</sup> is to investigate this introjection through the critique of experience, and thus to solve the riddle of the world by restoring the natural concept of the world, which Avenarius himself interpreted as a "pure universal concept".<sup>382</sup> Although for him the actual philosophical point of view of man does not differ from physical anthropology, nevertheless, the critique of experience should allow us to approach the resolution of the world as a problem — this is, after all, the classical course in the history of philosophy: from the "I" to the world.

W. Dilthey more definitely called life itself the source of worldview. In his work *Types of Worldviews and Their Detection in Metaphysical Systems* he points out that the life of each individual creates its own world out of itself.<sup>383</sup> From reflection on life, life experience emerges; extrapolating, the same can be said about all people in the world — in "an inextricably linked chain of individuals, a common life experience emerges".<sup>384</sup> It should be noted that the field of life experience also includes a strictly defined system of relations in which our "I" is connected with

<sup>384</sup>Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>381</sup> Vide: Avenarius R. Philosophy as Thinking about the World. Moscow, 2007. Pp. VI–VII. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>382</sup> Gomperz H. The Doctrine of Worldview. Vol. 1. St. Petersburg, 1912. P. 104. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>383</sup> Dilthey W. Types of Worldviews and Their Detection in Metaphysical Systems // Cultural Studies. XXth century. Anthology. Moscow, 1995. Pp. 216. (*In Russian*).

other people and objects of the external world. It is characteristic that Dilthey does not ignore the enigma of life formulated by himself, which is that thinking, directed towards the general and the whole, encounters in the data of experience a contradictory way of life. (Note *a propos* that the very concept of "the riddle of life" became popular at the turn of the century and is found even among natural scientists: for example, for the monist E. Haeckel it meant only the problem of substance).<sup>385</sup>

δ. Summarizing the considered approaches, we can say that the world-as-a-whole appears as a genuine problem for philosophers of the turn of the  $19^{th}$ — $20^{th}$  centuries. Essentially, we face the consequences of the Kantian distinction between the two worlds, nature and freedom, aggravated by the formalism of natural sciences. Life, which manifests itself in man as an unfolding project, appears as an enigmatic, mysterious epiphenomenon of actual human existence. Here we return to the thesis about the holistic nature of the world, which we stated at the beginning. *The implication* of this characteristic is that worldview as a basis for philosophical practice presupposes the recognition of the Other and unity with the Other. In this way, the recognition of solipsism as a theoretical limitation of the world and the attempt to overcome it in practice is achieved. At the same time, the Other can be understood personally, but can also be assumed impersonally.

E. Husserl's attempts to avoid solipsism by introducing and justifying apperception (or "apperception by analogy", i.e., clarifying perception by analogy) and intersubjectivity are well known. In the fifth and most problematic Cartesian reflection, he directly points out that the world of pure transcendental *egos* does not constitute itself, but always only as a constellation of "others" in relation to "I". By this, "a certain community of selves, including myself, is constituted as a community of selves existing next to each other and for each other, a certain community of monads is constituted, namely as such a community which (through its co-constitutive intentionality) constitutes the same world. In this world all selves arise again, but now they are endowed in objectifying apperception with the sense of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>385</sup> Vide: Haeckel E. The Riddle of the Universe. Moscow, 1925. P. 79. (In Russian).

'persons', i.e. psychophysical persons as objects of the world".<sup>386</sup> It is remarkable that these are not the same flesh-and-blood people in relation to whom our genuine experience (love, hatred, anxiety, etc.) arises — these steps will be taken by such original thinking followers of Husserl as M. Heidegger and M. Merleau-Ponty. It is important for us to notice that Husserl rescues his sterile construction of pure phenomenological inquiry with the recognition that every *ego* is exactly the same as I am myself. The world is not centered only within my skull, but it is revealed by the mathematical operation of adding up all the *egos* present around me and recognized by me. In one of the final paragraphs, Husserl himself summarizes this thought:

My *ego*, apodictically given to myself, the only thing that can be believed by me with absolute apodicticism to exist, can be an a priori ego that perceives the world in experience only by being in community with other egos like it, as a member of the community of monads given as oriented around itself. In virtue of the fact that the objective world of experience authenticates itself non-contradictorily, other monads non-contradictorily authenticate themselves as entities. Conversely, no multitude of monads is conceivable to me except as explicitly or implicitly organized into a community; hence it follows that this multitude constitutes in itself the objective world and — as a multitude of psychophysical and, in particular, human beings — acquires spatial and temporal form in this world and realizes itself in it.<sup>387</sup>

Husserl then introduces the concept of co-existence (*Mit-sein*), describing the structures embedded in the self that perceive the co-existence of other monads. It is from here that philosophers seeking a grounding in existential analyticism will later draw their inspiration. It is important, however, that in the thought of the founder of phenomenology we already see a dramatic attempt to go beyond the methodological trap he himself had set: attempts to interpret the transcendental subject as the source of the world inevitably turn on the problematic status of other *egos*.<sup>388</sup> Note that the course of discovering the universal and necessary principle of the world in the self is a quite natural course for classical philosophy. Thus, for example, A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>386</sup> Husserl E. Cartesian Meditations. St. Petersburg, 2006. P. 211. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>387</sup> Ibid., p. 264.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>388</sup> Pihlström S. Why Solipsism Matters. London, 2020. P. 95–96.

Schopenhauer proclaimed "the true nature of one's authentic being" as the discovery of "the truth simply, the truth of anything": "The whole world, everything in the world, as a whole and separately, has as its truth what I have as its truth".<sup>389</sup> For Husserl, however, recognizing another *ego*, the *ego* beyond the I, meant recognizing the unlivability of the world as such only within the boundaries of my transcendental *ego*. M. Mayatzky summarizes his views on man as follows: "For Husserl, a man is not fully human, but a subject free from being too human. He is a solipsist endowed with the most complex apparatus of self-description and practically does not engage in verbal exchange with others, but by the power of empathy and a priori analogy derives the structure of another from his own <...>".<sup>390</sup> This point became an important starting point for the followers of his phenomenology, in particular for those who developed the project of philosophical anthropology.

Scholars note that for M. Scheler "transcendence beyond 'life' is one of the most essential features of human existence".<sup>391</sup> In his project of philosophical anthropology, a human being appears to be striving for the realization of his/her unique and at the same time universal ontological self, in the dimensions of which the divine meets the human. God, understood in the context of this philosophical perspective personally, finds in the individual man and all of humanity a becoming, and man himself is perceived not as a "creature of God" but as a "co-author", a "co-creator" in the process of a grand synthesis of fundamental ontological forces. The true essence of the fact that the human spirit is able to distance itself from reality, Scheler discovers in acts of "idea-abstraction" (he applies here a quite phenomenological concept), by means of which the spirit rises to the realm of pure essences and penetrates into the ultimate foundations of being.<sup>392</sup> Therefore, the anthropocentric concept of the Renaissance of *the microcosm in the macrocosm* —

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>389</sup> Bibikhin V. V. A History of Contemporary Philosophy (The Unity of Philosophical Thought). St. Petersburg, 2014. P. 223. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>390</sup> Mayatsky M. Ad hominem and Back Again. Moscow, 2020. P. 119. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>391</sup> Chukhina L. Man and His World of Value in the Phenomenological Philosophy of Max Scheler // Scheler M. Selected Works. Moscow, 1994. P. 396. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>392</sup> Also vide: ibid., p. 395.

but if the Renaissance thinkers believed that human being is equal to God in his/her creative power, Scheler asserts the fundamental co-creation of man with God, in which the highest philosophical synthesis is achieved and the possibility of substantiating a philosophical worldview. He also notes that neither religious nor philosophical teachings have so far been devoted to revealing the essence of man, because they have ignored the essential *Kantian question* in their endeavor to trace anthropogenesis. Therefore, there is a historical need to develop a universal, philosophical doctrine of man, which would be able to cope with his specific feature — man's multidimensionality, with the fact that man is fundamentally impossible to be covered by a single concept.

M. Scheler substantiated his project of philosophical anthropology precisely as a mediator between the metaphysics of borderline problems of positive sciences and the metaphysics of the absolute. We have already mentioned above that modern metaphysics, from the German thinker's perspective, can no longer be considered as the cosmology and metaphysics of the subject — it becomes metaanthropology and metaphysics of action. Human being is understood as the first approach to God, and therefore the spiritual "personality" (Scheler's quotation marks) of man is neither a substantive thing nor being in the form of an object. Man can only actively absorb him/herself into personality — it is understood as "a monarchically ordered structure of spiritual acts, which is a unique individual self-concentration of the single infinite spirit in which the essential structure of the objective world is rooted".<sup>393</sup> In this regard, man returns to his/her metaphysically grounded ideal of the creator of God, God's co-creator in the absolute creative impulse also *practically*.

Thus, the human being appears as if at the crossroads of two worlds. On the one hand, he/she is something vital, in essence rising above a certain taxon of the organic world. On the other hand, the man as the goal of him/herself in cognition and realization belongs to a special sphere of education, the sphere of the spirit, which can be mastered only together with the members of the community from which he/she came and to which he/she belongs. However, this dualism is not at all

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>393</sup> Scheler M. Selected Works. Moscow, 1994. P. 13. (In Russian).

of the Kantian kind, which Scheler criticized so much: in this case man, like any living being, is perceived not as an object, but as "the last kind of categorical unities".<sup>394</sup> Consequently, as an organic being, he/she has never been numbered among "things". Man's essence is such that man turns out to be identical with the world, since he/she absorbs and contains all those beingness grounds, which are characteristic of the universe. Scheler, following the Catholic thinkers — St. Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Nicholas of Cusa — as well as representatives of Modern pantheism, asserts that in man "the whole of the world is contained as in one of the parts of the whole world",<sup>395</sup> despite the non-identity of the actual being of man and the world. As we have already partly seen, Scheler seeks to trace exactly how this idea finds its development in the doctrine of the creative union of man and God; Michael Gabel aptly summarizes these two ideas about the social character of human being: "Man is such an entity which in his finitude can exist only in solidary coexistence, not only with other finite persons, but above all with the personal God".<sup>396</sup> Now let us say that it is the value aspect of man's active being that turns out to be the common thing that makes man being a phenomenon of the world its bearer essentially.

The supreme being is comprehended on the basis of its attributes: first, the idea-forming reason itself, which itself simultaneously forms the essential structure of the world and of man him/herself, and, second, the irrational impulse that supposes irrational existence and accidental so-being ("images", as Scheler calls them), which expresses the whole variety and rendering of life in all its multiple forms. Exactly in what way this takes place must be shown by the natural philosophy of inorganic and organic nature. Initially, the increasing interaction of the above attributes of the supreme being in this process gives meaning to the world we are accustomed to, which in turn spiritualizes the creative impulse to initially unanswered ideas and higher values, or, as M. Scheler formulates this process,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>394</sup> Ibid., p. 305.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>395</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>396</sup> Gobel M. A Person — The Movement to the Divine? // Scheler M. Philosophical Fragments from the Manuscript Heritage. Moscow, 2007. P. 62. (*In Russian*).

reveals "the growing power and strength of the initially powerless, only projecting ideas infinite spirit".<sup>397</sup> Here we already see before us an attempt to reconcile the positions of representatives of classical German philosophy, who linked worldview with the natural philosophical comprehension of the world (with Schelling) and, on the other hand, with the dialectical development of self-consciousness (as we find in the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel). It is on the basis of such a reconciliation, or we can say a *unification* of the data of positive science and the results of axiological disciplines, that M. Scheler passes directly to metaphysical, or sacred knowledge.

The ethical projects "I and Thou" by M. Buber and "I and the Other" by E. Levinas already appear to us as having absorbed elaborate strategies for overcoming the limitations imposed on the autonomous and self-sufficient I. The unity of the world is achieved at the cost of this transgression from the I to the Other. The same view was inherent in the thinking of S. L. Frank, who pointed to the transrational trinity of the I, God, and the world as an impersonal factual totality of everything. The self is then understood as the true key "unlocking the entrance to the mystery of the relationship between God and the world," when along with the God-humanity, the theocosmism of the world is also manifested. In this way, the world is revealed as a potency brought by the fullness of the divine presence and human readiness for it, by the determination to universal spiritual actuality, to the "for-self-existent unity", to the "sacred 'we'".<sup>398</sup> Such ideas of communicative, even inter-active unity of the world were thought of as anticipations of the world as early as antiquity.

V. I. Ivanov, as we have seen above, summarizes this attitude to overcoming solipsism with the formula "Thou art", characteristic of the traditional recognition of the presence of God for the bearer of religious mind.<sup>399</sup> It is interesting that in his study of the peculiarities of Dostoevsky's poetics M. M. Bakhtin starts with this statement of V. I. Ivanov, pointing out that the characters of Dostoevsky's novels show a desire to affirm the other by their "penetration", to discover and reveal in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>397</sup> Scheler M. Selected Works. Moscow, 1994. P. 10. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>398</sup> Frank S. L. The Unknowable // Frank S. L. Works. Moscow, 1990. Pp. 527—528. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>399</sup> Ivanov V. I. The Native and the Universal. Moscow, 1994. Pp. 294—295. (*In Russian*); vide: Bakhtin M. M. The Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics // Bakhtin M. M. Collected Works in Seven Volumes. Moscow, 2002. Vol. 6, p. 15. (*In Russian*).

another's self as a subject rather than an impassive object. Let us note that Bakhtin characterizes polyphony as a special property of worldview, while monologism is inherent in ideology as its opposite. The ideologist is the one (such a character) who proclaims ideas, who speaks to be heard and noticed, the one who becomes, is realized through speech. Despite the fact that the word, and through it the idea, are characterized by nature as dialogical, Modern European culture created a special, rationally grounded ideal of monological ideologism, resting on the principle of the unity of being and consciousness: "Everything true fits within the limits of one consciousness, and if it does not fit in fact, then only for reasons accidental and extraneous to the truth itself. Ideally, one consciousness and one mouth are perfectly sufficient for the totality of knowledge; there is no need for a multiplicity of consciousnesses and no basis for it".<sup>400</sup> The bearer of such a principle does not err, and truth always speaks through him, but this truth is temporary and limited. On the contrary, it is the dialogical character underlying the idea that allowed Dostoevsky as the great artist to reveal the polyphony of truth, and this allows his artistic worldview to portray the idea "[j]ust as such a living event, played out between consciousnesses-voices".401

It is not accidental then that the word "event" appears here: polyphony as a principle of combining various voices-motifs in a single, but nevertheless complex novel form, allows the artist to anticipate, to foresee the leitmotifs of philosophical quests (as happened, for example, with the concept of historicity, which eighteenthcentury novelists mastered much earlier than philosophers), rather than to reproduce ideas from the realms of abstract philosophical constructions.<sup>402</sup> Eventuality also sets an intense experience of space and time (chronotope), sharpening the awareness of the here and now, and this is made possible by experiencing, or rather living, the Other in one's experience of communicating with it. Eventuality is a dialogical return to the self, and this is its meaning as an overcoming of solipsism. Here the thought inspired by Bakhtin's idea meets in dialogue with M. Heidegger's reflections

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>400</sup> Ibid., p. 92.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>401</sup> Ibid., p. 100.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>402</sup> The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London and New York, 2005. P. 85.

on the essence of language as a manifestation.<sup>403</sup> In regard with the said, we should supplement *the corollary* we have identified from the fourth characteristic of worldview with the statement about the conceptualization of the lifeworld in the language of its subject (see paragraph 2.4).

## 2.4. Summary

If we now omit all the historical-philosophical argumentation we have offered, the constellation of worldviews can be summarized in the form of the following table.

Table 1

Aspect	Implication
1.1. Worldviews have a heterogeneous	1.2. Worldview is associated with the
structure that lends itself to	criterion of partisanship in philosophy.
typologization. This implies the	This or that historical form of
existence of a certain type of	worldview has personal features: either
worldview, which is the best or most	these attitudes are connected with a
perfect at the moment.	thought-out life strategy of a particular
	person, or they are chosen from already
	existing attitudes developed by thinkers
	of different ages and cultures.
2.1. The worldview belongs to the field	2.2. Worldview as a research issue can
of non-scientific philosophy and,	be described and solved in the field of
although it claims to grasp reality as a	practical rather than theoretical
whole, cannot be considered an	philosophy.
objective system.	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>403</sup> Vide: Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 376—377. (In Russian).

Aspect	Implication
3.1. The doctrine of worldview is a	3.2. Worldview doctrines and the
complex project, or integrative	worldview projects that exist within
discipline. It encompasses not only	them testify to a greater extent to the
philosophical disciplines themselves,	changes that have taken place in the
such as ethics, aesthetics, axiology,	worldviews themselves. Worldview
ontology and epistemology, etc., but	doctrines thus demonstrate our fluidity
also related ones, such as sociology of	as worldview subjects in specific
knowledge, psychology, linguistics etc.	historical and cultural circumstances,
	which is expressed in the constant
	conceptualization of our language.
4.1. A worldview subject interprets his	4.2. Worldview as a basis for
own life world, which is expressed in	philosophical practice assumes the
the conceptualization of his language.	recognition of the Other and unity with
	the Other. In this respect, the
	recognition of solipsism as a theoretical
	limitation of the world and the attempt
	to overcome it in practice is achieved.

Having analyzed these statements (aspects) and the related implications, we see that, firstly, each following thesis, although not directly derived from the preceding implication, is related to it or is conditioned by it. On the other hand, we see that implication 4.2. loops the worldview constellation with aspect 1.1.: the diversity of worlds, the recognition of which is characteristic for overcoming solipsism through the recognition of the Other, presupposes a typology of worldviews reflecting the basic anthropological relation "own — the Other". Thus, the starting point for the existence of a worldview is communication with the "Others".

Summarizing, we can present the listed characteristics of the concept of *worldview* as a definition. The worldview is thus an actual image of a person's life world articulated by him/her as an ethical, aesthetic and axiological system of views through a dialog with the Other, acting as "his/her own", in specific historical and cultural circumstances.

It follows from the above that worldview as a concept demonstrates the property of cultural transgression: despite the fact that the person always exists in certain historical and cultural circumstances, he/she is able, firstly, to grasp the reality around him/her creatively (and in this respect actively), and secondly, to overcome his/her historical facticity, matching his/her understanding of the carriers of other cultural, linguistic, civilizational codes. Of course, such an understanding has a distinct subjective and therefore unscientific character. However, it allows us to recreate a dialogical (rather than ideological) environment between the subjects of understanding, however distant from each other (by time, culture, language, etc.). In reality, any typology of worldviews is allocated artificially, and such types, if we are not dealing with ideological or political discourse, can be a good example of a prejudice, from which it is convenient to depart in the process of communication, but which it is futile to affirm and preserve.

# Chapter Three. The Historical Aspect of the Metaconcept of *Worldview*

### 3.1. The History of the Concept of Worldview

In the Humanities (what is also recorded in lexicons), it has become generally accepted that worldview (*Weltanschauung*) as a concept appears for the first time only in Kant's work, what Heidegger himself says about in the cited work; this refers to the following passage from §26 of *The Critique of Judgment*, which is dedicated to the analysis of the mathematically sublime:

But the infinite is absolutely (not merely comparatively) great. In comparison with this all else (in the way of magnitudes of the same order) is small. But the point of capital importance is that the mere ability even to think it as a whole (ein Ganzes) indicates a faculty of mind transcending every standard of the senses. For the latter would entail a comprehension yielding as unit a standard bearing to the infinite a definite ratio expressible in numbers, which is impossible. Still the mere ability even to think the given infinite without contradiction, is something that requires the presence in the human mind of a faculty that is itself supersensible. For it is only through this faculty and its idea of a noumenon, which latter, while not itself admitting of any intuition (Anschauung), is yet introduced as substrate underlying the intuition of the world (Weltanschauung) as mere phenomenon (als bloßer Erscheinung), that the infinite of the sensible world, in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude, is *completely* comprehended *under* a concept, although in the mathematical estimation by means of numerical concepts it can never be completely thought. Even a faculty enabling the infinite of supersensible intuition to be regarded as given (in its intelligible substrate), transcends every standard of sensibility, and is great beyond all comparison even with the faculty of mathematical estimation: not, of course, from a theoretical point of view that looks to the interests of our faculty of knowledge, but as a broadening of the mind that from another (the practical) point of view feels itself empowered to pass beyond the narrow confines of sensibility (Kant's italics, German insertions mine. -A.L.).<sup>404</sup>

As we can see, in this fragment "intuition of the world" is associated with the ability to think of the world as a whole and correlates not only with the theoretical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>404</sup> Kant I. Collected Works in 8 Vols. Vol.5. Critique of Judgement. Moscow, 1994. P. 93. (*In Russian*). Cp.: Kant I. Kritik der Urteilskraft. Stuttgart, 2004. S. 176–177.

realization of the infinity of the world, but also with the preparation of the soul for the transition into the realm of the practical. The sublime reveals the boundlessness of any object, its external superiority over a human being, which gives rise to the paradoxical nature of the sublime itself. The infinite appears great absolutely; in comparison with it everything else of magnitudes of the same kind is small. To think of the infinite as a whole requires the supersensible faculty of the soul. The paradox lies in the fact that the infinite itself is not an object of contemplation, since any kind of contemplation touches the sensuality, but at the same time it itself, being a concept, is placed in the basis of intuitive comprehension of the world (*Weltanschauung*) as a phenomenon as its subject. Kant's perspective later had a significant influence on the representatives of German classical philosophy, and we find the concept of worldview as early as in the discussions of Fichte (in the meaning of *Weltansicht*), Schelling and Hegel.

The connection between the concept of worldview and practical activity, as we have seen, has a paradigmatic character. Heidegger himself says that worldview is always directed to a certain activity, which is explained by its factuality and historical certainty:

Every worldview and life view is presuppositional, i.e., it relates to essence. It presupposes being, it is positive. A worldview belongs to every Dasein and, like Dasein, is always determined factually and historically. <...> Insofar as the being of the worldview, and thus the being of its formation, belongs in general to this positivity, i.e., to the correlation with the existent, the existent world, the existent Dasein, then the worldview cannot be the task of philosophy. <sup>405</sup>

This verdict — worldview cannot be the task of philosophy — has also become for many a commonplace in the Humanities. A majority of authors supports the thesis about the relativity of worldviews, about the multiple forms, types and kinds that worldviews take, and that the true task of philosophy is to form a correct (however it is understood by the respective authors) worldview. However, despite

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>405</sup> Heidegger M. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. St. Petersburg, 2001. P. 11. (In Russian).

the undoubted prevalence of this view of the problem, it cannot be considered sufficient and exhaustive. It is convenient to take the described view as a starting point for a critical investigation and ask: is the fact that the very *concept* was shaped by German language and culture historically accidental or logically necessary? Can we therefore say that such a *way of thinking* was exclusively German, or was it only and exclusively characteristic of the Enlightenment? This will be the subject of paragraph 4.3, in which we will consider the possibility of the existence of a concept of non-Modern culture, comparable in scope and characteristic properties to the Modern concept of *worldview*.

F. E. D. Schleiermacher had a significant influence on the consolidation of the concept of worldview in the philosophical thesaurus. While Kantian thought was taken up by his immediate successors and even contemporaries, Schleiermacher's idea waited for its time until the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century; it was then that his doctrine was rediscovered and inspired by W. Dilthey. Researchers point out that Dilthey's theory of "historical worldview" appeared not without the influence of Schleiermacher, whose hermeneutical method he creatively developed and applied to the description and comprehension of the very spirit of time of various historical epochs and cultures.<sup>406</sup> N. S. Plotnikov points out that the study of the ideas of Schleiermacher and Schelling, as well as attention to the historical and philosophical search of A. Trendelenburg had a direct influence on the emergence of the very typology of worldviews proposed by Dilthey.<sup>407</sup>

Schleiermacher's idea of worldview consists of the desire to see the true, better world, which is higher indeed than the world of the "early semi-barbarians", and any comparison of it with the present temporary imperfect world shows only the insignificance of the latter: "[W]here I stand, there must be seen a sacred flame burning with a foreign light — a formidable warning to the superstitious slaves of modernity, for those who understand — a testimony to the power of the spirit. Let

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>406</sup> Hodges H. A. Wilhelm Dilthey. An Introduction. New York, 1944. P. 7. On the hermeneutic analysis of life as the foundation of worldview in Dilthey's philosophy vide.: Gadamer H.-G. Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen, 1990. S. 230.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>407</sup> Plotnikov N. S. Life and History. Wilhelm Dilthey's Philosophical Program. Moscow, 2000. P. 186. (*In Russian*).

everyone who, like me, belongs to the future approach it with love and hope, and let all the actions and speeches of everyone draw closer together and enlarge the beautiful free union of conspirators for a better future!"<sup>408</sup> It is remarkable that, according to the philosopher's thought, a human being and the world are also connected by language, which "gives the world precise signs and a beautiful surplus for everything that is thought and felt in the worldly spirit; it is the purest mirror of time, an artistic creation in which the spirit of the time is revealed".<sup>409</sup> Let us pay attention to this recognition of language as an artistic creation, a work of art of a special kind — this idea demonstratively unites two moments important for the worldview discourse: on the one hand, it is the Kantian idea of the aesthetic ability to grasp the world in one place, on the other hand, it is the ideas about the nature of language comparable to the ideas of W. von Humboldt. The very overcoming of language, its true and skillful interpretation turns out to be a means of approaching that very true world, overcoming the falsehood of the world here: "By virtue of language, the spirit already belongs to the world before it finds itself, and must first slowly break free from its nets; and if it finally, in spite of all the delusions and perversions that language has instilled in it, reaches, at last, the truth — how insidiously language then changes its struggle and tightly closes the spirit, so that it could not communicate itself to anyone and could not receive nourishment from anyone".410

In this case, however, there is a danger of getting carried away by the poeticism, even poeticized nature of Schleiermacher's sermons: as a philologist and theologian, he worked skillfully with texts and, accordingly, he himself thought of his program of skillful reading and interpretation of sacred texts as an applied task that could be solved by a rigorous scientific method. Thus, his lectures on hermeneutics and criticism of the New Testament contain the following definitions: "Hermeneutics and criticism, two philological disciplines, two theories of art are interrelated, because the practice of each of the two presupposes the other. The first

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>408</sup> Schleiermacher F. E. D. Speeches on Religion. Monologues. St. Petersburg, 1994. P. 311. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>409</sup> Ibid., p. 312.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>410</sup> Ibid.

is generally the art of correctly understanding the speech of another, predominantly written speech; the second is the art of correctly evaluating and, on the basis of sufficient evidence and data, establishing the authenticity of written texts and their parts".<sup>411</sup> This idea of qualitative reading-interpretation later formed the basis of philosophical hermeneutics; it is interesting to compare Schleiermacher's thoughts on the liberating art of understanding a text from the mundane and momentary and the practice of interpretation he developed with Heidegger's fragment *What does it mean to read*?, in which he reconciles these two positions, as if tying them together in the knot of a unified practice of understanding: "<...> Real reading is gathering for the sake of what has already and apart from us taken our being into its demanding call, whether we conform to it or prove to be untenable. Without reading in this way, truly, we are not able to see what looks in us, nor to contemplate what appears and shines".<sup>412</sup> Further we will develop these thoughts on the relationship between art and worldview (understood by Schleiermacher in a predominantly religious way).

For the first time, the history of *worldviews* (but not *the worldview*!) is given by G. W. F. Hegel in his *Lectures on Aesthetics*. This is an important stage in the reflection of the very concept of worldview in philosophy: the point is that artistic creativity was initially associated with the subject's ability to grasp the world in its wholeness. Such a subject in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was the genius, which was conditioned by Romanticism. The Romantic tradition, represented both in works of art and literature, and in philosophy, sought to strengthen the creative abilities of a person as a spirit who contrasts his/her creative powers with the power of God the Creator. It was important that it was the artist who could formalize in his/her creative impulse the "definite but all-embracing consciousness of nature, man, and God"<sup>413</sup> that he/she had. Such a view was largely possible because the German Romanticists sought to fund the cognitive value of artistic creation. In this regard, Y. V. Perov wrote: "Aestheticism claimed to solve the main problem of classical German

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>411</sup> Cit.: Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 386. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>412</sup> Heidegger M. What Is Called Reading? // Heidegger M. The Origin of the Work of Art. Moscow, 2008. P. 415. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>413</sup> Hegel G. W. F. Lectures on Aesthetics. In 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 2007. Vol. 1, p. 142. (In Russian).

idealism: the removal and connection of the opposites of subject and object, ideal and real on the basis of beauty".<sup>414</sup> That is, the need to overcome the gulf between the domain of nature and the domain of freedom, proclaimed by Kant, was understood by the Romanticists in the perspective of the free creativity of man as a subject of cognition.

Consequently, in the context of the Romantic tradition we see something more than just *callistry* — the doctrine of the beautiful: "The ideas about beauty as the ontological basis of the universe, about the original identity of subject and object in it and about the cognitive advantages of art in comparison with scientific-theoretical knowledge were justified and popularized by the Romantics, first of all by F. Hölderlin, F. and A. Schlegel. Philosophical aestheticism in its evolution was differentiated by its dominant orientations into 'theoretical-cognitive' and 'methodological', which affirmed aesthetic contemplation as the highest kind of cognition; 'value', which recognized beauty as the highest value and ideal of human existence, and 'ontological', which postulated the primacy of beauty as the ontological basis of the world and a person. Hölderlin and Schelling constructed variants of a 'universal aestheticism' that sought to synthesize these types into a comprehensive aesthetic worldview".<sup>415</sup> The Romanticists had no doubt that it was possible not only to encompass the whole world in their creative impulse, but also to realize their intuitions, to create with the help of a work of art their own world in its entirety. This idea of a universal work of art (Gesammtkunstwerk) as an ontological and later anthropological task (posed for the first time in 1827 by K. F. E. Trahndorff)<sup>416</sup> received further impetus in the works of such an original, though eclectic in its origins and philosophical views, thinker as R. Wagner.

"The doctrine of worldview" also becomes a popular concept by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century; it was largely inspired by the studies of W. Dilthey, E. Husserl, and M. Scheler, as well as such original authors as A. Riehl (although he should be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>414</sup> Perov Yu. V. Hegel's Philosophical Aesthetics // Hegel G. W. F. Lectures on Aesthetics. In 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 2007. Vol. 1, p. 23. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>415</sup> Ibid., p. 23–24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>416</sup> Trahndorff K. F. E. Aesthetik, oder Die Lehre von der Weltanschauung und Kunst. Berlin, 1827.

classified as a neo-Kantian) and H. Gompertz (who believed himself to be the one who completes the empiriocriticism). The idea of a universal work that would embody the artistic ideal of the unity of the world, God, and the artist transcended its usual aesthetic boundaries, thereby reinforcing the notion that life itself was also a canvas on which art could and should be created. The Romanticists were among the first to revolutionize the consciousness of the artistic model, and what had previously been on the stage began to be reflected in the culture of everyday life in early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Such an anthropological and social phenomenon of the advanced industrial era should also be mentioned as the dandyism movement: the formation of the middle class in England was accompanied by the formation of a unique type of personality, which embodied all of the Romanticists' inherent ideas about the God-fearing individuality, the hero of routine, the urban dweller, which later degenerated into the idea of the *self-made man*.<sup>417</sup>

This aesthetic phenomenon quickly outgrows any artistic boundaries, and by the middle of the century we see many aesthetes and flaneurs on the fields of civil and European wars, as well as on the barricades of revolutions. The artistic sample becomes a model of behavior, which is assimilated so quickly that in the end one has to reckon with the forces that produced this anthropological type. W. Dilthey's research on the peculiarities of the spiritual climate of this or that epoch, his attempts to find life-giving elements in the images of bygone cultures fit perfectly into the ideal of the study of an artistic work, with the only difference being that the hermeneutic method calls us to be strict and consistent in our research and not to allow fantasy to distort the historical forms of this or that phenomenon. The very principle of such research — reading as historical understanding — turns out to be akin to the Romantic theoretical and cognitive attitude. According to this attitude, the world is full of symbols and signs that we can and must unravel, and in this we realize our desire to correct and improve this imperfect world.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>417</sup> Lvov A. A. The Figure of Author in English Aestheticism // Vestnik Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. A. S. Pushkina. 2012. Vol. 2. № 3. Pp. 81—89. P. 82 ff. (*In Russian*). A detailed study of this phenomenon of the early period of the Industrial Revolution vide: Vainshtein O. B. Dandy: Vogue, Literature, Lifestyle. Moscow, 2006. (*In Russian*).

That is why the methodology of *Weltanschauungslehre* begins to interest those who previously had sought only strictly scientific cognition in philosophy. After all, if the existence of various forms of cognition is asserted, what guarantees the status of science as the most perfect of them, much less the only true one? If each person "gathers" him/herself and his/her world around his/her own chosen meanings in different ways, and this kind of creativity becomes productive, then can we seriously consider the claims of science to the universality of its provisions, to the universality of its laws, to the reliability of its research? The actively developing psychological science, especially in the form of psychoanalysis, gives even more food for thought and doubts, proving that the person is not capable of a purely rational comprehension of the world, but largely depends on the mechanism of the unconscious.

All these circumstances in one way or another contributed to the destruction of the uniform natural-scientific picture of the world, formed in the depths of Modern science of Newton and Galileo, which was once perceived as an ideal and a model of systematic knowledge. Now the methodological concept of the doctrine of worldview begins to play the role of a program of actions for the collection of the person him/herself with the help of the achievements of the entire scientific (or any other) community or even his/her entire life world. The person becomes the meaning-generating center of the universe, sacrificing the status of a subject in the objective world. Moreover, as knowledge of the surrounding reality increased, the person became more and more historical, and thus objective for himself. By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it was no longer possible to look at the person as a reasonable paragon of animals, which is able to comprehend everything and from his/her gnoseological pedestal to observe the fuss of objects of nature and culture. The studies of C. Darwin, W. Dilthey, F. Nietzsche, K. Marx and many others showed that history is as much a native space for the human being as nature, and to comprehend something historically means to essentially bring it into the human dimension.418

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>418</sup> In essence, it is a continuation of J. Vico's views on history — vide: Collingwood R. G. The Idea of History // Collingwood R. G. The Idea of History. Autobiography. Moscow, 1980. Pp. 63—69. (*In Russian*).

We mentioned above what fruitful work D. K. Naugle has done to elucidate the history of the concept of *worldview* in European languages. His book<sup>419</sup> was published in 2002, where he, among other things, carefully traced the history of the spread of the Kantian term of *Weltanschauung* in the English-speaking world. He has also written a number of articles that allow us to detail the insights of this process. Here we would also like to mention D. Naugle's meticulously compiled list of works on the study of worldviews.<sup>420</sup> Although this list should now be recognized as incomplete, it is nevertheless very representative of both the work done by the American researcher and the sources on the topic of interest to us.

Thus, in English the concept of *Weltanschauung*, which D. Naugle strictly conveys as *worldview*, was enthusiastically accepted by intellectual circles of Europe and not only as early as  $19^{\text{th}}$  century, and in Romance languages authors used mainly the borrowed concept (*Weltanschauung*), and in Germanic and Slavic languages there appeared a calque for it (as, for example, in Russian, Czech: *světový názor*, — or in Polish: *światopogląd*).<sup>421</sup> He also quotes information according to which "it [the concept of *Weltanschauung*. — *A.L.*] crossed the channel to Great Britain and made its way across the Atlantic to the United States. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, within seventy-eight years of its inaugural use in Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, *Weltanschauung* entered the English language in 1868 its naturalized form as 'worldview'. Ten years later, the German term itself gained currency as a loan word in Anglo-American academic discourse. Since their midnineteenth-century beginnings, both *Weltanschauung* and worldview have flourished, and become significant terms in the thought and vocabulary of thinking

http://www3.dbu.edu/naugle/pdf/worldview\_bibliography.pdf (accessed: 05.05.2023).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>419</sup> Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids, 2002.

 $<sup>^{420}</sup>$  A Worldview Bibliography. [Electronic resourse]. — URL :

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>421</sup> Naugel D. K. Worldview: History, Theology, Implications. — URL: <u>http://www3.dbu.edu/naugle/pdf/WV-HistyTheolImplications.pdf</u> (accessed: 05.05.2023), p. 3; also vide: Kowalewicz M. H. Übersetzungsprobleme des Begriffs "Weltanschauung" // Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. 2013. Vol. 55. S. 237—249. S. 238. In Naugle's book there are also interesting examples for the words from Germanic languages, vide: Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids, 2002. P. 62—63. We would like to pay special attention to the discussion there (p. 63, note 34) of the words that convey the meaning of German *Weltanschauung* in Dutch: this is important in connection with the history of the concept, because as a concept worldview is originally independent of Kant's insights and word usage, and it turns out that it has its own extensive genealogy in different national languages.

people in the English-speaking world".<sup>422</sup> Let us pay attention to this date, 1868, it will prove to be an important milestone in the history of obtaining the concept of *worldview* the right of citizenship in national languages, including the Russian language. Actually, it entered English, thanks to W. James, in one of his letters of 1868 there were the following words: "I remember you said ... that the worldview (*Weltanschauung*) of the Greeks was characterized by optimism".<sup>423</sup>

D. Naugle also adds that during the following years of the 19<sup>th</sup> century the word Weltanschauung itself became incredibly popular, and by the 1890s the Scottish theologian and professor of church history James Orr (1844-1913) spoke of it as a somewhat necessary concept.<sup>424</sup> In French, the concept of *worldview* was first recorded in 1930 and is associated with the name of Jean Grenier (1898–1971), a teacher and friend of A. Camus, who introduced the concept in his work Cum *apparuerit.*<sup>425</sup> The chronological framework of the appearance of this concept in Italian is approximately the same. It is interesting that French intellectuals, among whom we can single out P. Ricoeur, for a long time considered this notion untranslatable, because they distinguished polysemantic possibilities in the original German word, which were lost when the construction was applied in French. In general, in the process of adaptation in national languages, the concept of Weltanschauung was understood (and, accordingly, legitimized in the corresponding word usage) in terms of an individual's intuitive grasp of the whole world, individual reflection of the world in the consciousness and perception of a private person. In this regard, the definition of worldview from the dictionary of R. Vancourt is illustrative: "The reaction of an individual person's understanding of the whole world in terms of mind, perception, and action".<sup>426</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>422</sup> Naugel D. K. Worldview: History, Theology, Implications. URL: <u>http://www3.dbu.edu/naugle/pdf/WV-HistyTheoIImplications.pdf</u> (accessed: 05.05.2023), p. 3—4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>423</sup> Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids, 2002. P. 64.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>424</sup> Naugel D. K. Worldview: History, Theology, Implications. URL: <u>http://www3.dbu.edu/naugle/pdf/WV-HistyTheoIImplications.pdf</u> (accessed: 05.05.2023), p. 3—4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>425</sup> Kowalewicz M. H. Übersetzungsprobleme des Begriffs "Weltanschauung" // Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. 2013. Vol. 55. S. 237—249. S. 237.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>426</sup> Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids, 2002. P. 63—64. Dr. Naugle borrows much of his information on the history of word usage and the emergence of the concept of worldview in national languages from Helmut Meier's dissertation, vide: Meier H. G. "Weltanschauung': Studien zu einer Geschichte und Theorie des Begriffs." Ph.D. diss., Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster. Münster, 1967.

It is also interesting to trace the history of the shift of meanings in the German language, in whose bosom the very concept of worldview emerged, which is similar in dramatic terms, but which took place according to an ideologically different scenario. The history of its spread and influence on the very philosophical thesaurus of Western European countries is now clear to us; its further history, which took place in the notorious circumstances of the 1930s, is explained to us by the experience of intellectuals who witnessed many changes in the culture and way of life in Germany at that time. With the rise of the Nazis to power, these changes were also reflected in everyday language. One of these intellectuals was Sebastian Haffner. In his autobiographical novel Defying Hitler, a Memoir, he tells, among other things, how, after the assessor's examination, a young German had to undergo a procedure of "worldview education" in order to receive a degree. This procedure resembled a military training camp, but unlike the actual army training, here it was necessary to listen to lectures on the necessity of revenge for Germany's defeat in World War I, and to imitate a real barracks life, singing soldiers' songs and wearing special uniform every day. All the activities were aimed at suppressing the sense of individuality, and Haffner believes that it is in this loss of one's own inner world, in this union with many essentially random and alien people, that the essence of this education lies: "The individual personality of each of us ceased to play any role whatsoever; it was turned off, it was checkmated; it was, so to speak, not taken into account on this chessboard. From the very beginning, the arrangement of the pieces was such that there was no room for a separate 'I'; 'personal', 'own', 'individual' had no meaning, <...> [A]t night, when you suddenly woke up amidst the resounding sniffing and snoring of your comrades, you were suddenly seized with a feeling of unreality of everything that surrounded you, in which you mechanically participated".427

Another witness of the epoch was V. Klemperer, who systematized his notes on the changes in word usage characteristic of the time in his "philologist's notebook", and the new order of speech, as if reflected in the crooked mirror of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>427</sup> Haffner S. A Story of a German. St. Petersburg, 2018. P. 310. (In Russian).

criminal modernity, he very eloquently called *Lingua Tertii Imperii* (also *LTI*), or "the language of the third empire" (using the Latin language to transfer the German self-name *Drittes Reich*).

Thus, Klemperer discusses the concept of interest to us in connection with one of the episodes in A. Schnitzler's book *The Road into the Open*, which he came across in 1944. He himself had forgotten about this episode, although he remembered the content of the story in the book perfectly well. Its plot was as follows (we will quote it in full):

One of the main characters grumbles about the now trendy— i.e., at the beginning of the century — "talk about worldview". Worldview, as this character defines it, is "from the perspective of logic, the desire and ability to see the world as it is, i.e., to contemplate without distorting one's vision by preconceived opinions, without any desire to immediately deduce a new law from any experience or to squeeze that experience into an existing law... But for people, worldview is simply the highest type of thinking skill — skill, so to speak, on the scale of eternity".

In the next chapter, Heinrich continues this thought, and then one notices how strongly the previous judgment ties in with the true theme of this novel about the Jews: "Believe me, Georg, there are times when I envy people who have a so-called worldview... We have it all wrong: depending on the layer of the soul that comes to light, we can be at once guilty and innocent, cowards and heroes, fools and sages".

The desire to interpret the concept of "outlook" without involving any mysticism as an undistorted vision of reality, dislike and envy of those for whom the worldview is a rigid dogma, a guiding thread that can be grasped in any situation, when their own mood, their own judgment, their own conscience become unstable: all this, in Schnitzler's view, is characteristic of the Jewish spirit and, beyond any doubt, of the mentality of the broad strata of intellectuals in Vienna, Paris, and in Europe in general at the turn of the century. "Worldview talk" (the word is taken in its "illogical" sense) can be linked precisely to the emergence of opposition to decadence, impressionism, skepticism, and the decomposition of the idea of a coherent and therefore responsible Self. <sup>428</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>428</sup> Klemperer V. LTI. The Language of the Third Reich. A Philologist's Notebook. Moscow, 1998. P. 184—185. (*In Russian*).

V. Klemperer points out that the very word *Weltanschauung* was elitist in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century and had the character of a special password used by romanticized oppositionists. The word "worldview" was a clear identifier of this circle of people and did not apply to all strata of society. However, the German philologist was forced to record a characteristic ideological shift in word usage, namely, that with the Nazis coming to power, "worldview" from a "slang word" of the turn of the century, became a common expression used by "the most pathetic parteigenosse, the most ignorant bourgeoisie and merchant".<sup>429</sup> It should be noted that such phenomena of transformations or shifts in the meanings of used concepts as a reflection of the cultural and social situation are typical for a state that seeks to control citizens in all spheres of public activity and private life. With the insight of a true researcher, V. Klemperer explained the changes in the order of German speech as follows:

LTI was led to this word not by the fact, say, that it was seen as the German equivalent of the foreign word "philosophy" — LTI was not always interested in finding German equivalents — but nevertheless it expresses the antithesis of worldview and philosophizing, which is the most important for LTI. For philosophizing is the activity of reason, of logical thinking, and for Nazism this is a mortal enemy. But the required antithesis to clear thinking is not right vision (this is how Schnitzler defines the meaning of the verb "to contemplate," *schauen*); it would also prevent the constant attempts at stupefaction and stunning carried out by Nazi rhetoric. In the word "worldview", on the other hand, LTI emphasizes "contemplation" (*das Schauen*), the mystic's beholding, inner vision, i.e., the intuition and revelation inherent in religious ecstasy. Contemplation of the Savior, to whom our world owes the law of life: this is the innermost meaning or deepest anguish contained in the word "worldview", as it was when it surfaced in the vocabulary of the Neo-Romantics and was borrowed by the LTI. <...> the German root of Nazism bears the name "romanticism".<sup>430</sup>

Moreover, he observes that the technology of transforming the romantic *intuition of the world* into the mystical and destructive ideological construct of the worldview has more to do with spiritual practices or attempts to conceptualize all

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>429</sup> Ibid., p. 185.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>430</sup> Ibid., p. 185—186.

things. A much larger number of features tell us about the worldview's connection to the advertising campaigns that were such a runaway success in the 1920s in the United States: "The corresponding verb '*schauen*' has little or nothing to do with Schnitzler's meaning of 'to see correctly'. For here it is a matter of controlled vision, of satisfying and utilizing the sense organ, the eye, which in the extreme case leads to blindness. Romanticism and the advertising and business industry, Novalis and Barnum, Germany and America: both are present and inseparably fused in the words LTI — *Schau* and *Weltanschauung* ('show' and 'worldview'), like mysticism and sensual splendor in Catholic worship".<sup>431</sup> Spectacle, personal presence and complicity in a certain mystery of creation and at the same time the acquisition of meanings allowed Nazi propaganda to create a concept that was able to create a unity of a crowd of diverse members of society charged with joint action.

We have already seen that in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the concept of worldview was brought closer and even almost equal in scope to the concept of ideology. We have also shown, using the examples of the USSR and Nazi Germany, that such convergences play the role of an important anthropological factor, which makes it possible to identify the subject of worldview as one's own or the Other. It is interesting that in the technocentric 20<sup>th</sup> century, science has acquired great mythmaking power, which at the conceptual level has also been introduced into a special language game. The ideals of accuracy and empirical reliability of all knowledge, for which the brightest representatives of positivism and science since the Enlightenment had fought, were reinterpreted in the sense that any statement emanating from affiliated representatives of scientific institutions should be perceived as a broadcast of universal and necessary truth. (Note in parentheses that in today's information space, which is not free of fake news, there are characteristic satirical clichés like "British scientists" and "scientists have demonstrated"). The history of science of that period of time is not by chance full of surprising and often far from purely research questions vicissitudes. U. Hossfeld, studying episodes of the clash and struggle between empirically grounded and purely worldview

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>431</sup> Ibid., p. 187.

arguments in the history of evolutionary biology, showed, among other things, that E. Haeckel was considered a "political anthropologist" in engaged Nazi circles after the 1930s, and his teachings were perceived as the basis for a new worldview.<sup>432</sup> In addition, on the example of some discussions of the 1940s, U. Hossfeld demonstrated how significant was the ideological influence exerted on the mass consciousness of Germans not only by scientists, but also by scientific institutions such as the "model National Socialist" university in Jena.<sup>433</sup>

It is also interesting to note the political aspect that largely predetermined and directed the ideological activity of German scientific institutions. O. Yu. Plenkov points out that the task of searching for "objective" "empirical" evidence of Jewishness and proving the "special position" of Jews in the racial taxonomy was consistently transferred from the natural sciences (due to their obvious failure) to the humanities. As a result, "in the mid-1930s, five research institutes for anti-Semitic studies, independent of universities, were formed to study Jewish influence in the natural sciences, culture, history, law, and religion".<sup>434</sup> In addition, anti-Semitism was also receiving and "scientific justification" in the odious writings of F. Clauss, A. Rosenberg, H. Günther, H. Esser, as well as in popular (including clearly propagandistic and tabloid) publications.<sup>435</sup> Thus, anti-Semitism, the mobilization postulate underlying Nazi ideology, together with pseudo-scientific evidence, had a powerful myth-making effect on the formation of the worldviews of millions of people. This conclusion is interesting in the light of two circumstances related to the personal worldview (including in the psychological sense) of the founder of German National Socialism. First, it is well known from the testimonies of both his biographers and interlocutors that Hitler's "system" of views was formed from the most diverse, contradictory and internally incompatible sources - largely under the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>432</sup> R. J. Richards, who investigated the influence of Darwin's doctrine on Hitler's racist views, also notes that the figure of Haeckel has traditionally been seen as an intermediary between the English naturalist and the Führer — vide: Richards R. J. Was Hitler a Darwinian? Disputed Questions in the History of Evolutionary Theory. Chicago, 2013. P. 194.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>433</sup> Hoßfeld U. Geschichte der Biologischen Anthropologie in Deutschland. Stuttgart, 2016. S. 343 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>434</sup> Plenkov O. Yu. State and Society in the Third Reich. The National-Socialist Project. St. Petersburg, 2017. P. 305. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>435</sup> Ibid., p. 310.

influence of his resentment from failures in his chosen field at the Vienna Academy of Arts.<sup>436</sup> Secondly, as the researchers point it out, Führer's political program was closely linked to his mystical beliefs, which he considered, sanctioning with his orders such crimes against humanity as, for instance, mass exterminations of the representatives of different ethnical groups.<sup>437</sup>

However, such transformations of concepts were not only characteristic of totalitarian states; a curious example is the confrontation between religious views and freedom of scientific research, for example, in the United States. This confrontation, even open opposition and dislike of scientific achievements by representatives of religious fundamentalism began to emerge actively already in the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, thus revealing not so much religious and, in this respect, worldview (in Schleiermacher's terms) prerequisites, but also purely ideological, and thus political consequences. It will be appropriate to note that M. Scheler also testifies to the comparability of the situation in Soviet Russia and the United States in the 1920s. Free discussion of the status of worldview as a philosophical problem was hindered, on the one hand, by dogmatic Marxism as the ideology of the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, by the intellectual climate of the North American authors, which was funded by Puritan Christianity. In his report *Forms of Knowledge and Education*, later revised into an article, M. Scheler claimed:

Just look at the globe: in Russia there is an "*index librorum prohibitorum*" <...> in which the Old and New Testament, the Koran, the Talmud and all philosophers from Thales to Fichte have found themselves. Any books with the word "God" in them were forbidden to be taken across the border. <...> Marxism, quite thoroughly battered by criticism today, has been elevated *in forma* to dogma across a vast empire. <...> In North America and the United States, the opposite is true: here a movement calling itself "*fundamentalism*" seeks to elevate the Bible, interpreted as the divinely inspired Word, to the absolute "foundation" of knowledge and life; this idea is the basis of a mass

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>436</sup> Vide: Lucacs J. The Hitler of History. New York, 1998. P. 59; ibid., p. 62; Ham P. Young Hitler. The Making of the Führer. London, 2017. P. 191 ff. Also for a thorough analysis of the reflection of Hitler's views in the policies he pursued, see in: Haffner S. A Certain Hitler: The Policy of a Crime. St. Petersburg, 2018.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>437</sup> Plenkov O. Yu. State and Society in the Third Reich. The National-Socialist Project. St. Petersburg, 2017. P. 424. (*In Russian*).

movement gaining strength, demanding nothing less than a state ban on the teaching and study of the theory of evolution in one form or another <...> in public schools.<sup>438</sup>

Scheler read his report on January 17, 1925, and in July of the same year the infamous trial of a young schoolteacher, John Thomas Scopes, which went down in history as the "Scopes monkey trial" began. He was accused of violating the socalled *Butler act*, a law that prohibited public schools and universities from teaching theories that asserted the descent of man from lower animal forms and denied the doctrine of creation as taught in the Bible.439 "<...> John Scopes was convicted of violating Tennessee law because he taught evolutionary doctrine in high schools. Against the powerful biblical eloquence of William Jennings Bryan, he was defended by Clarence Darrow. Scopes lost and paid a \$100 fine, but the publicity of the case itself contributed to a distinction in the minds of the public between science and religion, education and ideological processing".<sup>440</sup> This shameful law was in effect until 1967, but similar cases arose thereafter, including in Russia (the famous "Shraiber case").<sup>441</sup> Researchers attribute this not only to the plaintiffs' sincere conviction in the truth of their sacred books, but also see the existence of such laws and the initiation of such proceedings as a purposeful assertion of clerical (not to say obscurantist) ideology.442

An interesting example of precisely the worldview opposition that the arguments of science raise in opposition to religious dogma is the story of modern geologist Kurt Wise (b. 1959), who works at the Center for Origins Research at Bryan College (the same one who inspired Butler act and led the prosecution against J. Scopes) in Dayton, Tennessee. Brilliantly educated and having studied at the University of Chicago and Harvard University under the best professors, Wise once

https://www.civisbook.ru/files/File/Konashev.pdf (assecced: 05.05.2023). P. 136. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>438</sup> Scheler M. Selected works. Moscow, 1994. P. 16. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>439</sup> Bowler P. J. Monkey Trials and Gorilla Sermons. London, Cambridge MA, 2009. P. 182 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>440</sup> Arnstine D. The Academy in the Courtroom: The Sacramento Monkey Trial // Journal of Thought. 1983. Vol. 18. No. 1 P. 10–23. P. 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>441</sup> Konashev M. B. Evolutionary theory and cultural-ideological state of Russian society of the second half of the XIX—beginning of the XXI century. [Electronic resource]. — URL:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>442</sup> Hellman H. Against Darwin. XXth Century. «A Monkey Trial» and the Attacks of Antidarwinians // Ekologiya i zhizn'. 2009. № 1. P. 4—11. (*In Russian*).

experienced an inner crisis over the imminent collision of his scientific knowledge and the religious education he had received as a child. The famous biologist and popularizer of atheistic views R. Dawkins recounts: "He was too smart to ignore the head-on collision between his religion and his science, and this conflict increasingly troubled his mind. One day patience came to an end, and he settled the matter with a pair of scissors. Taking the Bible, he cut out of it, page by page, every verse that would have to be abandoned if science were right. At the end of this ruthlessly honest and tedious labor, so little of the Bible remained that (Dawkins goes on to quote K. Wise himself. — A. L.) 'no matter how hard I tried, even trying to hold the Scripture by the remaining uncut margins of pages, I could not lift the Bible so that it would not fall in two. I had to choose between evolution and sacred Scripture. Either Scripture was right and evolution was wrong, or evolution was right and I must throw the Bible away... That night I accepted God's word and rejected everything that contradicted it, including evolution. At the same time, with incredible bitterness, I threw all my hopes and dreams in science into the fire'".<sup>443</sup> There is nothing political or ideological in this instance, but it is quite clear that this kind of worldview conversion, which apparently was once experienced by B. Pascal, necessarily entails already political and ideological consequences. The influence of the experience of such people burdened with degrees and having received education recognized by the world community on the legislative activity and educational policy of the state often leads to dramatic oppositions and populist agitations. K. Wise, for example, is considered a preacher of the Christian view of science, which in itself is an unambiguous sign of the engagement of his position.<sup>444</sup> Nevertheless, such cases reveal the essence of the worldview as a rather rigid structure that allows, at the level of culture and community life — at the anthropological level — to regulate the relationship between one's own and strangers and, most importantly, to effectively form such perceptions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>443</sup> Dawkins R. The God Delusion. St. Petersburg, 2015. P. 359—360. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>444</sup> Information taken from Dr. Kurt Wise's page on the Truett McConnell University website, URL: <u>https://truett.edu/directory/kurt-wise/</u> (accessed: 05.05.2023)

However, in some cases, different worldviews can coexist and mutually complement each other. Thus, Neo-Humboldtian linguists considered German mystics as the predecessors of their understanding of language as a space of recreating the world through the word,<sup>445</sup> while modern proponents of the project of "Christian worldview" actively use natural science argumentation.446 S. J. Gould proposed to call science and religion magisteria, understanding magisteria as "the area of life in which a particular way of knowing has adequate tools for making sense of the discussion and making decisions". He formulated the principle of NOMA, which F. de Waal describes as follows: "[M]agisteria of science is in the world of empiricism (theory). The magisterium of religion is in the world of spiritual values and the search for meaning. These magisteria do not overlap with each other and leave room for additional magisteria (e.g., art)."447 Of course, many problems cannot have a one-size-fits-all solution or correct understanding, since they are always expressed through the means of a specific language (science, religion, philosophy, art, etc.). But if we look at the specific ways of posing such problems as the question of euthanasia, abortion, the origin of life, the acceptability of slavery, etc. in different magisteria, we will see that the specificity of the position in relation to them is conditioned by the conceptual means that magisteria have as full-fledged linguistic meaning-forming structures.

Thus, the history of the concept of *worldview* reveals us an important order of transformation and shifting of meanings characteristic of this concept. If initially it was ontologically and even epistemologically loaded, then by the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century it began to be interpreted either in the sense of a system of values (religious, socio-political, cultural, etc.) or in the sense of a comprehensive view of the world, which can also be expressed in two ways. On the one hand, the researcher is able to grasp the psychological states or inner motivations of certain historical actors, key cultural or political figures of the past. On the other hand, the worldview expressed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>445</sup> Boroday S. Yu. Language and Cognition: An Introduction to Postrelativism. Moscow, 2020. P. 37. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>446</sup> Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids, 2002. P. 206–207.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>447</sup> De Waal F. The Origins of Morality: In Search of Humanism among the Primates. Moscow, 2018. P. 185. (*In Russian*).

a certain active position in relation to the existing surrounding reality and, therefore, implied the possibility of personal active attitude to this reality and change. However, at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the public and political discourse of the Western European states that actively exploited this concept shifted the meanings within it towards passive contemplation and ideological loyalty. Previously, Romantic thinkers proclaimed creativity in human activity as an integral part of the world — and the concept of *worldview* was articulated rather in an ontological context. The twentieth century brought it powerfully into the political context, giving it clear anthropological meanings. After the 1930s, worldview becomes synonymous with ideology and, as a consequence, acquires many connotations that allow to identify the subject of worldview as one's own or the Other's.

## 3.2. The Concept of Worldview in the Russian Discourse

In Russian, as well as in other Western European languages, the concept of worldview originally appeared as a word-formation calque from German. For the first time this word was recorded in one of the publications of the magazine *Herald of Europe (Vestnik Evropy)* in 1828.<sup>448</sup> The article in question was The Progress of Aesthetics in Germany (Khod Estetiki v Germanii),<sup>449</sup> a translated review of some papers on the philosophy of art of the first half of the 19th century. However, it was a German calque for the translation of the title of the book by the now forgotten philosopher K. F. E. Trahndorff Aesthetics, or Doctrine and Worldview and Art,<sup>450</sup> and it was used only as a technical term.<sup>451</sup> According to the *National Corpus of the* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>448</sup> Flekenshtein K. Calques on the German model in the modern Russian literary language: Author's abstract of the dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Philological Sciences / Lomonosov Moscow State University, Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner of Labor. M.V. Lomonosov. Philol. fac. Moscow, 1963. P. 6. (*In Russian*).
<sup>449</sup> The Way of Aesthetics in Germany // Vestnik Evropy. — May and June 1828. Moscow, 1828. P. 260—272. (*In* 

Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>450</sup> Trahndorff K. F. E. Aesthetik, oder Lehre von der Weltanschauung und Kunst. Berlin, 1827. In 2 Bde.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>451</sup> On the etymology of the concept of worldview vide: Vassmer M. Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language: in 4 vols. St. Peterburg, 1996. Vol. 2, p. 626 (*In Russian*); Vinogradov V. V. The History of Words. Moscow, 1994. P. 775. (*In Russian*); Zemskaya E. A. From the history of Russian literary vocabulary of the XIX century (to the study of the scientific heritage of Y. K. Grot) // Materials and Studies on the History of the Russian Literary Language. Vol. IV. Moscow, 1957. P. 33—34. (*In Russian*); Unbegaun B. Le calque dans les langues slaves littéraires // Revue des Études Slaves Année. 1932. Vol.12 (1-2). P. 19—48. P. 19—23.

*Russian Language*, the word "worldview" (*mirovozzrenie*) itself began to be actively used in journalistic and artistic literature from at least the mid-1860s: the earliest example is a reference to the work *The Slums of Saint Petersburg (Peterburgskie trushchoby*) by V. V. Krestovsky.<sup>452</sup>

The analysis of sources shows that such a combination of words expressing the meaning of "world" and "vision" or "outlook" is quite natural in different languages: according to N. S. Arapova, the syntagmatic convergence of the ideas "world" and "to see, to look" is known in Slavic languages at an earlier time than in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, and in Old Slavic we find, for example, the word *мирозрител(ь)ный (mirozritel'nyi)*: there is a well-known book of teachings called «Зерцало мирозрителное» (*Zertsalo mirozritelnoe*, Eng.: *Worldview Mirror*) of 1685. The most general reconstruction of this concept points to the conjugation of the roots \*Vido-mirъ/\*Vidi-mirъ, and this conjugation is traced by experts on the basis of Old Russian and Macedonian toponymic evidences.<sup>453</sup>

Further, the world proper in this case means міръ (the world)<sup>454</sup> as the Universe, *mundus*, ко́σµος. Dictionary by I. I. Sreznevsky also gives the formation of the concept in the meaning of "the whole world" as the whole universe (for example, "the whole world rejoices in God"), comparing the notion of the world with German *Weltall* and English *all the world*.<sup>455</sup> Thus, *Welt* in general corresponds to the Greek αἰών and κόσµος, and later acquired a close meaning to the Latin *saeculum* (in the meaning of "human", referring to the world of men).<sup>456</sup> A. von Humboldt, the author of the famous work of the same name, also understood it in the meaning of "cosmos".<sup>457</sup> We cannot help mentioning that already from the 11<sup>th</sup>— 12<sup>th</sup> centuries in the Russian language the concept of the *world (мир)* is firmly connected with humanity in general, as well as the *laity (миряне*), i.e. people not

<sup>454</sup> The pre-reform orthography it was міровоззрение.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>452</sup> National Corpus of the Russian language [Electronic resource]. — URL:

http://processing.ruscorpora.ru/search.xml?sort=i\_grtagging&lang=ru&startyear=1860&text=lexform&req=мирово ззрение&api=1.0&mode=main&env=alpha&endyear=1880&nodia=1&p=88 (accessed: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>453</sup> Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language. Issue 10: M. Moscow, 2007. P.226. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>455</sup> Sreznevsky I. I. Materials for the Dictionary of the Old Russian Language on Written Monuments. St. Petersburg, 1902. Vol. 2 (Л-П), pp. 147—148. (*In Russian*).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>456</sup> Grimm J., Grimm W. Deutsches Woerterbuch. Leipzig, 1955. B. 28, S. 1458.
 <sup>457</sup> Ibid., S. 1482.

belonging to the clergy, living *in the world* (живущими *в миру*), and also — in a narrower sense — a certain community (of peasants, civilians, urban dwellers, members of the church).<sup>458</sup> The latter circumstance allows us to say that the *world* in the Russian language has always denoted not only an object (cosmos, universe), but also a collective subject, a specific group united by some characteristic features (value, social or other).<sup>459</sup>

In addition, there was a strong word-formation connection between the Modern mentality based on Latin scholarship and the actively developing scientific Russian language. For example, the translation of C. Huygens's famous book *Kosmotheoros* into Russian is given as "MMpo3peHMe" (namely, "worldview") by the means of the Russian language.<sup>460</sup> Of course, there were parallel processes here with the rest of the scientific world, because it was the development of science that became an important stimulus for the development of national languages. Thus, in German the book was called *Weltbeschauer*,<sup>461</sup> in English this word was omitted at all (being *Conjectures Concerning the Planetary World*);<sup>462</sup> hence, this compound word, created in the spirit of the Modern Age, was perceived by contemporaries clearly as a technical term, which could and should be transmitted by means of the national language. It should be emphasized that in the *Dictionary of the Russian Academy*, published in the first quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, there are no worlds as *Mupo8033peHue*, *Mupoc03eptqueue* or similar, but there is the word *MipoonucaHue* with the note "*Cosmographia*".<sup>463</sup>

Thus, *worldview*, in terms of both its history of verbalization and from the conceptualization, appears to be a compound and heterogeneous concept. It is the

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>458</sup> The Dictionary of the Russian Language XI—XVII cent. Issue 9 (M). Moscow, 1982. P. 165. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>459</sup> A thorough observation of the characteristics and justification of pragmatics of the concept of "MMP" in the Russian language and Russian philosophy in: Lvov A. A., Osipov I. D. Metaphysics of the Heart as a Worldview Subject in Russian Philosophy // Voprosy Filosofii. — 2023. — Vol. 11. — Pp. 104—113. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>460</sup> The Dictionary of the Russian Language XVIII cent. Issue 12 (Льстец — Молвотворство). St.Petersburg, 2001. P. 208. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>461</sup> Herrn Christian Hügens Weltbeschauer oder vernünftige Muthmassungen, dass die Planeten nicht weniger geschmükt und bewohnet seyn, als unsere Erde / Aus dem Lateinischen übersezt. Mit Anmerkungen von Verschiedenen und Kupfern. Zürich, 1767.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>462</sup> Huygens Ch. The Celestial Worlds Discovered, or Conjectures Concerning the Inhabitants, Plants and Productions of the Worlds in the Planets. London, 1722.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>463</sup> Dictionary of the Russian Academy, Arranged in Alphabetical Order. Part 3 (K—H). St. Petersburg, 1814. P. 789. (*In Russian*).

convergence of various intents and meanings related to the idea of observing, seeing, surveying the world in its entirety. The concept itself is like a brief formula for observing the world in its unity, which means that the world is not initially considered of as a unified whole, and becomes a reference to the plot of the main myth, which will be further discussed in paragraph 4.3. Consequently, this concept has a dialectical component in its formulation: we tend to think of the diversity of the surrounding reality as a single world, and it is the certainty of our attitude as subject(s) that determines the unity of our world.

Perhaps, *mupocosepuanue* emerged in the 1840s was a more popular word, being formed on the principle of calque from German. It is known that the concept of *миросозерцание* was naturalized in the Russian language (according to dictionaries) in 1866, the same decade when a similar concept entered the English language. However, it seems to have appeared earlier than *мировоззрение*: one of the earliest instances of its use is a diary entry by A. V. Druzhinin.<sup>464</sup> True, in the 3rd volume of S. S. Gogotsky's *Philosophical Lexicon* (1866) there is no such a concept, although in the article "Mythology" it is said about "the relation of mythical and religious worldview to philosophical worldview",465 and in the article "Philosophy" we read the following: "With the development of new beginnings of philosophy in the nineteenth century, the concepts of history, Art, word and diction with its prose and poetry, geography and its relation to history, and so on, could not but be transformed. In this respect, the study of philosophy and the history of philosophy is very important for understanding the inner connection between the general worldview and the general beginnings of philosophy and the direction of the different branches of education of a certain time".<sup>466</sup> However, in his own *Dictionary* of Philosophy of 1876, which researchers say about that he defined the most important philosophical concepts, thus fixing the normal word usage within the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>464</sup> National Corpus of the Russian language [Electronic resource]. — URL:

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>http://processing.ruscorpora.ru/search.xml?sort=i\_grtagging&lang=ru&startyear=1842&text=lexform&req=миросо</u> зерцание&api=1.0&mode=main&env=alpha&nodia=1&endyear=1862&p=36 (accessed: 13.06.2020). (*In Russian*). <sup>465</sup> Gogotsky S. S. Philosophical Lexicon. 3 vol. Kyiv, 1866. P. 489—490. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>466</sup> Gogotsky S. S. Philosophical Lexicon. 4 vol. Kyiv, 1873. P. 87. (In Russian).

academic language,<sup>467</sup> these concepts are already present.<sup>468</sup> Here we find a controversial point: Prof. V. V. Kolesov claims that *мировоззрение* was fixed in the philosophical sense only in 1906,<sup>469</sup> while we managed to find, in addition to the data from the dictionary of S. S. Gogotsky, that in the dictionary article as early as of 1903 *мировоззрение* and *миросозериания* are used as full synonyms.<sup>470</sup> Moreover, Prof. V. V. Vinogradov mentions these words also in his Essays: "Ya. K. Grot noted the absence in Dal's dictionary of such words that were used in the literary language of the 60s: *мировоззрение*, *миросозерцание*...".<sup>471</sup> This message is surprising, because in the standard edition of Dal's dictionary, in the second volume under the letter "M" we find the word "миросозерцание" (in the article "Mip<sub>b</sub>") with the definition: "[M]ental contemplation of the world-worlds, the universe".<sup>472</sup> Be that as it may, it seems that we can rightfully assert that by the 1870s these words were already used not only by the educated but also by the general public and were hardly perceived as neologisms. This can be judged by the dynamics of the frequency of their use in the period from 1860 to 1880.<sup>473</sup> Apparently, this is primarily due to the history of its adaptation in the Russian language, although it is obvious that it took time for it to finally gain a foothold in everyday usage.

Note that it is not possible to fix an indispensable correspondence between the phenomenon and the concept by which this phenomenon would be denoted: if it is true that every concept denotes a certain phenomenon behind it, it does not follow

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>467</sup> Shevtsov A. A. Sil'vestr Sil'vestrovich Gogotsky // Gogotsky S. S. Philosophical Dictionary. St. Petersburg,
 2009. P. 5. (*In Russian*). M. A. Sharova indicates the same — vide: Sharova M.A. S. S. Gogotsky's Anthropological and Philosophical-Pedagogical Views // Nauchnye vedomosti Belgorodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seria: FIlosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Pravo. 2011. № 2 (97). Pp. 92—97. P. 92. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>468</sup> Gogotsky S. S. Philosophical Dictionary. St. Petersburg, 2009. P. 105–106. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>469</sup> Kolesov V. V. Our Proud Language... St. Petersburg, 2006. P. 78. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>470</sup> Vide: The Big Encyclopedia. Dictionary of Publicly Available Information on all Branches of Knowledge. Vol.13. St. Petersburg, 1903. P. 258. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>471</sup> Vinogradov V. V. The History of Words. Moscow, 1999. P. 775. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>472</sup> Dal V. I. The Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language. St. Petersburg, Moscow, 1881. Vol. 2, p. 331. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>473</sup> Dynamics for the concept of мировоззрение vide: National Corpus of the Russian Language. [Electronic resource]. — URL:

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>http://processing.ruscorpora.ru/graphic.xml?smoothing=3&g=i year created&graphic from result=1&sort=i year created&lang=ru&startyear=1860&text=lexform&req=мировоззрение&p=87&api=1.0&mode=graphic main&env =alpha&nodia=1&endyear=1880 (accessed: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*); Dynamics for the concept of миросозерцание vide: National Corpus of the Russian Language. [Electronic resource]. — URL:</u>

http://processing.ruscorpora.ru/graphic.xml?sort=i year created&lang=ru&g=i year created&text=lexform&req=м иросозерцание&graphic from result=1&api=1.0&mode=graphic main&env=alpha&nodia=1&&startyear=1860& endyear=1880&smoothing=4 (accessed: 05.05.2023). (In Russian).

at all that every phenomenon is denoted by a certain concept. Such strict correspondences are neither natural in language nor in thought. The man who strives for refinement of concepts and absolute rigor in their application not only makes speech and thinking artificial, but also strives to present the whole variety of thought as a rigid and consistent system made up of implausible strains. Calling for purity in the use of certain concepts, one should not think that, even by clarifying them, one can prevent their confusion in language and, most importantly, achieve conceptual rigor in their use. Thus, the point is not to cleanse the language, to rid it of contradictions or polysemy, but to present the fullest possible palette of word uses, within which these contradictions only make sense.

Indeed, it has been established that Weltanschauung was originally translated precisely as *миросозерцание*, for example, by P. A. Kropotkin, as early as in the early 1850s.<sup>474</sup> This is not surprising, if only because in Russian-language literature the most important Kantian concept Anschauung is traditionally translated as "intuition" or "contemplation" (*cosepuanue*) and linguistically interpreted precisely in connection with the tradition of translating this term. However, Russian writers and thinkers, like their European colleagues, understood *миросозерцание* primarily as something individual, personal, perhaps even psychological — as opposed to the obviously class meaning of the word *мировоззрение*, often with a positivistic or materialistic ("scientific worldview") connotation; we find such a distinction of meanings already in F. M. Dostoevsky and L. N. Tolstoy.<sup>475</sup> An example of the word usage in the magazine environment of the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century is quite revealing: "Publicists try to catch the nuances of words, but they are transient: 'He is very far from the type of philosopher to whom the words **мировоззрение** (worldview) or миропонимание (understanding of the world), мироразумение (comprehension of the world) correspond. His task was primarily миродействие (action of the world)" (N. Mikhailovsky). Миродействие (Action of the world), comprehension of the objectivity of the world in action, in practice, is, first of all, worldview".<sup>476</sup> In

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>474</sup> Kolesov V. V. Our Proud Landuage... St. Petersburg, 2006. P. 79. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>475</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>476</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

this example, the emphasis on the meaning of deed as action (in the spirit of Fichte's *Tathandlung*, "fact/act") as opposed to thought as action, contemplation of the world, based on speculative principles, which was closer to Kant's ideas, is obvious.

In addition, *мировоззрение* being conceptually powerful formed stable combinations with meaning-generating cultural connotations in the Russian-speaking space. For example, quite often in the texts of handwritten journals, which were created by schoolchildren in the late 19<sup>th</sup> — early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, it refers to "working out a worldview" (at the same time, as early as 1848, the wording "working out a modern worldview" was predominantly used).<sup>477</sup> These processes were considered by A. B. Lyarsky — in his study he summarizes the arguments presented in A. D. Galakhov's article:

If we read the text of the article in its entirety, we can understand that the worldview, according to the author, is characterized by the following features: firstly, it is by nature a product of the work of consciousness, the result of awareness of reality, while in the "unconscious" life there are no beliefs. Secondly, a developed worldview provides for the activity of transforming the world — if a person has realized how the world should change, it is his/her duty to work in this direction. The author of the article even divides people into three types: to the first type he refers conservatives, <...> [to] the second type, <...> refers people who, realizing the justice of progress, do not adhere to it definitively <...> to the third type the author refers people "normal, healthy". <...> [T]hirdly, <...> the author believes that it is the bearers of the right worldview who are the engines of progress. <...> Thus, the person is transformed from the object of the influence of blind historical forces into a reasonable subject of historical development, receives the proud status of the engine of history and progress.<sup>478</sup>

Further, A. B. Lyarsky quotes the thoughts about worldview and its tasks of the famous Russian sociologist and historian N. I. Kareev: "<...> worldview should be practically directed. The author [i.e., N. I. Kareev. — A. L.] explained that by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>477</sup> Vide: Galakhov A. D. Russian Literature in 1847 // Otechestvennye zapiski. 1848. January. Pp. 1–30. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>478</sup> Lyarsky A. B. School Lexicon at the turn of the XIX–XX centuries: world-view // Pechat' i slovo Sankt-Peterburga. Peterburgskie Chteniya — 2015 XVII Vserossiyskaya nauchnaya konferentsiya: sbornik nauchnykh trudov. Ministerstvo obrazovaniya i nauki RF; Sankt-Peterburgskiy gosudarstvennyi universitet promyshlennykh tekhnologiy i dizaina; Vysshaya shkola pechati i mediatekhnologiy. 2016. Pp. 86—91. URL: https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=26481308 (accessed: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).

wholeness, completeness, and structure of the worldview he understood the following: '...wholly, i.e., to cover the whole world, all areas of thought and life of both nature and man, fully, i.e., that each area was investigated in all its aspects, and coherently, i.e., that all ideas were brought into a system excluding contradictions between them'. Such a worldview necessarily contains in itself requirements to the surrounding world, called the ideal <...>".<sup>479</sup> We should add that N. I. Kareev also wrote a special work on worldview, also addressed to young people, which indicates that this topic was very popular among the intellectual and intelligentsia of the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>480</sup> The conclusion that the author of the study offers us about the vocabulary of schoolchildren at the turn of the century is as follows: "[W]orldview, understood in the spirit of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, really allows us to better understand the schoolchildren of bygone ages, who considered the development of a worldview a necessary part of life's journey: the consciousness and integrity of the worldview allowed us to feel in ourselves the work of the 'gears' of history. By changing himself, the teenager changed the world <...>".<sup>481</sup> At the same time, the researcher notes that as early as in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century there is a change in the perception of this concept (which, in particular, is evidenced by the memoirs of Academician D. S. Likhachev quoted in the article by A. B. Lyarsky) and the active, world-creating beginning is washed out of the extension of the concept of мировоззрение. Thus, the essence of worldview is changed from an active attitude to the world to a passive one and further transformed into the "only correct" ideology, with a brightly colored emphasis on partisanship, adherence to a certain ideological group. This, by the way, can be clearly seen in the texts of Russian publicists of the 1860s, in particular, D. I. Pisarev, and its roots, apparently, should be sought in the works of positivist philosophers, starting already with O. Comte.<sup>482</sup>

<sup>479</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>480</sup> Vide: Kareev N. V. Conversations on the Development of a Worldview. St. Petersburg, 1896. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>481</sup> Liarsky A. B. School Lexicon at the turn of the XIX–XX centuries: world-view // Pechat' i slovo Sankt-Peterburga. Peterburgskie Chteniya — 2015 XVII Vserossiyskaya nauchnaya konferentsiya: sbornik nauchnykh trudov. Ministerstvo obrazovaniya i nauki RF; Sankt-Peterburgskiy gosudarstvennyi universitet promyshlennykh tekhnologiy i dizaina; Vysshaya shkola pechati i mediatekhnologiy. 2016. Pp. 86—91. URL: <u>https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=26481308</u> (accessed: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>482</sup> Pisarev D. I. Historical Sketches. Selected Articles. Moscow, 1989. Pp. 344—354. (*In Russian*); ibid., p. 99; ibid., p. 171—172; ibid., p. 179.

Thus, we see that not only in the European languages, but also in Russian the words related to the translation and interpretation of the concept of *Weltanschauung* have a pronounced author's character, and was scarcely perceived by Russian-speaking people as a Russian word proper until the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, the publicists of the 1860s, who later influenced the culture of using this word in journalism, fine literature, and philosophy, did a lot for its russification and, accordingly, for saturating it with meanings characteristic of the Russian-speaking person.

Having analyzed the sources, we found out that the growth of research interest in the phenomenon of worldview is found in foreign authors starting from the middle and second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, while in the Russian tradition the concept of *worldview* was actively discussed among publicists (including revolutionary democrats) in the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, partly — in pre- and after-Revolutionary years of 1910—1920s, as well as starting from 1985. It is with the literary activity of the representatives of the Russian spiritual Renaissance who wrote about worldview that the conceptual development and polemics around this semantically loaded notion are connected. An interesting example of open worldview confrontation was the post-revolutionary period — there are wonderfully selected anthologies that allow us to show the diversity of views espoused by different groups in the context of not so much (as long as it was possible) political, but rather theoretical polemics of the 1920s.<sup>483</sup>

Let us give a few illustrative examples. L. Shestov repeatedly uses this concept in his book *The Apotheosis of Groundlessness*, and for him it means systematic views, perfection and limited understanding of the world by various scientific disciplines, including philosophy. He notes that this is the need of our reason, but that our reason itself has already been discredited by its inability to know everything and to encompass everything:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>483</sup> At the Turning Point: Philosophical Discussions of the 20s: Philosophy and Worldview. Moscow, 1990. (*In Russian*); Vekhi: Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia. Moscow, 1991. Pp. 7–206. (*In Russian*).

Is it the main task of our time to learn the art of bypassing (or even destroying) all those numerous roadblocks, which, under various pretexts, were built in the olden days by powerful feudal lords of the spirit and which, only due to the eternal conservatism of cowardly and short-sighted human nature, are still considered insurmountable, even "natural" barriers to the movement of our thought? Why the end? Why the last word? Why a worldview...? Of course, I am talking about philosophy and philosophers, people who strive to see, learn, experience as much as possible in life. For ordinary worldly practice, finality will still remain an unchanging dogma.<sup>484</sup>

In other words, for everyday thinking the completeness of the world picture seems to be a good thing and even a necessity, since its boundaries ("barriers of thought" according to Shestov) keep the mind from risky questioning of the essence of things. In this, however, the essence not only of philosophical thinking but also of worldview itself is paradoxically manifested, namely, the ability to grasp the world in the unity of its elements rather than to accept some externally given readymade model. By asking about the world, about its causes, about the essence of human nature, philosophers more firmly grasp the world as an ontological unity of its components, while the philistine picture of the world is only an ersatz world, and thus a genuine activity in the world. For the one who refuses to risk grasping the world with his own mind, the world falls apart before his eyes at the first shock.

No less colorful example is the use of the concept of "worldview" as identical to "ideology" by N. A. Berdyaev. In his program article, which opened the first issue of the journal *Vekhi* (1909), he spoke about the inherent near-sightedness of the revolutionary-minded Russian intellectual public and its indifference to the creative path of V. S. Soloviev: "[R]ussian intelligentsia did not read and did not know V. S. Soloviev, did not recognize him as their own. Soloviev's philosophy is profound and original, but it does not substantiate socialism, cannot be turned into an instrument of struggle against autocracy and therefore did not give the intelligentsia a suitable 'worldview' <...>".<sup>485</sup> Here Berdyaev also mentions the names of such creators of the intellectual worldview of the 19<sup>th</sup> century as Comte and Avenarius. One cannot

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>484</sup> Shestov L. The Apotheosis of Groundlessness. Moscow, 2000. P. 454. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>485</sup> Vekhi: Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia. Moscow, 1991. Pp. 25–26. (In Russian).

help noticing, how this word usage merges two fundamental meanings of *worldview*: on the one hand, it refers to the familiar from the publicism of the 1860s partisanship, the belonging of certain people to a certain group that shares certain views, ideals or values; on the other hand, the sense of the creative way of reorganizing the world, which was originally put into the concept of *Weltanschauung* by the German Romanticists, can be seen here. Thus, worldview as a concept is also enriched with the meaning of secular (or even profane) *credo*, the creed of intellectual practical reason. Berdyaev himself unambiguously interpreted the creative act only as a manifestation of genuine freedom, but for the *party* man the transforming action of reality must be sanctioned by the public recognition and understanding of like-minded people.

It is also interesting to mention how the classics of Russian literature of the 20<sup>th</sup> century also looked at the use of synonymous concepts. V. V. Vinogradov reports that "M. Gorky in his article *On Plays*, establishing subtle differences between the words *mupoouyyщenue* (perception of the world), *mupocosepyanue* (contemplation of the world), *muposo33penue* (worldview), *mupononumanue* (understanding of the world), which in bourgeois journalism were used as synonyms, wrote: 'The attitude of people to the world is convenient — although it will be somewhat crude — to place in four forms: *mupoouyyщenue*, i.e. a passive sense of reality as a chain of various and avoidable obstacles to human growth and movement; *mupocosepyanue* — an indifferent and "objective" mood, accessible only to those who are still provided with nourishment, peace, security and are sure that all this will be enough for their lifetime; *mupoeo33penue* — a system of "radical" views, learned in the family and school, supplemented by reading a variety of books — about a person who has such universally flexible views, beautifully and aptly said:

What the latest book tells him, That will lie on his soul. And the most dramatic hero of modernity is the man of *миропонимание* — he seeks to study and understand the world in order to fully master it as his household. He is the man of the new humanity, big, bold, strong<sup>\*\*</sup>.<sup>486</sup>

However, from as early as the 1930s, the order of speech changes and the meanings of the concept of *worldview* are transformed and shifted. This is also reflected in the literature and journalism of the Soviet time, especially in satirical writings of the postwar period. For example, S. D. Dovlatov in one of his texts quotes the following conversation:

- Do you have any political ideals?
- I don't think so.
- What about any kind of мировоззрение (worldview)?
- No мировоззрение (worldview).
- What do you have?
- Миросозерцание (contemplation of the world).
- Isn't that the same thing?
- No. It's about the same as a full-time employee and a freelancer.<sup>487</sup>

It is clear from the context of this conversation what the character means. *MupoBo33peHue* is something ostentatious, showy, a way of thinking, a way of reacting to what is happening that fits well within a stipulated and well-recognized external framework — social, political, or cultural. *Mupoco3epyaHue*, on the other hand, is something fundamentally different, since it concerns the intimate course of a person's mental life, which is not bound to any external stamps - ideological, cultural, or moral; in other words, worldview is spontaneous and intimate. It is characteristic that the interlocutor of Dovlatov's protagonist shares this view, perfectly understanding his irony and accepting the rules of the language game proposed by him:

- Still, what about ideals? You're in a political radio station. You could use some ideals.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>486</sup> Vinogradov V. V. The History of Words. Moscow, 1999. P. 775. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>487</sup> Dovlatov S. D. Affiliate // Dovlatov S. D. Selections. St. Petersburg, 2008. P. 584—585. (In Russian).

- Is that necessary?

- For full-time employees, necessary. For freelancers, it's desirable.<sup>488</sup>

In this case, we can extract from this conversation more of what it actually says. First of all, we can reconstruct the cultural background, which the conversation takes place on. The point is that both Dovlatov's protagonist and his interlocutor perfectly understand each other's attitude to the ideological environment prevailing in the country, which cannot but influence the editorial policy of the radio. Thus they basically express their position concerning the problem of correct and safe, which means expected or predictable attitude to the surrounding reality. It is this transformation of meanings that has been discussed above. Passive, "correct" acceptance of reality turns out to be an important sign of loyalty and, consequently, usefulness to the state machine, while any active attitude to reality becomes a marker of danger and alienation to the regime. In other words, worldview (as this concept is recorded in twentieth-century literature) turns out to be the most important social and, in fact, anthropological indicator: in the final analysis, it works as an effective distinguishing principle that allows us to identify the subject of an utterance in the mode of "one's own — the Other".

In the Soviet Union, the justification of the scientific worldview as the only possible form of person's attitude to the world in the conditions of the achievements of modern science and technology was important *ideologically* as well. Other worldview forms (and they were distinguished by the most diverse and often incomparable with each other in the work of different authors) were recognized as a relic of the past. If we try to make historical convergences, the case of scientific and ideological confrontation between Soviet and Nazi scientists and publicists is typical. For example, in an extensive critical preface to the Russian-language edition of the 1935 publication of E. Haeckel's most famous work *The Riddle of the Universe*, A. Maksimov wrote: "If under the leadership of the proletariat *the victory of science and the blossoming of the scientific worldview* are ensured, in the camp

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>488</sup> Ibid., p. 585

of *the bourgeoisie obscurantism and ideological reactionaryism* supplant science. <...> The decline of science and the rampant of religious superstition and obscurantism in the capitalist countries, the flowering of science and the triumphant march of militant materialism — dialectical materialism — in the USSR show that the path that Lenin pointed out to natural scientists, including Haeckel, is the only true way. <...> only dialectical materialism is the only philosophical doctrine which is consistently and to the end a scientific worldview" (italics added. — A.L.).<sup>489</sup> The proposed formula can be considered quite canonical, and further on the scientific worldview and its Marxist-Leninist core will be written about in more or less the same expressions.

Undoubtedly, it was the criterion of scientific character of views, no matter how wild and anti-humanistic they seemed, that was the dominant ideological debate and polemics around worldviews. Apparently, it was during this period of the 1920s that the idea of a special *scientific* type of worldview began to emerge in Western European, including Soviet Humanities. In general, the usual form of considering the relations between different worldviews is to contrast Marxism-Leninism as "the most advanced worldview of our time",490 which "has high merits that distinguish it from all other worldviews"<sup>491</sup> and the others: "There are different worldviews: both progressive and reactionary. Among reactionary worldviews there are such worldviews, which are built on the basis of ancient beliefs and instill in a religiously inclined person the need to remain in blind dependence on an imaginary supernatural being and his earthly viceroys and anointed. There are also such worldviews, whose proponents, without speaking directly about the deity and even swearing allegiance to science, with the help of sophisticated but false arguments seek to destroy the beliefs of modern man in the real existence of the material world. This is exactly what the representatives of the most fashionable currents of modern idealism do".492 Obviously, in connection with such a clearly expressed ideological interpretation of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>489</sup> Maksimov A. S. Haeckel and His *The Riddle of the Universe //* Haeckel E. The Riddle of the Universe. Moscow, 1925. P. 57—58. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>490</sup> The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism. A Textbook. Moscow, 1960. P. 5. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>491</sup> Ibid., p. 6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>492</sup> Ibid., p. 5—6.

the worldview, it receives negative critical coloring from most representatives of the official Soviet philosophy.

However, one should not think that the work on systematization of knowledge about worldview as a socio-political and philosophical concept was not carried out. It was conducted carefully and quite accurately, and the rejection of a direct connection between worldview and ideology became possible thanks to the discussion of the methodological prerequisites of such a study. The desire to move away from a dogmatic interpretation of Marxism required that the problems that were presented in the ideological discourse as non-negotiable conclusions, and sometimes even axioms, be brought into the problem field of discussion. This tendency (which concerns not only worldviews, but also other important philosophical problems) is especially visible in the works of the late 1980s. In particular, the heuristic attitude of the fellow of Russian Academy of Sciences T. I. Oizerman is a very indicative sign of the time:

The universal character of the dialectical process and the qualitative diversity of the laws of objective reality, the social-historical process as subject-object reality, i.e., the transformation of the subjective into the objective and the objective into the subjective, the rational and the irrational, the contradiction between descriptive and normative characteristics of culture, the uniqueness of human existence, the unity of necessity and freedom, thanks to which *homo sapiens* overcomes its species limitation and becomes more than a reasonable social life, and the unity of necessity and freedom. The scientific and philosophical worldview of Marxism is unthinkable without their thorough discussion, which will never be crowned with the final truth in the last instance. However, the very notion of a scientific-philosophical worldview is a highly debatable question. Only the study of its qualitatively different types can reveal the specificity of the philosophical worldview and the historical prerequisites that make it *scientific* and philosophical.<sup>493</sup>

We are inclined to perceive this quotation in two ways. On the one hand, it certainly summarizes the reasoning of a venerable Soviet researcher about worldview as a subject of scientific research, and in this perspective, we understand

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>493</sup> Oizerman T. I. The Problems of Historical-Philosophical Science. Moscow, 1982. P. 7. (In Russian).

that philosophical reflection of fundamental concepts was an important epistemological aspect of the craft of Soviet philosophers. On the other hand, however, it seems to us that such a mild formulation about the disputability of the question of the specificity of the scientific and philosophical worldview is a striking sign of the times. We quote a source from 1989, i.e., published at a time when the former firm (sometimes to the point of obliquity) formulations from textbooks on Marxist-Leninist philosophy were being overshadowed by the return to the discussion space of a range of questions characteristic of the post-revolutionary period. A striking feature of the late Soviet period is the revival of interest in the problems posed by the previously undiscussed representatives of Russian religious philosophy. And here is a telling worldview reversal: many Soviet experts in the fields of historians of philosophy, logic, ethics, social philosophy, and psychology became members of the editorial boards of a series of scientific editions of classic works by Russian philosophers of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries.

## 3.3. Did the Greeks Have a Worldview?

The study of various historical forms, which were proclaimed worldviews or expressed certain worldview attitudes, allows us to highlight the characteristic properties of worldview as a general cultural, universal spiritual phenomenon. We thus distance ourselves from the above-mentioned thesis of M. Heidegger that *Weltanschauung* as a word is not a translation from the Greek or Latin languages and, therefore, is a specifically German concept introduced in Modern philosophy. Adopted by both domestic and foreign researchers of the phenomenon of worldview as an initial given, this position of Heidegger points not so much to the fact that in no other culture than the Modern worldview existed, but rather to the problem: how original was the Modern worldview then, and in comparison, with what can we state its originality? Heidegger contrasts the German *Weltanschauung* with the Greek neologism  $\kappa o \sigma \mu o \vartheta \varepsilon \omega \rho i \alpha$  — but after all, there was the concept of *contemplatio mundi* (contemplation of the world) as early as in antiquity, which Seneca understood as a theatrical (spectacle) parallel to philosophical contemplation  $(\vartheta \epsilon \omega \rho i \alpha)$ : "The intellectual heritage that runs from Aristotle to Theophrastus to Menander makes of the New Comic stage a kind of laboratory of Peripatetic ethics, a screen against which the audience may study the trajectories of vice. But if the Hellenistic audience was one of *Glücksforscher*, translation into Latin and into spatial sensibilities informed by Roman culture made for an audience of *Himmelsbetrachter*".<sup>494</sup>

Such an opposition implies quite a definite line of development of thought, from the original contemplative natural philosophy of early Greek thinkers to the later, self-conscious ethical thought of Hellenistic philosophers. Here we see an already formed requirement of the canon of philosophy: it is reasonable to propose a doctrine of happiness when it is consistent with our knowledge of the correct order of the world, obtained with the help of a serviceable instrument of knowledge of the world, the logic. Note that this requirement was also characteristic of Modern thought, which absorbed the previous historical stages of development of classical metaphysics.<sup>495</sup> If we abstract this opposition into a concise formula, we will get the vector of the development of ancient thought from theory to practice; let us add that both theory and practice have to do not with a particular epoch or particular conditions of existence (such a statement of the problem never concerned philosophy), but with the whole world. In other words, we move from the contemplation of the world as a whole to the practice of the world as a whole, the latter presupposing a specifically formulated anthropological project. The world as a whole, if not the foundation of perennial philosophy (philosophia perennis), is articulated in philosophy precisely as an eternal problem. Consequently, we quite reasonably believe that we can speak of different worldview projects or approaches in the philosophical tradition not only of the new time, but also of classical antiquity, the Christian Middle Ages, and non-European spiritual traditions, ranging from ancient Eastern teachings to modern national or international ideological projects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>494</sup> Germany R. All the World's a Stage: Contemplatio Mundi in Roman Theatre // P. Horky (ed.) Cosmos in the Ancient World. Cambridge, 2019. P. 231.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>495</sup> Shokhin V. K. How Was Classical Metaphysics Made? // Vestnik Provoslavnogo Svyato-Tikhonovskogo gumanitarnogo universiteta. Seria 1: Bogoslovie. Filosofiya. 2015. № 5 (61). Pp. 41—58. Pp. 41—42. (*In Russian*).

It is clear that if there is the described consensus on the problem of the world as a whole, there must be at least the possibility of grasping and holding a unity of the world that is comparable in form across cultures. Perhaps such intellectual or spiritual practices will differ from one another in content, they will be heterogeneous within themselves, and yet we will be able to identify them as worldviews characteristic of the culture in question. Therefore, we need to consider the question of what constitutes an "ideal type" of worldview in the formal sense, namely, by taking into account those characteristic properties that we can identify, abstracting from the substantive aspect of specific worldviews or doctrines. Of course, we can derive such an "ideal type" (which is presented as a constellation of the *worldview* concept in the table at the end of the second chapter) only from the study of our native Modern culture, which provides rich research material regarding worldview strategies. In this sense, we remain faithful to Heidegger's position, but only until we have a model of worldview which, as a mold, can be applied to the study of similar worldview attitudes in other cultures.

We will give here an example of such a study for ancient Greek philosophy of the Hellenistic era. It is largely inspired by the successful Russian translation of the eighth chapter of the first book of Sextus Empiricus's treatise *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* by N. V. Brullova-Shaskolskaya, which renders the Greek concept aı̈pɛσıç as "worldview" (I, 16—17).<sup>496</sup> To compare, let us say that R. Bury's English translation is more formal in this respect (he gives as a variant "doctrinal rule").<sup>497</sup> Having investigated the question, below we will consider the notion of aı̈pɛσıç as correlative to the Modern notion of *worldview*. For this purpose, we will consider its origin, possible translations and discursive practices of its usage.<sup>498</sup>

To defining or translate  $\alpha$  is  $\alpha$  is not difficult — it is much more difficult to offer an interpretation of it. The word itself is a noun from the verb  $\alpha$  ip  $\epsilon \omega$ , which means "to take by hand", "to grasp", "to catch", "to win", "to acquire", or

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>496</sup> Vide: Sextus Empiricus. Collected Works in Two Volumes. Moscow, 1976. Vol. 2, pp. 210—211. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>497</sup> Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cambridge, London, 1976. P. 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>498</sup> The main results of the scrutiny of this problem were published in: Lvov A. A. Did the Greeks Have a

Worldview? A Comparative Study of Worldview's Genealogy // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. — 2022. — T. 38. — № 4. — C. 500—511.

finally "to choose" or "to elect". From its root numerous derivatives with different definitions have arisen, including technical meanings in logic, politics and ethics, which we will analyze in more detail below. There are three main translations and thus conceptualizations of the concept of alpeous: firstly, it is the selection or preference of one argument over another, as in argumentation theory, dialectic (or logic), or ethics; secondly, it is a philosophical school in the broadest sense of the word, which includes the Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics, and many others, as will be discussed in more detail further; finally, thirdly, it may refer to a school of medicine, which in the classical and Hellenistic ages it was customary to name after its leader or founder. We find an interesting relation of concepts when we study the derivative from  $\alpha i \rho \epsilon \omega$ , the concept of  $\pi \rho \alpha i \rho \epsilon \sigma \iota \varsigma$ . The study of these concepts becomes more productive if we place them in the context of later interpretations created by modern scholars. Thus, the British classics, on whose expertise Alfred Bloch relied heavily, have shown that Polybius understood access as a fundamental law (einen *Grundsatz*) that governed the life of the Achaean alliance: either freedom or a fight to the death against tyranny. At the same time, the Achaeans compare this to the political decision ( $\pi \rho o \alpha (\rho \epsilon \sigma \iota c)$ ) made by the "last of the Hellenes" Philopomenos.<sup>499</sup>

These in some respects synonymous, but not at all identical concepts were already considered by Aristotle — in his ethical writings one can find a distinction between reasonable, or (as we would say today) conscious choice, i.e.  $\pi$ poαíρεσις, and unreasonable (unconscious) choice. Among other things, he mentions αἴρεσις in his *Politics* in connection with the election procedure. It is noteworthy that Aristotle uses the concept of αἴρεσις primarily to describe the basis for free, conscious or deliberate choice, i.e.  $\pi$ poαíρεσις: the latter depends on human deliberation, personal decision and subsequent responsibility for the decision. One can also interpret αἴρεσις as the possibility of choice as such based on human reason, the capacity for inference or sound judgment. Regarding the latter, in *Magna Moralia* Aristotle says the following:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>499</sup> Bloch, A. Zwei Beiträge zur lateinischen Wortkunde // Museum Helveticum. 1958. Vol. 15. №2. S. 135.

Now in the case of the natural virtues we said that there existed only the impulse to right without reason; but he who has choice has it in reason and the rational part. So that as soon as choice is present, perfect virtue will be there, which we said was accompanied by wisdom, but not without the natural impulse to right. Nor will one virtue run counter to another, for its nature is to obey the dictates of reason, so that it inclines to that to which reason leads. For it is this which chooses the better. For the other virtues do not come into existence without wisdom, nor is wisdom perfect without the other virtues, but they co-operate in a way with one another, attending upon wisdom, <sup>500</sup>

whereas  $\pi \rho \alpha \alpha \rho \alpha \sigma \varsigma \varsigma$  is a deliberate choice or preference of one over another (indicated by the prefix  $\pi \rho \sigma$ -) after reasonable advice or consideration. In other words, this is how an attentive person who is not deprived of the opportunity to act acts. Another important indication of such a distinction between what one chooses, being, on the one hand, within certain circumstances, and, on the other hand, in accordance with one's understanding of the Good, can be found in the juxtaposition of the concepts of  $\dot{\epsilon}\kappa\lambda\sigma\gamma\dot{\eta}$  and  $\alpha$   $\tilde{\epsilon}\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  in Stoic philosophy.<sup>501</sup> In the first book of his commentary on Aristotle's *Topics*, Alexander of Aphrodisias says that the choice or preference of one of these is according to each man's own nature, whether he uses his reason or not. In this case, we must understand conformity to nature as being limited by its ultimate cause, that is, the Good (6, 1-10). Here is a short excerpt from his commentary:

All those things investigated which have reference to choice or avoidance are ethical problems. For the inquiry into good and evil, and what is to be chosen and what is to be avoided, is ethical and has reference to choice and avoidance, not to bare discernment: he who inquires whether pleasure is good or not, or in general about any good that can be acquired, inquires about choosing and avoiding them. <...> And logical problems are all those things which are neither investigated as possible actions nor have as their goal the discernment of the truth contained in them, but are investigated as contributing either to the discernment of what is to be chosen and what is not, or to the finding what is true, and what is false. 502

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>500</sup> Aristotle. Magna Moralia. Oxford, 1915. 1200a 1—10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>501</sup> Algra K. et. al. (eds.) The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. Cambridge, 1999. P. 698.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>502</sup> Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Aristotle Topics 1. London, 2001. 1:80.

As already mentioned, another important feature of the concept of alpeous is its application to medical practice. In *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, Sextus Empiricus points out that it is medical teaching that appears to be the most balanced, not rushing to conclusions, and in this sense akin to the skeptical school (I, 237). From our modern perspective, funded by the ideal of precise knowledge, medicine was considered in antiquity probably the only empirical discipline<sup>503</sup> that assumed a similar ideal of precision and scientific rigor (ἀκρίβεια).<sup>504</sup> Physicians were known in common parlance as "empiricists". This precision was also reflected in the method of treatment, i.e. how exactly to approach the treatment of the wounded or sick. This empirical aspect became a distinctive feature of medical science; note that it is by analogy with the activity of a physician that Socrates, contrasting himself with the Sophists, speaks not only of his method (majeutics, i.e., obstetrics), but also of the precision to which he aspires in his search for truth. This aspect of the Socratic approach was also noted by W. Jaeger.<sup>505</sup> However, John Glucker notes that "[t]he medical αιρέσεις are thus clearly not depicted as organized schools or institutions, but as 'schools of thought' or 'persuasion', differing merely in their approach to the method or essential nature of the practice of medicine. The followers of each of these 'schools' are called by the name designating their essential approach to their art".<sup>506</sup> It is noteworthy that the doctor's qualifications, i.e. professional skill, put the name of the doctor on the background in the memory of descendants. N. A. Chistyakova cites an interesting epitaph on a tombstone in Piraeus in the late 6<sup>th</sup> century B.C.: "Composed according to the traditional archaic formula ('this is the monument (or tomb) of someone') it fixes the main attention not on the name of the person, although it is indicated, but on his art ( $\sigma \circ \phi(\alpha)$ ), which allowed him to be known and remain an excellent doctor forever (ἄριστος ἰατρός)".<sup>507</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>503</sup>: Farrington B. Head and Hand in Ancient Greece. Four Studies in the Social Relations of Thought. St. Petersburg, 2008. P. 83. (*In Russian*).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>504</sup> Zhmud L. Ya. The Origins of the History of Science in Antiquity. St. Petersburg, 2002. Pp. 92—93. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>505</sup> Jaeger W. Paideia: The Ideas of the Greek Culture. Vol. 2: In Search of the Divine Center. New York, 1944. P. 32ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>506</sup> Glucker J. Antiochus and the Late Academy. Göttingen, 1978. P. 188–189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>507</sup> Chistyakova N. A. The Greek Epigram VIII—III cent. BC. Leningrad, 1983. P. 92. (In Russian).

We now turn directly to the most important of the semantic set of alpeau for us, namely αἴρεσις as a school. There is a standard list of Greek schools (or sects) of thought going back to Hippobotus, since he was the first to list them in this way. Let us qualify the sense in which we use the word "sect" here. It comes from the Latin sequor, "to follow", and is essentially a translation of αἴρεσις into Latin, whence it is borrowed in the quite usual way for ancient terms into Modern languages. Thus, it was Hippobotus who provided the readers of his work On the Schools of *Philosophy* ( $\Pi$ ερì αἰρέσεων) with a list of the following nine schools: (1) the Megarian, (2) the Eretrian, (3) the Cyrenaic, (4) the Epicurean, (5) the Annicerean, (6) the Theodoric, (7) Zeno the Stoic's, (8) the older Academic, (9) the Peripatetic. This is precisely the list mentioned by Diogenes Laertius, but Diogenes also gives us more information about the Pyrrhonian school, raising the question of whether it should be considered aipeous or not (these passages may, however, also be a compilation from Sextus's book on the Pyrrhonian positions, cf. I, 16-18). Suidae Lexicon literally repeats both the text from Diogenes and from Sextus, but in doing so provides us with criteria for what belongs to alpeous. Let us give the text of this small article from the Byzantine lexicon in full (the translation is ours):

αἴρεσις is when followed in relation to a phenomenon by some speech or doctrine. Hippobotus names nine schools of philosophers and their followers: the Megarian, Eretrian, Cyrenaic, Epicurean, Anneceridian, Theodoric, Zenonian, or Stoic, Academic, Peripatetic — but not the Cynic, the Aelid, or the Dialectic. Many are inclined to say that the followers of Pyrrho do not constitute a school either, owing to this difficulty: for if by school we understand the tendency to have dogmas and to follow them, then indeed we should not call a follower of Pyrrho (also "Pyrrhonian philosopher") a school (αἴρεσις). For he has no strict doctrine. Nay more, Potamo of Alexandria said that a certain one followed the doctrine of the Eclectics when he chose what he liked from each philosophical school (αἰρέσεων). The criteria of truth are said to be two: first, that over which reasoning (κρίσις) takes place, and he is supreme; secondly, that by which the most accurate representation is given. The beginnings of all things are matter (ὕλην), the determining quality (ποιοὺν ποιότητα), and place (τόπον); for they are both that of what, and that from what, and that how, and that in what. Purpose, then, is ascribed to everything: for the living, purpose is

consistent with all virtue, and of necessity with all those goods which belong to the body by nature, and those goods which are over and above that.<sup>508</sup>

The most general characterization of a philosophical school here is that its aim is the search for truth as such. Furthermore, it can be noticed that *Suidae* here lists only the Hellenistic and Socratic schools. Furthermore, the following two main characteristics of alpeous can be extracted from this article: first and in-principle, it is that over which reasoning (κρίσις) takes place; and, secondly, by means of which one is given the most accurate idea (την ἀκριβεστάτην φαντασίαν). It must be observed that allocatic has in this case a predominantly ethical meaning — this is perfectly accounted for by Kittel's Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, where this notion is conjugated with a certain choice of opinions, the advocates of which deliberately and intentionally distinguish themselves from any other doctrine or school. Seneca's testimony from his *Moral Epistles* to Lucilius, in which he denies that he is a renegade and compares himself to a spy infiltrating the enemy's territory, is quite revealing in this sense when he mentions his reading of Epicurus's works: "Today I came across this from Epicurus (for I often go into other people's camp, not as a defector, but as a spy): 'Cheerful poverty,' he says, 'is an honest thing'" (II, 5-6).509

We have said that by the term  $\alpha \tilde{i} \rho \epsilon \sigma \iota \zeta$  the Hellenistic and later Greek sources meant philosophical schools, or sects; but, firstly, it was not the only term to designate them, and, secondly, its meaning was not confined to philosophical schools only. Besides  $\alpha \tilde{i} \rho \epsilon \sigma \iota \zeta$ , the sources also use the terms  $\sigma \chi o \lambda \dot{\eta}$  and  $\delta \iota \alpha \tau \rho \iota \beta \dot{\eta}$ , all of which later appeared in Latin as independent terms, such as "sect", "school", or "diatribe" (as a genre of invective). The question of the naming of schools has been comprehensively studied by modern classical philologists, a striking example being L. Y. Zhmud's brilliant study of the history and activities of the Pythagorean community. In this book he discusses how the ancients labeled the Pythagoreans,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>508</sup> Bekker I. Suidae Lexicon. Berlin, 1854. P. 44.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>509</sup> S. A. Osherov's translation in: Seneca Lucius Annaeus. Moral Epistles to Lucilius. Moscow, 1977. P. 6. (*In Russian*).

citing the above-mentioned terms.<sup>510</sup> J. Glocker has thoroughly analyzed the question of the first mention of alpeous in the sense of "philosophical school". He refutes Kittel's idea that the term was first used by Chrysippus (in his book The School according to Gorhippides, Αἴρεσις πρὸς Γοργιπππίδην), and demonstrates its widespread use as an ethical and logical term up to the time of late Hellenism: "Thus it seems that, in the second half of the second century B.C., apercus already appeared in the titles of books concerned with the views of various philosophers and philosophical sects".<sup>511</sup> In his remarkable study of the history of the New Academy, Glocker distinguishes several terms by which the Greeks designated philosophical schools. Of alpeous he says that it was not an established sect or "school" in the institutional sense, but a kind of peculiar attitude of mind toward philosophical problems. Philosophical αἴρεσις is defined as "a disposition towards a consistent set of doctrines", or at least as "following or seeming to follow some rationale based on phenomena". In both cases the subject of the definition is the attitude of mind, and nothing is said about the group of people belonging to or following αἴρεσις. He also adds that "[i]n the preface to his Commentary to the Categories, Elias offers a definition of alpeous, which is in all probability derives from Proclus, like the rest of that preface: αἴρεσις ἐστι ἀνδρῶν ἀστείων δόξα πρὸς μὲν ἑαυτῶν συμφωνούντων, πρὸς δε ἄλλους διαφωνούντων– 'αἴρεσις is the opinion of educated men, agreeing among themselves and disagreeing among the others". <sup>512</sup> One curious story also deserves special attention, which J. Glocker takes apart to illustrate the vast range of meanings of αιρεσις, which is not confined to a mere "sect" or "school". He quotes *Herculanean Life of Philonides the Epicurean*, written by a probable contemporary of Dionysius of Halicarnassus:

<...>Antiphanes is quoted to the effect that Antiochus Epiphanes, under the influence of a teacher who was a renegade Epicurean, became estranged from the  $\alpha$  ( $\rho$   $\epsilon \sigma \iota \varsigma$ , and that it was Philonides who brought him back to the Epicurean fold. But this cannot mean that the King left the Epicurean

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>510</sup> Zhmud L. Ya. Pythagoros and Early Pythagoreans. Moscow, 2012. Pp. 125–147. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>511</sup> Glucker J. Antiochus and the Late Academy. Göttingen, 1978. P. 176.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>512</sup> Ibid., p. 180–181.

school of Athens, of which we are nowhere told that he was a member. Nor is Philonides depicted as bringing him back into membership of the school: he merely made him αἰρετιστὴς τῶν λόγων – a follower of the Epicurean *ratio*. We do not even know that Philonides ever studied in Athens or was a member of the Epicurean school there. Most of his early studies took place in the East. He later opened his own school at Antioch <...>. In such a context, away from Athens, one could be a follower of this or that philosophical persuasion, but surely not a member of an Athenian school.<sup>513</sup>

In other words, here we return to the classical Aristotelian concept of action ( $\pi \rho \alpha \alpha \rho \epsilon \sigma \alpha c$ ), which a reasonable person carries out on the basis of the opportunity he/she has, the very situation of choice ( $\alpha$  ( $\alpha$  ( $\beta$   $\epsilon \sigma \iota \varsigma$ ). Actually, this is how one chooses one's views — one is no longer called into the appropriate company ( $\pi\rho\delta\tau\rho\epsilon\psi\iota$ ), one is no longer involved in "word games" and discussion of various more or less tricky issues (διατριβαί). In the age of Hellenism, marked by the instability and conventionality of every state of affairs, by the absence of any *status quo*, and finally by the desperate mingling of blood and beliefs — in such an age a person who wished to save him/herself and become independent of the tumult of time and the turmoil that surrounded him/her was required to make a conscious choice, and to do so by his/her own judgment. He/she no longer had any guide; no scholarch could guarantee him/her the success of this or that philosophical trend or that he/she would necessarily achieve peace of mind by following these or other postulates. The age of Hellenism, therefore, for the first time, perhaps, placed the private individual, regardless of his/her status and origin, before the necessity of consciously looking at the world and, with every act and every word, proclaiming, affirming, and rejecting the truth of his chosen position. And so Hegel speaks quite naturally of that common character of Hellenistic teachings, that "the task of philosophy is now defined as a double basic question <...>: as the question of the criterion of truth and as the question of the sage".<sup>514</sup> In these terms, these two questions were resolved in the plane of the practical, where everyone was responsible for his own destiny. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>513</sup> Ibid., p. 182.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>514</sup> Hegel G. W. F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Book 2. St. Petersburg, 2006. P. 302. (In Russian).

schools of Hellenism were essentially the first step towards the great thesis that in truth there is "neither Hellene nor Jew"; it is highly significant that it was by αἴρεσις that the Greeks of later times began to mean the system of ideas, ideology, or philosophical or religious school of Jews, Christians, or pagans.<sup>515</sup> Hippolytus of Rome, in his *Refutation of All Heresies*, refers, among other ancient schools of thought, to the Indian Brahmans, the Celtic Druids, and even to Hesiod, whom he regarded as a natural philosopher.<sup>516</sup> It is noteworthy that the very title of his book — Φιλοσοφούμενα ή κατὰ πασῶν αἰρέσεων ἕλεγχος — includes the word φιλοσοφούμενα, by which he meant representatives of the ancient schools of thought (literally "those who have been philosophizing"), implying a view of these schools as basically heretical from a Christian point of view. Thus, αἴρεσις was used here not as a conceptual term, but as a kind of evaluation of rival or hostile views and doctrines.

In the context of Modern philosophy, the perception of aïpɛσuç as a *worldview* is formed indirectly (through the notion of secta), purified from the later understanding of it as *heresy*, burdened with Christian dogmatism. In the fourteenth chapter of the *Philosophical Treatise Concerning the Weakness of Human Understanding*, by P. Huet, a member of the French Academy, devoted to the *sects* (i.e. literally to the main trends) in modern philosophy, we find a list which partly repeats the classical pattern, but he adds to it his own peculiar though crude classification of all philosophers into three schools: empiricists, dogmatists, and skeptics, and asserts that only the latter are on the way to the attainment of truth in their endeavors. In this respect, it is interesting to pay attention to four so-called "philosophical essays" by D. Hume, in which he examines contemporary or in principle actual philosophical and religious trends through the prism of the classical schools of the Hellenistic era. In a note to the essay *The Epicurean* he explains this idea: "The purpose of both this and the following three essays is not so much to explain with all accuracy the opinions of the ancient philosophical sects, as to present

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>515</sup> Lampe G. W. H. (ed.). A Patristic Greek Lexicon. Oxford, 1961. P. 51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>516</sup> Kittel G., Friedrich G., Bromiley G. W. (eds.) Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Devon, 1985. P. 182– 184.

the opinions of the sects which have naturally developed in the world, and which hold different ideas concerning life and happiness. I give to each of them the name of that philosophical sect with which it bears the greatest resemblance".<sup>517</sup> Commentators on the Russian-language translation explain that this technique allowed to criticize different moral positions - for example, in the essay *The Platonists* Hume was referring not to the Platonists themselves, but to the Calvinists.<sup>518</sup>

The fact that the great schools of Hellenism — Stoicism, Epicureanism and Skepticism (or Pyrrhonism) — truly represent the cradle of Modern metaphysics and even politics has long been noticed by classical philologists, philosophers and historians alike.<sup>519</sup> It is remarkable that such dissimilar in their views Modern authors as M. Montaigne and P.-D. Huet, C. A. Helvetius and D. Hume called themselves Pyrrhonists, and it is not by chance that attempts are made to write a history of skepticism as an original continuation of the Hellenistic tradition.<sup>520</sup> On the whole, however, these examples allow us to say that the Modern reception of the very concept of "sect" in the meaning of a moral position, a system of views or a way of thinking goes back to the Hellenistic αἴρεσις. When we speak of the Modern concept of worldview (Weltanschauung) in the most general meaning, we mean the whole world as such, as a whole. This was the original idea of the Germans of the Enlightenment: ordo plurorum in uno ("the order of many in one"), as Kant's predecessor A. Baumgarten defined it in his treatise on ontology.<sup>521</sup> However, it is obvious that he was developing an already existing idea — in paragraph 3.2 we mentioned that the first to try to combine the ideas of observation and the notion of the whole world as a unity was the Dutch physicist C. Huygens. It was he who introduced, as we noted above, the term Kosmotheoros, which was the Latin title of his treatise on the planets, and the reception of this word in subsequent translations

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>517</sup> Hume D. Works in 2 vols. Moscow, 1996. Vol. 2, p. 560. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>518</sup> Ibid., p. 768, note 75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>519</sup> Vide: Pohlenz M. Stoa. A History of the Spiritual Movement. St. Petersburg, 2015, p. 1013 ff. (*In Russian*); Shakhnovich M. M. Epicure's Garden. St. Petersburg, 2002. P. 250 ff. (*In Russian*); Ankersmit F. Aesthetic Politics. Moscow, 2014. P. 97—102. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>520</sup> Popkin R. H. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. Assen, 1960.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>521</sup> Baumgarten A. Metaphysica. Halle, 1739. P. 34 (§119).

is extremely revealing. Importantly, however, "world-observer" indicates both what he does ("observing the world" through a telescope) and the one who does it (the observer himself). In other words, here the worldview as a concept is also in demand with regard to the status of truth, understood as validity, and with regard to the figure of the sage reincarnated as a scientist. The "republic of scholars", which was the great achievement of Modern science, also presupposed a remarkable unity of researchers, leveling out origin, religion, personal beliefs, and other extrinsic differences.

We can now return to Heidegger's statement about the essence of worldview as  $\kappa o \sigma \mu o \vartheta \epsilon \omega \rho i \alpha$  and consider it conceptually. First of all, we are inclined to believe that the very intension of a direct tracing into ancient Greek in Heidegger's text is explained by the fact that in the first half of the twentieth century the worldview positions of the empirio-criticists and their followers were quite strong in Germany. The very name of Kosmotheoria is of German, not Greek origin and belongs, as we have seen, to H. Gompertz, who considered himself the completion of the work of R. Avenarius.<sup>522</sup> Moreover, the philosophical foundations proposed by T. Ziehen proved to be in demand by such influential representatives of the developing German evolutionism as B. Rensch and W. Henning. Ziehen developed his doctrine of panpsychism with the achievements of the leading empiriocritics (first of all, E. Mach) in mind, which is why he remained associated in history (however, for rather superficial reasons) with the second Positivism.<sup>523</sup> Be that as it may, Ziehen's monism functioned as a very successful picture of the world, allowing evolutionary ideas to develop to the level of a systematic view of the world. Thus, Heidegger's struggle with "kosmotheoria" can be understood as a confrontation of the project of fundamental ontology with the essentialist approach of Modern science.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>522</sup> For more details vide: Lvov A. A., Kryukova K. V. H. Gomperz's "The Doctrine of Worldview" as a Result of the philosophy of Empiriocriticism // Vestnik Voronezhskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seria: Filosofiya. 2021. № 3 (41). Pp. 37—46. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>523</sup> Levit G. S., Hossfeld U. Biology and panpsychism: German evolutionists and a philosopher Theodor Ziehen (1862–1950) // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2020. Vol. 36. Issue 2. P. 240–253.

Moreover, the example of the Greek concept αἴρεσις reveals the transgressive properties of worldview as a metaconcept. In particular, we see that its most important aspects — pedagogical, ontological, and ethical — are also articulated in such an original medieval genre of spiritual literature as the "mirror" ("зерцало"). Although the name of the genre itself is considered to be a translation into national languages from Latin (speculum), Latin texts appeared only in the 9<sup>th</sup> century under the influence of original Arabic works of moral content.<sup>524</sup> We find works of this genre in Western European culture, in medieval and even Modern Russian culture, and these books were often translated into national languages and were considered to be spiritually useful due to their moral content. It is well known, for example, the anonymous Mirror of Princes (Fürstenspiegel), which presented instructions for rulers. Another work with the same title was compiled by the Braunschweig Duke Julius and his wife Elizabeth around 1570. The 16<sup>th</sup> century Polish writer Nikolaus Rey knew works with the same titles in Czech. On the orders of Peter the Great, the most famous work of this genre was published, apparently, The Honest Mirror of Youth (Юности честное зерцало), which was intended to educate "good tone" in society.525

One of the best-known examples of such "mirrors" is the classic text of the Byzantine monk of the 11<sup>th</sup> century Philip Monotropos (the Recluse) called  $\Delta \iota \delta \pi \tau \rho \alpha$  (i.e. literally "mirror"). In Russian, the text came to be known as the *The Mirror Reflecting the Soul* (Душезрительное зерцало). This text is a visual fiction textbook, the author of which was apparently inspired by a Greek translation of the famous Indian book *Kalila va Dimna* (i.e., "Foolish and Cunning") entitled *Stephanit and Ihnilat* that appeared in the 11th century. However, *Kalila va Dimna* was intended as a textbook of statesmanship, *speculum principium*, while *Dioptra* is precisely an entertaining textbook of human studies and a practical guide to self-knowledge. In *Dioptra*, the Soul and the Flesh have a dialogue with each other, with the Flesh representing the wise and enlightened counselor, and the Soul representing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>524</sup> The Oxford Dictionary of the Middle Ages. Oxford, 2010. Vol. 3, p. 1149

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>525</sup> The Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopaedic Dictionary. St. Petersburg., 1896. Vol. 18a, p. 704. (In Russian).

the simple-minded and emotional ruler. G. M. Prokhorov notes that "functionally it is the same as the through or "frame" dialogue of *Kalila and Dimna* and *One Thousand and One Nights*. The dialogue begins with the Soul, who has been in contact with her Flesh for many 'years and times', but who has never asked her anything useful before, now realizing her 'obliquity' and wanting to listen to 'words of punishment'; the Flesh willingly enters into the conversation and gives lengthy erudite answers to the brief questions of her mistress". <sup>526</sup>

It is interesting to note that this genre was perceived not only as a source of edification, but also as a practical consequence of the wise authors' deep understanding of the interrelationship of the nature of things. In particular, the researchers note that "no other work that was part of the literature of ancient Russia, neither translated nor original, gave such an amount of knowledge about man as Diotpra <...>".<sup>527</sup> This work by Philip Monotropus gave rise to many imitations by spiritual writers of medieval Russia, and the translation of his *Mirror* was perceived as a source of important knowledge about the external world, which affects the inner world of man and determines the harmony of the human soul with the surrounding reality: "The oldest Russian copies of *Dioptra* date back to the end of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, referring to it and citing excerpts from it to prove the injustice of the spreading expectations of the end of the world after the seventh thousand years 'from the creation of the world".<sup>528</sup>

As we have seen, the very concept of *worldview* emerges in the Modern Age, inspired by optical practices of knowledge: the appearance of the telescope and microscope caused the emergence not only of the macro- and micrographic worlds of Galileo, Huygens, Hooke, but also of the semantic pair "to know — to see". An example of this is the work *Dioptra, or Mirror of Worldview* (*Диоптра, или Зерцало мирозрительное*) published by N. I. Novikov in 1781. It was translated by Ivan Trediakovsky, and it was the second translation of this text, but from what original

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>526</sup> The Dictionary of Scholars and Scholarship in Ancient Rus. Issue 2 (2<sup>nd</sup> half of XIV—XVI cent.). Part 1. Vol. A—K. Leningrad, 1988. P. 193. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>527</sup> Ibid., p. 194.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>528</sup> Ibid.

or even from what language, we do not know — the translator in the "Preface" only informs us that it was translated and printed about 150 years ago already. The book is a curious text of teachings quite in the spirit of the medieval genre of zircal on how to treat him or other manifestations of this world. A remarkable attestation of the world in general is given in the first chapter of the second part "On the State of the World":

The world must be feared and withdrawn: its sweetness is deceitful, its labor fruitless, its fear unceasing, and its honor the poorest. It begins without prudence, and ends without repentance. The world promises much, but does not fulfill the promised [here as if there is an image of the great deceiver and the prince of this world. — A.L.]: it is impossible to imagine that you could live in the world without fear, sorrow, labor, and the most terrible danger and disaster. He traps man with his nets, and gives him no rest until he is drawn to death. It is not possible to love the world and not graze at will.<sup>529</sup>

Those who seek to know the physical world in all its manifestations should keep in mind the misery to which such studies will lead, as well as the lies of the world. The author believes that it is impossible to find salvation through the knowledge of this world, and therefore it is not necessary: "<...> it changes every minute, and its constant change with everything tilts to corruption: promises the greatest lucre, which, however, never fulfills: gives its lovers, apparently, beautiful fruits, but inside filled with worms, and unbearable stench: his fame leaves the living and does not follow the dead. In the face honors, in absentia does not know and leaves the dying".<sup>530</sup> In general, "[w]orld is like the body of a certain freak, for in it another has too much, another has too little, and another does not have the most important thing".<sup>531</sup>

In general, throughout the whole book, a red thread runs through the contrast between those who do not follow the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures and indulge in worldly affairs — they will perish, and those who renounce the world and vanity,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>529</sup> Dioptra, or The Worldview Mirror, Moscow, 1781. 2 part, p. 4. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>530</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>531</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

who honor God and keep the covenants — they will be granted eternal life. It is remarkable that the architectonics of the work is quite reminiscent of M. Montaigne's *Essays* right down to some of the headings, such as: "On self-love", "On the brevity of human life", "On the contempt of self", "On generosity" and so on. Anyway, we do not certainly find in this text any of Montaigne's inherent intention to examine himself — only doctrinal instructions, heavily seasoned with a pile of quotations from Scripture and biblical stories, which initially set the accents on the positions initially recognized as unquestionably correct.

From the above examples we can see how the medieval genre of the mirrors restores the conceptual unity of the world of the external, macrocosm, and the internal, microcosm, or the world of the human soul. The interconnection of logic, physics and ethics, embodied in the canon of philosophy of Hellenistic thought and then borrowed by medieval and Modern philosophical cultures, also shapes the ability of man to determine his place in the world through correct behavior, or being guided by true norms of morality. Apparently, it would not be wrong to say that such moral mirrors prepared the Modern cosmotheorist's perception of truth as a visible relation of things in the world. However, the tradition of translating moral writings also played a certain role here. G. V. Florovsky writes about the perception of Orthodoxy from Byzantium as a perception of Christian Hellenism. He attributes a great role in this endeavor to the feat of translators who created the Church Slavonic Bible and gave the language of worship to the dark Slavic peoples. Although it is true that the Slavs knew neither Homer nor Plato, were not familiar with the material and achievements of classical scholarship, philosophy and culture, they nevertheless joined the late Hellenistic tradition associated with Christianity. With the help and active activity of the enlighteners and ascetics of church activity, what G. V. Florovsky calls "the complexity of Slavic thought" developed:

[T]he translation of the Bible has always been a genuine event in the destiny of the people, always signifying a certain shift and feat. <...> In general, translation requires great creative tension, great ingenuity and resourcefulness, and not only in words. To translate is to be mentally alert and testing. It is not at all only a simple exercise or formal gymnastics of thought. Genuine translation

always means the translator's own becoming, his entering into the subject, i.e. the enrichment of the event itself, not only the enlargement of his horizons.... This is the unalterable significance of the Cyril and Methodius affair. It was the formation and education of the "Slavic" language itself, its inner Christianization and churching, the transformation of the very elements of Slavic thought and word, the Slavic "logos", the very soul of the people.<sup>532</sup>

It is fundamentally important to note here exactly the creative component, which means the creation of a different world, built on new and original meanings and principles related to the folk spirit. This allows us to look at translation activity as a creative linguistic activity, on the one hand, developing its own conceptual links and systems of Slavic culture, and on the other hand, conditioning spiritual and intellectual continuity with Byzantium. This kind of translation activity undoubtedly contributed to the creation of metaconcepts, since it was a question of conveying by means of one language the meanings characteristic of a culture not native to it and expressed in a foreign language. For example, the very idea of confession, taken from the reinterpreted concept of μετάνοια (literally: "change of mind"), became something deeply personal and firmly embedded in the idea of the educational, pedagogical ideal in the Orthodox tradition.

## 3.4. Summary

The historical aspect of the concept of *worldview* allows us to reconstruct the discourse within the framework of which worldview issues are articulated. The diachronic analysis of this discourse, in turn, allows us to identify a number of typical features of this discourse. Firstly, it is a departure from the exclusively methodological problems of philosophy of science and integration of elements of "non-scientific philosophy" (represented by ethical, aesthetic, and cultural spheres) into the system of views. Secondly, it is the preservation of a balance between logical rigor of problem formulation and free artistic search. Thirdly, it is the formation of an anthropological perspective, in which the classical principle of *self-care* is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>532</sup> Florovsky G. V. The Ways of Russian Theology. Paris, 1988. P. 6. (In Russian).

conceptualized in an original way. Thus, the worldview problematic can indeed be diachronically grasped as a set of characteristics expressing man's embeddedness in his world (*Umwelt*). This rootedness is supported by a unified communicative and meaning-generating environment formed and perceived as an optimal and possibly complete reflection of the ideas about the world unfolding in time and space.

The study of meaning-making means of different philosophical cultures has shown that conceptual relations can be articulated by specific ways and means native to a particular linguistic culture. This statement allows us to connect the problematics of various doctrines of worldview in the perspective of the project of "perennial philosophy" (philosophia perennis).533 Methodologically, the project of philosophia perennis is also related to the philological studies that emerged during the Renaissance. The search for sources and evidence of the wisdom of the ancients, the discovery of conceptual kinship with the spiritual teachers of mankind, including those from non-European traditions, went hand in hand with the formation of the historical consciousness of Renaissance human: "The Renaissance idea of humanitas, which relied on the poetic-artistic imagination, suddenly found its origins in 'the ancient wisdom' of magical knowledge, represented in the treatises of 'the hermetic corpus', which became widespread thanks to the translations of these treatises by M. Ficino. <...> The Renaissance 'new word' becomes the divination and unraveling of magical human affinity to the divine and all natural things, the search for *Prisca theologia*".<sup>534</sup> It is noteworthy that the very notion of *philosophia* perennis was proposed by the critic of Protestant theologians, A. Steuco.535 He sought to harmonize the so-called "ancient theology" (prisca theologia) with rigorous Catholic doctrine. However, it is Renaissance philosophy that provides the first examples of how the wisdom of the ages can be presented in its unity, despite the linguistic, religious, historical or other circumstances of its existence. Thus, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>533</sup> Also vide: Lvov A. A. The Problematization of the Project of "Perennial Philosophy" By the Means of Lingua-Cultural Analysis // Vestnik Omskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye issledovaniya. 2023. № 1 (38). Pp. 22—27. (*In Russian*).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>534</sup> Sergeev K. A. The Renaissance Foundations of Anthropocentrism. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 137. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>535</sup> Schmitt C. B. Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz, Journal of the History of Ideas. 1966.
 Vol. 27. №. 4. P 505—532. P. 506.

Byzantine Neoplatonist philosopher Georgios Gemistos Plethon, who was very critical of Christian doctrine, in his well-known and only fragmentarily preserved treatise *Laws*<sup>536</sup> listed the divine and therefore eternal ideas with which the gods endowed all peoples, but which are clearly distinguished only by the wisest of the teachers, from Zoroaster to Pythagoras and Plato. These ideas not only do not contradict each other or knowledge contemporary to that time, but, according to Plethon, constitute the treasury of the true wisdom of all peoples, and therefore should be followed by the great teachers of faith and legislators of the past.

M. Ficino, the head of the Florentine school of Neoplatonists, who was influenced by Plethon, had similar ideas regarding the status of such an "perennial philosophy". Despite the significant conceptual differences that can be found in the writings of these philosophers, Ficino follows the logic of the Byzantine author, arguing that the provisions that we find in the ancient sages are quite consistent with the teachings of Plato, which in turn do not fundamentally contradict the Holy Scriptures, but, on the contrary, correctly interpreted, strengthen us in the true faith. According to Ficino, Zoroaster, Orpheus, the legendary Hermes Trismegistus and Aglaotham, Pythagoras and Plato realized that true wisdom can only be received from God, and therefore treated their philosophical pursuits with true religious piety.<sup>537</sup> G. Pico della Mirandola gives perhaps the most rigorous example of a true compendium of universal wisdom: in his Nine Hundred Theses we find four hundred statements taken by the author from Eastern, Western, and classical religious and philosophical texts, which he seeks to harmonize with the principles of the philosophy he himself is developing. What unites all the authors chosen by Pico with his own views is a selfless pursuit of truth.

An enthusiast of the idea of "perennial philosophy" in the classical age was G. W. Leibniz, who in a rationalistic manner sought to restore the true wisdom of all mankind. Based on the principle of pre-established harmony inherent in his

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>536</sup> The translation of this text vide in: Medvedev I. P. Byzantine Humanism of XIV—XV cent. Leningrad, 1976. Pp. 171—241. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>537</sup> Ficino M. Plato's Theology on the Immortality of the Soul in XVIII Book. St. Petersburg, 2020. Pp. 446—447. (*In Russian*).

metaphysics, he sympathized with the project of "concordism", i.e. the selection and synthesis of the most significant philosophical ideas and statements of all times and peoples into a single system. On the one hand, such attention to his predecessors means his appreciation of the historical and philosophical material; on the other hand, it makes him a direct heir to the tradition of understanding *philosophia perennis* as *prisca theologia* in conjunction with the canon of Christianity contemporary to him, and of striving to form a unified and consistent language to express this idea.<sup>538</sup> However, the creation of a universal religion is one of the possible interpretations of the very essence of the idea of "eternal philosophy," going from Plethon, Pico, Nicholas of Cusa through A. Steuco to Leibniz.<sup>539</sup>

The latest original project of *philosophia perennis* also interprets this idea in a religious and ethical way. A. Huxley's *The Perennial Philosophy* presents the development of the most important ethical and religious-philosophical problems for modernity, which can be found already in the earliest monuments of religious thought in the East and West.<sup>540</sup> Huxley emphasizes that he is more likely to find examples of these ideas in texts recounting the spiritual experiences of ascetics and ascetics of the past than in the scholarly writings of philosophers and theologians. However, these mysteries also appear to be understandable to the lay person.<sup>541</sup> The ethic-religious problems he proposes bring his understanding of "perennial philosophy" closer to modern projects of worldview doctrine.

The attempts of academic researchers of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries to create a comprehensive history of philosophy as a project to codify, categorize, and interpret the history of human thought, led to two important methodological results. First, thanks to the development of philosophical comparativism, non-European forms of philosophy, which had previously been characterized only as specific forms

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>538</sup> Leibniz introduces the characteristics of the language proper to philosophers ("philosophical speech") in: Leibniz G. W. Collected Works in 4 vols. Moscow, 1984. Vol. 3, pp. 65—84. He also elaborated the foundations of the rational language, vide: ibid., p. 422—423.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>539</sup> Schmitt C. B. Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz, Journal of the History of Ideas. 1966. Vol. 27. №. 4. P. 505—532. P. 530—531.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>540</sup> Prokopchuk Yu. V. Religious-Philosophical Synthesis of L. N. Tolstoy and A. Huxley // Vestnik Provoslavnogo Svyato-Tikhonovskogo gumanitarnogo universiteta. Seria 1: Bogoslovie. Filosofiya. Religiovedenie. 2019. № 83. Pp. 47—64. Pp. 52—53. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>541</sup> Huxley A. The Perennial Philosophy. London, 1947. P. 2.

of philosophizing, were recognized. For example, P. Masson-Oursel demanded to realize the principles of synchronous development of ideas in different cultures and traditions, which relates comparative philosophy to anthropological studies — an idea expressed and substantiated by representatives of the philosophy of life, in particular, B. Groethuysen.<sup>542</sup> First, historians of philosophy were able to define the boundaries of the problem field of their research not just as an instrumental, but as an independent field of knowledge and, consequently, to problematize the concept of philosophy as such. A striking example of such a direction of historical-philosophical work is A. O. Lovejoy's study of the "great chain of being" — development, within which the problem of philosophia perennis was reconsidered in terms of the constant concepts used by philosophers in their research. In Lovejoy's view, the idea of a rationally comprehensible world order appears as early as Plato, develops throughout the history of Western philosophy, and is formulated in Modern philosophy in an inverted form as a descent from the world of ideas to the implicit laws of nature.<sup>543</sup>

These results can be seen as raising the question of the collective thinking of mankind, which acquires its specific forms in specific spiritual traditions or national philosophical cultures. Comparative historical and philosophical studies, as well as studies presented within the framework of the history of ideas, show that these specific forms are not impenetrable, but create a meaning-making unity at the metaconceptual level. The conducted study of the doctrines on worldview of modern authors, as well as the analyzed diachronic perspective of the articulation of the concept of *worldview* in various, including non-Modern philosophical cultures (on the example of Hellenistic philosophy), demonstrate the relevance and demand for worldview problems in the perspective of the project of "perennial philosophy".<sup>544</sup> It can be argued that the creative continuity of spiritual traditions is the actual

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>542</sup> Ermarth M. Intellectual History as Philosophical Anthropology: Bernard Groethuysen's Transformation of Traditional Geistesgeschichte // The Journal of Modern History. 1993. Vol. 65. No. 4. P. 673—705; Groethuysen B. Anthropologie philosophique. Paris, 2014.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>543</sup> Vide: Lovejoy A. O. The Great Chain of Being: The History of Ideas. Moscow, 2001. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>544</sup> Lvov A. A. The Projects of Doctrine of Worldview In the Light of Lingua-Cultural Analysis // Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Filosofiya i konfliktologiya. — 2023. — Vol. 39. — №2. — Pp. 261—273. — P. 270. (*In Russian*).

development and formation of worldviews as the intellectual and artistic (meaning the development of expressive means of language) potential of the people's spirit or the efforts of individual genius intellectuals. Or, to put it differently, worldview acts as *the cultural adaptation* of already existing and proven means of existence of the phenomena or the language of expression of these phenomena within a certain culture to the context of the other culture. This is what makes the bearers of a particular worldview able for a specific expression of collective thinking about the world, revealing the principle of partisanship in philosophy — however, not in the ideological sense, but in the sense of belonging to a certain "type of writing", which R. Barthes spoke about in connection with the discussion of the ways of history.<sup>545</sup> Accordingly, worldview requires a creative approach to articulating one's choices; this brings us back to the thesis about the non-scientific status of worldview, and also allows us to take a new look at the fact that the concept of worldview itself was first articulated in German-language aesthetic discourse.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>545</sup> Vide: Stepanov Yu. S. The Constants. The Dictionary of Russian Culture. Moscow, 1997. Pp. 337—338. (*In Russian*).

## Chapter Four. The Inner Aspect of the Metaconcept of *Worldview*

## 4.1. The Worldview Problematics as an Epoch-Making Manifestation

The phenomenon of *worldview* is problematized in situations when the familiar, "old" world is destroyed and the "new" world has not yet emerged as an alternative. Such situations of "rupture" are catastrophic<sup>546</sup> events: global disasters of natural origin, the destruction of great empires, the change of beliefs and the social patterns based on them in specific states or cultures, as well as a radical change of scientific paradigms arising from the publication of breakthrough ideas. The essence of those events is that the world can no longer be perceived as it was before. It is necessary to rethink the world, to create a new world picture, which would take into account newly discovered circumstances or formulated principles. Consequently, we are talking about the fact that the catastrophe not only overthrows the old, but also reveals the new, although sometimes vaguely presented as a necessary consequence of a necessary cause. In other words, the catastrophe raises the question of the relation between the historical and the logical, and thus demands that the "new world" be linked to the "old world" in a mode of adaptation: those who lived under the "old regime" must adapt to the "new regime" as well. This can only be done by reproducing the world as a holistic system with its inherent internal connections and relations of its constituent elements and as a reflection of this integrity in everyday practices at different levels, from geopolitical and economic ones to scientific and those of everyday life.

The Great Lisbon Earthquake, which occurred on November 1, 1755, was the first world catastrophe of the Modern Age and actually laid the foundation of the modern anthropocentric picture of the world. On that day tens of thousands of people came to churches, temples and monasteries of Lisbon to celebrate All Saints' Day with lighted candles. The terrible earthquake that day killed at least eighty thousand

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>546</sup> Noteworthy is that catastrophe means here literally καταστροφή — "overturning", "to overthrow", "to ruin" (from Greek κατα-στρέφω, "overturning from top to bottom", a word the Greeks used to describe shipwreck).

people and destroyed two-thirds of the Portuguese capital.<sup>547</sup> What was not swallowed by the earth's unfolding firmament was destroyed by fire: along with the magnificent royal palace, the pearls of which were collections of paintings by leading Dutch and Italian masters, a magnificent library, archive and the very residence of King José I, perished beautiful churches and monasteries, the building of the new opera house, the largest city hospital, most of the architecture of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, as well as was irretrievably lost to the tomb of the great Portuguese commander Saint Nuno of Saint Mary, who was solemnly buried in the Carmelite monastery destroyed by the catastrophe.

The Lisbon event, although one of the most devastating documented natural disasters in human history, was by no means exceptional in terms of devastation. Nine years earlier, in 1746, a Peruvian earthquake of comparable magnitude had struck, destroying Lima and the associated Callao region and killing, according to various estimates, between 15,000 and 20,000 people. Why did the destruction of the Portuguese capital remain in the cultural memory of humanity, but not the devastation of South American territories? S. Kierner points out two reasons why the Lisbon disaster played such a significant role in the minds of contemporaries: firstly, the geopolitical position of Lisbon made Europeans feel that the grandiose catastrophe occurred not in a distant exotic country, but in the capital of the world empire, and, secondly, numerous eyewitness accounts of the event.<sup>548</sup>

There is no disagreement with these arguments. It was not only Portuguese territories that were affected by the 1755 earthquake — there were numerous accounts from western Europe and North Africa of the seismic waves and the destruction they caused. In Morocco, ten thousand people were buried under a landslide. From Venice in Italy, serious damage to buildings in St. Mark's Square was reported — in particular, testimonies about it were left by the famous adventurer

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>547</sup> The number of victims varies from source to source. We accept data from: Morais A. J., Morais S. Yu., Tarasova I. V. Portuguese Structural System Pombalino, or Learning From Ruins // Arkhitekton: izvestiya vuzov. 2018. № 3 (63). Pp. 1—18. P. 5. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>548</sup> Kierner C. A. Inventing Disaster: The Culture of Calamity from the Jamestown Colony to the Johnstown Flood. North Carolina, 2019. P. 75.

G. Casanova, who was in the local prison at that time. The widely quoted article by A. A. Nikonov eloquently lists the evidence of the catastrophe in other cities and countries:

In Aachen, in western Germany, the image of the Virgin Mary hanging on the wall suddenly began to swing like a pendulum. Even in some churches in Hamburg, in the north of the country, the chandeliers swayed. The shock was felt in Saxony. Faint vibrations were felt in Holland. On the rivers and lakes in Northern Germany, Southern Sweden, Iceland waves (seiches) were noticed. Unusual tides were reported from the shores of Holland, Ireland, England and Norway. On the Lesser Antilles the tide (tsunami) instead of the usual 0.7—0.75 m rose by 6 m. In one of the ports of Ireland the wave twisted all ships in a whirlpool and flooded the market square. Tsunamis were also on the islands of the Atlantic Ocean. The shaking to the west and south of Portugal reached the Azores, Canary Islands and even the Cape Verde Islands, not to mention Madeira. The tremors are estimated to have covered an area of 2-3 million km<sup>2</sup>. And this despite the fact that the epicenter was far out to sea.549

To top it all off, it marked the decline of Portugal as a mighty trading empire: stocks on the Amsterdam and London stock exchanges plummeted as soon as their players learned of the disaster. It took an incredible amount of money to rebuild the capital, but even greater stores of money and cultural heritage were irretrievably lost to the earthquake and fires.

Yet what makes the Lisbon catastrophe a Modern European phenomenon in the full sense of the word is the reaction to it on the part of contemporaries. This event not only attracted attention as a news item, but also forced the leading minds of the Enlightenment to sincerely and responsibly understand the nature of what had happened. Voltaire in his poem about the destruction of Lisbon and his famous novel *Candide, or Optimism* gave a decisive battle to Leibnizian preaching of optimism and theodicy; I. Kant, having studied numerous evidences and reports, published three articles in which he outlined the first natural-scientific (though recognized by

<sup>549</sup> Nikonov A. A. «An Awful Shake» of Europe. Lisbon Earthquakes of Nov 1st, 1755 // Priroda. 2005. № 11 (1083). Pp. 21-29. [Electronic resource]. - URL:

http://vivovoco.astronet.ru/VV/JOURNAL/NATURE/11\_05/LISB.HTM (accessed: 05.05.2023). (In Russian).

modern experts as erroneous) theory of earthquake tremors. The results of the earthquake attracted the attention of the creator of modern geology C. Lyell. Many newspapers kept the population of all enlightened European powers and their overseas territories informed about what was happening in the capital of Portugal.

On the other hand, many European political and public figures, led by the Prime Minister of the then-affected Portugal, the Marquis de Pombal, insisted that what had happened had natural causes that needed to be carefully studied and analyzed. This view contrasts markedly with the fact that a quarter of a century earlier it was customary to be satisfied with references to the Providence of God in explaining such events. Thus, the educated clergy of Great Britain and New England opposed deism and, until 1750, considered les philosophes (i.e., the freethinkers of the Enlightenment) to be unreasonable deniers of the will of the omnipotent Lord.<sup>550</sup> From this perspective, perhaps a contemporary scholar's characterization of the relationship between the Marquis de Pombal and the Jesuit Fathers is fair: "The arrogance of those who worshipped reason was as excessive as the sense of superiority of those who believed themselves predestined by Providence".<sup>551</sup> In the person of the then Prime Minister of Portugal, however, we encounter a genuine enlightened optimism as to the course of action to be taken in the circumstances. His response to the frightened King José I when asked what they should do after the devastating disaster has gone down in history: "Bury the dead and heal the living!"552 These were not the words of an obedient servant of God, but of the Almighty himself, who had at his disposal all the knowledge and skills of his time, and, most importantly, who himself personified the spirit of the age of Enlightenment.

The Lisbon disaster presented the Prime Minister with three challenges: first, to think about how to strengthen the houses in the newly rebuilt city; second, to establish the exact causes and nature of what had happened; and third, to make the information flow, which shapes public opinion, work in favor of the measures taken

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>550</sup> Kierner C. A. Inventing Disaster: The Culture of Calamity from the Jamestown Colony to the Johnstown Flood. North Carolina, 2019. P. 72—74.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>551</sup> Alfaro A. The Monster of Reason // Artes de México. 2008. No. 92. P. 84—94. P. 85.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>552</sup> A variant: "Bury the dead and feed the survivors", — could also be found — vide: Neiman S. Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy. Princeton NJ, 2015. P. 326.

by the state. He achieved the first by analyzing the buildings that remained intact; Enlightenment architects, when thinking about new streets and development in the affected areas of the capital, sought to simultaneously realize the ideas of comfort, safety, and functionality.<sup>553</sup> Next, he compiled a list of questions about the circumstances of the earthquake (asking, among other things: how long the tremors lasted and how many of them there were; what kind of destruction was observed; what happened to the wells; how the animals behaved) and sent it around the country, wanting eyewitnesses to give accurate answers. Finally, he actively opposed the spreading sermons of the eloquent Italian Jesuit Gabriel Malagrida, who exhorted the people of Lisbon against considering the earthquake a natural event. Malagrida insisted that what had happened was a punishment from God, sent to people for their sins. Rumors, based on priests' accounts of a repeat of the terrible disaster exactly one year later, effectively sowed panic among the townspeople.<sup>554</sup> Pombal managed to deal with them with the help of a powerful tool — the periodical press: he was able to restore the distribution of the press in the shortest possible time and through newspapers informed the inhabitants of the capital about the progress of the reconstruction of the city, the search for the wounded and missing, as well as the situation in the country as a whole.

All these measures taken by the Marquis de Pombal were ultimately aimed at one thing: a person must overcome his/her mystical horror of the unknown and learn to understand what was happening through the powers of his/her own mind. Thus, he sought, on the one hand, to counteract the obscurantist rumors that hampered the reconstruction of the city, and on the other hand, to make every reader of these newspapers a witness to what was happening, an accomplice in the revival of the ruined Portuguese capital. It is noteworthy that a little later, in 1758, Pombal also dealt with the Jesuit Malagrida, who hated him: the latter was arrested on charges of conspiracy and executed by garrote, with his body burned at the stake.<sup>555</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>553</sup> Morais A. J., Morais S. Yu., Tarasova I. V. Portuguese Structural System Pombalino, or Learning From Ruins // Arkhitekton: izvestiya vuzov. 2018. № 3 (63). Pp. 1—18. P. 12. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>554</sup> Neiman S. Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy. Princeton NJ, 2015. P. 328 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>555</sup> Fumaroli M. Between the Rigorist Hammer and the Deist Anvil // Artes de México. 2008. No. 92. P. 97—101. P. 99.

The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 consolidated the Renaissance foundations of the idea of anthropocentrism, becoming the touchstone of the Modern scientific view of the universe. Everything that happens in nature can and must be understood, which means that from any moment in the here and now we can point to a moment in the past, where the true causes of what happened are located, and to a moment in the future, which we recognize as its effects and for which we will be prepared. As early as in 19<sup>th</sup> century, this focus on universal knowledge of the world would be reflected in the thought of Comte: "All sciences aim at prevision. For the laws established by the observation of phenomena are generally employed to foretell their succession".<sup>556</sup>

In other words, man, navigating in the world of nature, learned to create its virtual reflection — the mechanistic picture of the world became a unique speculative unity of the reality surrounding him. However, the way of Kant and Lyell, methodologically laid down by the works of Galileo and Newton, was only one of the possible ways to keep the world in integrity. Another such a path, as we have seen, was the traditional Jesuit reference to a divine providence that predetermines everything that happens on earth and is beyond rational cognition. Was such a "Malagrida way" unacceptable? Not at all, and it found many supporters at the same time. In the current situation, when the city needed to be rebuilt and the catastrophe required an explanation that could prevent such colossal losses, it was in a weaker position, because it called for humility with the world, not for domination over it; however, the event of the catastrophe itself fit into the system of religious doctrines and could be interpreted in the familiar concepts of the Catholic world. Finally, there was a third way — the "Voltaire way" — which led to a theoretical victory over the ideas and beliefs of his opponents, enriching the speculative sphere but not at all entering the realm of practical action. The impact on the public from the poems and novels by Voltaire, Pope, and other contemporary authors was indeed great, and although it was not effective in rebuilding the capital

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>556</sup> Brown R. Comte and Positivism // Routledge History of Philosophy. Vol. VII. The Nineteenth Century. London, New York, 2005. P. 134.

of a once-mighty empire, it shaped a certain ideology that set a very different discursive practice from scientific or religious ones. Those who followed this path found that many traditional expressive means of language were reinterpreted, and once familiar concepts and turns came to mean something completely different. The world changed along with the language, which it was *manifested* by.

The case of the Lisbon catastrophe was seen by many as the epoch-making emergence of the Modernity. The coronavirus pandemic, which started in 2019 and spread across the globe, is a relevant sign of the current times, which many humanitarians, publicists and science popularizers have labeled a new COVID-19 era. Some have explicitly labeled the pandemic as the greatest challenge to the world in the 21st century.557 However, in addition to the word "age" in connection with the pandemic, it is also appropriate to speak of the word "epoch" taken from the Greek:  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi \alpha\gamma \dot{\eta}$  ("cessation") eloquently reflects what we are facing in the face of the pandemic. During the pandemic, it increasingly seemed that the flow of time had stopped, or at least slowed down considerably. The pandemic situation has become a global event that is experienced in real time and from which it is impossible to be distracted or forgotten. Literally looking out of the window, one observed a new order of life, or more accurately, one no longer saw the previous order constantly reproduced. Of course, as time passes, controls are weakening; but nevertheless, freedom of movement around the world remains restricted; the atomization of society due to the need to be vaccinated and revaccinated is increasing; in 2020— 2022, waves of pickets and rallies against the restriction of the rights of the unvaccinated part of the population and the introduction of QR codes to visit public places swept the world. In connection with this series of political decisions, many public figures and public intellectuals expressed fears that after the victory over the coronavirus, the world will hardly be able to refuse the newly introduced rules of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>557</sup> Isikhak F. A., Hamad M. A., Mustafa N. G. COVID-19: A Renewed Outook // Infektsiya i immunitet. 2020. Vol. 10. № 2. Pp. 247—258. P. 254. (*In Russian*).

public behavior, and many thought of the pandemic as the completion of the Modern cultural canon.<sup>558</sup>

Can we say, however, that the coronavirus was the first worldwide postmodern phenomenon? Has the science-centered attitude of the Modern Age been replaced, and has the arrival of COVID-19 not created a special watershed between different attitudes to grasping a decaying, once coherent world? It seems that such expectations are premature.<sup>559</sup>

The situation with the coronavirus pandemic is essentially the same as that of the Lisbon disaster. Firstly, it also had a worldwide resonance, affecting all areas of life and activity of modern civilization. Secondly, the coronavirus pandemic has proven to be an extremely culturally influential event: it has powerfully overshadowed all topical agendas and has become the subject of a wide variety of studies. For example, already in March and April 2020, more than a hundred publications of miscellaneous topics dedicated to COVID-19 were posted on Amazon, Ozon, Litres and other platforms.<sup>560</sup> Second, like the Lisbon disaster, the coronavirus has influenced changes in the language: then the concepts and metaphors associated with stability, solidity, and foundation were reinterpreted (the very concept of the earth as a firmament turned out to be untenable), and now everything that relates to the subject of vaccination and, more broadly, to the conspiracy surrounding an unexplored to the end natural scientific phenomenon. As an example, we can cite the Anglicism "covidiot" <sup>561</sup> or J. A. Brodsky's line "Don't leave the room..." ("Не выходи из комнаты...") repeatedly reproduced in Runet in relation to the introduced regime of self-isolation. Here we are dealing with the memetic mechanism of adaptation to the modern cultural environment, which R. Dawkins wrote about: memes exist as units of cultural heritage transmission, in other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>558</sup>Vide: Kravchik E. V. The Influence of Pandemic on the Preservation of Culture // Society and Security Insights. 2020. Vol. 3. № 2. Pp. 150—157. P. 156. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>559</sup> Noteworthy is that it is an important task for the professional community to reach consensus in the presentation of COVID-19 — vide: Terzic B. COVID-19 as Not Unique but New Generic Problem // Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development. 2020. Vol. 16. P. 84—91.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>560</sup>Vide: Lvov A. A. Age of COVID-19 in the Light of Ideology and Scientific World Picture // Philosophy of Science: History and Modernity. St. Petersburg, 2020. P. 337 ff. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>561</sup> «New Words We Created Because of Coronavirus». [Electronic resource] — URL:

https://www.dictionary.com/e/s/new-words-we-created-because-of-coronavirus/#covidiot (accessed: 05.05.2023).

words, replicators of information in the "life-giving broth" of human culture.<sup>562</sup> Thirdly and finally, the coronavirus posed the same challenge to modern humanity as a whole (and perhaps as a species) as the elements did to the Marquis de Pombal: it is necessary not only to understand what to do, but also to identify the nature of what happened, including at the cultural level, and to skillfully organize timely and reliable information for the population, without allowing covid dissidents and adherents of pseudoscientific views to lead the media agenda. The era of the coronavirus marks an era of true total mobilization by the state apparatus with the indispensable informational, moral and legal support of the nation.

The case of the Great Lisbon earthquake seems to be an archetypal challenge to Modern rationality. On the one hand, the pandemic and the ways of dealing with it reflect basic Modern attitudes that scientific research is necessary to defeat the threat, realized through the political instruments that have been developed so far. On the other hand, the disease itself has been seen by many as the subject of a worldwide conspiracy, its natural origin has been denied or questioned, and the successes of medical developments and failures in the interaction of authorities with society in all countries have been interpreted by many as the fulfillment of a plan to exterminate humanity.

We have already mentioned above that in the first months of the pandemic the world was enriched with a huge amount of the topical literature. Summarizing all this information diversity, we could distinguish two dominant trends in the thencurrent information milieu. First, these appeared various forecasts, attempts to foresee the future course of things and, if possible, to justify and analyze the perspective unfolding before the author of the forecasts. Noteworthy were economic and socio-political forecasts, asking whether the previous, "pre-covidual" order of things would be preserved or whether the virus in the 21<sup>st</sup> century had played that revolutionary (by analogy with the Great French Revolution) role, after which a return to *ancien régime* was no longer possible. Secondly, there would be the various conspiracy theories pouring out in an endless stream not only in print, but also by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>562</sup> Dawkins R. The Selfish Gene. Moscow, 2013. P. 326 ff. (In Russian).

word of mouth, and most of all, from the most modern means of mass communication.<sup>563</sup> Telegram, YouTube, and other social networks and information platforms have been literally flooded with all kinds of news about who benefits from the "world insanity" and exposing the forces that, wanting evil, under the guise of doing good, were going to chip the entire population of the Earth. Comparatively later, with the appearance of vaccines and approbation (positive or negative) of the corresponding measures to combat the virus, one could observe the third trend in the information space, namely, "settling scores" with the opponents of the measures taken (the so-called "antivaxxers"). The general semantic background of these publications is: we understand how the disease develops; we know what and how to do in this regard; there is a group of people who think differently from us, who do not allow us to achieve the desired (predicted) success; careful work with them is necessary (or radical discrimination against them in the public sphere).<sup>564</sup>

It is interesting that these trends are quite compatible with each other, because if in the first case we are talking about the subject of expertise, about being offered a reasoned justification of this or that position, then in the second case we are faced with unproven or full of false fantasies, and in the third case, with a critical opposition between "us and them", and justification of the opposition forming in society. From our perspective, there is a certain regularity in such a dispersion of opinions and positions. The pandemic, like the Lisbon disaster, has shown that there are no sufficient grounds for giving scientific explanations of events any priority over other, non-scientific explanations. Rather, the various explanations organically complement each other, thereby expressing the essence of the notion of the world as an actual eventuality, which acts as both a result and a condition of our cognition.

<sup>563</sup> Sitaraman S. 2019-NCOV Political Framing and Blame-Gaming // Security Nexus Perspectives. Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. 2020. [Electronic resource] — URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24861 (accessed: 05.05.2023)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>564</sup> Vide: Ershova G. N. COVID-19 vaccination in Russia: Pro et Contra (based on the results of sociological surveys FOM and VCIOM 2020—2021) // V Nizhnevolzhskie chteniya. Sotsial'no-politicheskie, ekonomicheskie i demograficheskie aspekty razvitiya sovremennogo obshchestva. Materialy Mezhdunarodnoi praktichskoi konferentsii. Volgograd, 2021. Pp. 56—61. (*In Russian*); Popov N. P. Collective Immunity and Antivaxxers in the USA and Russia // Rossiya i Amerika v XXI veke. 2021. № 3. [Electronic resource] — URL: https://rusus.jes.su/s207054760017039-9-1/ (accessed: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*); Spasennikov B. A. COVID-19: The Lesson of Vaccination // Byulleten' Natsional'nogo nauchno-issledovatel'skogo instituta obshchestvennogo zdorovya imeni N. A. Semashko. 2021. № 3. Pp. 116—125. (*In Russian*).

Extreme events of this kind demonstrate how fragile our conceptions of reality are and that such situations of uncertainty say more about the fundamental properties of our internal structure than about the structure of the external world.<sup>565</sup> The emergence of various explanatory models of the pandemic process, the search for the beneficiaries of the coronavirus epidemic, equally with attempts to behaviorally predict new devastating earthquakes next year "by God's will" with certainty can only testify to the fact that our belief in causality depends on the principle of correspondence between past and future experience.<sup>566</sup> This universal principle of our consciousness allows us to effectively (and at the same time spectacularly) construct a general picture of what is happening on grounds that are convincing to us, but at the same time such a picture of the world may not be convincing to anyone but ourselves.

Although *worldview* as a philosophical concept was first articulated in German idealism, however, the most detailed and consistent development of the problem of worldview received only in the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup>—early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, mainly in German and Russian philosophy. This circumstance confirms the idea that the worldview problematic comes to attention in the epoch-making situation. Let us consider the factors that gave rise to the discussion of worldview at this time among Russian and German philosophers.

*Firstly*, an important role in the formation of worldview problems was played by the fact that university philosophy was dominated by positivist attitudes and methods, which led to the scientification of philosophy by the means of formalization of work with sources and the organization of research. This was compounded by the fact that systematic speculative philosophy was losing its until recently very strong position. Perhaps the most difficult task with regard to the realization of the doctrine of worldview as a task of post-Kantian philosophy is to justify its integrity. Such integrity is conditioned by the fact that it is necessary to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>565</sup> Leontiev D. A., Mospan A. N. World picture, Worldview and Definition of Indeterminate // Mir psikhologii. 2017. № 2 (90). Pp. 12—19. Pp. 18. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>566</sup> Vasilyev V. V. Consciousness and Things: A Sketch of Phenomenalistic Ontology. Moscow, 2014. Pp. 39–44. (*In Russian*).

show how exactly the ensemble of sciences can be represented as a consistent system. Accordingly, as we have seen, it is philosophy that is assigned the role of such a field of knowledge that would be able to offer an adequate solution to this problem. It is necessary to clarify what is the epistemological foundation on which the worldview is based as a systematic project? The point is that an example of such a universal system of the world has already been presented by Hegel, but his system was based on an essentially pantheistic position on the necessity for the world spirit to wander in the darkness of various moments of self-realization. Such naturalphilosophical speculations sounded unsatisfactory as early as by the middle and second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and could scarcely satisfy the researchers, the sophisticated ones, and even those just following the progress of empirical science.<sup>567</sup> Already contemporary researchers in that age noticed an important and obviously inconsistent with the spirit of the time feature of the German idealism's philosophy of nature — this proximity to the inherent romantic poetic search, completely alien to the pragmatic and mathematized biological knowledge of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. A subtle interpreter of the Hegelian system, R. Haym eloquently wrote about the language used by its creator to express his ideas, as follows:

The most impenetrable and, one might say, immense material is his philosophy of nature: in it lie the wild, undeveloped masses of reality next to other elements, which by the logical force of our philosopher are utterly devoid of flesh and blood. Even the keenest eyesight can hardly detect a single living speck of dust in these spaces of pure thought, and, in turn, hardly anyone's thought can make its way through the multicolored, densely overlapping images. Here the language of mathematics mingles with the language of logic and is replaced by majestic poetic expressions. The motley of brilliant pictures is pierced and framed by naked lines of construction. Never, perhaps neither before nor after Hegel, has any man spoken or written in such language. Sometimes his exposition is darker than that of Jacob Boehme and more abstract than Aristotelian: such is the hard and prickly shell from which we must take out, in its purest form, the grain of Hegel's worldview.<sup>568</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>567</sup> Riehl A. Theory of Science and Metaphysics from the Perspective of Philosophical Criticism. Moscow, 1887. (*In Russian*); Dühring E. The Worth of Life. St. Petersburg, 1894. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>568</sup> Haym R. Hegel and His Time. St. Petersburg, 2006. P. 66. (In Russian).

This stylistic and, in fact, characteristic feature of Hegel's philosophizing, characteristic of the very *Zeitgeist* of the Romantic era, allowed Haym to call his system of nature "an artistic work of cognition".<sup>569</sup> How accurately, how aptly this could have been said of, for example, Schelling's natural philosophy! Modern historians of science also note the characteristic feature of Romantic science, in which inspiration, aesthetic perception of the subject of their research, and the expression of the internal relations of the basic structures of nature by poetic means of expression are important along with experience.<sup>570</sup>

At the same time, the cornerstone of the transcendental Kantian project was still the problem of man, or anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. This gave researchers the opportunity to speak of an "anthropological dimension", which is inherent in Kantian philosophy by the very nature of its epistemological attitudes.<sup>571</sup> In particular, T. A. Akindinova, a well-known Russian researcher of the works of H. Cohen, the head of Marburg neo-Kantianism, reasonably connects this dilemma with the fact that Kant himself was critically inclined against the thesis of Enlightenment philosophers about man as primarily a bearer of reason. This implied that man was transformed into such a soulless epistemological subject, which only relates to the world in a theoretical-cognitive way. The fact that the doctrine of worldview as a project to create an interconnected system of sciences came to the forefront was a natural requirement of the time, and the root of this requirement was to remove the binary opposition between subjective and objective principles of systematizing our knowledge of the surrounding reality, which corresponded to the rational and empirical strategies of philosophical inquiry developed in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. It is important to note that the predecessors of the Neo-Kantian schools understood their task in a similar way; nevertheless, "[e]ven if the older generation of Kant's interpreters was characterized by the critical borrowing and interpretation of certain

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>569</sup> Ibid., p. 68.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>570</sup> Richards R. J. The Romantic Conception of Life. Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe. Chicago, 2002.

P. 12 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>571</sup> Perov Yu. V. Lectures on the History of German Classical Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 2010. P. 118. (In Russian).

provisions of Kantian philosophy to justify their own concepts, now [the Neo-Kantians. — A. L.] the main task is proclaimed to be the reconstruction of Kant's system as a whole — on the basis of the development and reinterpretation of the transcendental method applied in the trilogy of *Critiques* and overcoming the Kantian dualism between theoretical and practical reason".<sup>572</sup> Representatives of neo-Kantianism did not abandon attempts to offer their own solution to this anthropological problematic of philosophical criticism. Thus, the Marburgers sought to bring anthropology closer to ethics, while the representatives of the Baden School saw the possibility of a solution in the development of an original axiology.<sup>573</sup>

However, *secondly*, at the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century, philosophy was enriched with an interesting and very promising problem in terms of its influence on the subsequent development of the Humanities. The emergence of worldview problematics was largely predetermined by the unarticulated demand of the time for the development of a theory of values and the rethinking of the status of human being in the world. As an alternative to scientism and positivism, pessimism and irrationalism, fueled by interest in Schopenhauer's philosophy, matured in philosophy, science, literary criticism, and even politics. This interest was not accidental at all and had a strong influence on the Western European public, which took the statement that we live in the worst of the worlds, and even constantly subject to the deceptive perception of the surrounding cover of maya, as a special "worldpain" (Weltschmerz). Contemporaries perceived this strongest mindset, which led to such a phenomenon in culture as decadence (décadence), in different ways. Thus, V. V. Rozanov wryly summarized the characteristic view, shared by many conservative intellectuals, that this decline is a consequence of the shallowness of characters, the fact that the time of great thinkers and figures has passed: "The essence of 'our time' is that it turns everything into a template, scheme and phrase. Great men have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>572</sup> Akindinova T. A. The Problem of Worldview Integrity in German Philosophy and Aesthetics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Doctoral Thesis for Specialization: 09.00.03, 09.00.04 / St. Petersburg technological institute of refrigeration. — St. Petersburg, 1991. P. 116. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>573</sup> Dmitrieva N. A. Neo Kantianism and Leo Tolstoy: From "the Doctrine of Science" to the Doctrine of Man // German and Russian Neo Kantianism: Amid the Theory of Knowledge and Critics of Culture. "Humanitas" Series. Moscow, 2010. P. 380. (*In Russian*).

spoken. There was Schopenhauer: and 'pessimism' became a phrase. There was Nietzsche: and his 'Antichrist' spoke with a thousand horse's jaws".<sup>574</sup> However, there were also numerous followers of this view of the world — the philosophical horizon was enriched by the works of R. Wagner, E. von Hartmann, and later F. Nietzsche, O. Wilde and others. In addition to the attempt to overcome the doubts characteristic of voluntarist philosophy about the truth of the real world and its cognizability, there developed a natural need to form a doctrine of a human creator, who by his volitional effort could preserve the world from decay and destruction, and therefore the figures of the hero, scientist, and genius, who represented independent anthropological projects, became meaning-making in the works of philosophers and writers of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century.

*Thirdly*, an important cultural experience for European intellectuals was the event of the World War I. Many anticipated it, even called for it, and placed almost mystical aspirations on the war, since military action was seen as a means of ridding the sick European society of the contagion of formalism and bourgeois equalization. They even believed that the war would have a beneficial effect on the decrepit values and moral foundations of the Old World. Assessing this not so distant period in time, H. Kissinger reveals "a certain amount of carelessness", with which the better minds of Europe treated in their anticipation: "[I]ndividual European thinkers held the view that periodic bloodletting had a cleansing character of a cathartic kind — a naive hypothesis, which was rudely destroyed by the World War I".<sup>575</sup>

Those who perceived the war in the manner described by Kissinger were primarily representatives of the conservative camp in politics and philosophy. Within the conservative tradition, egalitarianism has long been a bugaboo, causing universal hatred in any of its manifestations; T. Carlyle and K. N. Leontiev, J. A. de Gobineau and K. P. Pobedonostsev, H. S. Chamberlain and J. Evola wrote about it in detail and consistently. <sup>576</sup> Contemporary researchers also point to the incredible experience of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>574</sup> Rozanov V. V. The Fallen Leaves // Rozanov V. V. Works in 2 vols. Moscow, 1990. 2 vol., p. 322. (*In Russian*). <sup>575</sup> Kissinger H. Diplomacy. Moscow, 2018. P. 163. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>576</sup> Cf.: Lvov A. A. Aesthetic politics as an Alternative and Requiem for a Political Aestheticism (Franklin Ankersmit. Aesthetic Politics) // Logos. — 2016. — Vol. 26 — №1 (110). — 142—148. (*In Russian*).

uplift, as if inspiration and unprecedented enthusiasm, which was caused by the first months of the war: "In August 1914, the intellectual elite (as well as the majority of the population) of these countries [i.e., Germany and Russia. -A.L.] was seized by a kind of 'enthusiasm of mobilization', which was reflected in the famous speech by Vladimir Ern From Kant to Krupp, as well as in the manifesto Aufruf der 93 an die Kulturwelt (Appeal of ninety-three to the cultural world), signed by W. Windelband, W. Wundt and other German intellectuals".<sup>577</sup> In this connection, M. Scheler's experience of waiting for war is illustrative.<sup>578</sup> In his 1915 essay *Der Genius des* Kriges und der Deutsche Krieg (The Genius of War and German War), he outlined many of the ideas that worried him about the beneficial effect of military events that had begun a year earlier on the hardened morality and *modus vivendi* of bourgeois society as it had developed by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It is known that the formation of Scheler's providential ideas was influenced by both classical and contemporary thinkers. From the classical philosophers of crucial importance for German culture at the turn of the century — namely, Hegel and Nietzsche — he drew the ideas that war is the surest way to transform reality, which allows man to become an instrument through which the Absolute Spirit realizes its plan. In his contemporaries, above all H. von Treitschke and General F. von Bernhardi, he was inspired by the idea of power (though developed by Treitschke from Hegel's doctrine) and by the decisive opposition to war and the destruction of the nation that inevitably awaits the Germans if they refuse to take military action.<sup>579</sup> In the introduction to the 1916 English edition of The Politics, the translator A. J. Balfour wrote that all of Treitschke's conclusions, all of his "his fears, his praise <...>, his philosophic theories, his practical suggestions, all draw their life from the conviction that German greatness was due to her military system, that her military system was the creation of Prussia, and that Prussia was the creation of Hohenzollern

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>577</sup> Попов В. Ю., Попова О. В. Weltkriegsphilosophie і філософська антропологія Макса Шелера // Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень. 2018. Вип. 13. С. 142—155. С. 144.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>578</sup> M. Scheler's position was discussed in details in: Lvov A. A., Kryukova K. V. Self-Identification in Conflict or the Dialogue of Cultures? An Anthropological Analysis of the Strategy of "Special Path" // Konfliktologiya. — 2020. — Vol. 15. — №2. — Pp. 38—53. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>579</sup> Staude J. R. Max Scheler. An Intellectual Biography. London, 1967. P. 69-71.

absolutism".<sup>580</sup> Treitschke, among other things, preached the view that war is sacred because until the very end of history men will always resort to the argument of arms and force.<sup>581</sup> As for General Bernhardi, in his military treatise he paid much attention to the social and cultural significance of the conduct of warfare. Recognizing the ever-changing nature of maneuverability and strategy, he had no doubt about the ontological and sociopolitical status of war itself. Thus, he wrote: "In order to successfully wage a modern, mass war, one needs: a healthy political education, discipline and readiness for self-sacrifice. <...> Weapons can be used only when the vital interests of the people are affected. <...> the very decision to go to war is conditioned by sound and prolonged reflection, as it affects the most vital interests of the people".<sup>582</sup> Among M. Scheler's contemporaries and compatriots one can single out W. Sombart and M. Weber, who, like him, devoted their research to the sociological phenomenon of the bourgeoisie. Thus, on the one hand, the war events and the very "spirit of 1914" had an intoxicating and inspiring influence on many European intellectuals. The aspiration for the realization of aesthetic principles that went far beyond the boundaries of art and culture alone, the demand for the creative realization of the idea of the superhuman, found in the event of war a perfect occasion for the realization of the idea of the superman.

On the other hand, the mere admiration of war was not enough for the emergence of new man, for the formation of a metaphysics of man and a philosophical science of man. This is why, *fourthly*, an essential circumstance on the way to the emergence of the worldview problem of philosophy, namely, the massification of society and people's increasing fascination with technology, giving rise to fear of it (*Angst vor Technik*). The identification of the relationship between the technical and the mass reflected very accurately the mood that was at the forefront of philosophy and social sciences at the beginning of the century. The collapse of the previous, old world was connected above all with the destruction of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>580</sup> Balfour A. J. Introduction // Treitschke H. von. Politics. In 2 vols. New York, 1916. Vol. 1. P. xi.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>581</sup> Ibid., p. 29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>582</sup> Bernhardi F. von. The War of Today. I vol. The Basics of the War of Today. St. Petersburg, 1912. Pp. 42–43. (*In Russian*).

the value possessed by the once separate individual. The World War confirmed these sentiments, even aggravated them — for example, F. Jünger noted that the First and the Second World Wars were essentially of a technical production nature and lost the inherent existential sense of a romantic enterprise, the participants of which were expected to display their best qualities and abilities: "The distinctive feature of this (i.e., the World War I. -A.L.) war, which makes it different from all previous ones, is that it has the character of a working process. <...> Soldiers are transformed into workers; this transformation was inevitable when the war began to be waged by mechanical means".<sup>583</sup> It is noteworthy that the phenomenon of world war and technology as a means of human massification is brought closer by N. A. Berdyaev: "[I]n the processes taking place, not only war played a huge role, but a much more lasting force, which has almost cosmic significance — technology and the technicalization of life. The war marked the boundary beyond which a new form of collective human existence begins, the generalization of man. <...> This process began in capitalism, in capitalist industry".<sup>584</sup> It is clear from the above that the technological modus of existence of human society as a mass is essential to the capitalist world that destroys the personal world.

Not going into the details of analyzing the capitalist character and the very image of the bourgeois in sociology and philosophy of the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, we would like to point out one essential detail, characteristic as a prerequisite for the creation of a philosophical doctrine of man. Perhaps it was W. Sombart, with whom Scheler had both creative and personal relations (in particular, he wrote a review of Sombart's book *The Bourgeois* and in 1912 went to Berlin largely because of the opportunity to establish personal contacts with him),<sup>585</sup> who fully expressed it. In exploring the origin and typical features of the bourgeois personality and the capitalist spirit, Sombart noticed, among other things, the disregard for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>583</sup> Jünger F. The Perfection of Technics. Machine and Property St. Petersburg, 2002. P. 251. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>584</sup> H Berdyaev N. A. Man's Fate the Current World. To the Understanding of Our Age // Berdyaev N. A.

Philosophy of Free Spirit. Moscow, 1994. P. 320. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>585</sup> Staude J. R. Max Scheler. An Intellectual Biography. London, 1967. P. 57.

individual that characterizes the bourgeois, who favors the masses, also in connection with mass production. He wrote:

[W]e have seen that the bourgeois of our day is characterized by his total indifference to the fate of the individual. We have seen that the individual is excluded from the center of economic evaluation and goal-setting, that progress alone is of interest <...>: fiat production et pereat homo. <...> modern technology sees the process of production as detached from the governing organ, the human being. In place of the organic articulation of production processes, which is bound up with the living personality, there is an expediently mechanized connection of members only in view of the desired result <...>.<sup>586</sup>

In addition, the analysis not only of the classical type of capitalism, but also relevant criticisms of the national character of the enemy, in particular the British, and the desire to propagandistically maintain the ideological and political unity of the German nation determined the social, cultural and political agenda not only of the wartime but also of the interwar period.<sup>587</sup> M. Scheler also had a hand in this ideological confrontation in his 1915 book, as he understood war as a purifying, cathartic phenomenon — and in this sense it is quite natural that war is for him an indicator of the tragedy of Modern history and European civilization in general: "|War was not mere physical violence; it was a deeply spiritual thing; in fact, it was the creator of all human progress, and even of civilization itself. Peace, on the one hand, was 'a constant danger to civilization'. 'Peace does moral and spiritual damage to the soul and all civilization, destroying the ethos-bearing vitality of the community, which only war can heal'."<sup>588</sup> In other words, mass war of a new type radicalized the search for a new anthropological model of non-mass man, and this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>586</sup> Sombart W. Bourgeois. Essays on the History of Spiritual Development of Modern Man // Sombart W. Bourgeois. Jews and Economic Life. Moscow, 2004. C. 328. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>587</sup> Tselishchev A. O. Werner Sombart: The Image of England as the Antithesis of the German Selfness in the I World War // Imagines Mundi: Al'manakh issledovaniy vseobshchei istorii XVI-XX cent. 2008. Vol. 6. № 3. Pp. 251—261. P. 251. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>588</sup> Staude J. R. Max Scheler. An Intellectual Biography. London, 1967. P. 69.

on the battlefield ceased to exist. The new world naturally demanded a new man, too.

## 4.2. The World Unfolds Itself in Space and Time

The world is *eventful*, and this *eventfulness* has always required its comprehension. The oldest primitive tribes themselves had various magical practices and ritual actions aimed at entering into a fruitful relationship with the world. J. G. Frazer observed that magic is a bad science, but it is bad not because it does not work or fails, but because its manipulations are rooted in the tradition of the tribe, it itself is inconsistent and connects random causes with random effects. In the end, the triad "magic — religion — science" that he proposes reveals an archetypal model of the development of human relationships with the surrounding reality. However, unlike magic and religion, science realizes its ideal of fullness of knowledge as something unattainable:

[I]f a scientific view is the best view of the world yet formulated, it cannot necessarily be concluded that it is final and comprehensive. We should not lose sight of the fact that scientific generalizations are essentially nothing more than hypotheses invented to organize the ever-changing phantasmagoria of thought that we arrogantly name the world and the universe. Ultimately, magic, religion, and science are merely modes of theoretical thinking, and just as science has supplanted its predecessors, it may be replaced in the future by another, more perfect hypothesis.<sup>589</sup>

Of course, these judgments belong to a representative of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. We would like to draw attention to these words of Frazer — *arrogant naming of the world and the universe*. Indeed, true knowledge has always been directed at the world as a certain wholeness, and if it was a question of the need for numerous sciences to master it, the question of a discipline that would unite this ensemble of cognitive practices naturally arose. It was philosophy that claimed such an integrative position, and the most diverse philosophical trends in all world cultures,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>589</sup> Frazer J. G. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. Moscow, 1986. P. 666. (In Russian).

from Eastern treatises such as *Bhagavad-Gita* and *Tao-De-Jing* to the naturalphilosophical poems of early Greek thinkers, sought to justify a view of the world as an internally complete natural whole.

Philosophy, unlike science or other forms of knowledge, has an important methodological advantage. Any philosophical endeavor is possible only in the presence of a fruitful (in the hermeneutical sense) prejudice, i.e. a ready-made, already formed position of the philosopher himself, from which it would be convenient to start (and later, perhaps, to abandon) in the search for truth. In this sense, we can say that man always in himself already has a prerequisite of the world, because he is always already in the world. The world is thus revealed simultaneously as both a condition and a precondition of human existence. It is obvious, however, that the human being is also the instance that changes the world during his life, at least in the sense that every human life lived is unique, filled with certain events and inimitable. The human being can only begin to change the world by looking around in it; he/she always discovers him/herself in the world by asking him/herself: what is the world like?

The closest answer is: this is my world, the world that I myself recognize as my own. We always philosophize as if from ourselves, from our own home, from our own situation, and we regard everything that serves as the starting point of philosophizing as a necessary condition for our questioning. But then I see that the world *as such* is not given to me either in sensation or in thought, but that I simply use this name as a convenient collective concept, which includes in its scope the totality of the conditions of my life, the objects around me, all things in general, abstractions, and so on. This is helped by language: this kind of gigantomania, the desire for colossal generalizations, exaggerations or, on the contrary, diminutions, of which the *world* is an example, is quite normal in everyday language. Obviously, this is so because we tend to universalize our own beliefs, thoughts, observations - our experience in general — in *our* daily lives.

It is quite natural that the image of the world that has emerged in philosophy is an image that is holistic in character. If we do not strive to propose or develop a

holistic image of the world, uniting many components of reality, we remain only at the level of positive knowledge about various unrelated things. Meanwhile, the world is a philosophical concept, and none of the sciences actually studies it. The world emerges as a consequence from the human view of the disparate fragments of reality scattered in time and space. Without this intension to restore an ordered unity in reality, no philosophy is possible, and therefore it is not for nothing that Hegel in his lectures on aesthetics calls philosophy a continuous divine service.<sup>590</sup> The point is not that we are obliged to postulate the Creator of the world in a religious sense, but that attempts to grasp the world as a whole philosophically can be methodologically fruitful only if such an attempt is possible not potentially, but actually. Pythagoras seems to have been the first to recognize the necessity in philosophical discourse of the divine presence as the supreme goal possessing perfect wisdom and virtue, and therefore the first to call himself a "philosopher", since the philosopher only aspires to the ethos and way of life of a wise being.<sup>591</sup> Recognition of one's own imperfection in comparison with the perfect knowledge of god also means the necessity of painstaking gathering of knowledge, accumulating it with the help of various sciences developing knowledge of separate parts of the world. This is why in the history of classical philosophy the idea of philosophy as *pre-knowledge* (*Ur-wissen*) is important precisely in terms of a holistic and comprehensive image of reality. In this image there are no assumptions, but everything is permeated with the consciousness of actual principles. Accordingly, in such an image there is no randomness, and the world is given as a necessity, meaningfully unfolding in nature and history.

The unity of perceptions of the world in different cultures is associated by researchers with two fundamental dimensions, which we could qualify as *temporal* and *spatial*. *The world* is thought of as both what reveals itself in space as such and what reveals itself in time as such. This means that *the world* as a concept makes it possible to make a representation of both space and time, in accordance with which

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>590</sup> Hegel G. W. F. Lectures on Aesthetics: In 2 vols. St. Petersburg, 2007. Vol.1, p. 170. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>591</sup> The Fragments of Early Greek Philosophers. Part I. From Epic Theocosmogenies to the Emergence of Atomistics. Moscow, 1989. P. 148. (*In Russian*).

these two dimensions will find their fullness through the presence of a human being. And this presence turns out to be very productive: on the one hand, man always, archetypically, thinks of himself as an inhabitant of the center of the world or as someone who lives near the center of the world; on the other hand, man thinks of himself as living in the center of the temporal sequence of events.<sup>592</sup> Let us examine these two attitudes in more detail.

Let us first turn to the order of orientation in the world as in space. Since ancient times, the world has been revealed to man as a whole, as an unconditional totality of everything that exists, because it is man who occupies the central place in the world. This view is reflected in various fairy tales, legends and beliefs and is associated mainly with the fact that it is through the narrator, the teller of a story about the world or its key features that the world itself becomes complete. Indeed, it is only on the basis of the testimony of the relevant events that ritual practice, supported by myth, emerges, and the permanence of ritual is always thought of as the most important, the innermost, the purity of which must be protected. It is clear that only those who belong to a given community that shares mythopoetic ideas, who have common ancestors who bequeathed them the myth and ritual, can do this, and, accordingly, the non-friends, the strangers (families, tribes, nations, etc.) always appear to the bearers of such consciousness as a "negative link" — a mobilizing threat of the collapse of the established world order.

It is noteworthy that this perception of the world with the center in the place where one's own people live is characteristic of a wide variety of peoples. For example, the Chinese Empire recognized itself as a "central state" ( $\pm$ ), Zhōngguó). Ancient Rome, thought of as a world city, to which all roads lead, as early as its foundation, as *Roma quadrata*.<sup>593</sup> In the Germanic-Celtic-Italic area of Indo-European cultural traditions,<sup>594</sup> researchers find uniform ideas of the world as something that connects with the local, with one's own, and therefore sacred. This

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>592</sup> The latter, however, does not mean that events taking place in the here and now are recognized as relevant.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>593</sup> Ortega y Gasset J. Invertebrate Spain // Ortega y Gasset J. The Revolt of the Masses. Moscow, 2002. P. 273. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>594</sup> In our consideration we refer to: Stepanov Yu. S., Proscurin S. G. The Constants of the World Culture. Alphabets and Alphabetic Texts in the Age of Bigotry. Moscow, 1993. (*In Russian*).

is confirmed by the archetypal symbol of *arbor mundi* — the world tree, which is interpreted differently among different peoples: from identifying it with Mjöllnir (Thor's hammer) to interpreting it as a cross on which Jesus Christ took torture and death. The sacrificial pole was also the most important symbolic center of the world in ancient India.<sup>595</sup> In addition to the tree, the center of the world could be something associated with elevation, which is reflected in the mythologemes of the sacrificial pillar, hill, mountain, etc. Thus, the fundamental links between the world of the lower and the world of the upper world are built: "tree—mount—god—world".<sup>596</sup>

An illustrious example of this world tree is Yggdrasil of the ancient Scandinavians, who believed that it connects the three worlds — the underground, the earthly (middle) and the heavenly (upper). A magnificent poetic understanding of this unity of the world was offered by T. Carlyle:

Yggdrasil, the ash tree, the tree of life, sprouts its roots deep into the realm of Heli or death; the top of its trunk reaches to the high heavens; its branches spread over the whole universe; such is the tree of life. At its roots, in the realm of death, sit the three *Norns*, the Fates, past, present, and future; they irrigate the roots of the tree with water from a sacred spring. Its "branches" with budding buds and falling leaves — events, deeds suffered, deeds done, catastrophes — spread over all countries and for all times. Does not each leaf represent a separate biography, each fiber an act or a word? Its branches are the history of nations. The rustling produced by the leaves is the noise of human existence, ever increasing since ancient times. It grows; the breath of human passion is heard in its rustling; or the stormy wind, shaking it, howls like the voice of all the gods. Such is Yggdrasil, the tree of life. It is past, present and future; what has been done, what is being done, what will be done — "the infinite conjugation of the verb *to do*" (author's italics. — *A.L.*).<sup>597</sup>

From this description it is clear that Yggdrasil serves as a kind of fastener of worlds of different levels — lower, middle and upper. On the one hand, the tree

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>595</sup> Zaporozhchenko A. V., Lugovoi K. V. «The Basic Myth» of the Indo-Iranians: Invariants and Transformation // Aktual'nye voprosy izucheniya istorii, mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy i kul'tur stran Vostoka. Materialy meahdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi kinferentsii. Novosibirsk, 2019. Pp. 28—33. P. 29. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>596</sup> Stepanov Yu. S., Proscurin S. G. The Constants of the World Culture. Alphabets and Alphabetic Texts in the Age of Bigotry. Moscow, 1993. P. 21. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>597</sup> Carlyle T. Heroes, Hero-Worship and Heroic in History // Carlyle T. The Past and The Present. Moscow, 1994.

P. 21. (*In Russian*). On the connection of the world tree with the past, the present and the future vide: Carlyle T. The Past and the Present // Ibid., p. 215.

really serves as a visible fastener of the top and bottom, stretching from the soil to the clouds. In the image of the magic ash tree, we can also guess that the world is thought of as an equal combination of different elements: both high and low, and the very concept of the world in different cultures is often associated with the concept of local, home, and, consequently, the soil. An interesting example of this is the Roman idea of *mundus* originally as a pit, which the inhabitants who came to the newly founded city of Romulus filled with handfuls of soil of their homeland.<sup>598</sup> We find similar representations in the Greek self-consciousness: the ancient Greeks thought of themselves as autochthons ( $\alpha \dot{\upsilon} \tau \dot{\omega} \tau \dot{\omega} \psi \omega$ ), i.e., as natives coming directly from the soil ( $\chi \theta \dot{\omega} \nu$ ).<sup>599</sup> The same is reported in Plato's dialogue *Timaeus* (23e).<sup>600</sup> Researchers point out that such notions of origin from the earth and even from arable land are an important component of folk identity, as it proves the right of a given people or tribe to the territory they occupy.<sup>601</sup>

Also, the world tree is a symbolic expression of the world axis around which the universe moves. This means that in it itself, as if in a coiled form, is hidden such a principle, which is revealed in the rest of the components of the world and organizes their movement. For example, in the Indian tradition, the human body is thought of as such a symbolic unity with the cosmos, which is embodied in a number of ritual correspondences:

The spine is likened to the Cosmic Pillar (skambha) or Mount Meru, the breath to the wind, the navel or heart to the Center of the Universe, etc. However, an analogy is also drawn between the human body and ritual in its entirety: the place of sacrifice, sacrificial utensils, ritual gestures are likened to various organs and physiological functions. The human body ritually embodies the Cosmos or the Vedic altar (which is a kind of imago mundi), but it is also likened to home. One of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>598</sup> Stepanov Yu. S., Proscurin S. G. The Constants of the World Culture. Alphabets and Alphabetic Texts in the Age of Bigotry. Moscow, 1993. P. 25. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>599</sup> CM.: Pelling C. Bringing Autochthony Up-to-Date: Herodotus and Thucydides // The Classical World. 2009. Vol. 102. No. 4. P. 471—483.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>600</sup> Vide: Plato. Dialogues. Book Two. Moscow, 2008. P. 664, note 25. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>601</sup> A. I. Zaitsev points this out in relation to the Athenians with reference to B. Malinowsky in the report: Zaitsev A. I. The *Iliad*'s Testemony of King Erechtheus Born out of the Earth // Zaitsev A. I. Selected Articles. St. Petersburg, 2003. P. 427. (*In Russian*).

the texts of hatha yoga speaks of the human body as "a house with one pillar and nine doors"  $<\!\!...\!\!>\!\!.^{602}$ 

The world ash tree serves as a true fastener, because in each of its elements, in each component, be it roots, leaves or branches, the whole world is already implicitly contained, which is fully unfolded in the world tree itself. Each of the parts of Yggdrasil participates in the integrity of the world. Here we see an important overlap with Goethe's thought about the metamorphosis of plants: it is known that Goethe formulated his concept of the "primal plant" (Urpflanze) as the ideal archetype of any plant at all, and the various sepals, stamens and petals as the development of the leaf.<sup>603</sup> This was the favorite method of this researcher: "Do not take nature piecemeal and in parts, but represent it as active and alive".<sup>604</sup> Given the quite "Faustian" ending of his description of Yggdrasil ("the infinite conjugation of the verb to do" rhymes well with the search for a translation for the first verse of John's Gospel, Έν ἀργῆ ἦν ὁ λόγος, which the character of Goethe's tragedy wrestles in his room with), we can assume an intent in Carlyle's speech to draw him closer to the figure of the great German. Suffice it to say that the young Carlyle read Goethe's works, corresponded with him, and in his obituary spoke of the Great Man as his spiritual father.<sup>605</sup>

As a small digression, let us pay attention to the way in which the unity of the world is revealed in each of its individual components in the sense of the unity of rhythm. J. Ortega-y-Gasset said it well: "When Goethe arrived in Italy, his northern predator's gaze, accustomed to the biorhythm of Germanic flora, opened wide and enthusiastically at the *allegro* of southern vegetation. And then, at the mercy of unthinking intuition, the poet suddenly discovered the law of metamorphosis - the artist's brilliant contribution to the natural sciences".<sup>606</sup> It is remarkable that Goethe

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>602</sup> Eliade M. Sacred and Secular // Eliade M. Myth of Eternal Return. Moscow, 2006. P. 335. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>603</sup> Friedman W. E., Diggle P. K. Charles Darwin and the Origins of Plant Evolutionary Developmental Biology // The Plant Cell. 2011. Vol. 23. No. 4. P. 1194—1207. P. 1195—1196.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>604</sup> Goethe J. W. Selected Scientific Works. Moscow, 1957. P. 98. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>605</sup> Symons J. Carlyle. Moscow, 1981. P. 119–122. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>606</sup> Ortega y Gasset J. Invertebrate Spain // Ortega y Gasset J. The Revolt of the Masses. Moscow, 2002. P. 293. (*In Russian*).

was so confident in his method of studying plants that while working on his theory of metamorphosis even hoped to find a real such plant in nature.<sup>607</sup> It was not so important for him to offer an original view of the organic world or to shed light on the dark and as yet unexplored question of the development of species with due empirical care; rather, he deliberately endeavored to present it as the study of only a special case of some universal principle, a single law pervading the entire universe. In this way he formulated a productive creative method, which was subsequently adopted not only by representatives of natural science, but also by philosophers and anthropologists. For example, C. Lévi-Strauss believed that Goethe's botanical works formed a special "epistemological approach" that played an important role in the emergence of structuralism.<sup>608</sup> Researchers of Goethe's natural scientific heritage point out that he apparently had a project of "a large 'novel about the universe' (Weltall)", in which various private articles and works played the role of complementary fragments, "since it was the comprehension of the universe as a whole that was the main task of all Goethe's diverse scientific studies, approaches from different sides to this whole".609

This methodological note is extremely important because it reflects the essence of such a view of the world, which allows us to gather the diversity of individual phenomena of nature or manifestations of spirit into a conceptual unity. If we draw a parallel with the Modern style of scientific knowledge, scrutinized by poststructuralists and historians of science in the middle and second half of the twentieth century, we see here carefully described techniques that facilitate the emergence of scientific epistemes, paradigms, and so on. In the end, developed humanitarian knowledge made man himself the subject of its study and (as a consequence) subjected any of his existential manifestations to a rigid conceptual network. Language in general, and the language of science in particular, can also be spoken of as a similar way of subjugating and controlling man; in this case, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>607</sup> Safranski R. Goethe: A Life as a Work of Art. Moscow, 2018. P. 339. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>608</sup> Schneider M. A. Goethe and the Structuralist Tradition // Studies in Romanticism. 1979. Vol. 18. No. 3. Structuralism and Romanticism. P. 453—478. P. 453.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>609</sup> Kanaev I. I. Goethe as a Scientist // Goethe J. W. Selected Scientific Works. Moscow, 1957. P. 426. (In Russian).

cultural constants we have discussed above play the role of the very dispositifs about which G. Agamben writes in connection with the principle of economy in the history of Western European metaphysics: "[I] would call a dispositif any thing that has the ability to capture, orient, define, suppress, model, control, and guarantee the behavior, gestures, opinions, and discourses of living people. Not only prisons, mental hospitals, panopticons, schools, confession, factories, discipline, legal decrees whose juxtaposition with power is in some sense obvious, but also writing, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cell phones, and, why not, language itself, perhaps the most ancient of dispositifs, into whose trap, millennia and millennia ago, some primate, unaware of the consequences, had the indiscretion to be caught".<sup>610</sup>

This meaning-forming node of the world-language-power center should be noted. The initial New Testament maxim that "in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God" (John 1:1) is peculiarly refracted in the idea of the all-seeing eye of the underworld — the sovereign. Machiavelli himself sets this theme of sight-knowledge when discussing what a statesman sees at the height of his position.<sup>611</sup> Further, as early as at the end of the 17<sup>th</sup>—early of the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, the idea of the all-penetrating gaze as an authoritative gesture that restores order in its path is realized in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the idea of an ideal panopticon prison is created, in which every prisoner literally feels the gaze of the invisible warder.<sup>612</sup> On the other hand, the rational idea of the prospectus is realized as the actual action of the monarch's perspective view of the city entrusted to him: "The prospectus is a comprehension of the city, a summary of its spatial structure, a construction of logic — a set of axioms and rules of inference - directly in physical reality. Axioms are the main places of the city, avenues are the rules of inference. Louis XIV, the second after Pope Sixtus, the creator of the trident of avenues, three streets converging in Versailles (the symbolic point of convergence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>610</sup> Agamben G. What Is Dispositif? // Agamben G. What Is Modern? Kyiv, 2012. P. 26. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>611</sup> Machiavelli N. The Prince. Moscow, 2017. P. 41-42. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>612</sup> Foucault M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Moscow, 1999. P. 286 ff. (In Russian);

Mamardashvili M. K. A Sketch of Modern European Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 2014. P. 54-55. (In Russian).

*was the king's room*), is not without reason called the Sun King" (italics added. — A.L.).<sup>613</sup> Thus, the age of rationalism peculiarly played with the maxim of Faust in Goethe's interpretation: "in the beginning was the Act", should be understood as the organizing space of the will of the observer endowed with knowledge, who articulates his knowledge in the form of a rational arrangement of the world. What a poetic reinterpretation, or rather, *Aufhebung* of the opposition between the principles of Old Testament law and New Testament love in this titanic *fiat*!

Another important aspect of this meaning-making node is the realization of the physical reality of the world. The great geographical discoveries were the first, fundamental step on the way for Modern man to understand his place on Earth but at the same time they were a challenge to all mankind to bring together, through the power of his mind, all the knowledge of the physical world that had been revealed to him. Natural philosophers, beginning with G. Bruno and up to F. W. J. Schelling, sought to substantiate the pantheistic doctrine of the universe as an animated matter, but the closest to solving this problem from the factual point of view was A. von Humboldt. In his multi-volume work *Kosmos* he set himself the task of presenting the whole variety of physical reality as a chain of interconnected phenomena: "My main motivation has always been the desire to embrace the phenomena of the external world in their common connection, nature as a whole, driven and animated by internal forces".<sup>614</sup> Emphasizing that the single unifying principle of the whole world is Nature, which itself appears to be animated by the natural "breath of the Earth",<sup>615</sup> Humboldt points to the exceptional ability of human language to express its pervasive properties: "Thought and language are from ancient times in an internal, mutual relationship. If language gives the presentation charm and clarity, if by its innate flexibility and organic structure it favors our enterprise of vividly denoting the wholeness of the contemplation of nature, it will at the same time,

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>613</sup> Revzin G. I. How the City Works: 36 Essays on the Philosophy of Urbanism. Moscow, 2019. P. 30. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>614</sup> Humboldt A. von. «A Person Is the Citizen of the Universe» // Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. 2000. №5. P.

<sup>115—119.</sup> P. 115. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>615</sup> Wulf A. The Invention of Nature. Alexander von Humboldt's New World. New York, 2015. P. 332—333.

almost imperceptibly, spill its enlivening breath on the very abundance of thoughts" (author's italics. — A.L.).<sup>616</sup>

Thus, we see that it is quite natural for a person who comprehends his or her position in the world to take his or her own starting point of observation as the center of the world. It is all the more interesting to trace the way in which the metaphor indicating the human ability to orient in the time stream develops. In a wide variety of cultures, from Babylonian, Jewish, and Sumerian to Japanese and Taoist, there are stories about the original "golden age", some ideal state of world harmony, which later underwent significant changes, deterioration, and degenerated into the present state of the world. In canonical form, the story of the "golden age" tells of the original coexistence of gods and humans (or heroes), with the gods (or one God) justly ruling over humans (or heroes) in some fabled place. Here it is interesting to note a mythological link that restores the characteristic chronotope, or the interrelation of the temporal and the spatial: the idea, widespread among all peoples, that we live in the age of deterioration, the loss of the former "paradisiacal" state is comparable to the idea of the world as a pit, that we live near the center of our world<sup>617</sup> and, accordingly, the former state known to our forebears is unattainable for us. The habitat of the heroes of the "golden age" is always lost, or is at the edge of the Earth and unattainable (or difficult to reach). Hence, apparently, the idea of a "lost paradise" widespread in the Indo-European mythopoetic tradition arises from those "islands of bliss" where the Greek Kronos rules,<sup>618</sup> to Avalon in the cycle of legends about King Arthur and Valinor ("immortal lands") in J. R. R. Tolkien's legendarium.

In fact, this means that when there was a golden age on earth, there was no time or labor that people had to do to provide for themselves. Nothing came due, everything was given by the grace of the gods (or God), free of charge. It is no coincidence that the very concept of "paradise" goes back to the Old Iranian

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>616</sup> Humboldt A. von. «A Person Is the Citizen of the Universe» // Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. 2000. №5. P. 115—119. P. 119. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>617</sup> Vide: Stepanov Yu. S., Proscurin S. G. The Constants of the World Culture. Alphabets and Alphabetic Texts in the Age of Bigotry. Moscow, 1993. P. 25. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>618</sup> Zaitsev A. I. Greek Religion and Mythology. Lecture Course. St. Petersburg, 2004. P. 79. (In Russian).

(Avestan) rấu- "wealth, happiness", as well as to the Old Indian rāu-, rās, which means "fortune, treasure, wealth", rayis "gift, possession", related to Latin res "deed, property", rāti "gives, bestows", and is also related to Greek παράδεισος (literally meaning "garden", "park" and derived from Old Iranian pairidaeza-), which constituted the perception of paradise as a garden or Booths.<sup>619</sup> In view of the above, the following statement by A. I. Zaitsev that "Hesiod's poems <...> represent the peasant religion of the ancient Greeks, where the idea of the deity as the guarantor of justice in the world is at the center of the religious outlook and takes a specific form of belief that the gods especially protect the weak and disadvantaged" seems not accidental at all.<sup>620</sup> It is obvious that the very idea of a certain better time ("the year one"), when everything happened according to justice and wise arrangement, could have appeared only under the actually difficult life of the people professing such mythology. This thesis is also confirmed by the fact that any fabulous past is associated with incredible fertility and strength: animals were believed to be very large in size and extremely fierce; people were also large in size; all creatures live long or do not die at all; everything grows easily and by necessity; there are no vices and flaws in the nature of things and people.<sup>621</sup>

It is interesting that metonymically such ideas are transferred to the "golden ages" in the history of states as a political project of utopia: for example, already in ancient Rome the social ideal of the flourishing and prosperity of the state quite coincided with mythological ideas about the "Saturnian kingdom" of the past.<sup>622</sup> It is curious that the imitation of Roman orders and antiquity in general, which was characteristic of the generation of the Great French Revolution, is recognized in various discussions about the principles and ideals that should be followed in order to organize the post-revolutionary world. Thus, many representatives of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>619</sup> Vassmer M. The Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language. St. Petersburg, 1996. Vol. 3, p. 435. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>620</sup> Zaitsev A. I. Greek Religion and Mythology. Lecture Course. St. Petersburg, 2004. P. 56—57. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>621</sup> Cf.: ibid., p. 73; Goudimova S. A. The Myth of the "Golden Age", Isles of the Blessed, Time and Eternity // Kul'turologiya. 2018. № 3 (86). Pp. 146—157. P. 148. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>622</sup> Aleksandrova M. A. The «Golden Age» in Russian Literary Mind: Genesis and Current Contents of the Image-Myth // Izvestiya Saratovskogo universiteta. Novaya Seriya. Seriya: Filologiya. Zhurnalistika. 2018. Vol. 18. № 4. Pp. 438—441. P. 438. (*In Russian*). Also vide: Chernyshov Yu. G. Social Utopian Ideas and the Myth of the Golden Age in Ancient Rome. Novosibirsk, 1994. (*In Russian*).

conservative party, considering the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689 as an ideal historical example, turned it into a mythologem of "golden age" characteristic for their ideological platform: "While conservatives fought mainly rearguard battles and zealously 'clung' to the past, finding a social ideal in the mythology of the 'golden age', liberals at first timidly, and then more and more persistently formed the main priorities and strategies of social development as an evolutionary movement of mankind towards Freedom and Progress".<sup>623</sup> In this respect, it is not at all surprising that many adherents of realpolitik over the last century have used and continue to use the rhetoric of a return to the mythological "golden age" (be it the ideal of a nation-state built on the principle of blood purity, or, on the contrary, an international or classless society), thus interpreting the movement backward as a goal and the achievement of tactical, here-and-now solutions.

However, let us remember that mythological time moves in a circle — the classical example of this is the Greek world, where the ideal but not at all historical movement of time in a circle corresponds perfectly to the perfect closed system of the cosmos.<sup>624</sup> The researchers note: "Traditional folk culture has a special attitude to time. It can be 'compressed' and stretched, it can be controlled and used as a magical means of influencing the surrounding world".<sup>625</sup> The reference to popular culture is also relevant to ideology — in political discourse, in order to legitimize certain decisions and actions of the government or the sovereign, there is often an appeal to the people, a reference to the constitutional provisions on the derivative nature of power from the power of the people and the desire to realize the people's aspirations. This phenomenon has long attracted the interest of researchers both in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>623</sup> Trunov A. A. The Great French Revolution and the Genesis of Classical Modern Ideologies // Nauchnye vedomosti Belgorodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seria: Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Pravo. 2017. № 17 (266). Pp. 78—89. P. 87. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>624</sup> Tantlevsky I. R., Evlampiev I. I. The Living Person vs. the Laws of the Cosmos: Hebrew and Ancient Greek Components of the European Worldview // Schole. 2021. Vol. 15. №1. P. 86—107. P. 87. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>625</sup> Goudimova S. A. The Myth of the "Golden Age", Isles of the Blessed, Time and Eternity // Kul'turologiya. 2018. № 3 (86). Pp. 146—157. P. 154. (*In Russian*).

theoretical<sup>626</sup> and practical aspects.<sup>627</sup> Thus, we can record the presence of objective correspondences and, generally speaking, structural kinship between political ideology and mythology and mythological thinking.

The relativity of human perception of time is associated with its content and diversity: the countdown of time was traditionally associated with certain milestones in the life of society or people. The Latin word *saeculum* in the times of the early Roman state was used to designate a period of time that coincided with the life of one generation, i.e. a little more than thirty-three years. So marked the milestones of the reign of the first Roman kings, and it was clear that the reign of Romulus was not commensurate with the reign of Numa Pompilius or Ancus Martius. Later this word coincided in meaning with the idea of "this world", and in Russian began to be translated as "a century" in all its inherent meanings. Researchers point out that over time this concept was used to denote secular life, and in the Modern Age it gave rise to the familiar word "secular" in the sense of secular, non-church, and later as a synonym for "anticlerical".<sup>628</sup>

In the mind of the native Greek speaker, similar transformations took place with regard to the concept of  $\alpha i \omega v$ . Originally it was used in several senses — "life force", "time of life", "age" or "generation", "time" in general, and "eternity". As early as in the age of Hellenism, the concept was personified and assumed the meaning of the god of eternity; interestingly, however, Plato contrasted  $\alpha i \omega v$  in the sense of fixed eternity with the lasting and becoming time  $\chi \rho \delta v o \varsigma$ . Philologists who have studied the language of the New Testament point out that the meaning of "world" in the word  $\alpha i \omega v$  arose from a metonymic transfer from the meaning of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>626</sup> Vide: Tarasova E. A. The Phenomenon of "Power" in the Culture of Ancient China // Uchenye zapiski Komsomol'skogo-na-Amure gosudarstvennogo tekhnicheskogo universiteta. 2010. Vol. 2. № 4. Pp. 106—110. (*In Russian*); Falaleeva I. N. Cultural and Legal Subjectivity of Ethnos: Historical and Theoretical Correlations of Concepts in the XIX Century.// Lex russica (Russiy zakon). 2014. Vol. 96. № 9. Pp. 1031—1042. (*In Russian*); Sleat M. Legitimacy in Realist Thought: Between Moralism and "Realpolitik" // Political Theory. 2014. Vol. 42. No. 3. P. 314—337.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>627</sup> Vide: Sampiev I. M. The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and the Construction of the "Russian nation"// Sovremennaya Nauka i Innovatsiya. 2017. № 4 (20). Pp. 248—253. (*In Russian*); Chepurnova N. M. Constitutional Principle of People's Power in the Russian Federation: Problems of Implementation // Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta MVD Rossii. 2018. № 5. Pp. 55—62. (*In Russian*); Rapkin D. P., Braaten D. Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy // Review of International Studies. 2009. Vol. 35. No. 1. P. 113—149.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>628</sup> Uzlaner D. A. The End of Religion? A History of the Theory of Secularization. Moscow, 2019. Pp. 11—12. (*In Russian*).

"time of peace" (Matt. 13:22; 1 Cor. 7:33) and, as a consequence, from the identification of αίών and κόσμος (1 Cor. 1:20; 2:6; 3:19).<sup>629</sup> However, the described movements of word meanings in Latin and Greek have a differently directed character: if in the Roman culture the concept of "the earthly world" was conceptualized, in the Greek culture the concept of "the heavenly world" emerged. It can be said that the Latin concept emphasizes the community of people who are united by a given (albeit very large) period of time, while the Greek conceptualized the idea of eternity, immobility and inexistence of the world as the place where God resides. It is no less significant, however, that Augustine already points out that the Greek αίών in Scripture can be rendered both by the concept of *saeculum* and *aeternitas* (eternity).<sup>630</sup> This convergence is especially noticeable in the plural forms (e.g., in the expression "for ever and ever" — Greek: είς τὸν αίῶνα τοῦ αίῶνος; Latin: *in saeculum saeculi*), since what is meant is not merely an abstract "multitude of time", but a very concrete multitude of generations.<sup>631</sup>

The spiritual essence of medieval Europe was the perception of the unity of the world, based on the Christian doctrine of revelation. We see in it a combination, on the one hand, of a mythological element, which consists in a constant return to the origins of religious belief with the central event of the atoning crucifixion of Jesus Christ, and, on the other hand, of a distinct linearity, which consists in the confession of the dogma of the beginning and end of all times.<sup>632</sup> In this second element lies a characteristic feature of medieval historical consciousness: "Revelation <...> enabled us to grasp in thought the history of the world as a whole, from its creation in the past to its end in the future, the history as it appears to the

 $<sup>^{629}</sup>$  Kittel G., Friedrich G., Bromiley G. W. (eds.) Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Devon, 1985. P. 30. On the concept of αίών and the development of its meanings vide: Sophocles E. A. Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods (from B. C. 146 to A. D. 1100). New York, 1900. P. 98; Foucher L. Aiôn, le Temps absolu // Latomus. 1996. T. 55, Fasc. 1. P. 5–30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>630</sup> A detailed consideration of the issue vide: Folliet G. L'ambiguïté du concept biblique αἰών (saeculum vel aeternum) dénoncée et interprétée par Augustin // Wiener Studien. 2001. Vol. 114. P. 575—596. Our example is taken from there, p. 595. Also of interest is the history of the reception of the Hebrew concept of 'ōlām — the world (in both singular and plural forms) in connection with proper temporal and spatial connotations — vide: Tantlevsky I. R., Evlampiev I. I. The Living Person vs. the Laws of the Cosmos: Hebrew and Ancient Greek Components of the European Worldview // Schole. 2021. Vol. 15. №1. P. 86—107. P. 88—91. (*In Russian*).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>631</sup> Kittel G., Friedrich G., Bromiley G. W. (eds.) Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Devon, 1985. P. 30.
 <sup>632</sup> Eliade M. The Aspects of Myth. Moscow, 2010. Pp. 168—169. (*In Russian*).

timeless and eternal vision of God. Medieval historiography thus envisioned the end of history, an end predestined by God and made known to men through revelation. It therefore included eschatology".<sup>633</sup> In other words, the Christian is already given the whole history of the world, he knows how the most important events in the life of the entire universe will develop. The historical power of Christianity, so demanded in the cosmopolitan empire of Constantine the Great, consisted in the postulate, which is proclaimed by St. Paul: "Where there is neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free: but Christ is all, and in all" (Col. 3:11). Consequently, since we (conditional we, the Christians) know what was in the beginning of time (Gen. 1) and the consequence of which human nature became sinful (Gen. 3:22), since we know that God made it possible for His Son to atone for the sins of mankind (John 3:16) and that the truth of the atoning sacrifice also ensures the truth of the revelation itself (1 Cor. 15:16-18), we have already surpassed the history of this world (returning to the Greek term  $\gamma \rho \delta v \sigma c$ ) and are ready to enter the eternal promised kingdom of God, which is not of this world (αἰών).

In this purpose of world history, even if only in the specific sense that the concept of history has in connection with Christian revelation, we may consider two parallel processes. First, it is the restoration of the unity of man and God, broken by the fall into sin: thereby establishing human non-participation in this temporal created world and emphasizing his divine origin (Gen. 1:27), which is also repeatedly mentioned in the Gospels. The model of God's all-conquering love for his creation (*caritas*) is built up, which is expressed in the final arrangement of "a new earth and a new heaven" (Rev. 21:1) as an eternal kingdom of truth and love. But, secondly, the New Jerusalem, this *civitas Dei*, can only be built when the whole old world, which still contains sin, lies and death, is defeated at once.

Thus, the affirmation of a new, better world is possible only if there is already a coherent and consistent (and in this sense, historical) idea of the world of the lower

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>633</sup> Collingwood R. G. The Idea of History // Collingwood R. G. the Idea of History. Autobiography. Moscow, 1980. P. 54. (*In Russian*).

world, *civitas terrena*. It appears, then, that a person who professes Christian religions — however, we can apparently extend this statement to other monotheistic religions as well — is at the point in the present that is most unstable. That which has gone before him is certain and firm; that by which the denouement of the world drama is completed is also known and possesses the truth of revelation. But such firmness and simplicity of perception of the world is only possible when a person has already made a conscious choice in favor of this order of things, has recognized the source of revelation as his/her personal God and is ready to confess the doctrinal postulates necessary for salvation and to perform soul-helpful rites.

And what if we are talking about non-religious strategies to keep the world in temporal unity? We have seen that since the Renaissance there has been a formula about man as the "world's fastener": it is man who appears as a complex internal universe as the external physical universe. It is clear that his choice of life path realized by himself fully coincides with the Renaissance idea of bringing the creative beginning in man from the potential to the actual. As K. A. Sergeyev wrote about it:

In the idea of *humanitas*, which requires the unfolding of its *scientia humanitatis*, human dignity was realized in the possibility of self-activity, the possibility of undertaking and comprehending something by oneself, of shaping oneself and of evaluating everything by oneself. <...> In the light of the category of possibility, the horizon of man's inherent freedom of will was redefined. It also drew attention to the fact that the Church itself, involved in politics and trade relations, was much more oriented toward the secular, *ad seculum*, than toward the sacred and divine. In scholasticism, scholarship was not thought of outside the religious and moral dimension. And politics as the arrangement of secular life with the help of power, as an expression of the ability to manage human affairs properly, was also not distinguished from virtue. The secular thus became sacred, and the secular as if divine.<sup>634</sup>

This last statement — the secular becomes sacred and the secular becomes divine — conceals an important reversal of emphasis that occurred in the run-up to Modern science and that alone made Modern science possible, namely, that the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>634</sup> Sergeev K. A. The Renaissance Foundations of Anthropocentrism. St. Petersburg, 2007. Pp. 190–191. (*In Russian*).

discovery of the divine nature of man as a microcosm became the work of those who recognized their responsibility for preserving the concrete values of the eternal and immortal in human nature, and hence in the nature of the universe. Perhaps this is in a certain sense an archetypal inversion — similar events occurred in ancient India, when representatives of the Kshatriya varna felt their responsibility for preserving the doctrine of the Atman and even instructed the priests, who became adherents of the doctrine of the "cosmic force indistinguishable in itself", Brahman, and gradually turned into a "priestly" caste in the worst sense of the word.<sup>635</sup> And while in the tradition of the Pāli canon the affirmation of personal agency is due to the "revolution of the Kshatriyas", in Western European history this phenomenon is inextricably linked to the Reformation movement and Protestantism.

Until the Modern Age, we see two levels of being constantly existing in parallel: the transcendent or metaphysical, which is inhabited by God or divine first principles (such as Aristotle's *primum mobile*, which only the science of God —  $\theta\epsilon o\lambda o\gamma(\alpha)$  — can know about) and the immanent or physical, in which the course of nature unfolds. Although there may have been different nuances in connection with the description of these two levels in the Christian Middle Ages or in Eastern spiritual traditions, there is nevertheless always an opposition between the world of the high and the world of the low, with the latter always imitating the former, being only a faint likeness of it. It is indicative that in answering the question of where the source of knowledge, happiness or unconditional good is, both the East and the West point without collusion towards the divine law; and it is indicative that T. Carlyle, already mentioned by us, as one of the most important distinctions between these two levels. Carlyle mentioned above, as one of the most important distinctive qualities of a true hero, who can appear in different hypostases — from a god and a prophet to a poet and a leader — never reveals his own will to the world, but always

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>635</sup> Evola J. The Doctrine of Awakening. A Sketch of Buddhist Ascesses. St. Petersburg, 2016. P. 50. (*In Russian*). Cf. with R. Guénon's idea of the revolution of the Kshatriyas as the assertion of secular power, proclaiming action and becoming, over the power of the spiritual, with the unchanging principles it upholds — vide: Guénon R. The Crisis of the Modern World // Guénon R. The Crisis of the Modern World. Moscow, 2008. P. 138, note 12. (*In Russian*).

speaks on behalf of the Providence that sent him (or Nature, which according to Carlyle's ideas should be understood as identical to each other).<sup>636</sup>

However, it was in the Modern Age that the New World was discovered; it was in the Modern Age that man ceased to treat the world as something finished, realizing that there are no once-and-for-all boundaries. If for mythological and religious consciousness it is important that there really exist unattainable places, their bearers are convinced that in order to reach them it is necessary to be reborn, to perform a ritual that changes the very nature of the one who passes through it. A person of the early Modern Age, confronted with the population of newly discovered lands, asks a different question: are these not the same beings that I, a human being *par excellence*, am seeing for the first time? This question has preoccupied many scholars, from the skeptic Montaigne and the dogmatist Gratian to the founding fathers of today's multifaceted anthropological discourse: Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Blumenbach, and others. Crossing the legendary, even *traditional*, boundary of the world proved potent against all transcendent authority in heaven as well as on earth. Man took the reins of power away from nature and took them into his own hands, thereby apparently breaking traditional symmetry — skillful man, equipped with the full power of the mathematical apparatus, abandoned the transcendent world of principles and strove to discover them in the very fabric of the world. And yet this endeavor could not destroy the very level of the transcendent. Man, who turned out to be the instance that establishes laws and rules in the world, appointed humanity in its political function — Leviathan, whom T. Hobbes defined as a mortal deity $^{637}$ — to the role of the transcendental.

The elevation of the political to a transcendent level required the recognition of man's immanence with nature. This idea was gradually enriched by the natural sciences: Descartes had already conceived a plan for a great work devoted to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>636</sup> For more details vide: Lvov A. A. The Burden of Freedom: The Doctrine of Subject in Thomas Carlyle's Works // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2018. T. 34. № 4. C. 534—542. Cf.: Polatayko S. V., Lvov A. A. The Existential and Heroic as the Subject of Philosophical reflection. Pondering Mikhail Pronin's "The Existence. The Forgotten Chernobyl" // Voprosy filosofii. — 2017. — № 5. — Pp. 45—54. — Pp. 49—50. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>637</sup> Hobbes T. Leviathan or The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil // Hobbes T. Works in Two Volumes. Moscow, 1991. Vol. 2, p. 133. (*In Russian*).

world — not in the sense of length or duration, but precisely in the sense of human natural position as one of the inhabitants of the animal kingdom. However, the philosophers of the Enlightenment made an important step towards substantiating the unity of the physical world as a historical one: Condillac proclaims the existence of an integrative science — the history of nature; Rousseau insists on the necessity of restoring the natural state of the human being, reinterpreting in the spirit of the time the mythologeme of the "golden age"; Helvetius asserts the principles demanded later by the creators of the US Declaration of Independence, which are based on the idea of human responsibility for human status, which is realized only in the state. Nevertheless, it was perhaps the representatives of German classical philosophy who developed the idea of the temporal unity of the world in the form of social and political relations of people with each other. Kant argued that the world can be thought of as unified only in the universal-civil plan, and this unity reflects the secret design of nature itself (als ob this design existed),<sup>638</sup> but it is impossible to say anything definite about the world as a physical object without falling into insoluble contradictions. These contradictions would later be resolved in Hegel's panlogical system. Note that it was at this time, at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that the idea of the Modern Age as modernity was finally consolidated. This literally means a secular interpretation of creation ex nihilo: "<...> From now on, Modernity is free from any criteria by which it defines itself from a model developed in another epoch: it must work out its normativity from itself" (author's italics. — A.L.).<sup>639</sup> In other words, the Modern European becomes the instance that creates his own future — his/her (historical) world hic et nunc. The future unfolds in the present — the present, our time, modernity is, in the true sense of the word, the future.<sup>640</sup>

It is interesting to trace the development of this approach to comprehending the realization of the world plan in the history of mankind and, consequently, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>638</sup> Vide the eighth statement in: Kant I. The Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View // Kant I. Works. In 8 vols. Moscow, 1994. Vol. 8, p. 23 ff. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>639</sup> Habermas J. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge, Oxford, 1990. P. 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>640</sup> Ibid., p. 5—6.

realization of the future in action here and now, which J. G. Fichte applied in his philosophizing. In a number of works he thinks of modernity as a point of intersection of the past and the future, and he understands both the past and the future as moments of formation and further unfolding of the present. It should be said that the task of his philosophy can be summarized in his own aphorism, which we find in a letter to Jacobi: "We began to philosophize out of pride and through this we lost our innocence, we saw our own nakedness and since then we have been philosophizing out of need for the sake of salvation".<sup>641</sup> This consciousness of personal responsibility for the establishment by humanity in the course of its earthly life of "all its relations freely and in accordance with reason"<sup>642</sup> pervades Fichte's lectures and speeches to a wide audience. With the same feeling the thinker also defines the modern era in which we (he and his listeners) have to be. He distinguishes, as is well known, five epochs in the earthly life of mankind, of which the first is the domination of reason through instinct); the second is the transformation of the rational instinct into a coercive external authority requiring blind faith and unconditional obedience; the third is the emancipation both from the commanding authority and from the domination of the rational instinct and reason in all its forms, when the public is indifferent to truth and deprived of any prospect of further advancement; the fourth is the epoch when truth is recognized as the highest and most valuable beginning; finally, the fifth is the epoch of humanity's building out of itself a community living according to the principles of reason which it has become aware of.

If we use the brief formulations of each of these epochs proposed by Fichte himself, the following picture emerges: the original or innocent state of the human race is replaced by a state of beginning sinfulness, which reaches its culmination in modernity as a state of completed sinfulness. But at the same time, insofar as we (under the guidance of the philosopher, insofar as he understands the modern age as the age of Enlightenment) are conscious of the task of humanity in the world as the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>641</sup> Fichte J. G. A Letter to Jacobi // Voprosy filosofii. 1996. №3. P. 114. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>642</sup> Fichte J. G. The Main Characteristics of Modern Age // Fichte J. G. Works. St. Petersburg, 2008. P. 401. (*In Russian*).

unfolding of the divine plan of world history, we are also conscious of how far we have deviated from the original state in previous epochs. Consequently, in order to reach this qualitatively new, mediated state of reasonable relation to nature and to each other, we must begin to act — to develop a worldview that would enable all people, without exception, to achieve unity with the world. He takes the first concrete step toward this in the epoch of beginning of justification, proclaiming truth as the ideal of thinking humanity, and culminates in the era of reasoned art, or the state of completed justification and sanctification.

It is important to see two fundamental points in this logic. Firstly, despite the actual number of epochs, in essence Fichte proclaims three indispensable time periods — the past as expressed in the first two epochs, the present as a moment of self-consciousness and orientation in time, and the future as a conscious return to the original blissful ("paradisiacal", as he himself says) state: "The whole way in which mankind passes through this series in this world is nothing but a return to the stage on which it stood at the very beginning; a return to the original state is the goal of the whole process. But this path mankind must walk with its own feet; by its own power it must make itself what it was without any assistance of its own, and that is why it must first lose its original state".643 Here we have a reinterpretation of the Rousseauist interpretation of the myth of the "golden age": noble savages regain their lost paradise through conscious effort and work on themselves in history. The same idea would later be developed by K. Marx and his followers in connection with the doctrine of historical formations;<sup>644</sup> some scholars have suggested that Marx's views fit into the tradition according to which struggle is a necessary element of social development and the triumph of man over nature.<sup>645</sup> Secondly, it is important that Fichte proclaims active action, not contemplative practices, as the condition for returning to this lost paradise. In other words, even philosophy, understood by the ancients as βίος θεωρετικός, Fichte interprets it in terms of the strenuous spiritual

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>643</sup> Ibid., p. 405.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>644</sup> Alekseev-Popov V. S. On Social and Political Ideas of J.-J. Rousseau // Rousseau J.-J. Treatises. Moscow, 1969. Pp. 517—518. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>645</sup> Berlin I. Marxism and the International in XIX century // Berlin I. The Philosophy of Freedom. Europe. Moscow, 2001. Pp. 371—372. (*In Russian*.

activity of all humanity, through which it changes the image of the world around it. And, of course, he proposes quite specific measures for this purpose.<sup>646</sup>

In our view, this kind of practical orientation of philosophical activity is characteristic of Fichte as the heir of the Enlightenment. In Fichte's discourse, Kant's problem of personal responsibility for getting out of the state of imperfection, which is the Enlightenment, turns into the scientist's responsibility for the entire human race. This allows us to assert that it is precisely during the Enlightenment that philosophers' reflection chooses to realize the essence of modernity proclaimed but not comprehended in the 1680s by the German chroniclers Hornius and Cellarius. This observation can also be supported by the fact that the concepts of "culture" (*Kultur*; *культура*), "enlightenment" (*Aufklärung*, *Просвещение*, *les Lumières*), "civilization" (*Zivilisation*, *цивилизация*) are constellated only at the turn of the 18<sup>th</sup>—19<sup>th</sup> centuries, and up to the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century researchers observe dynamism in their usage.<sup>647</sup>

The development of a purely historical attitude to time was not limited to an external orientation in historical periods and the definition of one's responsible position in relation to them. A. Comte substantiated the famous law of three stages, which interpreted the development of the attitude to the world of each modern person in connection with the development of science in the history of all humankind. The founder of positive philosophy wrote: "[A]ll our speculations, both individual and generic, must inevitably pass through three different theoretical stages <...> — theological, metaphysical and scientific. <...> The first stage, though first necessary in all respects, must henceforth always be regarded as purely preliminary; the second is in reality only a modification of a destructive character, having only a temporary purpose — to lead gradually to the third; it is at this last, the only quite normal stage,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>646</sup> Ivanenko A. A., Muravyov A. N., Kryukova K. V. J. G. Fichte's Philosophy of History in the Mirror of Contemporaneity // Vestnik of St. Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2018. Vol. 34. № 2. Pp. 186—200. Pp. 197—198. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>647</sup> Febvre L. Civilization: the Evolution of a Word and a Group of Ideas // Febvre L. Struggles for History. Moscow, 1991. Pp. 239—281. (*In Russian*); Asoyan Yu. A. «The Twilights of Enlightenment»: How the Enlightenment was Relabeled in Culture in Russia // Vestnik RGGU. Seria: Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Iskusstvovedenie. 2009. № 15. Pp. 11—24. (*In Russian*); Schmidt J. Enlightenment as Concept and Context // Journal of the History of Ideas. 2014. Vol. 75. No. 4. P. 677—685.

that the structure of human thought is in the full sense final".<sup>648</sup> In other words, we have before us a fully completed theory of the "epistemological ontogenesis" of the individual human being, set in accordance with the "epistemological phylogenesis" of the whole of humanity. Each stage is refracted, as it were, through the history of the beliefs of various human communities, and he seeks to give parallels with certain states of mind and attitudes to the world of the individual developing during his/her life. Is not some special Zeitgeist manifested in the fact that in the second half of the 19th century E. Haeckel, drawing on the studies of Comte's contemporary C. E. von Baer and C. Darwin, offers a formulation of the "basic biogenetic law" according to which "[t]he series of forms which an individual organism passes through during its development from the ovum to the developed state is the short, compressed repetition of the long series of forms which the animal ancestors of the same organism or the ancestral forms of its species have passed through from the most ancient times, the so-called organic creation to the present time", or in aphoristic form: "Ontogeny is the repetition of phylogeny"?<sup>649</sup> Let us also note that for classical positivists and their followers — philosophical naturalists were extremely important worldview implications from the research they carried out and the facts they established. Researchers of E. Haeckel's work note that "from his point of view, evolutionary biology should act as the basis of modern worldview, oriented and orienting others to the improvement of humanity as a whole, on the fundamental aspects of natural sciences".<sup>650</sup> The same was characteristic, for example, of I. I. Mechnikov's social views: he believed that only on a scientific basis could humankind build a science of overcoming its natural imperfections (disharmonies), and it, in turn, would help to improve the established social institutions as well.<sup>651</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>648</sup> Comte A. The Spirit of Positive Philosophy: A Discourse of Positive Thinking. Moscow, 2012. Pp. 10. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>649</sup> Raikov B. E. Carl Baer, His Life and Work. Moscow, Leningrad, 1961. P. 123. (*In Russian*). Also vide: Maksimov A. S. Haeckel and His *The Riddle of the Universe* // Haeckel E. The Riddle of the Universe. Moscow, 1925. P. 21 ff. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>650</sup> Porges K., Stewart I., Hossfeld U., Levit G. S. From Idea to Law: Theory, Concept and Terminological Formation in Ernst Haeckel's Works // Ontogenez. 2019. Vol. 50. № 6. Pp. 368—382. P. 369. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>651</sup> For more details vide: Lvov A. A. Positivist with a Romantic Soul: Overcoming the Conflict of Worldviews in the Anthropology of I. I. Mechnikov // Konfliktologiya. 2019. Vol. 14. № 2. Pp. 96—114. (*In Russian*); Lvov A. A. From Humanism to Polytechnicism: The Tokens of the Age // Paradigma: filosofsko-kul'turologicheskiy al'manakh. 2020. № 32. Pp. 64—79. (*In Russian*).

Of course, our study of views on the unity of the world in space and time does not pretend to be a complete enumeration of their historical forms. It is important for us to trace the genealogy of the modern view of the world in connection with the trends that this view has undergone. It is possible to keep the world in conceptual unity only when we deal with our world, with the world in which we ourselves are active participants of the world drama. This concerns both the position of the world in space and the position of the world in time. Let us explicate: our place in the world can be determined either from the outside on the basis of a law that is not laid down by us, but is realized by us, or from within, when I give myself a rule and a law. In this case, cultural constants serve as evidences of such ordering and can be interpreted as fertile ground for the development of corresponding mythologemes or ideologemes. However, from our perspective, they indicate a twofold process. On the one hand, we realize that they condition our perception of the world, which we have already found ourselves in, and therefore the world for us as bearers of the corresponding culture is initially perceived as our world, our home. But, on the other hand, we have to ask ourselves whether the constants of culture, although the first and therefore fundamental, are only one of the ways of reasonable organization of the world.

## 4.3 Structural Unity of the World in the Light of the Theory of the Basic Myth

Constants of culture condition the special optics of the bearer of a given culture, and this optics allows him/her to reproduce the key links between things in the world in a certain and recognizable way in his/her speech. And *the world* itself is an indispensable concept-constant: it is especially well studied in connection with the Indo-European languages, and represents a more or less unified, though heterogeneous semantic field for various specific historical communities — speakers of Indo-European languages. M. Eliade consistently substantiated the statement that the thinking of modern man is immanent to the characteristics inherent in mythological consciousness: "Some aspects and functions of mythological thinking

form an important component of the human being itself".<sup>652</sup> In this regard, he traces the development of myth-making subjects using various examples from contemporary artistic, scientific, and general cultural discourses — from Aryan myths of "noble origin" to Marxist doctrine and the principles of modern art (in particular, Dadaism) and the work of the mass media.<sup>653</sup>

In this respect, an extremely characteristic feature is the architectonic kinship between myth and political ideology, which has been emphasized by many researchers of myths and mythological thinking — from R. Barthes and A. F. Losev to C. Lévi-Strauss and M. Eliade.<sup>654</sup> Interestingly, active research on the cultures of primitive peoples, as well as impressive sociological explanations of various rituals provided by L. Lévy-Bruhl, M. Mauss, B. Malinowski and other theorists and field researchers, contributed in many respects to the realization of the Weberian project of "disenchantment of the world" (Entzeuberung der Welt): the attention of social sciences, drawn to the sacred already from the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, was directly connected with the attitude to overcoming this sacred. The works of A. Comte, K. Marx, E. Durkheim, and M. Weber constituted an entire epoch in the effort to debunk the mysterious halo of religious experience as a meaning-giving component of Western European culture. True, there were those who, while recognizing the inevitability of the process of secularization and the decline of religion, still assessed this evolutionary process negatively — for instance, F. Tönnies.<sup>655</sup> Nevertheless, we cannot help noticing that the disenchantment of the world inevitably turns into disillusionment with the world: the desire for mathematically precise knowledge of the laws of social life, just like the desire for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>652</sup> Eliade M. The Aspects of Myth. Moscow, 2010. P. 180. (In Russian).

<sup>653</sup> Ibid., pp. 181—189.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>654</sup> Vide: Barthes R. Selected Works: Semiotics, Poetics. Moscow, 1989. Pp. 128 ff. (*In Russian*); Losev A. F. The Dialectics of Myth // Losev A. F. Philosophy. Mythology. Culture. Moscow, 1991. Pp. 107—108. (*In Russian*); Lévi-Strauss C. Structural Anthropology. Moscow, 2011. P. 242. (*In Russian*); Eliade M. The Aspects of Myth. Moscow, 2010. P. 181—182. (*In Russian*). The point was also substantiated in: Lvov A. A. History of Philosophy as practices of Memory // Izvestiya Tul'skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye nauki. — 2021. — № 2. — Pp. 155—164. — Pp. 157—159. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>655</sup> Uzlaner D. A. The End of Religion? A History of the Theory of Secularization. Moscow, 2019. P. 27. (*In Russian*).

mechanization and mathematization of natural science, leads to the problematization of the anthropological status of the human being him/herself.

C. Lévi-Strauss, analyzing the way of primitive thinking works, argued: "[T]he requirement of order lies at the foundation of the thinking we call primitive, because it lies at the foundation of all thinking <...>".<sup>656</sup> He did not abandon this idea in his later writings either — for instance, in a 1993 text he showed that metaphorical means of expression and explanation by analogy are organically inherent in human language, regardless of whether one is a proponent of mythological or scientific consciousness: "[W]hile myth-making, they [i.e., the unwritten peoples. — *A.L.*] sometimes anticipated the tales that modern physicists invent in order to convey to our understanding the results of their research and the theories built on their foundations".<sup>657</sup> In general, in Lévi-Strauss's studies, it is not uncommon to refer to the problem of the interrelation of scientific and non-scientific, or rather mythological, styles of thinking. He consistently defends the thesis that they are not so much opposite as complementary in relation to each other:

[S]ocialists who have raised the question of the difference between so-called "primitive thinking" and scientific thinking have seen only a qualitative difference between them. That in both cases thinking analyzes the same phenomena has never been questioned. <...> The logic of mythological thinking is as inexorable as positive logic and, in fact, differs little from it. The difference here is not so much in the quality of logical operations as in the very nature of the phenomena subjected to logical analysis. <...> Progress <...> has occurred not in thinking, but in the world in which mankind, always endowed with thinking abilities, has lived, and in which in the course of its long history it has encountered ever new phenomena" (italics added. — A.L.).<sup>658</sup>

The anthropologist's quotation symptomatically echoes the physicist's reflections on the essence of natural scientific search. Here is what W. Heisenberg wrote about in one of his articles:

<sup>656</sup> Lévi-Strauss C. The Savage Mind // Lévi-Strauss C. The Savage Mind. Moscow, 1999. P. 121. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>657</sup> Lévi-Strauss C. Scientific Thinking and Mythological Thinking // Lévi-Strauss C. We Are All Cannibals. Moscow, 2019. Pp. 143. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>658</sup> Lévi-Strauss C. Structural Anthropology. Moscow, 2011. Pp. 269–270. (In Russian).

[I]t appears <...> that those constituents of matter which we originally considered to be the last objective reality cannot be considered "in themselves" at all, that they escape any objective fixation in space and time, and that the subject of scientific analysis can in principle be only our knowledge of these particles. The aim of investigation is therefore no longer to know the atom and its motion "in themselves", that is, independently of the experimentally posed question. From the very beginning we are in the midst of the relationship between nature and man, and natural science represents only a part of this relationship, so that the generally accepted division of the world into subject and object, inner world and outer world, body and soul is no longer acceptable and leads to difficulties. It follows that in natural science, too, the subject of inquiry is no longer nature in itself, but nature insofar as it is subject to human inquiry, so that here again man meets himself.<sup>659</sup>

To sum up, we can conclude: it would be naïve to believe that today, even with such advanced technical equipment at the disposal of mankind, we know *the world* better than the "primitive philosopher" of E. Tylor or J. G. Frazer knew it. *The world*, therefore, points more to the one who articulates it than to what it contains as its elements. Human beings constitute their central position in the world through a multitude of different narratives, and in this sense epistemically equal should be recognized such epistemologically and heuristically different narratives as science, religion, myth, discursive practices of everyday life, and so on. They are all equally good, equally convincing, if we consider them as evidence of a characteristically human mode of existence: man lives in the integrity of the world, creatively putting it together in various kinds of narratives.<sup>660</sup> We must emphasize this point: already primitive people in the creative act were aware of their primordial difference from animals. This difference was fixed by F. I. Girenok in a poetically expressive formula: "The inner world of man is realized not by the acts of an autonomous personality, but by external connections between people within one myth".<sup>661</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>659</sup> Heisenberg W. The Picture of Nature in Modern Physics // Heisenberg W. Selected Philosophical Works. St. Petersburg, 2005. P. 230. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>660</sup> We use the concept of narrative after J.-F. Lyotard — vide: Lyotard J.-F. The Condition of Postmodern. St. Petersburg, 1998. P. 51 ff. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>661</sup> Girenok F. I. The Philosophical Origins of Non-Human Anthropology // Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii. 2019. № 6 (1). Pp. 8—13. P. 11. (*In Russian*).

The question arises: if all the diversity of narratives we have considered above speaks in favor of the fact that man always thinks himself at the center of the world — both in time and in space — can we speak of a single structure of this world, or, on the contrary, is the world in the minds of representatives of specific cultures peculiar and absolutely unique every time? All kinds of peculiarities of culture and, consequently, of language, in the elements of which we find our place in the world, may lead us to think about the plurality of these worlds themselves. However, this multiplicity exists only in appearance; on closer examination, it turns out to be the unity of the underlying structure of perceptions and the world. This idea is suggested by the observation of Yu. S. Stepanov noticed by Yu. S. Stepanov, the connection between the world of the lowlands and the world of the highlands: "tree-mount-god-world".<sup>662</sup> It finds its explanation in the theory of the basic myth proposed by Vyacheslav V. Ivanov and V. N. Toporov. Without going into a detailed account of the various interpretations and plot variations of this theory, let us say what is most important for us.

The authors call the basic myth the story of the victory of the God-Thunderchief over the dark chthonic principle, usually represented in the form of a Serpent or a Dragon. The authors themselves named this mythological plot as the main one, having in mind the following:

This name is justified not only by the fact that this myth is central in Old Slavic mythology and answers the range of basic questions that were essential for the consumers of this myth, but also by the fact that the motifs of this myth were reflected in a wide variety of other complexes of representations. The reconstruction of the latter in one way or another brings us to the scheme of the basic myth. At the same time, this basic myth contains all the main semiotic oppositions that determine the system of symbolic classification. In this sense, the basic myth can be regarded as an abbreviated model of the world given through the plot.<sup>663</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>662</sup> Stepanov Yu. S., Proscurin S. G. The Constants of the World Culture. Alphabets and Alphabetic Texts in the Age of Bigotry. Moscow, 1993. P. 21. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>663</sup> Ivanov V. V., Toporov V. N. The Studies in the Field of Slavic Antiquities: Lexical and Phraseological Issues of the Reconstruction of the Texts. Moscow, 1974. P. 164. (*In Russian*).

The conclusion that Vyacheslav Ivanov and V. N. Toporov come to is important for us in this justification: the basic myth is an abbreviated model of the world given through a story. This means that, despite the various details that we find in the transmission of this story in specific cultures, the very structure of the world, about which the myth tells, remains unchanged. So, what is this structure?

The study of the basic myth itself is organized in such a way that the main components of the story are analyzed sequentially. Let us cite them following the authors of this theory (we deliberately buy details not related to the description of the world structure, but important for the development of the plot of the myth itself, and also omit the meaning-forming objects in the plot, highlighted by the authors):

A. The God of the Thunder is above, in particular, on the mountain, in the sky
<...>, at the top of the three-part world tree facing the four sides of the world.
B. The Serpent is at the bottom, at the roots of the three-part world tree <...>.
C. The Serpent kidnaps horned cattle (and hides them in a cave behind a rock);
the God of Thunder, breaking the rock, frees the cattle (or people).

D. The Serpent successively hides behind and turns to different kinds of living things <...>; The serpent hides under a tree or rock.

E. The God of Thunder <...> with his weapons <...> strikes a tree, burning it, or a stone, splitting it.

F. After the God of Thunder's victory, water appears <...>; the Serpent hides in the earth's waters.<sup>664</sup>

Thus, according to the plot, the Serpent appears not only as an enemy, but in the full sense of the word as an adversary of the God-Thunderchief, who strives for his victory over the Serpent. However, the nature of the adversary is such that, on the one hand, he is constantly changing, seeking to escape from God, taking on different guises (episodes C, E), and on the other hand, he cannot be destroyed, even after defeating him (episode F), because the Serpent hides in the water. An

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>664</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

examination of the summary table of plot features of the basic myth<sup>665</sup> allows us to make important generalizations concerning both the nature of God and the nature of the Serpent. The nature of God is associated with a multiplicity of hypostases expressing the power and reach of the whole. His number (among other variations) is four, which symbolizes the fourth day of the week (which is expressed in the connection of Thursday also with the names of God, for example, in the ancient Germanic tradition), the four sides of the world (and in this case he himself as the center of the world or as related to the center of the world is sometimes *the fifth*), from him come four estates (varnas) or the gods themselves may be four. The nature of the Serpent is that he is indistinguishable from water: he is fluid, he has a hidden omnipresent nature, which allows him to take any form, finally, he is not involved in death. His number is three, or twelve, which emphasizes the connection with time: the unity of the past-present-future or the complete annual cycle. It is important, however, that God is always on top of the world (episode A), as if supervising the world and in this sense pursuing the Serpent, who cannot hide from God; and, on the other hand, the Serpent is always at the bottom and is linked to water, with water also spilling downwards as a result of God's victory over the Serpent, sometimes flooding everything.

It is clear that the attributes of the Serpent and God are found throughout the world, as well as manifested in themselves. The Serpent and God appear not only as principled opponents, but they reveal an essential connection with each other. Consequently, the essence of the myth of God's victory over the Serpent is that the world emerges as *a* conceptual *unity in the multiplicity* of the distinguished. Returning to the narratives described above, we can say: if the natures of the God-Thunderchief and the Serpent have so many similarities, then the essence of understanding the world, which is the same for the bearers of any type of thinking, is revealed to us in a narrative and symbolic way. For mythological, scientific, religious or any other type of thinking it is important that the world is one in the diversity of its manifestations, that the world is exactly a monad, enclosing all its

<sup>665</sup> Ibid., p.138-140.

constituent elements and manifesting itself in each of these elements, or, as J. Beaufret poetically says, interpreting the idea of the monad in Leibniz's philosophy, "[i]n each element of the world the universe vibrates".<sup>666</sup> In other words, the world is always the world clothed and given in the concept of those cultures in whose language the world *speaks itself out*.

In the detailed interpretation of the episodes of the plot of the basic myth by Vyacheslav Ivanov and V. N. Toporov, as well as the objects, phenomena and creatures involved in them, we, to our great surprise, find only a superficial interpretation of the essence of water, in which the Serpent is hidden. According to the plot, the Serpent is defeated when God establishes order, i.e., breaks the indistinguishable unity of duration and defines that duration, but the Serpent does not disappear anywhere, but hides in the earthly waters (episode F). We have already noticed that the Serpent has a similar nature to water itself — in this sense he is the opposite of the fiery nature of his divine adversary. However, firstly, the God-Thunderchief himself is not one: the archetypal formula "Perun is many" (Перунъ *есть многъ*), which we find in the 15<sup>th</sup> century chronicle,<sup>667</sup> is well known, and the gods themselves, fighting with the Serpent, can be several or have several hypostases (never one — from two to, for example, seven). Secondly, the Serpent, who takes various images and also kidnaps cattle or people (episode C), acts as a moving, dominating by virtue of its chthonic nature and in general can be correlated with the passage of time.

Here we must return to the Greek concept of  $\alpha i \omega v$ , which we have already considered above. We pointed out then that it has a semantic field peculiar to it, embracing the notions of "life force", "time of life", "age" or "generation", "time" in general, and "eternity". R. Onians has shown that in the origin of this series there is a metonymic transfer from the vital force to that which possesses (or brings to the body) such force, i.e. the vital fluid, and then to the time of life, and further to eternity as the lifespan of the world. As evidence of this, he gives various examples of words

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>666</sup> Beaufret J. Dialogue with Heidegger. Book 2. Modern Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 106. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>667</sup> Ivanov V. V., Toporov V. N. The Studies in the Field of Slavic Antiquities: Lexical and Phraseological Issues of the Reconstruction of the Texts. Moscow, 1974. P. 30. (*In Russian*).

that in Indo-European languages etymologically link the concepts of time, fluid and motion, and also draws attention to the very essence of the flow of time as an observable process of life:

The fluid contained in the body seemed to be the basis of life and strength. Not only was it obviously consumed in the form of tears, sweat and semen, but in ordinary life the reserves of this fluid corresponded to the demands of the vital forces, and its diminution meant the diminution of life. Thus, in serious illness, the patient "melts" <...>, sweating and losing strength at the same time. The "body" diminishes with the fluid.<sup>668</sup>

In addition, the expiration of time as the expiration of life resource was manifested not only metaphorically, but also actually in Greek clocks — hourglasses and water clocks (clepsydra). Thus, the expression  $\dot{\epsilon}v \tau \tilde{\varphi} \dot{\epsilon}\mu \tilde{\varphi} \ \tilde{\upsilon}\delta\alpha\tau\iota$  (literally, "into my water") has been preserved, meaning the time of performance measured by the water clock.<sup>669</sup> Here it will be appropriate to draw attention once again to the essential fact that the world is *eventful* in its essence — it always unfolds as an action, it lasts, and through duration (or, as in the case of the main myth, plot) it acquires its own certainty.

Let us add to what has been said that the Serpent is associated with water in general, not only with earthly waters, where it is pointed to in the finale. He is also associated with rain, he is associated (obviously, also metaphorically through the attribute of omnipresence and fluidity) with the "fiery river", and through this — with fire, i.e. the attribute of his antagonist. This allows us to conclude about the dual function of the serpent in other myths: having a dual nature, it is connected with the opposite elements, and this "can be explained by its original ritual function of a mediator, through which the reconciliation of these two opposites and their conversion to the benefit of man is achieved".<sup>670</sup> In addition, the Serpent, like the God-Thunderchief, is involved in the world tree and is its natural foundation, while

<sup>668</sup> Onians R. On Gods' Knees. Moscow, 1999. P. 214. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>669</sup> Ibid., p. 215.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>670</sup> Ivanov V. V., Toporov V. N. The Studies in the Field of Slavic Antiquities: Lexical and Phraseological Issues of the Reconstruction of the Texts. Moscow, 1974. P. 118. (*In Russian*).

God is its summit. This shows the unity of the world in connection with the unity of its elements: the upper, middle and lower worlds or times. It should not be overlooked that it is the serpent that appears in the biblical myth of the fall into sin as a mediator, involved simultaneously in two natures — human and divine. Already J. G. Frazer noted that the story of eating fruit from the tree of knowledge should be reconstructed to the story of the second tree — eternal life, which exists in the legends of many other non-Semitic and non-Indo-European cultures. In this perspective, the Serpent turns out to be an archetypal symbol of an immortal, eternal being, always connected with the human beings according to the plot about the animal-mediator.<sup>671</sup>

If our guess is correct, and the theory of the basic myth describes the idea of the world as an ordered unity inherent in many cultures in the form of a universal plot (if not in the absolute majority of them), then every culture may be capable of conceptually ordering the world rationally, and not only by the mythological principle of the world as the order established by God. The logical, expressed itself in mythopoetic form, as cultural *a priori* conditions the perception of the historical.<sup>672</sup> Human awareness of the Umwelt, in which people live and to which their community belongs, unfolds in aspects of both time and space. In these terms, the historical can be interpreted as the continuous change of the reality surrounding man in time and space. Consequently, we can draw an important conclusion that confirms our working hypothesis: any dispositif (in the sense discussed above, in which this concept is used by G. Agamben) is only a manifestation of the fundamental creative ability of man to organize the chaos of reality around him into an order of the world that he is aware of. In this connection, a strong connection is established, or a transition from the possibility of ordering the world to the means of its ordering — to the concept of culture.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>671</sup> Frazer J. G. Folklore in Old Testament. Moscow, 1985. P. 46–48. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>672</sup> The law of Russian history described by V. V. Bibikhin, metaphorically expressed by him in the image of lightning, can serve as an interesting illustration of this position — vide: Bibikhin V. V. The Law of Russian History // Bibikhin V. V. Another Beginning. St. Petersburg, 2003. Pp. 8—70. (*In Russian*). Cf. with his consideration of the concept of "ruling lightening" in: Bibikhin V. V. The Language of Philosophy. St. Petersburg, 2007. Pp. 123—179. (*In Russian*).

## 4.4 Cultural Evolutionary Perspective on Human Beings

Speaking of the basic myth, one cannot ignore the plot detail that, after God's victory over the Serpent, God dismembers the unclean and imprisons him in the ground — just as science views the world as a sterile ideal space of pure causes and pure effects, killing and dismembering the living unity of reality with the scalpel of its analysis.

Initially man is convinced that the world is a natural given; but this conviction is weakened the more one learns about the structure of the individual elements of the world. The history of physics offers us a remarkable example of the evolution of this kind of worldview: the creation of classical mechanism and then the founding of relativity and quantum mechanics were undoubtedly two of the greatest advances in the way people interact with their environment.<sup>673</sup> In the case of the Newtonian world, philosophical thought preceded the idea of a deterministic nature, and the development of Galileo's proposed understanding of natural laws as once and for all given proved to be a fruitful way of reading truth ex libri naturae and established a rationalist program of interpreting the universe. In this respect, L. Althusser's statement that philosophy lags behind science seems quite fair, since its categories are developed in close alliance with science itself, and it is philosophy that comprehends the achievements of science.<sup>674</sup> However, paradoxically, researchers of the twentieth century discovered that true physics as a science begins where all physical reality ends — the sophisticated mathematization characteristic of nonclassical science turns into true metaphysics, which I. Newton, as is well known, urged physics to beware of with all its might.

Such a metaphysical approach to nature leads to the fact that we cease to understand, what physical (natural) reality actually is. The common-sense view of nature as an original wholeness fluctuates and, as a result, disappears under the influence of a variety of interpretations of the world order. The very founding fathers

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>673</sup> Vide: Heisenberg W. Changing of the Structure of Thinking in the Development of Science // Heisenberg W.

Selected Philosophical Works. St. Petersburg, 2005. Pp. 134-142. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>674</sup> Vide: Althusser L. Lenin and Philosophy. Moscow, 2005. Pp. 37–38. (In Russian).

of the modern scientific picture of the world emphasized the paradoxical status of their research as early as in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Thus, we have already seen in the above fragment from the article by W. Heisenberg that a person, creating an image of the world in one or another way available to him/her, always ultimately asks him/herself about his/her own discursive abilities to articulate this world. In other words, on the other side of nature stands the surrounding reality perceived and interpreted by man. In this case, any model in science becomes another discursive practice that is more indicative of the researcher him/herself than of the subject of his/her research. Science becomes a universal language through which the picture of the world is articulated. The question of the contemplator of this picture and the nature of this contemplator becomes logical.

Due to the natural sciences, we have achieved an unprecedented factual awareness of human nature. The well-known principle enunciated by T. Dobzhansky: "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution,"<sup>675</sup> — means that also the biological meaning of the existence of the species homo *sapiens* can be understood only in connection with the larger phases of evolutionary development. Indeed, human beings cannot be defined as any single entity, and the various definitions are always examples of failures or curiosities. Kant's proverbial four questions ("What can I know?"; "What ought I to do?"|; "What may I hope?"; "What is man?")<sup>676</sup> established the synthetic character of anthropology as a science of man, incorporating various aspects of research into both the domain of nature and the domain of freedom. In the anthropological doctrine he developed, Kant proceeded from two opposing characteristics of the human — as a being defined in the morphology of his/her body and physical appearance by nature, and as a rational actor who educates him/herself and works to improve his/her morality.<sup>677</sup> Thus, it is anthropology from a pragmatic point of view that becomes the philosophical justification for the search for the truth of human cognition, the origin of its values

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>675</sup> Dobzhansky T. Nothing in Biology Makes Sense except in the Light of Evolution // The American Biology Teacher. 1973. Vol. 35. No. 3. P. 125–129.

<sup>676</sup> Kant I. Logic // Kant I, Works. In 8 Vols. Moscow, 1994. Vol. 8, p. 280. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>677</sup> Kant I. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View // Kant I. Works. In 8 Vols. Moscow, 1994. Vol. 7, pp. 138–139. (*In Russian*).

and moral norms, as well as the ideal of its reason (both pure and practical), in accordance with which man, given the limitations of his experience, is able to realize his freedom in action and goal-setting.

The doctrines that place the human being in the history of the development of nature and, more broadly, of the cosmos, were especially in demand in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the search for points of contact between physical anthropology and genetics began. The emergence and active development of the synthetic theory of evolution (STE), the creators of which sought to bring the diversity of knowledge about living things to a theoretical unity in the light of evolutionary doctrine, contributed greatly to this.678 At the same time, the participants of such inquiries and discussions sought an answer to the quite traditional question, which already existed in science and philosophy of the 19th century, about the place of the human being in nature. The already mentioned T. Dobzhansky proposed a three-part development of the evolutionary process in the broad sense of the term: firstly, it is cosmic evolution, which concerns the emergence of the chemical basis for the development of life in the Universe and on Earth in particular; secondly, it is biological evolution, as a result of which the humans appeared; thirdly, it is cultural evolution, within the framework of which the first two continue in the new capacity of the humans as the creators of culture and transformers of nature.

Such a view allows us to look at the emergence of human beings as the most important event in the history of the universe, the development of which is understood as a single and continuous process. Although evolutionary anthropologists strongly refuse to claim that the human being is the "crown of nature" or the goal of evolutionary development, it is still obvious that with the appearance of the species *homo sapiens* and its further development, the evolutionary movement acquired a completely different quality, continuing at the level of the second nature created by the species *homo sapiens* itself. In this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>678</sup> Smocovitis V. B. Humanizing Evolution: Anthropology, the Evolutionary Synthesis, and the Prehistory of Biological Anthropology, 1927—1962 // Current Anthropology. 2012. Vol. 53. No. 5. P.108—125.

perspective, cultural evolution is spoken of as one of the stages of the universal process of development of the "big history". The classical definition of cosmic evolution as a synonym for this "big history" was given by E. Chaisson: "<...> it is a theory that studies the totality of the numerous and diverse evolutionary changes and changes, occurring within a single generation, in the composition and structure of radiation, matter, and life that have taken place in the history of the universe. These are the physical, biological, and cultural changes that have generally led to the formation of galaxies, stars, planets, and life forms, mainly taking into account Big History with its more limited coverage of the Milky Way, the Sun, the Earth, and life on the planet, especially humanity. The result is a comprehensive evolutionary synthesis that integrates many different scientific disciplines-physics, astronomy, geology, chemistry, biology, and anthropology-into a truly scientific narrative of epic proportions, stretching from the beginning of time to the present day, from the Big Bang to the emergence of humankind".<sup>679</sup>

This stage of universal evolutionary history has a number of peculiarities. First of all, they are connected with the fact that it is here that consciousness and reason appear and begin to act. In this connection, A. Mesoudi's remark about the scientific unproductiveness of typical ideas about culture as a distinctive feature of the human species seems important: "[E]ven if culture is defined broadly as socially transmitted information, regardless of the mechanisms at work, it is quite possible that culture, or some part of the mechanisms that ensure cultural evolution in humans, is also present in other species".<sup>680</sup> The fact that intelligence emerges together with the emergence of the human being is a turning point in many discussions of the uniqueness of man, expressing his/her qualitative difference from other living beings. On the one hand, this difference does exist, and in this sense the horizon of the transcendent opens up before man, on which the story of the cephalization of nature according to the so-called "Dana principle" unfolds before us. In brief, this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>679</sup> Chaisson E. Cosmic Evolution // Universal and Global History (Evolution of the Universe, the Earth, Life and Society). Volgograd, 2012. P. 199. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>680</sup> Mesoudi A. Cultural Evolution. How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences. Moscow, 2019. P. 316. (*In Russian*).

principle, formulated by the American geologist and zoologist J. D. Dana on the basis of his study of crustaceans, boils down to the following: during geological time, some part of the inhabitants of planet Earth acquired an increasingly complex central nervous system; hence, the process of cephalization, i.e., the enhanced development of the cranial area of the body in bilateral-symmetrical animals in the course of their evolution, reflects an objective, empirically observed process of centralization of forces at the highest levels of development of living beings. Researchers note that this principle had a serious influence on the formation of thought of domestic and foreign evolutionist scientists: V. I. Vernadsky associated cephalization with the irreversible growth of intellectual abilities of living beings, and the irreversibility of the process of cephalization plays an important role in the views of P. Teilhard de Chardin.<sup>681</sup> Note that in the works of these two authors the empirical process is interpreted differently: either in a strictly natural-scientific way of analyzing bio-geo-chemical processes and the theory of biocenosis, or acquiring unorthodox theological forms in the context of the doctrine of divergent and convergent processes in nature, striving to merge at the Omega point.

On the other hand, there is an emerging interest in exploring the "opposite pole" of humanity's natural history, namely, to substantiate humanity's "deep history" as an integral part of universal natural history. In this regard, an interdisciplinary field of study is justified, within which "archaeologists, anthropologists, molecular biologists, and neuroscientists who study the deep past" could join their efforts, and thus be considered "historians regardless of the archives they consult".<sup>682</sup> Such broadly expanded boundaries of the discourse on the human and their place in the history of the universe convincingly show that the human is an integral part of nature, and the natural laws and principles that apply in any other sphere of nature also apply to the traditionally considered unique human activity and culture. Accordingly, it is argued that the emergence of life in the universe was not at all a goal or task that was solved by the interaction of chemical elements, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>681</sup> Levit G. S. The Biosphere and the Noosphere Theories of V. I. Vernadsky and P. Teilhard de Chardin: A

Methodological Essay // Archives Internationales D'Histoire des Sciences. 2000. Vol. 50 (144). P. 160–176. P. 163. <sup>682</sup> Smail D. L. On Deep History and the Brain. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 2008. P. 11.

emergence of atoms and molecules in outer space. However, it is clear that with the emergence of life the further course of evolution passed and could not but pass to a qualitatively different level due to the emergence of living matter. That is why the human being is understood as a key result of biological evolution symmetrically as the emergence of life is thought as a key result of cosmic evolution.

At the same time, the human being, belonging equally to both the domains of nature and freedom, has from time immemorial presented a difficulty to religious and philosophical thought as to whether in human nature he/she was to be found a union of these kingdoms or whether he/she was to be pointed to the gulf between them. Nature is all that is given to the human by the fact of his/her birth and origin, and which separates him/her from every other being. Freedom is what man is free to make of him/herself, that is, how man is willing to realize him/herself as a future self, or his/her own end. We find a quite original interpretation of this statement in the studies of M. Scheler, who proposed a model of intersubjective disclosure of the world, a special (using A. Bergson's concept) creative evolution. From his point of view, God, or theos, is revealed as a prescribed image of unconditional creative ability, embodied in the principle of love, and therefore does not represent itself without and outside the Other. This Other is the man, who is him/herself an unrealized project; but at the same time, he/she is also a micro-theos, capable of unfolding God (explicatio Dei) in the sense of human awareness of his/her relation to the whole created world and, as a consequence, the potential bearer of all the qualities of the world. Thus, it is clear that it is in human activity, in full accordance with the idea expressed by Kant, that nature's potential for reflection over itself is revealed: the processes peculiar to the chemical composition of the organism and occurring in physical reality continue at a qualitatively different level in the world of human culture as well.<sup>683</sup>

However, we see that the science of man, represented by a whole ensemble of anthropologies — physical, sociocultural, philosophical —has come to two mutually

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>683</sup> Smocovitis V. B. Humanizing Evolution: Anthropology, the Evolutionary Synthesis, and the Prehistory of Biological Anthropology, 1927—1962 // Current Anthropology. 2012. Vol. 53. No. 5. P.108—125. P. 122

exclusive results in its development by the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. These results should be taken as an important sign of how the attitude to the subject of philosophical anthropology and to the tasks of philosophy itself have changed. On the one hand, an essentialist understanding of the human being as the protagonist, the subject of all world history (including the history of nature) is proclaimed. Researchers adhering to this perspective belong to different philosophical schools and offer different scenarios of its justification; the main thing they have in common is the actualization of the "thesis of human exceptionalism" (a concept proposed by J.-M. Schaeffer), which consists in the fact that "the human being is an exception among the creatures inhabiting the Earth, or even in the world existence in general", because "in the human essence itself, man has a special, unprecedented ontological dimension, by virtue of which he surpasses other forms of life and his own "naturalness".<sup>684</sup> On the other hand, it is argued that the human being, in his/her exclusive subject status for the Modern tradition, can no longer be perceived as the only actor on the stage of world history. Rather, we should speak of man as an epistemological project that allows us to affirm certain practices of truth and power - this applies both to science and to the organized management of people. Yu. A. Kimelev, following a review of the most significant modern approaches to anthropological problems in philosophy, notes: "Concepts that solve the philosophical-anthropological problem in its traditional sense, practically do not correlate explicitly with each other. In addition, as a rule, the connection with any one philosophical trend of the 20<sup>th</sup> century is not clearly declared. In particular, no continuity is declared with regard to philosophical anthropology as a separate direction".<sup>685</sup> This opposition between the proclamation of man as Hypersubject and Hyperobject is, firstly, an extra confirmation of Yu. A. Kimelev's thesis about the rupture of modern anthropological views with the tradition of the philosophical doctrine of man, and, secondly, a consequence of the state of affairs, which from our point of view it is appropriate to interpret as a crisis of substantive, conceptual

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>684</sup> Schaeffer J.-M. The End of Human Exclusiveness. Moscow, 2010. Pp. 9–10. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>685</sup> Kimelev Yu. A. Western Philosophical Anthropology at the Edge of XX—XXI Centuries. A Review. Moscow, 2007. P. 11. (*In Russian*).

philosophical generalizations of the data of experimental sciences and creative and theoretical achievements of culture.

Any crisis should be understood in the perspective of the conditions that have been formed in order to stop and look back at the path that has been traveled. It is obvious that between the classical (though rather localized culturally) German project of philosophical anthropology, proposed in 1920—40s by M. Scheler, H. Plessner, A. Gehlen, K. Löwith, E. Rothacker and other philosophers, and the modern views on the subject, method and tasks of anthropological research, there is an epistemological gap. This gap can be characterized in the following points.

Firstly, the lack of continuity indicates the absence of unity in the methodology and research programs of the representatives of philosophical anthropology. This allows us to speak of the latter as an independent, autonomous branch of philosophical and, more broadly, humanitarian knowledge with a rather large degree of conventionality. If initially Scheler's anthropological project was born out of his phenomenological studies,<sup>686</sup> and his supporters in one way or another followed the ways of searching for the discernment of the essence and description of *the human*, then since the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century we observe an extreme dispersion of views on the human being, and these views, as a rule, are more and more reduced to criticism of his essence. This dispersion can be explained by the heterogeneity of the postmodern situation, which was proclaimed as a conscious rejection of a consistent methodology of philosophical inquiry, leading to the establishment of a new metanarrative. Moreover, the representatives of philosophical anthropology themselves sought to synthesize the results of their research in their chosen problem field, as well as data from other fields of knowledge about man (primarily physical and cultural anthropology) into an integrative doctrine capable of substantiating the metaphysical generalizations they proposed. The current state of affairs shows that anthropological problematics has been marginalized, acquiring the status of a side issue in the pole road of criticism of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>686</sup> Although E. Husserl himself, in a special report, sharply criticized any anthropology built on phenomenological principles and dissociated himself from Scheler's project — vide. Husserl E. Phaenomenologie und Anthropologie // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. A Quarterly Journal. 1941. Vol. II. №1. P. 1—14.

modern project.<sup>687</sup> Anthropology is wary of the subject-matter of its research interest, not wanting to provoke a return to the agenda of anthropocentrism. The familiar philosophical paradigm of subject-object world is being replaced by the world of hypertext, open narration and even metanarration.<sup>688</sup> As a consequence, the History loses its teleological character, just as in natural sciences any metaphysical concept of purpose has been abolished. Consequently, history ceases to be perceived as something unconditionally human, thus abolishing the power symmetry of nature and society formed by the ideologists of the Modern Age.<sup>689</sup>

Secondly, the most important consequence of active protest movements around the world, from the so-called "student revolution" of May 1968 to the topical Black Lives Matter agenda and protests against the COVID-19 ban, has been the radical politicization of humanities knowledge. Certainly, we should note, this situation has the character of mutual influence: public intellectuals and professional researchers are now forced to explain and analyze what were in fact the fruits of the performances of intellectuals and researchers half a century ago. However, no matter how rapidly the forms of social structure change, as in the first half of the twentieth century, in its basic mechanisms it still remains media-centric, oriented towards the values of the market economy, and thus capitalism within the model of the consumer-production society, and, as a consequence, atomized. The mass and total politicization of social relations takes place with the consent of the silent majority, and the analysis of the humanitarian component of contemporary social phenomena at any level means a challenge to the established image of *homo consumens* as the only subject of political action. A good example of this is K. Ghodsee's thesis on the task of rethinking the position of women in a socialist economy: "I want to change

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>687</sup> This is convincingly, albeit schematically, illustrated in a sketch of the emergence of modern humanities in the West in: Wallerstein I. World-System Analysis: An Introduction. Moscow, 2020. Pp. 59—70. (*In Russian*).
 <sup>688</sup> Lvov A. A. Science-Art: Modern Technologies in the Context of Contemporary Aesthetics // Vestnik Sankt-

Peterburgskogo universiteta. — Seria 17. — Filosofiya. Konfliktologiya. Kul'turologiya. Religiovedenie. — 2015. — № 3. — Pp. 59—67. — P. 60. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>689</sup> This point was observed and justified in: Lvov A. A. The Conflict Circumstances of Historicism: From Teleology of History to Theology of the Current Man // Konfliktologiya. — 2022. — T. 17. — №4. — C. 115—130. (*In Russian*). See also: Lvov A. A. Dehumanization of History as an Antitheological Project. // Vestnik Omskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye issledovaniya. — 2022. — № 3 (36). — Pp. 25—29. (*In Russian*).

the rules of the game — to highlight the vices of the unrestricted free market in the discussion of sex. By beginning to better understand how the modern capitalist system has appropriated and commercialized basic human emotions, we will take the first step toward rejecting market valuations of our fundamental dignity as members of the human race. *Political means personal*" (italics added. — *A.L.*).<sup>690</sup> The last phrase is significant in the sense that the political is thought of as such a transcendent ideal, in relation to which any private position acquires value. It follows that under the existing atomization of capitalist society, there can be no unified idea of man, including the continuity of the image of man in tradition or national culture (except for fundamentalist religious movements). Today, a person, understood as an independent, self-determined, free individual, is only an incidental (and, let us add, marginal) function of the subject of the society of political correctness, in which the concept of truth has a fundamentally relational character.<sup>691</sup>

The ontological specificity of ideology consists in its neglect of the individual, the subjective. In relation to ideology, anyone becomes a thing, objective (aptly expressed in German as *sachlich*), and the one who comes into contact with it begins to act as an institution or instance. This is what Marx pointed to, for whom ideologies reflected true, objectively existing but historically conditioned formations in the context of the materialistically conceptualized science of history. Since the person is an integral and logically necessary form in the development of natural history, anthropology also acquires scientific features. (In brackets we note that N. G. Chernyshevsky also professed a similar view of the development of sciences about man and society, justifying the famous "anthropological principle" — which, apparently, reflected the spirit of the 19<sup>th</sup> century).<sup>692</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>690</sup> Ghodsee K. Why Women Have Better Sex Under Socialism And Other Arguments for Economic Independence. Moscow, 2020. P. 10. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>691</sup> For the statement of the relationship between political correctness and the underlying relational truth, in other words, the break with the classical understanding of truth as an unconditional category in the context of the revision of the principle of equality vide: Ionin L. G. Minority Society: Political Correctness in the Contemporary World. Moscow, 2010. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>692</sup> Chernyshevsky N. G. An Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N. G. Works in 2 vols. Moscow, 1987. Vol. 2, p. 146–229. (*In Russian*).

The Humanities have focused on the study of worldview as something that belongs to a particular individual. The common place has become the idea that ideology refers to the masses and social groups, while worldview refers to individuals. However, as already mentioned, ideology ignores the subjective status of its recipient, and its institutional aspect allows ideology to be interpreted extremely broadly. In relation to ideology, each individual person appears in his or her objective quality, acquiring an institutional status. This was already noticed by L. Althusser, who influenced the treatment of *Weltanschauung* in the works of his post-structuralist followers. According to Althusser, ideology has the same effect on a person as a shout in the street when someone suddenly addresses him/her by name: "<...> ideology 'acts', or 'functions', in such a way that it 'recruits' subjects among individuals (it recruits them all) or 'transforms' individuals into subjects (it transforms them all), that is, in the very way we call 'address', which can be imagined as the most banal, everyday address of a policeman (or anyone else): 'Hey, you, over there!".<sup>693</sup> The French philosopher gives a remarkable existential illustration of this statement in his autobiography The Future Lasts Forever, recalling that he literally hated his name because it was short, unsound, and also coincided in pronunciation with the form of the third person singular personal pronoun (lui): "It referred my uncle, the man who stood behind me: 'Lui' was Louis".<sup>694</sup> The boy felt that he was not independent in relation to the name given to him, because it always referred either to another (for example, to his uncle) or depersonalized him altogether, merging with the pronoun. It is in this ideological treatment that the Western European humanistic principle is manifested, according to which every actor acquires his or her *subjectivity* in the world of decision-making. A person who has become a subject is always aware that it is he who is being called. Although even here we are faced with the established word usage, which assumes the synonymy of the concepts of *worldview* and *ideology*, many authors nevertheless

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>693</sup> Althusser L. Ideology and Ideological Apparatuses of the State. [Electronic Resources]. — URL: <u>http://www.intelros.ru/readroom/nz/neprikosnovennyj-zapas-77-32011/10296-ideologiya-i-ideologicheskie-apparaty-gosudarstva-zametki-dlya-issledovaniya.html</u> (accessed: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>694</sup> Althusser L. The Future Lasts Forever. New York, 1993. P. 39.

insist on the need to distinguish them. In the course of his analysis of ideology, L. Althusser puts forward the following three theses:

1. ideology has no history (although there are separate ideologies as private manifestations of the general, but, nevertheless, ideology as a phenomenon has an extra-historical character and is manifested in any social activity of a person);

2. ideology necessarily implies a subject, i.e. its carrier, which is always in a certain historical formation, the society reproduces with the help of educational institutions;

3. ideology is real because it "represents the imaginary relations of individuals with the real conditions of their existence".<sup>695</sup>

As we can see, Althusser sees the essence of ideology as a phenomenon in the fact that it is the task of the state, and its successful reproduction is the guarantee of the long and unshakable existence of established state structures. Following Althusser's logic, we could say that everyone, being a subject of action, is doomed to *objectivity*, to function constantly as a decision-making instance. For this purpose, a whole set of ideological apparatuses exists and is successfully used: the church (in which, to refer to Althusser's autobiography, one is baptized, i.e. given a name), the school, the family, the trade union, etc.<sup>696</sup> It is clear that having become so objective, a person is no longer able to refuse to act, but one always acts *on one's own behalf* — although this behalf is endowed with some external structure, for example, by expressing this recognition with a document issued to the individual. Such an objectification therefore means subjectivization, i.e., giving man the properties of a subordinate, *a subject (sujet)*, and at the same time legitimizing his/her actions by a structure external to himself and conditioning him/her as an actor.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>695</sup> Althusser L. Ideology and Ideological Apparatuses of the State. [Electronic Resources]. — URL: <a href="http://www.intelros.ru/readroom/nz/neprikosnovennyj-zapas-77-32011/10296-ideologiya-i-ideologiya-i-ideologicheskie-apparaty-gosudarstva-zametki-dlya-issledovaniya.html">http://www.intelros.ru/readroom/nz/neprikosnovennyj-zapas-77-32011/10296-ideologiya-i-ideologicheskie-apparaty-gosudarstva-zametki-dlya-issledovaniya.html</a> (accessed: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).
 <sup>696</sup> Ibid.

*Thirdly*, a logical consequence of the current politicization of humanitarian knowledge, which is directly related to anthropological issues, is the devaluation of ideas about the opposition of "transcendent - immanent". Obviously, the recognition of the relativity of truth, which is traditionally the subject of philosophical cognition, although treated differently in different periods of the history of thought,<sup>697</sup> entailed the recognition of the relativity of existing ideals both in scientific research and in social and political life. Previously, as was shown by M. Foucault with the introduction of the notion of the dispositif,<sup>698</sup> social activity was seen as a practical synonym for theoretical knowledge, or as a translation of epistemological statements into the language of the real state of affairs. In one way or another, since the Baconian principle of scientia potentia est, knowledge and action have gone hand in hand, symbolizing respectively the strategy and tactics of explanation, and thus conquest the world. This was largely due to the conceptual opposition between nature as transcendent and culture as immanent, even though this opposition itself could only be formulated through a Modern cultural optics. The paradoxical nature of this position could not but lead to a revision of the very epistemological "constitution" of the Modern Age: on the one hand, it legitimized the order of experimental understanding of nature and the presentation of this order by means of mathematical natural science, but, on the other hand, it built the symmetry of a modern, power society that scientifically constructs its social order. Critics point out that overcoming this opposition of transcendent nature and immanent culture will help to return us to a pre-modern state and, consequently, to immerse us in the present as a cultural situation common to all mankind.<sup>699</sup> Or, as E. Viveiros de Castro and D. Danowski poetically put it, we should prefer the spatial to the temporal, since the latter constitutes the hierarchical domination of the transcendent over the immanent in the form of legitimized practices of moral and power relationships.<sup>700</sup> It follows that the project of man as a meaning-making unity

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>697</sup> Vide: Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg, 2007. P. 58-86. (In Russian).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>698</sup> Agamben G. What Is Dispositif? // Agamben G. What Is Modern? Kyiv, 2012. P. 13—44. (In Russian).

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>699</sup> Latour B. We Have Never Been Modern. St. Petersburg, 2006. Pp. 117—120. (*In Russian*); ibid., pp. 177—181.
 <sup>700</sup> Viveiros de Castro E., Danowski D. The Past Is Yet to Come // e-flux journal. 2020. #114. P. 7. URL:

https://www.e-flux.com/journal/114/364412/the-past-is-yet-to-come/ (accessed: 05.05.2023).

unfolding in relation to the transcendental ideal has come to an end or, at least for the moment, has exhausted its conceptual resource. The return to the premodern must be understood as the overcoming of the Modern in its extreme, i.e. postmodern, forms. However, does this mean that the anthropocentric perspective offered by the Renaissance will be overcome? The detachment from the transcendent, the rejection of anthropocentrism, and the withdrawal into a different, non-Modern reality may interrupt the meaningful representation of man in both time and space, but it hardly offers any alternative way of his becoming. From the extreme of a history closed to the human, we thus risk coming to the extreme of a history without any human being, located not on the other side but outside the anthropological problematic.

*Fourthly*, and it is the most important consequence of the above three points, the marginalized person loses his or her own speech. In the current discourse of the Humanities, we cannot discern any coherent image of the human being, because the anthropological problematic itself has been displaced by a larger economic and political agenda. This situation of eternal now, permanent today in the anti-modern light of the dispersion of the subject reinterprets W. Benjamin's Jetztzeit: "History is the subject of such a construction, whose place is not monotonous empty time, but time filled with the consciousness of 'now'".<sup>701</sup> This "now" peculiar to today's selfcentered timelessness is expressed in the loss of any independent voice: the inarticulate mumbling of political figures, the refusal to speak clearly and distinctly in the public space serve as a guarantee of the security and stability in international relations proclaimed in the post-war world, as well as the stagnation of domestic political processes. The ideological cliches and conventional constructions with which public speech (and there is no other in modernity, as Kant had showed it)<sup>702</sup> is filled, abolish any personality from which this speech could come, replacing it with an information flow broadcast by various instances. That is why behind the facade of actively changing programs of the first persons of states, endless meetings

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>701</sup> This concept, related to the concept of "messianic time", is articulated in: Benjamin W. On the Understanding of History // Benjamin W. Illuminations. Moscow, 2000. P. 234. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>702</sup> This is embedded in his understanding of enlightenment as the right to use one's own mind publicly —vide: Kant I. The Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? // Kant I. Woks. In 8 Vols. Vol.8. Moscow, 1994. Vol. 8, p. 29. (*In Russian*).

at high levels, heated political and public debates on various occasions, there is essentially only one desire to keep the existing state of affairs intact. This forces modernity to speak too much but to say nothing, carrying out non-stop communication without any hope for any intelligible attempts to take a break and realize what has been said. Thus, information flows, like telecommunication networks around the world, constrict and entangle the modern subject of information consumption, at the same time dehumanizing this subject, depriving it of any personal quality. Oversaturation with information, after all, does not suggest that each individual can claim something new from him/herself, or, to use W. Whitman's words, contribute a verse to the powerful game; on the contrary, such an environment defends itself with all its might against the personal voice, opposing it to the perfect, ocean of the Internet that washes over it, in which everything is already there. However, the total awareness and easy accessibility of any knowledge or communicative template does not allow the individual to connect with the past or the present, nor to cast a lonely gaze into the future. The rupture here is in a rather sensitive area — technical and media-communication progress, to which our technocentric civilization connects not only its successes, but also its very viability. The human being has been not just marginalized, not just caught in social or news networks - he/she has been sacrificed to the fullness and even excessiveness of information space.

The described dissociation of the subject can be interpreted as a consequence of the situation of fundamental existential security that emerged after World War II. R. Inglehart, famous for his long sociological studies of values, proposed the following understanding of cultural evolution: "The culture of a society is determined by the extent to which those living in it grow up with the certainty or uncertainty that their survival is assured. <...> [P]revious version of modernization theory — evolutionary modernization theory — <...> holds that low levels of economic and physical security are fertile ground for the development of xenophobia, strong in-group solidarity, authoritarianism in politics, and rigid adherence to traditional cultural norms; and conversely, that secure living conditions

lead to greater tolerance of out-groups, openness to new ideas, and more egalitarian social norms. <...> [P]roviding economic and physical security in recent decades has changed people's values and motivations, thereby transforming entire societies".<sup>703</sup> The diversity of possibilities of realization and models of identification existing in a large number of modern societies, on the one hand, promotes the subject to "assemble oneself", basing on the realization of such possibilities, from his/her own free choice, but, on the other hand, conditions such a choice as necessary, thus insisting that the subject identifies him/herself with a certain and formed model of views, their expression and behavior. However, this choice and in general the exercise of these kinds of strategies of "assembling oneself" cannot be seen as only rational. Inglehart emphasizes that "having emotions is ultimately more rational than pure rationality. The evolution of emotion enables people to make long-term commitments to support their friends or their tribe at all costs in situations where a perfectly rational person would back down if it were beneficial to do so. <...> In the long run, natural selection acts as if such behavior is more rational than pure rationality".<sup>704</sup> This means that along with rational behavioral and self-identity strategies, the emotional perception of such choices is still of great importance for modern humans. Consequently, we can say that in the context of the big history the modern man has in principle the same set of adaptive abilities to perceive what is happening in the world as the man of the 18<sup>th</sup> century A.D. when choosing a strategy of behavior in relation to the Lisbon disaster or the man of the 4<sup>th</sup> century BC — to the collapse of the empire of Alexander the Great.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>703</sup> Inglehart R. Cultural Evolution: People's Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World. Moscow, 2018. P. 29. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>704</sup> Ibid., p. 45.

Conceptual analysis makes it possible to identify those cultural fasteners and mental structures that keep the world united in the face of the catastrophic events of history. Since each particular worldview seeks to accumulate the most conceptually important achievements of its predecessors and to describe the existing reality in all the diversity of its manifestations, it can be regarded as a way of comprehending and criticizing the culture contemporary to the bearer of a particular worldview. In the doctrines of worldviews analyzed in the previous chapters, modernity turns out to be a critical "assemblage point" requiring a rethinking of the previous experience of its interpretation, since it contains some fundamental flaw. In this we see a certain relationship between philosophers proposing worldview projects and the Romantics of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, for whom the imperfection of the world turned out to be an occasion for creative rethinking of it and creating it anew.

Any worldview strategy offers its own tools for representing the world in a conceptual order. For example, mythological thinking developed ritual practices that allowed to accurately convey information about the unity of the world to the members of the community as early as at the early stages of the existence of the human community; religious thinking allowed to form the principles of referring reality to the canon (i.e. to the sources that are recognized in a given religious community as authoritative sacred writings). As for scientific thinking, it offers a particular way of ordering reality through an appeal to the validity of what is happening in relation to principles of nature that can be discovered by humans and discursively justified, i.e., logical argument. Of course, we cannot claim that such ways of ordering the world are characteristic only of the respective worldview strategies. On the contrary, we can see that they are intricately intertwined with each other: as F. de Waal pointed out, the magisteria of science and religion are not strictly delimited from each other, but there are as it were membranes between them that are

permeable.<sup>705</sup> Thus, the modern man is not free from the ritual perception of reality, and the representative of the ancient Greek polis is not devoid of a scientific way of thinking (which is revealed in the examples of various schools of the age of Hellenism).

Of course, each of the described worldview strategies emerged at some point, which means that they should be understood not as historical but as logical forms. This means that the ritual practices, characteristic of mythological thinking, have not been overcome by religious way thinking, and the appeal to the authority of sacred scripture has not been overcome and abolished by scientific thinking. As already noted, these ways of ordering the world are intertwined one with the other, but the principles themselves can be traced back to historical stages in the process of cultural evolution. We return to C. Lévi-Strauss's thesis that it is not the tool that man has created in the specific historical and cultural circumstances of his existence that has changed, but the world in which he discovers itself.<sup>706</sup> In this respect, it becomes clear that the ordering of the world in the form of myth has not become a thing of the past due to the development of science, but rather constitutes the logical core of the principle of all putting the world together. Of course, we understand myth not in the sense of "fairy tale", but as a meaning-forming discursive space in which a person as a bearer of the subjective image of the lifeworld (Umwelt) meets "one's own", the bearers of his/her own living worlds. Thus, the essence of the concept of worldview in its implicit aspect is revealed as mythopoetic: a person builds him/herself up to a subject of conceptual kind, who thinks the world by means of the collective life space to which he/she belongs. Noteworthy is that this conceptual genus is not limited by spatial and temporal boundaries — on the contrary, in its boundlessness lies the creative potency of the human, forming their own living space. The person's worldview attitudes express his/her inner certainty in his/her own creative freedom.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>705</sup> De Waal F. The Origins of Morality: In Search of Humanism among the Primates. Moscow, 2018. P. 193. (*In Russian*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>706</sup> Lévi-Strauss C. Structural Anthropology. Moscow, 2011. P. 269–270. (In Russian).

Worldview acts as a practical meaning-generating activity of a person, or as a cultural adaptation of a person to the big history. Indeed, if human cultures are defined by conceptual links that are built up in language, and the uniqueness of cultures is conditioned by a set of constants, then worldview allows to form a meaning-generating space, thus allowing a person to identify him/herself with a certain image of the world among those whom he/she recognizes as "his/her own". Thus, worldview acts as an adaptive ability of a person to culture. We see the same principle of action of worldview in the Greek philosophical schools ( $\alpha$ ipέσεις): the images of the world for the followers of the respective philosophers differ from each other, but everyone who accepts the doctrines of this or that school speaks the language peculiar to this school.

It is obvious that the current marginalization of the human being has as its logical consequence the rejection of any inner certainty, and therefore requires an external certainty as a means of keeping oneself in the discursive space of modernity. This external certainty has an ideological character, this is why every time the human being is predetermined in their necessary parameters, constructed in accordance with the expected socio-political effect. The triumph of man in the sense of a microcosm in a macrocosm, embodying the Renaissance idea of *humanitas*, looks like a challenge to tolerance and political correctness nowadays. And this in turn means that in the dispositif of modernity the concepts of the world and the state have been identified.<sup>707</sup> This is why, at the present stage of cultural evolution, the Modern worldview is understood in connection with ideology or even as ideology. This is why, in order to raise the question of worldview, we need to return from the state to the world.

In conclusion, we must say that worldview as an adaptive ability of a person to culture allows us to look at the problem of consciousness in a different way. In most contemporary studies, consciousness is understood primarily as individual consciousness, and in this respect the main difficulty faced by philosophers is to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>707</sup> This had been already noticed by C. Schmitt when developing his concept of the political — vide: Filippov A. F. Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt: Two Concepts of the Political // Sovremennoe znachenie idey Hanny Arendt. Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii. Moscow, 2015. Pp. 52—65. P. 56. (*In Russian*).

overcome solipsism. The human being in this case is reduced to an epistemological subject, the "conscious mind", as a result of which the fullness of his/her inner world (*Umwelt*) is lost, and all reality is considered only as the contents of the skull of the transcendental *ego*. Yu. M. Lotman's studies have demonstrated that man exists as a man only in culture and that the individual consciousness of the human being is always connected with the collective consciousness of the community in which he/she lives and with which he/she identifies him/herself. The redundancy of language, which allows the transgression of meanings from one culture to another, is conditioned by a system of cultural constants, which in turn actualize the conceptual features of the cultures involved in translation. In this sense, cultural solipsism can be overcome at the level of human cultural activity expressed in language practice.

In Russian philosophy, we also find predecessors of such a collective understanding of consciousness. In particular, we keep in mind the idea of *sobornost of consciousness* expressed by S. N. Trubetskiy:

[R]ecognizing the common, necessary character of historical events and the internal, reasonable unity of the general course of history, we at the same time recognize for the individual the ability to represent and manage his society. <...> [T]hat which is acquired by the individual becomes the property of the race, by virtue of its organic solidarity with it <...>. On the other hand, the individual personality can assimilate, accommodate the universal ideal, cognizing the universal truth only in the universal, tribal forms of human consciousness. Only in its organic solidarity with the genus does the individual personality possess such forms. And at the same time in its free, individual self-activity it rises above its innate nature, fills its potential consciousness with ideal content.<sup>708</sup>

This idea is also consistent with the evolutionary approach to culture that we have described: indeed, man thinks not only individually, but also through the semantic, conceptual means of the culture to which he/she belongs. The subject, which has replaced the human personality, is subject to dissociation. The personality

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>708</sup> Trubetskoy S. N. Works. Moscow, 1994. P. 562. (In Russian).

is always connected with the ancestral culture, by means of which it expresses its inner world. Of course, we do not seek here to offer a solution to the "hard problem of consciousness"; we only want to affirm that culture is man's natural habitat to a greater, at any rate, not lesser extent than nature itself. Man is not only an individual but also a generic being, conceptually expressing his *Umwelt*, and this means that man's worldview as a member of the human species is an evolutionary ability to be incorporated into culture.

## Conclusions

The conclusions we came to as a result of our study can be summarized in the following seven points.

1. Philosophical anthropology allows us to represent the problem of translation in the light of the dialogue of different cultures, each of which has already formed its own language, values and meanings, which are of fundamental importance within these cultures. We understand culture as information learned from other people through social mechanisms such as imitation, learning, and language. The uniqueness of any national, philosophical, traditional, or whatever culture lies in its own unique linguistic practices of meaning-making. Each particular culture is then closed in on itself, and the basic concepts, meanings and values of one culture cannot be represented with the same degree of accuracy and adequacy within the linguistic space of another culture. This effect can be called *cultural solipsism*. Each person is formed in the context of several cultures (linguistic, national, religious, ethical, etc.), being a carrier and representative of values and meanings characteristic of these cultures. If it is principally possible to grasp the order of meaning-making of another culture by the means of the culture one perceives as one's native one, it means that the problem is not in fundamentally inexpressible meanings, but in revealing and substantiating the possibilities of expressing a common, unified meaning, demonstrating the points of convergence and divergence of one's own and other cultures through reflection over the formal means of expressing culture as such.

In connection with such a reflection, the problem of translation appears in the light of communicative practice: a space is created for the dialogue of cultures, in which unified meanings, that form the metacommunicative level, are grasped and articulated by heterogeneous semantic means of specific cultures. Dialogue makes it possible to reveal universal metaconcepts, which each culture specifically expresses with its own semantic means. Consequently, we can speak about the analysis of metaconcepts as a philosophical work to overcome cultural solipsism and justify the universality of human thinking. The universality of thinking consists in the ability to affirm the conceptual uniformity of the totality of the world by various means of specific and irreducible cultures.

2. The problem of overcoming cultural solipsism can be characterized by an essential core related to the elucidation of the philosophical nature of worldview as a way of grasping the world by the means of a particular culture. It is necessary to understand what is the prerequisite of any systematic way of thinking about the world, expressed in mythological, philosophical, religious, and scientific discursive practices, and how such assumption of the world in its unity is possible. Consequently, putting the question about the philosophical nature of worldviews appears as an anthropological study, since it is the human being who is the only one that acts as a condition for seeing the world as a whole and enters into event relations with the world.

For this purpose, it is necessary to study the history of worldview as a concept and to investigate the possibilities of its articulation by means of non-Modern cultures. Conceptual analysis makes it possible to demonstrate that any historically specific worldview acts as a logical expression of subjective perception of the processes taking place in history. In this respect, a person appears no longer as a subject of cognition or a pure transcendental *ego*, but as a bearer of a subjective image of his own living world (*Umwelt*). Consequently, any concrete worldview can be regarded as a particular, specifically realized universal grasping of the world on the semantic level. Changes in our knowledge of the world entail changes in the language in which the unity of the world is expressed to us. Changes in worldview forms allow us to speak about the change of various conceptual languages that have developed at the stage of cultural evolution of man and articulate the unity of the world due to their inherent means of expressiveness. Thus, worldviews fulfill an adaptive function within a mobile and changeable human culture, which is embodied in the history of peoples in its specific forms, or in the big history. 3. The conceptual analysis of worldview allows us to raise the question of it as a meta-concept: worldview is not an exclusive feature of Modern philosophy, but in one form or another is present at the conceptual level in various philosophical and spiritual traditions. A concept, connected by its semantic nature with culture, should be distinguished from a notion connected by its nature with experience; in its philosophical aspect, a concept is a semantic unit that acquires meaning by transcending a single paradigm or a single problem field. In these terms, it has the ability to transgress, i.e. it reconciles the diversity of its own interpretations, overcoming the established boundaries of a particular linguistic culture.

The most important consequence of working with the material of linguacultural concept studies is the realization of the existence of uniform or at least comparable *principles* of grasping different aspects of the world and the basic ability to express (reflect) them in linguistic activity. This is facilitated by the conceptual analysis of such complex entities as *metacultural concepts*, or *metaconcepts* reflecting supracultural transgression. Whereas concepts at the formal-logical level are formalized as elementary semantic units and expressed verbally, a metaconcept refers to an intercultural clot of meanings that can be grasped only by analyzing the meaning-generating functions of the languages of different cultures. At the level of philosophical reflection, metaconcepts thus make it possible to create a unified intercultural meaning space that is formally expressed specifically for specific cultures as meaning-generating spaces.

To reveal the inner content of the concept of metaconcept of *worldview* means to present it as a timeless "bundle of meanings" articulated in other, non-Modern discourses and cultures. In this sense, overcoming cultural solipsism consists in affirming the cultural uniqueness of diverse worlds, while revealing a universal order of meaning production for all cultures. The study of cultural constants, therefore, allows us to better understand not only how the linguistic pictures of the world of other peoples are formed, but also the picture of the world that is constructed by our native culture. 4. The concept of *worldview*, like any other concept, reveals three layers of sense in its structure: the basic, or curren; non-actual, or passive; and internal or implicit, not realized by native speakers. At the level of the contemporary aspect, worldview appears as an actual image of a person's living world articulated by him/her as an ethical, aesthetic and axiological system of views through a dialogue with the Other, acting in the function of "his/her own", in specific historical and cultural circumstances. In this aspect, the concept of *worldview* demonstrates the property of cultural transgression: despite the fact that the person always exists in certain historical and cultural circumstances, he/she is able, firstly, to grasp the reality around him creatively, i.e. in an active way, and secondly, to overcome his/her historical facticity, matching his/her understanding of the carriers of other cultural, linguistic, and civilizational codes. This makes it possible to recreate a dialogical environment between the subjects of communication, however distant from each other in time or space.

5. At the level of historical aspect, the concept of *worldview* appears as a form of collective thinking, going back in its essence to the project of perennial philosophy. Diachronic analysis allowed us to trace the continuity and conceptual connection between different manifestations of this concept in specific philosophical cultures. Thus, in Modern European thesauruses it is represented as a calque from the original German *Weltanschauung*, but it is not, as it was commonly believed, limited only to the framework of philosophy of the modern era. The context of the articulation of the concept worldview is conditioned by three main vectors: the departure from the exclusively methodological problems of the philosophy" (represented by ethical, aesthetic, and cultural spheres) into the system of views; the preservation of the balance between the logical rigor of problem formulation and free artistic search; the formation of an anthropological perspective, in which the classical principle of *care of the self* is conceptualized in an original way.

The conceptual analysis of Hellenistic philosophy allows us to assert that in it the meaning of the Modern (in origin) concept of *worldview* is expressed by αἴρεσις

(a philosophical school, a sect). The most important semantic aspects of the worldview concept are articulated in the *speculum* — an original medieval genre of spiritual literature ( $\delta\iota\delta\pi\tau\rho\alpha$ , *zertsalo*). Thus, these examples reveal the transgressive properties of the metaconcept of *worldview*. The study of meaning-making means of different philosophical cultures has shown that conceptual relations can be articulated by specific ways and means native to a particular linguistic environment. This statement allows us to connect the problematics of various doctrines of worldview presented in the history of thought in the perspective of the project of "perennial philosophy". Thus, philosophical thinking can be considered as the collective thinking of mankind, acquiring specific forms in specific spiritual traditions or national philosophical cultures.

6. At the level of the internal aspect, the concept of *worldview* appears as a mythopoetic ability of a person as a member of a collective subject, who discovers the intersection points of subjective images of living worlds (*Umwelten*) of each person involved in a particular worldview, to form a generic view of the world. A person builds him/herself up to the subject of a conceptually perceived kin, and the later thinks the world by means of the collective life space to which it belongs. This kin is not limited by spatial and temporal boundaries, but acts in a transcendental function: in its boundlessness lies the creative potency of man, forming his/her own life space. Human worldview attitudes express his/her inner certainty in his/her own creative freedom. It follows from the above that worldview manifests itself as a cultural adaptation of a human being to the big history, which allows a human being to realize the unity with "the own" on a rational and emotional level. That is why worldview problems are in such demand in situations of catastrophe, when the old world has been destroyed and the new one has not yet been created.

7. Not only the results of fieldwork with primitive peoples or archaeological data can provide material for philosophical and anthropological research. An important field in this respect is the history of philosophy, with the help of which methods a comparative study of various systems of thought and intellectual traditions of different peoples becomes possible. Disciplined at about the same time

as anthropology, the history of philosophy is not only realized at the doxographic level as an enumeration of the opinions of certain philosophers, but also makes it possible to reconstruct the cultural and conceptual circumstances of specific ideas. Approaches such as hermeneutics, based on understanding of the spirit of the certain time, or comparative philosophy allow the historian of philosophy to work as an anthropologist studying the particularities of the articulation of meanings and ideas by the means of (a) foreign culture(s).

The desire to discern the *Zeitgeist* of each particular historical age behind historical and cultural processes has had an important propaedeutic influence on the development of the understanding history of philosophy, which is so relevant for cross-cultural research in contemporary comparative philosophy. The distance necessary for anthropological research is achieved by the perceived difference between the meaning-making tools used by researchers and those used by thinkers of the past to frame their ideas.

## References

- Augustine. Confessions / Trans. by V. E. Sergienko. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Renessans", SP IVO — SiD, 1991. — 488 p. (*In Russian*)
- 2. Avenarius R. Philosophy as Thinking about the World / Trans. by I. Fedorov.
   Moscow: KomKniga, 2007. 56 p. (*In Russian*).
- Agamben G. What Is Dispositif? // Agamben G. What Is Modern? Kyiv: Dukh i litera, 2012. — Pp. 13—44. (*In Russian*).
- Akindinova T. A. The Problem of Worldview Integrity in German Philosophy and Aesthetics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: Doctoral Thesis for Specialization: 09.00.03, 09.00.04 / St. Petersburg technological institute of refrigeration. — St. Petersburg, 1991. — 341 p. (*In Russian*).
- Akinin M. A., Pavlova V. V. The Problem of Philosophy as a Worldview in Contemporary Society // Obshchestvo: filosofiya, istoriya, kul'tura. — 2019.
   — № 10 (66). — Pp. 21—26. P. 22. (In Russian).
- Aleksandrova M. A. The «Golden Age» in Russian Literary Mind: Genesis and Current Contents of the Image-Myth // Izvestiya Saratovskogo universiteta. Novaya Seriya. Seriya: Filologiya. Zhurnalistika. — 2018. — Vol. 18. — № 4. — Pp. 438—441. P. 438. (In Russian).
- 7. Aleksandrova M. L. The Problem of a Conjunction as an Organizing Element of a Sentence // Vestnik moscovskogo instituta lingvistiki. 2012. № 1. Pp. 6—9. P. 9. (*In Russian*).
- Alekseev-Popov V. S. On Social and Political Ideas of J.-J. Rousseau // Rousseau J.-J. Treatises. — Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1969. Pp. 487— 554. (*In Russian*)
- Alkon E. M. Anthropology of Music and Harmony Archetypes (to the Problem of mastering the universals of musical language) // Vestnik kafedry UNESCO Muzykal'noe iskusstvo v obrazovanii. — 2018. — № 3 (23). — Pp. 101—119. (In Russian).

- 10.Althusser L. Ideology and Ideological Apparatuses of the State. [Electronic Resources]. — URL: <u>http://www.intelros.ru/readroom/nz/neprikosnovennyj-zapas-77-32011/10296-ideologiya-i-ideologicheskie-apparaty-gosudarstva-zametki-dlya-issledovaniya.html</u> (accessed: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).
- 11.Althusser L. Lenin and Philosophy / Trans. by N. Kulish. Moscow: Ad Marginem, 2005. 175 p. (*In Russian*).
- 12.Althusser L. On Art / Trans. by M. Grinberg. Moscow: V-A-C press, Artguide Editions, 2019. 112 p. (*In Russian*).
- 13.Ankersmit F. Aesthetic Politics / Trans. by D. Kralechkin. Moscow: Izd.
  Dom Vysshei shkoly ekonomiki, 2014. 432 p. (*In Russian*).
- 14. Aristotle. Metaphysics / Trans. by A. V. Kubitsky. Moscow: Izd-vo Eksmo, 2006. 608 p. (*In Russian*).
- 15.Armer E. V. A Picture of the World and a Picture of Social Reality: a Social Constructivist Approach // Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta.
  2013. № 366. Pp. 24—27. (In Russian).
- 16.Arutyunyan M. P. The Idea of "Corporate Spirit" in Education: A Methodological Approach // Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. 2006. № 2. Pp. 78—82. (In Russian).
- 17.Arutyunyan M. P. Worldviews and Education: The Emergence of a New Paradigm // Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. 2004. № 12. Pp. 32–37. (*In Russian*).
- 18. Arutyunyan M. P. Worldview: The Ontological Foundations of "Paideia" // Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. 2006. No 12. Pp. 66–71. (*In Russian*).
- 19. Arutyunyan M. P. Worldview Problems of Humanizing the School. Teacher
   Student: An Invitation to Reflection. Khabarovsk: Izd-vo KhGTU,
  1998. 82 p. (*In Russian*).
- 20.Arutyunyan M. P. The Concept of Worldview: A Phenomenological Approach // Sotsial'nye i gumanitarnye nauki na Dal'nem Vostoke, 2008.
   № 3 (19). Pp. 11—21. In Russian).

- 21.Arutyunyan M. P. The Phenomenon of Worldview. Khabarovsk: Izd-vo DVGGU, 2006. 322 p. (*In Russian*)
- 22.Asoyan Yu. A. «The Twilights of Enlightenment»: How the Enlightenment was Relabeled in Culture in Russia // Vestnik RGGU. Seria: Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Iskusstvovedenie. 2009. № 15. Pp. 11—24. (In Russian).
- 23.Asoyan Yu. A. The Practice of Concept Studies: From "Cultural Categories" to "Conceptosphere" and "Semantics of Concepts" // Kul'turologiya. 2008.
   № 1 (44). Pp. 5—26. (*In Russian*)
- 24. Atnashev T., Velizhev M. Cambridge School: History and Method // Atnashev T., Velizhev M. (eds.), Cambridge School: theory and Practice of Intellectual History. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2018. Pp. 7—50. (*In Russian*)
- 25.Barthes R. Selected Works: Semiotics, Poetics. Moscow: Progress, 1989.
   616 p. (*In Russian*).
- Barthes R. Myth Today // Barthes R. Selected Works: Semiotics. Poetics. Moscow: Izdatel'skaya gruppa "Progress", "Univers", 1994. — P. 72—130. (*In Russian*).
- 27.Bakhtin M. M. The Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics // Bakhtin M. M. Collected Works in Seven Volumes. Moscow: Russkoe slovari, Yazyki slavyanskoi kul'tury, 2002. Vol. 6. (*In Russian*).
- 28.Benjamin W. On the Understanding of History // Benjamin W. Illuminations.
   Moscow: Martis, 2000. Pp. 228—236. (*In Russian*).
- 29.Berdnikova A. Yu. "Back to Kant" or "Back to Leibniz"? A Critical View from the History of Russian Metaphysical Personalism // Kantovsky Sbornik.
   2017. Vol. 36. № 2. Pp. 33—45. (*In Russian*).
- 30.Berdyaev N. A. Man's Fate the Current World. To the Understanding of Our Age // Berdyaev N. A. Philosophy of Free Spirit. — Moscow: Respublika, 1994. — Pp. 316—362. (*In Russian*).

- 31.Berlin I. Marxism and the International in XIX century // Berlin I. The Philosophy of Freedom. Europe. — Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2001. — Pp. 366—423. (*In Russian*)
- 32.Bernhardi F. von. The War of Today. St. Petersburg: Komissioner voennouchebnykh zavedeniy, 1912. — I vol. The Basics of the War of Today. (In Russian).
- 33.Bibikhin V. V. The Deed of Heidegger // Heidegger M. Time and Being. St. Petersburg: "Nauka", 2007. Pp. 5—19. (*In Russian*)
- 34.Bibikhin V. V. Another Beginning. St. Petersburg: "Nauka", 2003. 430 p. (*In Russian*).
- 35.Bibikhin V. V. A History of Contemporary Philosophy (The Unity of Philosophical Thought). St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo "Vladimir Dal", 2014. 398 p. (*In Russian*).
- 36.Bibikhin V. V. Know Thyself. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 1998. 575 p. (In Russian).
- 37.Bibikhin V. V. The Language of Philosophy. St. Petersburg: "Nauka", 2007. 389 p. (*In Russian*).
- 38.Bobrov E. A. Recollections of Teichmüller // Filosofiya v Rossii: materialy, issledovaniya, zametki. Vypusk 1. — Kazan, 1899. — Pp. 25—48. (In Russian).
- 39.Bogatyryov D. K. Religions and Ideologies. St. Petersburg: Russkaya khristianskaya gumanitarnaya akademiya, 2019. 192 p. (*In Russian*).
- 40.Boguslavsky V. M. Condillac. Moscow: "Mysl", 1984. 190 p. (In Russian).
- 41. The Big Encyclopedia. Dictionary of Publicly Available Information on all Branches of Knowledge. — St. Petersburg: Tipografiya Tovarishchestva "Prosveshchenie", 1903. — Vol. 13. 794 p. (*In Russian*).
- 42.Boroday S. Yu. Language and Cognition: An Introduction to Postrelativism.
   Moscow: OOO "Sandra": Izdatel'skiy dom YaSK, 2020. 800 p. (In Russian).

- 43.Beaufret J. Dialogue with Heidegger. In 4 Books. Book 1. Greek Philosophy
  / Trans. by V. Yu. Bystrov. St. Petersburg: "Vladimir Dal", 2007. 253
  p. (*In Russian*).
- 44.Beaufret J. Dialogue with Heidegger. In 4 Books. Book 2. Modern Philosophy
  / Trans. by V. Yu. Bystrov. St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo "Vladimir Dal",
  2007. 394 p. (*In Russian*).
- 45.Burlak S. A. The Origin of Language: Facts, Investigations, Hypotheses. Moscow: Al'pina non-fikshn, 2019. — 609 p. (*In Russian*).
- 46.Burlaka D. K. Thinking and Revelation. A Systematic Intriduction in Christian Metaphysics. St. Petersburg: Izd-vo RKhGA, 2011. 445 p. (*In Russian*).
- 47.Bystrov V. Yu., Kamnev V. M. Historians of Philosophy and Ideology: Russian Experience // Studia Culturae. — 2019. — № 41. — Pp. 18–30. (In Russian).
- 48. Vainshtein O. B. Dandy: Vogue, Literature, Lifestyle. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006. 640 p. (*In Russian*).
- 49.Weisgerber J. L. Mother Tongue and The Formation of Spirit / Transl. by O.
  A. Radchenko. Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2004. 232 p. (*In Russian*).
- 50. Valeeva D. R. The Concepts of "World Picture", "Conceptual World Picture" and "Linguistic World Picture" in Conceptual Studies // Filologicheskiy aspekt. 2018. № 3 (35). Pp. 63—69. (*In Russian*).
- 51. Wallerstein I. World-System Analysis: An Introduction. Moscow: LELAND, 2020. 304 p. (*In Russian*).
- 52. Vasilyev V. V. Arab Syllogism and the Unity of Reason: on A. V. Smirnov's Paper // Voprosy filosofii. 2019. № 2. Pp. 22—26. (*In Russian*).
- 53.Vasilyev V. V. Consciousness and Things: A Sketch of Phenomenalistic Ontology. — Moscow: Knizhnyi dom "LIBROKOM", 2014. — 240 p. (In Russian).

- 54.Wierzbicka A. The Understanding of Culture By the Means of the Keywords
  // Wierzbicka A. Semantic Universals and the Description of Languages. —
  Moscow: "Yazyki russkoi kul'tury", 1999. P. 261—499. (*In Russian*).
- 55.Wierzbicka A. The Semantic Universals and "Primitive Thinking" // Wierzbicka A. Semantic Universals and Basic Concepts. — Moscow: Yazyki slavyanskikh kul'tur, 2011. — Pp. 54—90. (*In Russian*).
- 56.Vekhi: Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", 1991. Pp. 7—206. (*In Russian*).
- 57.Vinogradov V. V. The History of Words / Russian Academy of Sciences. Department of Literature and Language: Scientific Council "Russian Language: History and Current State". Institute of Russian Language RAS / ed. N. Yu. Shvedova, cor. fel.of RAS. — Moscow: Tolk, 1994. — 1138 p. (*In Russian*).
- 58. Vlasova O. A. Karl Jaspers: A Philosopher's Way. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal', 2018. — 463 p. (*In Russian*).
- 59.Vlasova O. A., Lvov A. A. The Conceptual Analysis of Existential-Phenomenological Tradition: Foundations and Perspectives // Znanie. Ponimanie. Umenie. — 2018. — № 2. — Pp. 94—102. (In Russian).
- 60. Vorkachyov S. G. Ex pluribus unim: Lingua-Cultural Concept as a Synthesis Formation // Vestnik RUDN, series Linguistics. 2016. Vol. 20. No 2. Pp. 17—30. (*In Russian*).
- 61.Haym R. Hegel and His Time / Trans. by P. L. Solyanikov. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2006. — 392 p. (*In Russian*)
- 62.Galakhov A. D. Russian Literature in 1847 // Otechestvennye zapiski. 1848. January. Pp. 1–30. (*In Russian*).
- 63.Hegel G. W. F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Book 2. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2006. 432 p. (*In Russian*).
- 64.Hegel G. W. F. Lectures on Aesthetics. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2007. In 2 vols. (*In Russian*).

- 65.Hegel G. W. F. Works of Various Years. In Two Volumes. Moscow: "Mysl", 1973. (*In Russian*).
- 66.Hegel G. W. F. The Phenomenology of Spirit / Trans. by G. G. Shpet. Moscow: Akadmicheskiy proekt, 2008. 767 p. (*In Russian*).
- 67.Hegel G. W. F. The Philosophy of Right / Trans. by B. G. Stolpner and M. I. Levina. Moscow: "Mysl", 1990. 524 p. (*In Russian*).
- 68.Heisenberg W. Changing of the Structure of Thinking in the Development of Science // Heisenberg W. Selected Philosophical Works. — St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2005. Pp. 134—142. (*In Russian*).
- 69.Heisenberg W. The Picture of Nature in Modern Physics // Heisenberg W.
  Selected Philosophical Works. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2005. Pp. 221—234. (*In Russian*).
- 70.Haeckel E. The Riddle of the Universe / Trans. by S. G. Zaimovsky Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe antireligioznoe izdatel'stvo, 1925. 535 p. (*In Russian*).
- 71.Guénon R. The Crisis of the Modern World. Moscow: Eksmo, 2008. Pp. 5—140. (*In Russian*).
- 72.Goethe J. W. Selected Scientific Works. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1957. 553 p. (*In Russian*).
- 73.Guizot F. The History of Civilization in Europe. Moscow: Izdatel'skiy dom "Territoriya budushchego", 2007. 336 p. (*In Russian*).
- 74.Girenok F. I. The Philosophical Origins of Non-Human Anthropology // Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii. 2019. № 6 (1). Pp. 8—13. P. 11. (In Russian).
- 75.Hobbes T. Leviathan or The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil // Hobbes T. Works in Two Volumes. — Moscow: Mysl', 1991. — Vol. 2. (*In Russian*).
- 76.Gobel M. A Person The Movement to the Divine? // Scheler M. Philosophical Fragments from the Manuscript Heritage. — Moscow: Institut filosofii, teologii i istorii sv. Fomy, 2007. Pp. 48—67. (*In Russian*).

- 77.Gogotsky S. S. Philosophical Lexicon. 2 vol. Kyiv: Univ. tip., 1857. —
  580 p. (*In Russian*).
- 78.Gogotsky S. S. Philosophical Lexicon. 3 vol. Kyiv: Univ. tip., 1866. —
  639 p. (*In Russian*).
- 79.Gogotsky S. S. Philosophical Lexicon. 4 vol. Kyiv: Univ. tip., 1866. —
  325 p. (*In Russian*).
- 80.Gogotsky S. S. Philosophical Dictionary. St. Petersburg: Tropa Troyanova, IT "Roshcha Akademii", 2009. 297 p. (*In Russian*).
- 81.Ghodsee K. Why Women Have Better Sex Under Socialism And Other Arguments for Economic Independence. — Moscow: Al'pina non-fikshn, 2020. — 218 p. (*In Russian*).
- 82.Gomperz H. The Doctrine of Worldview. Vol.1. / Trans. by B. G. Stolpner.
  St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Shipovnik, 1912. 568 p. (*In Russian*).
- 83.Goryunov V. P., Gura V. A. Current Textbooks in Philosophy: An Attempt of Comparative Analysis // Trudy SPbGTU. 2011. №513. Pp. 48—52. (*In Russian*).
- 84.Goudimova S. A. The Myth of the "Golden Age", Isles of the Blessed, Time and Eternity // Kul'turologiya. 2018. № 3 (86). Pp. 146—157. (In Russian).
- 85.Humboldt A. von. «A Person Is the Citizen of the Universe» // Vysshee obrazovanie v Rossii. 2000. №5. P. 115—119. (*In Russian*).
- 86.Humboldt W. von. On the Difference in the Structure of Human Languages and its Influence on the Spiritual Development of Mankind // Humboldt W. von. Collected Works in Linguistics. Moscow: OAO IG "Progress", 2000. — Pp. 35—298. (*In Russian*).
- 87.Humboldt W. von. On the Comparative Study of Languages in Relation to Different Ages of Their Development // Humboldt W. von. Collected Works in Linguistics. — Moscow: OAO IG "Progress", 2000. Pp. 307—323. (In Russian).

- 88.Husserl E. Cartesian Meditations / Trans. by D. V. Sklyadnev. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2006. 315 p. (*In Russian*).
- 89.Husserl E. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology / Trans. by D. V. Sklyadnev. — St. Peterburg: Vlsdoimir Dal', Sankt-Peterburgskiy gosudarstvennyi universitet MVD Rossii, 2004. 400 p. (*In Russian*).
- 90.Husserl E. Philosophy as a Strict Science // Husserl E. Selected Works. Moscow: Izdatel'skiy dom "Territoriya budushchego", 2005. Pp. 185—240. (*In Russian*).
- 91.Dal V. I. The Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language.
  St. Petersburg, Moscow: izdanie knigoprodavtsa-tipografa M. O. Vol'fa, 1881. Vol. 2. (*In Russian*).
- 92.De Waal F. The Origins of Morality: In Search of Humanism among the Primates. Moscow: Al'pina non-fikshn, 2018. 442 p. (*In Russian*).
- 93.Deleuze G. Lectures on Leibniz. 1980, 1986/87 / Trans. by B. Skuratov. Moscow: Ad Marginem Press, 2015. — 376 p. (*In Russian*).
- 94.Deleuze G. New Archivist // Foucault M. Archaeology of Knowledge. St. Petersburg: ITs "Gumanitarnaya akademiya", 2012. 373—405 pp. (In Russian).
- 95.Deleuze G., Guattari F. What Is Philosophy? / Trans. by S. Zenkin. Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2009. 261 p. (*In Russian*).
- 96.Demin M. R. Adolf Trendelenburg: Philosophy as Theory of Science // Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. 2010. №2 (24). Pp. 195—200. (*In Russian*).
- 97.Dennett D. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life / Trans. by M. Semikolennykh. Moscow: "NLO", 1995. 468 p. (In Russian).
- 98.Derrida J. Writing and Difference / Trans. by D. Yu. Kralechkin. Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2007. — 495 p. (*In Russian*).

- 99.Derrida J. Positions / Trans. by V. V. Bibikhin. Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2007. 160 p. (*In Russian*).
- 100. Destutt de Tracy A.-L.-C. The Foundation of Ideology. Ideology in its Own Sense / Trans. by D. A. Lanin. Moscow: Akademichskiy proekt; Al'ma Mater, 2013. 333 p. (*In Russian*).
- 101. Gentile E. Fascism. History and Interpretation. St. Petersburg:
  "Vladimir Dal", 2022. 558 p. (*In Russian*).
- 102. Dilthey W. Types of Worldviews and Their Detection in Metaphysical Systems // Cultural Studies. XXth century. Anthology / ed. S. Ya. Levit. Moscow: "Tsentr gumanitarnykh initsiativ", 1995. Pp. 213—255. (*In Russian*).
- 103. Dioptra, or The Worldview Mirror. Moscow: Universitetskaya tipografiya u N. Novikova, 1781. 132 p. (*In Russian*).
- 104. Dmitrieva N. A. Neo Kantianism and Leo Tolstoy: From "the Doctrine of Science" to the Doctrine of Man // German and Russian Neo Kantianism: Amid the Theory of Knowledge and Critics of Culture. "Humanitas" Series. Moscow: Rossiiskaya politichskaya entsiklopediya (ROSSPEN), 2010. P. 379—400. (*In Russian*).
- 105. Dmitrieva N. A. Philosophy as Science and Worldview: Toward a Question of Pacifism in German and Russian Neo-Kantianism // Logos. —
  2013. № 2 (92). Pp. 138—154. (*In Russian*).
- 106. Dovlatov S. D. Affiliate // Dovlatov S. D. Selections. St. Petersburg:
  Izdatel'skiy dom "Azbuka-klassika", 2008. 704 p. (*In Russian*).
- 107. Dawkins R. The God Delusion / Trans. by N. Smelkova. St. Petersburg: Azbuka, Azbuka-Attikus, 2015. 512 p. (*In Russian*).
- 108. Dawkins R. The Selfish Gene / Trans. by N. Fomin, P. Petrov. Moscow: AST: Corpus, 2013. — 512 p. (*In Russian*).
- 109. Dugin A. The Fourth Political Theory. St. Petersburg: Amfora, 2009.
   351 p. (*In Russian*).

- 110. Dühring E. The Worth of Life / Trans. by Yu. M. Antonovsky. St. Petersburg: Russkoe bogatstvo, 1894. 222 p. (*In Russian*).
- 111. Ershova G. N. COVID-19 vaccination in Russia: Pro et Contra (based on the results of sociological surveys FOM and VCIOM 2020—2021) // V Nizhnevolzhskie chteniya. Sotsial'no-politicheskie, ekonomicheskie i demograficheskie aspekty razvitiya sovremennogo obshchestva. Materialy Mezhdunarodnoi praktichskoi konferentsii. — Volgograd, 2021. — Pp. 56— 61. (In Russian)
- 112. Zhmud L. Ya. The Origins of the History of Science in Antiquity St.
  Petersburg: Izd-vo Rus. khristian. in-ta, 2002. 422 p. (*In Russian*).
- 113. Zhmud L. Ya. Pythagoros and Early Pythagoreans. Moscow: Universitet Dmitriya Pozharskogo: Fond sodeistviya obrazovaniyu i nauke, 2012. — 445 p. (*In Russian*).
- 114. Zaitsev A. I. Greek Religion and Mythology. Lecture Course. St.
  Petersburg: Filologicheskiy fakul'tet SPbGU, 2004. 208 p. (*In Russian*)
- 115. Zaitsev A. I. The *Iliad*'s Testemony of King Erechtheus Born out of the Earth // Zaitsev A. I. Selected Articles. — St. Petersburg: Filologicheskiy fakul'tet SPbGU, 2003. — Pp. 422—431. (*In Russian*)
- 116. Zaitsev A. I. A Myth: Religion and Poetical Fiction // Zaitsev A. I.
  Selected Papers. Vol. 2. St. Petersburg: Filologicheskiy fakul'tet SPbGU, 2003. Pp. 446—461. (*In Russian*).
- Zalevsky A. V. Philosophy of Man: A Worldview Shift in Understanding of Human Nature // Vestnik Pololzhskoi akademii gosudarstvennoi sluzhby. — 2008. — №4. — Pp. 191—196. (*In Russian*).
- 118. Zaporozhchenko A. V., Lugovoi K. V. «The Basic Myth» of the Indo-Iranians: Invariants and Transformation // Aktual'nye voprosy izucheniya istorii, mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy i kul'tur stran Vostoka. Materialy meahdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi kinferentsii. — Novosibirsk, 2019. — Pp. 28—33. (*In Russian*).

- 119. Zemskaya E. A. From the history of Russian literary vocabulary of the XIX century (to the study of the scientific heritage of Y. K. Grot) // Materials and Studies on the History of the Russian Literary Language. Vol. IV. — Moscow, 1957. (*In Russian*).
- 120. Zenkovsky V. V. The History of Russian Philosophy. Leningrad: "Ego", 1991. — In 2 vols., 4 parts. (*In Russian*).
- 121. Sombart W. Bourgeois. Essays on the History of Spiritual Development of Modern Man // Sombart W. Bourgeois. Jews and Economic Life. — Moscow: Airis-press, 2004. Pp. 5—410. (*In Russian*).
- 122. Zotov A. F., Melvil Yu. K. Bourgeois philosophy of the mid-Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries. Moscow, 1988. [Electronic resourse] URL: http://sbiblio.com/BIBLIO/archive/sotov\_burjuasnaja/09.aspx (access date: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).
- Ivanenko A. A., Muravyov A. N., Kryukova K. V. J. G. Fichte's Philosophy of History in the Mirror of Contemporaneity // Vestnik of St. Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2018. Vol. 34. № 2. Pp. 186—200. (*In Russian*).
- 124. Ivanov V. V., Toporov V. N. The Studies in the Field of Slavic Antiquities: Lexical and Phraseological Issues of the Reconstruction of the Texts. — Moscow: Nauka, 1974. — 342 p. (*In Russian*).
- 125. Ivanov V. I. The Native and the Universal. Moscow: Respublika, 1994. 428 p. (*In Russian*).
- Ivleva M. I. Formation of the Spiritualist Philosophical System in the Works of G. Teichmüller // Pravo i praktika. 2019. № 1. Pp. 325—328. (*In Russian*)
- 127. Ilyenkov E. V. The Dialectics of Abstract and Concrete // Ilyenkov E.
  V. Philosophy and Culture. Moscow: Politizdat, 1991. Pp. 276—293. (*In Russian*).

- 128. Ilyenkov E. V. The Logical and the Historical // The Issues of Dialectical Materialism. The Elements of Dialectics. Moscow, 1960. Pp. 310—343. (*In Russian*).
- 129. Ilyenkov E. V. The Logical and the Historical // Ilyenkov E. V. Philosophy and Culture. Moscow: Politizdat, 1991. Pp. 294—308. (In Russian).
- 130. Inglehart R. Cultural Evolution: People's Motivations are Changing, and Reshaping the World. Moscow: Mysl', 2018. 347 p. (*In Russian*).
- 131. Ionin L. G. Minority Society: Political Correctness in the Contemporary World. Moscow: Izdat. dom Gos. un-ta Vyssh. sh. ekonomiki, 2010. 43 p. (*In Russian*).
- 132. Isikhak F. A., Hamad M. A., Mustafa N. G. COVID-19: A Renewed Outook // Infektsiya i immunitet. 2020. Vol. 10. № 2. Pp. 247—258. (*In Russian*).
- 133. Itten J. The Art of Color / Trans. by L. Monakhovoi. Moscow:
  Izdatel' Dmitriy Aronov, 2015. 96 p. (*In Russian*).
- 134. Kanaev I. I. Goethe as a Scientist // Goethe J. W. Selected Scientific Works. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1957. Pp. 418—463. (*In Russian*).
- 135. Kant I. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View // Kant I. Works.
  In 8 Vols. Moscow: Choro, 1994. Vol. 7, pp. 137—376. (*In Russian*).
- 136. Kant I. The Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View // Kant I. Works. In 8 vols. Moscow: Choro, 1994. Vol. 8, pp. 12—28. (*In Russian*).
- 137. Kant I. Logic // Kant I, Works. In 8 Vols. Moscow: Choro, 1994. Vol. 8, pp. 266—462. (*In Russian*).
- Kant I. The Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? // Kant I.
  Woks. In 8 Vols. Vol.8. Moscow: Choro, 1994. Vol. 8, pp. 29—37. (*In Russian*).

- 139. Kant I. Collected Works in 8 Volumes. Vol. 3. The Critique of Pure Reason. Moscow: Choro, 1994. 741 p. (*In Russian*).
- 140. Kant I. Collected Works in 8 Vols. Vol.5. Critique of Judgement. Moscow: Choro, 1994. 414 p. (*In Russian*).
- 141. Kareev N. V. Conversations on the Development of a Worldview. St.
  Petersburg: tipografiya M. M. Stasyulevicha, 1896. 167 p. (*In Russian*).
- 142. Carlyle T. Heroes, Hero-Worship and Heroic in History // Carlyle T. The Past and The Present. Moscow: Respublika, 1994. P. 5—198. (*In Russian*).
- 143. Carlyle T. Heroes, Hero-Worship and Heroic in History // Carlyle T.
  The Past and The Present. Moscow: Respublika, 1994. P. 199—294.
  (*In Russian*).
- 144. Karmin A. S., Bernatsky G. G. Philosophy. St. Petersburg: Piter, 2009. 560 p. (*In Russian*).
- 145. Kimelev Yu. A. Western Philosophical Anthropology at the Edge of XX—XXI Centuries. A Review. Moscow, 2007. 76 p. (*In Russian*).
- 146. Kissinger H. Diplomacy. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo AST, 2018. 896p. (*In Russian*).
- 147. Klein L. S. The History of Anthropological Doctrines. St. Petersburg: Izd-vo S.-Peterb. un-ta, 2014. 744 p. (*In Russian*).
- 148. Klemperer V. LTI. The Language of the Third Reich. A Philologist's Notebook. Moscow: Progress-Traditsiya, 1998. 384 p. (*In Russian*).
- 149. Kozlov A. A. Gustav Teichmüller (End) // Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii. 1894. Book 24. Pp. 661—681. (*In Russian*).
- 150. Kolesnikov A. S. The History of Current Philosophy // Vestnik rossiiskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seria: Filosofiya. 2015. № 3. Pp. 77–93. (*In Russian*).
- 151. Kolesnikov A. S. Michel Foucault and His "Archaeology of Knowledge" // Foucault M. Archaeology of Knowledge. — St. Petersburg: ITs "Gumanitarnaya akademiya", 2012. — Pp. 5—30. (*In Russian*).

- 152. Kolesov V. V. Our Proud Language... St. Petersburg: "Avalon",
  "Azbuka-klassika", 2006. 352 p. (*In Russian*).
- 153. Collingwood R. G. The Idea of History // Collingwood R. G. The Idea of History. Autobiography. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1980. Pp. 5—320. (*In Russian*).
- 154. Kon I. S. Philosophical Idealism and the Crisis of Bourgeois Historical Thought. — Moscow: Izdatel'stvo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1959. — 403 p. (*In Russian*).
- 155. Konashev M. B. Evolutionary theory and cultural-ideological state of Russian society of the second half of the XIX—beginning of the XXI century.
  [Electronic resource]. URL: <a href="https://www.civisbook.ru/files/File/Konashev.pdf">https://www.civisbook.ru/files/File/Konashev.pdf</a> (assecced: 05.05.2023). P. 134—139. (*In Russian*).
- 156. Condillac E. B. On the Art of Reasoning // Condillac E. B. Works: in 3 vols. Moscow: Mysl', 1982. 3 vol., pp. 6 ff. (*In Russian*).
- 157. Condillac E. B. Treatise on Systems // Condillac E. B. Works: in 3 vols.
   Moscow: Mysl', 1982. 2 vol., pp. 5—188. (*In Russian*).
- 158. Comte A. The Spirit of Positive Philosophy: A Discourse of Positive Thinking / Trans. by I. A. Shapiro. Moscow: Izdatel'skiy dom "Librokom", 2012. 80 p. (*In Russian*).
- 159. Comte A. General View of Positivism / Trans. by I. A. Shapiro. —
  Moscow: Izdatel'skiy dom "Librokom", 2012. 296 p. (*In Russian*).
- 160. Kosilova E. V. The Ontology of Musical Meaning // Voprosy filosofii.
  2023. No 1. Pp. 52—62. (*In Russian*).
- 161. Kos'kov S. N., Seregina T. V. Principles of Worldview Principles of Being //Vestnik Tverskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta. Seria: Filosofiya.
   2019. № 1 (47). Pp. 57—69. (In Russian).
- 162. Kravchik E. V. The Influence of Pandemic on the Preservation of Culture // Society and Security Insights. 2020. Vol. 3. № 2. Pp. 150—157. (*In Russian*).

- 163. Krotov A. A. Auguste Comte and the Genesis of the Positivist Conception of the Historical and Philosophical Process // Filosofskie nauki.
   2016. №9. Pp. 7—20. (*In Russian*).
- 164. Krotov A. A. Positivism and Comparative Philosophy // Vestnik VGU.
  2006. №2. Pp. 38—46. (*In Russian*).
- 165. Quine W. V. O. Word and Object. Moscow: Logos, Praksis, 2000. —
  386 p. (*In Russian*).
- 166. Kuhn T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Moscow: OOO "Izdatel'stvo AST", 2003. 605 p. (*In Russian*).
- 167. Lovejoy A. O. The Great Chain of Being: The History of Ideas / Trans.
  by V. Sofronova-Antomoni, Moscow: Dom intellektual'noi knigi, 2001. —
  372 p. (*In Russian*).
- 168. Lanin D. A. Translator's Foreword // Destutt de Tracy A.-L.-C. The Foundation of Ideology. Ideology in its Own Sense. — Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt; Alma Mater, 2013. — Pp. 5—20. (*In Russian*).
- 169. Latour B. We Have Never Been Modern / Trans. by D. Ya. Kalugin. —
  St. Petersburg: Izd-vo Evrop. un-ta v S.-Peterburge, 2006. 240 p. (*In Russian*).
- 170. Lévi-Strauss C. Scientific Thinking and Mythological Thinking // Lévi-Strauss C. We Are All Cannibals. Moscow: Tekst, 2019. Pp. 140—150. (*In Russian*).
- 171. Lévi-Strauss C. The Savage Mind // Lévi-Strauss C. The Savage Mind.
   Moscow: TERRA-Knizhnyi klub; Respublika, 1999. Pp. 111—336. (*In Russian*).
- 172. Lévi-Strauss C. Structural Anthropology. Moscow: AST: Astrel,
  2011. 541 p. (*In Russian*).
- 173. Levitin D. This Is Your Brain on Music. The Science of a Human Obsession / Trans. by A. Popova. Moscow: Alpina non-fikshn, 2023. 433 p. (*In Russian*).

- 174. Leibniz G. W. Collected Works in 4 vols. Moscow: "Mysl", 1984.
   Vol. 3. (*In Russian*).
- 175. Leontiev D. A. Worldview // Sibirskiy psikhologicheskiy zhurnal. —
  2003. № 18. P. 152. (*In Russian*).
- 176. Leontiev D. A., Mospan A. N. World picture, Worldview and Definition of Indeterminate // Mir psikhologii. 2017. № 2 (90). Pp. 12—19. (*In Russian*).
- 177. Leontiev D. A. Tarvid E. V. Selection of proverbs as a worldview projection // Izvestiya TRTU. 2005. № 7 (51). Pp. 70—72. (In Russian).
- 178. Lyotard J.-F. The Condition of Postmodern. St. Petersburg: Institut eksperimentalnoi sotsiologii; Aleteiya, 1998. 160 p. (*In Russian*).
- 179. Lobanova L. P. Grammatical Picture of Language, Thinking and Spiritual Development of the People in the Conception of W. von Humboldt // Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seria 9: Filologiya. 2014. № 4. Pp. 75—89. (*In Russian*).
- 180. Lobanova L. P. Ethical Foundations of the World Picture in the Philosophical Conception of J. G. Fichte // Biznes. Obshchestvo. Vlast'. 2013. № 16. Pp. 2—10. (*In Russian*).
- 181. Losev A. F. The Dialectics of Myth // Losev A. F. Philosophy. Mythology. Culture. — Moscow: Politizdat, 1991. — Pp. 21—186. (In Russian).
- 182. Lotman Yu. M. Semiosphere. St. Petersburg: "Iskusstvo—SPb", 2000. 704 p. (*In Russian*).
- 183. Lund T. F. Heaven and Worldview in the Circle of Times. Odessa: Mathesis, 1912. — 233 p. (*In Russian*).
- 184. Lvov A. A. Aesthetic politics as an Alternative and Requiem for a Political Aestheticism (Franklin Ankersmit. Aesthetic Politics) // Logos. 2016. Vol. 26 №1 (110). 142—148. (*In Russian*).

- 185. Lvov A. A. Dehumanization of History as an Antitheological Project.
  // Vestnik Omskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta.
  Gumanitarnye issledovaniya. 2022. № 3 (36). Pp. 25—29. (*In Russian*).
- 186. Lvov A. A. Science-Art: Modern Technologies in the Context of Contemporary Aesthetics // Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. — Seria 17. — Filosofiya. Konfliktologiya. Kul'turologiya. Religiovedenie. — 2015. — № 3. — Pp. 59—67. (In Russian).
- 187. Lvov A. A. Social-Political and Critical Aspect in Contemporary History of Philosophy // Uchenye zapiski Krymskogo federal'nogo universiteta imeni V.I. Vernadskogo. Filosofiya. Politologiya. Kul'turologiya. —2019. — Vol. 5 (71). — №4. — Pp. 51—62. (In Russian).
- 188. Lvov A. A. The Conflict Circumstances of Historicism: From
  Teleology of History to Theology of the Current Man // Konfliktologiya. —
  2022. T. 17. №4. C. 115—130. (*In Russian*).
- 189. Lvov A. A. The Current Conceptions of the Worldview Phenomenon // Vestnik Russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii. 2020. Vol. 21. № 2. Pp. 11—23. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. The Projects of Doctrine of Worldview In the Light of Lingua-Cultural Analysis // Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Filosofiya i konfliktologiya. 2023. Vol. 39. №2. Pp. 261—273. (*In Russian*).
- 191. Lvov A. A. Age of COVID-19 in the Light of Ideology and Scientific World Picture // Philosophy of Science: History and Modernity. A Monograph / eds. I. D. Osipov, S. N. Pogodin. St. Petersburg: POLITEKh-PRESS, 2020. P. 329—355. (*In Russian*).
- 192. Lvov A. A. Anthropological Character of Historical-Philosophical Analytics of Worldview // Lichnost'. Kul'tura. Obshchestvo. 2021. Vol. 23. № 4 (112). Pp. 106—115. (*In Russian*).

- 193. Lvov A. A. Existential-Phenomenological Foundations of Psychology and Psychiatry // Izvestiya Tul'skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye nauki. 2019. № 3. Pp. 99—106. (*In Russian*).
- 194. Lvov A. A. From Humanism to Polytechnicism: The Tokens of the Age
  // Paradigma: filosofsko-kul'turologicheskiy al'manakh. 2020. № 32.
   Pp. 64—79. (*In Russian*).
- Lvov A. A. Historians of Philosophy in the Situation of Hypertext // Vestnik Severnogo (Arkticheskogo) federal'nogo universiteta. Seria: Gumanitarnye i sotsial'nye nauki. 2021. Vol. 21. № 2. Pp. 99—109. (*In Russian*).
- 196. Lvov A. A. History of Philosophy as practices of Memory // Izvestiya Tul'skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye nauki. 2021. № 2. Pp. 155—164. Pp. 157—159. (*In Russian*).
- 197. Lvov A. A. How Historians of Philosophy Substantiate Their Discipline: The Status of History of Philosophy and Historical and Philosophical Research // Uchenye zapiski Krymskogo federal'nogo universiteta imeni V.I. Vernadskogo. Filosofiya. Politologiya. Kul'turologiya. —2017. Vol. 3 (69). №4. Pp. 84—94. (In Russian).
- 198. Lvov A. A. Methodological Search in the Contemporary History of Philosophy // Diskurs. 2017. № 5. Pp. 10—16. (*In Russian*).
- 199. Lvov A. A. Positivist with a Romantic Soul: Overcoming the Conflict of Worldviews in the Anthropology of I. I. Mechnikov // Konfliktologiya. —
  2019. Vol. 14. № 2. Pp. 96—114. (*In Russian*).
- 200. Lvov A. A. The Competence of Worldview in the Sphere of Education
  // Filosofiya obrazovaniya. Istoriya i sovremennost': Kollektivnaya monografiya. I. D. Osipov, S. N. Pogodin (eds.). St. Petersburg: POLITIEKh-PRESS, 2019. Pp. 46—66. (*In Russian*).
- 201. Lvov A. A. The Figure of Author in English Aestheticism // Vestnik Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. A. S. Pushkina. 2012. Vol. 2. № 3. Pp. 81—89. (*In Russian*).

- 202. Lvov A. A. The Ideal of Philosophy as a Strict Science in the Discussion of Historians of Philosophy // Vestnik russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii. 2021. Vol. 22. № 4-1. Pp. 11—23. (In Russian).
- 203. Lvov A. A. The Place of the Doctrine of Worldview in Max Scheler's Philosophical Anthropology // Lichnost'. Kul'tura. Obshchestvo. 2020. Vol. 22. № 3-4 (107-108). Pp. 127—138. (*In Russian*).
- 204. Lvov A. A. The Positive Foundations of the Axiological Aspect of Historical-Philosophical Research // Filosofskie nauki. 2019. Vol. 62. № 10. Pp. 55—67. (*In Russian*).
- 205. Lvov A. A. The Possibility of Cross-Cultural Understanding in the History of Philosophy: The Topical Positions // Vestnik rossiyskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seria: Filosofiya. 2018. Vol. 22. № 3. Pp. 365—376. (In Russian).
- 206. Lvov A. A. The Problematization of the Project of "Perennial Philosophy" By the Means of Lingua-Cultural Analysis // Vestnik Omskogo gosudarstvennogo pedagogicheskogo universiteta. Gumanitarnye issledovaniya. — 2023. — № 1 (38). — Pp. 22—27. (In Russian).
- 207. Lvov A. A. The Specificity of Historical-Philosophical Research in the Humanities // Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta. Filosofiya i Konfliktologiya. — 2021. — Vol. 37. — № 3. — Pp. 449—463. (In Russian).
- 208. Lvov A. A., Kryukova K. V. H. Gomperz's "The Doctrine of Worldview" as a Result of the philosophy of Empiriocriticism // Vestnik Voronezhskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seria: Filosofiya. 2021. № 3 (41). Pp. 37—46. (*In Russian*).
- 209. Lvov A. A., Kryukova K. V. Self-Identification in Conflict or the Dialogue of Cultures? An Anthropological Analysis of the Strategy of "Special Path" // Konfliktologiya. 2020. Vol. 15. №2. Pp. 38—53. (*In Russian*).

- 210. Lvov A. A., Osipov I. D. Metaphysics of the Heart as a Worldview Subject in Russian Philosophy // Voprosy Filosofii. 2023. Vol. 11. Pp. 104—113. (*In Russian*).
- 211. Lyubutin K. N., Koryakovtsev A. A. K. Marx's Manuscripts // Marx K. Economical-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and Other Early Philosophical Writings. Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2010. P. 742—773. (*In Russian*).
- 212. Lyarsky A. B. School Lexicon at the turn of the XIX–XX centuries: world-view // Pechat' i slovo Sankt-Peterburga. Peterburgskie Chteniya — 2015 XVII Vserossiyskaya nauchnaya konferentsiya: sbornik nauchnykh trudov. Ministerstvo obrazovaniya i nauki RF; Sankt-Peterburgskiy gosudarstvennyi universitet promyshlennykh tekhnologiy i dizaina; Vysshaya shkola pechati i mediatekhnologiy. — 2016. — Pp. 86—91. — URL: <u>https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=26481308</u> (accessed: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).
- 213. Machiavelli N. The Prince. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "E", 2017. 512
  p. (*In Russian*).
- 214. Maksimov A. S. Haeckel and His *The Riddle of the Universe* // Haeckel
  E. The Riddle of the Universe / Trans. by S. G. Zaimovsky. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe antireligioznoe izdatel'stvo, 1925. Pp. 7—58. (*In Russian*).
- 215. Mamardashvili M. K. A Sketch of Modern European Philosophy. St.
   Petersburg: Azbuka, Azbuka-Attikus, 2014. 608 p. (*In Russian*).
- 216. Markov B. V. People and Signs. Anthropology of Interpersonal Communication. St. Petersburg: "Nauka", 2011. 667 p. (*In Russian*).
- 217. Markov B. V. Philosophy. St. Petersburg: Piter, 2014. 432 p. (In Russian).
- 218. Marx K. Economical-Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and Other Early Philosophical Writings. Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2010. 775 p. (*In Russian*).

- 219. Marcuse H. One-Dimension Man / Trans. by A. A. Yudin. Moscow:
  AST: AST MOSKVA, 2009. 331 p. (*In Russian*).
- 220. Mayatsky M. Ad hominem and Back Again. Moscow: Izd. dom vysshei shkoly ekonomiki, 2020. 264 p. (*In Russian*).
- 221. Medvedev I. P. Byzantine Humanism of XIV—XV cent. Leningrad:
  "Nauka", 1976. 254 p. (*In Russian*).
- 222. Merleau-Ponty M. The Phenomenology of Perception. St. Petersburg: "Yuventa", 1999. 606 p. (*In Russian*).
- 223. Mesoudi A. Cultural Evolution. How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences / Trans. by O. Sobshuk,
  A. Sheli. — Moscow: Izdatel'skiy dom "Delo" RANKhiGS, 2019. — 384 p. (*In Russian*).
- 224. Mironov V. V. Philosophy. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Prospekt", 2010.
   672 p. (*In Russian*).
- 225. Morais A. J., Morais S. Yu., Tarasova I. V. Portuguese Structural System Pombalino, or Learning From Ruins // Arkhitekton: izvestiya vuzov. 2018. № 3 (63). Pp. 1—18. (*In Russian*).
- At the Turning Point: Philosophical Discussions of the 20s: Philosophy and Worldview. Moscow: Politizdat, 1990. 528 p. (*In Russian*).
- 227. Naumova E. I. Cultural-Philosophical Justification of the Development of the Concept of "Capitalism" // Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seria 7: Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya i sotsial'nye tekhnologii. 2014. № 5 (25). Pp. 29—33. (In Russian).
- 228. National Corpus of the Russian language [Electronic resource]. —URL:

http://processing.ruscorpora.ru/search.xml?sort=i\_grtagging&lang=ru&start year=1860&text=lexform&req=мировоззрение&api=1.0&mode=main&en v=alpha&endyear=1880&nodia=1&p=88 (accessed: 05.05.2023). (In Russian).

- 229. Nekrasova N. A., Nekrasov S. I. Worldview as a Subject-Matter of Philosophical Reflection // Sovremennye neukoemkie tekhnologii. 2005. №6. Pp. 20—23. (*In Russian*).
- 230. Nikonenko S. V. Analytical Philosophy: The Basic Conceptions. St. Petersburg: Izd-vo S. Peterb. un-ta, 2007. 546 p. (*In Russian*).
- 231. Nikonov A. A. «An Awful Shake» of Europe. Lisbon Earthquakes of Nov 1<sup>st</sup>, 1755 // Priroda. 2005. № 11 (1083). Pp. 21—29. [Electronic resource]. URL: <a href="http://vivovoco.astronet.ru/VV/JOURNAL/NATURE/11\_05/LISB.HTM">http://vivovoco.astronet.ru/VV/JOURNAL/NATURE/11\_05/LISB.HTM</a>

(accessed: 05.05.2023). (In Russian).

- 232. New Philosophical Encyclopedia. [Electronic resourse] URL: <u>https://iphlib.ru/library/collection/newphilenc/document/HASH010896462d</u> <u>320b6dff553108?p.s=TextQuery</u> (Access date: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).
- 233. Oizerman T. I. The Problems of Historical-Philosophical Science. Moscow: Mysl', 1982. — 301 p. (*In Russian*).
- 234. Onians R. On Gods' Knees. Moscow: "Progress-Traditsiya", 1999.
   592 p. (*In Russian*).
- 235. Ortega y Gasset J. Invertebrate Spain // Ortega y Gasset J. The Revolt of the Masses. Moscow: OOO "Izdatel'stvo AST", 2002. Pp. 269—370. (*In Russian*).
- 236. Ortega y Gasset J. The Mission of University / Trans. by M. G.
  Golubeva. Minsk: BGU, 2005. 104 p. (*In Russian*).
- 237. The Foundations of Marxism-Leninism. A Textbook. Moscow: Gosudartvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1960. 774 p. (*In Russian*).
- 238. Pastoureau M. Yellow. A History of a Color / Trans. by N. Kulish. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2022. — 160 p. (*In Russian*).
- 239. Pastoureau M. Red. A History of a Color / Trans. by N. Kulish. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2019. 160 p. (*In Russian*).

- 240. Pastoureau M. Black. A History of a Color / Trans. by N. Kulish. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2019. — 168 p. (*In Russian*).
- 241. Perov Yu. V. Lectures on the History of German Classical Philosophy.
   St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2010. 530 p. (*In Russian*).
- 242. Perov Yu. V. Hegel's Philosophical Aesthetics // Hegel G. W. F. Lectures on Aesthetics. In 2 vols. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2007. Vol. 1, Pp. 5—78. (*In Russian*).
- 243. Pisarev D. I. Historical Sketches. Selected Articles. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", 1989. 608 p. (*In Russian*).
- 244. Planck M. New Ways in Physical Studies // Pod znamenem marksizma.
   1923. №1. Pp. 72—82. (*In Russian*).
- 245. Plato. Republic // Plato. Dialogues. Book Two. Moscow: Eksmo, 2008. Pp. 89—454. (*In Russian*).
- 246. Plato. Dialogues. Book Two. Moscow: Eksmo, 2008. 1360 p. (*In Russian*).
- 247. Plato. Timaeus // Plato. Dialogues. Book Two. Moscow: Eksmo, 2008. Pp. 455—541. (*In Russian*).
- 248. Plenkov O. Yu. State and Society in the Third Reich. The National-Socialist Project. — St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2017. — 783 p. (In Russian).
- Plotnikov N. S. Life and History. Wilhelm's Dilthey's Philosophical Program. Moscow: Dom intellectual'noi knigi, 2000. 232 p. (*In Russian*).
- 250. Podshibyakina T. A. Ideological Aspects of Worldviews: Research Methodology in Political Science // Zhurnal politicheskikh issledovanii. —
  2023. Vol 7. № 1. Pp. 38—49. (In Russian).
- 251. Polatayko S. V., Lvov A. A. Philosophy and "Naturalistic Approach" in Science // Aktual'nye problem gumanitarnykh i sotsial'no-ekonomicheskikh nauk. — 2018. — Vol. 12. — № 4. — Pp. 86—89. (*In Russian*).

- 252. Polatayko S. V., Lvov A. A. The Existential and Heroic as the Subject of Philosophical reflection. Pondering Mikhail Pronin's "The Existence. The Forgotten Chernobyl" // Voprosy filosofii. 2017. № 5. Pp. 45—54. (*In Russian*).
- 253. Pohlenz M. Stoa. A History of the Spiritual Movement. St. Petersburg: Izdatel'skiy proekt "Quadrivium", 2015. 1040 p. (*In Russian*).
- 254. Попов В. Ю., Попова О. В. Weltkriegsphilosophie і філософська антропологія Макса Шелера // Антропологічні виміри філософських досліджень. — 2018. — Вип. 13. — С. 142—155.
- 255. Popov N. P. Collective Immunity and Antivaxxers in the USA and Russia // Rossiya i Amerika v XXI veke. 2021. № 3. [Electronic resource] URL: <u>https://rusus.jes.su/s207054760017039-9-1/</u> (accessed: 05.05.2023). (*In Russian*).
- 256. Porges K., Stewart I., Hossfeld U., Levit G. S. From Idea to Law: Theory, Concept and Terminological Formation in Ernst Haeckel's Works // Ontogenez. — 2019. — Vol. 50. — № 6. — Pp. 368—382. (*In Russian*).
- 257. Prokopchuk Yu. V. Religious-Philosophical Synthesis of L. N. Tolstoy and A. Huxley // Vestnik Provoslavnogo Svyato-Tikhonovskogo gumanitarnogo universiteta. Seria 1: Bogoslovie. Filosofiya. Religiovedenie. 2019. № 83. Pp. 47—64. (*In Russian*).
- 258. Raikov B. E. Carl Baer, His Life and Work. Moscow, Leningrad: Akademiya nauk SSSR, 1961. 524 p. (*In Russian*).
- 259. Revzin G. I. How the City Works: 36 Essays on the Philosophy of Urbanism. Moscow: Strelka Press, 2019. 270 p. (*In Russian*).
- 260. Riehl A. An Introduction to Modern Philosophy. St. Petersburg: Tovarishchestvo "Obshchestvennaya pol'za", 1904. — 196 p. (*In Russian*).
- 261. Riehl A. Scientific and Non-Scientific Philosophy. St. Petersburg: izdanie P. P. Soikina, 1901. 24 p. (*In Russian*).

- 262. Riehl A. Theory of Science and Metaphysics from the Perspective of Philosophical Criticism / Trans. by E. Korsh. Moscow: K. T. Soldatenkov, 1887. VIII+426 p. (*In Russian*).
- 263. Rozanov V. V. The Fallen Leaves // Rozanov V. V. Works in 2 vols.
   Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", 1990. 2 vol., pp. 275—629. (In Russian).
- 264. Ryakov E. E. Problems of Formation of Humanistic Worldview of Students in Contemporary School // Obrazovanie v XXI veke. Materialy nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii. Mezhdunarodnyi institute professional'nogo razvitiya pedagoga; Irkutskiy gosudarstvennyi universitet; O. M. Kolomiets, M. G. Golubchikova, I. I. Kapalygina, R. K. Kyyakbaeva (eds.). — 2019. — Pp. 617—620. (*In Russian*).
- 265. Symons J. Carlyle. Moscow: Molodaya Gvardiya, 1981. 288 p. (*In Russian*).
- 266. Sampiev I. M. The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination and the Construction of the "Russian nation"// Sovremennaya Nauka i Innovatsiya.
  2017. № 4 (20). Pp. 248—253. (*In Russian*).
- 267. Safranski R. Goethe: A Life as a Work of Art. Moscow: Izdatel'skiy dom "Delo" RANKhiGS, 2018. 704 p. (*In Russian*)
- 268. Safranski R. Heidegger: German Master and His Time / Trans. by T. A.
  Baskakova featured by V. A. Brun-Tsekhovskiy. Moscow: Molodaya gvardiya, 2005. 612 p. (*In Russian*).
- 269. Sextus Empiricus. Collected Works in Two Volumes. Moscow:
  "Mysl", 1976. Vol. 2. (*In Russian*)
- 270. Seneca Lucius Annaeus. Moral Epistles to Lucilius. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1977. 383 p. (*In Russian*).
- 271. Sergeev K. A., Perov Yu. V. Hegel's History of Philosophy in the Context of Modern Metaphysics // Hegel G. W. F. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Book 1. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2006. Pp. 5—61. (*In Russian*).

- 272. Sergeev K. A. The Renaissance Foundations of Anthropocentrism. —
  St. Petersburg: "Nauka", 2007. 591 p. (*In Russian*).
- 273. Serov N. V. The Color of Culture: Psychology, Cultural Study, Physiology. — St. Petersburg: Rech, 2004. — 644 p. (*In Russian*).
- 274. Dictionary of the Russian Academy, Arranged in Alphabetical Order.
  Part 3 (K—H). St. Petersburg: Tipografiya pri Imperatorskoy Akademii nauk, 1814. 1444 p. (*In Russian*).
- 275. The Dictionary of Scholars and Scholarship in Ancient Rus. Issue 2 (2<sup>nd</sup> half of XIV—XVI cent.). Part 1. Vol. A—K. Leningrad: "Nauka", 1988. 493 p. (*In Russian*).
- 276. The Dictionary of the Russian Language XI—XVII cent. Issue 9 (M).
   Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1982. 357 p. (*In Russian*).
- 277. The Dictionary of the Russian Language XVIII cent. Issue 12 (Льстец Молвотворство). St. Petersburg: "Nauka", 2001. 252 р. (*In Russian*).
- 278. Smirnov A. V. «Big Culture» and cogito // Pragmatics of Philosophical Text: Proceedings of the All-Russian Scientific Conference XV Tauride Philosophical Readings "Anakharsis" (Crimea, Sudak, Novy Svet, Sept 16— 19 2019) / eds. O. V. Zarapin, L. T. Ryskel'dieva, O. A. Shapiro, E. G. Shkoubskaya, A. D. Shorkin. — Simferopol, 2019. — Pp. 7—8. (*In Russian*).
- 279. Smirnov A. V. The Logic of Meaning: A Theory and Its Application to the Analysis of Classical Arab Philosophy and Culture. — Moscow: Yazyki slavyanskoi kul'tury: Koshelev, 2001. — 503 p. (*In Russian*).
- 280. Smirnov A. V. The Limits of Philosophy // Voprosy filosofii. 2023.
   № 1. Pp. 15—28. (*In Russian*).
- 281. Saussure F. de. The Course of General Linguistics // Saussure F. de. Works on Linguistics. — Moscow: "Progress", 1977. — Pp. 31—285. (In Russian).
- 282. Spasennikov B. A. COVID-19: The Lesson of Vaccination // Byulleten' Natsional'nogo nauchno-issledovatel'skogo instituta obshchestvennogo

zdorovya imeni N. A. Semashko. — 2021. — № 3. — Pp. 116—125. (*In Russian*).

- 283. Spirkin A. G. Philosophy: A Textbook for Bachelors. Moscow: ID Yurait, 2012. 828 p. (*In Russian*).
- 284. Sreznevsky I. I. Materials for the Dictionary of the Old Russian Language on Written Monuments. — St. Petersburg: Tipografiya Imperatorasoi Akademii Nauk, 1902. — Vol. 2 (Л-П). (*In Russian*).
- 285. Stevenson L. Ten Theories of Human Nature / Trans. by V. V. Vasilyev.
   Moscow: Slovo/Slovo, 2004. 230 p. (*In Russian*).
- 286. Stepanov Yu. S. The Constants. The Dictionary of Russian Culture. Moscow: Shkola "Yazyki russkoi kul'tury", 1997. — 824 p. (*In Russian*).
- 287. Stepanov Yu. S., Proscurin S. G. The Constants of the World Culture.
  Alphabets and Alphabetic Texts in the Age of Bigotry. Moscow: Nauka, 1993. 158 p. (*In Russian*).
- 288. Steppun F. A. A Mystical Worldview. Five Images of Russian Symbolism. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2012. 479 p. (*In Russian*).
- 289. Tantlevsky I. R., Evlampiev I. I. The Living Person vs. the Laws of the Cosmos: Hebrew and Ancient Greek Components of the European Worldview // Schole. 2021. Vol. 15. №1. P. 86—107. (In Russian).
- 290. Tarasova E. A. The Phenomenon of "Power" in the Culture of Ancient China // Uchenye zapiski Komsomol'skogo-na-Amure gosudarstvennogo tekhnicheskogo universiteta. 2010. Vol. 2. № 4. Pp. 106—110. (*In Russian*).
- 291. Trubetskoy S. N. Works. Moscow: "Mysl", 1994. 816 p. (*In Russian*).
- 292. Trunov A. A. The Great French Revolution and the Genesis of Classical Modern Ideologies // Nauchnye vedomosti Belgorodskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seria: Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Pravo. 2017. № 17 (266). Pp. 78—89. (*In Russian*).

- 293. Uzlaner D. A. The End of Religion? A History of the Theory of Secularization. Moscow: Izd. dom Vysshei shkoly ekonomiki, 2019. 240 p. (*In Russian*).
- 294. Falaleeva I. N. Cultural and Legal Subjectivity of Ethnos: Historical and Theoretical Correlations of Concepts in the XIX Century.// Lex russica (Russiy zakon). 2014. Vol. 96. № 9. Pp. 1031—1042. (In Russian).
- 295. Farrington B. Head and Hand in Ancient Greece. Four Studies in the Social Relations of Thought. — St. Petersburg: ANO: "Izd-vo S.-Peterb. unta", 2008. — 172 p. (*In Russian*).
- 296. Vassmer M. The Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language: in
  4 Vols / Trans. by O. N. Trubachov. St. Petersburg: Terra-Azbuka, 1996.
   Vol. 3. (*In Russian*).
- 297. Vassmer M. The Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language: in
  4 Vols / Trans. by O. N. Trubachov. St. Petersburg: Terra-Azbuka, 1996.
   Vol. 3. (*In Russian*).
- 298. Febvre L. Civilization: the Evolution of a Word and a Group of Ideas // Febvre L. Struggles for History. — Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1991. — Pp. 239—281. (*In Russian*).
- 299. Filippov A. F. Hannah Arendt and Carl Schmitt: Two Concepts of the Political // Sovremennoe znachenie idey Hanny Arendt. Materialy mezhdunarodnoi konferentsii. Editorial board: A. N. Salikov, I. O. Dementev, V. A. Chalyi. — Moscow, 2015. — Pp. 52—65. (*In Russian*).
- 300. Philosophical Dictionary (Shortened translation from German Philosophisches Woerternuch, begruendet von Heiinrich Schmidt, Alfred Kroeners Verlag, Stuttgart, 1957) / ed. M.M. Rozental. — Moscow: Izd-vo inosrannoy literatury, 1961. 590 p. (*In Russian*).
- 301. Philosophical Encyclopaedical Dictionary / ed. L. F. Il'ichev et al. —
   Moscow: Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1983. 839 p. (*In Russian*).

- 302. Philosophical Encyclopaedical Dictionary / ed. E. F. Gubsky et al. —
   Moscow: INFRA-M, 2003. 576 p. (*In Russian*)
- 303. Fichte J. G. A Letter to Jacobi // Voprosy filosofii. 1996. №3. —
  P. 114. (*In Russian*).
- 304. Fichte J. G. Works. St. Petersburg: Nauka, 2008. 752 p. (In Russian)
- 305. Ficino M. Plato's Theology on the Immortality of the Soul in XVIII
  Book. St. Petersburg: Vladimir Dal, 2020. 832 p. (*In Russian*).
- 306. Flekenshtein K. Calques on the German model in the modern Russian literary language: Author's abstract of the dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Philological Sciences / Lomonosov Moscow State University, Order of Lenin and Order of the Red Banner of Labor. M.V. Lomonosov. Philol. fac. — Moscow, 1963. — 22 p. (*In Russian*).
- Florovsky G. V. The Ways of Russian Theology. Paris: YMCA-Press, 1988. 599 p. (*In Russian*).
- 308. The Fragments of Early Greek Philosophers. Part I. From Epic Theocosmogenies to the Emergence of Atomistics. — Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Nauka", 1989. — 576 p. (*In Russian*).
- 309. Frank S. L. The Unknowable // Frank S. L. Works. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda", 1990. Pp. 181—559. (*In Russian*).
- 310. Frolov A. V. Categorical Foundations of the Metaphysics of the World
  // Filosofiya i obshchestvo. 2018. № 1 (86). Pp. 97—100. (In Russian).
- Frazer J. G. The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion. —
   Moscow: Politizdat, 1986. 703 p. (*In Russian*).
- 312. Frazer J. G. Folklore in Old Testament. Moscow: Politizdat, 1985.
   511 p. (*In Russian*).
- 313. Foucault M. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. —
   Moscow: Ad Marginem, 1999. 479 p. (*In Russian*).

- Foucault M. Words and Things. Archaeology of the Humanities. St.
  Petersburg: A-cad, 1994. 406 p. (*In Russian*).
- 315. Heidegger M. Being and Time / Trans. by V. V. Bibikhin. Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2011. 460 p. (*In Russian*).
- 316. Heidegger M. Time and Being / Trans. by V. V. Bibikhin. St. Petersburg: "Nauka", 2007. 621 p. (*In Russian*).
- 317. Heidegger M. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology / Trans. by A. G.
  Chernyakov. St. Petersburg: Vysshaya religiozno-filosofskaya shkola, 2001. 445 p. (*In Russian*).
- 318. Heidegger M. A Conversation on a Country Road. Moscow: Vyssh.
   shkola, 1991. 190 p. (*In Russian*).
- 319. Heidegger M. What Is Called Reading? // Heidegger M. The Origin of the Work of Art. — Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2008. — P. 415. (In Russian).
- 320. Kharichev A. D., Shutov A. Yu., Polosin A. V., Sokolova E. N. Perception of Basic Values, Factors and Structures of Socio-Historical Development of Russia (Based on Research and Approbation Materials) // Zhurnal politicheskikh issledovanii. 2022. Vol. 6. № 3. Pp. 9—19. (*In Russian*).
- 321. Haffner S. A Story of a German. St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Ivana Limbakha, 2018. — 448 p. (*In Russian*).
- 322. Haffner S. A Certain Hitler: The Policy of a Crime. St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Ivana Limbakha, 2018. — 320 p.
- 323. Huizinga J. The Autumn of the Middle Ages / Trans. by D. Sil'vestrova.
  St. Petersburg: Azbuka, Azbuka-Attikus, 2018. 720 p. (*In Russian*).
- 324. Hellman H. Against Darwin. XXth Century. «A Monkey Trial» and the Attacks of Antidarwinians // Ekologiya i zhizn'. 2009. № 1. P. 4—11. (*In Russian*).
- 325. The Way of Aesthetics in Germany // Vestnik Evropy. May and June
  1828. Moscow, 1828. P. 260—272. (*In Russian*).

- 326. Tselishchev A. O. Werner Sombart: The Image of England as the Antithesis of the German Selfness in the I World War // Imagines Mundi: Al'manakh issledovaniy vseobshchei istorii XVI-XX cent. 2008. Vol. 6. № 3. Pp. 251—261. (*In Russian*).
- 327. Chaisson E. Cosmic Evolution // Universal and Global History (Evolution of the Universe, the Earth, Life and Society). An Anthology. Series: "Library of the Faculty of Global Processes MSU" / eds. L. E. Grinin, I. V. Il'in, A. V. Korotaev. Volgograd, 2012. 197—207. (*In Russian*).
- 328. Chepurnova N. M. Constitutional Principle of People's Power in the Russian Federation: Problems of Implementation // Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta MVD Rossii. — 2018. — № 5. — Pp. 55—62. (In Russian).
- 329. Chernyshevsky N. G. An Anthropological Principle in Philosophy // Chernyshevsky N. G. Works in 2 vols. — Moscow: Mysl', 1987. — Vol. 2, p. 146—229. (*In Russian*).
- 330. Chernyshov Yu. G. Social Utopian Ideas and the Myth of the Golden Age in Ancient Rome. — Novosibirsk: Izdatel'stvo Novosibirskogo natsional'nogo issledovatel'skogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 1994. — In 2 parts. (*In Russian*).
- 331. Chistyakova N. A. The Greek Epigram VIII—III cent. BC. —
   Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1983.— 216 p. (In Russian).
- 332. Chukhina L. Man and His World of Value in the Phenomenological Philosophy of Max Scheler // Scheler M. Selected Works. — Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Gnozis", 1994. — P. 377—396. (*In Russian*).
- 333. Shakin D.A. Professional Worldview VS The Worldview of a Professional // Sovremennye problem nauki i obrazovaniya. 2021. № 1. P. 26. (*In Russian*).
- 334. Sharova M.A. S. S. Gogotsky's Anthropological and Philosophical-Pedagogical Views // Nauchnye vedomosti Belgorodskogo gosudarstvennogo

universiteta. Seria: FIlosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Pravo. — 2011. — № 2 (97). — Pp. 92—97. (*In Russian*).

- 335. Shakhnovich M. M. Epicure's Garden. St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2002. — 283 p. (*In Russian*).
- 336. Shevtsov A. A. Sil'vestr Sil'vestrovich Gogotsky // Gogotsky S. S. Philosophical Dictionary. St. Petersburg: Tropa Troyanova, IT "Roshcha Akademii", 2009. Pp. 3—10. (*In Russian*).
- 337. Scheler M. Selected Works. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Gnozis", 1994.
   490 p. (*In Russian*).
- 338. Scheler M. The Problems of Sociology of Knowledge / Trans. by A. N.
  Malinkin. Moscow: Institut obshchegumanitarnykh issledovaniy, 2011. —
  320 p. (*In Russian*).
- 339. Schelling F. W. J. Lectures on the Method of University Education / Trans. by I. Fokin. — St. Petersburg: Izdatel'skiy dom "Mir", 2009. — P. LXXXVIII + 352 p. (*In Russian*).
- 340. Schelling F. W. J. Works in 2 vols. Moscow: "Mysl", 1989. (In Russian).
- 341. Shestov L. I. Apotheosis of Groundlessness. Moscow: OOO "Izdatel'stvo AST", 2000. 832 p. (*In Russian*).
- 342. Schaeffer J.-M. The End of Human Exclusiveness / Trans. by S. N.
  Zenkin. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010. 392 p. (*In Russian*).
- 343. Schleiermacher F. E. D. Speeches on Religion. Monologues / Trans. by
  S. L. Frank. St. Petersburg: AO "ALETEIA", 1994. 335 p. (*In Russian*).
- 344. Shmonin D. V. The Wisdom of the Philosopher and the Christian Idea of Education // Vestnik Leningradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. A. S. Pushkina. 2019. № 3. Pp. 7—17. (*In Russian*).
- 345. Shmonin D. V. The Mystery of the Answer: An introduction to Rational Theology. St. Petersburg: Izd-vo SPbPDA: Izd-vo RGPU im. A. I. Gertsena, 2021. 460 p. (*In Russian*).

- 346. Shmonin D. V. Philosophy, Theology and Value-Sense Sphere in Education // Vestnik Russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii. 2015.
   Vol. 16. № 4. Pp. 206—221. (In Russian).
- 347. Shokhin V. K. How Was Classical Metaphysics Made? // Vestnik Provoslavnogo Svyato-Tikhonovskogo gumanitarnogo universiteta. Seria 1: Bogoslovie. Filosofiya. — 2015. — № 5 (61). — Pp. 41—58. (*In Russian*).
- 348. Evola J. The Doctrine of Awakening. A Sketch of Buddhist Ascesses / Trans. by A. P. Shurbelev. — St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo "Vladimir Dal", 2016. — 413 p. (*In Russian*).
- 349. Ezri G. K. The Philosophy of Lotze and Teichmüller and the Russian Religious Philosophy of "All-Unity": Commonality of Approaches in Ontology and Anthropology // Mezhdunarodnyi zhurnal gumanitarnykh i estestvennykh nauk. — 2018. — № 11—2. — Pp. 122—126. (In Russian).
- 350. Eliade M. The Aspects of Myth / Trans. by V. P. Bol'shakov. Moscow: Akademicheskiy proekt, 2010. 251 p. (*In Russian*).
- 351. Eliade M. Sacred and Secular // Eliade M. Myth of Eternal Return. Moscow: Nauchno-izdatel'skiy tsentr "Ladomir", 2006. — Pp. 249—356. (In Russian).
- 352. Engels F. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of German Classical Philosophy. Moscow: Politizdat, 1989. 127 p. (*In Russian*).
- 353. The Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopaedic Dictionary. St. Petersburg, 1896. Vol. 18a. (*In Russian*).
- 354. Etymological Dictionary of the Russian Language. Issue 10: M / eds.
  A. F. Zhuravlev and N. M. Shansky. Moscow: Izd-vo MGU, 2007. 400 p. (*In Russian*).
- 355. Hume D. Works in 2 vols. Moscow: Mysl', 1996. Vol. 2. (In Russian).
- Jünger F. The Perfection of Technics. Machine and Property / Trans. by
  I. P. Streblova. St. Petersburg: "Vladimir Dal", 2002. 559 p. (*In Russian*).

- 357. Yurkevich P. D. The Heart and Its Importance in the Spiritual Life of Man // Yurkevich P. D. Works. Moscow: "Pravda", 1990. Pp. 69—103. (*In Russian*).
- 358. Yartseva K. V. The Concept of "World Picture". Adaptive Function of the World Picture // Vestnik Pomorskogo universiteta. Seria: Gumanitarnye i sotsial'nye nauki. — 2010. — № 4. — Pp. 87—90. (In Russian).
- 359. Jaspers K. Philosophical Autobiography // Pertsev A. V. Young Jaspers: The Birth of Existentialism from the Foam of Psychiatry. — St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo Russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii, 2012. — Pp. 207—337. (*In Russian*).
- 360.AWorldviewBibliography:http://www3.dbu.edu/naugle/pdf/worldview\_bibliography.pdf
- 361. Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Aristotle Topics 1 / Transl. Johannes M.
   Van Ophuijsen. London: Duckworth, 2001. 228 p.
- 362. Alfaro A. The Monster of Reason // Artes de México. 2008. №92.
   P. 84—94.
- 363. Algra K. et. al. (eds.) The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy.
   Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 916 p.
- 364. Althusser L. The Future Lasts Forever. New York: The New Press, 1993. 365 p.
- Aristotle. Magna Moralia / Transl. W. D. Ross. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1915. — 318 p.
- 366. Arnstine D. The Academy in the Courtroom: The Sacramento Monkey Trial // Journal of Thought, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 1983), pp. 10–23. P. 10.
- 367. Ashmore J. Three Aspects of Weltanschauung // The Sociological Quarterly. 1966. Vol. 7. №.2. P. 215—228.
- 368. Balfour A. J. Introduction // Treitschke H. von. Politics. New York: MacMillan Company, 1916. — In 2 vols.
- Baumgarten A. Metaphysica. Halle: Magdeburgicae, 1739. 432p.

- Beiser F. C. Late German Idealism. Trendelenburg and Lotze. —
   Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 333 p.
- 371. Bekker I. Suidae Lexicon. Berlin: Typis et impensis Georgii Reimeri, 1854. 1158 p.
- 372. Bloch, A. Zwei Beiträge zur lateinischen Wortkunde // Museum Helveticum. 1958. Vol. 15. №2. P. 130—138.
- Bloom H. The Anxiety of Influence. A Theory of Poetry. Oxford, New York, 1997. — 157 p.
- Bowler P. J. Monkey Trials and Gorilla Sermons. London,
   Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009. 256 p.
- 375. Brown R. Comte and Positivism // Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. VII. The Nineteenth Century / ed. C. L. Ten. — London and New York: Rootledge, 2005. — P. 148—176.
- 376. Catana L. The Historiographical Concept 'System of Philosophy'. Its Origin, Nature, Influence and Legitimacy. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008. 384 p.
- 377. Chabrolle-Cerretini A-M. La vision du monde de Wilhelm von Humboldt: Histoire d'un concept linguistique. Lyon, ENS Éditions, 2007. 149 p.
- 378. Distin K. Cultural Evolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University
   Press, 2011. 237 p.
- 379. Dobzhansky T. Evolution, Genetics, and Man. NY: John
   Wiley&Sons, London: Chapman&Hall Ltd., 1959. 398 p.
- 380. Dobzhansky T. Nothing in Biology Makes Sense except in the Light of Evolution // The American Biology Teacher. 1973. Vol. 35. No. 3. P. 125—129.
- 381. Ekman P. Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional life. — New York: Holt Papaerbacks, 2003. — 320 p.

- 382. Ermarth M. Intellectual History as Philosophical Anthropology: Bernard Groethuysen's Transformation of Traditional Geistesgeschichte // The Journal of Modern History. — 1993. — Vol. 65. — №. 4. — P. 673— 705.
- 383. Folliet G. L'ambiguïté du concept biblique αἰῶν (saeculum vel aeternum) dénoncée et interprétée par Augustin // Wiener Studien. 2001.
   Vol. 114. P. 575—596.
- 384. Foucher L. Aiôn, le Temps absolu // Latomus. 1996. T. 55. —
  Fasc. 1. P. 5—30.
- 385. Friedman W. E., Diggle P. K. Charles Darwin and the Origins of Plant Evolutionary Developmental Biology // The Plant Cell. — 2011. — Vol. 23. — No. 4. — P. 1194—1207.
- 386. Fumaroli M. Between the Rigorist Hammer and the Deist Anvil // Artes de México. 2008. №92. P. 97—101.
- 387. Gabriel M. Die Erkenntnis der Welt Eine Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie. — München, Verlag Karl Alber, 2013. — 422 S.
- 388. Gabriel M. Why the World Does Not Exist. Cambridge, Polity Press,
  2015. 239 p.
- 389. Gadamer H.-G. Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr,
  1990. 494 S.
- 390. Germany R. All the World's a Stage: Contemplatio Mundi in Roman Theatre // P. Horky, ed., Cosmos in the Ancient World. — Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. — P. 212—31.
- 391. Glucker J. Antiochus and the Late Academy. Göttingen:
   Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978. 510 p.
- 392. Griffioen S. On Worldviews // Philosophia Reformata. 2012. Vol.
   77. №1. Р. 19—56.
- 393. Grimm J., Grimm W. Deutsches Woerterbuch. Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1955. B. 28.

- 394. Groethuysen B. Anthropologie philosophique. Paris, Gallimard,
  2014. 409 p.
- 395. Groethuysen B. The Bourgeois: Catholicism vs. Capitalism in Eighteenth-Century France. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968. 268 p.
- 396. Große Kracht K. Zwischen Berlin und Paris: Bernhard Groethuysen: (1880–1946). Eine intellektuelle Biographie. — Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2002. — 336 S.
- 397. Habermas J. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge,
   Oxford: Polity Press, 1990. 456 p.
- 398. Ham P. Young Hitler. The Making of the Führer. —London, Doubleday, 2017. 308 p.
- 399. Heidegger M. Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers "Psychologie der Weltanschauungen" // Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. — Frankfurt a.M. Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. — B. 9. S. 1—44.
- 400. Heidegger M. Besinnung // Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt a.M. Vittorio Klostermann, 1997. — B. 66.
- 401. Heidegger M. Der Weg zur Sprache // Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe.
   Frankfurt a.M. Vittorio Klostermann, 1985. B. 12. S. 227—257.
- 402. Heidegger M. Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus
  // Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt a.M. Vittorio Klostermann,
  1986. B. 1. S. 189—412.
- 403. Heidegger M. Zur Sache des Denkes // Heidegger M. Gesamtausgabe.
   Frankfurt a.M. Vittorio Klostermann, 2007. B. 14.
- 404. Herrn Christian Hügens Weltbeschauer oder vernünftige Muthmassungen, dass die Planeten nicht weniger geschmükt und bewohnet seyn, als unsere Erde / Aus dem Lateinischen übersezt. Mit Anmerkungen von Verschiedenen und Kupfern. Zürich, bey Orell, Gessner und Comp., 1767. 225 S.

- Hodges H. A. Wilhelm Dilthey. An Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. X+174 p.
- 406. Hoßfeld U. Geschichte der biologischen Anthropologie in Deutschland.
  Von den Anfängen bis in die Nachkriegzeit. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2016. 573 S.
- 407. Howlett S. Marsilio Ficino and His World. New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. 232 p.
- 408. Hurford J. R. The Language Mosaic and Its Evolution // Christiansen
  M. H., Kirby S. (eds.) Language Evolution. Oxford: Oxford University
  Press, 2003. P. 38—57.
- 409. Husserl E. Phaenomenologie und Anthropologie // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. A Quarterly Journal. 1941. Vol. II. №1. P. 1—14.
- 410. Huxley A. The Perennial Philosophy. London: Chatto&Windus, 1947. 377 p.
- 411. Huygens C. The Celestial Worlds Discovered, or Conjectures Concerning the Inhabitants, Plants and Productions of the Worlds in the Planets. — London: Printed for James Knapton, at the crown of St. Paul's Church-Yard, 1722. — 162 p.
- 412. Ibrahimov M. Historiosophy of Sport and Physical Culture as a Projection of Culturo-Ligical Meanings // Теорія і методика фізичного виховання і спорту. 2012. Т. 2012. № 1. С. 107-115.
- 413. Inwood M. A Heidegger Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell publishers, 1999. — 283 p.
- 414. Jaeger W. Paideia: The Ideas of the Greek Culture. Vol. 2: In Search of the Divine Center. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. 442 p.
- Jaspers K. Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer, 1919. 428 S.

- 416. Jensen C. B. New ontologies? Reflections on some recent 'turns' in STS, anthropology and philosophy // Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale. 2017. № 25. Vol. 4. P. 525—544.
- 417. Kant I. Kritik der Urteilskraft. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam Jun Verlag GmbH, 2004. S. 73—453.
- 418. Kierner C. A. Inventing Disaster: The Culture of Calamity from the Jamestown Colony to the Johnstown Flood. — North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2019. — 304 p.
- 419. Kittel G., Friedrich G., Bromiley G. W. (eds.) Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. Devon: The Paternoster Press, 1985. 1235 p.
- 420. Koselleck R. Begriffsgeschichten. Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und sozialen Sprache. — Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006. — 569 S.
- 421. Koselleck R. The Practice of Conceptual History. Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002. 384 p.
- 422. Koslowski P. A Philosophy of a Historical School: Erich Rothacker's Theory of the *Geisteswissenschaften* (Human Sciences) // Methodology of the Social Sciences, Ethics and Economics in the Newer Historical School. (ed. P. Koslowski). Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997. P. 510—531.
- 423. Kowalewicz M. H. Übersetzungsprobleme des Begriffs "Weltanschauung" // Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. — 2013. — Vol. 55. — S. 237—249.
- 424. Kuklick B. Seven Thinkers and How They Grew: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz; Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Kant // Rorty R. (ed.) Philosophy in History. Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. P. 125–140.
- 425. Kurt Wise's Webpage URL: <u>https://truett.edu/directory/kurt-wise/</u>
- 426. Lampe G. W. H. (ed.). A Patristic Greek Lexicon. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 1616 p.

- 427. Lauster J. Marsilio Ficino as a Christian Thinker: Theological Aspects of his Platonism // Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy / eds. Michael J. B. Allen, Valery Rees and Martin Davies. Leiden, Boston, Köln, Brill, 2002. P. 45—70.
- 428. Leontiev D. Approaching Worldview Structure with Ultimate Meanings Technique // Journal of Humanistic Psychology. 2007. 47(2).
   P. 243—266.
- 429. Levit G. S. The Biosphere and the Noosphere Theories of V. I. Vernadsky and P. Teilhard de Chardin: A Methodological Essay // Archives Internationales D'Histoire des Sciences. 2000. Vol. 50 (144). P. 160—176.
- 430. Levit G. S., Hossfeld U. Biology and panpsychism: German evolutionists and a philosopher Theodor Ziehen (1862—1950) // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2020. Vol. 36 (2). P. 240—253.
- 431. Lewens T. Cultural Evolution. Conceptual Challenges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. — 205 p.
- 432. Lucacs J. The Hitler of History. New York: Vintage, 1998. 304p.
- 433. Lvov A. A. The Burden of Freedom: The Doctrine of Subject in Thomas Carlyle's Works // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2018. T. 34. № 4. P. 534—542.
- 434. Lvov A. A. Did the Greeks Have a Worldview? A Comparative Study of Worldview's Genealogy // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. 2022. T. 38. № 4. C. 500—511.
- 435. Lvov A. A. Anthropological Turn in Worldview Studies: Theoretical and Practical Aspects // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. — 2020. — T. 36. — № 2. — C. 279—290.
- 436. Lvov A. A. On the Possibility of Freedom Beside the Subject: Michel Foucault and the Attempt of Overcoming of the Teleology of Modern

Historicism // Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University. Philosophy and Conflict Studies. — 2017. — T. 33. — № 3. — P. 316—325.

- 437. Masson-Oursel P. Comparative philosophy. London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner&Co, Ltd., 1926. — 199 p.
- 438. McCune T. J. The Solidarity of Life: Max Scheler on Modernity and Harmony with Nature // Ethics and the Environment. 2014. Vol. 19. №1. Р. 49—71.
- 439. Meier H. G. "Weltanschauung': Studien zu einer Geschichte und Theorie des Begriffs." Ph.D. diss., Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster. — Münster: Ohne Verlag, 1967. — 390 S.
- 440. Meyer, H., Geschichte der abendländischen Weltanschauung, 5 Bde.
  (Die Weltanschauung des Altertums / Vom Urchristentum bis zu Augustin / Die Weltanschauung des Mittelalters / Von der Renaissance bis zum deutschen Idealismus / Die Weltanschauung der Gegenwart). Würzburg, 1947—50.
- 441. Mulligan K. Foolishness, Stupidity, and Cognitive Values // The Monist. 2014. Vol. 97. №.1. P. 66—85.
- 442. Naugle D. K. Worldview: History, Theology, Implications. URL: <u>http://www3.dbu.edu/naugle/pdf/WV-HistyTheolImplications.pdf</u> (accessed: 05.05.2023).
- 443. Naugle D. K. Worldview: The History of a Concept. Grand Rapids:W. B. Eerdmans. 2002. 384 p.
- 444. Neiman S. Evil in Modern Thought: An Alternative History of Philosophy. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015. 408 p.
- 445. «New Words We Created Because of Coronavirus». [Электронный pecypc] URL: <u>https://www.dictionary.com/e/s/new-words-we-created-because-of-coronavirus/#covidiot</u> (дата обращения: 17.07.2020).
- Pelling C. Bringing Autochthony Up-to-Date: Herodotus and Thucydides // The Classical World. 2009. Vol. 102. №4. P. 471—483.

- 447. Piaia G., Santinello G. (eds.) Models of the History of Philosophy. —New York: Springer, 2011.
- 448. Pihlström S. Why Solipsism Matters. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. 240 p.
- 449. Pocock J. G. A. The Machiavellian Moment. Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. — Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975. — 602 p.
- 450. Popkin R. H. The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. —
  Assen: Van Gorcum&Comp. N.V.— Dr. H. J. Pracke&H. M. G. Pracke, 1960. 236 p.
- 451. Rapkin D. P., Braaten D. Conceptualising Hegemonic Legitimacy // Review of International Studies. — 2009. — Vol. 35. — №1. — P. 113—149.
- 452. Richards R. J. The Romantic Conception of Life. Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2002. 606 p.
- 453. Richards R. J. Was Hitler a Darwinian? Disputed Questions in the History of Evolutionary Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013. 280 p.
- 454. Richter M. Opening a Dialogue and Recognizing an Achievement: A Washington Conference on the "Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe" // Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte. 1996. Vol. 39. P. 19—26.
- 455. Riehl A. The Vocation of Philosophy at the Present Day // Lectures delivered in Connection with the dedication of the Graduate College of Princeton University in October 1913. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1914. P. 43—63.
- 456. Russell B. New Hopes for a Changing World. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1951. 218 p.
- 457. Schild W. Napoléon und Hegel // Europa nach Napoléon. Hg. Christoph Enders, Michael Kahlo, and Andreas Mosbacher. Brill, 2018. S. 55—77.

- 458. Schmidt J. Enlightenment as Concept and Context // Journal of the History of Ideas. 2014. Vol. 75. № 4. P. 677—685.
- 459. Schmitt C. B. Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz
  // Journal of the History of Ideas. 1966. Vol. 27. №.4. P. 505—
  532.
- 460. Schnaedelbach H. Philosophy in Germany 1831—1933. Cambridge:
  Cambridge University Press, 1984. 265 p.
- 461. Schneider M. A. Goethe and the Structuralist Tradition // Studies in Romanticism. 1979. Vol. 18. №3. P. 453—478.
- 462. Sectus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: W. Heinemann, 1976. 576 p.
- 463. Shryock A., Smail D. L. et. al. Deep History. The Architecture of Past and Present. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2011. 342 p.
- 464. Sire J. W. Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept. Westmount, IL: InterVarsity Press. 2004. 163 p.
- 465. Sitaraman S. 2019-NCOV Political Framing and Blame-Gaming // Security Nexus Perspectives. Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. 2020. [Электронный ресурс] — URL: <u>https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24861</u> (дата обращения: 17.07.2020)
- 466. Sleat M. Legitimacy in Realist Thought: Between Moralism and "Realpolitik" // Political Theory. — 2014. — Vol. 42. — №3. — P. 314—337.
- 467. Smail D. L. On Deep History and the Brain. Berkeley. Los Angeles,
  London: University of California Press, 2008. 271 p.
- 468. Smocovitis V. B. Humanizing Evolution: Anthropology, the Evolutionary Synthesis, and the Prehistory of Biological Anthropology, 1927—1962 // Current Anthropology. 2012. Vol. 53. №55. The Biological Anthropology of Living Human Populations: World Histories, National Styles, and International Networks. P.108—125.

- 469. Sophocles E. A. Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods (from B. C. 146 to A. D. 1100). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1900. 1188 p.
- 470. Staude J. R. Max Scheler. An Intellectual Biography. London: Collier-Macmillan Press, 1967. — 298 p.
- 471. Taves A., Asprem E., Ihm E. Psychology, meaning making, and the study of worldviews: Beyond religion and non-religion // Psychology of Religion and Spirituality. Special issue: Atheism, Agnosticism, and Nonreligious Worldviews. — 2018. — Vol. 10 (3). — P. 207—217.
- 472. Teichmüller G. Neuen Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe. I. Heft: Herakleitos. — Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1876. — 598 S.
- 473. Terzic B. COVID-19 as Not Unique but New Generic Problem // Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development. — 2020. — Vol. 16. — P. 84—91.
- 474. The Oxford Dictionary of the Middle Ages / ed. Robert E. Bjork. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. — Vol. 3.
- 475. The Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy / Ed. E. Craig. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. — 1104 p.
- 476. Trabant J. Traditionen Humboldts. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990. 261 S.
- 477. Trahndorff K. F. E. Aesthetik, oder Die Lehre von der Weltanschauung und Kunst. Erster Teil. Berlin: In der Maurerschen Buchhandlung, 1827. 459 S.
- 478. Treitschke H. von. Politics. New York: MacMillan Company, 1916.
   In 2 vols.
- 479. Unbegaun B. Le calque dans les langues slaves littéraires // Revue des Études Slaves Année. 1932. Vol.12 (1-2). P. 19—48.
- 480. Underhill J. W. Creating Worldviews: Metaphor, Ideology and Language. —Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2011. 301 p.

- 481. Underhill J. W. Humboldt, Worldview and Language. Edinburgh,
  Edinburgh University Press, 2011. 161 p.
- 482. Van Buren J. The Earliest Heidegger: A New Field of Research // A Companion to Heidegger / Hubert L. Dreyfus, Mark A. Wrathall (eds.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2005. P. 17—31.
- 483. Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens // Schriften des Forschungsinstitutes f
  ür Sozialwissenschaft in K
  öln. Vol. II / ed. Max. Scheler. M
  ünchen und Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1924/2013. 460 S.
- 484. Viveiros de Castro E., Danowski D. The Past Is Yet to Come // e-flux journal. 2020. №114. P. 7. URL: <u>https://www.e-flux.com/journal/114/364412/the-past-is-yet-to-come/</u> (accessed: 11.01.2021).
- White H. Foreword // Koselleck R. The Practice of Conceptual History.
  Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2002. P. IX—XIV.
- 486. Wierzbicka A. "Sadness" And "Anger" In Russian: The Non-Universality of the So-Called "Basic Human Emotions" // Athanasiadou A. et al. (eds.) Speaking of Emotions: Conceptualization and Expression. — Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gryuter, 1998. — P. 3—28.
- 487. Wulf A. The Invention of Nature. Alexander von Humboldt's New World. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2015. 576 p.
- 488. Yu J. Soul and Self: Comparing Chinese Philosophy and Greek Philosophy // Philosophy Compass. 2008. №3. Vol. 4. P. 604—618.